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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 39

Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B.; Examined

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Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B.; Examined.

1. Chairman: You are the Clerk of the House of Commons?—I am.

2. You, I believe, are perfectly acquainted with what took place when Mr. Bradlaugh came to the table of the House, and proposed to make his affirmation instead of taking the oath?—Yes, I was personally present on that day.

3. Will you have the kindness to state to the Committee exactly what took place on that occasion, in order that we may have the facts upon our proceedings?—I will read what occurred, mainly from the Votes and Proceedings of the House, in which an accurate and authentic record of the proceedings of that day will be found. It appears that on Monday, the 3rd of May, 1880, "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table and delivered the following statement in writing to the Clerk : 'To the Right Honorable the Speaker of the House of Commons. I, the undersigned Charles Bradlaugh, beg respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration, instead of taking an oath. (Signed) Charles Bradlaugh.' And being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he answered: By virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon the Clerk reported to Mr. Speaker, that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of taking the Oath prescribed by law, in virtue of the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Mr. Speaker thereupon informed Mr. Bradlaugh that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim he might be permitted to do so. Mr. Bradlaugh addressed the House in accordance with Mr. Speaker's intimation, and then he was directed to withdraw." The Committee will observe that there is no entry in the Votes of the words used by Mr. Bradlaugh; it is not customary on such occasions to make an entry of the observations made, which are considered to be part of the debates of the House, which are not recorded in the Votes and Proceedings; and there was no shorthand writer page 13 authorised by the House to take notes, and therefore there could have been no authentic record upon which one could rely.

4. Have you any reason to believe that something was said upon that occasion by Mr. Bradlaugh other than what appeared upon the Votes?—Mr. Bradlaugh's observations were very short. He repeated that he relied upon the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, "I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation." Substantially those were the words which he addressed to the Speaker.

5. What took place after that?—Whereupon Mr. Speaker addressed the House as follows : "I have now formally to acquaint the House that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claims to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the oath prescribed by Law. He founds this claim upon the terms of the 4th clause of the Act 29 and 30 Vict., c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. I have not considered myself justified in determining this claim myself, having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, but desire to refer the matter to the judgment of the House."

6. That is substantially all that took place upon that occasion?—I presume the Committee will scarcely desire that I should proceed through all the subsequent Votes of the House in regard to the appointment of the Committees.

7. There is nothing beyond what you have stated which is material for the Committee to consider?—No, nothing besides what happened on that day in reference to this matter.

8. You are, of course, acquainted with the terms of the reference to this Committee.—Yes.

9. What were the proceedings which took place after the Report of the former Committee?—The Report of the Committee was ordered to lie upon the table, and no further proceedings were taken upon it; it lies upon the table at present.

10. Mr. Gibson: On what day was it laid upon the table?—On the 20th of May, the day on which the House assembled for business.

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11. Mr. Attorney General: I think some of the members of the Committee would like to have some account of what took place in the interval between the time when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to make the affirmation, and the time when he appeared at the table to take the Oath?—Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table to be sworn on the 21st of May, the day after the receipt of the Report from the Committee; and if the Committee would desire it, I can read from the Minutes what took place upon that occasion. "Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, and the Clerk was proceeding to administer the same to him, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Member for Portsmouth, rose to take objection thereto, and submit a motion to the House; whereupon Mr. Speaker directed Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw." And then, as the Committee are aware, several proceedings occurred, which extended over some days : the Committee will scarcely desire them to be read.

12. Chairman : Those proceedings are really stated in the Order of Reference to this Committee?—Yes.

13. Mr. Gibson: At what date did this Parliament meet for the first time?—On Thursday, the 29th of April.

14. And on what day did Mr. Bradlaugh claim to make the affirmation?—On Monday, the 3rd of May.

15. The swearing of Members had been going on in the meantime, had it not?—The swearing of Members began on Friday, the 30th of April.

16. You are acquainted with Mr. Bradlaugh's appearance; are you yourself aware whether he had been in the House during the swearing of Members on any of the intervening days?—He had been about the House, unquestionably.

17. Mr. Serjeant Simon : Mr. Bradlaugh was present, I believe, and voted when the Speaker was elected?—Yes; none of the members had then been sworn.

18. Chairman: Since this Committee has been appointed; have you made a search into the Journals of the House for I any precedents which bear upon the question before the Committee?—Yes, I directed the Clerk of the Journals to make a search for every precedent which would tend to illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of oaths.

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19. What is the result of the search?—The result of that search is the paper which is upon the table to-day, and in the hands of all the Members of the Committee.

20. I see that one of those is a precedent of a Member disabled for having sat in the House without taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member being admitted to sit without taking the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy; then there are precedents of Members being discharged for declining to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, refusing to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member expelled for absconding, and not taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, claiming to make an affirmation; then there are precedents of Members omitting the words in the Oath of Abjuration, "on the true faith of a Christian;" and lastly, the precedent of a Member stating that he had a conscientious objection to take the Oath. I should like to ask whether there is any precedent amongst those of a member coming to the table and stating that he was ready to take the Oath, and any objection being taken to him in consequence of that statement?—No, there is no precedent to that effect, unless it might be argued that the case of Mr. O'Connell, in 1829, was, to a certain extent, analogous. He claimed, as the Committee are aware, to take the Oath recently provided by the Catholic Relief Act, and which, he contended, was the oath that he was entitled to take; it was a question of law whether that was the oath which he could take.

21. In that case he refused to take the old oath, and he offered to take the new oath under the Catholic Relief Act?—That is so.

22. And the House refused, I believe, to allow him to take that oath?—That was the case. I may state briefly that these precedents may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the oath; secondly, claims to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath; and thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. With one or two exceptional cases, those three classes comprehend all the cases which have been laid before the Committee.

23. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I should page 16 like to ask upon that whether the case of Daniel O'Connell was not a case of absolute refusal by the Member to take the oath required by law?—I think the best way will be, perhaps, to read the precedent from this paper, and then any inference can be drawn from it. It is at page 5. "Precedent of Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; Daniel O'Connell, Esq., professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned knight of the shire for the county of Clare, being introduced in the usual manner, for the purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a certificate of his having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed by the Lord Stewart, whereupon the Clerk tendered to him the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O'Connell stated that he was ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege of being allowed to take the oath set forth in the Act passed in the present Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects'; whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O'Connell that, according to his interpretation of the law, it was incumbent upon Mr. O'Connell to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy and Abjuration, and that the provisions of the new act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of the said Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the declaration against transubstantiation; And that Mr. O'Connell must withdraw unless he were prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration. Whereupon Mr. O'Connell withdrew. Motion, That Mr. O'Connell be called back and heard at the table. Debate arising, a Member stated that he was requested by Mr. O'Connell to desire that he might be heard. Debate adjourned. Resolved, That Mr. O'Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard at the bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to sit and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy. Mr. O'Connell was called in and heard accordingly : and being withdrawn; Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House that Mr. O'Connell, having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act passed in this Session of Parliament 'for the relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic page 17 subjects,' is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy. Ordered, That Mr. O'Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy. And the House being informed that Mr. O'Connell attended at the door, he was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him the resolution of the House of yesterday, and the order thereon, as followeth." Then the resolution and the order are repeated. "And then Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O'Connell whether he would take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O'Connell requested to see the said Oath, which being, shown to him accordingly, Mr. O'Connell stated that the said Oath contained one proposition which he knew to be false, and another proposition which he believed to be untrue; and that he therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy. And then Mr. O'Connell was directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly;" and then a new writ was ordered.

24. Mr. John Bright: Were those oaths separate oaths?—Yes, they were three separate oaths.

25. And they require three separate acts in taking them?—Yes.

26. Mr, Attorney General : I think the result is that the House first determined that the Oath of Supremacy which ought to be taken by Mr. O'Connell was the old oath, and not the oath under the Catholic Relief Act?—Clearly.

27. And having determined that it was the old oath that required to be taken, Mr. O'Connell refused to take it?—Certainly.

28. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee) : Have you searched for any precedent affecting the taking of the oath by a Member alleged to be disqualified or ineligible; has your attention been called to the case of John Home Tooke, in Volume 35 of Parliamentary History, in the year 1801, commencing at page 956?—Not in respect of any question relating to oaths: it is not amongst these precedents.

29. As a fact, was Mr. John Horne Tooke's capacity to sit in the House challenged in tills case?—Yes, as being page 18 in Holy Orders, but not in relation to any question of taking the oath.

30. The next question that I have to ask is whether your attention has been called to the case of the alleged ineligibility of Francis Bacon, the King's Attorney General, in 1614, cited in the Commons Journal, Volume I., pp. 459 and 460?—No, my attention has not been directed to any questions of incapacity: it has been confined to questions arising out of the taking of the oaths prescribed by law.

31. There is one other question that I should like to ask, and that is whether your attention has been called to any case in which the House has discussed and dealt with the election of a Member, before that Committee was sworn?—With regard to the Jews, that would apply to Baron Rothschild and to Alderman Salomons.

32. I do not mean a case of a Member refusing to be sworn, but a case in which the House has dealt with the election before the Member had been sworn; has your attention been called to that?—No.

33. There is one case, the case of John Wilkes; the cases of O'Donovan Rossa and Mitchell were cases of legal disability; has your attention been called to any case in which the House has dealt with the election of a Member before he was sworn except for statutory disability?—Sir John Leedes sat in the House without having taken the Oath, and therefore he had clearly vacated his seat, and a new writ was issued.

34. I mean a case in which the Member has not been sworn, and in which there has been a discussion upon his eligibility outside the precedents which you have handed in; I refer to the case of John Wilkes, which is to be found in 38 Commons Journals, p. 977, and Cavendish's Parliamentary Debates, Volume I., extending over many hundred pages, commencing at 827. May I ask Sir Erskine May whether the practice has not been that when a Member appears to take the Oaths within the limited time, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has sworn and has subscribed the roll?—That was the old practice, but it has been superseded by a recent Standing Order under the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, and the rule is now different; Members can be sworn until the page 19 commencement of public business and afterwards; but no debate or business may be interrupted for that purpose.

35. That is not quite the question that I wish to put; the question that I wish to put is whether it is not now and has not always been the practice of the House that within a limited time, whatever that time may be, if a Member appears to take the oaths all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll?—That was the old practice, when the oaths were required to be taken before four o'clock, but it has since been altered. This is the present Standing Order under which the oaths are administered, and this order was made in pursuance of the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866 : "That Members may take and subscribe the Oath required by law at any time during the sitting of the House before the Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions have been entered upon, or after they have been disposed of, but no debate or business shall be interrupted for that purpose."

36. Then I again repeat my question, whether the practice has not been that a Member so appearing under the Standing Order just read to take the oath, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll?—I have already stated that such was the old practice, which has been distinctly and specifically superseded by the last Standing Order, which is now in force.

37. Is that the Standing Order which you have just read?—Yes, that is the Standing Order now in force.

38. Of course it will be a matter for argument whether it has altered it or not, but is there any other Order altering this practice except the one which you have just read?—There is no other Standing Order, and that Standing Order was made, as I have already stated, in pursuance of the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, which authorised the House to make regulations with regard to the swearing of Members.

39. But except so far as it may have been altered by the Standing Order which you have just read, was the practice that a Member appearing to take the oath all other business was to cease, and not to be resumed until he had sworn and subscribed the Roll?—Yes, certainly.

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40. Mr. Attorney General : The present Standing Order is dated the 30th April, 1860, is it not?—It is.

41. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee) : Are you aware that the House has refused to make any inquiry as to what is consistent, or what is not consistent with the Oath of Allegiance taken by a Member?—I presume that the reference must be to a case which arose in debate. That I do not consider, in any way, in point in the present inquiry, but the question was this: "In one case an attempt was made to obtain from a Member who was about to bring forward a motion, a repudiation of statements made elsewhere, which were alleged to be at variance with the oath he had taken; but the Speaker stated that it was no part of his duty to determine what was consistent with that oath, and that the terms of the motion were not in violation of any rules of the House." That was a point of Order, and had no reference whatever to the taking of the Oath.

42. Mr. Attorney General : What was the motion?—It is in the 210th volume of "Hansard's Debates," 3rd Series, page 252. It is at page 197 of my book, in a note.

43. Mr. John Bright: In what year?—On the 19th March, 1872; there is merely an incidental reference to it.

44. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee) : Are you aware of any precedent for the dealing by the House with the election of any Member not disqualified by statute or common law, until after that Member had sat and been sworn?—My attention has not been directed to any precedent bearing upon that precise point, but I apprehend that the fact of whether the Member had been sworn or not would not interfere with any proceedings. For example, under an election petition, if a Member's seat were contested, under the old system, the matter would have proceeded in the usual way, without reference to the question of whether the Member had taken the Oath or not.

45. But in such a case the Member would have been sworn, and would have sat until the question was decided?—Not necessarily; under the terms of the question I assume that he had not taken his seat.

46. Are there not very numerous cases in which with a petition against a Member for alleged statutory disqualification that Member has been sworn and has sat until the page 21 decision?—Unquestionably; there can be no doubt about it; it frequently happens.

47. Then I ask whether there is any precedent whatever for the House dealing with a Member's election or his right to sit, except in cases of absolute statutory disqualification, until that Member has taken his seat and the oaths?—So far as I understand the question, I should say that whether the Member has been sworn, or not, the matter of his disqualification, or of his right to sit would be open to the decision of the House.

48. I am not arguing the point at the moment; I am only trying to get at the fact. If you have not looked for it, of course I cannot have it; but is there, so far as you know, any precedent of such a thing ever having happened?—I know of none; but I have not searched for any such precedent.

49. Mr. Attorney General: It would not appear, would it?—I hardly know how it would appear; unless one's attention were specifically drawn to any case, there would be no means of discovering it.

50. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I will ask whether that question was not raised in the case of Wilkes, and whether it was not in the consideration of that case fully discussed, and whether the House did not resolve that any such dealing with a member was subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom?—I do not understand how that case has any bearing upon the present question.

51. There are three cases: one of expulsion, two of election annulled, and then ultimate reversal of the whole of that and expungment by the House?—Yes, but that has no bearing upon the present case. Of course, I am familiar with the case of Wilkes, but not in connection with any matter arising out of the administration of oaths, which is the special matter referred to this Committee.

52. Have you had your attention called to the Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. I., page 460, in which Sir Francis Bacon, the King's Attorney General, having sworn to his qualification, which was challenged, the House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it?"—That case is not one of the precedents that we have collected.

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Mr. Bradlaugh : They are entered extremely curiously, and one can only take the decision. It begins on page 459, "Eligibility of the Attorney General," and it does not show there that it is Sir Francis Bacon: but I have learnt that by looking up the other records; and there being then a statutory declaration which lasted until a few years ago for all counsel, solicitors, and practising men of the law, it was objected that the King's Attorney General could not sit; it appears that he had to swear to his qualification, and the question of his oath and of his disqualification, being Attorney General, were put, and the House said, "Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it," and they left him in the House, resolving that no future Attorney General should sit in it.

Chairman : That was the case which was raised as to whether the law officers of the Crown, who had for certain purposes seats in the House of Lords, had seats in the House of Commons.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Not quite that. There was an obsolete statute of the 46th Edward III., which was only repealed eight or nine years ago, but which does not seem to have been attended to, by which all practising barristers and solicitors were disqualified for sitting for counties.

53. Mr. Beresford Hope: Wilkes's precedent being expunged, is it still legible in the Journal, and could it be produced for historical information?—Certainly.

54. Major Nolan : With regard to the evidence about O'Connell, I think you stated that an Act was passed to enable O'Connell and his co-religionists to sit in Parliament?—Not to enable O'Connell to sit in Parliament, but to enable Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament.

55. O'Connell was not allowed to take advantage of that Act until he was re-elected?—No, because he had been elected prior to the passing of the Act, and the Act was clearly prospective.

56. Was the wording of that particular statute the reason why he was not allowed to take advantage of that Act?—Certainly; distinctly.

57. Would it be possible for the present or any future page 23 Parliament to pass an Act which would enable a man who had been elected previous to the passing of the Act to sit in the House?—It is not for me to say what Act of Parliament might be agreed to by Parliament, but that is quite a distinct case. In that case Mr. O'Connell had actually been elected when the Catholic Relief Act was passed, and there was a clause in the Act which made its operation prospective, and therefore distinctly, and, I believe, intentionally, excluding Mr. O'Connell from the benefits of the Act.

58. Then he was only prevented from taking advantage of that Act owing to the particular wording of that particular clause, and not owing to anything inherent in the House of Commons?—Yes; the decision was founded upon a literal construction of the words of the recent statute.

59. Mr. Whitbread : The case of Mr. O'Connell was this : that he declined to take the oath which was required of Members of Parliament elected at the time that he was elected, and that he requested to be allowed to take another form of oath; he was ordered to withdraw, and the House considered his case; is there anything that you have found in the Journals or in the Debates to indicate that if Mr. O'Connell had been willing to take the oath required of him by the House, the House would have objected to his so taking it?—Certainly not; they put it to him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and upon the face of the Journal, it would seem that if he had taken that oath, he would have been admitted.

60. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): After John Archdale had claimed to affirm, did not the House absolutely order him to attend in his place for the purpose of being sworn, and tender the oaths to him?—Mr. Archdale was ordered to attend, and the House being informed that Mr. Archdale attended according to order, his letter to Mr. Speaker was read. That letter is printed at full length among the precedents. "And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote in this House were read, viz., of the 30 Car. II., 1 Will, and Marias, and 7 & 8 Will, and Marias. And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in, and he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table; and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had taken the oaths, or would page 24 take the oaths, appointed to qualify himself to be a Member of this House : to which he answered, That in regard to a principle of his religion he had not taken the oaths, nor could take them; and then he withdrew, and a new writ was ordered."

61. Mr. Serjeant Simon : With reference to what the Honorable Member for Bedford has put to you just now, Mr. O'Connell refused to take the Oath of Supremacy on the ground that it contained matter which he knew to be untrue, and other matter which he believed to be untrue?—Yes, he so stated.

62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take the oath under such circumstances?—No, this is the only precedent, so far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.

63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O'Connell, a Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr. O'Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath afterwards?—There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly there is none in any of these precedents.

64. Mr. Secretary Childers : Is the precedent in Mr. O'Connell's case this; that on the 15th May Mr. O'Connell said that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously informed the House that he was unable to take it?—Yes, because he had been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under the recent Catholic Relief Act.

65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by the House whether he would take it?—It so appears on the face of the precedents.

66. I will put that question again more clearly; is it not the case that, as appears on page 5 of the Paper which you page 25 have placed before us, Mr. O'Connell on the 15th May said, that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy?—Yes.

67. And that, nevertheless, on the 19th of May it was ordered that Mr. Speaker do communicate to him the Resolution passed on the same day, and ask him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy?—It was so.

68. Although the House was aware that Mr. O'Connell had said that he could not take it?—Yes; but as I observed before, in the interval he had been heard upon the question of his right to take the new oath; and that, I think, accounts for the fact that the question was repeated to him as to whether, after the decision of the House had been communicated, he still persisted in refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy.

69. Mr. Watkin Williams : Was not Mr. O'Connell's objection to taking the Oath of Supremacy an objection to the truth of the matter sworn to?—Yes, certainly; and it was an oath which no Roman Catholic could take.

70. It was the truth of the matter which he was asked to pledge his oath to that he objected to, and he did not express any disbelief in the binding character of the oath itself?—No. Every Roman Catholic objected to take the Oath of Supremacy; in fact, the Oath of Supremacy was expressly designed to exclude them from Parliament.

71. Mr. Attorney General: And in consequence of the objection a new form of oath was put in the Catholic Relief Bill?—Certainly, because the Oath of Supremacy was intended to exclude Roman Catholics, and did exclude them, and was known to exclude them.

72. Mr. Watkin Williams : It was not his inability to take the oath, but his inability to pledge himself to the truth of what he was asked to swear to?—Certainly.

73. Mr. Staveley Hill : I gather from you that the House never asked O'Connell to take the oath after his giving the grounds of recusancy?—Yes, that is so.

74. Mr. Serjeant Simon : It appears that the Speaker first asked him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and then he says, No, and gives those reasons?—Yes.

75. Mr. Pemberton : In addition to Mr. O'Connell's having been heard after he had at first declined to take the oath, was there not some further discussion in the House page 26 in which other Members took part?—Certainly; those Debates will all be found in Hansard.

76. Sir Gabriel Goldney : His refusal to take the oath in the first instance was accompanied by a claim at the same time to take the new oath?—Clearly.

77. It was a refusal to take the oath accompanied by a claim for a new one; afterwards he was allowed to be heard upon that point, and then it was that the House, having decided that he could not be admitted on the new oath, he was asked if he chose to take the old oath, which he refused to do?—That is a correct statement of the case.

78. Mr. Hopwood : With regard to the point of the Standing Orders as to which Mr. Bradlaugh has asked, as I understand you, under the old practice, as pointed out in Hatsell, and as we know it existed, the occasion of a Member coming to be sworn caused all other business to cease?—Yes.

79. And then as you say, a Standing Order was passed that particular times more appropriate should be allotted for taking those oaths?—Yes.

80. But even though that may be so at the time of taking an oath, no other business can go on?—Clearly not; it is the sole business that is transacted at the moment.

81. No other business can be interposed, and nothing else can be proceeded with but the oath of the Member?—Certainly not; it is the business of the moment, and no other business can interpose.

82. Mr. Gibson: You have been asked by several honorable Members about O'Connell's ease; in your opinion, is there the slightest analogy between the facts and circumstances in O'Connell's case and those of the case now before the Committee?—I see none myself, but I would rather leave such questions for the determination of the Committee. I have stated the case in print, and of course the points of difference are matters of argument.

83. So far as you know, is there any precedent for permitting a Member of the House of Commons to take the Oath after he has stated in the House expressly, or by necessary implication, that it will have no binding effect upon his conscience?—There is no such case on record, so far as I have had the means of ascertaining.