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The Tragedy of October 12th.

The front of attack for the 12th was between the Ypres-Roulers Railway and Houthulst Forest, and the attack was to be made by troops of the Second and Fifth Armies, the latter being on the left. The objectives included Passchendaele Ridge and the village of Passchendaele itself. The New Zealand Division, with the 3rd Australian Division on the right, and the 9th Division of the Fifth Army on the left, was to attack with two Brigades disposed side by side. The two brigades chosen for the attack were the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, the 4th Brigade being in Divisional Reserve. The Division's first objective was the Red Line which extended from the Ravebeek to the left across the Bellevue Spur, and the second objective was the Blue Line one thousand yards further on. When the New Zealand Infantry came into the line on the night of the 10th, there was only a very imperfect and confused understanding as to the general condition of affairs, but reconnaissances that night and early the following morning disclosed the fact that the enemy blockhouses were still intact and the wire uncut. A request was sent in for heavy artillery fire, but the amount of fire supplied entirely failed in its purpose, and another urgent, request for heavy artillery fire was sent in on the afternoon of the 11th. Some time later the heavy artillery opened fire on Bellevue Spur, but the fire was of brief duration, and the damage to the enemy defences small.

The assembly of the infantry for the attack commenced at 6.30 p.m. on the 11th and, continuing through the night, was satisfactorily accomplished before daylight on the 12th, despite the darkness and the heavy condition of the ground. Rain held off during the night, but commenced to fall in the early hours of the morning. Zero hour was at 5.25 a.m. and about 5 o'clock the enemy commenced to shell the assembly areas, and a number of casualties was suffered. The attack was met with heavy machine gun fire, though the enemy's barrage was weak; with indomitable courage and tenacity the attackers pushed on until brought up by the pill-boxes and the uncut wire. The attack failed before it had reached the first objective. The artillery barrage proceeded according to programme, until messages were received that the infantry advance was held up, page 194when fire was brought back to the protective barrage for the intermediate objective. At mid-day orders were received by the artillery that a fresh attack would be made at 3 p.m., when the barrage would recommence from a point slightly beyond the line Cemetery-Wolf Farm. But representations were made by responsible infantry commanders as to the inadvisability of attempting to continue the attack; they pointed out the exhausted condition of the men, the heavy casualties, the state of the ground, and the fact that the infantry were so close up under the enemy wire that they could not be extricated during daylight without incurring casualties, thus rendering reorganization impossible. Fortunately any further effort to advance was abandoned, and at 2.35 p.m. the Artillery were informed that the afternoon operation was cancelled, and orders were received to make the Red Line the S.O.S. line. Fire on S.O.S. lines was called for at 3.50 p.m. and at 6.15 p.m.; no further calls were received during the night.

Very heavy casualties had been suffered by both Brigades of Infantry which took part in the attack; the losses in killed and wounded numbered 2730. Communications were utterly disorganised, the greatest difficulty was experienced in getting rations and water to the men in the forward areas, and the condition of the wounded was pitiable in the extreme. Many lay all night in the mud, exposed to the hail and rain and the bitter cold. On the night of the 12th-13th 1,200 men of the 4th Infantry Brigade, and every spare man from the Artillery and the Army Service Corps were engaged in getting out the wounded, a battalion of the 147th Brigade having been also loaned to the Division for the same purpose. Six or eight men were required to carry a wounded man on a stretcher over that veritable morass, and it took hours for each party to flounder down to the dressing stations.

From the moment the attack opened, the artillery barrage was weak and patchy as a direct result of the conditions under which the guns had to shoot; but this deficiency, though serious in itself, was not the chief factor in the tragic failure. The primary causes of the failure of the attack were the deep and continuous belts of uncut wire which faced the attacking infantry, and the massive concrete blockhouses, or pill-boxes, from which the page 195enemy machine gunners shot down everything that moved. In short, it was lack of preparation. The Division was supported in the attack, in addition to heavy artillery, by eight brigades of field artillery, which totalled one hundred and forty-four 18-prs. and forty-eight 4.5in. howitzers. Some of these were still blocked on the road when the attack opened, and in the case of those that had reached the forward positions, the ground was so soft and water-logged that the guns simply sank up to the axles after the first few shots had been fired, and in some cases before a shot had been fired. The provision of stable platforms is an essential to good shooting at any time; but on the 12th it was only by desperate expedients that guns were kept in action at all. All the New Zealand batteries fired in the barrage; the gunners secured logs, odd bits of timber, anything, in fact, that would provide a foundation, and so contrived to keep their guns in action. The results of the day indicated nothing more clearly so far as the Artillery is concerned, than that if reliance is to be placed upon the adequacy of their support under such conditions provision must be made both for getting the guns forward and for the construction of platforms. The experience gained in the Messines operations in the use of light railways for the supply of ammunition might usefully have been applied in these operations even to a limited extent; besides being economical in point of time and in man-power such a system would have considerably relieved the congestion of traffic on the roads and been the means also of saving the lives of a great many horses.

Despite the fact that the artillery was almost reduced to total immobility and that even movement on foot was a matter of extreme difficulty, orders were actually issued to certain batteries about this time regarding the provision of mobile sections of 18-prs. in readiness to co-operate in case of a rapid advance on the front by cavalry. And this at a time when even unburdened animals became so hopelessly bogged that extrication became impossible and they had to be destroyed. Obviously Corps Headquarters must have possessed a better knowledge of the conditions prevailing in forward areas than such an order would seem to suggest; needless to say the opportunity of assisting the cavalry in a "rapid advance" never arose.

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Notwithstanding the adverse conditions with which they had to contend, the shooting of the New Zealand batteries was not allowed to suffer, and careful checking of registration was frequently carried out in order to obviate any risk of inaccurate shooting. Several complaints were made regarding short shooting, however, and on the afternoon of the 14th October reports of "shorts" were received from one of the brigade observers; but it was ascertained that the New Zealand batteries had not been in action at any of the times stated, the officer commanding the sub-group having visited the infantry in the afternoon for the purpose of having the matter cleared up. On the 16th all 18-pr. guns on the Divisional front fired two rounds per gun on the S.O.S. line, and an hour later a report was received that some of the shells had fallen short. Lieut.-Colonel Falla expressed his conviction that none of the batteries of the New Zealand sub-group was responsible, and asked that they should be permitted to fire alone on the same lines. Permission was granted, and the shooting was reported to be quite satisfactory. This test exonerated the batteries from any suspicion of blame; but it also did more in strengthening the confidence of the infantry of the Division in their own Artillery.

At 11 a.m. on the 13th batteries were ordered to reduce fire to thirty rounds per gun every twenty-four hours; but this made matters little easier for the drivers, as supplies of ammunition had to be got up to the forward positions yet to be occupied; it was almost impossible for horses to get into the positions, and the ammunition had often to be dumped at the side of the road and carried to the guns by hand. The decision having been come to that all guns were to be moved forward to the positions near Winnipeg-Kansas Cross Roads with as little delay as possible, a company of New Zealand Pioneers was detailed to help repair the roads and assist in extricating the guns from their positions, and moving them forward. This was on the 15th of the month, but nothing was done towards moving the guns that day, owing to the condition of the roads. On the following day two 18-prs. and three 4.5in. howitzers were brought forward; but on the 17th, when the day was fine and the ground was drying fast, the roads were so heavily shelled that considerable delay was caused, and by the evening page 197rain had set in again. The movement of the guns was continued, however, in the face of almost incredible difficulties. The whole countryside was one vast quagmire, and the roads were little better. The employment of horses was out of the question, as they sank up to their bellies at almost the first step, and some even were submerged and lost in the seemingly bottomless mire. At times even the guns threatened to sink out of sight; and tracks for the wheels had to be contrived from lengths of planking, which were taken up as the guns went on and laid down in front again, so that progress was by short and toilsome stages. The Pioneers, two hundred strong, and the gunners devoted their whole strength to each gun in turn, and it required the united effort of this powerful team to drag the gun along foot by foot. It was a task which only men of powerful physique and great endurance could have faced, and on which the Pioneers expended every ounce of their strength. Their hands became blistered and cut with the wet ropes, and often they were waist-deep in the mud; but they hung on, heaving in unison to the Maori cries of their leader, and very, very gradually the work progressed.

The position by the 20th was that about two-thirds of the New Zealand Artillery had been got up to the forward positions, where the simultaneous packing of ammunition had provided 800 rounds per 18-pr. and 450 rounds per howitzer. During this period the enemy had persistently shelled the whole area with guns of every calibre up to 11in., the shelling being particularly heavy round Spree Farm, Nos. 5 and 6 Tracks, Kansas Cross, and the whole of the Gravenstafel Spur. He had also systematically searched for battery positions, both forward and rear, and had made a favourite target of the Schuler Galleries, where the New Zealand batteries had their control posts. Night bombing of the waggon lines and rear areas had become systematic, whilst the enemy bombing planes had also begun to come boldly over by day. bombing battery positions and the traffic on the crowded roads. At 10 a.m. on the 20th command of the artillery on the Divisional front passed to the C.R.A., 3rd Canadian Division, which was relieving the New Zealand Infantry; command of the Left Main Group passed to Brigadier-General Forman, C.R.A., 49th Division, and Lieut.-Colonel Falla remained in command of the sub-group.

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During the six days which elapsed before the Canadian Corps joined in the renewal of the attack, the New Zealand Brigades were occupied in vigorous harassing fire, most of which was carried out at night, and in taking part in preparatory barrages, which were designed to thoroughly sweep the enemy's territory to a considerable depth. Steps were taken to deal with all uncut wire, and vigorous counter-battery work was done along the whole front, the 4th (Howitzer) Battery being attached to a counter-battery group for this purpose. In short, a thorough effort was made to remove the obstacles which had chiefly been responsible for the arrest of the advance on October 12th. The activity of the enemy batteries chiefly found expression in the heavy shelling of battery positions and communications. The attack was launched at 5.45 a.m. on October 26th, on a front extending from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to beyond Poelcappelle, the Canadians attacking on the right on both sides of the Ravebeek, a small stream flowing south-westerly from Passchendaele. On the left bank of the stream they advanced astride the main ridge, and established themselves on the small hill south of Passchendaele; strong resistance was encountered on the Bellevue Spur, however, which was only captured on a second attempt in the afternoon.

The supporting barrage, advancing in lifts of 50 yards every four minutes, went through all its phases till 10.30 a.m. when cease fire was ordered, and at noon the S.O.S. line was given as the line of the protective barrage for the first objective. Hostile fire throughout the day was mostly directed on forward areas, but back areas and battery positions were heavily shelled throughout the night with howitzers of all calibres and high-velocity guns. Batteries were subjected to equally heavy fire practically every night until the next attack on the 30th. On this occasion the front of attack extended from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to the Poelcappelle Westroosebeke Road. On the right the Canadians continued their advance along the high ground, and reached the outskirts of Passchendaele, but the village was not finally captured until November 6th, some days after the New Zealand batteries had been relieved. Zero hour on the 30th was 5.50 a.m., and the supporting barrage was entirely satisfactory. Fire ceased at page 1999.10 a.m., but the enemy counter-attacked several times during the day, and S.O.S, calls were answered at 9.45 a.m., 11.30 a.m., and 5 p.m.

On November 1st batteries of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery commenced the relief of the New Zealand batteries, taking over the guns as they stood in the pits. The relief was completed the following night, when the personnel of the New Zealand batteries, which had not received any guns in exchange, withdrew to the waggon lines. Both Brigades and the Divisional Ammunition Column moved out for the Watou area at 9.30 a.m. on the 3rd. While the relief was in progress waggon lines were heavily bombed, and casualties to men and horses were suffered, the 15th battery having twenty-six horses killed on the night of the lst-2nd November.

After the New Zealand Artillery had withdrawn from the line the following letter was received by Major-General Russell, G.O.C. the Division, from Major-General L. J. Lipsett, Commanding 3rd Canadian Division:—"I must thank you very much for the great assistance given to us by your artillery during the Passchendaele battles. They have been very highly spoken of by all our people. They worked hard, and were keen on producing results."

The following letter was also received from Brigadier-General P. A. Mitchell, C.R.A., 3rd Canadian Division:—"Now that the New Zealand Artillery are leaving my command, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the high standard of efficiency maintained by them while they were assisting to cover the offensive operations of the 3rd Canadian Division. In spite of the difficulties of bad weather, and almost impassable roads, they kept their guns in action and their ammunition dumps filled with a regularity which would have been impossible without a high standard of discipline, energy, and efficiency. I should be glad if you would convey my thanks to all officers, N.C.O.'s, gunners, and drivers of the New Zealand Artillery for their gallant and faithful work in trying circumstances."

After spending three days in the Watou area, the artillery marched to the Wallon Cappel area on November 7th. For several days the weather was wet and disagreeable; but both page 200men and horses were thoroughly exhausted after their prolonged and, tremendous exertions at Passchendaele, and the rest, despite the unfavourable conditions, was much appreciated. On the 25th of the month both the 1st and 3rd Brigades and the Divisional Ammunition Column marched to waggon lines in the Boeschepe area, under orders of the CO., 3rd Brigade, moving viâ St. Sylvestre-Cappel. In this area units remained until they received orders to return to the line in the Ypres salient.