Air Power

THE victory at El Alamein had been made possible by the close co-operation between ground and air forces and owed much to the unceasing air attacks on every kind of enemy activity, on sea, on land, or in the air. This invaluable co-operation continued throughout the campaign; but except when direct support for the advancing troops was specifically requested, or when aircraft were visibly attacking the enemy near the foremost troops, the air offensive took place out of sight of the army. Formations of aircraft passing steadily overhead, an occasional dogfight, a column of smoke far behind the enemy lines, or especially at night, the heartening sound of bombs falling on an enemy port—these were all that the land-bound soldier saw or heard of the Air Force, but it was enough to comfort him and to maintain morale.

The decisive air battle had already been won: our air forces had clear superiority throughout. On any day or night they were operating somewhere, attacking enemy transport aircraft or vessels at sea—especially tankers—bombing airfields, dumps and transport concentrations, shooting down enemy fighters and bombers, and making low-level attacks on tank laagers and other targets. The air offensive was unceasing, and forms as it were a perpetual bass accompaniment to the more intermittent fighting on land.

The force directly supporting Eighth Army, known as the Desert Air Force, was commanded by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham,¹ a New Zealander serving in the RAF. It included RAF, USAAF, and South African Air Force squadrons, flying fighters, fighter-bombers, tank-busters, light and medium bombers, close reconnaissance aircraft, and day and night interceptors.