War By Timetable

How the First World War Began. By A.J.P. Taylor. Reviewed by Shirley Fox.

Yet another attempt has been made to describe that futile, senseless train of events which preceded the outbreak of World War One. This time the author is A.J.P. Taylor—demi-god amongst modern historians and eminent writer (Bismarck, The Origins of the Second World War, The Course of German History and so on).

War By Timetable traces events in Europe from the development of that inflexible military and diplomatic situation which—once triggered by the Sarajevo assassination—expanded like some nightmare beyond the control of man to the machinations at Vienna, Berlin and London, epicentres of tension in pre-war Europe. This led to the outbreak of a bloody and futile War in which Frenchmen died at the rate of one a minute between August 1914 and February 1917.

Lest we be blinded by thoughts of the glory of war, or actually believe that it was inevitable, Professor Taylor stresses the nature of the diplomatic and military leaders (sporting brilliant uniforms and exercising dull minds). "In nearly all European countries," he writes, "The forces making for war were much what they had always been—silly old generals who had never seen fighting, pedantic diplomats who had been told by someone or other that they should guard the national honour, hack journalists who could pull in an odd penny by uniting a jingoistic piece. These were the diseases of an endemic nature present in every modern society."

It's all there—all the tawdry details of man's stupidity: the development of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, the meticulous preparations for war ("Every railway wagon in France had been labelled '40 men or 8 horses'"), the development of highly complex and inflexible timetables, the make-believe pre-war games acted out during summer manoeuvres ("If anyone won the game by an unorthodox move a black mark was set against him"), the pitiful lack of co-ordination between the prospective allies with regard to equipment or intelligence services ("The British and French had made no preparations at all and, when they found themselves fighting side by side, had to rely on any bilingual officer who happened to be available,") and the gradual build-up of tension throughout Europe with strikes in Russia, suffragettes in England, chaos in the Austrian parliament. Futurists in Italy and German militarism.

Sarajevo and its aftermath have often been subject to historical (hysterical?) analyses which either boost our egos (we were right, they were wrong) or muddle us horribly. Professor Taylor does neither. He is clear, concise and frank: "In July 1914 things went wrong. The only safe explanation is that things happen because they happen." This sensible statement contrasts with the usual long-winded explanations used by historians to explain why international diplomacy, the balance of power, the alliances, and the accumulation of armed might which had preserved the peace for the previous thirty years, now reversed themselves and produced a great war.

War By Timetable is worth reading—especially as a basis for further, more intensive study of how the First World War began.

It is perhaps over-illustrated with approximately equal space having been given to illustrations and to text. Many of these illustrations, although colourful, seem unnecessary. Who really wants to see German dandies in jack boots smiling through Teutonic mustachios?

A final thought, stimulated by this book: Professor Taylor emphasises that at the root of World War One was "a failure of human intelligence, human courage, and human goodwill. The men of 1914 let the War happen not because it was inevitable but because they could not think of anything better to do." Have we thought of anything better to do?

It cannot be doubted that this book is extremely informative. Mr Floyd covers the events of 1905 with painstaking precision, but at the same time Russia in Revolt does not become a mere chronology. The author includes eye-witnesses accounts and statements made by Nicholas II and his Ministers concerning the unrest. Mr Floyd also avoids a closely interpretative discussion of the events this book is concerned with. Rather, he has preferred to draw a series of fairly generalised and safe conclusions from the facts related. Thus the book will have only limited value to those who know the period well. It would, however, be of great benefit to those embarking on a study of this era or those others of us who may be merely interested in the subject. David Floyd's precise writing style leaves a coherent picture of events in the reader's mind.

Russia in Revolt is also magnificently illustrated with photographs and good political cartoons. I cannot help but praise the effort that must have gone into searching out these illustrations. What is more important, they have not been used gratuitously: they aid the reader to reach a surprisingly deep (considering the relative brevity of the whole book) understanding of the subject.