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Chapter IX
Winter at Ypres
Period 22nd October, 1917, to 1st March, 1918

Although the weather conditions were far from perfect after the Companies left the battle area, they were comfortably billeted in the villages near Boulogne to which they proceeded, and were soon restored to health and vigour.

The shortages that had occurred were replaced, and the reinforcements completed establishments. Active training was soon begun by all the Companies, and by the beginning of November it was difficult to imagine that they had such a little while previously undergone the terrible hardships referred to in the last chapter.

General Russell paid a visit to each of the Companies, and delivered instructive and interesting addresses to the officers. Capt. J. W. D. McKnight, after relinquishing command of the Grantham depôt, arrived to take command of the 1st Company in place of Capt. C. G. Hayter.

The 3rd and 4th Companies were the first on the move, back to the line, marching off from the resting area on 11th November, and after a two days' march and one day's train journey, reached Poperinghe on the 13th.

The new Divisional front lay in front of Polygon Wood, extending for about one and a half miles from just beyond Cameron Covert in the south to Inder Ster Cabaret in the north. The sector was divided into two sub-sectors; the left sub-sector was taken over by the 4th Brigade, and the right sub-sector by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.

On the 14th November the 4th Company relieved the 62nd (British) Company in the left sub-sector, placing the whole sixteen guns in the line. The relief took place during the daytime, and was accomplished by 2.30 p.m. The enemy artillery fire was very heavy, especially against the tracks leading for-page 102ward to the line, causing five casualties. The signallers quickly established a line from Company Headquarters to Brigade at the Butte de Polygon, and the gun teams lost no time in improving and making more comfortable the improvised gun positions they took over.

The 3rd Company relieved the 15th (British) Company in the right sub-sector, without suffering any casualties. Fourteen guns were placed in the line and two were kept in reserve.

Immediately the Division took over the sector, active preparations were begun to organise its defence in view of the probability of an enemy attack on a large scale. The sector was of the highest importance, and, realising this, no stone was left unturned to do all that was possible for successfully resisting any attack that might be made. The proper placing of the machine guns was of great importance; the whole of the 3rd and 4th Companies' guns in the line were co-ordinately arranged to provide three belts of fire from No Man's Land back to the Army Corps system. To supplement the machine gun defence eight guns of the Divisional Company were taken on 19th November to positions near Jetty Wood, where they were placed in two groups. These groups were laid on S.O.S. lines to barrage forward of our front line, with one gun enfilading the enemy line in front of Polderhoek Château. Capt. Chaytor established an Advanced Headquarters with these two groups, which were in communication with the infantry companies in the line.

The enemy low-flying aircraft became active, and a number of guns were mounted during the day for anti-aircraft work. These guns were kept very busy nearly every day, and succeeded in turning a number of 'planes.

The guns near the front line were kept silent and well concealed, no movement being made near the positions by day. The other guns of the 3rd and 4th Companies were actively engaged by day and night, firing on positions at which movement was reported.

When the Divisional guns came into the line on 19th November, four guns of the 4th Company were grouped to barrage in front of the northern boundary of the sector. All the guns employed for the barrage work were so placed that page 103if an enemy attack penetrated our lines they could change from barrage work and create a new belt of fire.

From where the Divisional Company's guns were placed, observation of enemy positions was possible, enabling many targets to be engaged by day. Probably at no time during the period the Division was in France did the Germans expose themselves to such an extent, as they did during November and December, 1917, except in offensive operations.

In the early morning of 21st November a covered cart was observed on the spur near the Château, with several small parties of Germans. Two guns quickly opened, the cart was got away, but several men were seen to fall.

At 2.15 p.m. on the 24th November a large party of Germans with full packs up were observed moving back, apparently having been relieved from a position behind the Château. Four guns quickly opened on the party, which dispersed. Stretcher bearers carrying a Red Cross flag appeared on the spot soon after, and removed a number of bodies.

Twice on the 25th enemy parties were observed and fired upon, but the gunners were unable to say whether any casualties occurred. So much movement was seen from time to time in the vicinity of the Château that the whole eight guns were laid on it during the hours of daylight. On 26th November, at 10.30 a.m., eight men were seen to leave the Château; two guns fired, either wounding or killing the whole party. A little later a ration party was seen crossing the ridge to the north of the Château. Only one gun opened, but the party was able to reach shelter before the gun could get range. Several other parties were effectually fired upon, and later stretcher bearers with the Red Cross flag were again seen collecting the wounded or removing the dead.

As the telephone communication had been completed between the barrage guns and the infantry companies, a number of trial S.O.S. calls were made, to test the barrage. One group opened fire fifteen seconds after the call was made.

On 24th November, at 4.45 pm., the barrage guns put up a test barrage for twelve minutes, expending 12,000 rounds. This brought heavy artillery retaliation, which was directed against the group positions. Although the retaliatory shelling was near its object, no casualties were suffered, an extremely page 104remarkable thing, in view of the fact that twelve direct hits were scored on pill boxes occupied by the gunners.

Preparations for the capture of Polderhoek Châtetau had been proceeding for some days, and towards the end of November the whole of the machine guns, except those in the forward line increased their activity and co-operated in the artillery bombardments.

The attack on the Château was peculiar, for the ground lay to the south of the Divisional sector. The 2nd Brigade, which was entrusted with the attack, took over the line from which it would assault on the night on the lst/2nd December.

The machine gun scheme was to employ all the guns on the Divisional front proper to enfilade behind the objective, and for those who had observation to engage all enemy targets. A barrage group under Capt. R. B. Caws was specially detailed to cover the attack with frontal fire, and for this purpose eight guns were withdrawn from each of the Divisional and 3rd Companies. Eight guns of the 2nd Company were attached to the assaulting companies, to be pushed forward of the final objective while the new line was being made.

The attack only partially succeeded, and the Château still remained in enemy hands. The guns opened at Zero and were kept actively engaged throughout the afternoon. The guns on the Divisional front proper had a field day; frequently they were able to successfully deal with enemy infantry that were sent forward to reinforce the front garrisons. Capt. Caws's barrage guns rendered very valuable assistance to the 1st Otago Battalion, playing havoc among the bodies of enemy infantry that came along the Becelaere Road. A feature of the operation from the machine gunner's point of view was the excellent communication that was maintained between the D.M.G.O. and the various gun positions. Major Hardie (D.M.G.O.) established his battle Headquarters with Capt. Chaytor's guns at Jetty Wood, and from the top of a pill box was able to view the whole operation. This enabled Major Hardie to control and direct the gun groups firing [gap — reason: damage] Divisional front on the left of the attack. During the afternoon several S.O.S. calls were speedily answered.

At 4 o'clock the D.M.G.O. sent a message through that the enemy were concentrating for a counter-attack near a page 105certain point east of the Château; within five minutes the whole of the guns were pouring a concentrated fire upon the locality, with decisive effect. Throughout the night the guns remained laid upon their S.O.S. lines and fired at intervals until 6 a.m. the following morning.

The guns of the 2nd Company that went forward with the attack suffered severe casualties, one section being practically wiped out. Lieuts. P. G Ashby, M.C., and B. Palmes, M.C. (2nd Company), were severely wounded during the operation, after performing very gallant work. The casualties among the rest of the Companies were extremely light. Frequent reference has previously been made of the phenomenal immunity from casualties some companies enjoyed. During the afternoon of 3rd December a salvo of high explosive shells landed in front of a group of barrage guns; guns and gunners were knocked over, but no damage was done to either. The Company's report on this happening is: "12.30 p.m. During the enemy bombardment twelve shells fell within five yards of the group, and in four instances craters touched the positions." On the 5th December the 2nd Brigade withdrew from the area on which the attack had been made, and the Divisional front proper was again assumed.

The 1st Company had an off month during December so far as active operations were concerned, except that two sections were sent for ten days to reinforce the 2nd Company, owing to the casualties it had sustained during the attack against the Château. The 1st Company had two sections employed on anti-aircraft defences at various dumps, and after the two sections that went to the 2nd Company returned on 18th December a training and recreational programme was carried out.

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and Divisional Companies remained in the line and continued active harassing fire.

Christmas Day arrived, but although the enemy seemed anxious to be quiet, the gunners kept up their activities. The intelligence report of one Company for the Great Festive Day, will serve to illustrate what took place: "25/12/17. Enemy artillery and machine gun fire was nil, and day and night were extremely quiet. He evidently wanted a quiet Christmas, but our machine guns were active throughout. At 2 p.m. page 106observation was very good, and a good deal of movement was seen in what appeared to be carrying parties going to and from a Battalion Headquarters, apparently in connection with the Christmas dinner. These were fired on with very good effect, and men were seen to scatter and disperse in all directions. We could not see if any casualties were inflicted, but we worried him plenty. After dark our usual programme of indirect fire was proceeded with and continued through the night, 12,000 rounds being expended. The weather was showery, and snow fell all the afternoon."

On 26th December the enemy attempted to recapture a square crater on the 2nd Brigade front, which the 1st Canterbury Battalion had occupied upon the Germans evacuating it a few days previously. The crater was an excavation for the erection of a large pill box. A heavy bombardment preceded the attack, which was launched at 4.15 p.m. Two guns of the 4th Company under Lieut. C. V. Marks, in position in the front line, a short distance from the right of the crater, opened on the assaulting Germans and were instrumental in crushing the attack.

During the operation Sergt. J. L. Collins was mortally wounded. Collins had been a tower of strength to the Company, and was regarded as one of its most efficient n.c.o.'s. Although Collins's wounds were so serious (his right eye had been knocked out amongst other things), he insisted upon reporting progress to his Company Commander at Headquarters on his way to the dressing station. He collapsed after making his report, and died two days later. Another valued n.c.o. (Sergt. A. S. Oliver) was killed by a shell.

The 2nd Company was relieved on 30th December, and it is observed in the War Diary of the Company for that day: "Men were given their Xmas dinner. Menu: Turkey stuffed, carrots, potatoes, onions, plum pudding and wine." When the printed forms on which, the War Diaries are written are looked at, one finds a reference to Field Service Regulations Part II, as to what the Diary shall contain; whether or not the regulations provide for the insertion of a Christmas dinner menu in the War Diary, it is indeed refreshing to find it there, and it may be used in the next war as a precedent for a similar meal to be provided.

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The old year was duly heralded out and the New Year welcomed in to the accompaniment of five minutes concentrated fire by our artillery and machine guns, and many wondered whether in twelve months' time the War of Attrition would still be waging, or whether the Great Victory would have then crowned the glorious work of Britain and her valiant allies.

1918

The old year passed out and the New Year came in, the year that was destined to see the cessation of hostilities and the final triumph of the Allied Arms. The 3rd, 4th and Divisional Companies were in the line on New Year's Day, and the 1st and 2nd Companies were at rest in the rear areas. The Companies in the line had been putting a lot of work into their gun positions, which were by this time quite serviceable and habitable. The barrage guns were kept very active at night with harassing fire, and by day watching for and dealing with enemy parties. The enemy was now paying a great deal of attention to our machine guns, whose incessant night firing was causing great confusion and inconvenience. A number of organised enemy artillery shoots were launched to search our gun positions, which fortunately with one exception, were not found. Polderhoek Château still remained the favourite object of observation, and seldom a day passed that the watching gunners did not secure several Huns. January was not a severe month from a climatic point of view; the thaw, however, came very early, causing many regrets as the carefully made positions "fell in."

On 3rd January, Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O., the D.M.G.O., was wounded, near the Butte. His wounds were very serious and caused the loss of a leg. Frequent reference has been made in this book to Major Hardie's splendid work, but it is impossible to do justice to the many acts performed by this gallant officer, who so materially advanced the welfare of the Corps, and whose guidance did so much towards the great efficiency it so quickly attained. Major Hardie had the naturally ideal soldierly instinct, a quick judgment and a quiet impressive method of imparting to his officers what he required of them. His loss was deplored by all ranks.

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Enemy aircraft were busy about our lines throughout January and February, giving our anti-aircraft guns a large amount of firing. On the day that Major Hardie was wounded a heavy enemy bombardment took place under the direction of an airman. Twenty machine guns on anti-aircraft mountings, poured a heavy fire against the 'plane, which turned it homewards. Just as it seemed getting beyond range it suddenly burst into flames, and fell behind the German lines. This was the one and only 'plane that the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps claims was brought down by its guns.

On the 19th January information was sent to the Companies that an enemy relief was expected to take place soon after dusk. All the available guns in the line co-ordinated a harassing scheme, keeping every known approach under fire throughout the night; over 100,000 rounds were expended. The guns also responded when the enemy launched his ill-fated raid on the night of the 22nd January, and assisted in the salutory lesson the enemy was taught that night. The 24th January was a perfect day, more like spring than midwinter, and in consequence there was splendid visibility. The ever watchful gunners picked up two good targets that day, one being transport wagons; the drivers were hit and the horses bolted; another was a party of twelve Huns with packs up. Seven of these fell, but the remainder managed to reach cover.

A special machine gun instruction was issued on 2nd February, as follows: "Two bombardments will be carried out by the artillery of XXII Corps, commencing at 12 noon and 4 p.m., respectively, with a view to harassing the 31st Division (German), which has recently transferred to this sector from the Russian front. The machine guns will co-operate in the second bombardment. Accordingly the 3rd and Divisional Companies got ready to welcome the newcomers, and at 4 p.m. they put up forty minutes hurricane fire. The following report from the War Diary is descriptive:—

"It was decided by Headquarters to-day that we should give the Bosche a good 'strafe,' as the division opposite us had just come across from the Russian front, and it would be as well for it to become inured to the gentleness of the Western front gradually."

The 4th Company did not return to the line after the 18th page 109January, but was kept on the back area anti-aircraft defences until the 26th February, when it marched to the reinforcement camp at Abeele to disband and become absorbed in the other Companies.

In the preface to this History mention was made that to ensure greater efficiency in the tactical handling and co-ordination of machine guns it was decided to form the four companies of a division into a machine gun battalion; in accordance with this decision the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion came into being at the end of February, 1918.

The Companies were all out of the line by the 25th February, and for the first time since the inception of the Corps they became concentrated together at Hondeghem, in the Renescure Area.