Other formats

    Adobe Portable Document Format file (facsimile images)   TEI XML file   ePub eBook file  

Connect

    mail icontwitter iconBlogspot iconrss icon

The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 75

Chapter IV. — Party Government and Democracy

Chapter IV.

Party Government and Democracy.

"The virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons, consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. . . . It was not instituted to be a control upon the people, as, of late, it has been taught by a doctrine of the most pernicious tendency. It was designed as a control for the people."—Burke.

Some of the reasons which show the peculiar unsuitability of the Party system for a democratic government may be gathered from what has been said about our own politics in New Zealand. The subject is, however, of such an important nature as to warrant a somewhat closer inquiry.

There is no need to go back to Aristotle for definitions of an aristocracy or a democracy. Aristocracy, which to him meant government by the best, has become in modern thought hopelessly confused with oligarchy; while democracy, which according to Mazzini is a "Government freely consented to by all, and acting for all," was used by Aristotle to signify a government warped to [unclear: uit] the interests of a part—namely, the common or poorer classes. In modern phraseology, democracy simply stands for "a government in which everyone has a share," to use Professor Seeley's words. Even this is, of course, understood with limitations. Children and lunatics have no votes; nor, for other reasons, have page 50 criminals. These disqualifications might, perhaps, be added to with advantage. In a country where education is compulsory and free, it is doubtful if illiterates should be allowed to vote The principle of "No representation without taxation" (which, [unclear: in] a heavily-indebted country, is just as truly Liberal a maxim as its converse) would disfranchise the inmates of charitable institutions, as they do not contribute in any way to the public revenues. [unclear: It] might be as well, also, if judges and stipendiary magistrates [unclear: were] authorised to add to the term of a criminal's incarceration [unclear: a] further sentence of disfranchisement for a number of years proportionate to the anti-social nature of his offence. Although [unclear: the] direct effect of this might be but small, it would have the [unclear: valuable] indirect effect of increasing the public estimation of the value of [unclear: a] vote, and of emphasising the fact that it is a social and sacred [unclear: trust].

Taking democracies, however, as we find them, their [unclear: main] characteristic obviously is that all the people have political power. This fact alone increases the difficulty of government, and more especially of Party government. It is obvious, from what [unclear: we] have already seen of the permanent political party, and [unclear: the] methods which have to be adopted to "keep it together," [unclear: that] the more extended the franchise the more widespread the evils of the system must be. It is difficult to persuade the majority of men to take sides even on a real issue of considerable moment. When the issue put before them is a fictitious one, and obviously of no importance to themselves, the feat is impossible—by [unclear: far] means, at least. Party strife, with its accompanying tendency [unclear: to] look on politics as a game, has always been a failing of the "classes" rather than the "masses." As Sir Henry Maine says—

Party disputes were originally the occupation of [unclear: aristocracis] which joined in them because they loved the sport for its own sake; [unclear: an] the rest of the community followed one side or the other as its [unclear: clien]. Now-a-days Party has become a force acting with vast [unclear: energy] multitudinous democracies, and a number of artificial contrivance [unclear: hav] been invented for facilitating and stimulating its action. Yet, [unclear: in a] democracy, the fragment of political power falling to each man's [unclear: sl] is so extremely small that it would be hardly possible, with all the [unclear: aid of] the caucus, the stump, and the campaign newspaper, to rouse the [unclear: inter] of thousands or millions of men, if Party was not coupled with [unclear: another] political force. This, to speak plainly, is corruption.*

* "Popular Government." Compare Earl Grey's statement [unclear: th] "Parliamentary government derives its whole force and power [unclear: fr] the exercise of an influence akin to corruption."—"[unclear: Parliamentary] Government.

page 51
Experience teaches us that this statement is perfectly true. There is not a democratic country governed by permanent political parties which is not contaminated by public corruption of one sort or another. Even in the early days of Party government the intimate relation between the Party system and corruption was quite apparent to clear-sighted men. Sir Henry Maine goes on to say—

A story is current respecting a conversation of the great American, Alexander Hamilton, with a friend who expressed wonder at Hamilton's extreme admiration of so corrupt a system as that covered by the name of the British Constitution. Hamilton is said to have, in reply, expressed his belief that when the corruption came to an end the Constitution would fall to pieces. . . . Hamilton, of course, meant that amid the many difficulties of popular government, he doubted whether, in its English form, it could be carried on unless support was purchased by Governments.

The usual method in those days was to buy votes in Parliament. This has now been superseded by the bribing of constituencies to return members who will not require any further outlay, and even by the bribing of whole classes—granting them some advantages at the expense of the rest of the Community. It requires no explanation to show that class corruption and class legislation are quite incompatible with the "government of the whole for the whole."

Corruption of the people by the Government may be said to be enough to condemn any form of government, if only because it is fatal to the principle laid down by Fox (previously quoted) that the main object of good government is to obtain independent voters. In a democracy, however, purity of administration is much more essential than in any other form of government. The pore democratic the country, the more closely are the State and the individual brought into contact, and necessarily so. Indeed, one of the most essential characteristics of Democracy is the increased and increasing use of the machinery of government in the interests of mankind. With an upright and patriotic Government this would act to the advantage of the community; but it is obvious that with a corrupt and self-seeking Government the more limited its sphere of action the better. And not only does a widely-extended field of administration make corruption Indefinitely more dangerous to the community, it also makes it very much easier. The working of State railways, the retention of the fee simple of Crown lands, and the right of resumption by page 52 the State, at a fair price, of land already sold, are all experiments in State Socialism on the lines of the truest democracy; but they offer opportunities to a corrupt Government to demoralise the people, and thereby to degrade Democracy itself in the opinion of the unreflective but honest citizen. Even the co-operative scheme for public works has much to be said in its favour, if wisely and honestly administered, but the following extract from the Auckland Herald (although but a mild specimen of the sort of thing continually recurring) is enough to make thoughtful men almost despair of the future of their country if State Socialism and Party politics are to be allowed to advance hand in hand—

A number of men were employed at Pahiagua, who were to be paid according to the measurements of the proper officer of the Public [unclear: Works] Department. That officer did his work; and, as he had no interest [unclear: in] defrauding the men, we have no doubt that his measurements [unclear: were] accurate and fair. But the men, knowing this to be a Liberal Government, disputed these measurements, and apparently they [unclear: confided] their case to the Wellington Trades and Labour Council. The Ministers state to that Council that they believe the measurements of their officer to be accurate, but offer to "split the difference." They do not consider the money to be due, but they make the offer "simply as an [unclear: indieatis] on the part of the Government that they desire to act generously with the men." The "generosity" is to be exercised with the money [unclear: wrong] from the taxpayers by the yellow papers that have been in [unclear: circulation] lately. Have Ministers a right to be "generous" with public [unclear: money]. The fact is that the generosity is inspired by the belief that the Trades and Labour Council can make and unmake ministers, while those who pay [unclear: the] taxes have very little power or say in the matter. It would simplify procceedings if, after this, the Public Works Department received [unclear: instructions] to add one-half to the measurements of all these co-operative works.

As to the Editor's comment on the cause of the Ministers "generosity," we may point out, in passing, that the [unclear: recipients] of the Government bounty were taxpayers also—if only [unclear: through] the Customs House. The real cause of the safety of all [unclear: such] corruption is that the few receive direct, tangible, and [unclear: obvious] benefit, whereas the many pay for it by an addition to their taxation so small and unknown, in each particular case, that their resentment is not roused sufficiently to make them resist the robbery and stop the abuse. Instances of somewhat similar [unclear: corruption] by the Lands, Railway, and other departments could easily be given, but perhaps it is unnecessary to say more on this point.*

* The following extract will serve to show that the [unclear: dangerous] nature of this unholy alliance between State Socialism [unclear: and] Party Government is widely recognised. It is from an article entitled "Why Not Abolish Party Government?" which appeared m the Speaker (the ablest English Liberal Weekly paper:—I "Apart from the sweetening of public life, what seems to me to specially recommend the abolition of Party government is the near advent of 'Collectivism.' The combination of State Socialism with Party government in a purely democratic State can lead to but one goal—national debauch, ending in national collapse We see the tiling working out before our eyes in Australia—a reckless piling up of debt to create wages, each party outbidding the other p the evil competition, no party able to hold power for many months without sending to London to procure the sops with which to quiet its Cerberus. . . . But there are other ways of reaching disaster besides bankruptcy. If the struggle for place and the rancour of political life (in England) were to maintain their present level at a time when 40 per cent, of the electorate were in State or municipal employ, it would be impossible to maintain any order in the finances, any discipline in the services, any method in administrative business. In struggling madly for the votes of the State stokers, the municipal milk-pen, and the district dentists, the politicians would outbid one another in promises of high pay, short hours, easy tasks, and early pensions, until the whole fabric of English life came down in one mighty crash. We see a foretaste already of what would happen in the sordid manoeuvring far the police vote, the postal vote, and the school-teacher vote, in constituencies where such votes are potent."

page 53
One of the most generally-accepted principles of Democracy is that the majority must rule. Here again we see the hopeless incompatibility of the Party system and Democracy, for under Party government the majority does not rule, excepting quite occasionally and accidentally. Mr. Syme explains this apparent anomaly thus—

Government by Party is usually spoken of as if it were the same firing as government by the majority. This is a great mistake. It is true, as I have said, that the Government of the day is now chosen from the majority in Parliament; but it by no means follows from this that the Government is carried on by a parliamentary majority; on the contrary, we know that government by Party is not government by the majority, but government by the majority of the majority—that is to gay, the majority of the party which has the majority in the House. And this majority of the majority may be, and often is, really a minority of Parliament. Let me explain what I mean by an illustration. . . . The Government introduce a Bill, some of the details of which are not acceptable to more than a bare majority of their supporters. The ministerial minority wish to amend it, and the amendments which they desire would also be acceptable to the whole of the Opposition. Hut Ministers refuse to give way, and the Hill is eventually carried, the whole of the ministerial following voting for it, rather than break up the Ministry. In this case the majority of the majority would be a very small I minority of the whole House. Government by Party and government page 54 by the majority are therefore two very different things. Indeed, Party interests are often antagonistic to parliamentary government, or government by the majority.*

As another acute writer says—"A Party government is essentially a weak government. It cannot venture to offend or, estrange anyone who commands votes. It is unable to grappls with the selfishness of local interests, sections, rings—the perpetual enemies of the common weal." And so, whenever, as is usually the case, the balance between the two permanent parties is fairly even, it becomes a very easy matter for a third party, compact and unanimous, though numerically insignificant, to bargain and intrigue with both sides—playing off one party against the other—until it discovers which is the more amenable to pressure—that is to say, which is the least conscientious and the most anxious for office. Such a third party as this, consisting, perhaps, of a dozen members, or even less, is said to "hold the balance of power," and by the skilful use of ordinary Party tactics—by giving support in exchange for concessions—it is able to keep one side of the House in power so long as its demands are acceeded to; and thus it imposes its will on the majority, and so practically governs the country. It would be easy to give examples of this, for it is of common occurrence in New Zealand and elsewhere; but no observer of contemporary politics will attempt to deny it, nor can anyone deny that it is an essentially anti-democratie state of affairs.

The mere position and standing of the Ministry under over present system is opposed to all democratic principle. Ministers were once servants of the King, appointed and dismissed at his pleasure. Now that the people is King, Ministers should bear very much the same relation to the representatives of the people as they once did to the Crown. Instead of this, the Premier (as Professor Seeley points out) rather than the people, has been invested with the royal power. The other Ministers naturally look to their chief—who has appointed and may dismiss them with feelings of loyalty and subservience which they do not extend to Parliament or the country. The Cabinet system—the parent of Party government—is at the bottom of this mischief, as it is also of the "collective responsibility" principle. There was a time when "responsible government" was no mere fiction; but

* "Representative Government in England."

page 55 no Minister is now really responsible at all. He can always shelter himself behind the Cabinet, and his colleagues must support him or fall with him. Mr. Syme describes the situation thus—

Ministers cannot be punished for wickedness of policy, however great, for folly, however disastrous, except if it should be in violation of an express statute—a circumstance never likely to occur. They are not punishable, even by solemn personal censure, for any wrong use of the enormous power committed to them, so long as they act together as a Party, observing the forms of routine. The fundamental idea of a Party is, that after they have collectively agreed on a policy, each individual is publicly to adopt it as his own, even though he dissuaded it previously in private, and is both to act for it, and to argue for it, as if he sincerely approved it. . . . Out of this fundamental subjection of individuals to the corporate vote rises a necessary inference, that it shall be concealed how each voted in the Cabinet. The Ministry could never show their faces publicly, as unanimously promoting a certain measure, if it were known which of them had previously opposed this very measure. Of course, that is kept in profound darkness. Not only so, but each one of them, being liable to the humiliation of having to argue in solemn Parliament against his secret sentiments, demands that no record shall be kept of the reasonings and votes in which his sincere judgment was testified. This is the essential difference between a Cabinet (which is nothing but a cabal) and a legitimate Privy Council, like that of Queen Elizabeth. In the latter a register is kept of every proceeding which leads to practical result; the presence of all is enforced; and each member signs his name for permanent record of his vote. It is then open afterwards to demand of the Sovereign the names of those who have given pernicious advice; hence to enforce the responsibility, though always difficult, is not wholly impossible. But so long as it is uncertain which of them apposed in secret Cabinet the baneful acts which they collectively carried out no legal punishment is imaginable, nor, indeed, any strong ban of parliamentary opinion. On the Ministry collectively no worse punishment can possibly fall than that of losing office temporarily; a lot which ordinarily befalls the most innocent of Cabinets from mere accident, as from the death of a leading man. And the contingency of such temporary displacement is called Responsibility! Ejectable, not responsible, is the word which describes the fact. Moreover, when they are ejected, the indignation which ejects them is cumulative; the final act is an occasion, not the cause; hence, their worst deeds avoid any public stigma, and often any parliamentary discussion.*

For a concrete example of the great advantage this "collective ejectability"—and, indeed, the whole Party system—is to Ministers, and of the disadvantage it is to the country, we need only to look at one of our latest bungles—the banking legislation of the last year or two. The country has been committed to the

* "Representative Government in England."

page 56 expenditure of an unknown number of millions to support the Bank of New Zealand, owing to the Cabinet having strongly recommended, and, indeed, forced through the House, in 1894, an initial advance of two millions—a sum which Parliament was assured was adequate to put the bank on a thoroughly [unclear: soun] footing. The House was misled by the Government, and the Government plead that they were misled by the representative of the bank. They appear to have accepted the statements of [unclear: an] interested person—Mr. John Murray—without obtaining any figures or other proof of their correctness. The country, by [unclear: its] representatives, should be in a position to sheet home such [unclear: gross] carelessness, such unbusiness-like imbecility, to the Minister or Ministers mainly responsible for it. This is, however, impossible. Even if any records had been kept of the Cabinet meeting of June 26, 1894, they would not be accessible to Parliament. The House then appointed a Committee to inquire into this matter, and into the amalgamation of the Colonial Bank with the Bank of New Zealand, which had also been carried, on the recommendation of the Government. But the inquiry was burked, as far [unclear: as] its main objects were concerned, by the Ministry forcing two of themselves on to the Committee, and filled up most of the other places with their own nominees.

This exhibition of the power of the Cabinet is only a [unclear: mild] sample (though a more expensive one to the country than [unclear: usually] of the fruits of Party government; but it shows how the "collective responsibility" principle prevents the people having any real control over Ministers, and also how any question can [unclear: be] made a Party question, if Ministers think it to their interest that it should be. Nothing can cure this but the complete [unclear: abolitions] of the Cabinet system, and the relegation of Ministers from their present position of masters, with power to threaten, to their rightful one of servants, whose duty it is to advise, the House.

Perhaps nothing shows more clearly the incompatibility [unclear: of] Democracy and Party government than the fact that this [unclear: system] is fatal to the real liberty of the people, and leads directly [unclear: to] despotism. Liberty is a word of various meanings; but in [unclear: this] connection what is meant is, of course, political liberty—that [unclear: is] to say, that—after due allowance is made for the necessary political fiction that the will of the majority is the will of the whole—every man has a fair share in making and enforcing the laws which [unclear: he] has to obey. Under our present system the people are practically page 57 not even allowed the elementary liberty of electing whom they choose for their representatives—so long as the "Government candidate" is supported by Government influence and the taxpayers' money. Not even with the utmost vigilance and vigour can the electors prevent an unscrupulous Party government exerting influence, direct or indirect, over elections. And with this liberty all is lost; for with representatives that are no representatives, but Government nominees, the people have no real control over administration or legislation. They are living under a despotism, and not in a Democracy. No doubt liberty is just as valuable a possession under a monarchy as in a Democracy. But there is this difference: a monarchy, or even an autocracy, can exist and flourish without the people having any real political liberty. A Democracy, under such circumstances, is not only impossible; it changes at once into a despotism of a peculiarly dangerous description.

The actual political equivalence of all citizens becomes the engine of a subtle and secret despotism, because the government is exercised in the name of the whole people, and all insurrection in pursuit of popular aims, as against a monarch or aristocracy, is out of the question. Public liberty is not ignored or defied, as in a State overtly governed by a despotic authority, but it is rather silently eaten away under all the forms of a Government holding its mandate from nothing else than the popular will.*

Nothing is more essential in a Democracy than the adoption of carefully-considered political institutions, which will make for freedom, and thereafter the greatest vigilance to preserve them from deterioration.

This brings us naturally to the subject of local government; for all the best writers on political science are agreed that liberal local-governing institutions are the surest safeguard for the liberty the people, and, in a Democracy, may be said to be an absolute necessity. No Democracy, at all events, can hope to prosper without them; and it is worthy of note that in Switzerland (the only successful Democracy in existence) the system of local government is the most thorough and complete in the world. The clear-sighted De Tocqueville truly says—

A central administration enervates the nations in which it exists by incessantly diminishing their public spirit. It may contribute admirably to the transient greatness of a man, but it cannot ensure the durable prosperity of a nation.

* "The Science of Politics," by Sheldon Amos, M. A.

page 58
Nor is it only as the best means of ensuring the [unclear: preservation] of public liberty that a liberal scheme of local government [unclear: i] valuable; it is also the best school for the political education [unclear: of] the people. John Stuart Mill says—

I have dealt in strong language on the importance of that [unclear: portion] of the operation of free institutions which may be called the [unclear: public] education of the citizens. Now, of this education, the local administrative institutions are the chief instruments.

To emphasise the importance of this education in a Democracy seems hardly necessary; for it is obvious that, where the power is, there should the knowledge and experience be also, and that [unclear: if] Democracy means government by the ignorant, it is doomed to [unclear: a] very brief existence. The manner in which these direct governing responsibilities furnish the needful education and [unclear: experience] is almost as obvious. They replace the comparative mystery which enshrouds a distant administration by publicity; they teach the useful lesson that the Government has no resources but the pockets of the taxpayers; and there is no better and [unclear: surer] way of fostering a desire for honest and economical administration than that all men should realise the immediate [unclear: connection] between expenditure and taxation. They teach, moreover, the general management of affairs, and so make both the State more useful to the citizen and the citizen more valuable to the State. Of course, to preserve the unity of a country its main legislation must always be centralised, and so must certain of the administrative departments; but all friends of Democracy should [unclear: insist] that the onus of proof lies with those who say that any particular act or department is best administered by the Central Government. This applies with particular force to New Zealand-[unclear: a] country embracing different islands, several degrees of latitude, and various climates.

It is doubtful if there is another country in the world where, if only for geographical reasons, a sound system of local government is more necessary in the best interests of the people [unclear: or] more easy of accomplishment. Nor are we without local traditions of self-government. Just as in Switzerland the Cantons [unclear: are] older than the Confederation; just as in England the county, the parish, and the hundred are older than either the monarchy or Parliament; so in New Zealand some at least of our provincial settlements are older than our central authority. It is unfortunate that our Provincial Governments, when they fell a little out page 59 of repair, should have been ended rather than mended. They cannot now be revived; but something more of their old spirit of independence and self-reliance must be breathed into our local institutions if New Zealand is ever to be a successful Democracy. At least we must have municipal and county councils with liberal powers and an "assured finance," not liable to undue interference, not obliged to beg for subsidies, from Wellington. Roads and ridges must no longer be regarded as convenient means of corruption for the Central Government. The land boards and education boards should have their powers increased; and, speaking generally—for the subject is too vast a one to discuss an incidental manner—the people should be encouraged in every possible way to manage their own affairs for themselves.

But what hope is there of any such reform so long as Party government is supreme? We have been promised a new Local Government Bill for the last two sessions, and some of its proposals have been made public; but when it is passed (unless Party government is abolished first), I for one shall be much surprised if it is any improvement whatever on the Counties and Municipal Acts of 1886, with their 176 pages of, for the most part, minute and vexatious restrictions and regulations as to the most insignificant details, their narrow limitations of the powers to frame bye-laws, and their general air of disinclination on the part of the central authorities to delegate any more of their powers than they could possibly avoid. So long as Party government exists it will be to the advantage of the Central Executive that all the revenues of the country shall pass through their hands, and that the local representatives should come to them, hat in hand, whenever a new bridge is needed over the Clutha or a new gaol at Blenheim. So long as Party government exists, we may hope in vain to see this country on a safe Democratic basis, with an active and intelligent centre of public life in every district, lid a people educated and anxious to manage their own affairs with ability and economy.

To sum up briefly: We have shown that under government by Party, in a Democracy, corruption is absolutely inevitable, and that it is fatal to the safe extension of the sphere of Government action—an essential feature of any true Democracy. We have seen that the Party system is inconsistent with the political liberty of the people; that under its baneful influence the people, although appearing to rule, have really very little control over page 60 either administration or legislation; that, in short, its [unclear: natu] tendency is towards despotism. It is obvious, therefore, [unclear: th] Democracy and Party government cannot co-exist; the [unclear: fig] between them is a fight for life. That thought should help [unclear: i] nerve us for the struggle. As Dr Sandford Fleming (the [unclear: w] known Canadian statesman) says—

Our ancestors succeeded in overthrowing many theories which [unclear: we] destructive of the liberty of the subject and the well-being of the [unclear: nation]. We will be unworthy of our ancestry if, on our part, we hesitate [unclear: t] grapple with the theory of party supremacy and injustice, [unclear: however] strongly entrenched by prejudice and interest.*

The ultimate result is not in doubt; but, in the [unclear: meantime] the bitter feelings, the low passions and sordid motives so [unclear: can] fully cultivated and excited by the Party system cause [unclear: incal] culable harm to the human race and bring discredit and [unclear: disgra] on Democracy. The opinions of Mr Lecky (as touched upon [unclear: in] the first chapter) are not of importance because they are [unclear: hi] opinions, but because they are shared by large numbers of the best citizens in all civilised States. If these worthy members [unclear: of] the community will but give the subject a somewhat closer [unclear: study], they cannot fail to discern what is the real disease from which the political world is suffering, and what the remedy must be.

The first step towards any improvement must be to recognise [unclear: the] truth about our actual system. In what is not so much a system [unclear: as] accretion of expedients, compromises, and adaptations, our obvious [unclear: duty] is to look at the realities behind the veil of contention and [unclear: usage;] test the true working power of forces apart from their [unclear: nominal] official strength; to guage the efficient bearing capacity of the [unclear: venerable] devices which served as the piers of the original construction. The parody of Conservatism, which clings to names as if they were [unclear: things] which struggles to preserve the forms of institutions by forswearing [unclear: the] principles they exist to foster; which calls in the spirit of [unclear: anarchy] order to defend the symbols of order;—this is that dry-rot by [unclear: which] many States have passed through silent decay to ultimate ruin. [unclear: These] is nothing destructive in probing the rottenness and dilapidation of [unclear: old] institutions if our purpose be that they may be made equal to [unclear: their] actual requirements. Nor, again, is there anything Conservative [unclear: fo] patching up with gilding and paint the façade of old institutions which we know to be within, in many a cardinal feature, cumbrous, [unclear: ricket] and unwholesome. Institutions may often be altered without [unclear: destr] tion or harm; the true political evil is the tampering with organic [unclear: truth], which are the life of all societies.

* "On the Rectification of Parliament."

"Order and Progress," by Frederick Harrison.

page 61

No doubt the evil influence of our present system will disappear only gradually—the period of convalescence will be a difficult one in some respects; but that the result will be health and strength to the body politic is just as certain.

A pure Democracy is without doubt the best, if not the only permanent, form of government for any civilised and educated race: but it is a true old saying that Corruptio optimi pessima. And although it is true of all forms of States that "It is righteousness that exalteth a nation," it is especially true of Democracies. The greatest care is therefore needed to see that our institutions are calculated not only to preserve freedom to all, but also to train up the citizens of the future in the paths of integrity, honour, and fraternity. It is only necessary thus to set down what the aim and end of the political institutions in a Democracy should he to show once, more and finally how completely incompatible with such an ideal is any form of Party government.