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Official History of the New Zealand Engineers During the Great War 1914-1919.

Chapter IV. — The Attack on Sari Bair and the — Evacuation

page 42

Chapter IV.
The Attack on Sari Bair and the
Evacuation.

Our last great throw for victory and the command of The Narrows was not undertaken without close investigation of all the possible avenues of attack. While none were particularly attractive, the plan finally adopted met most of the objections fatal to the others. Under this scheme a new landing was contemplated at Suvla Bay, where no special difficulties were anticipated by the naval authorities. Feint attacks, as usual, were to be delivered on the extreme flanks—on the Asiatic coastline, and away up at Bulair. On 6th August a more definite assault at Cape Helles, and by the Australian Division along the whole Anzac front from Russell's Top to the southern extremity at Chatham's Post, would engage the attention of the enemy sufficiently to hold fast any reserve troops he might have in those immediate vicinities, and would possibly attract others to the scenes of conflict. Meanwhile, early on the morning of the 7th, when these operations had committed the Turkish reserves, the New Zealand and Australian Division, reinforced by the newly-arrived 13th Division, and by an Indian Brigade, would advance up three deres or valleys leading to the summit of Sari Bair.

At the same time, the IX. Army Corps, comprising the bulk of the new troops now available, would land at Suvla Bay, smother any light opposition likely to be met on Suvla Flats, and linking up with the Anzacs' left flank, would converge on Sari Bair from the northward. Once we held possession of the main ridge, Maidos and the coast of the Straits should be within easy grasp. Shorn of elaboration, these were the main outlines of the coming attack. Numerically we were much inferior to the enemy, and inevitable difficulties would occur with water and supplies, but the scheme appeared, and probably was, within the range of possibility. Unfortunately it never had a fair chance of reaching fruition.

It must be understood that Sari Bair was not a hill but a great central ridge system, broken by numerous sharp rocky ridges, and a wilderness of precipitous water-courses. The three main spurs breaking out in the direction of Anzac from the nearer height of Chunuk Bair were the one running down page 43to Quinn's Post and Walker's Ridge; a second running due west called Rhododendron Spur and separated from Walker's by the Sazli Beit Dere; and a third called Cheshire Ridge, separated from Rhododendron by the Chailak Dere, and bounded again on the north by the Aghyl Dere. Rhododendron Spur and Cheshire Ridge met some 400 yards from Chunuk Bair at a point called the Apex, then ran as one steep ridge up to the heights.

The forces from Anzac were to attack in two columns, one up the Aghyl Dere, the other by way of Sazli Beit and Chailak Deres, each preceded by a covering force to remove obstacles, and generally to ensure as far as might be that the men detailed for the final assault should arrive near the summit as fresh as possible. The Field Troop was assigned to the Right Covering Force, while the 1st and 2nd Field Companies formed part of the Right" and Left Assaulting Columns respectively. Their particular duties were to be the removal of mechanical obstacles, the consolidation of positions captured, and above all to find water. For several nights before the attack, fresh troops from the English New Army Divisions were landed at Anzac, and hidden away in positions already prepared among the numerous little gullies and fissures abutting on the coast. On the 5th August the bulk of the New Zealand Engineers moved out to Happy Valley, where they lay all next day in the scrub.

On the 6th our attacks broke out at Cape Helles and along the line of the Anzac Posts, where the Australians in particular suffered frightful losses, but all successfully fulfilled their share of the major operation. As darkness fell, the waiting troops on the left began to file off up the beach to the mouths of the deres. Heavy wire of great height and depth was found in several places up Chailak Dere, but gallant work by Lieutenant Oakey and a party from the Field Troop, assisted by some of the Maoris, resulted in a track being cleared for our advancing troops. This splendid work largely assisted the Right Assault Column in its attack on Rhododendron Spur, where their advanced troops finally reached the Apex. The 1st Field Company spent the night in Chailak Dere completing the clearance of obstacles and commencing a mule track up the valley. With the dawn they moved on towards the Apex. Wounded and prisoners began to pour down from both the Apex and Cheshire Ridge, and all tracks in the bottom of the valley were soon hopelessly blocked. The Indian Mountain Batteries were urgently needed in front, and to get page 44them forward the sappers were set on the formation of a 10ft. track from the dere up the slopes of Cheshire Ridge and so to the Apex.

The Left Assaulting Column, composed of Australian and Indian Brigades, met with considerable opposition, but pushed on up the Aghyl Dere to where the valley forked about 2000 yards from the sea. The Australians here took the northern fork and by dawn had reached the ridge at the, head of Asma Dere. The Indians went on up the southern fork towards the Farm, just under the crest of Chunuk Bair. As they went their flanks spread right and left, and succeeded in establishing touch with the New Zealanders and Australians on either side.

By this time it was full daylight, and the exhausted troops were everywhere held up by seemingly endless hordes of Turks. Still, a considerable advance had been made, and the tired men were given fresh heart by the sight of Suvla Bay full of ships, and apparently quite undisturbed by the Turks. Help must be near at hand. By the Australians on the far left in particular, with their flank entirely in the air, it was urgently required. All day the men lay out on the parched hillsides, where any attempt at movement was instantly shot down. The 2nd Field Company was employed digging wells in the Aghyl Dere, though no supplies of water could go forward till darkness fell. That night reorganisation was effected and a fresh attack planned for the morning. Only on the right did it succeed, where the New Zealanders took the crest of Chunuk Bair in the early dawn. All day again the fight went on with tremendous slaughter but little success. However, Chunuk Bair still lay in our hands at night. Still no sign of any troops from Suvla. Once more fresh arrangements were made to exploit our hold on Chunuk Bair, quite the most important gain of the whole campaign.

On Sunday, the 9th, fresh efforts were put forth all along the exhausted line, but far from advancing our gains, the only men still holding their own at nightfall were again on the grimly-contested Chunuk Bair. That night these worn-out troops were relieved by two battalions of English troops. With dawn on the 10th came a decisive counter-stroke by the Turks, who, pouring down the hill shoulder to shoulder in several lines, completely overran everything on Chunuk Bair, and were only held up at the Apex by the most strenuous efforts of the garrison.

Once their attack was broken, the enemy were forced to page 45retire up the steep slopes in full view of every man on our side able to fire a shot, and only a mere handful ever crossed over the ridge. But Chunuk Bair was lost to us and was never regained. During the three days' fighting the sappers were used as reinforcements in the firing line between spells of consolidation on Rhododendron Spur and of digging for water in the deres, and suffered very severe losses.

The failure at Suvla was complete. The only battalion which did make any material gain on the first day moved forward and occupied Scimitar Hill. During the night, owing to the general confusion reigning, it was recalled to attack somewhere else in the morning, and this valuable position was abandoned never to be again occupied by us.

With no early prospect of gaining Sari Bair in sight, nothing remained for the Anzacs but to establish connection with the troops round about Suvla Bay, to put such trenches as had been gained into a proper state of defence, and to make good their lines of communication. As many sappers as could be spared from the pressing needs of the water supply situation were at once put on to supervise these new works. The water question was soon greatly relieved by the finding of new wells on the beach and in Aghyl Dere, and by the installation of an oil engine and pumping plant.

The old Turkish well at No. 2 Post had always been a mainstay of the water supply system, but now it became one of the most important features of the whole local situation, since by pumping 20 hours a day enough water could be obtained to supply approximately two Divisions. On several occasions the overworked engines broke down. Fortunately the New Zealand sappers included men who could be relied on to make a job of any engine that could move at all, but their ingenuity was severely taxed. New bearings were filed up out of spare parts of abandoned service pumps, then the cylinder rings burnt on to the piston and had to be broken off. New rings were made by cutting up a Turkish 4.5 shell with a haeksaw. Luckily these were exactly the right size, and a supply was kept in stock thereafter. These are samples of the little problems confronting the sappers all through the occupation of the Peninsula, but few of which were long able to withstand the resource and skill brought to bear upon them.

Cables for reinforcements met with the reply that none were available. A further attempt to advance, was accordingly made with troops on the spot, the long-suffering "regulars" of the faithful 29th Division being brought up from Cape page 46Helles to stiffen the raw battalions at Suvla Bay. Scimitar Hill and Hill 60 were the objectives of this fresh assault, the first to be attacked by the troops at Suvla, the other by a force of Australian Infantry and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, with a sprinkling of other details. Scimitar Hill cost 5000 casualties and then was not occupied, an ironical contrast with the ease with which it was taken and abandoned some days earlier.

The attack from the Anzac side met with better fortune, but even then, after tremendous losses we only carried a portion of the crest of Hill 60. The 2nd Field Company was closely concerned digging consolidation trenches during the week occupied by these operations, while the Field Troop, despite heavy casualties, put out a large amount of barbed wire protection with their usual energy and skill. These struggles were the last pitched battles on the Peninsula. Simple honesty forces the admission that after four long months of ceaseless effort and continual bloodshed we were still nowhere past the outer fringe of the Turkish positions.

September found defensive works well in hand all along the front. Welcome assistance arriving on the 16th, nominally the 5th Reinforcements, but the first as far as the Engineers were concerned, put fresh heart into all activities. At the same time, the arrival of the 2nd Australian Division made it possible to relieve all Australian or New Zealand infantrymen of long standing for a spell of rest at Mudros.

The 1st Field Company had been employing half its forces widening the Big Sap running out from Anzac past No. 2 Post and so on towards Suvla, a track which ultimately became more like a sunken road than a communication trench. The remainder of the Company was improving trenches and erecting wire from Camel Hump to Destroyer Hill, two knolls commanding the mouth of the Sazli Beit Dere. These comparative veterans were now relieved by the greater portion of the fresh sappers, and sent to Mudros with the infantry. The following men of the 1st Company are noted in the records of the time as having been conspicuous for consistent good service:—Sergeants D. Ross, G. Masters, and A. K. Fyson; Corporal J. Caird, Second-Corporals W. J. McLaughlin, J. S. Cripps, and J. McKay; Lance-Corporals J. Woodhall and E. St. G. Gorton; Sappers F. Bridgewater and V. R. Maney.

The rest camp at Mudros was at Sarpi on the outskirts of the town, and despite some small inconveniences at the start, in page 47
Plan of the Apex Defences

Plan of the Apex Defences

page 48 the way of insufficient accommodation and bad weather, the general conditions obtaining were in extraordinary contrast with those on the Peninsula, and quickly worked wonders in the health and spirits of the gaunt, disease-weakened troops. Good fresh food was available in surprising quantities, men could sleep secure from the everlasting shells, recreational institutes sprang up, and even to walk abroad in the pleasant country-side, with women and children in the villages, and flocks and crops on the peaceful hills, was a certain tonic to minds over-long familiar with filth and slaughter. And to men who had not seen a hot bath for five months, the extremely good facilities existing at Thermos, some three miles away, were a boon beyond all price. Later on, the Field Troop, and even some of the 2nd Field Company, were given an opportunity of enjoying the attractions of Lemnos, and of sharpening their wits in contact with the eager, banditti who masquerade as the normal inhabitants of that Grecian isle.
The 2nd Field Company, now numbering but some 75 fit men, received the balance of the new men available, and carried on with renewed energy. The main portion of the Company was attached to the 3rd Australian Light Horse in Sazli Beit Dere, where their especial cares were the trenches along the southern flanks of Rhododendron Spur and the defences at the Apex. Both fire and communication trenches were in poor condition here, and demanded much devoted labour. The difficulties of obtaining material for such an exposed spot were greatly lightened by the completion of a mule track graded by the sappers up the side slopes of Sazli Beit Dere. Ultimately all trenches were successfully completed, and the whole position in that locality was accurately surveyed. Malcolm Boss, the New Zealand Official War Correspondent, bore tribute to the Company's efforts in the following words:—"At Rhododendron Spur the Engineers were confronted with a very difficult position, being exposed in front and on each flank. The fire trenches were only two feet deep. On the right there was absolutely no protection. By dint of great ingenuity, and much hard work, both the Apex and the Spur were made secure, though the Turks, right, left, and in front, on the heights above, practically dominated the position." On completion of this job, the Company's energies were transferred to Chailak Dere, on the southern side of Cheshire Ridge, where a new road was formed right up from No. 2 Post to the Apex. While in this locality, page break
Horse Lines at Moascar Camp.

Horse Lines at Moascar Camp.

A Pontoon and Trestle Bridge erected by the Engineers at Moascar.

A Pontoon and Trestle Bridge erected by the Engineers at Moascar.

Engineers on Camels, returning to Moascar after constructingthe Ballah Defences.Photos by Major N. Annahell

Engineers on Camels, returning to Moascar after constructing
the Ballah Defences.

Photos by Major N. Annahell

page 49 Durrani's Post, in the front line at the head of the dere, was taken in hand, to the great satisfaction of the Australian Officer Commanding, who wrote a special letter of thanks and commendation to the C.R.E. The Field Troop, now pitifully few in numbers, was also with the Australians on Cheshire Ridge, where it was employed on wire entanglements and general trench improvement.

Engineers still remained at the Apex, which, by virtue of its location and of the activities there carried on, soon became on this new front much what Quinn's Post had been on the old; a stronghold whose safety was essential to the defence of the Whole sector, but always commanded by the enemy and ever subject to hostile fire. Mining was carried on from the first, both by us and by the Turks, and despite the inevitable shortage of explosive, we gradually gained the upper hand by dint of unremitting toil and no mean skill. Lance-Corporal W. J. Riddell of the 2nd Company won distinction here for the gallant rescue of an injured comrade from No Man's Land under point-blank fire.

With October came cooler weather and a marked improvement in the general health of the troops in consequence, though all were sadly reduced by comparison with their original condition. With October also came the first storm of autumn— welcome rather than otherwise since the beach was strewn with wreckage, which was eagerly added to the depleted stores of the Engineer's Depot—but a disquieting indication of what might happen later on. Plans for winter accommodation were forthwith considered, but beyond making plans, what could be done? It was useless to decide on uniform methods of trench revetment, of drainage, or of shelter, when the materials essential to the fulfilment of any scheme however modest were not even within the range of possibility. The only decision possible was that each locality must do its best with the scraps available, and "the natural resources of the countryside." Steady inroads ever since the landing on that particular source of supply had long ago exhausted what had never been more than rock and clay and patches of twisted scrub. The report of the C.R.E. stated inter alia that "Corrugated iron in large quantities would solve all difficulties." Some time later 120 sheets arrived—not enough to make a large stable. There was no material, and would be none, and the knowledge of that bedrock fact of the situation was better than unfounded expectations. The shortage of course extended in every direction. The arrival of the 6th Reinforce-page 50ments brought some fresh relief, but even after absorbing them the total number of sappers available did not bring the Companies up to half strength.

By this time the question of evacuation was prominent in the minds of the authorities in London, and doubtless had long disturbed the plans of Sir Ian Hamilton, since far from sending him reinforcements, they had already asked him to send three Divisions from Gallipoli to Salonika. Into the medley of conflicting facts and circumstances surrounding this point we need not attempt to enter here, but the fact noted above is pretty good evidence that the campaign had lost the wholehearted support of the responsible authorities and was doomed from that time onwards. Whether it could have succeeded under happier auspices, and just what degree of extra support would have been necessary, are points that will always be debated among military critics. Lord Kitchener and Sir Charles Munro recommended withdrawal; some time later Sir Ian Hamilton again referred to "the final folly of the evacuation."

No whisper of these momentous differences of opinion had yet reached the devoted garrisons of our hard held line on the Peninsula. What they had won they were still prepared to hold, and were still confident that the support necessary for final success would arrive at last. Then on November 27th came the great blizzard, with bitter, driving wind and heavy falls of snow. Within 24 hours the damage done was enormous. The floors and walls of the little clay dugouts became wet and greasy, and all tracks were rivers of mud and slush. All temporary shelters in the open collapsed under the weight of their snow mantle, and men were forced to shiver in any nook or cranny they could find unoccupied, while the carefully-cut trenches, destitute of all necessary revetment, showed sure signs of collapse. Many of the trenches became untenable owing to the flood waters draining down from the higher levels. Down in the Cove, all light craft were piled up on the beach, no very serious loss in themselves, but closely touching the question of future supplies.

On the 24th, mysterious orders had been given for 24 hours complete silence, probably to see what attitude the enemy was likely to adopt under circumstances approximating to those of the pending withdrawal. Any attempt to advance would have been dealt with, but apart from such precautions, no shovel was lifted and no shot fired. The Turk accepted the strange break in the proceedings with philosophic page 51calm, and employed the time in rebuilding his parapet and strengthening wire entanglements. The interlude was finally extended to 72 hours, when the blowing of a small mine was the signal to lay on afresh. The Turkish estimate of this manoeuvre, if any existed, has never been made public. With the frost following the blizzard came some relief in the way of drier tracks and trenches, but this advantage was quickly set oft' by the bursting of all water pipe lines. Sappers with large working parties were at once detailed for repair, and the renewed pipes were also placed underground. The water problem was as acute as ever, despite the streamlets now running freely in every dere, since they represented the drainage of the whole congested battlefield after many months of slaughter. Numerous wells came under the same disability, and the water barges, which were altogether dependent on the weather conditions along shore, became indispensable.

An extensive pumping plant had been landed early in November, along with a special pump expert sent out by the contractors to superintend its erection. However, the plant was relegated to the Engineers' Stores in the meantime, and the expert, a Mr. Bodman, was forced to employ his unexpected leisure in inspection of the other engineering marvels abounding all round him, and in the collection of souvenirs. He was housed with the 2nd Field Company, which provided him with an Australian hat and overcoat to minimise risk of accident. His performance at a coal-pinching expedition, where he took the part of an Australian Sergeant-Major at short notice, and as to the manner born, was the outstanding feature of the enterprise, and won him the hall-mark of approval from all his whilom hosts. Ultimately his pumping apparatus was urgently called for, but had only been in operation for a day or two, when it was dismantled and sent away prepartory to the final withdrawal.

Up to the middle of December Engineering activities to combat the approach of winter were carried on strenuously, though it was pretty generally understood long before that, that Christmas would never be spent on Gallipoli. Officially, of course, the word "evacuation" did not exist, but the instant removal to hospital ships of any man with the slightest disability, the open-handed attitude of ordnance and supply officials, and above all the number of troops who were sent away every night to an alleged rest camp at Imbros, convinced the most sceptical that something was in the wind. On December 16th further disguise was abandoned, and an Army Order informed all ranks of the decision to withdraw, and exhorted page 52them to stand fast should any hitch occur during the operation. Many a time during that awful summer the troops had longed to see the end of the filth and hardships of Gallipoli, but not this kind of ending. Most of the garrison knew perfectly well that without reinforcements there was no reasonable course open but to withdraw, and were thankful that decision had been reached, but no sensation of relief could dispel the sense of failure, the feeling that the job was being left half-done, and that so many brave lads had died in vain. Sufficient indication of what might be expected during the winter had been afforded by the November blizzard, but it is perfectly certain that had official policy decided in favour of enduring the rigours of winter for the prospect of victory in the spring, there would have been no murmurings on Anzac.

The evacuation, in common with the landing, was a type of military enterprise unique in the annals of war. The numerous unfavourable circumstances which made it such a delicate operation, and so peculiarly liable to miscarry, are too well known to need further description. Knowledge of them serves to throw a vivid light on the skill and daring with which the arrangements were conceived and carried out. The sappers were directly concerned with the final measures undertaken. Reserve stocks of tools and stores were broken up and burnt or cast into the sea. In particular the beach entrances to the deres leading down from the trenches on the heights above were completely filled up with extensive wire entanglements, leaving only narrow means of exit for the retiring garrisons, which could be blocked up by dropping gates of wire already prepared. Similarly numerous blocks were prepared in the communication trenches, where the last men to leave could, if necessary, make a stand against the enemy sufficient to ensure the safety of the main body. Wire gates were placed in position to be closed as these last men came through on the final dash for the beach. Trip wires were also arranged so that interference therewith drew the safety-pin from Mills bombs, which by this time had made a belated appearance on the scene.

The final stage of the evacuation was conducted in two operations on the nights of the 18th and 19th December.

On the 19th there remained of the Engineers only the Acting C.R.E., the O's.C. of the Field Troop and the 2nd Field Company, and 13 other ranks, who spent the day in erecting two light jetties to assist in the evacuation of the Indian troops. All that day great efforts were made to induce the enemy to believe that everything was going on as page 53usual. Men with packs on their backs walked up the tracks leading to the trenches wherever they could be seen by the Turks. Fires were kept burning and blankets were spread in the; sun round the areas that had usually been occupied by incoming troops, while in the front line a few men moved tirelessly up and down firing shots from all points from which fire had usually been prominent. Numerous mechanical contrivances were also in position ready to continue spasmodic fire long after the trenches were vacated by the garrison. These generally depended on a tin full of water with a gradual leak, or a time fuse which burnt through a string; in either ease a weight being released which pulled a trigger.

The men of the Division remaining on Gallipoli on that last day, about 3000, were to be withdrawn in three parties known as A, B, and C, which would leave at varying intervals. Should the enemy attack at any stage of the proceedings, the great wire gates in the deres would be instantly closed and the deres themselves heavily bombarded by the warships. Whatever part of the garrison still remained in the trenches were to stand their ground till 2 a.m., and then to retire down the ridges to the sea, where some of them might possibly be picked up by the Navy. Virtually the arrangement meant the sacrifice of the rearguard to save the Army, but the ranks of the C party could have been filled many times over. Every man was a volunteer, though it was early decided by the wags that A stood for Alexandria and B for the Beach, while the best C could hope for was Constantinople.

Our last night on Gallipoli opened with a glorious peaceful sunset and not a ripple on the sea. As darkness finally settled down, intense activity broke out everywhere. The departure of each boatload of men was scheduled to a minute, and there was much to be done. The few remaining guns were hauled down to the beach, men went round lighting candles in the empty dugouts, while others maintained the faithful round of the front line and the intermittent rifle fire so essential to success. As the night wore on nervous tension naturally increased, but the Turks remained quiet. Sappers remained at the Apex till the last moment in readiness to fire a prepared mine should such a proceeding become necessary, and as they left the enemy could be heard putting out fresh wire. The extra shipping on the coast had been interpreted as the forerunner of another grand attack. About 2.15 a.m. the last man in the trenches made for the main gate at the mouth of Chailak Dere, which was closed finally at 2.25 a.m. after numbers had been checked by a staff officer. The page 54last definite action of the New Zealand Engineers on the Peninsula was the demolition of a Hotchkiss gun and a 5-inch Howitzer not considered worth removal. By 4 a.m. all troops were on board ship and bearing away for Lemnos. The fires along the beach were now in full blaze, and the lines of the Turkish trenches were picked out along the dark hillside by countless darts of flame as the occupants opened harmless fire. By dawn the sinister blood-soaked ridges of Gallipoli were but a smudge on the horizon.

No details of many individual acts of courage and resource by members of the 2nd Field Company are now available; possibly none were kept, since in those early days of the war, when every man put forth his utmost endeavours all day and every day, there was no careful organisation of distinctions and awards such as existed later on in France. In any case, no system of awards could possibly have arrived at complete justice in the matter, but the names of the following men are noted in the records for continuous faithful service in the front line throughout their stay on Gallipoli:— Sergeants C. E. Bradley and T. F. Rowe; Corporals W. J. Courtney, P. Scahill, and C. King; Lance-Corporals W. A. Laing and A. E. Gibb; and Sapper F. Drinkrow. Members of the Field Troop who achieved the same measure of distinction were:—Sergeant Brunsden; Corporals H. Dyson and K. Draffin; and Sappers C. Horne, W. Carter, G. Williamson, and H. Gray.

No reference to this aspect of the Engineers' experiences would be complete without some mention of Sergeants-Major T. W. Dollimore and J. J. Moore, who were later awarded commissions in the field. Both men were fully trained N.C.O. 's of the Royal Engineers, who had been selected for service in New Zealand as Instructors before the war, and had fortunately been sent to Gallipoli along with the 2nd Field Company. Their skill, resource and cheery courage made them towers of strength in the constant crises of the Peninsula campaign, and were a credit alike to themselves and to the best traditions of the fine Corps from which they sprang.