American Judges,

Austin, in his 39th lecture, states that Colonel Murat, who practised in some of the American States, informed him that the Acts of some of the State legislatures were habitu-ally over-ruled by the Bench and Bar; that, in fact, it was quite a common thing for the judges, after a session of the legislature, to assemble for the purpose of considering the Acts passed and determining which of them were binding, and that if an Act were considered unsuitable it was rejected sans cérémonie. It would appear also that the opinion of the judges was uniformly endorsed by the public at large. With very great deference to the authority of Colonel Murat I am disposed to think that his statement is calculated to convey an erroneous impression. That the judges of some of the States were in the habit of assembling in the manner stated I do not doubt, but in so doing they were acting extrajudicially, and their opinion had no legal effect. The judges, I apprehend, have no authority except in cases actually under their consideration to give a decision on the effect of a particular statute. Indeed, according to two comparatively recent cases, one of which was decided in Iowa and the other in Pennsylvania, the Courts held that unless a statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no reasonable doubt it will not be held unconstitutional. Having made these general remarks I may now proceed to consider the