Correspondence.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that the attention of the Government has been called to the case of "Meringa v. W. Humphries," heard on the 20th December last.

It appears from the report of the case that a statutory declaration made by Meringa, and translated and explained to her by you, contained a statement that she had received a sum of £40 as the purchase money of a certain piece of land, whereas it was well known to all concerned, including yourself, that as a matter of fact she had only received £20. The declaration was therefore false.

The Government will be glad to receive any remarks or explanation which you may desire to offer in this matter.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 20th instant, and in reply thereto, I beg to say that the Department is misinformed in the matter. Upon a narrow and purely technical view of the question, it is possibly correct to say that no payment of the purchase money due to Meringa had been made at the time the declaration was signed, because the sum of £40 (the purchase money) had been paid to her in sovereigns; it is, however, a gross libel upon the integrity of myself and Mr. Joe Ward, the Justice of the Peace who took the declaration, to suggest, as the learned judge presiding in the trial of Meringa v. Humphries did, that a perjury was committed by the Native, and suborned by us. The actual facts are clearly set out in a letter printed copy of which I now enclose for your perusal, from Mr. J. Ward to the Editor of the Taranaki Herald, dated the 23rd December, 1893. I need only add that Mr. Humphries, to whom Meringa looked as her agent and who by the verdict of the jury was found to have been such, was, to my mind, in precisely the position of his principal for the purposes of the declaration. It is the invariable practice of the Trust Commissioners, who have had any experience whatever, to treat a receipt by an agent as a receipt by a principal. This is also, I may add, a rule of common page 5 sense, and, it appears to me that no person with any practical knowledge of the proper way of completing native transactions, would for a moment venture to say that, to all intents and purposes, payment had not actually been made to Meringa when she signed the declaration. I would draw your attention to the fact that the declaration known as form E is always used without altering Clause IV, because those who are well versed in native matters, consider it as covering payment to the principal, payment to the agent or a carrying to credit as between principal and agent in account current. It might, however, be advisable to have the declaration form, as now printed, re-issued slightly altered, but I doubt its practical utility. In conclusion, I should like to say that it is not an axiom that in all native transactions all the Europeans concerned are engaged in some form or other of fraud or criminal conspiracy.

Enclosure.

[Taranaki Herald, 23rd December, 1893.]

(To the Editor.)

Sir,—The Herald of Thursday reports District Judge Kettle's charge in effect as follows:—"That Major Brown, Messrs. Humphries and Cunningham and a Justice of the Peace (myself) went to Moturoa some time since and, to use his very words, "these people got the old Maori woman (Maringa) to sign a statutory declaration which actually amounted to perjury." I observe that in your contemporary report, Mr. Kettle suggested that I "probably did not know anything about the matter," a statement in direct conflict with with your report of his charge, leaving, however, for the moment this discrepancy to shift for itself, I desire to say that my part in the transaction was a very simple one, and hardly warrants the accusation of the judge as reported by you. I went as a Justice of the Peace to take a Native's signature to a transfer and statutory declaration. The latter alone is in question. I understood, and I believe it is not denied, that the purchase money was to be £40, of which £15 was with the express consent of the Native retained by Mr. Humphries for expenses, £5 was to be accounted for by him upon completion, and £20 was paid to the Native and her husband in hard cash. This bargain I am convinced was understood by the Native thoroughly, and she appeared to be satisfied and made no complaint. Mr. Kettle complains that £40 should have been paid to Meringa in cash, whilst Providence, the native conscience, and good luck were to be trusted for a refund of the £20 ac- page 6 cording to the bargain made. This I cannot understand. Any man who would have trusted the Native with the money would have been a little short of a simpleton, in my humble judgment. The only practicable method of settlement appears to me to be the plan adopted, which there was no kind of objection to on the part of the Native; and if this did not amount to payment of the £40 to all intents and purposes, then one must live and learn. I humbly venture to submit that the declaration was not an act of perjury, and I most emphatically say that I at all events was not one who "got the old woman" to perjure herself by signing. What Mr. Cunningham's guilt, or Major Brown's, or Mr. Humphries' is I do not know. I saw none of it in the way of deceit or inducement at all events. I have known Major Brown, whom I mention as perhaps the most important functionary on that occasion, many years as an upright and very fearless man, and with the reputation of being a good Maori scholar. And I might conclude by saying that the learned District Judge's remarks have not in the least shaken my confidence in either Major Brown's ability or integrity.

Sir—Referring to previous correspondence on the subject of your action in connection with the ease of the Native woman Meringa, I am directed by the Hon. the Native Minister to inform you that, after giving your explanation careful consideration, the Government has decided to advise His Excellency the Governor to remove you from the Commission of the Peace, and to cancel your license as a Native Interpreter.

Hons. Native Minister and Minister of Justice are both absent, and will not return for about a fortnight, but I will telegraph to them your request for delay.

Am directed that no reason is seen why decision of Cabinet in respect to Major Brown should be interfered with.

Note.

—I then decided to leave for Wellington to lay the whole facts before Ministers, as my letter of 26th February was not written or intended as a complete defence of my action. It will be observed that the letter of the Justice Department, dated 20th February, has no hint or suggestion that I was then really being put upon my trial—as it turned out, to be summarily convicted without appeal. So that it will be readily understood my reply of the 26th was not in such a form as I should have adopted had I been consciously fighting for the retention of my license, and my status as a Justice. Hence the necessity for a more elaborate statement on my part. I accordingly left for Wellington on May 22nd with a carefully prepared and lengthy memorandum for Ministers' consideration, arriving there the same day late at night.

On May 23rd, in the morning, I handed the memorandum above referred to to the Under Secretary of Justice, and received on the same day the brief note which follows it.

[Memorandum.]

It may be assumed that the decision of the Cabinet to remove me from the Boll of Justices and cancel my License as Native Interpreter rests upon:—

1. The ground that I permitted Meringa to sign form E knowing it to contain a false statement.

2. That I did so with the full intent and desire to defraud the native and that the native was defrauded by my action.

It is of course impossible to imagine that the Government should desire to deprive me of my status as a Justice and Interpreter for a mere oversight nor for an imprudence on my part which had no effect whatever in injuring the native concerned. The admitted facts are that Meringa's son received £5 (on account of the sale at £40 by Meringa) with her knowledge and consent, that £15 was paid to Meringa personally at the time of signing the transfer and declaration and that with her knowledge and consent £20 was paid to Humphries, her agent, duly authorised to receive the same.

It is contended that the declaration should have deliberately omitted all reference to the £20 not received by Meringa or her son personally; and the charge against me is that I did not omit this other sum of £20, but included it in the amount declared to as received.

I will now address myself to the first of the above paragraphs, To sustain this ground it must of course appear beyond the shadow of a doubt (a) that the declaration as sworn was false and (b) that I knew and believed it to be false and untruthful.

a. I respectfully submit that the declaration was not false but a literal fact. Had it contained a statement that £20 originally had been received by Meringa it would have been an obvious and undeniable perjury. The paragraph 4 in the declaration as to payment is intended to cover, and I venture with the utmost confidence to say will be admitted by any competent legal draftsman that these words as intended to cover, all payments made by the buyer to the seller or his or her agent. It is suggested that it does not, and that the intent and meaning of the words is to cover only payments made to the seller personally. Before going further I will draw attention to the curious inconsistency in the charge against me which passes over as properly included in the declaration the payment of £5 made to Meringa's son (which was not of course personally paid to her) and which in the same breath treats as improper the payment made in a precisely similar way to a duly authorised agent. What ground of distinction there is in matter of enormity between including the one payment and not including the other it passes my comprehension to imagine. Perhaps it can be explained. But I pass on. I will proceed to show that it is preposterous to contend that the paragraph is not devised to cover payments to an agent duly authorised. I will put a hypothetical case. A native sells a piece of land at £100 through an agent, who receives a deposit of £25 on account. Such sales have already been decided by the Supreme Court in more than one case to be binding and are known I believe to the legal profession to be perfectly regular and proper. The native sells as I have said at £100; the agent receives £25 deposit. The balance of £75 is paid to the native direct. Is it or is it not perjury for a native, or for that matter for a European, to make a declaration that he has only received £75 of the purchase money? Is the £25 paid to the agent to be included in the declaration or not? That is the whole question. I submit with the greatest respect that it would be wilful perjury to make such declaration, and clear subornation of perjury for any person to procure and induce a native or other seller to make the same. If it would be perjury for a native to make a declaration, which did not take into account this payment to the agent, how can it be suggested that it is perjury to make a declaration which does take such payment into account, That is really all that Meringa's declaration did. £20 had been (prior to and at the time of Meringa's declaration) paid to her: £20 had been paid to her agent. Why then was it false to state that she had received £40? Would it have been anything but a quibble to declare that she had not? Let me for a moment state the question from a different aspect. Supposing Meringa had sued the pur- page 9 chaser for the purchase money, £40, swearing she had received only £20, could it be contended for a moment that a Court of Justice would have permitted her to escape the penalty of perjury in so swearing, knowing as she did that her duly authorised agent had received £20 more on her behalf. Or even if she escaped prosecution, could it be seriously argued that the purchaser would not have a complete defence in the payment made by him to the agent of the balance of £20 due on account of the sale.

The reasoning above given indicates what is really the true object of the declaration known as Form E. It is to ascertain—though it is only one way of ascertaining—what money has been paid to the native vendor, or on his account, by the purchaser. I would draw Ministers' attention to the fact that none of the Frauds Prevention Acts contain any reference to or provide for payment to the native personally; nor do the Frauds Prevention Regulations; nor does the Declaration Form E. Why should they? There are many ways in which value may be given other than by paying in gold to the vendor himself what is due: and the Legislature anticipated this. What would have been easier than for the Acts to have stated specially that payment must be made to the vendor personally. A few words would have done it. But one may search the whole of the Legislation and every Rule made on the subject through, and find no syllable shewing this necessity. Section 6 of "The Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act, 1881," says "the Trust Commissioner shall satisfy himself that the consideration purporting to be paid or given has been paid or given." Section 4 of "The Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act, 1888," says that "the Trust Commissioner must be satisfied that the consideration purporting to be paid or given has been paid or given." Section 5 of "The Native Lands Frauds Prevention Amendment Act, 1889," says "He shall satisfy himself that the consideration purporting to be paid or given has been paid or given." The Rules of 1888 and 1890 are silent on the point. Where is there then any suggestion, much less a specific provision, that a payment to a Maori must be a personal one; and that, what every person of common sense would treat as a payment, and what is all over the world known as a payment to the principal, is not to be so treated in native matters. But quite apart from any reasoning, what is the actual practice of Trust Commissioners on the point? Do these officers, who are of course specially qualified judges in such matters—do they treat payment to an agent as not being payment to a principal? I ask Ministers to ascertain this point of practice at once: and I affirm with great confidence that it will be found on enquiry that many of these officers, of long experience and high standing, do not hesitate to accept the agent's receipt as a receipt of a principal in such cases; and that transactions are frequently passed by Trust Commissioners where the only payment proved is payment to the authorised agent. If I am correct in stating this, I may fairly sum up thus what page 10 my contention is under this head, viz.: That the law recognises and approves payment to the agent as payment to the principal, and that the officers specially appointed to construe and act upon this law do so understand it.

b. If the above argument is sound, it of course follows that the charge against me is disposed of. But even assuming that the law as it stands does provide that payment shall not be deemed payment Unless made to a Native personally, can it be reasonably contended that the Statutes or the forms are clearly against me? I submit that no impartial and competent person can be of this opinion. There again one must refer to specialists; and, in common fair play, I have a right to ask that their opinion shall be asked, Will Ministers do me the justice to ask the opinion of the law officers of the Crown upon this point, or the opinion of any leading barrister in the colony? I am quite confident of the result. Any leading counsel, I am convinced, will advise that neither the Acts, nor the forms, nor the rules, in clear terms prohibit or discountenance payment to an agent; and that if the prohibition is there at all, it is certainly veiled and ambiguous. Is it then fair and reasonable to treat the declaration as false, and false to my knowledge?

2. How it can be urged that I had any desire to defraud or injure anyone I cannot imagine. If I had been a person entirely unacquainted with the proceedings of the Trust Commissioners Courts, and especially of the Court presided over by Mr. Trust Commissioner Stuart, it is conceivable that I might have plotted a piece of abominable deceit in this fashion; but I am no neophyte in native matters, and I have some knowledge of the routine of Mr. Trust Commissioner Stuart's Court. I was fully aware that in most cases Mr. Stuart insisted upon witnesses attendance by the Native in Court. I was aware that he desired as a rule summonses to be issued to Natives to compel attendance. I was therefore perfectly well aware that there would be ample opportunity for the Native to attend, and contradict the gross untruth which, in the view of Ministers, I had been a party to. I knew also that Trust Commissioners generally do not rely exclusively upon these declarations, and that Mr. Stuart invariably insists upon corroborative evidence as to payment of purchase money. I was also aware that under Rules 4 and 5 of the Native Land Frauds Prevention Rules of January 23, 1890, though form E may be used as evidence, it is specially provided that the Trust Commissioner may call other evidence to support or contradict the declaration itself. It is of course obvious that this could be no excuse for the deliberate manufacture of a false statement in the declaration. Nothing could excuse that; but, in considering whether I had the matured design of manufacturing such a falsehood in order to mislead, it is only fair to consider whether I, or any other sane person, could have, or be supposed to imagine that there was, any reasonable prospect of accomplish. page 11 ing that object. With this knowledge of procedure before me, what a perfectly idle, futile, and I might add, childish, effort should I have been making in procuring the false declaration imputed to me. This brings me to the second portion of paragraph 2-namely the allegation that as a matter of fact the Native was defrauded or injured in some way, or the Trust Commissioner misled by the misstatement, if any contained in paragraph 4 of the declaration. As I of course knew must be the case, at the hearing at the Trust Commissioner's Court Mr. Stuart carried out his duty in all respects with his quite usual caution. Meringa was summoned to appear. Her son was in attendance on more than one occasion. Evidence of payment was asked, and given on oath by Mr. Humphries, clearly showing precisely how payment had been made and when. The Trust Commissioner was perfectly satisfied with that evidence, and none the less satisfied because the payment was proved as having been made to the agent in part. How, in the face of these facts, can it be suggested that the misstatement in the declaration, if it was one, was in any way material or that anyone was misled by it? I ask Ministers whether Mr. Stuart has reported, or can report, that he took paragraph 4 of the declaration, as signed, to be directly in conflict and inconsistent with the oral evidence taken by him on his enquiry. It would be impossible for him to do so. Let us see what were the two sets of facts—the one from written, the other from oral testimony, which were before him. The declaration states that £40 was paid Meringa. Mr. Humphries' evidence shows that £5 was paid to her son, £15 to Meringa on execution of the deed, and that the balance was held by her agent, Mr. Humphries, all with her knowledge and consent. Again I say where is the conflict, where is the inconsistency; or how can it be argued that the Commissioner was misled?

Here it is necessary to state, what is possibly not known to Ministers, that the case of Meringa v. Humphries not only did not arise out of the alleged misstatement in the declaration, but on the contrary actually proved by the verdict of the jury the propriety and correctness of the declaration. The jury found in substance—1. That Mr. Humphries was Meringa's agent; (2) that she received the £40, and (3) that she perfectly understood and approved of every step in the transaction from the beginning to the end, except, and this does not concern me in anyway, the overcharge found by the jury to have been made by Mr. Humphries for commission.

Now I here ask for a clear answer to a very simple question. Surely I have a right to an answer. What was the amount of money Meringa was cheated out of by my action? Is it true, or is it not true, that Meringa did not lose a sixpence thereby? The answer is inevitable, and must be in my favour.

I ought to add that I am placed at a great disadvantage in defending myself through not having been supplied with a copy of the official report containing the charge against me. It has been the invariable rule to supply accused persons with a copy of such charges, a rule I should say which obtains wherever the English spirit of fair play exists; and without which a person in my position, whom you propose to peremptorily degrade and dishonor, has no real opportunity of being heard.

I have to formally request you to supply me with a copy of any official report containing the charges against me.

Sir,—I am directed by the Hon. Mr. Reeves to inform you that having looked into the matter, he regrets that he can see no reason to interfere with the decision already arrived at to revoke your Interpreter's license, and to remove you from the Commission of the Peace.

[Memorandum.]

Referring to my memorandum of the 21st instant, I submit for the consideration of Ministers that the decision of His Honour Mr, Justice Richmond in the case of Wi te Ruke and others v. The New Zealand Land Company, argued before him on March 27th, 28th and April 16th, 1884, has an important bearing upon the question.

On the 5th June a public meeting was held in the Alexandra Hall to consider the circumstances connected with my removal from the Commission of the Peace and the cancellation of my Intrepreter's License. Appended is a brief report of the proceedings.—C.B.

[Report of Public Meeting."]

Mr G. Curtis proposed Mr Paul to the chair.

Mr Paul, in taking the chair, stated the object of the meeting. He wished to state on behalf of himself and those who had joined with him in convening the meeting that there was nothing of a political Ming in it, and the meeting must, therefore, not be looked upon as being antagonistic to the present Government. The meeting was called to help Major Brown to get a fair hearing of his case. It was not called to say whether the accusations against Major Brown were right or wrong, but simply to help him to get a fair hearing of his case from the Government. He then called upon Major Brown to address the meeting.

Major Brown, who was received with applause, said that he was much obliged to those who had called the meeting and had taken the matter into consideration. He felt the position he had been placed in especially in view of the positions he had held among his fellow settlers, and the part he had taken in public matters in this Province and the colony generally. It was his aim to maintain the character that he had always held. There were some present who did not know what positions he had held, and therefore, he would briefly advert to them. He had been twice Superintendent of the Province, once Colonial Treasurer, four times a member of the House of Representatives, and had been Agent here for the General Government in difficult times, when there was no telegraph, and things were left to him to decide on his own responsibility. He also commanded the district in the war time, and had fifteen hundred men under his command. To give and instance how he had to use his own discretion, he stated that when the Lord Worsley was wrecked near Opunake, Col. Warre informed him that there were three hundred men ready to go to the rescue of the crew on his requisition. He felt that the Colonel did not know the nature of the country and the Maoris that inhabited it, and as he considered that the passengers and crew would be slaughtered he acted on his own judgment and would not let the men go. Colonel Warre wrote a memorandum on the subject in which he stated that the blood of the crew would be on his (the speaker's) head. This was one of the cases in which he had to use his judgment. He could recount many more, but would not take up the time of the meeting. With regard to the matter for which the meeting had been called, all he desired was to get a fair hearing of the facts of the case to see whether he was guilty or not of the acts which had been charged against him. If be was guilty his name should be blotted out of their memories, but if he proved that he was innocent, page 14 which he was conscious he could prove, then he would maintain that good position among them that he had always held. He had never injured man or woman, pakeha or Maori, and on his reputation he would stand. (Applause.)

The Chairman called on Mr. C. F. Richmond, who was conversant with the facts of the case, to address the meeting.

Mr. Richmond said the meeting had to consider whether due consideration had been given to the facts of the case by the Government before striking Major Brown off the Commission of the Peace, and cancelling his license. [The speaker here read the correspondence that had passed between Major Brown and the Government, and which has already been published]. They would see that the charge against Major Brown was that a Maori woman named Meringa had signed a declaration interpreted to her by Major Brown, that she had received £40, whereas she had only received £20 and, therefore, the declaration was false. In fact, £40 had been paid in value to Meringa and her agent, namely, £20 to herself and £20 to her agent. They had also the letter of Mr. Joe Ward, the Justice of the Peace on the occasion of the signing of the declaration, and that gentleman, whose name every person in the room held in high honor, in the letter referred to addressed to the Taranaki Herald, said he knew the whole facts; and said he was not ashamed of the part he or any one else took in the transaction. If there was any blot upon Major Brown in connection with it, Mr Ward and the others present when the declaration was signed, having knowledge of the facts, shared it with Major Brown. Mr. Ward's opinion of the case had never been asked by the Government before Major Brown was struck off the Commission of the Peace and his license cancelled. The speaker then referred to the steps that Major Brown had taken when he was notified of his removal, etc., and, in conclusion, pointed out that all they desired was to see a fair hearing given to the facts of the case.

The Chairman stated that Major Brown was willing to answer any questions, but none were asked.

Mr. Govett then moved—"That this meeting is of opinion that so important a thing as the cancellation of an interpreter's certificate and the removal from the roll of Justices should not be done without giving the person affected the fullest opportunities of answering before some suitable tribunal any charges that may be alleged against him." In speaking to the motion he said that he belonged to a profession in which charges against its members were heard before the Judges of the land, and then one could get a fair hearing to defend himself against any accusations made. He contended that all charges should be heard before a suitable tribunal, and in the matter of a native interpreter he held that the fittest person to hear charges was the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court. When a matter of this page 15 kind was referred to a Minister, the chances were that it would not receive the fullest consideration, as Ministers were too much occupied with other business.

Mr. G. Curtis seconded the motion, and also urged that a fair hearing should be given Major Brown to answer the charges made against him.

The motion was carried unanimously.

Mr. Cock then moved—"That having regard to Major Brown's long and distinguished public services; to the fact that he has been for 40 years past a Justice of the Peace; that he was twice superintendent of the Province of Taranaki, and that he was at one time the senior officer in command of the militia; this meeting having heard the facts in connection with Major Brown's removal from the Commission of the Peace, and the cancellation of his interpreter's license, considers that a fair judicial hearing should be given to his case without delay." In speaking to the motion Mr. Cock said that he had known Major Brown from the time he left his cradle, and he had always held that gentleman in the highest respect. (Applause). If they had had a few men like him years ago, Taranaki would have been a different place to-day. (Applause). Mr. Cock then spoke on the justice of giving Major Brown a fair hearing to answer the charges made against him.

Mr. N. King seconded the motion, which was carried unanimously.

Mr. Bewley, Chairman of the County Council, then moved—"That the Government be requested to constitute the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court a Commissioner to enquire into Major Brown's case, and report thereon." He also referred to the justice of giving Major Brown a proper hearing, and concluded by stating that the case had his fullest sympathy.

Mr. W. D. Webster seconded the motion, which was carried unanimously.

Mr. Richmond then moved—"That the resolutions, signed by the chairman, should be forwarded to the Justice Department as soon as possible."—Carried.

The Chairman said it would give him much pleasure to carry out the wishes of the meeting.

A vote of thanks to the chair terminated the meeting.

Thomas Avery, Printer and Stationer, New Plymouth.