What consideration was given, and

What steps were taken—

for providing the troops charged with the defence of Crete with the necessary equipment—

Note: To some extent no doubt these questions are answered by a report^*on the matter supplied to me in the Middle East.

The importance of Crete as a naval base for our own use and as a point which should be denied to the enemy was realised before Italy came into the war, and forces were held ready in the Middle East to go there should Greece become involved. Consequently, as soon as Italy attacked Greece, we occupied the Island. On the 1st November, 1940, the Secretary of State for War, who was then in the Middle East, telegraphed home giving details of the forces which were being sent to Crete, and said: ‘A further difficulty in basing aircraft in Crete is that Crete at present possesses only one aerodrome which can be made serviceable. Crete is very vulnerable to air attack not only from Italian bombers from Libya but also from fighters operating from the Dodecanese. If British squadrons are based on Crete, vulnerability of aerodrome must result in high percentage of losses on the ground.’

While the evacuation of Greece was still proceeding, General Wavell was informed from home that a heavy air-borne attack by German troops and bombers appeared likely to be made soon upon Crete. He was told that the Island was to be stubbornly defended. It was realised that, with the Germans in Greece and the Dodecanese, it might not be possible to use Suda Bay as a naval base on account of the scale of air attack which could be brought to bear, and because of the difficulty of operating sufficient fighters page 503 from the three landing grounds which by then were available. Moreover, the resources of the Middle East, especially after the losses which had occurred in Greece, did not permit of the allocation of that scale of anti-aircraft defence which experience in Malta showed would be necessary to provide reasonable security for the harbour and aerodromes. It was, however, judged essential, if by any means it could be achieved, to deny the use of Crete to the Germans.

A full account of the steps taken to make the Island defensible can only be given in the Middle East. The Commanders-in-Chief had been urged, ever since the first occupation, to strengthen the Island as much as possible, but it must be borne in mind that their resources were strained to the utmost by the campaigns in Cyrenaica and Greece, and while these campaigns were going on it was difficult for them to lock up tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, transport, &c., on an Island which, at that time, was not a scene of active operations.

The situation in Libya was causing much anxiety during the period between the evacuation of Greece and the German attack on Crete. Great efforts were being made to build up sufficient forces to turn the tables on the Germans before they should become too strong and no doubt this hampered the Commander-in-Chief in his efforts to provide the large amount of equipment required to re-arm the troops which had arrived in Crete from Greece. Much of what was sent was sunk en route or in Suda Bay before it could be unloaded.

Little or nothing could be done from home to assist. The pipeline of aircraft, guns and equipment of all kinds flowing from the United Kingdom to the Middle East round the Cape was kept full and a number of hazardous operations were carried out to pass aircraft and tanks through the Mediterranean. General Wavell was urged to send as many tanks and artillery as he could spare to Crete, but, for the reasons mentioned above, the amount actually sent was small. Full details will only be available when reports from the Middle East are received.

When weighing up the results of an operation such as the defence of Crete, it must be remembered that war cannot be conducted on the principle that only those enterprises in which success is certain should be undertaken. When the enemy holds the initiative, the pressure of events inevitably compels us from time to time to fight in positions and under conditions which are not in our favour. The alternative is to abandon, without a struggle, friends and allies, and to hand over important positions to the enemy without making him pay the price.

In the case of Crete, even if it had been decided to abandon the Island without fighting, it would hardly have been possible to do it. The large number of troops could not have been evacuated in the face of the enemy without losses almost as great as those sustained in the actual battle. It did not prove possible, in fact, to withdraw from the Island the 10,000 or so unarmed men who could contribute little or nothing to the defence. As will be seen from the answer to Question 7, good hopes were, in fact, entertained of being able to beat off the attack.

The question of air support for Crete was fully studied. It was clearly realised by all the Commanders concerned and by the authorities at home that fighter aircraft could not be maintained on the Island in face of the scale of air attack which would be experienced. The Germans could concentrate against the Island the whole of the air forces, short-range as well as long-range, which they could base in Greece and the Dodecanese. To deal with a really determined effort by these forces to dominate the air over Crete would have required a force of 15–20 Fighter Squadrons in Crete—a figure quite beyond our resources to provide or to operate. Even if such a force had been available, there would have been no possibility of making, even with years of labour, the aerodromes necessary to enable it to operate in a mountainous country like Crete. Still less would it have been possible to provide the vast number of anti-aircraft guns necessary for the defence of these aerodromes. To have maintained a token force of, say, 5 squadrons, would have been worse than useless; they would have been overwhelmed both in the air and on the ground, and would merely have added to our losses without result.

The Commanders in the Middle East decided that, as there was no possibility of establishing in Crete a fighter force of the size necessary to be effective, the proper course was to withdraw the small force of fighters stationed there and so save them from useless destruction. This decision was taken on the advice of General Freyberg and Group Captain Beamish, the local R.A.F. Commander, and no responsible authority has questioned its wisdom.

in the United Kingdom;

in the Middle East?

The scale of attack on Crete was fully appreciated in the United Kingdom, as can be seen from the following telegram which was sent to the Middle East on the 28th April:

‘German attack Crete by simultaneous airborne and seaborne expedition believed imminent.

‘Scale of airborne attack estimated 3,000/4,000 parachutists or airborne troops in first sortie. Two or three sorties per day possible from Greece page 505 and three or four from Rhodes, if Rhodes not used as dive-bomber base. All above with fighter escort.

‘Heavy bombing attacks to be expected immediately prior to arrival of air and seaborne troops. Main fighter and dive-bombing support probably based Rhodes. Following is our estimate based on establishment of operational aircraft available in Balkans for all purposes: 315 long-range bombers, 60 twin-engined fighters, 240 dive-bombers, 270 single-engined fighters. Last two categories would require extra tanks if operated from north of Corinth Canal. Only very small attacks from points south of this owing to aerodrome shortage in Morea, but some 60/90 dive-bombers and similar number single-engined fighters could operate from Rhodes provided aerodromes in Rhodes not required for other operations.

‘Estimated that both troops and shipping ample for seaborne operation, and lighters for transport of tanks also believed available, hence scale of seaborne attack dependent on extent to which enemy can evade our naval forces. Reinforcements enemy naval forces and shipping from Italy possible, but involve hazardous route round Cape Matapan, if Corinth Canal unusable.’

The Commanders-in-Chief were under no illusions as to the difficulty of meeting this scale of attack, though they questioned whether it could, in fact, be achieved with the forces the Germans, according to their information, had in the Balkans.

The scale of attack which actually took place was approximately equal to that which had been foreseen. The Germans showed, however, an ability to keep it going for a longer period than was expected.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom;

The United Kingdom's Chiefs of Staff individually;

General Wavell;

Admiral Cunningham;

Air-Marshal Longmore;

Air-Marshal Tedder;

General Freyberg?

A true appreciation of the chances of defending Crete could only be formed in the Middle East. However, the great importance of the island to our position in the Mediterranean was clear, and there was never any question of abandoning it without a struggle. On the 29th April the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed to the Commanders-in-Chief asking for an appreciation of the defence of Crete from General Weston, who was at that time commanding on the island. The Chiefs of Staff also enquired when the mobile page 506 Naval base defence organisation would arrive and how soon the defences would be installed, and requested a report on the state of troops, and of the arms possessed by those who had been evacuated from Greece.

The views expressed and the attitude of the various authorities concerned are best shown in the telegrams exchanged between the United Kingdom and the Middle East. These are reproduced in Annex I.¹ His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, advised by the Chiefs of Staff, were satisfied that there was a reasonable chance of success in the light of the telegrams received.

to some degree exhausted after the Greek campaign;

to some extent disorganised;

inadequately supplied with practically everything but rifles, i.e., transport, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, means of communication, and even tools for digging;

embarrassed by considerable numbers of refugees?

As explained in the answer to Question 4, the air situation was fully appreciated, both at home and in the Middle East. It was always realised that the defence of Crete would be a struggle between sea and land forces on the one hand and air and airborne forces on the other. Experience in the evacuation from Greece, which had been successfully carried out by the Royal Navy in face of heavy air attack, seemed to show that the fleet would be able to prevent any seaborne landing without undue loss. As it turned out the landing was prevented, though heavy losses were sustained.

It still seems reasonable to suppose that troops well dug in and provided with mobile reserves and adequate artillery would not have been dislodged by parachutists and dive bombers.

As to the ‘destruction’ of the aerodromes, it should be realised that they were in use by our own forces right up to the day before the attack took place. This was most necessary as great efforts were being made to protect the harbours on the North coast at which equipment, transport, stores, &c., were being unloaded for the garrison. It was only when it was known with certainty that the attack was imminent that the remnants of the Air Force were withdrawn.

The significance of this fact will appear from consideration of what is involved in making an aerodrome unserviceable. It should be made quite clear that to ‘destroy’ an aerodrome is virtually impossible. All that can be done is to render it unusable for a limited period. How difficult a task this is can be shown from our own experiences in South-east England last autumn. For example, 280 bombs were dropped on Biggin Hill Aerodrome on one day, including a number of delayed-action bombs. In spite of this, the fighter squadrons continued to operate, without interruption, from the aerodrome.

Blocking expedients with surface obstacles are generally ineffective. The maximum delay that can be imposed on the use of the aerodrome is by the production of a large number of craters over nearly all the surface. Trenching with mechanical diggers is effective but rarely possible in the field.

The speed of production of craters depends upon the nature of the subsoil. For example, a possible landing ground at Portland took a Field Company, R.E., with three compressors, 10 days to crater. Gravel subsoil is exceptionally difficult to deal with, as the explosive chambers keep falling in. Water near the surface creates obvious difficulties. (A number of aerodromes in Greece, for example, were water-logged almost up to the date of the German attack.)

The preparation of a large number of charges, ready in position beneath the surface of the aerodrome in anticipation of demolition, has been suggested, and the question was fully investigated in the case of Manston Aerodrome in Kent. The R.A.F., however, are quite definite that they cannot conduct operations from an aerodrome in which charges have been laid. There is not only the risk of contact detonation in a crash landing, but also the more serious one of the destruction of the whole surface due to sympathetic detonation of all the charges initiated perhaps by one bomb. page 508 The preparation of charges must, therefore, take place after we ourselves have ceased to use the aerodrome.

To take the case of Maleme Aerodrome, which had a clay surface from which a quantity of large stones had been removed. The subsoil is believed to have been clay mixed with large stones and boulders. The only methods of immobilising the aerodrome were by trenching or by the production of craters, using camouflet equipment. Mechanical equipment for trenching was not available, and, in any case, is a slow process.

If the Field Companies on Crete had had their full equipment (which they had not, due to the evacuation from Greece), each would have had 3 Light camouflet sets and 13 Hand Earth Augurs. The number of craters which would have been required is approximately 300, not more than 30 yards apart. Working at full strength and without enemy interference, a fresh Field Company could produce these in 24–30 hours' work, provided the subsoil was not found to be more difficult than stated in paragraph 3 [sic]. At the end of this task they would be exhausted. Enemy interference would probably restrict the work to the hours of darkness, and, if this were so, the work would have taken 5 nights to complete. The dilution of the Company with unskilled labour would not materially assist.

The quantity of explosive required would be approximately 7½ tons of Ammonol or Gelignite with corresponding accessories, such as fuze, primers, detonators, &c.

It remains to consider what would be the resulting delay caused by this great work. The evidence of Biggin Hill shows how small a part of an aerodrome is required to maintain operations from it. Unless all the debris from the craters were removed from the field—a colossal task without mechanical equipment—there would be very little work required to provide a usable landing strip for troop-carriers. Something in the nature of 100 men working 6–10 hours with shovels could prepare a 700-yard strip on which the landing and taking off of troop-carriers could proceed.

An answer to this question could only be given by a detailed enquiry in the Middle East. In the United Kingdom, as the telegrams show, there was a keen desire that every possible step should be taken in the time available to strengthen the defences and to provide reinforcements in tanks, artillery and equipment. While no one could give a guarantee of success, there was no shadow of doubt but that the defence must be attempted.

before and

during

The detailed plans made in the Middle East are not at present available. There is no reason to suppose, however, that there was not a full degree of co-operation between the three Commanders-in-Chief and the three Services as a whole, both before and during the operations. More light will be thrown on this matter when reports are received from the Middle East.

It has always been recognised that the arrangement referred to is not entirely satisfactory, and from time to time there have been discussions as to how to improve matters. It goes without saying that the Commander-in- Chief, Mediterranean, must go to sea with his fleet and can hardly have his headquarters when ashore anywhere but at Alexandria. It might be proposed that Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, should make their headquarters also at Alexandria, but there are a number of objections to this course. As the capital of Egypt and the seat of the Government, and the centre of communications throughout the Middle East, there is much to be said for the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, being in Cairo.

The matter is, however, now under investigation, and it is hoped that a better arrangement will be found practicable.

As explained in the answer to Question 4, the giving of adequate air support to the army is very largely a question of geography. The side which has its air bases nearer the scene of land operations is placed at a great advantage. The only places in the Middle East theatre of war in which the enemy can develop overwhelming air strength from positions more favourable than our own are in Malta and possibly Cyprus, which are dealt with in the answer to Question 17.

the disadvantages to us by the loss of the Island;

the advantages to us in losses by the enemy of men and equipment and the delay imposed upon him?

Disadvantages to us by the loss of Crete.

Advantages to us in losses by the enemy of men and equipment and the delay imposed upon him.

The geographical situation of Cyprus is not so unfavourable as that of Crete since, if we hold Syria and Palestine, we can operate air forces over the island with greater facility than can the enemy from his base at Rhodes. An early attack on Cyprus was considered quite probable soon after the end of the battle in Crete, and the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government was that no serious attempt to defeat a heavy attack should be made. A small garrison was to be maintained, so that the enemy could not walk in unopposed, but in face of a serious attack this garrison was to take [to] the mountains and operate as guerillas. Preparations for this were put in hand.

As soon as we have completed the occupation of Syria, the policy for the defence of Cyprus will have to be reconsidered.

The situation in Malta is, of course, very different to that of either Crete or Cyprus. Malta is a fortress which has been in our possession for over 100 years and has powerful defences which are constantly being augmented. A great deal of underground accommodation is available, so that, although there have been almost incessant air raids for a year, the casualties have been trifling. There is a completely equipped and efficient garrison; the air defences consist of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, the strength of which at the end of June was—

It is hoped, before the end of this month, to increase the number of anti-aircraft guns to—

A good system of R.D.F. has been installed.

It has always been recognised that a proportion of the air forces operating in an overseas theatre of war must be under the direct control of the Army. This proportion consists of the Army Co-operation Squadrons whose primary task is reconnaissance and whose personnel are specially trained for the purpose. In addition to the Army Co-operation Squadrons, an Expeditionary Force is accompanied by an air component which contains a proportion of fighter and bomber squadrons for the immediate support of the Army. When important operations are impending, the action of the whole of the air forces in the theatre of war is closely co-ordinated by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief with the General Officer Commanding-in- Chief, so that the whole of the combined resources of the Army and the Air Force will be used to the best advantage at the time.

Recent operations in the Middle East have shown that the machinery for co-ordinating the work of the land and air forces leaves something to be desired. The method of communication from ground to air; the training of soldiers and airmen in close co-operation; and the avoidance page 513 of the wasteful use of air power, are matters which require more attention. This attention is now being given both at home and in the Middle East and it is hoped to achieve better results in future.

It should not be thought, however, either that the Germans employ a different system to our own or that the control of air forces in the Middle East by the Army would have led to any different results in Crete. Apart from the Army Co-operation Squadrons, which are similar to our own, the Germans employ their air force in accordance with their general strategical plan, either on independent means or in support of the Army, as the case may be. A great deal of the apparently superior results which they have achieved have been due to the enormous superiority in numbers which they have been able to employ at the decisive point and this, in turn, has been due to their central position on the Continent, which has enabled them to transfer air forces rapidly from one theatre to another. The reasons for the lack of air support at Crete have already been dealt with in the answer to Question 4.

Except at Malta and Cyprus, which have been dealt with in the reply to Question 17, there is no part of the Middle East … [where] an attack similar to that on Crete could be staged by the enemy. There is nowhere where he could attain the complete air superiority which would enable him to land large numbers of parachutists and air-borne troops in daylight.

There is, of course, the obvious possibility that, when he has built up his forces, he may attempt large-scale operations against Egypt and the Canal zone, as part of which he may attempt to drop air-borne troops, and everyone is fully alive to this possibility. If, however, he attains the complete air superiority necessary to give him freedom of action in daytime over our back areas, the situation will indeed be serious. All our efforts must, therefore, be directed to ensuring that such a state of affairs cannot occur.

The vital importance of air and armoured reinforcement of the Middle East has always been fully recognised and the only limits placed on what is sent by every available route are: