Although the second attack on Kaiajik Aghala had been in a large measure successful, the success was of purely local importance. It could not in any way affect the fortunes of the campaign, which had been already finally decided by the failure of the attack on the Sari Bair Ridge, and the tragic fiasco at Suvla Bay. But though all chances of success were thus irretrievably lost, the campaign dragged wearily on for another four months. During this lengthy period of stalemate the action of the artillery was of necessity largely routine, though the routine was never devoid of hazards and hardships, and its activities continued to be severely limited by the inadequate supplies of ammunition. The spirit of all ranks and arms in the Division was unaltered. The great battle had brought victory no nearer; there had been no amelioration in the conditions of living, and the rigours of a stormy winter were close at hand; but at Anzac confidence remained firm and faith unshaken. The condition of some of the units in the line was such, however, that a rest of some sort became imperative. During September the worn-out and sadly thinned infantry brigades and mounted rifle regiments of the Division were withdrawn for a brief period of rest at Lemnos. The Divisional troops, including of course the artillery, remained at their posts without relief until the evacuation.

The New Zealand batteries, together with the other attached batteries under the command of the C.R.A., covered during this period the fronts of the N.Z. and A. Division and the 54th Division. The strength of the artillery had grown considerably since the beginning of August, and the big area of country gained to the north of the original Anzac position gave scope for the employment of more heavy guns. The New Zealand Artillery itself had been strengthened by the arrival of the 3rd Battery from Helles, and the 5th Battery from Egypt. The 1st Battery was still on Walker's Ridge. The page 912nd Battery had one section on Bauchop Hill, and the other on Damakjelik Bair, to which latter position the section from Bauchop'a Hill moved on September 28th. The 3rd Battery was in emplacements built on the edge of the beach, some distance north of the Chailak Dere. The guns of the 5th Battery were near the road that ran behind Taylor's Hollow, and of the 4th Battery's howitzers two were in Taylor's Hollow, and two in their permanent positions in Ari Burnu Point. Of the three 5in. howitzer batteries of the 69th Brigade, which were attached to the Division, two were in the neighbourhood of Taylor's Hollow and the third was in the bed of the Aghyl Dere. The 24th Siege Brigade, R.G.A., had landed part of its strength, sending one 6in. howitzer battery (17th Siege Battery) out on to the flat north of the Chailak Dere, and mounting two 4in. naval guns on the beach half-way along to Suvla Bay. Finally, there were the 6in. howitzer which had been landed in the middle of May, two batteries of Indian Mounted Artillery, and a battery of 60pr. guns also situated on the flats out on the left. The 4in. guns, which did not open fire until the middle of October, were very old, and in very bad condition, and possessed only one dial sight between them. Very early they were out of action owing to buffer trouble, and when that was remedied they continued constantly to go out of action from various causes. Both these two guns and a 60pr. battery drew a great deal of hostile fire. On several occasions the 4in. were put out of action, and the 60prs. were so badly damaged that eventually they were sent away about a month before the evacuation.

At the end of August it became necessary to decide as to the disposal of some heavy artillery, including one 15in. howitzer, which had been held in readiness for use in the event of a successful issue to the battle of Sari Bair. Regarding the 15in. howitzer the C.R.A., G.H.Q., gave it as his opinion that as matters stood the army had no use for this weapon, and that it was inexpedient to land it on the Peninsula. The employment of heavy guns on the Peninsula had been depending for some weeks on the outcome of the recent operations, and if those operations had resulted in putting the army astride the Peninsula heavy guns landed at Suvla and page 92suitably sited could have commanded all the country between the Anzac position and the Dardanelles. In confirming the opinion that there was no room for the 15in. howitzer, the Commander-in-Chief stated that there was a battery of Mark VII. 6in. guns, another of 9.2in. howitzers, and much field artillery then in Egypt because there were no positions for them on the Peninsula.

Thus when the campaign had almost reached its closing stages the artillery had grown so considerably in strength as to present an almost imposing array when compared with the few batteries which the Division possessed in the first months at Anzac. The increase in gun-power, however, was almost purely nominal, because guns are of no use without shells, and the supply of ammunition never showed any increase that was worth the name. The War Office informed Sir Ian Hamilton at the end of September that all available ammunition was needed for France, and so to the very end the artillery was always grievously hampered and handicapped by this never-ending dearth of shells. That the New Zealand batteries achieved so much and stood so high in the estimation of their own front line troops speaks volumes for the service at the guns and the careful skill of the observers, who had to see to it that the maximum results were obtained with each day's quota. There was never any lack of good targets; and requests were constantly being received from the infantry for fire to be directed on to some particularly troublesome enemy machinegun, or perhaps a redoubt or strong point. Such requests were seldom declined, and generally the shooting was satisfactory in its results. But more difficulty was experienced in dealing with enemy batteries, which neglected none of the advantages of position. Almost all the battery positions at Anzac were overlooked by the enemy, and some of them, such as the 3rd Battery's position down near the beach, lay in full view of the enemy on the commanding height. On the other hand, most of the Turkish batteries were situated on their own side of the high ridges beyond observation. Possessing ample supplies of timber and abundance of labour, both scarce commodities at Anzac, they built innumerable covered emplacements which served as alternative positions to which they page 93could move their guns whenever they were located and shelled. Aeroplane observers reported the existence of these emplacements, but could never indicate which of them were occupied. Several of the New Zealand batteries engaged hostile guns with aeroplane observation, but these shoots were seldom justified by results. Obviously incorrect "corrections" were sometimes sent down from the air, and on one occasion, after twenty odd precious rounds had been fruitlessly expended on an aeroplane shoot, the battery commander observed in his report;—"I conclude the aeroplane found a number of targets or the estimation of distance was poor."

Generally the activity of the enemy guns was most successfully countered by neutralising fire where the positions were known, or by prompt retaliation on to registered points in his lines. The enemy guns seemed to be liberally enough supplied with shells, and in addition to subjecting battery positions to periodic bouts of shelling, engaged in some destructive shoots round about the headquarters area near Nos. 2 and 3 Posts. The mules of the Indian Transport Columns suffered badly on one or two occasions, and some losses were also experienced amongst the New Zealand artillery horses which were picketed in Waterfall Gully. The 5th Battery had landed with all teams and waggons, but most of them had been sent back to Egypt, and there were kept on the Peninsula only a few horses per battery—sufficient merely for moving the guns when required.

The 1st Battery remained always up on the heights at Russell's Top, although application had been made to Army Corps Headquarters for its relief by an Australian Battery so that it might be employed on the left flank. About the end of September, however, one gun was taken out to the left to be used in an ingenious effort to obtain close range enfilade fire on some trenches on Hill 60. The plan adopted was to drive a tunnel through to the face of the cliff, which commanded these particular trenches, and bring the gun through the tunnel to a chamber from which an embrasure or port could be broken out in the cliff-side when it was desired to open fire. The gun, piece by piece, was taken through the tunnelway, and reassembled in the pit, but for some reason the page 94position was never disclosed and the gun never used. There were few further moves of batteries or guns in the remaining month or two of the campaign. Practically the only one was the move of a section of the 5th Battery on October 2nd to a position on the lower north-western slopes of Damajelik Bair.

The 6th (How.) Battery, which had been despatched from New Zealand in June, arrived at Anzac from Egypt on the night of October 12th, and was parked for the night in Reserve Gully. On the night of the 15th-16th the Battery got into action on the left of Walden's Point. Though the artillery of the Division was relatively strong in howitzers, there was always plenty of work for modern weapons like those possessed by the 4th and 6th New Zealand Batteries, and the 6th Battery, which was commanded by Captain G. E. Daniell, established its usefulness from the very day of going into action. An unfortunate and tragic mishap occurred in this battery a few days before the evacuation, a premature, which burst immediately in front of the muzzle, destroying the piece and killing two and wounding three of the crew. About the same time one of the 2nd Battery guns also had a premature, the force of the explosion tearing the piece into strips, but the crew escaped without injury.

On the whole the batteries got off well in the matter of casualties, despite the fact that none of them escaped a share of the liberal attentions of the Turkish batteries. The low casualty rate was attributable in some measure to the industry which the gunners displayed in strengthening their positions and digging shelters. The skilful placing of batteries, so far as the limits of the terrain permitted, and their concealment where possible, also served to reduce casualties, although naturally the howitzers had more freedom of choice in selecting their positions than the 18pr. batteries. Dysentery, however, claimed an increasing toll, and at times the small drafts of reinforcements coming forward were barely sufficient to keep the gunners up to strength.

Seasoned campaigners as they were, the men did not wait for the onset of the winter weather before endeavouring to make their dug-outs as nearly weatherproof as possible. The page 95impossibility of obtaining by ordinary means any timber or other material was a serious handicap, but the wreck and destruction in a sudden storm of a timber-laden barque provided a harvest for the needy. Some effort was being made by General Headquarters to alleviate the conditions of, the soldiers on the Peninsula during the winter months, but in everything that counted the men had to rely on their own initiative and their own individual effort. General Headquarters experienced difficulty in procuring materials, and consequent difficulty in giving effect to their schemes. For instance, on August 21st, 15,000 tons of corrugated iron were ordered by cable from England, but the shipment of the first consignment did not commence until the last week in September.

The bad weather set in in good earnest on November 27th, when the Peninsula was swept by a violent gale, accompanied by heavy rain. The storm caused a tremendous amount of damage on the landing beaches, and for the time completely isolated the troops at Anzac. Snow fell heavily during the night to complete the discomfiture, and by the morning of the 28th the whole countryside was completely enveloped. The cold was intense, and the traffic on the roads and tracks up to the forward areas turned the snow to slush, and so churned up the clay that locomotion became almost an impossibility. The artillerymen were more fortunately circumstanced than the units in the line or in their scanty bivouacs in reserve, and by comparison they suffered little. Observing officers rapidly discovered the effect of the altered conditions on their shooting, and the necessity for making all calculations for the atmospheric conditions was fully demonstrated. Such tempting targets had not offered since the fighting in August. The first morning after the blizzard large numbers of the enemy freely exposed themselves outside their trenches, which seemingly were bad enough to make them think the risk worth while. The guns soon taught them to keep under cover, but before the lesson was fully learnt it had been dearly bought. Across the flat country towards Anafarta the labouring mule trains, silhouetted against the white expanse, also afforded some good shooting for several of the batteries.