Address to the Electors of Bruce.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Fellow-electors in Bruce,—I appear tonight to address you as an elector in Bruce. The question I address you on is not now a question of license or no-license; that is settled, and settled according to law. The electors of Bruce, by a majority of 847, have lawfully declared for a proposal that Parliament has placed within their power to decide, and before that proposal—no-license—can be altered a like majority of the electors of Bruce have, at a lawful poll, to decide that new licenses shall be granted. Let the issue at the outset be clearly put before the electors of Bruce and the people and Parliament of this colony, and no power on earth shall defeat the electors of Bruce on this occasion. What is that issue? It is not the issue of license or no-license. It is the question whether we are a free people. It is the question whether the liquor-sellers of Bruce shall govern and dictate to the people of Bruce. Let it be clearly understood that there is no dispute now as to whether the lawful majority of the people have voted no-license. That is settled, and settled three times over. First, it was settled when the returning officer announced the verdict of the people. He had counted the votes, and the majority was for no-license. Then the Liquor party demanded a recount. They were not sure whether at all the booths a correct count had been made. That was a perfectly fair demand. They could reasonably doubt whether the voice of the people had been declared. They could appear as bona fide electors, interested in honest government. The law gave them, as it gave every elector, power and right to see that a correct count had been made. And what was the correct count? It still more increased the majority for no-license. It doubled that majority. That second count should have been final. It showed a majority of 847 in favour of no-license—a majority of 5 to 3 and 31 to spare in favour of no-license. There was the will of the people unmistakably expressed. And, if the vote had been the other way, as to alleged irregularities at the poll, there never would have been a word about them. That is, no bona fide elector, willing to obey the Constitution of his country, the rule of the people lawfully expressed, would have sought, on the ground of legal technicalities, to quash the verdict of the people. Electors of Bruce, such an attempt in a free country is little short of a crime. For, mark you, the plea of irregularity was not made that there might be a fresh appeal to the people on the same conditions, with the irregularities rectified. The attempt to quash the verdict of the people was made that there should be no verdict at all, that the people should be coerced, robbed of their rights, and that the voice of nearly 4000 electors should not be heard at all. Now, what has been the fight of our people all along the ages? It has been the fight of the common people against the men of privilege and of page 6 elector of Bruce the true bearing of the present situation, how it has been brought about, and the way out of it. At the same time, I have the wider object of appealing to the electors of the colony and to Parliament.

Now, there are some preliminary explanations and arguments I must address to you if you are to have an intelligent grasp of the situation. The first thought, the first question, in every elector's mind is: How is the one poll void and not the other? It is just as certain that no-license was carried as that Mr James Allen was elected for Bruce. In the licensing poll the sitting member, let us say, is Mr License. At the election he was defeated by an overwhelming majority. Yet still he holds his seat as firmly as ever. How is that? How is it that there is no petition against Mr Allen? How is it mandatory for the magistrate to declare the lawful member (Mr No-License) defeated and unseated, and Mr License elected? Nay, how comes it that if there had been a petition to unseat Mr Allen, though all the irregularities charged against No-License and many more had been committed, it would not have affected his seat one jotr? Has the liquor-seller a life tenure, a perpetual life interest in his seat, and do what you will and vote how you will, shall he sit there and rule you forever? Are we in Russia or in the British Empire, in Bruce or Siberia? In Russia they do not pretend to have popular laws and rule for the people by the people. They have the Czar. It is the law here—at least, we pretend it is the law—that the people shall rule. Yet the liquor-seller here is above that law. He is the Czar of New Zealand. And, in the words of Lord Bacon, our laws are like spiders' webs, where the small flics are caught and the great break through.

The first thing we must be clear about is, What are the conditions of the contest? How is the licensing poll conducted, under what law? And the next question is, If a petition to void the election is presented, what court tries it, and what are the rules of that court? The two questions are quite distinct, are easily confused, are much debated, and have been grievously confounded in the present contest. First, then, the poll. How is it conducted? Section 7 (1) of the "Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, 1895," says: "The returning officer of the electoral district shall, upon the day appointed, proceed to take the licensing poll in the manner provided by the Electoral Act for taking the electoral poll;" and then follow clauses stating that the machinery of the "electoral"—that is, the parliamentary poll—is to be duplicated for the licensing poll. Words could not be clearer or more explicit. There is the one principal returning officer—everything else is duplicated. If that is the manner of taking the poll, what is the manner and what the court for trying a petition to void the election? This is a totally distinct question. The first contest before the people at the polls has to do with the merits of the case, license or no-license, Mr Allen or his opponent. The trial of a petition has nothing to do with the merits of the contest whatever. The simple question page 7 is, Was the poll conducted according to law? Was the candidate or proposal carried? At the outset, however, an important factor in favour of the validity of the poll should be borne in mind. If it has been shown on a careful recount that the candidate or proposal returned bona fide by the returning officer has unmistakably the majority, then in every case of charges of irregularity, where ever there is doubt, the verdict shall be given in favour of the accused—that is, here, in favour of the validity of the poll. Now, I cannot get out of my mind the impression that here was a source of confusion in the magistrate's mind, whether the electors or publicans should have the benefit of the doubt, and five skilful lawyers did their utmost, by able and sophistical reasoning, to obfuscate the mind of the magistrate on this point. Once, however, the question had been settled, that no-license had the majority—and it was settled by the magistrate himself—every doubt, in short every difficulty, in the magistrate's mind, as it would go to an accused person, should have gone in favour of the validity of the poll. What the magistrate has done in the case of Bruce is to give his doubt in favour of the accuser and not of the accused. What, then, are the conditions for trying a petition? What is the court procedure? Sub-section (o) of the Act quoted says: "If the result of any licensing poll is disputed, any fifty electors may require an inquiry to be held in manner provided by section 48 and the subsequent sections of 'The Regulation of Local Elections Act, 1876,' and the matter in dispute shall be determined in the same manner, mutatis mutandis, as if the said poll were an electoral poll." Now, you might think, in your simplicity, that all this was clear and patent to the intelligent elector. The petition is to be tried; "the matter in dispute is to be determined in the same manner, mutatis mutandis, as if the said poll were an electoral poll." Very well; the case is brought before the stipendiary magistrate in the manner for bringing a petition under section 48 of The Regulation of Local Elections Act, and what do you discover? Is the matter in dispute settled "in the same manner as if the said poll were an electoral poll"? Oh no! It is to be tried as if it were a "Road Board poll!" Now, this is one of the most surprising and cruel things that you have ever heard of. "The Regulation of Local Elections Act, 1876," has for many years been in peaceful operation for the regulation of such local elections as County Councils and Road Boards. It provides a directory for two things. First, a directory for the returning officer as to the manner in which he is to conduct the polling; and second, a directory to the stipendiary magistrate as to the manner in which he is to try a petition to void that poll. These two things are wholly distinct, are easily separable; yet they may be confused. And they have been grievously and cruelly confounded in this contest. For what is contended for by the legal minds of our opponents is that "electoral poll" in section 7 (o) of the Alcoholic Liquors Act quoted means not "parliamentary poll," but "Road Board poll.". And, as I say, by one of those surprising page 8 and cruel decisions of legal minds that sometimes stupify the layman and enrage the reformer, the petition is tried as if not only the constitution and procedure of the court were the same as for trying a Road Board poll, but as if also the polling itself—that is, the manner of conducting the poll—were for a Road Board election. And, as you may be ready to blame Mr Cruickshank for this, let me say that he is not to blame. It was a judge of the Supreme Court who gave this ruling in Bastings v. Stratford, and the magistrate, it is held, was bound by that ruling. For that judge I have the greatest respect; but even Homer has been known to nod and to multi-tudes at least of lay minds, and of parliamentarians, too, it will appear that this able and most respected judge in this instance has not simply nodded, but gone clean asleep. When we were at school and studied Euclid, we used to test the validity of some conclusions by supposing the contrary to be true, and seeing what inferences followed. If you could draw absurd inferences from a conclusion, you deemed the conclusion itself false. Now if the words of the Licensing Act, "that the matter in dispute is to be determined in the same manner as if the said poll were an electoral poll, mean that the directory for the returning officer is the same as for a parliamentary poll, everything is plain sailing, and nothing will void a licensing poll that will not void a parliamentary poll; but if the words imply that "electoral poll" means "Road Board poll, then it follows that the directory for the returning officer is the directory for a Road Board poll. It is this legal ruling that is the chief source of all our present troubles, and, as I have said, Mr Cruickshank is not to blame for this at all events. It is held he was bound by that ruling. And what follows? A mass of inconsistencies, contradictions, legal quibbles, sophistries, and heart-breaks. First, as regards its effect on the returning officer. There are sent to him to conduct the elections the Electoral Act and the Alcoholic Sale Control Acts, and these alone. These Acts contain his directory—the one for the parliamentary poll, and the others for the licensing poll. Now, as already quoted, the Alcoholic Act, section 7. gives his directory for the licensing poll, and says: "The returning officer of the electoral district shall, upon the day appointed, proceed to take the licensing poll in the manner provided by the Electoral Act for taking the electoral poll"; and then follow directions so clearly making the two polls run parallel, as if on opposite rails, that he is directed to do a physically impossible thing, "to give the voting paper and the ballot paper simultaneously to the voter"—a physically impossible thing, when the two officers, one for the parliamentary poll and the other for the licensing poll, are sitting, as they must do, at adjoining tables. The two polls are as nearly parallel as the rails on a railway, and open and close at the same hour, and there is just one principal returning officer to conduct the polls and declare the result. But if his manner of conducting the respective polls is called in question, what happens? If the conduct of the parliamentary poll is called in question, he has to page 9 appear before two judges of the Supreme Court, who have all the powers and procedure of the Supreme Court. What more? He takes his directory, the Electoral Act, into court, and he shows that he conducted the election in the manner provided; and if there have been technical irregularities among his subordinates, he claims the indemnities provided in section 167 of the Electoral Act—namely: "An election shall not be declared invalid by reason of any irregularity in any of the proceedings preliminary to the polling, or by reason of a failure to hold a poll at any place appointed for holding a poll, or by reason of a non-compliance with the directions contained in this Act as to the taking of the poll or the counting of the votes, or by reason of any mistake in the use of the forms contained in the first schedule hereto, if it appears to the court having cognisance of the question that the election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this Act, and that such failure, non-compliance, or mistake did not affect the result of the election." That is how an electoral or parliamentary petition is dealt with, with the result that scarcely ever is one presented, and more rarely still does one succeed. Hence you have in your parliamentary elections a free poll for a free people. But if the licensing poll is called in question, and the question is, Has Mr License or Mr No-License been returned? then, in the first instance, a recount of the votes may be ordered by the stipendiary magistrate, and this recount is conducted by the magistrate himself. Now, this was done in Bruce; the magistrate recounted the votes, and doubled the required majority, and declared Mr No-License to be duly elected by a majority of 5 to 3 and 30 to spare. So Mr No-License was unmistakably elected. But if, further, the question is raised that the result does not represent the true mind of the people, because people were prevented from voting, or persons not entitled to vote have voted, then, in that case, the returning officer has to appear in the Magistrate's Court to answer his accusers. He appears, and he understands that the authority of the magistrate is limited to the jurisdiction of his court. He understands that the directory or procedure for the magistrate in hearing the petition is the directory for hearing a petition in a Road Board election; but he is equally sure that his own directory for conducting his poll is that for the "electoral" or parliamentary election. The two things are wholly distinct—the directory for the manner of hearing the petition, and the directory for the manner of conducting the election. They are distinct, and can be kept distinct. When, however, the unfortunate returning officer appears in court—now, after the recount, like a chairman of a meeting, representing the people—he is met with the astounding legal conundrum, that follows on the decision in Bastings v. Stratford, that since he is to be tried in the same court as would try a "Road Board" returning officer, he is no longer to regard himself as an "electoral" or parliamentary officer, but only a returning officer for a Road Board. This, I say, is surprising and astounding. page 10 He says, first, that the directory for the manner of conducting the licensing poll is given in the same Act by which he is called into court, and that Act expressly says: "The returning officer for the electoral district shall, upon the day appointed, proceed to take the licensing poll in the manner provided by the Electoral Act for taking the electoral poll." And, he says, secondly, the same Act that brings him before the magistrate declares: "The matter in dispute shall be determined in the same manner, mutatis mutandis, as if the said poll were an electoral poll.' "It does not matter," the magistrate tells him. "By the legal decision in Bastings v. Stratford, I will try you as if you were a Road Board returning officer, and if you or your subordinates have wilfully or negligently done anything or omitted to do anything that the directory in the Local Elections Act requires, I will void your election, and fine you not more than fifty pounds." I say, the returning officer wonders where he has got to, equally with the electors for whom he now stands. He wonders if he has dropped into a court of justice in Turkey, and whether the magistrate is not a pasha. No, says the stolid magistrate; but "I am somewhat like an automaton, and it is mandatory for me to be 'strict,' so that if you err but in the extent of a hairsbreadth, I will void your election, and fine you not more than £50." And so the farce of trying the returning officer and the electors of Bruce proceeds. Seriously, I ask. Can this be the law, and if it is the "law," is it the mind, was it ever the mind, of the Legislature? By express enactment, the licensing polls were taken from the category of "local" questions. Such a category was deemed too parochial for a national question, and accordingly the small licensing areas were abolished, and the areas made coterminous with the parliamentary electorate. Then the polling was made on the same day, and the election on the licensing question was run on the same line, on parallel rails, so to speak, with the parliamentary election. The same officer is appointed to conduct the two polls, and give the papers "simultaneously." Moreover, he has sent for his guidance, and he sends to all the booths, the Electoral Act and the Alcoholic Acts, and these alone. He does not receive, nor does he send, the Local Elections Act, under which he is now tried. A copy of the Local Elections Act could not have been found in a single booth in the Colony on the day in question. He does not receive, neither he nor his officers, the Local Elections Act, yet he is now tried, and the electors are tried, on an Act not sent to them, and on a directory for polling, dated 1876, for Road Board elections! How is it possible, I ask, to conduct two polls "simultaneously' on different directories? How is it possible for either officers or people, even if they were fully warned, to carry on "simultaneously two different and important elections on a "common or parliamentary law" and on a "much stricter" "road board law," and not land themselves in interminable confusion and perpetual defeat? Did the Legislature intend this thing? Is it possible the Legislature intended thus to give a free poll to a free page 11 people, and so to arrange this election that the people of the Colony should be perpetually governed by a public an oligarchy, and be immersed in constant, vexatious, oppressive, and expensive litigation? Such a supposition is impossible to believe. I decline to believe that the Parliament of New Zealand are a band of conspirators, with ideals and purposes that would disgrace a Boer oligarchy. Such, then, is the preliminary cause of our present troubles—the ingenuity of legal minds and the power of the liquor oligarchy employing splendid counsel, to wrest judgments from the courts on legal technicalities against the people. And, accordingly, we have the confession wrung from Mr Cruickshank in his Mataura judgment: "By the common law, minor irregularities will not disturb any election, unless they can be shown to affect the result; but I am bound here by the 'local election' statute, and I have to decide the question in the same manner as if it was a dispute into the conduct of a Road Board election." Again, in his Bruce judgment he says: "The court in this matter is somewhat like an automaton."

Well, now, where have we got to now? The returning officer and electors of Bruce are being tried for their political liberties, as if it were a "Road Board election." where not thousands but only a few hundred make up the rolls. Let it proceed, and let us watch the struggles of the unfortunate magistrate and the equally unfortunate returning officer and electors of Bruce. The magistrate has got his "Road Board" Act, his bed of Procrustes, let us call it; and if the returning officer of Bruce is too long or too short for the dimensions of this instrument of torture, the magistrate will lop off a limb, or strike off the head altogether, and leave the officer, whose electoral box is the palladium of the liberties of the electors of Bruce, a quivering and decapitated corpse. What, then, are the dimensions of this bed of Procrustes, this "Road Board" Act? Section 50, subsections 2 and 6, gives the two relative sections under which the magistrate grouped all the irregularities and technicalities, covering in their enumeration almost the entire alphabet, alleged against the returning officer and electors of Bruce. These sections are: "(2) That the poll was open beyond or was not open within the hours hereby required," and "(6) That any other irregularity occurred in the proceedings, which, in the opinion of the magistrate, tended to defeat the fairness of the election." Now, at the outset, I am prepared to say and prove that the returning officer and electors of Bruce conducted both elections—parliamentary and licensing—in an honourable and creditable fashion, and that probably in no other electorate were they more honourably and creditably done. Molehills have been made into mountains, and powerful legal microscopes have been turned on the conduct of the proceedings to detect a flaw, with results most creditable and honourable to the returning officer and electors, and discreditable and dishonouring to their persecutors. And if the magistrate had exhibited in Bruce the same courage and judgment as he displayed in Mataura, and been con- page 12 sistent with himself, "local" Act notwithstanding, the petition would have been dismissed, and the election upheld. But an array of counsel, such as probably never addressed a Supreme Court judge within the bounds of the Bruce electorate, appeared at Milton before the stipendiary magistrate, and pounded into him as many legal sophistries and quibbles as ever obfuscated the judicial intellect, and reduced him as he appears to confess, to "something like an automaton."

And let us study the result in his long and disappointing decision. First, under section 2, on the question of time. If "strict time," it is alleged, is not kept the election is void. But in considering this question of "strict time," even in a Road Board election, it was not necessary for the magistrate to divest himself of his reason or his courage. It was mandatory—the capital sentence, it is true; but to bring in the capital verdict was no more obligatory than for a jury to bring in a verdict of murder in a trifing assault. Just because the court could pronounce nothing less than a capital sentence, final and without appeal, it might have been evident to a magistrate, who maintained his balance and his courage, that the capital verdict itself was not to be brought in on vexatious, frivolous, and technical grounds. For if it had been so. Parliament would have taken some care to provide a common standard "time" for every booth in the electorate. "Tis with men's judgments as their watches: None go just alike, yet each believes his own." Hence, when the watches of the witnesses varied, it could not be certain which was right, and both might be wrong. Abstract "strict time," apart from the purpose for which the time is stipulated, is a figment of the brain, and could not have been found kept in every booth in any electorate in the colony on the day in question.

Now, at Manuka Creek the question of "strict time" could not have been decided that day. By the parliamentary officer it was stated he opened his box at a-quarter to six; the licensing officer stated it was ten to six. Both officers counted first the parliamentary votes, and, as there were 53 of these, the magistrate reasons that to count them "would not take many minutes." Now, notice this "would not take many minutes." This is merely opinion—it is not evidence, and it is not fact. The question is not "would," but "did" it take many minutes? And the magistrate had no positive evidence for his opinion, but much to the contrary. Having got this "would, he draws the conclusion: "It is certain there must have been a premature closing of the booth. I hold, therefore," he says, "that strict time was not kept at Manuka Creek." Upon such flimsy evidence and precarious reasoning does the magistrate bring in a verdict involving capital sentence. Bear in mind, the electoral poll had nothing to do with the licensing poll, and that an irregularity of the electoral or parliamentary officer did not in any way affect the conduct of the licensing officer. As the magistrate says in his Mataura judgment: "I have nothing page 13 to do with the pranks of the electoral officer." Now, even if abstract strict time had been laid on to Manuka Creek by electric telegraph, copyright, from Wellington, there is every reason to believe that the licensing officer kept it that day at Manuka. Everyone knows that it might have taken much more time than the magistrate thinks would suffice. To count 53 electoral votes, take note of, and discuss with scrutineers doubtful markings, might take, and often does take, 20 minutes or more. Was it mandatory, then, for the magistrate to adopt that precarious reasoning? As a matter of fact, I believe it was some time after six when the licensing officer reached his own box. It is certain, therefore, contrary to the magistrate's opinion, that there was no premature closing of the booth. In fact, it is difficult for any sane man to bring himself seriously to discuss abstract "strict time" in the case in question, for not a solitary voter disturbed the peaceful flow of time as it approached the fateful moment of 6 p.m.

Next, take Berwick. Here, again, it is not the simple question of fact; but, while the sentence is death to the political liberties of the entire Bruce electors, the magistrate himself finds by a process of legal and inconsistent reasoning that this booth was closed 15 minutes. At this precious booth, a private residence, only 33 voters polled. Not one human being was precluded from voting, or voted before or after the hours of opening and closing, and yet the magistrate brings in the verdict: "Closed 15 minutes; the sentence is death to the political liberties of the electors of Bruce." How did this come about? This frightful and scandalous offence was committed in this way:—The licensing officer went a few chains to vote at another booth "over the border," in the Taieri electorate. He left the electoral officer in charge of his poll till he came back. It took him 15 minutes; and then remember this: he performed the same kind office for the electoral officer, who went and likewise voted. Not one voter came during his absence. Now, if the proper evidence of whether a door is locked or not is that someone has tried to open it, so the proper evidence, one would think, of whether the poll was open—that is, in the magistrate's own words, "the operation or opportunity of voting"—would be that someone tried it and failed. That would, at all events, be positive evidence of closure. And it is evident the magistrate was ill-assured that this poll was indeed closed. At any rate, it is a legal opinion, for which he gives three inconsistent reasons, which, to the lay mind, cannot but appear inconsistent and unsatisfactory. Remember that at Waikawa, in Mataura, the booth was locked twice over for 20 minutes, and that a voter, who sought to enter the booth to vote, found it locked; and yet the magistrate "held" that the poll was open all the time. Again, it is legal opinion; and the magistrate gives three reasons for his conclusion. First, he asks, was there a lawfully appointed substitute? and he answers in the negative. He quotes section 112 of the Electoral Act, where it permits the appointment of a substitute, in writing, page 14 for illness or other sufficient cause. As his substitute was not appointed in writing, or for sufficient cause, the magistrate declares he was not appointed at all. "The cause of absence was purely private business—to vote in another electorate. This is not a 'sufficient cause' within the meaning, of the section." This is an opinion which many will question, and a man of more courage would have settled it differently. Now, is it "purely private business" tendering your vote on election day? Private, indeed, may be your reasons for voting in one direction or another, but the act itself is one of the most public and honourable a man can discharge. In the ancient State of Greece penalties were laid on the citizen who failed to vote, and, as a matter of fact, our own Colony penalises the citizen who fails to vote by striking him off the roll, and at great cost provides an opportunity of voting for every elector. More than that, the very section preceding the one quoted by the magistrate says: "(3) A deputy-returning officer shall be entitled to vote as an elector of the district on the roll whereof his name is duly entered as a qualified elector, but he shall not have the power hereinafter conferred upon the returning officer of giving a casting vote"; it being the expressed will of the Legislature not to disfranchise any, not even the principal returning officer, whose vote is reserved, in case of equality, to decide the poll. And it is upon this narrow and illiberal view of a great public duty and privilege that the validity of the election turns. If the magistrate had deemed this public and honourable duty, when it could be discharged without in any way infringing on the equal right and privilege of another elector, a "sufficient cause" for a 15-minutes' absence from a booth where only 33 voters polled all day, it would have saved him from trampling on the rights and liberties of 4000 electors for a mere legal figment. And if the cause of absence "was not sufficient," then the magistrate might have stopped there; but he proceeds to give a second reason for closing this poll 15 minutes, and thus avoiding the election. "Again." he says, "the electoral officer cannot act as deputy-returning officer for the licensing poll, as the law is clear that there must be two deputies." Now, what "law" is clear? The magistrate, in his Mataura judgment, as already quoted, declares: "I have nothing to do with the pranks of the electoral officer." Very good. Then what has he to do with the pranks of the electoral officer at Berwick? Nothing whatever; if he chose to close his poll and go home, or if he chose to act for the licensing officer for 15 minutes, what has the magistrate to do with his pranks? He was certainly a fit and reliable man to act for 15 minutes, and if the magistrate had nothing to do with his pranks as electoral officer, he was a fit man as a substitute. And as to the "law that there must be two deputies," I ask. What "law "? Not the "licensing" nor "local" law. Is it not plain to the lay mind that if there "must be two deputies," and if the electoral officer vacated his position to "act" for the licensing officer during the latter's absence, then it was the electoral poll and not page 15 the licensing poll that was closed for 15 minutes that day? And, although the electoral poll had been closed all day, the magistrate had nothing to do with the "pranks of the electoral officer." Apparently little satisfied with his precarious reasoning, the magistrate gives a third and apparently conclusive proof that, as there was no legal substitute, the poll was closed. "Again," he says, "the deputy-returning officer being in one of his functions, at least, an officer whose duties are judicial, he cannot by a common law delegate his functions to another." Now, this third reason proves too much. Whatever the common law is, it is contradictory of the magistrate's first reason, that by section 112 of the Electoral Act "Every returning officer and deputy-returning officer may appoint, in writing, a substitute to act for him in case of being prevented by illness or other sufficient cause from attending, or continuing to attend, at his polling place." If, by a common law, "he never could delegate his functions to another," what is the meaning of these very words explicitly stating that he can? Further, if the magistrate can quote section 112 of the Electoral Act against the returning officer for not appointing his substitute in writing, how does he not also quote and state the relevance of section 165 of the same Act, which says: "(165) An election shall not be liable to boo questioned by reason only of any defect in the title or want of title of the person by or before whom such election or any polling was held, if such person was actually appointed or was acting in the office giving a right to preside at any such election or polling." Now, it will take some legal fencing of no ordinary kind to overcome these objections to the magistrate's reasoning on this matter. If it is replied that section 165 of the Electoral Act is not in the Regulation of Local Elections Act, then, I reply, neither is section 112 of the Electoral Act, quoted by the magistrate. Does it amount to this, then: that when the returning officer pleads that his licensing election was conducted, like a parliamentary election, under the Electoral Act, he is nevertheless tried under the Local Elections Act as if the election was a Road Board one? And, further, when he is tried under the Local Elections Act, may the Electoral Act. notwithstanding, be quoted whenever it is against him, but never when it is in his favour? Indeed, as to the legal subtleties involved in this single question, so far from their being within the scope of the intellects of the returning officer and the un-fortunate electors of Bruce, one may say that the whole question might, with advantage to all concerned, have been turned over by the magistrate for settlement amongst the subtle intellects in Milton's "Paradise Lost," who

"reasoned high
Of Providence, foreknowledge, will and fate.
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end in wandering mazes lost."

When the magistrate himself gets out of the labyrinth of his own reasonings into the light of day he declares: "There was, therefore, page 16 at this polling booth for the licensing poll neither substitute nor returning officer either de facto or de jure, and the poll was thus closed for 15 minutes." Here, it appears, that instead of its being a manifest certainty that this booth for 33 voters was closed for 15 minutes, when nothing but the wind sought entry at the door, it is a highly complicated and knotty and inconsistent argument whereby it is "proved." If a man is innocent till he is proved guilty, if the accused should have the benefit of the doubt, have not the returning officer and electors of Bruce good reason to ask, Why did the magistrate not give them the benefit of the doubt? But no: he "finds" the poll closed, and pronounces the capital sentence of political extinction on the returning officer and electors of Bruce. Such is this most heinous and scandalous offence in the matter of time.

Yet there is Waitahuna Gully to consider. "It is four minutes to 6" at Waitahuna Gully on this fateful day. "Strict time" is to be kept—it is a Road Board poll that is proceeding, and if you err a minute or two the heaviest penalty that can be inflicted will fall, Not on the officers, whose watches may err, but upon the whole electors of Bruce. It does not matter whether the result of the poll is affected one jot by what is done or not done. The law of this Road Board Act, so we are asked to believe, is that "strict time" must be kept. Let us see what absurdities we get out of this legal figment at Waitahuna Gully. The magistrate says: "The evidence of both sides agrees in the main, and shows that the poll was definitely and intentionally closed by locking the door and opening the ballot boxes at about four minutes to 6. Within two or three minutes of such closing, the door was unlocked to admit a belated voter, who claimed it was still not quite 6 o'clock. The vote was taken, and the door once more locked. There was thus a clear and distinct breach of the sub-section." Now. I defy any reasonable mind to follow the magistrate here. What is the offence disclosed against the licensing officer? Is any offence whatsoever disclosed against him? First, as an elector of Bruce, have I not the right to ask. Is the magistrate sure that either of the disputant watches was correct? Is it not very likely that neither was absolutely right to the minute where "three minutes" are in dispute? A "twelve-and-sixpenny Waterbury" was one of the authorities quoted—and are the electors of Bruce disfranchised on the evidence of a twelve-and-sixpenny Waterbury? Now, to examine the magistrate's reasoning. He says: "The poll was definitely and intentionally closed by locking the door and opening the ballot boxes at about four minutes to 6." As to the facts, not only is there no evidence to support this statement—it is directly and minutely contradicted (1) by the scrutineer for the Liquor party, and (2) by the returning officers. Mark you, the magistrate has nothing to do with the electoral box: he has to do only with the licensing box. He says both "boxes" were opened on closing the doors. The Liquor scrutineer—Quilter [evidence Daily page 17 Times]—says that when the door was closed only the "electoral box" was opened. Further, he says: "The door had been closed three or four minutes before Mr Henry knocked. Nothing had been done to the licensing ballot box in that time." Now where is the offence disclosed? Where is it shown that it was not within "strict time" that this elector voted? There was a difference of opinion, as might be expected, as to the correct time when a minute or two was in dispute. What if the "door" had been closed, however, "intentionally," if the time was not up? The door was closed and locked for 20 minutes twice over at Mataura—for 40 minutes in all,—and yet that did not close the poll or void the election there. If at a minute or two before 6 the licensing officer closed the door "intentionally," preparatory to opening his box, the offence, if offence there were, was not committed of opening his box. Meanwhile, in the nick of time, a free and independent voter taps at the door. "Time is up!" "No, it is isn't!" "Well, let us see!" The twelve-and-sixpenny Waterburys are consulted! "A minute to spare!" Now, so long as the voter tendered himself to vote before 6, it did not matter if the process of voting went itself beyond the hair line of 6 p.m. traced by the Waterburys. Where, then, is there any evidence to show that the "polling"—"the opportunity of voting—was closed before 6, or was open after it? Not a particle; but much to the contrary. What reason is there to doubt the Liquor scrutineer and the licensing returning officer's evidence? He said: "Witness locked the door, and one of the ballot boxes was opened. It would be about three minutes before 6 o'clock that he locked the door, and it was subsequently that Henry voted. After Henry had left the booth the door was again locked. The booth was not open more than nine hours." Yet, in the face of that evidence, the magistrate holds there was a "clear and distinct breach of the subsection" about "strict time." Again, I ask, What offence was disclosed? Surely, in the name of common sense, this magistrate appointed to try people for their lives does not convict and sentence a man for an "intention" that, in point of fact, was not carried out. He appears to reason that as Mr Barnett "intentionally" closed the "door," that that is equal to, in fact, closing the poll—i.e., "the opportunity of voting." The sole question is, in point of fact, What did Mr Barnett do? If he "intended" to close the poll two or three minutes before the time, but, in point of fact, altered his mind before it was too late and allowed a man to vote, where, in the name of reason, I ask, was an offence disclosed? Carlyle somewhere has a powerful sentence on the chasm that separates "the hand on the trigger" and "pulling the trigger"—and that chasm was here. Mr Barnett had his hand on the trigger; in point of fact, he did not fire; nobody was hurt or even frightened; and this magistrate brings in the verdict, "Murder"; sentence, "Death." An "automaton" magistrate, with a vengeance! It appears to me that the returning officers acted with far more wisdom, prudence, and courage in the discharge of their duties than the magistrate in the discharge of his.

Such, then, is all the evidence on this subject of time. Such are the reasons compelling the magistrate to bring in a capital verdict, and inflict a capital sentence, depriving the electors of Bruce of their power at the polls. On such flimsy and precarious reasoning is his verdict based. And seeing, as he alleges, that this capital sentence is so strict, is mandatory, was it mandatory to bring in that capital verdict itself? Few but partisans will believe it.

Now, if these are all the counts against the electors of Bruce on the section dealing with time, what are the charges under subsection 6? That subsection says "That any other irregularity occurred in the proceedings which, in the opinion of the magistrate, tended to defeat the fairness of the election." Now, you must bear this section in mind, for a mass of false reasoning and nonsense has been talked about it that might have disgraced an assembly of Hottentots. The able counsel for the publicans pounded a lot of sophistical reasoning and nonsense into the magistrate as to the meaning of this section, and he appears to have been completely obfuscated by their sophistry. I think I shall make it clear to every elector in Bruce that the magistrate has had the wool pulled over his eyes by these clever gentlemen. It is a wonder he did nob see the twinkle in their eyes. They knew better; and I think he knows better by now.

Now, what does this subsection provide? "That the election shall be void if any other irregularity occurred which, in the opinion of the magistrate, tended to defeat the fairness of the election." If you are to detect the fallacy of the magistrate's decision under this section, you must get a clear meaning of the words employed. What is the magistrate's meaning? He says: "By the common law an election was voided if the irregularities proved were such as to affect the result of the election; but it is clear that a certain practice may be unfair in its tendency without, as a matter of fact, really affecting the result of the poll, and it is this class of practice which conies under the sixth subsection." The moment the magistrate got this nonsense into his head the voiding of the election was a foregone conclusion. And there never could be a popular election conducted under the sun but it would be instantly upset if such were the meaning of the subsection in question. Where did the magistrate get this notion from? Mr Chapman (counsel for the petitioners) pounded this into the magistrate. He said: "What was required to void an election was that the tendency, and not the effect, had to be shown. There were some classes of acts as to which it would be impossible to show the ultimate effect. He submitted that the Legislature selected with deliberation the expression 'tended to defeat the fairness of the election,' and that that enabled the magistrate to void the result of the poll if he found that the acts complained of had that tendency, without his being obliged to find they had that effect." If Mr Chapman had seriously brought this page 19 nonsense before a judge of the Supreme Court, the judge would have advised his examination by two medical men. Shorn of its sophistry, what does it mean? That if something happens in a vacuum, somebody has got to be hanged! A tendency is a balanced force—and we are surrounded with myriads of them, physical, moral, and spiritual—forces of gravity, pulling and straining and balancing our world and its contents; forces of good and forces of evil tending in contrary directions; forces of men tending in contrary directions;—but no one in his senses treats a balanced force as a liberated force.

Now let us examine the magistrate's language. He says that an election is voided for a class of practice which may have a tendency to, "but, as a matter of fact, really does not, affect the result!" We are asked, as Mr Chapman says, to believe that the Legislature "with deliberation" has selected its words, and that if the magistrate finds any tendencies—that is, forces at work—in the conduct of an election that, though unfair, yet do not affect the result, he is to void the election, and to inflict the capital sentence on the whole electors. This is simply incredible. Let us strip the fallacy by examining the words in detail. There are two expressions used by the magistrate that will let us see where the fallacy got in. He says that by the common law of parliamentary elections only such irregularities count as "affect the result"; but here he has only to find irregularities that "defeat the fairness of the election"; and he holds that these two things are different, though it is as clear as can be that they are one and the same. When is the fairness of an election defeated? Evidently only when Brown is elected when Jones should have been. If Jones has the majority of votes, yet if Brown is elected, evidently the fairness of the election is defeated. Only when the wrong party gets in, or the wrong issue is carried, is the fairness of the election defeated. That Brown's votes or Jones's votes might have been more or fewer is of no consequence to the ultimate fairness of the election, if, in point of fact, a few votes more or less did not affect the figures to the extent of placing the wrong man in and the right man out. That is the only "result" the Legislature cares two straws about when it speaks of "defeating the fairness" or "affecting the result." Now, if after allowance for all irregularities it is found that the "result" would not have been other than it is, then no man will contend that the Legislature would void an election for anything less than what would affect the ultimate result. And the magistrate declares in explicit words that none of the irregularities" "affected the result"; yet he has voided the poll. He says: "As the majority was over 30, I do not think the proved cases affected the result." Surely, then, if the proved cases did not affect the ultimate result, the fairness of the election was not defeated. The two things—when you are dealing with the simple question, "Who had a bare majority of votes after all allowances and deductions are made?"—"to defeat the fairness" and to "affect the result," page 20 that is, to defeat the ultimate fairness, and to affect the ultimate re-sult—are one and the same. And if you will read the decision of the magistrate who tried the Ashburton petition, you will see this non-sensical fallacy never disturbed his judgment. He used the expressions "tended to defeat the fairness of the election" and "affected the result of the election" with precisely the same meaning. Here are his incisive words: "As to the overcrowding, it is quite evident that though an irregularity was permitted, causing some inconvenience, it in no way affected the result of the election, as no one was thereby prevented from voting. . . The method adopted was not strictly in accordance with the letter of the statute, but I cannot see that it would make any difference in the result, or suppose that the result would have been altered had the proper method been used. It may have been a mistake, but it did not tend to defeat the fairness of the election. It seems to me unreasonable to contend that any such irregularity, without which no election is ever likely to be free, can over-ride the will of the people so unmistakably expressed." There you have as clearly as language can express it that the Ashburton magistrate regards "tending to defeat the fairness of the election" the same as "affecting the result of it." Not so our magistrate. And once the counsel for the petitioners sent him wool-gathering for things which, after all, it was found did not affect the ultimate result, the decision of the magistrate in their favour was a foregone conclusion.

It is plain the magistrate was misled by the fallacy lurking in the word "tendency," which he asks us to believe the Legislature decreed should void an election. That a "tendency to defeat" should be as fatal as "in fact, to defeat." This is incredible. This is to play at elections. It is to ask us to believe that the electors are playing themselves in school at mock elections, and if in the course of the election the teacher should notice anything that tended to defeat fairness he should "have it all over again," even although the ultimate result was not affected. We have heard of grandmotherly legislation; but playing at elections and making them void because of irregularities that have a bad tendency, but, in fact, are counteracted in the ultimate result, is to reduce a grave public question and the electors of the colony to factors in a "Comedy of Errors." Now, what is meant by a "tendency"? I would respectfully invite the magistrate's attention to any text-book of Logic, say to "Mill's Logic," Book III., chap. 10, "Of the Plurality of Causes, and of the Intermixture of Effects"; to "Whately's Logic": Appendix, "Ambiguous Terms"; chap. 28, "On Tendency"; and to "Jevons's Logic," chap. 31: "Explanation, Tendency, etc."; and he will admit that if he can quote "authorities," so also can I. Let me endeavour to explain what is really meant by "tendency," and you will at once see how reasonable is this sub-clause 6, and, if you will examine the context, how consistent it is with the preceding clauses in the Local Elections Act, and how, as might be expected, it is an expression of a principle of equity and justice, page 21 instead of being, at the instigation of our opponents' counsel, a weapon of folly in the hands of a magistrate. We are dealing with tendencies or causes or forces and their effects. Now, it is well known that in nature, as in an election, any effect may have more than one cause, and it is because there might be more than one cause tending to affect unfairly the ultimate result of an election that the word "tendency" ("a contributing influence," the Century says) is used. How, for instance, to take an illustration from nature, are the trade winds accounted for? Not by one cause; but by a plurality of causes, which tend to produce one effect. And so the ultimate result of an election may be altered by a plurality of causes or tendencies, or contributing influences, which affect the ultimate result, but which, taken singly, might not have that power. As Professor Jevons says of the example I have taken:—"There is one law or tendency which causes winds to blow from the Arctic regions towards the equator, and a second tendency which causes them to blow from east to west. These tendencies are combined together, and cause the trade winds to blow from the north-cast in the Northern Hemisphere, and from the south-east in the Southern Hemisphere." Again, he says:—" If the joint and homogeneous action of causes has been clearly explained, it will be now clear that a tendency means a cause which will produce an effect unless there be opposite causes, which, in combination with it, counteract and disguise that effect. Thus, when we throw a stone into the air, the attractive power of the earth tends to make it fall, but the upward motion we have impressed upon it disguises the result for a certain time." And Jevons concludes: "A tendency, then, is a cause which may or may not be counteracted." Now, the whole question for the magistrate resolved itself into this: Granted the irregularities, inseparable from every election, and tending to unfairly affect the ultimate result, were these irregularities and tendencies counteracted in that ultimate result? Plainly, a cause, hurtful in itself, if counteracted, is rendered harmless; and there are thousands of such tendencies abroad that are so counteracted. But neither law nor reason could treat a cause or force counteracted, and so rendered innocuous, as if, in fact, it was liberated to its full effect. The tendency of the careless discharge of firearms is to wound or kill, and the careless discharge of firearms in a public place is punishable. But it would be absurd if the law punished a man for murder or culpable homicide, when, in point of fact, the tendency, in a particular case, was counteracted—and the bullet entered the ground or buried itself in a wall. In fact, nobody was hit, the tendency was counteracted, and other fortunate circumstances altered the ultimate result. You see, then, that a tendency is a cause that may or may not be counteracted. Now, in the particular cases the magistrate groups under this subsection, he says that the tendency to defeat the fairness of the election was, in fact, counteracted, and did not appear in the ultimate result. He says: "I do not think the proved cases affected the result." That is to say, the tendencies to unfairness were counteracted by the tendencies to page 22 fairness, and did not appear in the ultimate result, whereby no-license was carried, representing the will of the people. Yet the magistrate, at the instance of "learned counsel," tried the unfair tendencies in a vacuum, and without regard to reason or common sense. It was a favourite dictum of Lord Chancellor Eldon that a "thing should be clothed with its circumstances"; and if the magistrate had clothed this tendency to unfairness with the circumstance that, in the ultimate result, it was counteracted, he would have seen he was upsetting our election for a figment of the imagination. These, then, are the grounds on which our election is voided. The legal figment of strict time, and the logical figment of a counteracted force, neither of which affected the result one jot. And, if only the magistrate had exhibited the same courage and consistency in dealing with the Bruce election as with the Mataura his decision would have been in the exact words of the Ashburton magistrate, who used the words I have already quoted: "It seems to me unreasonable to contend that any irregularity, without which no election is ever likely to be free, can ever over-ride the will of the people so unmistakably expressed."

I have not, however, done full justice to the electors of Bruce if I do not now examine this same magistrate's decision at Mataura. How he upheld Mataura and voided Bruce no reasonable mind can fully understand. The irregularities at Mataura were greater than those in Bruce, and yet he dismissed the former petition with decision and courage. I think possibly the reason is, that the powerful bar engaged in Bruce pounded so many legal technicalities, quibbles, and sophistries into him that he got misled for the moment by his adoption of the fallacy I have exposed. Be that as it may, the decisions are not consistent with each other. Take the irregularities in Mataura under "strict time" alone, and you will see they were much more serious and pronounced than those in Bruce. At Gore the poll was not open till a-quarter past nine. Yet. how does the magistrate reason? He admits the "main door was shut at 9. when Mr Boyne told the officials inside, 24 in number, to vote. This was done, and the main door was immediately again opened at 9.15 a.m. to the public. There was also a side door open all the time. I am satisfied polling commenced at 9 a.m. here, and to have allowed the general public in until the officials had voted would have caused a block. I therefore hold strict time was kept at Gore." Now, if the magistrate had applied the same principles at Mataura that he applied in Bruce, I fail to see how "strict time" was kept at Gore. He says the main door was locked; the public were excluded, but that, as the "officials" were voting, this kept open the poll. But when did Parliament appoint a time for "officials" to vote, and give them the privilege of barring cut the "general public" for the first 15 minutes of the poll? Parliament expects every booth to accommodate, in addition to the officials, at least six of the public; and provides that officials shall vote, not as officials, but as members of the general public, in an open booth. And if any elector that page 23 morning had appeared at the poll to vote at nine before catching a train, he would have been prevented from doing so. Certainly, if the "strict time" limit applied in Bruce had been applied in Mataura, it puzzles me to see how the former poll is void and the latter upheld. Again, at Hedgehope a more glaring irregularity occurred than any in Bruce. Here the electoral officer was late 20 minutes, and "he had the official seal"; but "with the electoral officer's pranks," the magistrate says, "he had nothing to do." No, certainly; but he had to do with this fact: that "where the machinery was wanting, there could be no poll"; and the licensing officer could not give out, and probably would have refused to give out, any voting papers without the official seal. So far as he was concerned, the seal might have been at the bottom of the sea for these 20 minutes; and, as the act, section 7 (f), provides that "the returning officer shall cause the voting paper for the licensing poll to be marked in the same manner as the ballot paper, and shall give the voting paper and the ballot paper simultaneously to the voter," it was manifestly impossible for him to do so. And if the magistrate had acted "like an automaton" in Mataura, as he did in Bruce, he would have held that strict time was not kept at Hedge-hope, and have voided the election. Again, at Waikawa Valley, it is equally impossible to reconcile the magistrate's decision in Bruce with his decision in Mataura, Here a private residence was gazetted as a polling place. "The actual voting took place in the front room, which opened off the hall. The hall or front door was open all day. At lunch time and tea time all the officials left the front room, locked it, and retired for, say, 20 minutes into the adjoining room, where they had a meal. A voter who called during this interval of refreshment was given a meal before they all returned into the voting room, when he voted." Now, clearly the booth—that is, "the room where the actual voting took place "—was closed here for at least 40 minutes that day; and a voter who called to vote was absorbed, so to speak, by the officials, while they had "locked" the booth and were absent from it. I think anyone will admit that the elements of irregularity here were in a high degree more reprehensible than any in Bruce, and yet, although none of our booths were "locked" in the face of any voter, our poll is void, and Mataura is upheld. On the principle that where an irregularity did not affect the result one jot an election should stand, then nothing occurred, either in Mataura or in Bruce, to void the poll; but the reasoning by which the magistrate constructed a legal figment into an offence in Bruce is conspicuously wanting from his reasoning in his Mataura decision.

I think it must be evident to the electors of Bruce that on very flimsy evidence and precarious reasoning they have been robbed of their rights, and their will rendered void at the polls. Moreover, apart altogether from the evidence itself, there was good reason for the magistrate to look on the whole petition with the gravest suspicion as a transparent attempt on the part of a few electors to get page 24 behind the polls and defeat, by legal technicalities, the will of the electors lawfully declared. Indeed, it is questionable whether there has been a more flagrant attempt to defeat the will of the people by legal technicalities since the days prior to the Reform Bill, a hundred years ago, in Old England. You would think that the clock in one night had been turned back a century, and all the struggles of the Chartists and reformers were a thing of nought. For what do we find in the present instance? The petitioners to void the poll were parties, by their officially-appointed scrutineers, to all the offences they complain of. What do you think of a man who comes into court with a grievance, and seeks judgment against his fellow-electors for an irregularity which he took no means to prevent, which he connived at, condoned, or even perpetrated himself? For, in the case of the violations of secrecy of the poll on the part of the voters, what evidence was there to show that it was committed by the no-license voters, and not by the complainants themselves? And, while the magistrate remembered this fact in Mataura, he entirely forgot it as a factor in his Bruce decision. In his Mataura decision he says: "Those witnesses, chiefly hotelkeepers and licensing scrutineers, who testified about the defective arrangements, did not complain to the deputy-returning officer at the time, and made no suggestion of improvement." Now, this is precisely the position in Bruce; and it is most exasperating to temperance reformers, who have been carrying on this battle for years, to have the victory, fairly and honourably won, snatched from them by methods that belong to to the dark ages, a hundred years ago, of parliamentary warfare in England. To such a pass have we come in this Colony that boasts itself as in the van of the world's progress. I say, then, our position has only to be brought clearly before the people and Parliament of this Colony to have this wrong rectified. It is incredible that a proud and free people have degenerated to the level of a South American Republic, where one oligarchy gives place to another, but the people never rule. The law is no stronger than its weakest link; and let it be borne in mind by electors everywhere, that the power of the people of New Zealand is no stronger than the power of the electors of Bruce. There is no free poll in Bruce for nearly 4000 electors, who, by the decisions of the law courts, are robbed of rights, which I will not say Parliament has conferred on them, but of which Parliament is the guardian.

Now, what are the electors of Bruce going to do? They are going to stand by the poll. Some have talked of a fresh election; but that is not the road to victory, but to a fresh defeat. Some have dug a section out of the old Licensing Act, by which, in certain circumstances, provision appears to be made for a fresh poll. But a fresh poll cannot be taken in the same circumstances. You cannot make a fresh parliamentary election; hence it is impossible to have a fresh election on the same conditions, with only alleged irregularities eliminated. You cannot guarantee that your poll will not be void by the absence of half the voters on the roll. You, page 25 in short, cannot repeat the conditions; and a fresh election is just a further attempt to trample on the rights of the people by using the forms of popular government to deprive them perpetually of power. Again, it is said that, by another section, it may be declared that Bruce electorate has undergone some boundary changes, and that after all it is not the electorate of Bruce, and our ultimate success hinges on this legal technicality. That is unless Parliament meantime validates our poll. After the decisions that have come from the law courts heretofore, I shall be surprised at nothing in future, even though it should be decided that Bruce is in Taieri or in Turkey. But let our opponents wring what decisions they may from the courts, they, will find that, until Parliament has reviewed the situation and decided whether the people arc to be robbed of their liberties by legal figments and legal technicalities, no more such decisions will affect the determination of the people of Bruce. They will stand by their poll, as they stand by their ancient liberties and birthrights, and demand that no licenses be granted in Bruce until by lawful vote at a parliamentary election they reverse their previous decision. And before that is done, nearly one thousand voters will have to go over to our opponents. I believe that the action of our opponents in going behind the polls will bring to our side more than one thousand electors that have hitherto voted against us. We therefore intend to elect a Licensing Committee who, meanwhile, in terms of section 3 of the Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, will grant no new licenses or renew old ones until a fresh mandate, reversing the previous decision, is arrived at by the electors of Bruce. That reversal, I believe, will never come. The future is on the side of the Temperance reformers of New Zealand, and the Liquor party cannot fight against the future any more than they can against the rising sun. Though our fortunes are at their lowest ebb in this reverse, yet I believe Mr Cruickshank has done the greatest service that has ever been clone by the courts of New Zealand to the Abolition cause. By strict adherence to "law," he has reduced it to an absurdity. He has called pointed attention to the state of the law, to the mass of legal technicalities, decisions, and figments that stand in our way, and how, while enjoying the forms of popular election, a minority can perpetually thwart and defeat the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, and deprive them in the law courts of every victory that they win at the polls.

We must then go to Parliament. Parliament and the people of the colony have got an object lesson that they will not soon forget. We have given our opponents every advantage. Though the Abolitionists are a majority of the electors, they have said: We will not force this reform until in every electorate it is carried by 5 to 3. That ought to satisfy even our opponents; and Parliament, I am convinced, will not tolerate a state of things one day, by which a minority of 3 to 5, beaten at the polls, are able to wrest victory from the law courts. Law courts—at least, in the Old Land—have page 26 been notoriously conservative in their judgments in favour of popular rights; but the day is past, when the courts can, even if they should wish, long withstand the will of an overwhelming majority of the people. Parliament is higher than the courts, in the sense that it is the final interpreter of its own intentions and statutes, and can make these statutes express the mind of the people. The people, in short, have their intentions expressed by Parliament. And to Parliament we make our appeal. No doubt strenuous efforts will be made to defeat us, because our victory now will be the herald of victory next election in half the electorates of New Zealand. But no more trials of this kind will be repeated. The farce of conducting an election according to the provisions of one Act, and trying a petition to void that election according to the inconsistent provisions of another, thanks to Mr Cruickshank will not be repeated. And "it Parliament—which I will not believe—is responsible for sending the Electoral Act to every booth in the colony to guide licensing returning officers, when it meant to send the Local or Road Board Act, then, I say, Parliament will hasten to undo the wrong inflicted on the electors of Bruce, and will validate their poll. I believe in this demand I voice the mind of the 4000 electors of Bruce, as will be seen when the petition of the electors of Bruce is presented to Parliament. And hundreds of thousands of electors throughout the Colony, when they really understand our position, will be of one mind in demanding for the future a poll free of legal technicalities and figments—a free poll for a free people. I beg to move the following motion:—"This meeting of the electors of Bruce protests against the voiding of the licensing election by the magistrate on unsubstantial and purely technical grounds, and resolves to petition Parliament, at the earliest opportunity, to validate the poll, as the magistrate, who conducted the recount and held the inquiry, has declared that the required majority of three-fifths unmistakably expressed the will of the electors of Bruce, and that the irregularities and technicalities did not affect the result. The electors of Bruce pledge themselves to resist every attempt of a minority to get behind the polls, and to demand a free poll for a free people. And that copies of this resolution be sent to the Right Hon. the Premier and to the Honourable Member for Bruce."

Mr Fraser resumed his seat amidst loud applause, the address, which was frequently applauded, having occupied nearly two hours in delivery.

Mr P. M'Skimming, in seconding the resolution, made a strong appeal to the electors to return the Temperance candidates at the licensing election.

The resolution was adopted unanimously by large and enthusiastic audiences at Milton, Kaitangata, Stirling, and Waitahuna. the centres of the electorate, March 20-26. 1903.