Chapter VIII.

Protection in Old States.

The doctrine that we have just examined—as to young states being the only proper exceptions to the universal adoption of free trade—offers a curious contrast to another which asserts the precise contrary, viz., that it is the old states, and not the young ones, that are entitled to form the exceptions in question. The plea may be condensed into the following shape:—"As a theory, free trade is, we admit, unassailable, but, exceptionally, it does not apply to old states, in which interests have grown up under the shelter of page 28 protection for such a length of time, and have attained such dimensions, that the change now to a free-trade policy would bring with it wide-spread ruin and desolation, and must therefore be avoided. Would that these interests had never been created and fostered by protective laws! But, unfortunately, here they are, and we shrink from the task of disturbing them. Of course, young states would not be so foolish as to encumber themselves with such burdens, but our forefathers were unacquainted with political economy, and hence the errors of which we are now feeling the effects." We may observe, in the first place, that as the truth of the free-trade theory is not controverted, and as the only question is whether the positive and permanent advantages which its adoption offers would compensate for the temporary disturbance which it would occasion to protected interests of old standing, we need only address ourselves to the latter topic.

To paraphrase the old Roman axiom, salus populi, supremo, lex, we may say that the good of the people ought to be the first and paramount consideration. That the interests of certain limited classes should be consulted to the detriment of the country at large, that all should be injured in order that a few should be favoured, is a doctrine which has too often been acted upon, but has never been unblushingly proclaimed. In the present day, if put forth in its naked deformity, it would be denounced as utterly false and untenable. And yet that is, in plain words, the doctrine advocated in the foregoing plea. It implies opposition to all change and denial of all progress, because the change might be injurious to a few, though the progress would be the beneficial to the many. It is, no doubt, to be regretted that the interests which stand in the way of the public good should ever, from a false policy, have been placed in that position, and we may sympathise with the individuals who may prove to be the innocent victims of an evil system, but that sympathy must not blind us to the fact that the community had for a long period been suffering from the existence of the abuse, nor still less induce us to stay the hand that is lifted to destroy it. The page 29 longer the evil has lasted, the more just and necessary it is to put a speedy end to it; and since we know that the change is for the national good, our desire to confer a permanent benefit on the community must overrule our regret at abolishing privileges by which a few gained and all the rest suffered.

All improvements in the machinery by which our social requirements are supplied involve changes that are injurious to some class or other. Railways occasioned a vast displacement of the capital and labour employed in the previously-existing modes of conveyance. The adaptation of electricity to lighting purposes would, if successful, occasion heavy losses and deal a severe blow to the innocent holders of shares in gas companies; and so on in hundreds of analogous instances which are of constant recurrence. Yet no one has ever seriously maintained that these improvements were to be "prohibited" in order to "protect" the interests which such improvements interfered with. Even a century ago, when the buckle-makers of Birmingham petitioned Parliament to protect them, by prohibiting shoe-ties, their request was refused, although it was in perfect consonance with the protective principles that then prevailed.

Under the Tudors and the Stuarts the protective system in England assumed the shape of patents and monopolies under the Crown. By arbitrary edicts consumers were not left free to buy where they could buy the best and cheapest wares, but were compelled to deal for certain articles with certain "protected" parties only, who frequently were new and clumsy at their trade. This system became so costly and oppressive that the Commons frequently remonstrated with Elizabeth and James against it as an intolerable grievance. It was accordingly alternately remedied and renewed, until the sturdy Puritans came and put an end to it altogether. The people of Europe and America who at the present day suffer by the protected trades, as we, of old, suffered by patentees and monopolists, and who also are "not free to buy where they can buy the best and cheapest wares, but are compelled to deal for certain articles with certain 'protected' parties only," have not yet thoroughly page 30 realised the situation, and suffer in silence. The fact is, that those who are pecuniarily interested in the maintenance of high duties and protective laws, are few in number but wealthy, energetic, clamorous, and united; while the people, whose individual loss is small, though the aggregate is large, are apathetic and frequently misinformed and misled. It is hardly therefore to be wondered at that the rulers of nations should, hitherto, have found it expedient to court the alliance of the former, instead of siding with the inert and indifferent mass of the public.

But if statesmen are sincere in their recognition of the advantages derivable from the adoption of free trade, and only hesitate from the fear of injuring "old protected interests," let them bear in mind that this disturbance of interests is limited and temporary, since, as has been the case with all new movements, whether from scientific or political causes, the displaced capital and labour rapidly get re-distributed into other channels, while the improvement is universal, permanent, and expansive. Moreover, if it should be absolutely necessary, the disturbance which is so much dreaded can be mitigated by graduating the fiscal changes, and spreading them over a certain space of time. As a certain quantity of the previously-prohibited articles gradually obtained admittance from abroad into the country, its exports would increase to the same extent, and to the production of this increased export, the capital and labour disengaged by importing what was before produced at home, would by degrees be applied. This process would go on until the protective duties were wholly removed, and very soon the "old interests," which were dependent for a precarious existence on a subvention from the rest of the community, would become "new interests," vigorous, self-supporting, and contributing to the wealth of the country instead of subtracting from it.