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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 58

Appendix B

Appendix B.

Parliament of New South Wales.

The earliest suggestions which are found for the adoption of personal representation in this colony, are contained in the Sydney Morning Herald of the 26th November and 4th December, 1861, on the proposal to make the Upper House of the Colonial Parliament elective, instead of nominative, as theretofore. Early in the session of 1862 a Bill was brought into the Legislative Council, adapting the principle to the election of the Upper House. This Bill was, on the 18th June, 1862, referred to a Select Committee, of which Mr. Wentworth was chairman. The Committee made its report on the 21st of August, 1862. The following passages relate to this system :—

"As respects the mode of voting, your Committee have given much consideration to the plan now commonly known as that of Mr. Hare, and page 44 which has lately attracted considerable notice among leading political writers in Europe. It has been urged on the attention of your Committee, not only by the intrinsic merits of the scheme, but from the circumstance that it admits of being applied to the formation of a Colonial Legislative Council in a much simpler form than it presents in the original scheme of the author, as intended for application to the British House of Commons. The mere fact of its tending to increase the distinctness of character between the two Houses has been felt to be a strong recommendation. Your Committee are not disposed to shrink from its adoption merely because it is new and experimental.

"The leading feature of the plan is the representation of all the electors, in the proportion of the numbers of their respective parties and sections, instead of the representation merely of the majorities prevailing in each local electorate, while leaving the defeated minorities wholly without representation. Under the usual system, if one interest or prejudice be prevalent in a majority of the electors in twenty constituencies, twenty members may be elected to represent those majorities, although the minorities may collectively amount to a number not far short of the successful majorities. A difference of one vote in each electorate might determine the election, and twenty votes might thus determine the fate of twenty elections, leaving thousands of electors, forming the minorities, without a single representative. This is, doubtless, an extreme supposition; but the merits of any system may be fairly illustrated by showing to what it tends when carried to its utmost length,

"The system of Mr. Hare provides a remedy; but while it renders this injustice to minorities impossible, it equally maintains all the just rights of majorities. It establishes a true representation of the whole society, with its various interests and opinions represented in due proportion; and the manner in which this is effected is, when fully explained and understood, extremely simple. Supposing the number of voters to be 30,000, and the number of members to be thirty, each 1,000 voters (called a quota) is considered entitled to be represented by one member. Instead of a local electorate, inhabited by 1,000 electors of divided opinion, and comprising a minority which, if out-voted in that particular electorate, is left wholly without representation in the legislature, each member's constituency will consist of 1,000 electors, coinciding in their choice of a representative, irrespective of their places of residence. For this purpose, the whole colony will form a single electorate, the electoral districts of the Assembly being adopted solely for the purpose of more conveniently making up the roll and polling the votes, but not for the purpose of restricting the votes of the electors to any special local candidates. This term "single electorate"will, however, be apt to lead to a serious misapprehension, unless care be taken to observe that under Mr. Hare's system the effect of a consolidation of many electorates into one is quite the reverse of that which would result under the present system of voting. Under the present system, it would merely give the aggregate majority the power of defeating the aggregate minority on a wider field, and of sending into the Council a preponderating number of members to represent one party, to the exclusion of the other. The subdivision of electorates under the present system thus increases the chance of the occasional prevalence of a weaker party in one or more local electorates, but it affords a mere chance, uncertain and capricious; whereas Mr. Hare's system insures, without any subdivision whatever, the due and proportionate representation of each party. Thus, while the colony forms a single electorate as regards territory, each quota of electors, agreeing in the choice of a member, forms a separate electorate as regards persons.

page 45

"Each elector can thus ensure the return of at least one candidate, by associating himself with a sufficient number of fellow-electors, wheresoever resident, to form a quota. But if the vote of each were limited to the naming of the one candidate he prefers above all the others, it is evident that more than the quota would often concur in the choice of a popular candidate, and thus lead to the throwing away of the votes given in excess. To prevent this, each voter is entitled to name several candidates in the order of preference, so that if the vote be not required for the first, it may be used for the second, if not for the second, then for the third, and so on, to ensure its being made ultimately contributory to the election of some candidate of his choice. He cannot fail of his object so long as he does not fail to name on his list some one candidate in whose election he and the required proportion of other voters concur. Whether the first or last on his list be the recipient of his vote, his intentions are equally fulfilled. More so, indeed, if it be the last, for it can only descend to that candidate when all those higher on his list, and therefore of his earlier preference, have been already elected by other votes. Nor is this justice to individuals purchased at the expense of any injustice towards leading parties and majorities. Whatever number of quotas are comprised in the ranks of any party, they can so vote as to obtain a corresponding number of members, and thus maintain their legitimate proportion of influence in legislation. The ideal of representative government in the writings of statesmen has long been the representation of classes and interests in due proportion, so as to render the legislature a true epitome of the political opinions of society. Hitherto nothing but an approximation to this ideal has appeared possible. Mr. Hare's system, for the first time, proposes to make it a reality."—[Ordered to be printed, 21 August, 1862; Sydney. J. Richards, Government Printer.]

The Committee amended, agreed to, and reported, the Bill. It was read a first time in the Legislative Council, and on the 4th September, 1862, on the order of the day for the second reading,

Mr. Holden said that on account of the share he had taken in preparing the amended Bill, and his identification with one of the chief principles of the measure, he had yielded to the desire of several members of the committee to bring forward the measure. His ambition was limited to securing the result he desired; and if that result—the passing of a safe and wise measure—could be obtained by the silent expression of his secret will, he would gladly relinquish to others the prominent share in the steps taken to accomplish it He had been uniformly a supporter of the elective principle, and had advocated it ten years ago in this Chamber. He had, however, felt its difficulties; and perhaps the delay which had taken place had not been without its advantages. He believed that the enunciation, in the meantime, of Mr. Hare's system, had thrown a new light on the subject, and had rendered it possible to do now what it was impossible to do then. When that system was first brought to his attention it struck on his mind exactly as it struck on the mind of John Stuart Mill; and he was not ashamed to identify his own feelings and ideas with those of that great man. He (Mr. Holden) could have written and thought and felt exactly in the words in which he (Mr. Mill) said (referring to Mr. Hare's system of representation) that "it solved the difficulty of representation, and by so doing raised up the cloud which hung over the future of representative government, and therefore of civilization."For he felt that the civilization of mankind was identified with the success of true, wise, well-constituted representative government, and that that species of government never had page 46 existed yet on the face of the earth. But he trusted that it would, and might, and should exist; and he trusted that the first specimen of it might be exhibited in this country. And the only fear he had about it was, that it might not be so effectual as it would otherwise be (supposing that this Bill should pass), because of the system being confined to one House of Legislature, and not being extended to the other. The lion, member then stated that his measure, though alleged to be in the spirit of conservatism, was yet truly in accordance with liberal principles, and showed that his views of the necessity, function, and qualification of a Senate, were those expressed by the founders of the American Republic—by Madison and Hamilton, in the Federalist; by Calhoun, by Sir James Mackintosh, and also by Lord John Russell. The want of a proper negative power in the constitution of a country compelled the Legislative power, when established on too wide a basis, to concentrate itself by degrees into a single Executive. This occurred as an inevitable consequence if the struggle for place and power between the two parties of the State was more and more developed, until at length all power was virtually concentrated in political leaders—ruling as absolutely as any aristocracy. The evil was augmented instead of lessened, as the community advanced in prosperity. By rendering the representation more equitable as regarded the interests of opposing parties, it was made more possible to have universal suffrage without the dangers which might be apprehended to arise therefrom, and the division of power secured by such a division of power, promoted a harmonious action between coexisting interests which would not be likely otherwise to take place, or to continue uninterrupted. Speaking of the mode of voting adopted in this Bill, Mr. Mill, in his work on Representative Government, said. "Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, and who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances. On Mr. Hare's system, those who did not like the local candidates would have the power to fill up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons of national reputation on the list of candidates, with whose general political principles they were in sympathy. Almost every person, therefore, who had made himself in any way honourably distinguished, though devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance to no political party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota; and with this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves hitherto undreamt of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency, have by their writings or their exertions in some field of public usefulness made themselves known and approved by a few persons in almost every district of the kingdom : and if every vote that should be given for them in every place should be counted for their election, they might be able to complete the number of the quota. In no other way which it seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the very élite of the country. Not solely through the votes of minorities would this system of election raise the intellectual standard of the House of Commons. Majorities would be compelled to look out for members of a much higher calibre. When the individuals composing the majorities would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either page 47 voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all; when the nominee of the leaders would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate of the minority, but of all the men of established reputation in the country who were willing to serve; it would be impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the first person who presents himself with the catch-words of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The majority would insist upon having a candidate worthy of their choice, or they would carry their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail. The slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of their number would be at an end. Had a plan like Mr. Hare's by good fortune suggested itself to the enlightened and patriotic founders of the American Republic, the Federal and State Assemblies would have contained many of those distinguished men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest reproach, and one of its most formidable evils. When the Democracy is supreme there is no One or Few strong enough for dissentient opinions, and injured or menaced interests to lean upon. The great difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be, how to provide in a democratic society, what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have maintained themselves ahead of others—a social support—a point dappui, for individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power; a protection, a rallying point for opinions and interests which the ascendant public opinion views with disfavour. For want of such a point d'appui, the older societies, and all but a few of the modern ones, either fell into dissolution or became stationary (which means slow deterioration), through the exclusive predominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being. The only quarter in which to look for a supplement or completing corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority is the instructed minority, but in the ordinary mode of constituting democracy this minority has no organ; Mr. Hare's system provides one. The representatives who would be returned to Parliament by the aggregate of minorities would afford that organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organization of the instructed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence. But if the élite of these classes formed part of the Parliament by the same title as any other of its members, by representing the same number of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the national will, their presence could give umbrage to nobody while they would be in the position of highest vantage both for making their opinions and counsels heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more than their numerical share of the actual administration of Government, as the Athenians did not confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyperbolus (the employment of Cleon at Pylus and Amphipolis was purely exceptional), but Niceas, and Theramenes and Alcibiades were in constant employment, both at home and abroad, though known to sympathize more with oligarchy than with democracy. The instructed minority would, in the actual voting, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would count for much more in virtue of their knowledge and of the influence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised. A democratic people would, in this way, be provided with what, in any other way, it would almost certainly miss—leaders of a grade of intellect and character better than itself. Modern democracy would have its occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding page 48 minds. With all this array of reasons of the most fundamental character on the affirmative side of the question, what is there on the negative? Nothing that will sustain examination when people can once be induced to bestow any real examination upon a new tiling. Those, indeed, if any such there be, who under pretence of equal justice aim only at substituting the class ascendancy of the poor for that of the rich, will, of course, be unfavourable to a scheme which places both on a level."The hon. member addressed himself to the question of the suffrage for the Council roll. He had been asked why they did not adopt the ballot ? He had been anxious for something of the kind in first drafting his Bill; but it might be said in reply that Mr. Hare's system was itself so superior that it would not conform to the ballot, to secret voting in its essence; but still there was so much of the ballot that there could be no violence, no influence used at the time of voting, which the ballot sought to avoid. He moved that the Bill be read a second time.

Mr. Plunkett seconded the motion : and after some observations by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Merewether, Mr. Brown Russell, and the Attorney-General, the debate was adjourned.

The above report, omitting the argument on the other portions of the Bill, is taken from the Sydney Morning Herald for Thursday, the 4th September, 1862. The report of the discussion on the next day has not come to hand, which is the more to be regretted, as the Bill appears to have been opposed by one member, Captain Ward, who would seem from the subsequent report to have addressed himself especially to this method of election, and to have contended, 1, that it would not be a guarantee for the representation of majorities and minorities in just and equal proportion, putting forward in support of that argument, substantially the problem suggested in Denmark, in which E with 101 third votes is elected, while B, with 299 second and 200 third votes, fails; 2, that mere single voting would be a better method without the contingent vote; and 3, that the loss of votes, owing to a large number of electors polling for the favourite candidates, might be obviated by publication of the state of the poll from time to time.

Wednesday, 17th September, 1862. The debate was resumed by Mr. Merewether. He did not admit that popular election of an Upper Chamber was better than a selection by the ministers of the Crown, with proper restrictions, to prevent a creation of members to carry particular measures. If the Lower House was the people's Chamber, the Upper should be the Chamber of statesmen, composed of public men who had passed through great political offices and employments. Addressing himself to the election clauses, &c., he could not refrain from referring to the manner in which his hon. friend Mr. Butler had misunderstood both Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill on this subject. The hon. member had complained that the committee had mutilated Hare's scheme by rejecting manhood suffrage. But Mr. Hare's scheme had nothing to do with manhood suffrage; it was, in fact, devised for England, where, happily, manhood suffrage did not exist. But Mr. Hare's scheme was nothing more than a mode of voting applicable alike to any constituency. He had weighed the Bill under a deep sense of their responsibility to the future, and he supported it not as a perfect measure, page 49 but as one which it would be wise in them to pass, and as one which they might pass without prejudice to the future policy of the country.

After discussion on other parts of the Bill,—

Mr. Holden replied.—The first objection of Captain Ward arose from a misapprehension of the principle and object of the contingent votes. Their entry on the voting paper was apt to be misunderstood as a departure from the system of single voting, whereas it was merely an expedient to prevent the single vote from being thrown away on a candidate who did not require it It merely indicated for whom the elector would desire to give his vote, if on his coming to the poll he were told, "Mr. A., for whom you intend to vote, is already elected by a full quota, and you are therefore at liberty to aid in the election of another."It was not a second vote, and should be regarded as if it were non-existent, or written in invisible ink, until effect was given to it in consequence of the primary vote not being required. Then it has all the effect of a primary vote. Such being the case, it was evident that no candidate whose name was second on any voting paper has any claim whatever to consideration on this account if the first-named candidate received the vote as a part of his quota. It was a mere indication that the elector would have voted for him if he had not used his vote for another in preference. A vote given by an elector to B, because his greater favourite A did not require it, was as good a vote as the vote of another elector, who esteemed B as superior to A. Now if these two considerations were borne in mind, all the objections raised by his hon. friend Captain Ward to the method of allotting contingent votes, on the ground of supposed injustice to candidates, fell to the ground. It was wholly the concern of the voter, and if he had secured the privilege of rendering his vote—his one vote—effectual for some one candidate of his choice, no other candidate was entitled to complain. Surely nothing could be more ridiculous than that a candidate should complain of it as a hardship that he is not allowed to derive any advantage from the votes of electors whose votes had returned another, because they would have voted for him if they had not voted for that other person. But although no candidate had any greater right than another to influence the selection of the voting papers which were to be taken as the surplus beyond any candidate's quota, general policy required some rules, and these have been applied. The first rule was to select those on which the greatest number of contingent votes were entered. The reason of this was obvious. The greater the number of names entered, the less likely was the vote to be lost in the election. After this rule had been applied, Mr. Hare had introduced a great number of complicated rules, which he had rejected for the sake of greater simplicity. All that appeared necessary to him was, to provide some rule which should preclude any selection of papers by the registrar, through personal or political motives. A political motive could, indeed, hardly apply, because the question would not be (as now, in ordinary elections) between candidates of different parties, but those of a second choice of two electors of the same party, which of two voters for A should have a second choice, because A did not require both votes. An equality of chance was the only impartial course to be adopted, and the most convenient mode of accomplishing this seemed to be the taking the votes in the order in which they happened to stand on the roll; and, notwithstanding it was characteriezd by the hon. and learned Attorney General as absurd and ridiculous, he would venture to abide by it until some wiser and better plan were suggested; when that were done, he was perfectly ready to consider and adopt it. The hon. member (Captain Ward) said that under this system A might be returned and B rejected by page 50 a course which had no greater merit than the system of tossing up. This was a very narrow and fallacious view of the case. The system was a matter altogether distinct from the tossing up. True, it might be that in the working of the system, as in that of any other, a state of facts might result in which there might be a tie, or two or more parties might have equal claim to that which all could not by the nature of the case obtain. A resort to some plan equivalent to tossing up was in such case the only way out of the difficulty. But the hon. member (Captain Ward) had not been content with criticising the system of Mr. Hare. He has declared his preference for another. The system of single voting without quotas and without contingent voting appears to him preferable. It will, he says, protect minorities better. Possibly it might do so; but in what manner and at what expense of confusion and injustice towards majorities it might be worth while first to consider. Taking his friend Captain Ward's illustrations in order, he would answer his objections seriatim. In his first example, he complained that if 1, 2, 3 were taken to make A's quota, A and C would be returned, whereas if 4, 5, and 6 be taken, A and B would be returned. He (Mr. Holden) denied that this was any objection, unless either B had some claim superior to A, or A superior to B. This not being shown, some form of decision by lot was the just and proper course. If instead of an election by contingent voting the votes had been taken by 1, 2, and 3 going to the poll first, and 4, 5, and 6—knowing how they had voted—going to the poll afterwards, and voting for the candidates of their respective second choice, in consequence of such knowledge, the candidate whose election was defeated by his not receiving the vote of 1, 2, or 3 would have no ground of complaint, because he would have received it had they voted last in order. With regard to the second example, in which a greater claim was maintained on behalf of the excluded candidate, on account of his having more primary votes, the fallacy of the objection was equal, though of another kind. It was forgotten that when the contingent votes were used, they had the same force as primary votes. The fact that an elector would have voted for A, if A had wanted his vote, did not render his vote for B less valid, if it were not used for A. Thus, the return of C, in example two, by contingent votes in excess of B's primary votes, is quite legitimate. It was not because the vote was called contingent when placed on the voting paper that it was contingent or inferior when used. It has then become absolute, and of equal power with the primary vote. It was the actual vote of one elector. The third example turned upon the converse fallacy. Here contingent votes were taken into account which had never taken effect. The objection assumed that B was entitled to reckon, as influencing his claim to consideration, contingent votes on voting papers actually used for a preceding candidate. These were only votes which would have been given for B, but have not been given in fact. They should be, therefore, considered as non-existent for the purpose of the computation, and the objection would then utterly vanish. This system of single voting, without the protection of Hare's adjuncts, was that proposed in the Bill of the Forster Ministry; but as it was never fully discussed, public attention was not attracted to the objections to which it was open, although they at that time very clearly presented themselves to his mind, and he was thereby more prepared to welcome Mr. Hare's discovery as an escape from them. And his friend Captain Ward hinted that some better plan than Mr. Hare's contingent voting might answer all the purpose of this cumbrous system,—this better plan being, as he understood, a public statement of the number of votes already polled for candidates. If his honourable friend had said at once that he proposed to supersede the necessity of a cumbrous system by a system of voting page 51 through the electric telegraph, he could hardly have more astonished him. If he would show in what manner his suggestion could be practically carried out, he was willing to relinquish the field to him. The only merit he claimed for Hare's system was that of doing in the most practicable way which has hitherto been propounded. But what did the publication proposed involve? First, that by some miracle of intuition all the polling officers in the colony were to be aware of the instant at which any candidate had acquired a sufficient number of votes in the aggregate to effect his return. Secondly, that the polling be thus simultaneously stopped, and the fact published, the machinery of election being suspended until all the electors are duly apprised. When, on this being effected, the election recommenced, it could only go on until another candidate were elected, when the polling would again stop, and the same proceedings would be repeated until the electors were tired of travelling backwards and forwards to the poll. If it were practicable to prevent votes being thrown away at elections by any such publication as his hon. friend suggested, it would surely have been long ago introduced in connection with the existing system. It was no part of the avowed policy of the electoral law that votes should be thrown away. It had only been tolerated, as an evil supposed to be unavoidable, until Mr. Hare's invention had, for the first time, supplied a remedy.

The second reading was earned by a majority of 11 to 4. It was passed by the Legislative Council, and read a first time in the Legislative Assembly. In that House, on the 13th November, 1862, on the order of the day for the second reading,—

Mr. Wilson, after addressing himself to the other questions, said he had heard no one who had risen to speak attempt to defend the principle of one electorate only, and the only question was, would it be at all tolerable even under Hare's system ?—though it was scarcely to be dreamt of that that should be adopted here. He believed it to be too complicated for any person to understand it; so much so, that he did not think there were ten members in this House and the other who thoroughly understood it. [An hon. Member: "It is very simple."] Possibly it might be; but they had the declaration of the Master of the Mint, who was no mean authority in mathematical matters, that it was directly the reverse. For himself he would confess that he had not understood much of it when it was first introduced into the Bill, but afterwards the explanations of the hon. gentleman who had proposed it had so mystified him that he now knew less of it than before.

Mr. Morris, after adverting to the franchise and other subjects, added, the principle, however, most important in this Bill, whatever franchise might be adopted, was the principle known as Hare's system—a system of election by quotas. There had been great prejudices against this system, and it had been frequently observed by hon. members that they could not understand the practical working of it. He would explain to the House in a few minutes that there was no mystery in connection with the practical application of this principle. Hare's system was the only one by which representation according to numbers could possibly be secured. Under that system a man carried his rights with him, and could exercise his power of voting in whatever part of the colony he might be at the time of an election. If the Upper House be composed of members returned for large districts, it would, after all, be a mere reflex of the majority of the community; and consequently, out of a community of 100,000 people, it might so happen that 49,000 were not represented at all. But such a state page 52 of things could not possibly arise under Mr. Hare's system. He wanted to know why these 49,000 persons were not to be represented! No reason had yet been given why the majority of the people should have the whole of the representation. This principle—which many hon. members were fond of exalting—of taxation and law-making by representatives, was practically ignored by the system at present adopted; the majority alone of the community made the laws and taxed the people.

Mr. Love did not think there would be any necessity for discussing Hare's system, because the country was so thoroughly against it; and it was so imperfectly understood that every one believed it would never become the law of the land. He considered it to be a system that would never work well in this country; it might look well in theory, but would be impracticable. Too much power would be left in the hands of the Registrar-General, who could almost return what members he pleased.

Mr. Dalgleish, among other observations, said: As to the principles of this Bill, he disagreed with them all, except the one pertaining to Hare's system. He believed that no system of representation was so perfect, or so capable of fully eliciting the will of the people, as this which was called Hare's. It was impossible to define it fully in a speech, but any hon. member who carefully examined it would see the truth of what he stated. The hon. member (Mr. Harpur) had struck the only objection that he saw to the system, in the suggestion as to two candidates having equal votes. The effect of this would be to throw the election virtually into the hands of one person. But the present and any other system was open to the same objection. Such an occurrence would, however, happen only very rarely. He did not agree with the drawing by lot as proposed, but would prefer to have the decision left to some impartial person, uninfluenced by personal considerations, as a returning officer should at all times be. Hare's system, he repeated, was the only true way of obtaining the will of the people, and by having the whole colony formed into one great electorate, and all the elections taking place on the one day, every one could vote, while no person could possibly vote in more than one electorate. He could not understand how members of that House could say they preferred the present nominee Chamber to an elective House under the Hare system. He was told, when he asked how it was that hon. members could possibly express such an opinion, that they justified the preference indicated on the ground that, in the present state of things, there was the "swamping power"to fall back upon. He could not understand the force of such an argument as that. Was it to be supposed, if a Ministry, to insure a majority, should suddenly create a number of new members, that an immediately succeeding Government would be disposed to accept such a set of nominations ? And if they should not accept them, what was to be done ? Was it not clear that their only course in such a case would be to increase the number of members of Council to a very large and indefinite extent, so that the influence of such a Chamber might be practically nullified.

Mr. W. Forster, after explaining what had been proposed by a former ministry, and discussing the general question of the construction of an Upper Chamber, observed that representation of the average opinions of the country was assumed to be arrived at under our present system. But how was it proposed to produce that effect when there was only one electorate returning six or seven members ? [Mr. Harpur: By the progress of truth,] Whatever faith the hon. member might have in the operation of truth (0r perhaps Providence was meant), it was their duty, as legislators, to have in their institutions as little liability to error as possible, to prevent injurious and unjust results. It was a palpable injustice when, in pro page 53 posing to give the whole country representation, a small majority of a constituency was given the power of returning the whole of the members. That was a result we should endeavour to guard against. He thought a majority of the House would agree with him that this would be unfair, and not a representation in principle at all—only one section was represented, having, it might be, only a majority of three or four, to the entire disfranchisement of the other; at any rate, for a certain period. He thought a result like that which must arise in many instances ought to be guarded against by the institution they were now endeavouring to perfect. He thought he had demonstrated that if the principle of large electorates were admitted, they must alter the system of voting. It was the fear that he and others entertained of this result which led him to make, in the measure his administration introduced, a provision by which an elector was allowed to vote for only one candidate. He admitted that that was an imperfect attempt, and he conceived that Hare's system, so much spoken of in the present debate, went in the same direction, but did the tiling aimed at in a far more effective and just manner. They had heard all sorts of denunciations, but not a single argument against that system. Was it a reason that the House should reject this system, which had obtained the attention and approval of thoughtful men, including one honourable member well known to be extreme in his democratic notions, because certain hon. members informed the House that they did not understand it? Or did it follow that because hon. members did not understand it the public would not understand it ? It was called a conservative measure. Now, according to his mind, it was one of the most democratic measures ever proposed: it was a complete innovation upon old established principles. It was conservative in the sense in which every reform was conservative, because it seemed to him to conserve justice, being allied with truth and equity, and thus conserving the very best interests for the people. That it was conservative in the sense of obstruction, in the sense of the word "tory,"or the maintenance of obsolete, oligarchical, or anti-democratic notions, he denied; and no one who thoroughly considered its operations could entertain such an opinion for a moment. They were told that it was unpopular—that the people out of doors were against it. But the people out of doors had not considered it; there had been no discussion or expression of opinion on the part of the public to entitle any hon. member to come to that conclusion. He thought it was a popular belief in the widest sense, though not in the superficial sense of being approved of by the people, because they had given no opinion upon it. But it was popular as being thoroughly democratic in its theory, and would prove democratic in its practice. It seemed to be the idea of population carried out in principle; the principle of proportion applied to numbers. In brief, he might say that at its roots were the axiom that equal numbers should have equal representation. [Mr. Harpur: Not as embodied in the Bill.] He admitted that the details were imperfect; he was speaking of the principles of the system. So far as equality could be attained, the system proposed that each equal portion of electors should have an equal representation; and could the equity of the system be better shown ? How was it possible to find fault with a system that told off the community into different sections, giving each a representative in proportion to its numbers ? [Mr. Harpur : Stereotyping faction.] This remark contained no argument. Anything might be termed faction. Majorities in the House, and even the Government themselves, had been termed a faction, until people were tired of hearing it. This system was a mere mechanical provision, if anything like faction could be involved in that. He believed he had been able to understand the system, after giving it a considerable amount of attention, and he would page 54 endeavour to explain to the House some of the features he had remarked in it, and which he thought were in its favour. One objection he had heard against the system would show the manner in which it was treated by honourable members. It was said, suppose a case in which 20,000 electors were to return ten members, and supposing there were forty candidates, each having an equal number of votes—why, such a tiling was simply impossible; or, if possible, it was provided for by this system. The easiest way of putting the question was, by supposing a case of one electorate where there was but one returning officer. Supposing there were 10,000 votes to be given and ten members to be returned. The quota was arrived at by a simple sum in division, the number of electors being divided by the number of persons to be elected. Thereby was obtained what was called a quota. It was not arbitrary, but a definite proportion of the electors to the elected. [A voice: How if less than the quota voted?] And here he took exception to the phraseology of the Bill—the expressions "primary"and "contingent"not being at all connected with the Hare system of voting. Strictly speaking, there was but one vote. He was supposing a case where the electorate was sufficiently limited to admit of one returning officer officiating. Say there is a certain number of candidates to be elected—ten, for instance—and there are 10,000 electors. In such case the quota will be 1,000 votes. Well, the returning officer receives votes up to 1,000 for A and B. After that, if any electors wish to vote for A and B, they are told the votes are not required, and they then vote for C and D, or, if these candidates have also obtained the quota, they are carried to E and F, or any others that the electors approve of. [Mr. Harpur: But the votes are given on paper.] It is not at all necessary. In this way, in a small electorate, the whole number to be returned may be elected without 'the necessity of any great expense, and without the need of much official machinery. But, of course, when you came to apply the principle to extensive electorates, then this official machinery became necessary, just as it was necessary at present. It was not more liable to abuse than any other system. In all cases you must necessarily depend on the integrity of individuals, and if they could not repose confidence to this extent in their officials, the sooner we obtained a despotism the better. But he (Mr. Forster) had no doubt on this score, and he saw no difficulty whatever in applying this system, which embraced the best possible means of securing a representation of opinions. It was argued that persons might combine to secure the election of particular candidates. But was there anything improper or undemocratic in that? Suppose the Wesleyans, or the Roman Catholics, or any other body, desired to elect one of their own number to represent them, was there anything wrong in their combining in order to secure that end ? He maintained there was not. On the contrary, he contended it was quite in accordance with the true theory of representation, which regarded the candidate as the representative of opinions, and not of mere numbers. The more he considered the Hare system, the more he admired it, as calculated to secure democratic freedom. He might be told that it destroyed responsibility. It destroyed responsibility to local opinion, perhaps; but it held the representative amenable to the general opinion of the country; for the holding of his position must depend on his having gained the confidence and the respect of the commonwealth of which he formed part. He (Mr. Forster) said, therefore, he had no hesitation in giving in his adherence to the Hare system—a system admirable for its simplicity, and one that did honour to its contriver in the mother-country, and for the introduction of which the honourable gentleman who had brought it so prominently under notice here was entitled to great credit.

Mr. Hoskins would accept the single electorate, in combination with page 53 Hare's system, which had the advantage of giving effect to every vote. The provision for giving five votes to each elector was no part of Hare's system, and should not have his support.

Mr. Lucas was in favour of trying Hare's system; and, in so far as he could understand it, he regarded it as being as simple and easy as the present system. Nor did he think there was any possibility of a vote being lost, as had been stated by one hon. member; for every man who voted must tell for one member at all events; and if he put one name only on the paper, then it would be the duty of the returning officer to first select those papers which had one name only on them, so that the vote should not be lost. The present bill differed somewhat from Hare's system, but he believed that difference to be an improvement. Under the system the returning officer collects the number of votes registered, and from that forms his quota. Thus, if there were 30,000 electors and thirty to be returned, he formed his quota by dividing the one by the other; but if only 8,000 electors voted, the probability would be that the matter could not be worked out. inasmuch as no one member would get a quota. According to the bill, however, the returning officer took the number of votes actually recorded, and divided them by the number of members to be returned, in order to obtain his quota. In that way every man would have his vote used, without the possibility of loss. He believed the system to be a good one, and he would like to see it tried; and as there was a bill to amend the Municipalities Act now before the House, he thought a good opportunity was afforded of testing the working of the system. He would be willing enough to apply it to the Council elections if the bill were such a one that he could support.

Mr. R. Forster would remove from the bill the part relating to Hare's system, for the simple reason that he did not understand it. It appeared to be a very ingenious theory, but one that had never been brought into operation. The Government were bound to see that the bill, with the alterations proposed, was passed by the Upper House, and was not again sent back to us.

Mr. Holt thought the hon. member for New England (Mr. It. Forster) might, if he would only take the pains, easily understand Mr. Hare's system of representation. He would try to explain the matter to the hon. member. The system would give every elector the opportunity of voting just as if he knew the state of the poll. He would suppose that there were twelve hundred electors, and that there were three vacancies; the quota in that case would be four hundred. He would also suppose that the four Ministers were the candidates. First of all, the electors would vote for Mr. Cowper, who ought to be returned on account of his long services. Well, when the number for Mr. Cowper was made up the elector would give his vote for the Minister for Lands; and on Mr. Robertson's number being made up he would give his vote for Mr. Arnold. Every elector had the opportunity of doing what he would do if the polling booths had glass windows. Although the clauses were drawn up in legal phraseology, they were when examined easily intelligible. The instructions to the scrutineers were very complete and explicit. He looked upon this bill as merely a skeleton measure, and in voting for the second reading it was with an anxious desire to get this important matter settled. He did not, however, commit himself to any of the details. If he thought any bill could be so altered as to make it a satisfactory measure, as he thought was the case with this bill, he would support it. There was a good deal in the bill of which he quite approved, and more especially that clause which contained Hare's invention, as it might be termed.

Mr. Stewart said that, as to Hare's system, he must admit, from the opportunities he had had of judging, it was his impression that nineteen- page 56 twentieths of the community did not and would not, if it was passed, know how to carry it into effect. He thought the present system, which enabled the electors at the close of the poll to know which was the successful candidate, was the best that we could adopt, and with the ballot the elections had been the most satisfactory that had taken place in the colony.

Mr. Dangar and Mr. Dick addressed the House, and on a division the second reading was carried by a majority of 24 against 20.—Sydney Morning Herald. Friday, November 14th, 1862.

Soon after the debate the Ministry resigned, and the measure proceeded no further.