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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 56

I. Of Fact—Alleged Process of Nature

I. Of Fact—Alleged Process of Nature.

Science takes an interest in a hypothesis or doctrine only so far as it alleges a fact of physical nature-nature disclosing its process through its history. Thus her doctrine of gravitation is nature's fact of the apple's fall comprehended by reason, so that the apple's fall is for her the doctrine of page break gravitation apprehended through sense. Keeping this in view, we obtain deliverance, in relation to the alleged evolutionary process of nature, from entanglement with baseless naturalistic speculation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, from supranaturalistic doctrine of creation.

1. Baseless naturalistic speculation about origin is represented by the "specs I growed' of clever childish Topsy, and by the daydream of primeval Athenians and others, in the clever childhood of peoples, regarding autochthonic origination of their fathers from their soil of fatherland. Such things are humanly interesting, as phases of the pathetic history of human guesses at truth near the deep springs of life. But by science they are disregarded as guess-work, not solidly built up on ground of nature from her facts, but floating in air, on wings of imagination or fancy; or they are by her regarded with aversion as dangerous to solid ascertainment of truth, all the more hateful if they be plausible, so as to be peculiarly dangerous impostures. Such, in relation to the world as a whole, was the ancient cosmogony; to us represented by the noble poem of Lucretius, whose rerum natura is, not simply the system of things, but their genesis as a system, their systematic origination as a world, of cosmos, "order," or mundus, "the beautiful." We shall pause for a little in view of that speculation, which has lessons to our present from its past.

The method of inductive science, which had hardly begun to dawn upon the ancient masters of speculation, has in our new time come to be almost a second nature of inherited habit through generations of induction as a science and a practice; so that a petit maitre in our schools can easily obtain exact and full information about wide regions which were as worlds unknown, not only to the deep and far penetrative industry of [unclear: Aris] mighty intellect, but to the incarnate genius of speculation a out ideal possibilities, eagle eyed adventurous, in the imperial reason of Plato the divine. This must be held in view of our minds if we will do justice to the old masters, and enter through sympathetic intelligence into comprehension of their speculation, and place our Helves in right relation of discipleship to their genius; as Manfred saw "hoar antiquity" majestic and lovely in the moonlit world he gazed on from the solitary tower, so that for him—

The place became religion; and the heart ran o'er In silent worship of the great of old! Those dead, but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule Our spirits from their urns.

And yet, moonlight is not daylight. We are the children of a distinctively modern day of science. We must judge, as we shall be judged, according to our lights. And in the new light of our day we perceive that that speculation was not science. To poetry, in her love of beauty and grandeur, it has a fascination in its magnificent unity in vast and varied multiplicity of movement and life. To philosophy it might be welcome as a rain-bow ladder of ascending through physica of nature to metaphysica of being. It may even be made subservient to theology as a discipline of religion, in her aspiration, on wings of the soul, "to follow nature up to nature's God." For she can distinguish the glorious poetry of a Lucretius from his Epicurean metaphysic, and transfigure his poetry into her psalmody more glorious, apprehending his natura as being also creatura, the physis a ktisis, meet theme of nobler song than his. But it was not the result of solid ascertainment of Nature's doctrine from her facts. Origination was apprehended as a sort of universal growth-pangenesis-with perhaps an unconscious anima mundi, or non rational "soul in nature," as vital principle of the great evolutionary movement. And this gave rise to song—in the strain of—

From [unclear: harmony] from heavenly harmony,
This [unclear: univers] began;
From harmony to harmony
Through [unclear: I] pass of the notes it ran,
The [unclear: diapa] closing fun in man.

But poetry is not science. The hypothesis of universal growth, at the core of the representation, and in pervasive domination of it all, was essentially guess-work like the "spec's I growed," and the day dream about autochthones. Ionian Anaximander adduced on behalf of it the fact of a spontaneous origination of life from the slime of subsiding seas in sweltering primeval heat of the sun. But that fact was a [unclear: fi], like the recent fable of Bathybius. It was an afterthought of imagination in support of a speculation really fanciful. In substance and spirit that cosmogony was but a sort of philosophical poetry page 6 of nature, meetly robed as poetry even when strenuously reasoned as the "Paradise Lost," but not less truly fanciful though in aspect it should be quasi-scientific plain prosaic, like a transcendental muse in quakeress costume.

To us it may come in the deeper disguise of a master of modern science in the third century of our new Baconian epoch of Induction. It may call itself a scientific evolutionism. And he may regard with scorn such as will not receive his speculation, denouncing them in the spirit of the saying, "This people, who know not the law, are cursed." For there is a phariseeism of science as well as of religion: professed teachers of the law who make the law of none effect by vain traditions of their coteries; idolatry of the theatre of system, or of the cave of cloistral isolation, to say nothing of the baser idolatry of the market place, which can sink into pandering to low cravings of the unreflecting by pungent contradictions or inuendos against received beliefs. And science, having no passions, may not repay that scorn with scorn. But she will guard herself by remembering that, while there may be a really scientific evolutionism, ostensibly built up on ground of nature from her facts, a viewy speculation floating in air is not science but imposture, even though the impostor should be himself a believer—

Like [unclear: Katerfe] to with his hair on end.
At his own wonders wondering.

Corresponding to that ancient cosmogony, there is an ideal construction of nature, now-a-days calling itself materialistic philosophy, and really being a hybrid of physics and metaphysics, both misunderstood, which may be set forth as follows. We assume, to begin with, one infinite homogeneous substance, inhabited by one force working equally in all directions. And from that we imagine the universe as arising in a manner such as might have been suggested to Kant, if he bad not been either a philosopher or a physicist, by his categorical imperative, "Act from a maxim fit to become law in a system of universal legislation" Here the germinal idea is "fitness." In the government of a rational universe, nothing is "fit" to hang together as a system but morality, and nothing but what is moral is "fit" to hold abiding place in such a system as precept of detail. Let us apply this idea to the wholly different case of origination of a physical universe. The universe will rise into being through a vast process of unconscious experimentation, on a principle of what we call "survival of the fittest," though a clear-eyed philosopher might prefer to say "instatement of the fit," First, in that laboratory, by all round operation of the one force, all conceivable worlds, every one of them with all conceivable infinitude of variety in details, rise toward inchoate being; but while yet only nascent, not instated in being, like Milton's half-created lion: "pawing to be free," are flung back into nonexistence by friction or strain of "unfitness:" the totality proving "unfit" to hang together as a world, or one or more details in an infinite infinitude of details proving "unfit" for adjustment into harmony with the whole. At last, by a sort of physical abscissio infiniti, there is attained an evolutionary [unclear: sab] of nature, reposing on completion, in that one world which, both as a whole and throughout all its infinite infinitude of details, has been found "fit" to stand—on what? And how? And why?

The idealism of this construction is clumsy and coarse as compared with the methodology of Hegelians, Chinese, and other speculative barbarians, who deduce the universe by process of logic from a characterless Being equal to Nothing. The speculation, thus crude and crass intellectually, is inferior to the Epicurean materialism in respect both of simplicity and of that cynical frankness, of confessed guess-work, which underlies the Epicurean suggestion of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. The assumption which it has in place of that guess, the one substance with one force, is a purely arbitrary creation of man's will; "shooting," as Hegel said of a kindred speculation," the universe out of a pistol." In fact, the universe is assumed as begun, before we have begun to begin it. And this oddly fatalistic universe, thus originated by man's will before it begins to originate itself by necessity of physical nature, has in it a fatal incapacity of "marching" either through the origination or to it. For the speculation has no provision for either setting the one force in operation or sustaining it in operation once begun. And it is bewildering to try to think whether the resources of mathematical symbolism can conceivably furnish an expression for the infinite infinitude of infinity of chances against the origination, by one force always dispersing itself aimless in ail conceivable directions, of a page 7 universe so thoroughly and essentially definite as ours, with a great system for every star, and a little world in every atom, through ill its countlessly multitudinous infinitude of systems of differentiation, precise and harmonious, as if in express manifestation of one sovereign mind, "a manifold wisdom" all pervasive, pervasive "all in the whole, and all in every part." But from the view point of real science what falls to be said of the speculation is this:—It is not only unscientific but anti-scientific, in matter and spirit, in method and result, from centre to circumference all round. To the real world known to science its ideal world stands in no relation but of persistent reciprocal exclusion and repulsion. To real knowledge it is related only as thesis to decisive antithesis. To a really scientific evolutionism, if such a thing there be, it is only an illustration of contrast. Upon disciplined reason it has no claim, except to be driven away from her bar as an old and oft-exposed impostor.

2. At the opposite extreme, we seek to avoid entanglement with the supranaturalistic doctrine of creation. Some appear to regard evolution simply as the antithesis of creation. And many are under the impression that the one is of course exclusive of the other. But science knows not any matter of course. She will believe only what she perceives in the nature of the things in question. She therefore disregards any "strife of tongues" that may be among zealots of either science or theology. For zeal may be "not according to knowledge," nor conformable to the maxim, "He that believeth shall not make haste." And men may consult their ambition more than their qualification before rushing into a controversy so momentous in its issues, both for true rational science and for true rational theology. Disregarding then, "vain janglings," of [men who perhaps "know not what they say nor whereof they affirm," let us look into the nature of the things in this case. It is represented by the expressions, respectively, process of nature, and will: evolution is, origination by process of nature, and creation is, origination by will. Here then there is difference with coincidence and connection. But that does not make a manifest necessity of collision. There is difference with coincidence and connection, yet there is no reality of collision, nor indeed possibility of it, in the case of space and time as related to one event, and in the case of colour and sound in relation to one body. And in the clear light of science we can see that there is no real necessity of collision between evolutionism and creationism in their own true natures.

On the face of the matter we see that while creationism with its will has to do only with extranatural, supernatural, relatively metaphysical, evolutionism, as an hypothesis of science, has to do only with the physica of nature and its process. Every thing extra-natural is as such outside of the province of physical science as such, be-yond her jurisdiction and her ken, her power of right to judge or to think. Assuming the substantive reality of nature, she does not further inquire whether that reality reposes on supernatural, or whether it may not be self-existent and eternal, or whether it may not be constituted by chance assemblage of atoms. To any such question she cannot say either yes or no without so far ceasing to be as physical science. It would be suicidal on her part to think about anything metaphysical, supernatural, extranatural, even in her dreams. In relation to everything but physical nature she is bound by her constitution, under penalty of death by "the happy despatch," to be dumb because deaf and blind, as Babbage's calculating machine.

An Evolutionist, it is true, besides being thus far a man of science in profession, may further in practice of thought or speech be a metaphysician—perhaps without knowing it, like the man who spoke prose. In this capacity he may, beyond inquiring into realities of nature, speculate about the ultimate constitution of the universe. And speculation may land him in the panphysicist doctrine, that physical nature is the only reality; so that what he sees in the looking-glass is a sublimated beast; and that correspondingly it is weak unscientific unreason to believe, with the Great Father of Modern Science, that most assuredly in the judgment of reason "this universe frame is" not "without a mind" (Bacon's Essays: "Of Atheism"). Or, speculation may root him and ground him in the doctrine, that, while physical nature is real and substantial, there is a supernatural not less real and substantial at each of her poles, both in man at our terrestrial pole of wondering contemplation, and in God at the celestial pole of sovereign gubernation and origination: that page 8 nature herself is to reason a mute eloquent plea for supernuturalism,—"Shew me thy man, and I will shew thee my God." (Theoph. Ant.) But Physical Science as such does not delare for or against either doctrine. He who says a word about either so far puts himself out of her court. The most devoted of her disciples, if he so much as begin to think about supernatural or extranatural in any way, of negation, affirmation, or dubitation, then and thereby "drops into" metaphysic of poetry, philosophy, or theology—lapses instanter from physical science, as distinctly as Daniel O'Rourke fell out of the moon. And if we dissolve from strict science into considerate philosophy for the occasion, and look into the heart of the matter, still we shall find no apparent necessity of collision.

Where creationism is at its highest, most eminently characteristic in supernaturalism express, there most clearly all possibility of collision is completely out of the question. It is inconceivable that there should be even contact. For there there is no ideal possibility either of evolution or of any other process of physical nature. I refer to what is called "immediate creation;" that is, the primary origination, with no employment of material or medium, by—(rhema, not logos, He. 11: 3)—pure and simple fiat of will. This extends to rational spirits or souls and to the raw material of the physical world. And in the origination of these it is inconceivable that there should be any process of physical nature; as it is that there should be "a natural body" outside of space and time. The rational spirit or soul in view of creationism does not belong to physical nature. It is not of her world even when in it: though here among her physica, it is gershom, "stranger here." Physical science as such, so far from having any theory of its origin, is not competently aware of its existence; she does not know, and even cannot competently inquire, whether any such thing as a rational soul has ever existed anywhere in the universe. Not less clearly the origination of the raw material of the physical world is altogether beyond her competency of knowledge. A raw material—hule—which may be for metaphysic as ens rationis-is not for physical science as a concrete entity, an object of knowledge or distinct conception. As raw, formless, indeterminate, chaotic, it is to her apprehension only as an abyssmal darkness, to look upon which is to be struck blind. In order to have fur her a cognisable existence, the matter must be [unclear: indu] I with some form, or imbued with something of formative determination, were it only as bathyoius or other slime. Thus far a formed world, an existing nature, at least in germ, actual or possible, real or imaginary, has to be i presupposed in order to ideal possibility of so much as a germinal science. Doubly or trebly a fortiori, it is beyond the competency of science to frame any hypothesis of the origination of a raw material of nature or of world. To speak of a natural process of originating nature's raw material is like speaking of a mar's being the father of his grandfather.

The secondary origination which has place in a formed world introduces us to the doctrine of a "mediate" creation. Here Theology recognises the previously existing nature with its process. Thus, in the origination of individuals, parentage with generation. This she makes to be employed by the Creator as his material or medium. But in so doing she does not ostensibly annul the nature in respect of reality, nor cancel the process in respect of validity. On the contrary, she validates and conserves, and that in two ways. First, generally, all creation secures the reality of nature as resulting consequent. For a true creation is a positing of something real; so that if the creature be unreal the creation is illusory, and providence is without a sphere of preservation and government. And second and specially, mediate creation further demands the validity of nature in her process as antecedent condition. For here the Creator employs the previously existing nature as his medium. And only what is real can be really so employed: to employ is not to destroy but to conserve, in employment, for the employer. So of the origination of individuals. And so, conceivably, of the origination of species. If it be ascertained that the origination of species is, like that of individuals, by process of nature, for Theology the result needs to be only her finding, that the creation of species, like that of individuals, is not immediate but mediate.

The finding does not need to be for her an unwelcome surprise, as if thrust upon her by necessity of conforming to new ascertainments of science. Her doctrine of a mediate creation was formulated in her schools many page 9 ages before the new science had begun to be; and was applied to species as well as to individuals by the most illustrious of her masters, such as Thomas Aquinas, her Angel of the Schools. That may now appear to her—as it did to him—most fully in keeping with her general view as to immediate creation, that its appropriate work is origination of raw material and of souls. It may otherwise interest her as affecting her logic of classification or her metaphysic of dogma. It does not touch her substantive doctrine of creation, as consisting in origination by will, with or without employment of medium or material previously existing. Her distinction between mediate and immediate affects only the way and manner of creation, not the substantive fact of creation. It enables her to show that in good faith she has no quarrel with evolution simply as origination by process of nature. But it leaves intact the grand reality of her fundamental confession and song, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth."

Physical science, on the other hand, on behalf of an hypothesis of origination by process of nature, has no call of interest, nor power of right, to quarrel with theology as affirming origination by will. We know that there can be an origination which is at once by process of nature and at the same time by will. For in the inner world of mind, while the origination of logical conclusions is wholly by process of nature intellectual, and while the origination of true poetry is wholly by process of nature aesthetic-imaginative, at the same time the origination in both eases is wholly by will, designing free agency, of the person as reasoner or poet. We do not know that it is otherwise in relation to the outer world of physical nature. For aught that we can really see there may be there a rational agency along with the physical, yet distinct from it, as light is from atmosphere in space which by each of them is filled "all in all;" rational causation may be there in concourse with physical, to one and the same effect, as light blends with heat in effect of the sunbeam; the physical may be employed as a second cause by the rational as first cause, witness the "voluntary" action of our body, always conformable to its laws of body, but always controlled by the mind. So we reason; and that from the view point of physical science.

So it is even when there is no origination of life in the question. In ordinary course of nature's history her falling apple makes us aware of a process of gravitation; the uniform direction of this becomes for us the revelation of a law; and through know-ledge of that we rise iuto comprehension of the mechanical system of the universe. But what is this force thus proceeding through nature, or whose? May not that which here in nature appears as a law have its unseen fountain in sovereign personality as a statute or decree? May not this force be wielded for the purpose, if not ultimately reposed in the will, or even constituted in its operation by the stable persistent volition, of a supernatural free agent—an angel or a God? Questioning to which physical science cannot answer. This matter, metaphysical, is beyond her: here she has "nothing to draw with, and the well is deep." Hersciolist, not knowing himself nor her, may be dogmatic in the presumption of ignorance, dreaming of omniscience where nesience—docta inscitia—is her deepest wisdom. But she, knowing herself, can school him, with the world's great master of wisdom in song-" There are things in heaven and earth, Horatio, that are not dreamed of in our philosophy." And her Newton, knowing himself and her, will subscribe to the confession of her reverent humility, and speak of himself as a child who gathers a few pebbles or shells on the sea shore, while the great ocean they came from remains to him ever an unfathomable and unsearchable deep.