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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 72

Chapter XI. — Some More Legal Legerdemain

page 53

Chapter XI.

Some More Legal Legerdemain.

Here follows the subsequent conversation between the lawyer and myself, to the best of my recollection.

Lawyer: "You have endeavored to prove that on legal principles the community have a right to deprive some people of their property. In the same breath, however, you denounced these legal principles as iniquitous. Will you state now a principle that will justify this monstrous law?"

I: "I have done so already. It is the principle that every individual has a right to himself."

L.: "Whence that right? Are you aware that great authorities, both legal and scientific, have not only denied the existence of what are called natural rights, but have actually proved that there are none? I will only mention Maine and Prof. Huxley."

I: "I am aware of the fact, and will admit at once the force of their arguments. They have convinced me that I have no natural rights whatever. But in doing so, they have also convinced me that no one else has, since their arguments apply equally to all human beings."

L.: "And does it not follow from this that, inasmuch as you have no natural rights, that you have no right to the land either?"

I: "It does. But it also follows that you and others have no right to it either. It amounts to this: If you would press this doctrine as a justification of your claim to the land, because of the absence of any specific 'natural law'—whatever you may mean by that term—you could defend it against others by brute force only. For to say that nobody has a right to it is tantamount to saying that one person has as much (or as little) right to it as anybody else. That is, the party of 'law and order,' who are now preaching this doctrine, are driven to the extremity of proclaiming lynch law as the highest authority of their possessions. For on that theory the land can be yours only until somebody is strong enough to drive you off it, or knocks you on the head."

L.: "A nice doctrine that, is it not?"

I: "Pray, do not saddle me or the people with it. It emanates from your own party. I only admitted the force of page 54 the logic by which this new doctrine has been arrived at. [unclear: N] so new, either; as it has been acted on in the past, and is [unclear: st] being acted on in savage communities. Not only were peopled [unclear: di] possessed of land and all forms of property, but themselves have been made into chattel slaves. Under such conditions security to life, liberty, or property was out of the question. Everybody lived in constant dread of robber or assassin. The [unclear: greate] scoundrel, the most cunning, was the most dreaded, and [unclear: homag] was paid to him as the Koning, Konig, or King. We nee[unclear: d] enter into the history of civilization. Sufficient for us to [unclear: kno] that people got tired of this ceaseless strife and feud, and at [unclear: l] agreed to live neighborly together on principles of equity—[unclear: th] is by recognising in each other the right to equal freedom."

L.: "What principle is there in that?"

I: "This, that when A toils, he has the right to enjoy [unclear: th] fruits of his labor, and B has no right to take it forcibly from him; since in that case A would be B's slave to that [unclear: exte]. On the other hand, A is not allowed to prevent B exerting himself in a similar manner. They respect each other's freedom for the simple reason that if A denied the rights of B, he at the same time would deny his own rights, and could henceforth defend his life and liberty by main force only."

L.: "Then you hold that land cannot belong to an individual?"

I: "Not as his exclusive property."

L.: "Does it not follow, then, that if it cannot be owned b[unclear: y] an individual, neither can it by a number of individuals? [unclear: O] you admit it. Then, since the community is made up of individuals, it cannot rightfully belong to the community either."

I: "That is so."

L.: "And what follows inevitably from that admission?"

This question was put in a tone of triumphant expectation Seeing the Liberty Annual in his hand, whence he too[unclear: k] inspiration, I knew what answer he expected. In that publication some over-grown, but not over-clever, schoolboy [unclear: argu] from the above premises that since land cannot be rightly owned by the community, therefore it must be left in the possession of a class. I smiled at the silliness of such reasoning. The lawyer mistook this for embarrassment, and so repeated his question with greater emphasis:

L.: "If the land cannot rightfully belong to the community what follows from this admission?"

I: "This: That the community has no right to dispose of it and that if at any time the community did take upon itsel[unclear: f] say how or by whom the land shall be owned in the future, [unclear: su] an act would have no greater validity than if I now trie[unclear: d] dispose, without your authority, of your watch or your own person."

page 55

L.: "Oh!—h'm! But suppose I gave you that authority, would you have the right or power to dispose?"

I: "Then neither would be required. Then practically it would be yourself who disposed of yourself."

L. . "And cannot a whole nation do the same?"

I: "Each for himself—yes! But not one for another. You could become my servant or my slave if you liked. But you could not barter away the liberties of your descendants. Of course you might sign me a paper promising that your descendants shall be the slaves of my descendants for ever and ever. Whether your descendants will be fools enough to obey such instructions, or whether they will simply laugh at the idiocy or villainy of their grandsire is another matter."

L.: "To whom does the land belong then?"

I: "To nobody. I have already told you that the people can do one of two things. Either fight and devour each other, or agree to live peaceably together on equal terms. From this we derive our principle of equalness or 'Equity'; perfect Equity meaning that no one should enjoy an advantage over his fellows at their cost or to their detriment. The land belonging to no one, they must agree to use it in such a manner only as is consistent with this principle. This at once precludes the possibility of disposing of the land forever. For, even if all the people were agreed at any time on a division of the land among themselves, they could not decide for as yet unborn generations. Hence we contend that the land can never become the exclusive property of any number of individuals, but can only be held in usufruct."

L.: "So that you deny the right to private property altogether."

I: "No; on the contrary, I contend for the sacredness of that right. Since every individual has a right to himself, he has a right to the things which are due to his own exertions. To deny him this right, or to deprive him of the results of his labor, is to deprive him to that extent of his personal liberty."

L.: "I quite understand that. But if you deny private ownership in land, you must also deny private ownership in everything else. For have you not yourself admitted that all things consist chiefly of the raw material of nature—that is, land? You deny us the right to land because, you say, we have not made it. On the other hand you claim a right to your watch because you say you have made it. Have you made the silver also? And if not, have not all an equal claim to the silver of that watch, especially since the quantity of silver is, like that of land, limited?"

"I: "You had an equal right to it, and that is the reason I had to compensate you—that is, the community—for it before I could have the exclusive use of it. That is just why we claim that all rents and royalties must go to the community."

page 56

L.: "That does not help us over the difficulty. I will [unclear: state] to you the objection in the precise words of our Liberty Annual 'If in any real sense, as distinguished from a rhetorical send the land belongs of right to everybody, then everybody, without exception, must at all times and at all places be able to have the use of it. We must have a communistic anarchy in the [unclear: mos] thorough sense. There must be no plot of land used by A which is not equally open to B or C to use also; for if there were such a plot reserved to A, then everybody who is not A would be defrauded of his rights.' What answer can you give to this?"

I: "A Scotch answer, by asking you another question. [unclear: Did] his lordship, in the days of his supremacy, have the use—the actual use—of what he then called his lands?"

L.: "Well, his tenants used them."

I: "And did then his lordship consider himself defraud of his rights?"

L.: "No; because he reserved to himself the revenue from it."

I: "Then, if A has the exclusive use of a particular plot of land, and for this privilege pays whatever advantages accrued to him therefrom to all those who are not A, how can you make out that they would be defrauded of their rights?"

L.: "Who is to decide? For—to again quote from our Liberty Annual—'If the land belong to everybody, then it is everybody (minus nobody) who must decide how it shall be disposed of. In such case no majority and no Government can dispose of it, just because neither a majority nor a Government is everybody.'"

I: "That is very well reasoned. It is precisely the view we all take of the matter, and hence the Government does not interfere. It does not say this block of land is to be occupied by A, and this by B or C, but lets the people decide that for themselves. All the Government does is to collect from each occupier the surplus value, the 'unearned increment,' or the economic rent.' So long as this is paid, the occupier is lefts in undisturbed possession, since what he produces over and above that is his own. Without such security of tenure it were not possible to insure that those who sow shall reap. All we need do is to take from the harvest on behalf of the community that part which is due to some natural advantage, and therefore belongs equally to all."

L.: "But who is to decide what shall be the rent?"

I: "We all have a word in that, and decide it—mostly unconsciously—as the rent has always been decided, viz., by supply and demand. Sites differ both in position and fertility, as do the tastes and occupations of the people. Some sites are more desirable than others, and it often happens that several people wish to occupy some particular plot; the result is that the rent of such plots goes up. Suppose you wanted to live in page 57 Belgravia, and you found the Square already occupied; the Government could do nothing for you, but you yourself could. You could offer to buy someone out, offer a high price. The owner does not move. Others do the same thing; he still remains. Will not that send rents up at once? So that although the possessor of that plot would enjoy an enviable position, he would have to pay for it to the community a little more than the latter think it worth. That is, he would be in possession of that plot because of all applicants for it he deems it worth most."

L.: "How will you set that machinery to work?"

I: "That machinery is already at work, and has been for centuries. For if rent in Belgravia is higher than in Homerton, it is because there are more applicants for it. And if some prefer living elsewhere notwithstanding, it is because they do not set the same value on the privilege of living there as those who consent to pay the high rent The whole principle is a very simple one, and I will illustrate it to you. A man left to his five sons five cottages, one to each, without stipulating which should belong to this or that man. But inasmuch as the cottages differed in size and quality, he provided that whoever should choose one of the better cottages should make adequate compensation to the others, the sons to decide among themselves both how the cottages were to be divided, and what compensation there should be paid, and to whom."

L.: "And each of the sons, of course, wanted the best cottage, and tried to make out it was the worst."

I: "It came to that, and not being able to come to an understanding—"

L.: "They went to law."

I: "They would have done so had they been fools. But not having a taste for lawyers' justice, and, without being necessarily bad or unduly selfish, desiring to possess what was willed to them by their father, they put up the cottages to auction among themselves. You perceive what followed. There was bidding against each other, until one or two of the brothers thought that they preferred the price offered to the privilege of living in that particular cottage, and so dropped out of the competition. Then the three continued bidding against each other, and so on, until the last bid was higher than either of the others thought it was worth."

L.: (grumbling): "Such practices, were they to become common, would be the ruin of the legal profession."

I: "This is the principle by which rents are determined. You see, it was 'everybody minus nobody' of those concerned who determined who should possess each of the cottages, and also fixed the amount of compensation. For I need hardly tell you that the money which the five brothers paid for the cottages was equally divided among them."