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The Case for the "Braddon Clause" in the Federal Bill.

By the Right Hon. Sir E. Braddon, Premier of Tasmania.

Review of Reviews, September 15, 1898

In writing my justification of the Braddon clause of the Constitution Bill, as finally adopted by the Convention at Melbourne, I labour under the serious disadvantages: (1) Of shortness of time, and (2) of scarcity of material. I shall therefore give merely a brief and rough outline of the reasons that led to the action I took in this respect, and the necessity, as a majority saw, for some such provision as the Braddon clause made.

From the outset it was recognised by members of the Convention, with but few exceptions, that the intercolonial Free Trade that was to come of Federation must be accompanied, both for revenue purposes and for the preservation of local industries, by some measure of Protection against the colonies and countries outside the Common wealth.

It was also felt by the larger number of representatives that there must be in the Constitution some certain guarantee of a return to the several States of their share of the surplus revenue from customs and excise—a guarantee that was not provided in any form until my clause was inserted.

There were, also, many representatives, including that capable and cautious Treasurer, Sir Geo. Turner, who urged at every opportunity the necessity for such measures as should insure, at least in the early days of the Commonwealth, observance of rigid economy in the Federal administration. But these views did not always prevail, as, for example, when that costly tribunal, the Inter-States Commission was created during the Melbourne Session of the Convention.

As that session drew to a close, there were upon the notice paper three motions, all very much alike in character and motive, whereof mine was one, and the others stood in the names of Messrs. Deakin and Higgins. Mr. Deakin's motion stood before mine, but he was good enough to allow mine to take precedence, and, that being carried, the others were allowed to drop.

That motion became Clause 87 of the Bill, with the following effects:—

1. By limiting the Commonwealth expenditure to one-fourth of the net revenue from customs and excise, it insured economy of the federal administration, inasmuch as no federal government would venture to raise such heavy customs and excise duties that one-fourth of the net collections would permit of extravagance.

And here I would specially note that, as Mr. Nash has frankly admitted, it would be impracticable to the Federal Government to raise, by way of income or other direct taxation upon the States, any revenue whatever under the existing order of things, or so long as that order remains.

2. Because of the necessity of that one-fourth of the net customs and excise revenue being sufficient for efficient, although economical, discharge of federal affairs, this clause makes it incumbent upon the Federal Government to raise such a sufficient revenue that three-fourths of it will provide for the reasonable requirements of the several States.

3. Because it gives to the States a guarantee—the only guarantee in the Bill—that there shall be such return of revenue to them.

The principle of this clause was, I believe, urged strongly by Mr. Holder in the Financial Committee of the Convention, but without effect. The clause, as submitted and carried, was approved of by all the Premiers and Treasurers present in the Convention with the exception of Mr. Reid, who, at least, preferred it to any other suggestion of like character. And it was carried because of the strong feeling which existed then—and still exists in many quarters—that without such a clause, or such safeguards as this clause provides, Federation would not be acceptable to some of the States represented, in the Convention.