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Introduction.

The first clause of the fourth section of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, reads:—"Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, give, lend, or agree to give or lend, or shall offer, promise, or promise to procure, or to endeavour to procure, any money or valuable consideration to or for any elector, or to or for any other person, in order to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or shall corruptly do any such act as aforesaid on account of such elector having voted or refrained from voting at any election, shall be deemed guilty of bribery."

The following clause of the same section has similar provisions against giving or promising employment.

The seventh clause refers to undue influence, and among other prohibitions has the following:—"Every person who shall, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, . . . . . threaten the infliction, by himself or by or through any other person, of any injury, damage, harm, or loss . . . . . upon or against any person, in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting . . . . shall be deemed to have committed the offence of undue influence."

The English Act is almost identical, and the decisions of the English Courts are expressly embodied in the Colonial Act, section 2, which reads:—"The expression 'corrupt practice,' as used in this Act, means treating, bribery, undue influence, or personation, as defined by this Act, or as recognised by the common law or the law of Parliament."

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It was not a little startling, therefore, to find Mr Justice Gillies saying he would not be bound by English precedents, as from his experience he knew that what would be intimidation in England would not have the slightest effect upon electors in the Colony ! This substitution of an "impression" for the law, was well sustained throughout the trial. We fear it may be held that when the Court is the Jury, the public may not be any more convinced of its judgment and fairness than of the fairness and judgment of "twelve men in a box." Nor can Mr Justice Gillies's electioneering experiences have been very fortunate if we may judge by the sentiment he approvingly expressed in Court: "Anderson merely pointed out to him on which side it was his interest to vote, and they knew very well that a man's interest was the side he generally voted on." The interest here was the intimation that if the elector voted for one candidate he would have ten enemies, but if he voted for the other he would only have one enemy!

After this it is hardly surprising that the Court should hold that the intimation on the part of an agent, that seventy-three men would "Boycott" an elector if he voted for a certain candidate, was not undue influence! It remains for the public to pronounce judgment on the doctrine as laid down by two Supreme Court Judges. The final Court of Appeal always is:—Public Opinion.

In consequence of the extraordinary refusal of Mr Justice Gillies to see proof of agency in the direct evidence of the witnesses who proved Anderson was a prominent member of the Respondent's Committee, the counsel for the Petitioners was compelled to extract further evidence of agency in the progress of the trial, and it will be seen that the answers were frequently in reply to questions put to the witnesses with this object. At length the Court held the agency established.