Appendix No. 5.

Report on Privileges, &c., of the Legislative Council.

Memoranda.

We submit the opinions which have been expressed by eminent writers on the privileges of the Parliament of Great Britain and other Legislative Assemblies, and extracts from the Acts granting Constitutions to Victoria, New South Wales, and Canada.

We would observe, with reference to the first branch, that in the 54th section of the Constitution Act of New Zealand it is laid down "that it shall not be lawful for the House of Representatives or the Legislative Council to pass, or for the Governor to assent to, any Bill appropriating to the public service any sum of money from or out of Her Majesty's revenue within New Zealand, unless the Governor on Her Majesty's behalf shall first have recommended to the House of Representatives to make provision for the specific public service towards which such money is to be appropriated."So early as 1854, on the introduction into the Legislative Council from the House of Representatives of the first Appropriation Bill, the Legislative Council raised the question whether it did not possess the power to amend or alter any such legislative measure submitted for its consideration; but, as it was proposed to prorogue the Assembly on the following day, the Council consented to pass the Appropriation Bill without alteration, referring the question of its rights page 57 to alter such Bills to the consideration of Her Majesty's Imperial Government. The reply, dated the 25th March, 1856, was to the effect "that, as the New Zealand Constitution Act was silent on the subject, the analogy of the English Constitution ought to prevail; and it pointed out that the undisputed practice, as affirmed by a resolution of the House of Commons of the year 1678, was that Bills of Supply ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords."

The Privileges Act of 1856 indicated certain privileges as pertaining to legislative bodies and officers of the Government of the colony and provinces of New Zealand, conferred certain powers on the said legislative bodies, and gave protection to persons employed in the publication of papers under the authority of the same. At the same time it was expressly stated that the Act was not to be held directly or indirectly, by implication or otherwise, to restrict whatsoever privileges or immunities any such legislative body might possess.

"The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865,"passed on the 26th day of September, repealed the 52nd section of the Constitution Act, which empowered the Legislative Council and House of Representatives to make rules for the orderly conduct of the business of such Council and House; and also repealed so much of "The Privileges Act, 1856,"as applied to the Legislative Council and House of Representatives; and it enacted that "the Legislative Council or House of Representatives of New Zealand, and the Committees and members thereof respectively, shall hold, enjoy, and exercise such and the like privileges, immunities, and powers as, on the 1st day of January, 1865, were held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the Committees and members thereof, so far as the same are not inconsistent with or repugnant to such and so many of the sections and provisions of the said Constitution Act as, at the time of coining into operation of this Act, are unrepealed, whether such privileges, immunities, or powers were so held, possessed, or enjoyed by custom, statute, or otherwise."The Act also provided that "such privileges, immunities, and powers shall be deemed to be and shall be part of the general and public law page 58 of the colony;"and further declared that, in cases of inquiry into such privileges, printed copies of the Journals of the House of Commons shall be evidence of such Journals. It also empowered the Legislative Council and House of Representatives and their Committees, or any joint Committee, to administer oaths, and protected publishers of reports acting under the authority of either branch of the Legislature. "The Privileges Act, 1866,"exempted members of the General Assembly from attendance in Courts of law in certain cases. Since then there has been no further legislation on the subject.

With reference to the second branch of the inquiry we would observe that in 1704 the Lords communicated a resolution to the Commons at a Conference—to which resolution the Commons assented—"That neither House of Parliament have power by any vote or declaration to create to themselves new privileges not warranted by the known laws and customs of Parliament."(See May "On the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament,"1868, p. 66.) Without entering minutely into the question of the rise and progress of the power to impose taxation and grant supplies, it may be sufficient to say that "Her Majesty's Speech at the commencement of each session recognizes the peculiar privilege of the Commons to grant all supplies, the preamble of every Act of Supply distinctly confirms it, and the form in which the Royal assent is given is a further confirmation of their right."The grant from the Commons is not, however, "effectual in law without the assent of the Queen and the House of Lords."(P. 534.)

The claim thus recognized of originating grants appears to have existed for 300 years. In 1678 it was extended, and the Lords were precluded from amending Bills of Supply. (P. 537.) "This principle is acquiesced in by the Lords."(P. 538.) "In Bills not confined to matters of aid or taxation, but in which pecuniary burdens are imposed upon the people, the Lords may make amendments, provided they do not alter the intention of the Commons with regard to the amount of the rate or charge, whether by increase or reduction; its duration; its mode of assessment, levy, collection, appropriation, or management; or the persons who shall pay, re- page 59 ceive, manage, or control it; or the limits within which it is proposed to be levied."(P. 538.) Bills containing provisions of the above kind are sometimes introduced into the Lords, but ultimately passed in a form by which no privileges of the Commons are infringed upon. When Bills of Supply have had tacked to them enactments which, in another Bill, would have been rejected by the Lords, such a proceeding, invading the privileges of the Lords, "has been resisted by protest, by Conference, and by the rejection of the Bills."(P. 545.) In 1860 the Commons, on the rejection of the Paper Duties Repeal Bill, which overruled the financial arrangements voted by the Commons, resolved—"3rd. That, to guard for the future against an undue exercise of that power by the Lords "(viz., the power of the Lords to reject Bills of taxation) "and to secure to the Commons their rightful control over taxation and supply, their House has in its own hands the power so to impose and resist taxes, and to frame Bills of Supply, that the rights of the Commons as to the matter, manner, measure, and time may be maintained inviolate."(P. 545.) Acting upon this resolution, the Commons, in the following session, embodied the repeal of this duty in a general financial measure for granting taxes and duties, "which the Lords were constrained to accept."(P. 546.)

Lord Brougham, in his work on the British Constitution (1844), observes, in reference to the tenacious adherence by the Commons to certain privileges with respect to the Lords: "I allude particularly to the exclusion of the latter from the originating of any measure of Supply, and from all alterations upon any financial measure sent up from the Lower House. Although the Lords have never abandoned their claim to originate and to alter money Bills, as well as the Commons, yet, in practice, they never assert the right, and we may therefore take it that, by our Constitution, the Commons alone can begin any measure of Supply, and that the Lords have no power to alter it as sent up to them, but must either accept it wholly or wholly reject it."(P. 115.) The Commons have, however, he states, allowed this exclusive privilege to be broken in upon once and again, as when they withdrew from "the absurd pretence that a prohibition, being enforced by a pecuniary page 60 penalty, could not be touched by the Lords because it was a money clause."(P. 116.)

Mr. Hearn, in his work on the Government of England, observes that "although Parliament grants supplies to the Crown, and provides the ways and means for raising these supplies, the functions of the two Houses of Parliament are not in this respect alike. The House of Commons has acquired in this matter peculiar powers. It claims as within its exclusive jurisdiction all questions of finance. With the initiation of all such questions, and with all their details, this House exclusively deals. The House of Lords on these Bills, like the Crown on these and all other Bills, retains the general power of assent or rejection only, but not of amendment. The functions, then, of the several powers of the State in matters of finance may be thus briefly stated: The Crown makes requisitions to the Commons for the supplies which the public service demands. The Commons grant the supplies, and provide the ways and means for raising them. The Lords assent to these grants and these financial arrangements. The Crown accepts the grants and assents to the legislation which they involve."(P. 353.)

The exemption of such Bills (money Bills) from amendment by the Lords may be dated from the Conferences of 1671 and 1678. "These principles may now be regarded as firmly settled. The House of Lords, indeed, has never formally abandoned its right of amendment, but it has for many years abstained from its exercise in cases calculated to excite dispute."(P. 353.) In 1860 the Lords rejected, for financial reasons, a Bill passed by the House of Commons for the repeal of the excise duties on paper. This action of the Lords was met by the Commons by declaratory resolutions, and in the following session by a Bill including various enactments for the repeal of some taxes (the paper duties among the number) and the imposition of others. The House of Lords, after some opposition, passed the Bill rather than reject it in its entirety; but such forbearance, it is said, is not to be expected where "questions of general commercial policy are involved."The precedent of the paper duties does not sanction the combination of a Tax Bill with an Appropriation page 61 Bill, or with any other measures not connected with ways and means. (P. 354.)

The constitutional theory of taxation, it is said, has been recognized by express enactment in the various Colonial Constitutions which during the present reign have received the sanction of Parliament. (P. 353.)

Mr. Todd, in his book on parliamentary government, remarks that "there is no rule or usage of the House of Lords to forbid the presentation and discussion of a petition for pecuniary redress or compensation, provided it be couched in general terms;"and the Lords "are not constitutionally debarred from instituting inquiries by their own Committees into financial matters or into questions which involve the expenditure of public money,"because it is desirable "that they should be prepared, by full investigation and tree inquiry, to give or withhold their assent intelligently"to every legislative measure, whether of Supply or otherwise. In 1852 the House of Lords inquired by a Select Committee into the claims of Baron de Bode for pecuniary relief; and in 1860 a Lords Committee upon Floating Breakwaters recommended "that a sum not exceeding £10,000 be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty"to enable that department to test any plans for the suitable construction of such works. (P. 433.)

Upon matters of Supply and taxation the Commons "have succeeded in maintaining their exclusive right to originate all measures of this description. They have gone further, and have claimed that such measures should be simply affirmed or rejected by the Lords, and should not be amended in the slightest particular. The Lords have practically acquiesced in this restriction, although they have never formally consented to it."(P. 457.) "Every Bill to impose or repeal a tax involves other considerations besides those which are purely questions of revenue: it necessarily includes principles of public policy or of commercial regulation; and on points of this kind the Lords, as a coordinate branch of the Legislature, are constitutionally free to act and advise as they may judge best for the public interests."Their power should, however, be only "resorted to upon extraordinary occasions."(P. 459.) In 1862 the Budget propositions, involving twenty-two millions of money, were page 62 introduced into the House of Commons in one Bill. When the Bill was before the Lords, Lord Derby, in debating the expediency of such a mode of introduction, remarked that "the one course interposes to us no greater obstacles than the other, because, as it is perfectly within our province and our right to reject a particular proposition in a single Bill, so it is equally within our competence to reject that same proposition when incorporated with others,"and "leave the Commons to the consequences of their own proceeding."(P. 464.)

Mr. Homersham Cox observes in his work on the institutions of the English Government (1863): "The now established practice of the House of Commons admits of no discussion with or amendments by the House of Lords with respect to money Bills; but that practice was not completely established until after the seventeenth century."(P. 185.) "In 1678 the Commons resolved that all supplies were their sole gifts, and that the 'ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants ought not to be altered by the House of Lords.' From the end of the seventeenth century these claims have been seldom, or but faintly, controverted by the Lords."(P. 186.) Mr. Cox also quotes the proceedings of the House of Commons in 1860 with respect to the rejection of the Paper Duty Repeal Bill, and the consequent action taken by that House in 1861, in passing a Bill "in which measures for the repeal of some taxes and the imposition of others were combined." "The Lords,' he observes, "passed the Bill, but not without a protest from several lords against the course taken by the House of Commons, on the ground that it was contrary to usage, and that measures of Supply and repeal of taxes ought not to be combined in the same Bill."He also quotes Blackstone as saying with reference to the right of the Lords to reject money Bills, "It is sufficient that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the Commons too lavish or improvident in their grants."Also De Lolme: "The Lords are expected simply and solely either to accept or reject them."(P. 188.)

Hallam says ("Constitutional History,"Vol. III., p. 27) "that the importance of the exclusive privilege claimed by the Commons"(in money Bills) "has been rather exaggerated by them." page 63 "In early records Lords and Commons made money grants to the King without mutual communication." "22nd Edward III.: Commons alone granted three-fifteenths, levied on themselves." "After this both Lords and Commons are jointly recited, sometimes after deliberating together."

In Richard II.'s reign, Commons are recited to grant money with assent of Lords, apparently indicating that the vote originated with Commons, and that the grant was mainly theirs.

In the reigns of Henry IV. and V. the Commons grant, the Lords consent. Hallam doubts whether, in other than cases where it is specially mentioned, the Lords bore any part of the taxes.

Hallam further says that "in 1 Car. I. Commons began to omit names of the Lords, reciting the grant as if wholly their own."

After the Revolution the Commons objected to the Lords providing for local and limited assessment; then "by-and-by to the Lords meddling with or first passing Bills imposing penalties or altering the application of such as had been imposed by Lower House."

Taylor, in his "Book of Rights,"1833, tells us that "Sir William Beetham says that no deliberative assembly existed until the reign of Edward I."

In 34 Edward I. "No tallage or aid shall be taken by us without the goodwill and assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land."

It appears that laws were placed on the Statute Book in the reign of Edward II. without, and sometimes against, the consent of the other branches of the Legislature; which seems to have occasioned a page 65 petition of Commons as to an equal participation in drawing up statutes. (5 Richard II., 1381.)

In 9 Henry IV. we find a very important record of one of the first disputes, if not the first, about money Bills between the King and Lords and the Commons. (Pp. 117, 118, 119.)

Taylor further observes (1604), "The Commons say that their privileges and liberties are their right and inheritance no less than their very land and goods."

Guizot, in his work on representative government (1861), says: "Barons (vassals of the King) had a right to levy imposts only as representatives of their own vassals. E.J." "Although they were not elected, and had received neither appointment nor mandate, we may nevertheless say that they were regarded as representing their own vassals, and that it was only in virtue of the power which was attributed to them in this fictitious representation that they exercised the right of levying imposts on all the proprietors in the kingdom." "(Note.—This is expressly indicated by two writs, one in the reign of John, 17th February, 1208; the other issued by Henry in., 12th July, 1237.)"(P. 35.)

The Convocation of County and Burgh Deputies became an actual necessity as the principle, that consent in all matters of impost was right, came to be recognized. (P. 375.)

Guizot also cites, for the division of Parliament into two Houses, the following authorities: "Carte 17, Edward III., 1844. Parliamentary History, 6 Edward III., 1333. Hallam, 1327, or perhaps 8 Edward II, 1315"(organized, perhaps, between 1345-1355). (P. 418.) He tells, at page 514, that in 1407, Henry IV., Commons recognized these principles: Parliamentary initiative in its present form, and exclusive initiative of Commons in matters of subsidies. (P. 514.)

Guizot explains fully the causes of jealousy of the Commons and reasons for their seeking to have control of money Bills. (Pp. 434, 435, 436, 447, and 462.)

Arthur Mills, in a work on Colonial Constitution, 1856, says that "Upper House can originate, amend, or reject all Bills except money Bills;" "the extent of their parliamentary privileges is considerable, but hardly admits of legal definition;"and that "the election of representatives, as Lord Chief page 66 Justice Holt expresses it, is an original right vested in and inseparable from the freehold."

Earl Russell, in "English Government and Constitution,"1866, says, "It was a part of the practical wisdom of our ancestors to alter and vary the form of our institutions, as they went on, to suit the circumstances of the time, and reform them according to the dictates of experience. They never ceased to work upon our frame of Government as a sculptor fashions the model of a favourite statue. It is an art that, till of late years, had fallen into disuse, and the disuse was attended with evils of the most alarming magnitude."(Pp. 10, 11.)

Bagehot, on the English Constitution, 1867, says, "The evil of two co-equal Houses of distinct nature is obvious." "In both the American and Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much authority as the second." "If it does not produce a deadlock it is owing, not to the goodness of the legal Constitution, but to the discreetness of the members of the Chamber."(Pp. 127,128.) At page 130 he says, "Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a revising and suspending House. It can alter Bills, and it can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is not yet thoroughly in earnest—upon which the nation is not yet determined. This veto is a sort of hypothetical veto: they say, We reject your Bill for this once, or these twice, or even these thrice, but, if you keep on sending it up, at last we will not reject it. The House has ceased to be one of the latent directors, and has become one of the temporary rejectors and palpable alterers."

The Duke of Wellington's letter to Lord Derby quoted here is worthy of perusal: Mr. Bagehot goes on to say, "The House of Lords now is a Chamber with, in most cases, a veto of delay—with, in most cases, a power of revision—but with no other rights and powers." "As the Duke's letter in every line evinces, the wisest members—the guiding members of the House—know that the House must yield to the people if the people are determined." (P. 135.) And at page 169, "But I do not consider that, upon the broad principle of omitting legal technicalities, the House of Commons has any special function with regard to financial different from its functions with respect to other legislation." "It is to rule in both, and to rule in both through the Cabinet." page 67 And at page 270 he adds, "The House of Commons may, as was explained, assent in minor matters to the revision of the House of Lords, and submit in matters about which it cares little to the suspension veto of the House of Lords; but, when sure of the popular assent, and when freshly elected, it is absolute—it can rule as it likes and decide as it likes."

We would further observe, in reference to the third branch of the investigation, that the Constitution Act of New South Wales, of 1853, provides "that all Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue, or for imposing any new rate, tax, or impost, subject always to the limitations contained in clause 62 of this Act, shall originate in the Legislative Assembly"—that is, the Lower Chamber; and by clause 62 it is provided "that it shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to originate or pass any vote, resolution, or Bill for the appropriation of any part of the said Consolidated Revenue Fund, or of any other tax or impost to any purpose which shall not have been first recommended by a message of the Governor to the Legislative Assembly."

The Constitution Act of Victoria states that "it shall be lawful for the Legislature of Victoria by any Act or Acts to define the privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Council and Assembly, and by the members thereof respectively: Provided that no such privileges, immunities, or powers shall exceed those now had, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament, or the members thereof." And also that "all Bills for appropriating any part of the revenue of Victoria, and for imposing any duty, rate, tax, rent, return, or impost shall originate in the Assembly, and may be rejected, but not altered, by the Council." And, further, that "it shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to originate or pass any vote, resolution, or Bill for the appropriation of any part of the said Consolidated Revenue Fund, or of any other duty, rate, tax, rent, return, or impost for any purpose which shall not have been first recommended by a message of the Governor to the Legislative Assembly during the session in which such vote, resolution, or Bill shall be passed."

The Act of 20 Vict., 25th February, 1857, is "An Act for defining the Privileges, Powers, &c., of the page 68 Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of Victoria," and differs from the New Zealand Act of 1865 chiefly as to the date from which the privileges, &c., of the House of Commons are to be taken as a guide. The Victorian Act fixes the date at 18 and 19 Vict.; the New Zealand Act at the 1st January, 1865.

The British North American or Canadian Constitution Act was passed in 1867, and it declares in clause 18 that "the privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, or exercised by the Senate and the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that the same shall never exceed those at the passing of this Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof;" and it further provides, in clause 53, that "Bills for appropriating any part of the public revenue or for imposing any tax or impost shall originate in the House of Commons," and in clause 54 it is declared that "it shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or of any tax or impost, to any purpose that has not been first recommended to that House by message of the Governor-General."

Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, says that "the first clause" (sec. 7, art. 1) "declares, all Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. This provision, so far as it regards the right to originate what are technically called 'money Bills,' is, beyond all question, borrowed from the British House of Commons, of which it is the ancient and indisputable privilege and right that all grants of subsidies and parliamentary aids shall begin in their House, and are first bestowed by them, although their grants are 'not effectual to all intents and purposes until they have the assent of the other two branches of the Legislature.' The general reason given for this privilege of the House of Commons is, that the supplies are raised upon the body of the people; and, therefore, it is proper that they alone should page 69 have the right of taxing themselves. And Mr. Justice Blackstone has very correctly remarked that this reason would be unanswerable if the Commons taxed none but themselves. But it is notorious that a very large share of property is in possession of the Lords; that this property is equally taxed as the property of the Commons; and therefore, the Commons not being the sole persons taxed, this cannot be the reason of their having the sole right of raising and modelling the supply. The true reason seems to be this: The Lords, being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleasure by the King, are supposed more liable to be influenced by the Crown, and, when once influenced, more likely to continue so, than the Commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would, therefore, be extremely dangerous to give the Lords any power in framing new taxes for the subject. It is sufficient that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the Commons too lavish or improvident in their grants. (Sec. 874.)

"This seems a very just account of the matter in reference to the spirit of the British Constitution, though a different explanation has been deduced from a historical review of the power. It has been asserted to have arisen from the instructions from time to time given by the constituents of the Commons (whether of county, city, or borough) as to the rates and assessments which they are respectively willing to bear and assent to, and from the aggregate it was easy for the Commons to ascertain the whole amount which the commonalty of the whole kingdom were willing to grant to the King. Be this as it may, so jealous are the Commons of this valuable privilege that herein they will not suffer the other House to exert any power but that of rejecting. They will not permit the least alteration or amendment to be made by the Lords to the mode of taxing the people by a money Bill, and under this appellation are included all Bills by which money is directed to be raised upon the subject for any purpose or in any shape whatsoever, either for the exigencies of Government, and collected from the kingdom in general, as the land-tax, or for private benefit, and collected in any particular district, as turnpikes, parish rates, and the like. It is obvious that this power might be capable of great abuse if other Bills were tacked to such money page 70 Bills, and accordingly it was found that money Bills were sometimes tacked to favourite measures of the Commons with a view to insure their passage by the Lords, an extraordinary use or, rather, perversion of the power, which would, if suffered to grow into a common practice, have completely destroyed the equilibrium of the British Constitution, and subjected both the Lords and the King to the power of the Commons. Resistance was made from time to time to this unconstitutional encroachment, and at length the Lords, with a view to give permanent effect to their own rights, have made it a Standing Order to reject upon sight all Bills that are tacked to money Bills. Thus the privilege is maintained on one side and guarded against undue abuse on the other. (Sec. 875.)

"It will be at once perceived that the same reasons do not exist in the same extent for the same exclusive right in our House of Representatives in regard to money Bills as exist for such right in the British House of Commons. It may be lit that it should possess the exclusive right to originate money Bills, since it may be presumed to possess more ample means of local information, and it more directly represents the opinions, feelings, and wishes of the people; and, being directly dependent upon them for support, it will be more watchful and cautious in the imposition of taxes than a body which emanates exclusively from the States in their sovereign political capacity. But, as the Senators are in a just sense equally representatives of the people, and do not hold their offices by a permanent or hereditary title, but periodically return to the common mass of citizens, and, above all, as direct taxes are and must be apportioned among the States according to their federal population, and as all the States have a distinct local interest both as to the amount and nature of all taxes of every sort which are to be levied, there seems to be a peculiar fitness in giving to the Senate a power to alter and amend, as well as to concur with or reject, all money Bills. The due influence of all the States is thus preserved; for otherwise it might happen, from the overwhelming representation of some of the large States, that taxes might be levied which would bear with peculiar severity upon the interests, either agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing, of others being the minor States; and thus the equilibrium page 71 intended by the Constitution, as well of power as of interest and influence, might be practically subverted. (Sec. 876.) There would also be no small inconvenience in excluding the Senate from the exercise of this power of amendment and alteration, since if any or the slightest modification were required in such a Bill to make it either palatable or just, the Senate would be compelled to reject it, although an amendment of a single line might make it entirely acceptable to both Houses. Such a practical obstruction to the legislation of a free Government would far outweigh any supposed theoretical advantages from the possession or exercise of an exclusive power by the House of Representatives. Infinite perplexities, and misunderstandings, and delays would clog the most wholesome legislation. Even the annual Appropriation Bills might be in danger of a miscarriage on these accounts, and the most painful dissensions might be introduced. (Sec. 877.) Indeed, of so little importance has the exclusive possession of such a power been thought in the State Governments that some of the State Constitutions make no difference as to the power of each branch of the Legislature to originate money Bills. Most of them contain a provision similar to that in the constitution of the United States; and in those States where the exclusive power formerly existed, as, for instance, in Virginia and South Carolina, it was a constant source of difficulties and contentions. In the revised Constitution of South Carolina (in 1790) the provision was altered so as to conform to the clause in the Constitution of the United States. (Sec. 878.)

"The clause seems to have met with no serious opposition in any of the State Conventions; and, indeed, could scarcely be expected to meet with any opposition except in Virginia, since the other States were well satisfied with the principle adopted in their own State Constitutions; and in Virginia the clause created but little debate. (Sec. 879.) What Bills are properly 'Bills for raising revenue' in the sense of the Constitution has been a matter of some discussion. A learned commentator supposes that every 'Bill which indirectly or consequentially may raise revenue is within the sense of the Constitution a revenue Bill.' He therefore thinks that the Bills for establishing the Post Office and the page 72 Mint and regulating the value of foreign coin belong to this class, and ought not to have originated (as in fact They did) in the Senate. But the practical construction of the Constitution has been against his opinion. And, indeed, the history of the origin of the power already suggested abundantly proves that it has been confined to Bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. No one supposes that a Bill to sell any of the public lands, or to sell public stock, is a Bill to raise revenue in the sense of the Constitution. Much less would a Bill be so deemed which merely regulated the value of foreign or domestic coins, or authorized a discharge of insolvent debtors upon assignments of their estates to the United States, giving a priority of payment to the United States in cases of insolvency, although all of them might incidentally bring revenue into the Treasury. (Sec 880.)"