The earliest notice of this system in America appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer in 1860, in which the plan is thus introduced:—

"Its leading feature is that a unanimous constituency is necessary to the election of a representative. Nor is this unattainable, as at first sight it appears to be. It is rendered feasible by simply taking away the restraint which at present limits a voter to a choice between the two local candidates.

"Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that there is to be held an election of Congressmen for this State. There are twenty-five members to be elected, and half a million of votes will be cast; the quotient, twenty thousand, shows the number of votes necessary to elect a member. If every voter is at liberty to select according to his preference from all the candidates in the State, there can be no doubt that the prominent candidates of either party will secure the requisite twenty thousand votes. In all probability they will receive more than that number; and this surplus would be thrown away, were it not for the provision that each vote should be a list of the members desired by the voter, and in the order of his preference for them. Thus, if the first member on his list already has the requisito number, that name should be stricken from the list, and the vote will then count for the second in order, who is the next choice of the voter, and so on. The admirable simplicity which characterizes this plan is likely to make us ignore the wonderful results that would flow from its adoption. Let us consider what would be gained by its introduction.

"First, it starts out with the fundamental idea, now almost lost sight of page 64 in the abuse of the system, that the representative body should reflect exactly the feelings and opinions of the community which it represents. Under this plan every opinion is represented, and that, too, just in proportion to the generality with which it is entertained. The only limitation is, that those holding a given opinion should be sufficiently numerous to entitle them to at least one representative. That is, in the case of a Congressional election, twenty thousand in the whole State should be agreed in that opinion. The majority thus has all the influence which it is strictly entitled to have, but it cannot exercise the undisputed sway which has hitherto given it the character of a tyrant. Every measure which it proposed would be contested inch by inch, and though it would be ultimately carried, it would only be after it was shorn of all its most obnoxious features, in consequence of the thorough exposure which it had received.

"Thoughtful men have at times endeavoured to secure a due share of influence to the minority. John C. Calhoun devoted himself to this subject, and has left a treatise upon it, to explain the mode in which such a scheme could be realized. But the plan which he proposed is wholly impracticable, and is now looked upon only as a monument of his patience and ingenuity. Every one feels the hardship of a minority, whose voice is not heard, and whose wishes go for nothing. We have submitted to the inconvenience because we have not heretofore seen any practical plan suggested for avoiding it. Our ready philosophy has taught us that it would be better to be poorly represented than not to be represented at all. Fully aware of the injustice of our condition, we have endeavoured to make the best of it, hoping, with labour and time, to become, in our turn, the majority.

"The grand recommendation of this plan is, however, the tendency it would have to bring forward distinguished men as candidates. An individual of any note soon becomes known throughout the State, and he will be voted for in preference to the unheard-of nominee of some petty local convention. The same reason which induces the bringing forward of men of reputation also operates to keep them in the position which they have shown themselves qualified to occupy. At present the reverse is true. The moment a man becomes prominent by displaying his ability or integrity, he makes himself obnoxious to those who rather desire tools to carry out their sinister designs, than men of character -who will obstruct them. Hence, an intrigue is set on foot to defeat such a man, and always with success. Those in the community who would sanction his conduct, in case an opportunity was given them to express their opinion, have no influence whatever. It is all settled in the primary meetings, where delegates to the convention are chosen, hostile to him. We all know how these matters are managed. Some greedy aspirant scours up his confederates to aid him to elect, in the ward meetings, his favourites to the convention. They are successful, because respectable citizens will not degrade themselves by frequenting such dens. When in convention, they nominate a candidate who professes the political principles of a party, and its members must either vote for him or throw their vote away. In such an alternative they give him their vote rather than his opponent, who is probably no better, and professes the opposite principles.

"In the final appeal to the people a decided advantage would also be gained. Bribery, that subtle and most dangerous of all foes to free institutions, would be greatly weakened, if not wholly destroyed. At present, the main inducement for resorting to its aid, is the fictitious importance which a few votes acquire in a closely-contested election. The change of a few votes determines whether a large part of a constituency is to be fairly represented, or not represented at all, or rather misrepresented. Take away page 65 this strong motive for bribery, by recognizing a unanimous constituency, and this dangerous element in our government will be eliminated. It is an incredible supposition that an entire constituency could be bought up, but, granting that it were true, it could never be generally done. Hence the influence of a representative so elected would be counteracted by that of the honest men about him.

"There is no reason why a salutary change of this kind should not be introduced. It would work as potently to renovate our legislature and city councils, as it would to restore the lost character of Congress. The corrupting agencies are powerfully and systematically at work in all these places, and it is time that the people, who have the welfare of the country at heart, should set to work to counteract their deadly influence."—Philadelphia Inquirer, October 22, 1860.

The civil war arrested all effectual efforts for electoral improvement, and well-high suspended discussions on the subject. Several pamphlets and articles, urging a consideration of the method, have, nevertheless, been published; among others, True and False Democracy. Boston. Prentis and Deland, Congress-street. 1862. North American Review. 1862. Vol. xcv. p. 240. Christian Examiner. Boston, 1863, &c.

The North American Review thus states the case :—

"Now if the legislative assembly be in its prime intent and use a parliament, a talking body, every numerous and respectable party among the people has an undoubted right to its share in the talk; every significant phasis of opinion has a right to be presented and advocated; or, to state the case still more strongly, the nation has a right to such practical wisdom as can be elicited only by the free comparison and discussion of opposing and divergent theories and measures; and the legislators who represent a bare majority have no right to close their ears and minds to the most ample and forceful presentation of the views and arguments of the minority. But how is it possible to insure the representation of minorities? It can be effected by no system now in practice. An approximation is made to it by rendering each constituency so small that it shall elect but a single representative; for it is probable that a large minority in a state or nation will be a majority in a considerable number of these small constituencies. (?) On the other hand, constituencies large enough to choose several representatives on a general ticket, will be likely to have a majority coincident with that of the whole state, or of the section of the country to which they respectively belong. Thus most of the counties of Massachusetts would generally furnish majorities of the same complexion with that of the State; while the individual towns could many of them choose minority representatives. Thus, too, it almost always happens that, of two legislative chambers, the smaller and higher is much more nearly homogeneous in opinion than the larger and lower; and we have known at least one instance in which a senate of twelve consisted wholly of members of a single political party, while one-third of the members of the lower house were in opposition. We deem this subject of so great importance in theory, and so sure to become, at no great distance of time, a matter of practical discussion, that we make no apology for quoting at length the solutions of the problem suggested by Mr. Mill."