A Growing Tyranny.

We referred in our leading article on Thursday last to the steady encroachments of Executive upon the powers of the Legislature during recent years, and to the obliging manner in which the Legislature had acquiesced or actively [unclear: assisted] the proces. The rule of one man or of a body of men whose will is superior to the law of the land as laid down by Parliament and interpreted by the courts is tyranny, and it is to this consummation that our political institutions have been gradually approaching under the guidance of the strong hand that could brook no restraint upon its powers. "A tyrant," says Milton, "is he who, regarding neither the law nor the common good, reigns only for himself and his faction." Nobody could truthfully say that this definition exactly fits the kind of Government to which we have been recently accustomed in New Zealand. An entire disregard to the common good has certainly not been characteristic of it, nor could it have continued all these years if it had not done many things that were-beyond question for the common good, and many more which were so regarded by the popular humour. But in what would appear to be the two most essential points of the definition, at any rate in its application to any tyranny that, having no foreign or military force behind it, is driven to pay homage to the forms of freedom and to the demands of public opinion, the correspondence between the definition and the facts of our case has been remarkably close. Our Government has not been entirely above the law, but in innumerable instances after the fashion already detailed it has been allowed to become a law unto itself, it has secured express legal enactments giving it an absolute power of legislation in matters of vital concern, and it has not hesitated to defy and make light of the law where lawlessness seemed more convenient than obedience. And as to the other branch of the definition, which speaks of the tyrant as reigning only fox himself and his faction, here also the correspondence is very close. Political colour has fortunately not been the only consideration which has influenced the appointments of the Ministry, but it has been potent enough to fill hundreds of offices with occupants who have no other claim whatever.

Of the direct abandonment to the Executive by the people's representatives of one of their primacy functions, the most obvious specific instance is the much-debated section 4 of the Public Revenues Amendment Act of 1900. Section 3 of the same measure, which empowers a snatch vote of the House on the Estimates to override statute law, has naturally made a deeper impression, on the popular imagination, because on, the very a same day on which it passed it was taken advantage of by members of the House to vote themselves the sum of £40 by way of "sessional allowance" in addition to the salary fixed by law, and without notice of any kind to the constituencies. If tine passing of that clause and the snatching of that money—both carried out at the instance of Ministers who, as an obvious part of the same bargain, also got an increase of their own salaries during the same session—must be regarded as one of the foulest blots which the public morality of the colony has ever suffered, the passing of clause 4 undoubtedly marks one of the most deplorable of constitutional or unconstitutional innovations. In the early days of the British Constitution, when the only tyranny to be guarded against was that of the Sovereign, and the leaders of Parliament were the champions of the popular opposition to it. It was natural that a marked contrast should arise "between the jealous susceptibility displayed by the House of Commons in asserting their exclusive right to grant tie supplies and the indifference with which (until very lately) they have abandoned the final appropriation of the supplies, when granted, to the unchecked discretion of the executive Government." But recent authorities note that in Great Britain of late years "the constitutional control of Parliament over the public expenditure has been exercised with [unclear: gr] vigilance and effect." These seem [unclear: to] several good reasons why this constitutional control should be [unclear: still] jealously guarded and tightened in New Zealand, but it has been one of Mr. Seddon's distinctions to reverse the process both by statute law and administration practice.

The facts that ours is a more democratic community than that of [unclear: Gre] Britain, that we have no [unclear: monarch] privilege or superstition to be [unclear: on] guard against, that the only [unclear: tyra] to be dreaded is that of the Ministry and that the uncontrolled disposal moneys for public works would form strongest possible buttress for such tyranny, are surely sufficient [unclear: reasons] the jealousy of which we [unclear: speak;] section 4 of the Public Revenues Amendment Act is evidence of how Parliament has discharged its obligations the matter. There had previously [unclear: b] a power on the part of the [unclear: Execu] to transfer the unexpanded [unclear: surplus] a particular vote in aid of a [unclear: si] vote in the same class, but in clause of the Public Revenues Bill of [unclear: 19] which only reached its second [unclear: read] on the third day before the close of very exhausting session, Mr. [unclear: Seddon] plied for power to transfer the [unclear: wh] of any sum voted by [unclear: Parliament] any particular purpose to any [unclear: oc] item in the same class. Very [unclear: prope] the clause was denounced by Mr. [unclear: I] ner as "a most monstrous provision but it went through, [unclear: nevertheless,] another Government supporter [unclear: who] now a very likely candidate for a [unclear: p] folio, bus since referred to it [unclear: as] wickedest thing of all." The [unclear: pract] effect of the clause could hardly [unclear: be] ter put in a brief compass than [unclear: by] Tanner in his speech on the [unclear: sec] veading:—"Complaint has often [unclear: h] page 7 made of the way in which large sums are amassed under a single vote, that vote being only one vote in one class. Why, there are single votes under the Appropriation Act of last year; some of which run to £30,000 and £40,000. When one speaks of a particular class he can soon find votes of half a million. If the money available under any one vote is to be made available for any other purpose indicated in that class, it practically means placing £500,000, £600, 000, or even £800.000 in the hands of the Government to spend on any one or other of the lines or works that they choose" The total amount voted for railway construction in the last Public Works Estimates was £860,500, the items ranging from £1000 for "land-claims," etc., to £300,000 for the North Island Main trunk. Every item has its sum duly allocated by the House, but the allocation may be disturbed at the uncontrolled discretion of the Ministry under this extraordinary clause. The House may talk; and vote, but Ministers govern, and the money will be spent as they desire. Is this sound business and rational control? or is it a moat dangerous increase of the alarming; powers already enjoyed by the Government to treat the public money as their own?