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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 79

Legislative Council

Legislative Council.

Under the Constitution Act of New Zealand, it is provided that legislation shall be the result of the deliberations of two Chambers, such result having the Governor's assent. I have referred at House length to the election of the Lower House hut the Upper stands in a different position, and around its composition and powers an unceasing discussion has ranged for very many years, but no practical proposal for its reform has been placed before the country by any responsible Minister. The original proposal of Sir George Grey, who drafted our Constitution, was that the members of the Legislative Council should be directly elected by the Provincial Councils, but the Constitution, as finally sent out from Downing Street, substituted life appointment of members by the Governor. Under that system the Chamber long continued to represent, in the main, the landed and moneyed interests of the country. It was Conservative in the most pronounced sense. But, notwithstanding this, very many fine men found seats there, and in a number of instances, did good work, but the people, in a proper sense, had no entrance or representation. In the time of John Ballance the life tenure of members was changed to one tending over a period of seven years only, and under this rule, the majority of the present Legislative Council loss sit. When liberalism got into power the personnel of the Council was gradually changed in political colour, and all class of the community were called to it, so that now, in a general way, it may be said, the old Tory ascendency has disappeared, and few of that class are appointed. This transformation was inevitable if Liberal Administrations were to carry into law the measures which they in the Lower House, as representatives of the people, bad safely put through. "Blocks" between the two Houses were not infrequent in the early days of Liberalism, but to-day the Upper House is little mote than an echo of the Lower so far as conclusions are concerned.

For a long time "Refor mof the Upper House" has been a "burning question talked about election after election, but nothing has been done. The principal reform proposals hitherto made by irresponsible persons amount to the election of the Upper House by the direct vote of the people, or by the members of the Lower, But none of these proposals, so far as I have seen, have ever seriously handled the real question—is such a legislative body needed at all? Surely in these days of "Triumphant Democracy" the Upper House, in its present form, is an anachronism, a survival of the post, having no warrant in common sense for its continued existence. Election by the people direct could only result in a duplication of the Lower House, the constituency being in both cases alike; while election by members of the Lower House, though an improvement upon the former proposal, would always result in the majority in the Upper Chamber being the elect of the ruling party in the Lower. In all, except a few matters, finance and such like, the Upper House has legislative powers identical with those of the Lower, It can initiate legislation, it can alter the conclusions of the Lower House, it can lay aside bills sent up to it. Is this really needed or wise? Granted a Revising Chamber is desirable, is the Upper House such a body, noted for its suitability for such a task? A "revising body," from its very name, implies a body superior in knowledge and capacity to that which primarily initiates proposals. By no stretch of imagination can the present Legislative Council he so esteemed, however excellent the qualities of some of its, members may be. My conception of how to deal with the Upper house is to abolish it altogether as being an excrescence upon the body politic. In its place I would substitute a real revising body, in the shape of a score or less of men, call them by any name you will, "Notables" or such like, to whom should be referred all the work proceeding from the House of Representatives for revision in small matters, and defined suggestions for improvements in larger. These "Notables" should have no power to initiate legislation, or to veto that of the House of Parliament But they should have power to formulate page 6 amendments or additions to the work sent to them for revision, and, if necessary, appear before the House in support of their suggestions, but the final action would be that of the House itself. Under extraordinary circumstances, such as some great Constitutional question being involved, these revisers should, if failing in the House, possess the right to approach the Throne with their objections to the decision of the House, so that the Crown might be the better able to consider the matter of assent or veto. The membership of this body should, as far as possible, consist of men reputed for their past public service, or their special knowledge in matters relating to political economy trade, labour, commercial, educational and other departments of lite They should sit through the whole Parliamentary session, and receive such recognition for their services as might be fixed upon, not exceeding that now given to members of the Upper House. They might be appointed, two thirds of the number by the members of the House, voting by single transferable vote, and the remaining one-third nominated by the Crown. Their period of office might he conveniently made to coincide with the life of two Parliaments. This seems to me a businesslike way of dealing with the question which calls for early settlement, and if placed in a position to press it upon the attention of Ministers and of Parliament I shall certainly press it with all my power.