ON 23 April Headquarters Anzac Corps was in the Levadhia area until dusk, when it moved back to Mandra in the vicinity of Elevsis. Before then General Blamey had reported to General Wilson in Athens and had been ordered to leave for Alexandria at five o'clock next morning. He had also been told that the course of the campaign would probably necessitate some revision of the embarkation plans.

The activity of the Luftwaffe over the coast of southern Greece was the deciding factor. On 21–22 April twenty-three vessels, including two hospital ships and one Greek destroyer, had been destroyed. The final disaster was the destruction¹ that evening, 23 April, of the Hurricanes at Argos. As this meant that W Force would have to be evacuated without air cover new plans had to be drawn up. When possible, fast-moving destroyers must act as transports. If less use was made of the beaches in Attica and more of those in the Peloponnese, the embarkations would be safer and the sea voyage to Crete and to Egypt much shorter. If there was an early departure from each beach the convoys could possibly reach by daylight the areas screened by the fighter aircraft operating from the airfields in Crete.

On 24 April the new timetable was produced. No troops would leave from Theodhora and 16 and 17 Australian Brigades, instead of embarking from Megara, would move to the Argos area and probably from there to Kalamata, a port in the extreme south of the Peloponnese.

These changes necessitated many new orders. Sixth Brigade was instructed that it must maintain a rearguard covering the road north of Tatoi until 6 p.m. on 26–27 April, the night of its embarkation from Rafina and Porto Rafti. British officers were sent south to ensure the support of the Greek commanders at Corinth and Tripolis; a senior officer was appointed to control the Peloponnese; and a force was hastily organised for the defence of the Corinth Canal.²

The embarkation would be as follows:

German forces cross the Pinios River—a page from a German magazine

The German text read:

A BRIDGE IS FORMED

The Pinios Bridge in the Vale of Tempe has been blown up.

Rubber dinghies have taken the first attacking troops over. Foot soldiers and light vehicles can now get across.

By heavy travel on muddy roads, over swampy fields, through the narrow defile by Pandeleimon and along the railway embankment the bridging column reaches the Pinios. While the sappers build a new bridge near the one destroyed, vehicles are drawn across on a quickly set up ferry. Only a few hours later supplies roll over the new bridge.

German reconnaissance plane in the Molos area

Thermopylae

Sunrise near Kriekouki

Kriekouki. Shelling disperses the enemy advanced guard

Brigadier Puttick's map of Attica showing 4 Brigade positions at Porto Rafti (‘D’ Beach)

Athens waves goodbye. A convoy passes through the city during the withdrawal

Porto Rafti

Corinth Bridge

A Sunderland flying boat lies off the coast of Greece

Commanders' conference near Monemvasia. Standing against the car is General Freyberg. Colonel Stewart (dark glasses) sits in the centre with his back to the car and seated on the bumper is Lieutenant- Colonel Gentry

New Zealand troops arrive at Suda Bay, Crete

HMAS Nizam, carrying troops from Greece, arrives at Alexandria

The Salween disembarks troops at Alexandria

The 24th was also notable for several other incidents and decisions. The capitulation of the Greek Army was now definite; General Papagos resigned his command; and King George with some of his Ministers left in a flying boat for Crete. About midday Blamey reached Alexandria and impressed upon Admiral Cunningham the full seriousness of the situation; Headquarters Anzac Corps finally closed and Advanced Battle Headquarters W Force settled in at Miloi in the Peloponnese. In the afternoon General Mackay and his staff went to Argos, the latter leaving that night by cruiser from Navplion and the General early next morning in a Sunderland from Miloi.

General Freyberg had received identical orders for evacuation on the night of 24–25 April or 25–26 April, but he chose to disregard them. As he explained to Headquarters W Force, 6 Brigade had yet to break contact at Thermopylae and, even if it did so successfully, there were all the hazards of a long withdrawal. In answer to his question about the command of the forces after his possible departure, he was told that the responsibility would be one for Movement Control, in the sense that Movement Control would handle the embarkation.

The explanation for this surprising statement is that when the instructions for the evacuation of Mackay and Freyberg were sent over from GHQ Middle East the last suggested night, 25–26 April, was to have seen all units, except the rearguard, in their lying-up areas awaiting embarkation. It seems that Middle East command was paying particular attention to the safety of the Dominion commanders.

Even so, the closing of Headquarters Anzac Corps does seem to have been somewhat premature. In fact on 23 April, when General Blamey announced the date to Brigadier Rowell, the latter had protested, saying that in view of ‘this changed situation, Anzac Corps headquarters should remain’.¹ The General had, however, insisted that the orders were to leave Greece. This meant that Brigadier Allen would have no specially selected staff to assist in the embarkation from Kalamata of the 16 and 17 Australian Brigade Group—seven battalions and two artillery regiments; that after 25 April,² when the evacuation plans were once again changed, the absence of Headquarters Anzac Corps increased the responsibility of General Freyberg³ and the already overburdened staff of W Force Headquarters.⁴