The serious shortage of all training equipment in England for some time, due to the re-equipment of the British Expeditionary Force, and the inadvisability of Colchester for concentration are disclosed in the attached exchange of cables with Brigadier Falla:

The High Commissioner for New Zealand to Headquarters 2nd NZEF

1 June. Following from Falla:¹ Your telegram of 31 May.² Your wishes have been communicated to the War Office who have advised that training equipment is limited to an approximate scale as below, and this will be provided only after the re-equipment requirements of the British Expeditionary Force have been met; unless the contingent is in a battle area there is no prospect of increasing these scales: motor transport—minimum amount for administration only; Bren guns—lower training scale; antitank rifles—ten per battalion; mortars, 2-inch—three per battalion, 3-inch—one per battalion; 2-pounder anti-tank gun—two per regiment; field artillery–six drill-purpose guns and carriages per regiment; pistols—84 for the contingent; Engineers—lower training scale; Signals—interim training scale; Medical—hospital and field ambulance equipped to war establishment if in a troop area, otherwise field ambulance only equipped on lower training scale. The prospect of the New Zealand contingent going to Colchester is welcomed by Eastern Command as the present stage of training of the contingent will be much in advance of other units available there.

Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the High Commissioner for New Zealand

2 June. Following for Brigadier Falla: The issues raised in your telegram must be considered carefully. Will you telegraph at once if going to Colchester will enable the contingent to be concentrated in the town, using existing barracks. The suggestion put forward in your telegram of the 30th¹ is quite unworkable. An answer to this is urgently wanted before a decision can be made. Referring to the scale of equipment, will you let us know when the approximate scale mentioned will be available and when the equipment for collective training will be issued; also, when are the Second Echelon expected in the United Kingdom?

The High Commissioner for New Zealand to Headquarters 2nd NZEF

3 June. Your telegram of 2 June. Following from Falla: Tactical considerations rule out the Colchester area. Concentration in town and barracks is considered unsound because of the risk of bombing. Harwich and Frinton were indicated for urgent garrison requirements. The War Office appreciation follows. The only definite information available is that the contingent is due at Freetown on 7 June. I will reply later regarding equipment.

Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the High Commissioner for New Zealand

3 June. Following for Brigadier Falla: As a permanent base the Colchester area is definitely out of the question. My Government now want to concentrate the Second Echelon in Southern Command. Will you therefore discuss the question with Colonel Allen, who knows all areas, and make the best arrangement possible with the War Office? Any arrangements made must visualise a complete base for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in barracks or hutted camp, together with a concentration area capable of taking the Second Echelon and with possible expansion for further troops. The area should be adjacent to good training areas and musketry facilities; tents are preferred to billets.

The situation disclosed seems thoroughly unsatisfactory. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force is split up with no policy to reunite, particularly the First Echelon, which apparently has been relegated to garrison duties in Cairo owing to the absence of mobilisation equipment, while the Second Echelon appears worse off than the First, with no likelihood of taking its rightful place in the field. Further, as no decision as to the final destination has yet been made, no plans can be made for the base organisation. In spite page 119 of the equipment situation disclosed in Falla's cable, I have replied asking that the Second Echelon should concentrate if possible in Southern Command.

Until the Italian situation is clarified, the separation of the First and Second Echelons must now be accepted, and it is for your consideration whether the present policy of keeping the New Zealand troops out of action until the Division is concentrated should be temporarily abandoned. That both echelons will be kept low on the priority list for equipment and employed in garrison duties seems to be the alternative. This would have an adverse effect on the men now that active operations have commenced. If Italy does not enter into the war, or the situation in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea is cleared up, I advise that the First and Second Echelons be concentrated in England at the first opportunity with early despatch to France if another brigade can be made available by the War Office or the Australians in the United Kingdom.