Second Evening.

r. bright: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen—I feel satisfied that all concerned in this debate will felicitate themselves on the manner in which it passed off last evening. For my own part I may say, that it has been my earnest desire that this discussion shall be con-ducted with the utmost calmness, because, in considering a question of this nature, we know that there are naturally excitable feelings evolved on both sides, and unless we have something like a philosophical spirit in the audience as well as in the disputants, the debate becomes a mere wrangle. Therefore, I say, last night, we on this side may thank the audience; and I trust the audience on its part was satisfied with the way in which myself and my friend conducted our arguments.

My friend undertook last night to prove the Divine origin of Christianity in the sense which he put upon it in the interpretations well known to you. Had that Divine origin not been specified as in a different sense—not in a different degree—to that of other religions I could not have taken the negative. But when it is asserted that Christianity,—with this explanation of it, involving as it seems to me what is false in theology—is of Divine origin, and all other religions are asserted to be, by comparison, of human origin, I maintain we require a large amount of proof. If the proof is not merely to satisfy those who are already satisfied—those who, through early training, believe in the same way as my friend believes—if it is to prove satisfactory to those who doubt and disbelieve—then surely it will have to be of a very complete and thorough nature. Now, I do not think that as yet the proof has been thus complete. My friend stated that he occupied a difficult position in having to prove, while I might be satisfied merely with denying. But surely if he has truth on his side, affirmation should become tolerably easy. If it be simply truth which has to prove itself against falsehood, page 33 surely he has the better side of the argument. Would it be difficult to advance evidence in favour of the truth of the law of gravitation against a simple negative? Or if my friend were trying to show the wisdom of the command that we are to do to others as we would have others do to us, would he then occupy a difficult position in affirmation against a simple negative? Hence I say that if he have the full truth on his side, which he declared he had at the commencement—and as he no doubt thoroughly feels he has—he ought to occupy an easy and not a difficult position. For myself, I may state it seems to me all the other religions of the world are also of Divine origin, differing, if you will, in degree—not so well fitted for the foremost races among mankind—but still having their genesis in the same Divine Mind from which emanates the Christian religion. Of course I do not allude specially to the Jewish religion, as doubtless my friend would not except that from his divinely originated faiths, as upon the Jewish, the Christian religion itself affects to be based. But taking other religions, my object now is to try to show to those who may not have previously studied this question that the devotees of these religions put forward the same pretentions on behalf of their Divine origin as are put forward by the devotees of Christianity. I would refer first to the religion of that large mass of people, the Hindoos, now numbering something like 139 millions. In the work I hold in my hand—that very excellent treatise by Viscount Amberley, entitled "An Analysis of Religious Belief," a statement is made regarding the extreme antiquity of the sacred books of the Hindoos; and I allude to this subject of antiquity as showing that what may be good in these books is not merely independent of the teachings of Jesus, but to all appearance, does not emanate from any sacred source as acknowledged by my friend. Lord Amberley says:—

"The extreme antiquity of our extant Veda is guaranteed by the amplest testimony. In the indexes compiled by native scholars 500 or 600 years before Christ, 'we find every hymn, every verse, every word and syllable of the Veda accurately counted.' (Max Müller's 'Chips from a German Workshop,' vol. 1, p. 11.) Before this was done, not only was the whole vast collection complete, but it was ancient; for had it been a recent composition it would not have enjoyed the pre-eminent sanctity which rendered it the object of this minute attention, And not only is the Veda ancient, but it has been shown that, page 34 from the variety of its component strata, it must have been the growth of no small period of time, its earliest elements being of an almost unfathomable antiquity. Max Müller, who has elaborately treated this question, divides the Vaidik age—the age during which the Veda was in process of formation—into four great epochs. The most primitive hymns of the Rig-Veda he attributes to what he terms the Chhandas period (from Chhandas, or metre) the limits of which cannot be fixed in the ascending direction, but which descends no later than 1,000 B.C. And he thinks that 'we cannot well assign a date more recent than 1200 to, 1500 before our era,' (Chips, vol. 1, p. 13) for the composition of these hymns." A page or two further on, Lord Amberley says:—"Whatever their antiquity, the sanctity of these works in Indian opinion is of the highest order. Never has the theory of inspiration been pushed to such an extreme. The Veda was the direct creation of Brahma; and the Rishis, or Sages, who are the nominal authors of the hymns, did not compose them, but simply 'saw' them. Although, therefore, the name of one of these seers is coupled with each hymn, it must not be supposed that he did more than perceive the divine poem which was revealed to his privileged vision."

Now these Vedas contain morality of as high a character in many respects as is to be found in the sacred books of Christianity. I will read you just one or two short passages from one of the Vedas. It says:—"Any place where the mind of man can be undisturbed, is suitable for the worship of the Supreme Being." "The vulgar look for their gods in water; the ignorant think they reside in wood, bricks, and stones; men of more extended knowledge seek them in celestial orbs; but wise men worship the Universal Soul." "There is one living and true God; everlasting, without parts or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things." "He who considers all beings as existing in the Supreme Spirit, and the Supreme Spirit as pervading all beings, cannot view with contempt any creature whatsoever." "To know that God is, and that all is God, this is the substance of the Vedas. When one attains to this, there is no more need of reading, or of works; they are but the bark, the straw, the envelope. No more need of them when one has the seed, the substance, the Creator. When one knows Him by science, he may abandon science, as the torch which has conducted him to the end."

I may state that the extracts I gave from the Buddhistic and Hindoo writings are contained in a book, entitled "The Bible of the Ages." The last extract is from a volume by Hudson Tuttle, entitled "The Christ Idea in History." These illustrations might be multiplied to any extent, but they serve my purpose in sufficiently showing that among these great nations, during past ages, the people have been struggling towards righteousness. They have not the same animal force as the nations have with whom the Christian religion is the accepted faith; but notwithstanding that, they have peopled in an orderly fashion large quarters of the globe. And I ask: Are these religions simply human in their origin, while this other religion, with a morality of little, if any higher cast, is the sole religion that has been inspired by the Divine Mind? In my opinion, and in the opinion of nearly all those who deeply consider this question, the infinite Father of Humanity has left no portion of His family without its representative of the highest morality——the most perfect spiritual faculties. Throughout the wide wide world, we find that everywhere this Supreme Mind has been operating during ages past; and that it has not been left to one small secluded portion of the globe—one infinitesimal corner, as it were—to have conveyed to it, and it alone; a message of love for the comfort of the children of the Almighty. This is the ground large numbers of Freethinkers take in believing that all these religions have also been of Divine origin—that everywhere there has been operating in a more or less conspicuous degree the same Divine impulse. The Buddhists at this day, accord-to the latest edition of "Chambers's Cyclopaedia," number 483 millions. Surely we cannot suppose that all these people now living, and all their predecessors throughout the past, who never heard even the name of Jesus—the only and solitary specimen of Divinity in human shape, according to my friend—were left in utter darkness without some evidence of that light which seems, in broken rays, to have come to the whole of mankind.

I ask, too, why is my reason to act differently in considering the sacred books of those peoples who, during ages upon ages, have managed to live by them, and work righteousness by them,—why is my reason to act differently by these page 37 writings than by some other alleged sacred book? Why am I to be allowed to select what is good from these books, to take their enunciations as authoritative to the extent that my reason approves, and to reject in them all that appears fabulous and immoral, while the moment the sacred book of my friend is held up before me, I am to bow down and worship it as the infallible word of God? I ask: Where is the proof of this in the one case, and not in the others? Where is the proof that this Christianity is a Divine religion, and that no other religion known to humanity is similarly Divine?

Mr. Green: Mr. Chairman and respected hearers: I would just say in regard to the reference that has been made to other religions, that the mere profession of a religion, and the assertion that that religion is of Divine origin does not make it so. If those Hindoos and others can prove that their religion is of Divine origin by evidence which stands the test of all the rules that we are guided by in judging of evidence, then by all means accept it. If we are thus guided, and after examination are convinced that the evidence proves Divine origin, as far as evidence is capable of proving such a thing, then we ought to accept it as being so. But as I have said, the mere statement of Divine origin does not make anything so; and I am here to-night not merely to assert that Christianity is of Divine origin, but I am endeavouring, with the help of God, to prove that this proposition-is absolutely true.

In regard to the Hindoo writings, I think it would have been better if my friend had read a little more at first hand, and not merely at second hand. Professor Max Müller is confessedly a scholar of the very highest reputation in connection with the Hindoo mythologies, and if my friend will take Max Müller's work, "Chips from a German Workshop," and read his lecture upon those ancient Vedas, he will find from Müller's own statement, the estimate which he puts upon the Vedic hymns, and upon the morality which is taught in these ancient writings. I admit they are the most ancient writings in the world next to the Scriptures; but as Professor Müller, after a most thorough and searching investigation into those writings, has said, when compared with the Scriptures which have come down to us through the Jews, when page 38 compared with their pure morality and their elevated conceptions of the Deity, those Vedic hymns sink into utter insignificance. If my friend had been better informed in regard to these Vedic hymns, he could never have passed the eulogy he has upon the morality and elevated conceptions of the Deity contained in them. I did not expect that he would refer to these matters to-night, and consequently I am not furnished with the testimony that would thoroughly establish this. But I will be to-morrow evening, and I will therefore pass it by, simply affirming that I have positive knowledge, from actual personal research, that his statement in connection with those books is not based upon clear and reliable testimony.

Now, let me point out to you that my friend altogether misapprehends the position which he occupies in this debate, and certainly, although he is a great advocate for reason, he must permit me to say that, in my humble judgment, he is not pursuing a reasonable course. You are aware that I am called upon to prove a proposition, namely, "the Divine Origin of Christianity." I am called upon to prove that Christianity consists of certain items along with others; and Mr. Bright denies that two special items have any part in Christianity. Now, what have those statements about the Hindoo religion to do with our proposition to-night? What have those disquisitions upon the Deity, that he gave us last night, to do with our proposition? We are not considering the nature of the Deity, but the fact as to whether the Divinity of Christ, and His death as an atonement, are essential parts of the Christianity announced by Christ and His Apostles. It appears to me that my position is to present evidence to establish the definition of Christianity which I have given, and which Mr. Bright denies, in order that I may then proceed to establish its Divine origin; and it is Mr. Bright's duty to take the arguments which I present, and show, if he can, that they are not arguments that can be relied upon. He has not even attempted to do this. I think the audience must be convinced, that my friend last night did not for one moment attempt to grapple with the real subject in hand. I understand that I have a certain duty to perform in this debate, and although my friend may try to draw me to a side issue, and which I am willing to debate with him if he will give me the amount of time necessary, still I am determined not to be drawn aside from the proposition we have page 39 under consideration. He shall be kept, as far as I can keep him, to the point, and I will endeavour to keep myself to it.

Mr. Bright may be said to deify reason, for he says that nothing is of authority above reason, and that everything must be brought to the bar of his own reason (speaking of himself), or, making it more universal, to the bar of every man's own reason. Now, I quite agree that nothing is above reason in a sense, providing that we put in the "Divine" reason; but if my friend means that nothing is above "human" reason, then I draw a clear issue with him, and say that all the facts of history, and the evidence that comes from daily experience, are directly opposed to his principle. Do we not see that it is utterly impossible to find any human being whose reason is uninfluenced, either by passion, or self-interest, or inclination of one kind or another, and thus his reason has not the power of free exercise? Hence, we find men under the influence of reason inflamed by passion, becoming drunkards, indulging in lying, in swearing, in thieving, in thousands of vicious practices; and I ask, if, as my friend affirms, that what appears to any man's reason is right to that man, in the name of reason, what is there in this world to prevent any man from being guilty of the most atrocious crimes, and justifying himself in them, if he can reason himself into the belief that those crimes are right? But if I take my friend's own companions, I say that the insufficiency of human reason is clearly demonstrated. My friend believes in a God—as you heard last night—but some of his friends do not believe in the existence of a God; and they profess they are brought to this by their reason. Now, is not this an evidence that mere human reason is not a sufficient guide? All the violations of law, all the evils that have arisen in the world in the past, have been committed under the guidance of reason, inflamed by passion, by self-interest, or some other feeling. I would call attention to this fact, that our partially informed reason cannot always guide us in the discovery of what is true, inasmuch as if a thing appeared improbable to my friend, he would reject it, not because the thing was really untrue, but it might be because of lack of information. You remember the Eastern prince who refused to believe that water congealed under certain circumstances, because it appeared to be contrary to his reason, and was contrary to his experience; and yet it was true. Now, I say that seen facts, and facts which have been related upon credible testi- page 40 mony, are above human reason, simply because there is no human being in the world who can say he has such a general information of all things that have taken place, and of all things that can possibly take place, as to be able to decide that any fact that may be stated to him cannot really have taken place. I say that a man, guided at all by true reason, would not allow his own partially informed reason to be the criterion by which he would decide everything that is brought before him.

My friend professes to consider the idea of Christ's being the Son of God as so abhorrent to his nature that he cannot for a moment accept it. But he accepts some things that are far more surprising, and far more difficult of belief than this. Let me put it to this intelligent audience. If it were that the Divine Father saw it was wise, and for the good of his creatures on earth, to embody in human form a manifestation of Himself, and to communicate a knowledge of Himself through a human being, and to present a perfect example in human form; what is there in the nature of things to prevent our believing in the possibility of the Deity thus manifesting Himself? But now, here are points in which my friend believes, and which to me appear immensely more absurd than even he would say this is, and which are in defiance of reason, of testimony, and of authority. My friend is an evolutionist. In other words, he believes that we sprang from a little speck of jelly, that grew in process of time, and in some way, into an oyster, from an oyster to a seal, and on from a seal to a monkey, which monkey ultimately became a man. I ask: Is this consonant with our reason? If we go to the rocks, and ask geologists if they keep any record of this change which he says has taken place—this development from the smallest speck and through the lower orders of animal existence to majestic man, as he now is, we are told that not only is there no testimony from the rocks, but that their testimony is directly opposed to any such theory. Not only is there no testimony from our own reason, but our reason revolts against it as utterly opposed to the intuitions of our higher nature, and it is not only of no authority, but I may say that some of the highest scientific minds are not only opposed to this theory, but say that there are such chasms that have not been, and cannot be bridged, as render it impossible that this theory can hold water, when fairly looked at. Yet if I understand rightly, my friend believes this page 41 theory, and that without either reason, testimony, or authority.

But more absurd still, my friend believes that man is infinite or immortal, and yet believes that man, the infinite, has grown from the finite! Now, let me ask you if there is anything in this volume which I hold in my hand (the Bible), so incomprehensible, so repugnant to our reason, so contrary to all that human thought could suggest, or that the reasoning powers of man could demonstrate, as that the finite creature could grow into the infinite? Yet my friend believes, that from the little speck of jelly, the oyster, the seal, the monkey, have been produced man, whom he terms an infinite and immortal being! I ask, then, what is there in the Scriptures of Truth that calls upon us to believe anything so monstrous, so capping the very climax of the absurd, so revolting to our reason, and our senses, as this which I have mentioned.

Last evening, I showed that Christianity included the Divinity of Christ, and His death as an atonement, and I gave proof. You will remember that I cited the Scriptures, and the early Christian writers; I quoted profane historians, also those who were opposed to Christianity, and then I quoted Strauss. Now my friend rejects this definition of Christianity, and says: "I claim the right to define Christianity for myself!" You will remember that I endeavoured to convince him of the unreasonableness of that course, by pointing out, that if we wanted to know what was the Baconian philosophy, we must go to the writings of Bacon in order to find out what it was. Now, my friend appeared to be in a state of confusion, for he said: "We do not take Bacon as an authority." The question was not as to the authority of Bacon; but, how can we know what Bacon taught, except by consulting Bacon's writings? Now let me give an illustration from Mr. Bright himself. In the correspondence that took place between us in the newspapers, he said: "I should not have deemed it necessary to communicate further with you publicly, had you not stated in your last that my position is generally regarded to be that of an opponent to Christianity! My position is not generally so regarded by those who are in the habit of attending my lectures, and the opinion of others can be of little value, as it is based rather on ignorance than knowledge." Now, my friend in that letter takes it for granted, that anyone wishing to know what his views are, must go and hear him; and that is just what I say in regard to the subject under consideration, that anyone wanting to page 42 know what Christianity is, must go to the records where we have the sayings and doings of Jesus. My friend's statement, "I define Christianity for myself," is the very apex of unreasonableness instead of reason; and I call upon him during the further course of this debate to manifest more reason in his arguing than he has shown in connection with this matter.

"The teachings of Jesus and the example of a life," Mr. Bright defines Christianity to be. Now, in my concluding words I ask him again, as I asked him on the first night, either to show that the statements I have quoted from this book, are not the statements of Jesus, and if, in his judgment, they are not, let him tell us which he takes to be the statements of Jesus, and which are not, and on what authority he takes or rejects them; or, if he cannot do that, let him take the passages I have cited from Christ's own words as proof of the Divine nature of Jesus, and show that I am not giving them their legitimate meaning. Unless he takes this course, these is no reason on his side of the debate. It is for him to meet the arguments I am presenting, and I would say that as my friend wishes us to reject Christianity, and to accept his ignis fatuus of human reason, which has led to such disastrous results in the history of the race, he must give us evidence that will convince our judgment ere we can do so.

Mr. Bright: It is a very fortunate thing for my friend that he is addressing an audience already for the most part convinced of the truth of the view he takes. (Strong tokens of dissent.) Otherwise he would indeed be in a very serious predicament, because he has not yet advanced the slightest proof why there should be any difference made in taking as Divine the writings which he believes in, in preference to other writings believed in by other portions of mankind. He simply makes assertions, but he has not advanced one iota of proof why, when we see in those writings things which are contradictory to observed facts, we should believe them to be true merely because they are in that book. I say that my ideal of Christianity must be made to accord with my ideal of what is true. If it does not accord with that it has to be rejected, and so far from my being in a position which may be denominated as a muddle, I would leave those who are un-prejudiced on this question to say what sort of muddle my page 43 friend was in last evening when he attempted to explain how Jesus of Nazareth was at the same time the Deity, and yet was less than the Deity; how he was and was not God in person; how he was equal to the Divine, the Creative, and the Eternal Power, and yet at one and the same time was something less. He never attempted to explain how those two contradictory assertions could be made to agree. My reason is ready to be convinced if he can advance anything in the nature of proof of that which he asserts; but until that is done, I have just the same right of selecting from those writings that which appears to me to be true, and rejecting that which appears to me to be false, as I have in the case of sacred writings published in unfamiliar parts of the world. I challenge him, also, to show why I am not to act by those Biblical writings the same as I do by other commingled historical and moral compositions. Take, for instance, the life of Plato. Am I to be told that everything which appears in the life of Plato is to be accepted by me as authoritative truth, if I agree with the teaching advanced by Plato, and the morality which he and his friends practised? Surely I must accept that which appears to me accordant with proved facts, with truths of Nature, and reject the rest. Mr. Lewes in his "Biographical History of Philosophy," states, in regard to Plato:—

"So great a name as Plato's could not escape becoming the nucleus of many fables; and we find, accordingly, the later historians gravely repeating all sorts of miraculous events connected with him. He was said to be the child of Apollo, his mother a virgin. Ariston, though betrothed to Perictione, delayed his marriage because Apollo had appeared to him in a dream, and told him that she was with child."

There are innumerable fables mentioned by other historians of a somewhat similar character. Now the proposition which my friend has to prove, not to the satisfaction of those who have been trained in a special form of belief, but to the conviction of a jury previously unacquainted with the facts of the case,—a jury, say, composed of half a dozen Buddhists, and half a dozen Hindoos—is: Why mankind should receive as absolute fact all that is stated in one published book; but that with another book, published about some other personages, they may use their reason to reject all that does not accord with the observed phenomena page 44 of nature, and to accept all that appears to be good and worthy of acceptance by rational beings? That is the proof I ask. To prove merely that certain allegations are to be found in a certain writing—to prove that that writing has for a long time been received in a certain sense—is absolutely no proof. Why, for something like 4,000 years known, and an immense period non-historical, the whole of mankind—not merely one section of it—believed that the earth was simply a plain, and comparatively a small one; that the heavens constituted a solid canopy supported on pillars resting on the outskirts of the earth; that the sun was a luminary which absolutely rose at one side of the earth and went down at the other. All that was believed in such a thorough way that men who contradicted it, became of their clear observation of facts, were put to death. For 800 years that struggle went on between the rational minds—the freethinkers, the observers of facts—and those who pinned their faith to what had been believed in the olden days. We know the result. We know now that a man would be regarded as tremendously ignorant if he spoke of the Universe as being what it was believed to be by the ancients. Yet the very book which my friend holds to be the Word of God contains the statement that at a certain time the sun was held suspended in its course—that by some miraculous process the sun was not allowed to move in its supposed transit. And for what purpose? That a certain commander, with a horde of bravos might slaughter a larger proportion of the enemies opposed to him. If we are to take everything in that book as absolutely true, without bringing our reason to bear upon it, we must believe that that phenomenon occurred, and for the reason therein stated.

A Voice: You cannot prove the contrary.

Mr. Bright: I know I cannot prove the contrary, but I can prove that if that is accepted as true, it must produce in the mind of the believer a lowering and degrading ideal of the Deity. If the infinite God, to whom we all look—aye, even those whom my friend terms Atheistic, though they may ignore the mere name, is to be described as commanding that the sun shall be stopped in its course in order that there may be a larger slaughter of His human children by their brethren, the ideal of the Deity is degraded, and the mind of the man who entertains that ideal is proportionately impaired and dwarfed. All I contend for is that rational Christianity shall be made to coincide with observed facts—that it shall not out- page 45 rage those facts. It is an all important matter that this shall be, because at the present time the religion set up as something that is to be bowed down to and worshipped whether it be rational or not, is of such a character as to divide man from man, to prevent humanity uniting as a brotherhood, and advancing in the path of progress. It is for that reason that those who are denominated by all sorts of opprobrious names—Atheists and Infidels—desire that the truth should become better known, that people should come to think what their religion really means, so that it may no longer stand in the way of men acting together for the public good. By the fruits of a religion you may judge it, and I ask what must be the nature of that religion which sets up a clannish spirit, which prevents one man from fraternally acting with another merely because of a question of opinion? Why, the other day, in a religious paper published here, I saw a strong objection urged to the course pursued by Mr. Gough, the teetotal lecturer, because he affirmed he would act with a man in the temperance cause whether that man was a Christian or not. Surely it is self-evident that a theology which would thus attempt to step between man and man, which would encourage its disciples to say, "Stand aside, for I am holier than thou art."—being based, as Freethinkers believe, not on truth but on errors of the past—should give way to a more rational belief. All that is good in the Christian religion—all its high morality, all that which says, "Love thy neighbour as thyself," "love God by performing acts of goodness towards man"—we should retain. But this barbarous theology, declaring that a man in order to be saved from some terrible and eternal punishment, must believe whether his intellect enables him to believe or not—should be at any rate relegated to the realm of speculation, inasmuch as it cannot be brought down to the platform of proof. My present objection to the theology advanced by my friend, and declared by him, rightly or wrongly, to be contained in that book (some people assert that it is not in that book, but I have nothing to do with that subject, inasmuch as this is not a debate between a Unitarian and a Trinitarian; it is a debate between a religionist and a freethinker)—my objection is not so much that the idea of Christ being Deity is abhorrent to my reason, but that it is a dogma which is not proved. That is the vital point in this debate. It is a doctrine which emanates from times when people were not critical in their judgment—when they did not know the page 46 characteristics of nature as we know them—when they believed the universe to be a large square plain, and that the Deity was in the shape of a big man sitting on a throne above the firmament. But now, when, greatly through the teachings of science in the direction which my friend appears to conceive to be so ridiculous—through the hypothesis of evolution, which is by no means such a new thing as he would make it out to be—we conceive of an Infinite Mind ruling the universe by eternal laws which are eternally operative, we cannot assume as true what was readily received in the past. We bring a more critical spirit to bear upon these questions, and if they cannot prove themselves as facts, we relegate them to the realm of speculation and poetry.

My friend has made himself merry at the expense of the evolutionary theory of creation. It forms no part of the questions before us this evening, but assuredly the idea of the universe having advanced by eternal laws of the Creative Mind from primeval fire-mists to a nucleus of matter, containing the potentialities of all the marvellous developments we see around us, is not more incredible or ridiculous than the idea that at a certain specific time, and in one corner of the earth, the Deity stepped down from his heavenly residence, and moulded a man out of clay like a sculptor would mould him, and then, discovering that this man wanted a wife, set him asleep, took a rib from him, and transformed it into a woman. If we come to the merely extravagant and ludicrous, surely the latter idea is far more inconceivable than the former.

Mr. Green: I am sure your intelligence must at once see that there is something far grander and nobler, something which commends itself more to the intelligent judgment, in the account of the formation of man given in Genesis, than in the theory of my friend that we came from that little speck of jelly which progressed in the way I have described. I am quite willing to leave that matter to your judgment.

Now my friend took up Strauss's statement, that Christianity must be made to coincide with ascertained facts. But suppose that some person was writing a work on geography in the country of that Eastern prince I have mentioned, and that a traveller came to the writer and said, "In describing certain parts of the globe, such as England, America, and page 47 other countries, it will be necessary to mention that water, under certain atmospheric influences, congeals, and becomes so hard that people are able to walk over it." The writer replies, "Oh! not at all. It is contrary to ascertained facts, and in writing on geography, of course we must make it coincide with ascertained facts." Now I would ask: Are that man's "ascertained facts" the whole of the facts of nature? And docs my friend, acting in the same spirit, pretend to arrogate to himself such a wide, universal knowledge, that he can state what, in every part of our globe, coincides with fact? The thing is absurd upon the face of it. And in connection with the manifestation of the Deity in human form, you will observe that he has not attempted to show that the Christian doctrine of Divine manifestation is at all more absurd than that of the creation or growth of an infinite being out of a finite being, as he holds.

Now let me say in regard to one portion of my friend's speech, that I was very sorry to hear it, because he was evidently appealing to the lower feelings of the audience when he talked about certain things mentioned in the Bible as in his judgment wrong. In proving the Divine Origin of Christianity we have nothing to do with the slaughtering of the Amalekites, or with any of these other things written in the book, and to which my friend objects. I am prepared to defend all that is there sanctioned if my friend is willing to take it up, and he need not fear any unwillingness on my part to meet him on those points. But I say those matters have nothing to do with the question now in hand; and you must have seen that he did not attempt to meet the point really before us. If he allows me to take it for granted that his definition of Christianity rests simply upon his mere assertions, and that he wants us to take it upon his authority—which authority, in the case of others, he so denounces—I am willing to let it rest there. But you will see clearly by his silence, that he has been compelled to admit that his definition of Christianity is purely arbitrary, and utterly irrational, and contrary to all reason. He asks, "Why are we to accept this book above all other books?" Now I have not said a word during this debate about inspiration. It is not our proposition. I take the facts of the Bible just as I am bound to take the facts in the History of England or France, or of any past age, if that history comes down to me upon testimony that cannot with reason be refuted. A man page 48 would be regarded as a simpleton who refused to accept the facts of history. So I say in connection with the history of Christianity in this book. During this debate I take it simply as credible history, and upon this I am willing to rest my case. In answer to my friend's request, I will now give you a brief outline of some of the evidence on which we accept it as credible history.

Last evening my friend spoke of the deterioration of manuscripts. Let me say that Scripture manuscripts have not deteriorated more than classical manuscripts, nor more than is reasonable, when we consider that in copying all written documents, there must be many clerical errors, such as the wrong spelling of a name, leaving out letters, inserting a pronoun instead of a proper noun, &c. Now, unless he will say, that because these errors are in the classical manuscripts, we must therefore reject them, he cannot say that because similar errors are in the Scripture manuscripts we ought to reject them. Of the work of Cicero, called De Amicitia, one thousand copies were made from the original copy carefully written out by Tiro his freedman; and although Atticus, his friend and publisher, sought out the cleverest copyists to be found, of those thousand copies no two of them agreed with each other. Therefore, we say that although there has been great care shown in the copying and preservation of Scripture manuscripts, yet there have been such errors. But as my friend accepts the classics as being substantially the same as written by their authors; so we say, that on the same grounds, the manuscripts of the New Testament are to be received. Now, the oldest manuscript of the classical authors, that, of the historian Herodotus, does not date back more than to the ninth century, and there are only fifteen manuscripts by this author, whereas we have more than one thousand manuscripts of the Scriptures, more than fifty of which are more than one thousand years old. The Alexandrian manuscript dates to the middle of the fourth century; the Vatican manuscript is even older; and the Sinaitic manuscript, to which reference was made last night, comes evidently, very nearly to the beginning of the third century.

My friend spoke of the Epistle of Barnabas, and of the Shepherd of Hermas, found by Tischendorf in the Nunnery or Convent of Mount Sinai, as if those books were recently discovered, and were regarded as newly discovered inspired page 49 writings. Now, no person read in ecclesiastical history was ignorant that the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Shepherd of Hennas, were books known and read in the second century, and extracts from which had been preserved in the work of Ensebius. If I did not misunderstand my friend, he also said that some of the books we have in our New Testament are not found in that Sinaitic manuscript. Let me say that, if I understood him rightly, he is in error. That Sinaitic manuscript dates doubtless to the early part of the third century, within about 170 or 180 years of the death of Christ; and with the exception of the latter part of the Gospel of Mark, and the first eleven verses of the 8th chapter of John, the authenticity of which was questioned long before this manuscript was discovered, all the other portions of our Scriptures are found complete in that ancient manuscript. Now, is there one classical author of whom we have manuscripts of such a date as this? We see that from these three manuscripts alone—the Alexandrian, the Vatican, and the Sinaitic—we get a purer text of the Scriptures, than can be obtained of any one of the classical authors, whose writings are taken without question in the present day.

Now let me proceed to a few more facts. I would say that it is not needful to go back to prove that those books existed centuries ago, because we have the admission of Strauss, in the first volume of his "Life of Jesus," which I hold in my hand, that in the year 150, beyond all question, the first three Gospels were in existence; and he admits that, between the years 170 and 180, all the four Gospels, as we now substantially have them, were in existence. Now, mark, this is the admission of Strauss, one of the most bitter and most learned opponents of Christianity in modern times, and we take this admission of an enemy as irrefragable proof of our position, that our New Testament, as it is now, existed in the year 175, and that that testimony cannot be refuted.

But I likewise hold in my hand the work of Ernest Renan, and he states that, in his work, Strauss has paid too much attention to the theological, and too little to the historical view of the question—that he has passed over the historical facts with insufficient consideration. Renan declares in the introduction to his bock, that the Gospel by John—which is the one most questioned of all in the present day (though not anciently), because of its clear teachings as to the Divinity of Christ, was so widely known, and generally accepted in the page 50 year 150, that it was quoted from on all sides without the slighest question. Not only so, but Renan states that the whole of our four Gospels, when the historical testimony is fairly taken into account, must be placed within the first century of the Christian era. Now, let me read an extract from the historian Froude, showing the bearing of this fact upon our position. He says:—"If, as English commentators confidently tell us, the Gospel of St. Matthew, such as we now possess it, is undoubtedly the work of the publican who followed our Lord from the receipt of custom, and remained with Him to be a witness of His ascension; if St. John was written by the beloved disciple who lay on Jesus' breast at supper; if the other two were indeed the composition of the companions of St. Peter and St. Paul; if in these four Gospels we have independent accounts of our Lord's life and passion, mutually confirming each other, and if it can be proved that they existed, and were received as authentic, in the first century of the Christian Church, a stronger man than M. Renan will fail to shake the hold of Christianity in England."^* And with all due deference to my respected friend, I would say that, unless he can shake the evidence which I have just very briefly and imperfectly outlined, but which I am prepared to present more at large; unless he can show that these narratives were not written within the first century of the Christian era, I have no hesitation in saying, that it will take many more men than he, and of far greater mental power, to shake the hold of Christianity on the people of New Zealand, Australia, England, and of the world; for while those testimonies remain, I care not whether they are regarded as inspired narratives, or as simple histories, and considering what those men who wrote them had to suffer for no earthly good that they could gain, no power on earth, no human ingenuity, no human skill or eloquence, can at all destroy their influence over the minds, and, we thank God, also over the hearts and affections of myriads of our fellow human beings, whom they have raised, and elevated, and made happy, by their cheering promises, by their pure and elevated morality, and by their description of a Being of infinite love, of infinite mercy, and at the same time, of infinite justice, and who has manifested that love in a scheme which is in harmony with man's nature, and in adaptation to all his wants, and to the dearest aspirations of the human spirit.

Mr. Bright: The chief question in this debate, my friend seems entirely to lose sight of, viz., that it is a question of dogma as against reason. My friend introduces such an argument as, that an Eastern prince did not believe in the formation of ice, because he had never seen it formed, and the testimony relative to its formation was insufficient. That was a very proper position for the Eastern prince to take up. Why should he believe in the formation of ice, if he had insufficient evidence of the fact? By-and-bye, after he had ample evidence of the phenomenon occurring, he would accept it and believe. But here lies the whole point. We assert that we are asked to believe a marvellous story on insufficient evidence, or on no evidence whatever; that dogma, and not evidence is thrust down our throats. The moment we can get testimony which our reason accepts, that moment, as a matter of course, everything becomes clear, as it would with those who, having hitherto had no evidence regarding the formation of ice, declined to believe in it until approved on good testimony. This is a process which is perpetually being performed. Science is continually advancing, in despite of incredulity, into the domain where it compels submission to that which it declares to be true. But how does it compel submission? Not merely by assertion, not by pointing to its formulas in ancient writings, not by showing that men believed so at a time when they were credulous and not scientific, but simply by demonstrating it—just as Newton demonstrated the law according to which the heavenly bodies move. By mathematical calculations he showed that a body like the moon, for instance, must move precisely with the rapidity with which the moon moved, if his law was correct, and he pointed to what absolutely occurred as proof of what he advanced. That is the way science challenges our acceptance. But here it is dogma we are speaking of.

My friend seems to me to surrender the entire question in dispute when he says that those infallible Scriptures—the word of God put into black and white—if we do not accept which, we are told we shall be condemned to an eternity of torment, are, forsooth, only a little freer from error than certain classical manuscripts, regarding which it scarcely matters anything what our opinions may be. It seems to me that everything is surrendered if that is the view he accepts. I ask, where is the infallibility, where the truth, of every word within that book, so that upon the authority of that book page 52 alone, we are to believe that certain occurrences took place that our mind would otherwise reject? Where is that infallibility gone if we are simply to consider that book in the same way as we would consider a manuscript of Cicero's? That is the position I am maintaining, but surely not the posi-of my friend. That is the view in favour of which I am arguing. I say: Take that book, and look at it with the same rational eye with which you would examine the writings of Homer. Take within it all that is good and beautiful, all that can be made to advance humanity farther than it is at present; and reject all that is degrading, or opposed to scientific conclusions. That is my line of argument, and I cannot understand my friend taking up the same position, and putting those writings forward to be examined in the same way as writings about which it matters not what our opinion may be. In dealing with a subject where dogma is thrust at us, we have to deal with it far differently to any question where it does not signify much what our belief may be. That Eastern prince would be just as well off, disbelieving in the formation of ice as believing in it, except that he would be minus the knowledge of one fact of natural truth. But we are told that if we disbelieve the Deity of Jesus, all eternity before us is to be of a dismal and horrible nature. Surely the two things cannot for a moment be brought into comparison. When we have it dinned in our ears that our personal salvation depends upon some specific form of belief, our reply is that the evidence on which that belief rests, must be of a character far more conclusive in its nature than that affecting the critical aspects of certain Grecian or Roman manuscripts.

My friend affirms that the statement he puts forward—the theology he advances—is not merely part of Christianity, but is absolutely true and rests on demonstrable testimony and credible history. My argument is that it rests upon incredible history and insufficient testimony, and that so soon as our reason is free to act, his theology is rejected; that we see nothing like it happening around us; that there are no such, marvellous occurrences now as he believes in—no such unnatural incidents as many of those described in the book which he declares to be entirely the Word of God. That is the reason why those who think freely say: We reject this because it is not borne out by what we observe around us. But my friend asks, do I know all the observed facts of nature? No—of course I do not. But when I have to reason for my page 53 own satisfaction, as Pope asks:—"How can I reason but from what I know?" From what other foundation am I to reason? I do not profess to know all things, but when I come to reason on any question of history or nature, I can only reason from the knowledge I possess from my own observation, or such testimony of others as seems to me to be credible and trustworthy. That is the way all men throughout Christendom, act by every writing in the known world, save and except the Bible. My question to my friend—and it is a question that remains unanswered—is: Why am I to bow my intellect before that writing and that alone, and in all other cases to judge by my reason, by my knowledge of observed facts, and by what appears to me to be natural truth? That is the question I put to my friend. It is useless to point out that certain things are in a certain book; or that that book was written at this or that date. If the men were here and wrote the book now, and declared that every word was inspired by God, why are we not to use our reason regarding their utterances and writings? The question at stake between us turns on that point. A revelation to one man is not a revelation to any other man. A revelation to a man who may be writing before me, and who may say that what he is writing has been revealed to him by the Divine Mind, is no revelation to me. It would merely be a statement by that man that he had something revealed to him, and then it would be a question for me to consider whether or not his alleged revelation were true; which means, whether or not it were in accordance with the ordinarily observed facts of nature. Therefore all the argument my friend is advancing regarding the date of the writing of those Scriptures is beside the question, Rational men must use their reason upon those Scriptures; and incidents like that of a man living three days and nights in a fish's belly, or of another man slaying a thousand Philistines with the jaw-bone of an ass, may be regarded by them just as incredible when found in the Bible, as if put forward in Homer, in the Vedas, or in any other ancient MS. Therefore, throughout the Scriptures, the same as through those other writings, my reason must operate. I dare not, I cannot abandon it simply because certain incidents appear in one book rather than in another book.

The word "Christianity" is used by my friend as if, when he used it, he had stated something specific beyond the definition as it stands in the debate now being argued. But page 54 his Christianity differs materially from the Christianity of the Roman Catholic Church, the Presbyterian Church, or the Episcopalian Church. The Roman Catholic Church comprises, at the lowest estimate, 180 millions of followers, who conceive that the dogma of the Virgin Mary, being the Queen of Heaven, is part of Christianity. In that respect their Christianity is something opposed to the Christianity of my friend, and yet they likewise affect to base their faith upon what they conceive to be the Divine Word. When he uses this term "Christianity," he ought to remember that in this debate it simply means what he has explained it to mean: the Deity of Jesus, and his death as an atonement for man's sin. We cannot go beyond that, and these are the two points which, if he wishes to convince those who do not think as he thinks, he is still called upon to prove—to prove in some shape or way, so that our reason may accept them as Divine truths—so that we may see that this man, who lived nearly 2,000 years ago, was truly and really the Deity—and so that we may know—because he has scarcely as yet touched upon that question—that his death was an atonement for man's sin, and that our belief in that death (for I presume that would be part of what he would state) is necessary for our salvation. We want some distinct proof of that—something more than its being written in a particular book; for we all know that the doctrine assumes to be based on what is written in those ancient MSS. No Freethinker denies that; no one has the temerity to assert that it is not written there in some shape. We know that divers people put a very different interpretation upon those writings in many ways. We know that vast numbers of Christians deny that there is any proof of the Divinity of Jesus in that book. But that is not what I am here to debate. Let some Unitarian debate that. But what I hold is that I, as a Freethinker, have a right to reason through and through that volume, and that anything therein contained not acceptable to my reason, I, acting for my individual self alone, am justified in rejecting.

Mr. Green: That matter of the Eastern prince and the formation of ice, is rather a stumbling block in the way of my friend, for this reason: my friend's principle is, that whatever appears to be true to my reason, and his reason, and the reason of every other person, is true to that person. But the page 55 mere denial of the existence of ice by the Eastern prince, did not make the existence of ice not to be a fact; and therefore,. I say, that just as my friend is not fully informed of the evidence in connection with Christianity, his rejection of Christianity does not make Christianity untrue. I would say further, that, while I shall not be drawn from the point by his statement about damnation, &c., that if God has not given sufficient evidence to convince every reasoning man who will impartially and carefully consider the evidence that he has given in support of Christianity, he could not with justice, judge or condemn any for not accepting it. But just as the man, who knows he cannot walk on air, if he steps over this platform, must come to grief by falling on the floor, and can keep himself from doing it by knowledge and reason, so God, who has a right to impose laws on His creatures, does so for our good, and if He has given us evidence that those laws do emanate from Him, then, if the punishment which comes from the violation of law comes upon us, it results from our own ignoring of that which reason—which our own intuitions, springing from our relationship to our Creator, would teach us ought to have been observed.

In regard to this statement of my friend that Christianity began in a non-critical period, I may say that it is just like some other of his statements—not based on sufficient evidence. May I ask if Plato, Zeno, Zenophon, Socrates, and others, had no critical acumen? If not, then may I ask, why those samples of ancient eloquence have not only been handed down to the present time, but are even models in our seminaries and universities? My friend knows—I cannot presume that he is ignorant—that the age in which Christianity arose was not a mythical age; that, leaving out of consideration the present enlightenment of the modern age, there never was a period of more enlightenment, or a period when philosophy was more highly cultivated, and critical acumen keener, than the time when Christianity began. And I say, that if such a system could not begin in the present day, and claim to be founded on miracles, without the most convincing evidence being given, because of the critical acumen of the people now living, neither could it have arisen in that age, for we see that, in regard to powers of reasoning, in regard to keen sightedness as to things that were ludicrous and absurd, that age will bear favourable comparison with the age in which we live. I say that if my friend asserts the page 56 contrary, he manifests that he has insufficiently read the history of those times.

He says that Christianity rests on incredible history. Why? Simply because it declares that miracles were wrought. Now, "why is it incredible? Simply because miracles have not been wrought before his eyes. But because miracles are not wrought in my presence, does that prove that miracles have not been wrought, and never can be? Do you not see my friend's process of reasoning? While it is the reasoning of, that "modern man of God," whom my friend appears to admire—David Hume—it is certainly not reasoning that will commend itself to the judgment of those who think that unless we can comprehend the entire scheme of the Universe, unless we can know the working of the Divine Being in all things, we cannot say that the working of miracles is contrary to all experience. It may be contrary to mine, but it may not be to that of other persons. I would say here, that if we have miracles presented to us upon credible testimony, as being wrought in the presence of a number of individuals; if those miracles were such as were cognisable by the senses; if in connection with those miracles, institutions were established which have continued down to the present day; and, if the record of those miracles was written by those who saw them, then I challenge anyone to say that the miracles in support of which this testimony is given, can, in the nature of things, be false. If miracles, proved by such testimony, are not reliable, then there is no proof that my friend sits at this table writing at the present moment, because nothing in the wide Universe can be demonstrated to man.

Now, let me make a remark as to my Christianity differing from that of other persons. I have nothing to do with who it may differ from. It is the Christianity of this book—the Bible—that I am defending. If my friend is opposing the evils that have crept into so-called Christianity, if he is opposing its excrescences, and unlawful accretions, I would say to him over this table, "Give me your hand, and we are united to pull down all human additions, and to destroy every-thing that has not upon it the stamp of Divine authority." It is the Christianity that came from Jesus and from his Apostles, that I am advocating, nothing more and nothing less—and believing, as I do, that if there is anything true under the heavens, it is true, I hope to defend it until life shall cease.

Let me just call your attention to another point. He asks: Why are we to accept the statements of this book? I reply to that: Just as we accept credible history; and as no sane man would be considered justified in refusing to accept the facts of history which have been recorded on reliable testimony, so in connection with this matter, if it can be proved that those witnesses are reliable, then their evidence is to be received. Now, although my friend has talked about an infallible book and inspiration (you see he keeps wide of the point we have before us), and has given us this question of the definition of Christianity, he evidently feels that that is a point too warm to touch upon further. But I say that with regard to the infallibility of this book, I have not said one word. I am prepared to prove the Divine Origin of Christianity upon the simple fact of the credibility of these writers as historians. If it were necessary, I would be prepared to establish their inspiration; but with a freethinker—with my friend—who does not believe in inspiration, it would be foolish for me to take that inspiration for granted, which would need to be proved. Now, I am trying to prove Christianity upon the ground that these accounts are credible histories, and if my friend denies they are credible, I will be prepared to give further evidence to establish that point.

With regard to the testimony which we have in this book, I just wish to say further, that from a.d. 175, or I might say from 140 up to a.d. 202 or 220, there lived three men—Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Irenæus. Clement of Alexandria lived in Egypt, and may be said to speak for the Christians of Egypt and Palestine. Tertullian wrote at Carthage, and may be said to speak for North Africa and Italy; while Irenæus, who lived at Smyrna, but who wrote at Lyons, may be said to speak for Asia Minor and Western Europe. Those three men declared that during their lifetime, and we may take it to include as far back as their memories carried them, our four Gospels were accepted as the productions of Matthew and John, who were apostles, and of Mark and Luke, the companions of apostles, and that testimony Strauss and Renan accept. Now, we may take this further position: We have Irenæus, a disciple of Poly carp, who was a disciple of John the Apostle. Here is a chain of three links: Irenæus, Polycarp, and John. Now, leaving the three Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, for the present, and dealing simply with the Gospel of John, I ask: page 58 Could that Gospel have been fabricated during the lifetime of Irenæus? Remember that he proved his sincerity by dying in attestation of his faith in Christ. If he knew that the Gospel of John, and the other Gospels, were not in existence in the early part of his lifetime, and that years later, they came into existence as forgeries, and not as the result of Apostolic writing, would he have died in support of their claim? Then, supposing you say that they were forged in the days of Polycarp. But he, too, died as a martyr. Can we suppose that he would die in support of that which he knew to be false? Can we suppose that this Gospel was forged during John's lifetime, and that he did not denounce it? It is simply preposterous. Now, notice: No doubt John would tell Polycarp, his disciple, what were the Scriptures written by the Apostles, and the other authentic records of Jesus; Polycarp, teaching Irenæus, would declare to him those Scriptures which were of authority, and of which he had been informed by John. I ask my friend to break that compact chain of three links. I say it is unbreakable, and so long as that chain remains, the basis on which those Scriptures rest, may be said to be unassailable. I have not said all that may be said in order to show that these witnesses are credible, but I wish to pass on to another point before I close to-night; and that is to show the reason why we accept Christianity as being of Divine origin.

I have proved—and my friend cannot disprove—that the Divinity of Christ, and the atonement, are parts of Christianity, and I now, therefore, proceed to the second part of my proposition. But before doing so, let me just mention—having shown the grounds on which we accept the New Testament—that, with regard to the Old Testament, we have an equally reliable foundation. In the work of Josephus, "Antiquities of the Jews," 12th Book, 2nd chapter, you will see an account there given how Ptolemy Philadelphus, having heard of the existence of the Jewish records, desired to obtain them, and wrote to Eleazar, the High Priest of the Jews asking him to send the manuscripts of their scriptures, and to select six persons from each of the twelve tribes, to go to Egypt to translate those books into the Greek language, that he might have them in his largo and extensive collection. Now, Josephus declares that this was done, and therefore, we have clear evidence that, at least 280 years before Christ, the Old Testament Scriptures, as we now have them, were trans- page 59 lated into the Greek language, and circulated among the Hellenist Jews, so long before the things predicted in them are said to have been fulfilled. And further, in regard to the Book of Daniel, which is a hardly contested book, you will find it stated in the 11th Book of Josephus, 7th and 8th chapters, that when Alexander was intent upon destroying Jerusalem, the priests came out in procession to meet the conqueror, and that Alexander gave up his intention of destroying Jerusalem, because the high priest produced the Book of Daniel, and showed it to him, in which it was predicted that one from the Greeks should conquer Asia, and which he took to have reference to himself.

Mr. Bright: My friend says that my rejection of Christianity does not prove it to be false. That is no argument whatever, because a Roman Catholic would say that my friend's rejection of the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church does not prove that to be false. Of course my rejection of anything does not prove it to be false; but the question to be settled in this debate is not the question of my rejection, or anyone else's rejection of alleged facts, but the proof, or lack of proof, upon which those alleged facts are based. My friend implies there is the same certainty of the truth of what he terms Christianity, as there is that if we step off this platform into the air we shall have a fall. The latter fact, as the French say, may go without saying. Anyone would know at once, that on stepping off a height into space, he would have a fall. But is it equally clear that a person stepping from the ground on which my friend stands—the ground of the Deity of Jesus, and of His death as an atonement for man's sin—and trusting entirely to nature and science, would therefore be subjected to a fall? Have we seen no grand lives lived by those who have denied my friend's dogmas? Why, the greater number of the celebrated names of later times are the names of men—and women too—who have denied these things. Let anyone read the autobiography of Harriet Martineau, for instance, and see how that brave woman lived for 21 years under sentence of death, passed upon her by her doctors, who told her she was suffering from heart disease and could not call an hour her own. She lived after that, 21 years of public usefulness and calm happiness and yet without one vestige of this belief which my friend page 60 says is so necessary. Where shall we look for nobler lives than those of Channing and Theodore Parker? At this moment nearly all the great men in the ranks of science and philosophy are men who do not believe in this Deityship—men like Darwin, Tyndall, Haeckel, and Huxley. I could mention nearly all the scientific men of our time as men of that character. I could refer to Draper, Lewes (who is just dead, and who was the husband of George Eliot), George Eliot herself, Walt Whitman the poet, Froude the historian, Carlyle, Herbert Spencer, Alfred Russell Wallace the great naturalist, Crookes, Buchner the German scientist, Swinburne, Gambetta, Newman, Greg, Lecky, Lord Amberley (now dead, from whose book I quoted), and scores upon scores of others. I ask, therefore, is it as certain that those who step from the belief that my friend holds step from a stronghold into helplessness, as it is certain that if you step off this platform you lose your foothold? I say it is not a fall to step off a belief which is unsupported by rational evidence. On the contrary, it is an elevation to a higher and purer atmosphere.

I think that my friend must have been rather attempting to play upon our credulity, when he said that the events to which he referred—the events which he is endeavouring to prove true—happened in an age which we may term critical. Doubtless, in other portions of the world, there were critical men living—men who would have given the events to which my friend refers, a very different consideration to that which they received from the few ignorant people cognizant of them. We find that these very events which are recorded in the Bible to have occurred—marvellous events, like a darkness coming over the face of the earth for at least three hours—are not chronicled elsewhere. Gibbon, the historian, draws prominent attention to this point. At that time there were living the elder Pliny, and Seneca, the philosopher, whose principal satisfaction it was to take a note of all marvels then happening; and yet this marvel, which out-marvels all marvels, and that other marvel of the graveyards giving up their dead, found no record in the writings of these men. Therefore, I say, so far as the testimony of the men of experience as critics in that age goes, it tells strongly against the allegations put forward, and not in their favour. Moreover, the historian Josephus, who is regarded as in the main, a credible chronicler, and who absolutely writes concerning that very neighbourhood and period, taking a note of some of the mi- page 61 nutest events said to have occurred, positively takes no notice of those marvels which my friend alleges to have happened. Doubtless, there is one paragraph in his large history which does speak of Jesus Christ, and says of him: "If it be lawful to call him a man." But that paragraph is so evidently one interpolated at a later day, that there are very few people at this time, however prejudiced they may be in favour of those alleged facts that my friend is supporting, who will attempt to hold that this paragraph is a part of the true and original writing of Josephus. Therefore, I say that all the testimony, so far as criticism at that period is adducible, tells immensely against the position which my friend occupies. But even, as I said before, if there were far more evidence in those writings than can be found in them, favourable to such a marvellous phenomenon as that of a man being the Deity, still we are entitled to use our reason upon them. Are we, at this day, to be placed in a different position towards those alleged occurrences to that occupied by the very men who are put forward as contemporaries of Jesus himself? Are we not to exercise our judgment upon them, when we are told that one of his own apostles declined to believe merely in the resurrection of him whom we are now assured was the Deity? One of his closest followers declined to believe in that resurrection unless he had an opportunity of touching and seeing. Are we—those amongst us who think for ourselves—now to believe on the evidence of remote and unknown witnesses, simply because these marvels have for so long passed current as truth? All religious marvels and doctrines are believed until they come to be critically examined, and the age of free and critical examination of these alleged Christian truths is only just now commencing. (Expressions of dissent.) I assert—and defy contradiction—that the time is only now arriving when, for instance, such a fundamental debate as this would be patiently listened to by an audience like that I see before me.

Mr. Green: I would like to ask my friend what Harriet Martineau's dying peacefully has to do with evidence against the Divine Origin of Christianity? I would ask also: Is he, who is the denouncer of all authority, now to ask us to bow down before this august assembly of names that he has repeatel in our hearing? Can we not, on the other side, men page 62 tion Sir Francis Bacon, who believed in Christianity; Sir Isaac Newton, and numbers of others—the highest ornaments in the constellation of the literary world? I do not care to mention those names, because I do not accept the authority of names. I believe in the use of reason in thoroughly sifting evidence which may be presented to the mind. But when, by the use of reason,! am convinced that the Divine Being is speaking, then I say that I must accept the statements of the Divine Being even where, as in some cases it may be, I do not understand the reason of them, and while I may know the fact that is stated, I cannot explain how the things that are mentioned can really be. I say there is a province for reason and a province for faith.

My friend again says that Christianity was not born in a critical age. I have simply to reiterate what I said before. Does my friend mean to say that even in Judea, where those events took place, there were not critical men? Was not Philo, who has written one of the most learned treatises on philosophy, a Jew? Was not Josephus, one of the most able-indeed, we may say, the most able—historians of that time, a Jew? I ask, were not the miracles of the apostles wrought in learned Greece, in Ephesus, in Corinth, and in the various cities of those parts? I say again, my friend is manifesting that he has not taken sufficiently into account the evidence presented, or he could not affirm that it was not the very highest period of the critical age, that existed prior to these modern days.

I will just call your attention in my concluding time to one or two thoughts in connection with the Divine Origin of Christianity. I would ask you: Supposing that we conceived it possible that the Divine Being would communicate a religion for the guidance of man, can any man say it is not possible? And when we conceive the relationship of the Creator to the creature, and the need of that creature to be guided; when we conceive the love which the great Universal Father must have for his children, does it not amount to a certainty that he would not leave them in the midst of the quicksands and shoals of life without some guide in order to direct them, and save them from misguided reason, inflamed by passion, self-interest, and all the other influences so powerfully operating around us on every side?

Now, admitting the possibility of a system of religion being made known to man, then the question arises as to how page 63 it would be possible to prove to man that such a religion was Divine. You and I, as reasonable persons, must admit that a religion which professes to be of Divine origin must have testimonials which could not be expected in the case of one which merely claimed to be human. If we are called upon to accept as an emanation from the Deity anything whatever, we must have evidence in harmony with the nature of that Deity, to prove that this system is not one which could have originated with man, but must have originated with the Divine Being Himself. Is not this really undoubted? Can any person say it is contrary to reason? I would ask further: What line of proof could God give to us that this system of religion He had presented was really from Himself? There are two ways in which it might be done. One would be by predicting the coming of this system hundreds of years before the event, and by describing the nature and general character of the person by whom the system was to be brought into operation, so that when the event took place, those living at the time of the fulfilment would be clearly enabled to see that the predictions had reference thereto. That is one way.

Further, if God was pleased to commission some person to make known this system of religion to the world, is it not reasonable that that person who claims to be the Divine messenger should give us credentials proving that he possessed powers such as we do not possess? If I came to any of you and said: "My friend, I am inspired by God to speak to you as I do," would my saying so be proof of my inspiration? Suppose a number of men came to you, and said they were commissioned by the Almighty, would their statement make that an actual fact? We would naturally say: "If God sent a messenger, He would give him credentials; those credentials must be of a nature that a man could not manifest without the aid of God; and therefore we ask you for your credentials." Seeing that it is beyond the power of mortal man to foresee a long concatenation of events, and to predict them exactly as to time and general circumstances, I ask: When we find such a large body of predictions uttered hundreds of years before the event, and when we find that those predictions are actually fulfilled, is not that evidence of the Divine origin of the system that was predicted in them? But if, in addition to this, we have the person who Himself introduced it, giving us His credentials by working miracles, is it not just what would page 64 have been expected under the circumstances? If I can prove that these two lines of evidence were found in connection with Christianity, have I not established that it is of Divine Origin in a sense in which no other religion in the world can be said to be Divine, unless it will produce the same credentials—which, I affirm, no other religion in this world can at all produce? I will not enter to-night upon details, but will reserve them till to-morrow night. I will say, however, that these two points are well worthy of your consideration. I say again, it is a possibility, as we must admit, that God not only might, but would, communicate to His offspring some lesson for their guidance—some religion whereby they might know how to act. I say, in opposition to my friend, that the ancient philosophers wonted authority—they had reason, and were sick of it. If my friend reads the dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades, he will see how that wise sage dissuaded Alcibiades from going to offer prayer to the Deity, because they needed someone to declare to them the character of the Deity, and how they might offer acceptable prayer. We see that the ancients were pining for someone who could speak as from God. Their reason led them unto quagmires. They felt that their reason could give them no certain knowledge as to their past history, their present position, or their future destiny; and hence they pleaded for authority. This intuition of their nature, we say, seems to point to the reasonableness of that which is presented in the religion of Christ.