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The Wellington Regiment (NZEF) 1914 - 1919

Chapter V. — Preparations for the Gallipoli Campaign

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Chapter V.
Preparations for the Gallipoli Campaign

More Hard Training on the Desert—Lemnos.

After returning from the Canal on 26th February, the Regiment recommenced its hard training. Long and strenuous field days, with full packs up, brought inevitably long marches; but all ranks stood up to the heaviest work cheerfully, and stragglers on the march were rare. Twice the Division was inspected on the desert, first by General Godley and, later, by Sir Ian Hamilton, and both occasions were memorable for the quantity of dust swallowed by all ranks. When the Regiment marched into its own lines on its return from inspection, faces were so coated with dust as to be unrecognisable. As may well be imagined, when the command to "dismiss" was given no time was lost in reaching the nearest canteen to moisten coated tongues. Towards the end of March, frequent parades to check the state of the regimental equipment for war, indicated to all ranks an early participation in important operations. It was an open secret that the operations to be undertaken were against Turkey in the Mediterranean. As vacancies in strength occurred, the men of the reinforcements then in Egypt displayed the greatest keenness to be absorbed into regimental strength, and all weak men who had displayed any lack of staying power or any lack of discipline were quietly dropped in favour of picked men from the reinforcements.

Final orders were now received for the Regiment to join the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, under Sir Ian Hamilton. With the rest of the Brigade, the Regiment left Zeitoun on the 10th April, the C.O., Lieut.-Col. W. G. Malone and headquarters, with Taranaki and Ruahine Companies, 18 officers and 550 others, proceeding by one train, and the page 232nd in Command, Major H. E. Hart, with Wellington-West Coast and Hawkes Bay Companies, seventeen officers and 513 others, proceeding in a second train. The first train load embarked in the "Itonus," and the second train load in the "Achaia." The regimental transports sailed the next day for Lemnos. The "Achaia," which was a captured German tramp, proved a very uncomfortable ship. She had iron decks, no conveniences for working, and very little accommodation of any sort. Sleep on her iron decks, covered with rivets, was anything but easy; but it was all excellent training for the discomforts that were soon to follow. The "Itonus" was scarcely less uncomfortable. The two transports proceeded independently to Lemnos and the run through the Agean Sea, with its abounding isles and lovely colouring, was extremely pleasant and interesting. Very little training could be done on board, owing to the cramped and crowded quarters. The officers endeavoured to familiarize themselves with the Gallipoli Peninsula by studying the maps which had been issued, and Lieut. L. H. Jardine on the "Achaia," with the aid of plasticine, constructed a model of the portion on which we might expect to operate.

The transports arrived at Lemnos on the 15th April, and anchored in the outer harbour. Next day we proceeded to the inner harbour, where the Captain of the "Achaia" very proudly handed over to the Naval Authorities two large barges which he had safely towed all the way from Alexandria. The inner harbour at Lemnos at the time our transports arrived presented a scene of the greatest activity. The harbour was crowded with huge transports filled with troops. Many warships of the Mediterranean Squadron were there, from the magnificent "Queen Elizabeth" down to small submarines. There were French warships and French troopships. The land-locked harbour was surrounded by low hills, studded with windmills.

Our time at Lemnos was taken up with boat drill, incessant practice at climbing up and down the ship's side on rope ladders with a rifle and in full marching order, and frequent marches ashore. Tt was a disadvantage that the Regiment was not accommodated in a single transport as, to some page 24extent, touch was lost between the two halves of the Regiment, and final prepartions for the first great trial in battle had to be made piecemeal.

At this stage it would, perhaps, be convenient to review the events which led up to the attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Turkey had declared war against the Allies on the 31st October, 1914, and, on the 3rd November, 1914, the Mediterranean Fleet had bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles for about ten minutes, endeavouring to test the effective range of the Turkish guns. The entry of Turkey into the war immediately concentrated attention on the Suez Canal. The strength and fighting qualities of the Turkish land forces were not fully appreciated by the Western Powers as they were subsequently. The easy way in which Ihr Turkish attack on the Suez Canal in February, 1915, had been beaten off, while it demonstrated the determination of the Turk in the face of difficulties, did not enhance his military reputation. Save for the small demonstration by our Fleet at the Dardanelles on the 3rd November, we had not carried the War into Turkish territory. The possibility of undertaking operations against Turkey, either by an attack on some part of the coast of Turkey-in-Asia or against the Gallipoli Peninsula as a means of defending Egypt, had been discussed at the War Council in November 1914, but nothing definite had been decided. At this stage of the War on the Western Front had reached a deadlock; politicians and the War Staff in London were seeking some other theatre where a decisive blow might be struck. It was calculated that the capture of Constantinople would mean the immediate capitulation of Turkey, while at the same time the opening of the Dardanelles would give a free passage to Russia for munitions of war and allow the export of that country's harvest. It was a tempting prospect, and, looked at with the inadequate maps available in London, presented many allurements. It was not until early in January, 1915, that the proposal to launch an attack against the Dardanelles was translated from the sphere of empty discussion. At this time, the British Government received an urgent representation page 25from Russia that she was being hard pressed by the Turks in the Caucasus, and requesting that a demonstration against the Turks in some other quarter might be made, in order to relieve the pressure on the Russian front. A reply was sent immediately to Russia that a demonstration would be made. It was after this that the idea of attacking the Dardanelles with a view to forcing a passage for the Fleet to Constantinople was considered by the War Council. There was much discussion as to whether the operation should be a combined attack by the Fleet, supported by adequate land forces, which would land and occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula when the Fleet had silenced the Turkish Forts, or whether an attempt should be made to force a passage with the Fleet alone. Anxiety as to the position on the Western Front made it difficult to spare sufficient troops to ensure the success of land operations, and it was, eventually, decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles with an attack by the Fleet alone. The first operation by the Fleet, under Admiral Carden, in which the French squadron also participated, took place on 7th February, 1915, when the outer forts protecting the Dardanelles were bombarded at long and short ranges, and demolition parties were landed. The shore parties found that a good deal of damage had been done to the forts, but about seventy per cent. of the heavy guns still appeared to be serviceable. On this occasion, the Turks appeared to have retreated before the intense bombardment, and the landing of demolition parties must have been a surprise to them. No further operations by the Fleet were undertaken until the 18th March, when the attack was renewed. This time the Fleet lost five ships, principally from floating Turkish mines, and the attack had to be abandoned. After the attack of 19th February, the Turk had awakened to the fact that his defences against attack on the Peninsula required strengthening, and commenced to build field fortifications with the greatest rapidity. In the words of Admiral Sir John de Roebeck, thousands of Turks were at work like beavers all night on trenches, redoubts and entanglements. All landing places were communicated by lines of trenches and effectually ranged by field guns and howitzers.

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Although in February the War Council had cancelled the sailing of the 29th Division, at the beginning of March, a decision was reached that, if the Fleet could not get through the Straits unaided, the Army would have to see it through. General Birdwood, who was then proceeding to the Dardanelles, was asked to report. He reported that he very much doubted whether the Navy could force the Straits unaided. Early in March, it was decided to send out General Sir Ian Hamilton to command the troops, which were being assembled in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. Meantime he was to get in touch with the Navy, and ascertain the extent of the operation which would be involved in landing on the Peninsula in the event of the Fleet failing to get through. Sir Ian Hamilton arrived before the bombardment on the 18th March and the reconnaissance he made down the coast on that date confirmed the report of Admiral de Robeck as regards the action of the Turks since the 19th February. After the failure of the Fleet on 19th March, General Hamilton was informed that he was to undertake, in co-operation with the Navy, the task of taking the Peninsula with the Army. He immediately proceeded to Alexandria to organise the expedition. The troops put at his disposal for the operations were:—
Naval Division11,000
A. and N.Z. Force34,100
29th Division18,000
French Division18,000
Total81,000

The support of a Russian Army Corps of 47,600 men was promised when the attackers reached Constantinople.

The Turkish Forces expected to oppose a landing on the Peninsula were estimated at 40,000 on the Peninsula, with about 30,000 in reserve west of Rodosto. On this estimate, the attacking forces at the disposal of Sir Ian Hamilton appeared to be numerically superior.