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Stepping Stones to the Solomons: the unofficial history of the 29th Battalion with the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific.

Chapter One — Why the Pacific?

page 9

Chapter One
Why the Pacific?

The question most often asked by members of the Third New Zealand Division and perhaps least satisfactorily answered is 'Why are we here in these islands?' It is not a complaint against service in itself, because all wanted to get into the job of driving the Japanese back where he belongs, but rather an expression of the feeling that is inevitable when active operations against the enemy are few and far between. Organisation and training without the expectation of actual combat soon lose their interest, and it is hard to pacify a well' trained New Zealander with high-sounding expressions of policy or tactical necessity. He likes to see the results of training in actual physical combat.

To provide a background then to the pages that follow outlining the life of this battalion, it is necessary to try to analyse briefly how it was that the battalion came to be in the various war stations it has occupied. This outline is sketchy and is not in any way authoritative, for, without access to the official documents, it can be only the piecing together of the thoughts of the ordinary man in the ranks. While it is agreed that personal opinions on matters of policy and strategy are of little worth, it is hoped that this outline will give some coherence and background to the rest of the book.

Before the war started in 1939 it was quite obvious to all concerned with the defence of New Zealand that should there be war in the Pacific many of the innumerable islands of the Central and South Pacific would assume great strategic value. None of these groups was more important than Fiji. So it was not at all surprising when shortly after the despatch of the main New Zealand forces to page 10the Middle East, steps were taken to garrison and strengthen the defences of Fiji. Germany was our enemy on the offensive on all fronts; Japan was still neutral, but unfriendly and prepared to strike whenever it suited her; America was a benevolent neutral. Hence it was necessary that all Pacific forces should be small and strictly defensive, while our main strength in men and materials was concentrated to strike against the Germans.

Garrison duty cannot be thrilling; it consists mainly of digging holes in the ground, improvising with obsolete weapons and equipment, constructing obstacles and working out by trial and error the plans to be adopted in all conceivable enemy attempts to overpower the garrison. This, then, was the role of the 29th in Fiji, especially in the anxious days after Japan entered the war in December 1941.

It is a strategic axiom that no attack should be made without security—that is, that the bases from which the attack is to be launched are well defended. So it was of vital importance to the allies when planning their campaign in the South-West Pacific that the bases in Fiji, New Caledonia and Auckland were secure. It enabled the first forward movement—the attack on Guadalcanal—to be made earlier than would otherwise have been the case.

After the Americans had taken over the defence of Fiji, the New Zealand force now known as the 3rd New Zealand Division was returned to New Zealand for a brief spell to reorganise and refit in preparation for the more exacting role of a combat division.

The first elements of this new force—Third Division—were sent to New Caledonia in December 1942 to finish off their training and to replace American troops required for other duty. They were given an active role under command of the area commander—Admiral W. Halsey, Jnr.—for use in active operations. Manpower and other difficulties impeded the building up of a complete division, and the campaign in the Solomons progressed leaving the depleted division still in a garrison role with elements in New Caledonia, Tonga and Norfolk Island.

In February 1943 Guadalcanal was finally cleared up, and the Russell Islands were occupied by allied forces. Early in March came the battle of the Bismarck Sea, where a large Japanese convoy bringing reinforcements to Lae was destroyed. During April and May most attention was focussed on New Guinea, where the allies were making slow but steady progress, but forces were being gathered for page 11further moves into the Solomons. Early in June the Japanese made a violent air attack on Guadalcanal, losing 94 aircraft to an allied loss of six planes. This was followed by an allied attack on Rendova Island. The Japs were still on their outer defence line, but their wide-flung offensive had been effectively halted, and they were now on the defensive. The allies' problem now was to maintain the pressure.

It was about this time that it was decided to send the Third Division into the combat area. The division was not yet complete— one infantry brigade had had to be disbanded to fill the two older brigades and to provide a pool of reinforcements. Various changes were also made in unit organisation to save men, and tactics had to be altered accordingly.

There followed in August the occupation of Munda—an operation that was more protracted and costly than had been anticipated. It was during this month and in the early part of September that the Third Division was moved north, exercised en route in amphibious operations at Efate, and concentrated in Guadalcanal. Some weeks later the first part of the division to be given a combat role landed without opposition on Vella Lavella and proceeded to clear up the island. This was a further step forward in the move towards Rabaul. Shortly afterwards Munda airfield came into full operation, and the drive northward was resumed on the same pattern as previously— first, heavy air attack on the enemy bases up to 300 miles forward, then the clearing of the seas by naval action, and finally the landing of troops at points where airfields were to be established.

Bougainville was the next objective. At the end of July there was a big air strike at Kahili, when the Japs lost a cruiser and five or six other warships as well as about 50 aircraft. In the naval battle off Vella Lavella Island, one Japanese cruiser and three destroyer's were sunk for the loss of one American destroyer, with three damaged. After the capture of Munda these attacks were increased and extended.

The next stage of the forward move was carried out in October by the 8th New Zealand Brigade Group, with supporting American naval and ground forces. This was the landing against light opposition on the Treasury Islands, only 10 miles from the still strong enemy air and naval base at Kahili. It was to become in later months the site of one of the best air strips in the South Pacific and to play a big part in the neutralisation of Rabaul. The occupation of this ad-page 12vanced post allowed the light PT boats of the American navy a new base to work from to clear the water for the next big move—the landing at Empress Augusta Bay on the mainland of Bougainville in the opening days of November. From November until February 1944 was a time of consolidation, with air and sea attacks on the big enemy bases of Rabaul and Kavieng.

Early in February the ground had been prepared for a further northward move of ground forces and once again part of the New Zealand Division was used. This time the 14th Infantry Brigade and Divisional troops moved in the van of the advance to occupy Nissan Island.

With this accomplished, Rabaul and Kavieng neutralised and the Americans in possession of the Admiralty Islands and Emirau, the campaign in the South West Pacific came to a successful end. A regrouping of forces saw the New Zealand Division taken out of the combat area and brought back to its old base in New Caledonia.

The pattern of the campaign is clear—get good air bases, launch heavy air attacks on enemy bases and strategic points, clear the sea' ways and then follow with ground forces to points where air strips can be quickly established. In the Solomons campaign each advance was limited to about 300 miles—a good effective range for bombing attacks and the maintenance of air cover. Because of its size and composition the Third Division was not used in the larger operations —Munda and Empress Augusta Bay—but found its niche and did its work well in the smaller, very valuable if less spectacular sallies into Vella Lavella, Treasuries and Nissan Islands.