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Dedication.

It seems to be generally accepted that the relations between Science and Theology should form the staple of most of the Lectures given on behalf of the Early Closing Association; but those Lectures unfortunately, are deprived of most of their point, for want of the simultaneous presentation of the views with which they are in antagonism. It, therefore, seems desirable to rescue them from the imminent charge of fighting against shadows. This is a defect which is doubtless inseparable from the one-sided discussion which is characteristic of the ordinary lecture hall and the pulpit, where the views contested are stated, if at all, solely by an opponent. Human nature seems scarcely competent to do this with impartiality and perfect fairness; refutation being the object, the easiest way to accomplish it is naturally and unconsciously adopted. As Dr. Boyd says—" you have merely to state your opponent's "views so as to make them rank nonsense, and then it is compara- "tively easy to show that they are rank nonsense." But truth thus suffers from want of salience in the error with which it should contrast.

I observe some rather puzzling passages in the address of the talented lecturer on "History;" several apparent defects indeed, some elucidation of which is probably desired by others as well as myself. For these reasons I venture to offer to the consideration of the Rev. A. M. Henderson and of the Early Closing Association, a revised reprint of a colonial production on the subject of "Science and Theology," the reasoning in which I have never been able satisfactorily to refute, and which does not appear to me to have been met by Mr. Henderson; and I take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded of indicating points in Mr. Henderson's address of which explanation seems most required.

Though I desire to confine these remarks mainly to that part of the lecture in which an attack is made upon those views of the Philosophy of History, which are becoming so prevalent among the most distinguished disciples of modern Science, and which are notoriously spreading elsewhere in duo proportion to the more general application of scientific method in the investigation of nature; still I do not feel justified in passing over his ninth page in which he scouts the idea that the supernatural is impossible. He page iv says (page 9, line 20.2)—"It is on all hands admitted that the "sacred Scriptures assume the existence of the supernatural; "nay, even base all their claims to acceptance upon it." If this be really true, it seems to follow clearly, that there can no longer remain a shred of rational basis for belief either in the sacred Scriptures or in the Supernatural! Yet those are Mr. Henderson's words ! According to them the solo basis for belief in the Scriptures or in the Supernatural (which may be regarded as his whole stock-in-trade), is nothing but a mere assumption! One which itself implies the absence of corroborative evidence, and which is directly opposed by the testimony of modern science ! Mr. H. himself says—line 41-2—"No believer in the supernatural has ever "said it was to be seen in the natural!" But the rationalistic opinion is based upon evidence to be seen everywhere in nature, and is applied to nothing beyond. It simply asserts the unreasonableness of gratuitously assuming the existence of a supernatural in the natural, where it is confessedly "not to be seen;" the charges therefore of absurdity and impudence are surely inapplicable Those who simply ask for reasonable evidence in favour of a bare assumption which they are required to adopt, seem scarcely deserving of such hard terms; while those who use them can hardly be justified in doing so, while compelled to admit that they have no proofs whatever to offer; whether they recognise the force of those producible on the other side, or not.

Mr. Henderson next ridicules his old skipper for saying that he had not seen certain phenomena in places where it was asserted that they had sometimes been seen by others; and for therefore in some instances disbelieving their existence; and Mr. Henderson regards that statement as equivalent to an assertion by the skipper that the phenomena could not have been, because he (the skipper) had not seen them, though Mr. Henderson does not say that the old skipper actually said so. Is Mr. Henderson really incapable of recognising the important distinction between the two statements? From his own account of the matter his cautions old skipper seems In have understood what he was saying far better than Mr. Henderson, who might have learned from him a useful lesson in logic. Mr. Henderson can probably say he never before saw the arguments in the following reprint against a belief in the supernatural, and yet not be chargeable with having denied their existence or their truth.

At page 21 Mr Henderson generously comes to the rescue of the doctrine of free will, from an "atrocious contradiction to the uni- "versal conviction of man." If this conviction of man be, as Mr. page v H. states, universal, is any rescue required? And does Mr. H. speak truth in calling this conviction of man universal, if he knows that Luther, Hobbes, Edwards, Locke, Collins, Hartloy, Priestley, Buckle, Mill, Spencer, Bain, &c., express the opposite? Does the fact that Mr. H. comes to the rescue, prove that he feels that the conviction is universal? Or was this merely a rhetorical flourish? In any case I decline to borrow the terms "absurdity" and "impudence," to characterise the passage.

In the next paragraph Mr. Henderson quotes from Mr. Mansel a singularly weak passage, in which it is attempted to be shown that statistical averages are not results of natural laws. Mr. Mansel says, "A natural law is valid for a class of objects, only because "and in so far as it is valid for each individual of that class; the "law of gravitation, for instance, is exhibited in a single apple as "much as in an orchard; and is concluded in the latter from being "observed in the former. But the uniformity represented by "statistical averages is one which is observed in masses only, and "not in individuals." I will adopt Mr. Hansel's illustration, and see if the law is less applicable to men than to apples. In accordance with the law of gravitation a single apple falls to the ground if sufficiently unattached to the tree and nothing intervene; and so under the same conditions will all the apples in the orchard. The law of averages expresses, under conditions, how many apples will fall with a wind of given strength in a given time. In accordance with the law of human action, a man will commit suicide if he be sufficiently unattached to life and if opportunity serve. The law of averages expresses, under conditions, how many men will commit suicide under misfortunes of given severity in a given time, and we can foretell the number of suicides as accurately as that of fallen apples. Is it not clear that the laws of motion and of average are equally applicable to both? Mr. Mansel and Mr. Henderson both overlook the fact that, in defiance of statistics, they determine the application of the laws of motion and of average by their own foregone conclusion that they are inoperative on man, instead of simply considering whether the logic of facts is not equally applicable to both men and apples. It was never asserted that, of a certain number of men under the same conditions, a few will commit suicide while the others will not;—any more than that of an orchard full of apples, equally firmly attached to the trees, a few will fall and the others continue fast. It was never asserted that a few happy fortunate men out of ten thousand must commit suicide; but that in large masses of men of all conditions, a few are sometimes so miserable and page vi dissatisfied, that the ordinary attachments of life are weakened so much, that a small additional temptation will suffice to make them leave it. The law of averages merely expresses this proportion, and just as the apple with the weakest attachment to the tree must fall with a sufficiently strong wind—so the man most friendless, moneyless, and hopeless, inevitably chooses the fate most consonant with his circumstances and frame of mind.^* Mr. Mansel continues "and hence the law, if law it be, which such averages "indicate, is one which offers no bar to the exercise of individual "freedom, exercised, as all human power must be, within certain "limits"! Within certain limits !!! Yes! within certain limits! Why in these three words lie all the pith and marrow of the argument. A stone is as free "within certain limits," and so is a steam engine or a watch. But the movements of the watch and steam engine are as evidently determined by the motive power of each, limited by the texture, form, and disposition of their parts, as is the repose of the stone itself. So are those of a bull-dog—a far more complex being than either; a being too that, Mr H. can scarcely deny, exhibits more will and determination than the average of men, though he does not attribute to it moral responsibility, of which again he makes will and determination the basis.

But turning to page 22, where Mr. Henderson says that "Mr." Buckle was evidently blind to the fact that, as consciousness, "properly understood, is that knowledge which the mind has of "itself—as thinking, feeling, or willing—he was destroying the "possibility of all knowledge by denying the validity of its testimony." I simply challenge the statement that Mr. Buckle ever denied the validity of all knowledge, or the possible validity of much of its testimony. But he showed most incontrovertibly that man's knowledge and the testimony of his consciousness cannot possess absolute certainty and infallibility; and that the greatest certainty to which he can attain must be achieved by careful comparison of the evidence furnished in all times and places, and the cautious adoption of that which, on the whole, seems most consistent with itself and past experience. Though the Pope may not be infallible, it does not therefore follow, that he may not think accurately on a few points on which he may agree with Mr. Henderson. This illustration may avail further, and suggest that as the (Ecumenical Council, to give authority to its dictum, has yet to prove its own page vii infallibility; so Mr. Henderson, even if he be infallible, would find some difficulty in demonstrating the fact upon his own authority. His Lecture on "History" has certainly not tended to prove it.

Mr. Henderson says (page 22) that on the subject of volition, the deliverance of his consciousness is diametrically opposed to that of the late Mr. Buckle. Evidently, therefore, one of them must be or have been, in Mr. H's. words, "the dupe of his own deceptive consciousness." Of course, that of Mr. Henderson may be assumed to be genuine. But then, if that of Mr. Buckle—a man at least worthy to be selected as the most eminent victim of Mr. H.'s scathing criticism—if Mr. Buckle's consciousness was so radically fallacious, what guarantee or hope can any ordinary man have of the certainty or accuracy of his own? By admitting the possible duplicity of Mr. Buckle's consciousness, has not Mr. Henderson utterly annihilated his own argument for the infallibility of human consciousness generally? If my consciousness should un-fortunately err with Mr. Buckle's, what am I to think? If Mr. Henderson's consciousness be infallible, I should rejoice to follow it. But if Mr. Henderson's consciousness asserts mine to be in-fallible, am I not bound to follow my own?

Mr. Henderson says in his next paragraph, with happy innocence of definition, that his volitions are his own, with power to choose the alternative. Might it not be replied, that if that were the case—if the act of volition has no antecedent determining cause—there can be no reason to expect that the future will be like the past—causation must be altogether a myth—science and knowledge impossible—and experience inapplicable and worthless? But the unsophisticated consciousness of all men (including Mr. Henderson), rejects such a fatal theory; which, however, it may be nominally held, is practically denied by all men in their every act. Their instinctive faith or rather certainty in inviolable causation is too strong, and is so rapidly expanding into a recognised principle, that the theoretical objections of those whose conduct invariably contradicts their assertions must eventually pass into desuetude and contempt. The simple fact that those who advance them endeavor to influence others, proves that they instinctively recognise that the volitions of men are liable to be caused by the physical acts of writing and speaking. In fact, education, business, and social life, consist mainly of endeavors to supply to others, motives which we feel will induce them to act as we desire. Allowing, for the sake of argument, that there could be any sense or meaning in the statement that "all volition is conditioned on motive page viii "though not determined by it;" (though to my poor consciousness this seems too like an attempt to gain shelter in sophistical obscurity) it should, at least, be susceptible of clearer explanation. If Mr. Henderson allege a relation between motive and volition as cause and effect, he yields the point taken by Mr. Buckle. If not—ho has failed to show any cause for an act of volition; which, therefore, being so far as shown, an uncaused phenomenon, necessarily comes into the category of chance, which Mr. Henderson elsewhere repudiates. When Mr. Henderson says that volition is not apart from motive, but is conditioned on it—if he means that they are concomitant or concurrent causes, he gains nothing; for it is then plainly incumbent upon him, if he would consistently repudiate a doctrine of chance, to indicate the causes of the motive as well as of the volition. If he assert the efficient causation of volition without equally efficient antecedent causation, whether in motive or otherwise, he not only by implication contradicts himself when he repudiates a doctrine of chance, but he also explicitly contradicts the scientific experience of those who have ascertained and proved that for every act there is an equivalent molecular change, corresponding to the expenditure of efferent nervous force, for which there is invariably an adequate measurable cause in afferent stimulation. To put this more concisely—Every event must have cause. If the cause of volition be not in motive, it must be elsewhere, and should be shown before the causation of motives is denied. But to imagine that the exigencies of the argument are met by saying that volition is conditioned on motive though not determined by it, or that that is equivalent to the indication of the link of causation which universal experience and consciousness demand, is merely se payer des mots.

Once more,—as to the power to choose between alternatives. To suppose any fact, whether of choice or otherwise, to have occurred differently, clearly involves (to my consciousness) that its causes must have been different also:—their causes also again—and so on throughout the preceding eternity. From this it follows, that nothing could ever have happened, or can happen, otherwise than as it did, or does. Either this is infallibly true, or else experience can furnish no certainty or even a balance of probabilities as to the consequences of events, and must, therefore, be as worthless as knowledge is impossible. Every intelligent act, however, is based upon the invincible conviction of the uniformity and inviolability of causation, and experience consistently justifies this confidence.

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It also appears (to my consciousness) that any consistent con eeption of freedom or liberty necessarily involves absence of restraint—of obligation; and that obligation—rather than its antithesis freedom—is an essential constituent in moral responsibility, with which freedom and liberty are, therefore, essentially incompatible. Let us formulate this however.

Moral responsibility involves restraint and obligation.

Liberty and Freedom are incompatible with restraint and obligation.

Therefore

Liberty and Freedom are incompatible with moral responsibility.

It may profit those to whom the collocation of terms is novel, to ponder the foregoing syllogism, and observe that its integrity demands solely that the word obligation be denuded of no other meaning than is absolutely surreptitious, and antagonistic to its strictest etymological signification. I think the term should be rescued from the equivocal misapplication to which it has been subjected. On this important point the deliverance of Mr. Henderson is not as direct and explicit as might be wished.

The cases selected by Mr. Henderson as those to which the words "ought" and "ought not" are inapplicable are those of a tree and a stone. But a bull dog evinces fully as much "will" and "determination" as any man; and, in fact, typifies anyone who exhibits both in an eminent degree. Would Mr. Henderson apply "ought" and "ought not" equally to dogs as to men in so far as they exhibit such qualities? And why not, if will and determination are with him the bases of moral responsibility?

I am conscious of entirely sympathising with the most eloquent indignation against impersonal bigotry and intolerance. At the same time I consciously excuse and pity those who exhibit them. I repudiate oven the supposititious right claimed by Mr. Henderson to blame them. But self-interest and altruism (not comtism) concur in forbidding that we should permit the self-cancelled claims of any individual thief, murderer, or intolerant persecutor, to weigh with us against the peace and security of their otherwise probable victims in the future, or of the victims of those who might be encouraged by their immunity to follow their example. Am I wrong in asking the learned lecturer whether, if lawyers were to demand the release of prisoners on the grounds given by him (at the top of page 28 in his lecture), the "certain condition of society" provided for in the premisses (in page 22), would not be thereby materially altered and changed? So much so that, to my consciousness, it seems that it would have been more accurate if Mr. Henderson had page x said next—"I cannot," instead of "I need not say that such are "the legitimate conclusions of the doctrines taught by this much "lauded writer."

In the next paragraph the lecturer is scarcely sufficiently explicit for my consciousness. He does not show horn the theory of free will—of a cause acting without any anterior cause or mover—differs from a doctrine of chance, susceptible of accurate description in nearly identical terms. This fallacy, however, has already been sufficiently pointed out.

Mr Henderson says (p. 26, line 12) that he takes "the liberty" of converting Mr. Mill's admissions into an argument for that "which he rejects. All sound philosophers" (!) he proceeds, "have regarded the action of the human will as a true instance of "an efficient cause—indeed the only instance directly known to "us; and they have regarded it as the analogue of a higher will "conceived as the cause of the universe itself. The argument is "very plain. We see changes produced in our own system by our "own volitions; and seeing analogous changes occurring around "us, we naturally trace them to an analogous cause." Really Mr. Henderson seems to have been so intent upon picking a hole in Mr. Mill's argument, that he quite overlooked that he was rending his own into shreds and tatters. What can this mean, but that we should infer a cause—analogous to that which Mr. H. discerns within ourselves—volition—in every object in which we observe analogous changes! nay, in the universe! (line 41). Thus either every change in surrounding objects is caused by an intrinsic will or volition in—and identified with each object;—or else,—if these analogous changes are to be referred—not to a local volition analogous to our own, residing or arising in every such object, but—to a higher will conceived as the cause of the universe itself;—what possible reason can we have, if there is any analogy at all in the matter, for refusing to refer the changes occurring in ourselves to the same cause as that which produces the changes around us? Mr. Henderson here places himself in the dilemma exposed by the author of the following essay. He either commits himself to the Pantheistic doctrine by which the volitions of men are—as exclusively as any movement in the universe—the action of Deity; (thus annihilating free will as completely as Mr. Buckle could desire, and transferring at the same time all responsibility for every action to God alone)—or else he ignores Deity completely—makes everything happen by intrinsic volition in each moving object—denies causation—and has nothing to substitute for it but page xi blind chance! And all this comes by complete misconception of the point of Mr. Mill's argument. Mr. Mill speaks of volition as an efficient cause, not as a premiss of his own, but as a supposititious one granted solely for the sake of argument (vol. 1, p. 398, 1. 18-22), and he shows conclusively that even if volition mere an efficient cause, we should have even then no right whatever to attribute analogous efficient causation to every movement around us (as Mr. Henderson would assume when rising to "the assertion "of will as a universal efficient cause"), but should restrict it to those movements which are strictly analogous. Mr. Mill points out how unwarrantable—even from their own premisses—is the demand made upon him by such as Mr. Henderson, "to infer that volition "causes everything, for no reason except that it causes one particu- "lar thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a typo "of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing "scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, "whether of inorganic or organic nature." (Vol. 1, p. 399.) And Mr. Henderson admits that this is so (page 26, line 13-4), when he says "that the action of the human will as a true instance of an "efficient cause—"is "indeed the only instance directly known "to us." Clearly, then, Mr. Mill's position is impregnable, although he reasons only from an illegitimate assumption of his opponents to show them that their logic is as defective as their premisses.

But after quoting from Mr. Mill's second volume to the effect that induction by simple enumeration is a valid process in arriving at the generalisation of universal causation from the uncontradicted and best known facts of experience—but not from arbitrary and disputed assumptions of efficient causation in what is confessed to he "the only instance directly known to us;" Mr. Henderson proceeds thus—"Now this is precisely the thing we do in arguing "upward to a First cause. We notice a fact, that certain changes "take place in our own frame from the exercise of our own will, and "Mr. Mills admits that this is so."!!! Where does Mr. Mill admit this? Let the quotation be given, which it is not by Mr. Henderson; though the page he quotes (898, vol. 1.) contains an exactly contrary conclusion. The only concession I can find is distinctly made (page 898, lines 18-22) merely for the sake of argument to give added force to the refutation, but which Mr. Henderson appears to have misconstrued into an unconditional admission. But Mr. Mill does not admit anything of the kind; and it should be sufficiently obvious from what I have said, that Mr, page xii Henderson's process of arguing upwards to a First Cause is directly opposed to that by which we arrive at the generalisation of the universality of causation; and that it inevitably conducts into solecisms which should be as abhorrent to piety, as they are repugnant to reason. So much for Mr. Mill's supposed admission, and Mr. Henderson's argument, by which he was to have convicted Mr. Mill of the inconsistency in which he has plunged himself.

Mr. Henderson seems to be as unfortunate in dealing with Spencer, Taine, &c., as with Buckle and Mill. On the fundamental point at issue he expressly yields the argument to them (lines 24-5, page 25), by saying, "and we agree with them that when they do know "all, they can predict;" a statement identical in effect with that for which (at Mr. Henderson's page 20, lines 83-5), Buckle's 18th page is the object of derisive censure; and at page 27, I find a paragraph devoted to assertions that the wills of Abraham, Cyrus, Paul, and Cromwell were influenced and moulded, determined and caused by God to suit his purposes. Their wills evidently could not have been free when so influenced; or, if they wore free, God could not have foreseen the alternatives that they would choose; the theories of freedom and foreknowledge being absolutely incompatible. (See Jonathan Edwards's demonstration to that effect.)

I have now only to express my admiration of the method by which close and terse argument is rendered entirely superfluous by the simple asseveration that "the creed of thoughtful men" finds its expression, not in the writings of Hobbes, Locke, Collins, Edwards, Voltaire, Priestly, Buckle, Mill, Spencer, Bain, &c., so much as in the mouth of a Melbourne preacher, of whom the trait freshest in my recollection, is that the Early Closing Association has found the way to convert him. At his lecture, no doubt, not only his great dead and absent living antagonists were mute, but his present dissentient auditors were likewise silent from conventional courtesy, even when the round assertion was made that "all "sound philosophers" have held the lecturer's opinions. It is of trifling importance how many or how great men may have held the opposite—because, of course, they must have been "unsound philosophers."—Q.E.D.

Before concluding my remarks I wish distinctly to disclaim any intention whatever of blaming Mr. Henderson for misrepresenting the views of Buckle and others. He had, doubtless, no more intention of doing so than of stultifying himself, as I have shown he has done. One cause of his mistakes I have already indicated in the vicious system of one-sided discussion incidental to his un- page xiii fortunate vocation, and probably I have sufficiently explained that whatever he has spoken or written, has been evoked—not by any undetermined volition arising without cause in Anketell Matthew Henderson as a Great First Cause thereof (what a very modest theory!) but has been simply the necessary result of a concatenation of circumstances, of which he has been privileged to be unconsciously the instrument. This is, doubtless, humbling—particularly to one who has been misled into believing himself the voluble exponent of the ideas of Deity, or rather (I beg pardon), of his own volition! I now merely wish to point out the superior charity of those necessitarian principles which admit of the benignant exposure, and even sometimes of the merciless punishment, of grave error, without imputing wilful turpitude to its perpetrator; and to contrast them with those by which a mistake cannot be discovered without attributing voluntary perversity and sin to a poor organism, in which the effects of particular circumstances upon its individual constitution could not otherwise be converted into expression. The one system producing only sanctified conceit, intolerance, hatred, and all uncharitableness; the other, true humility, brotherly kindness, and aspirations after all possible knowledge and good of humanity.

Finally—as it is a common device to refuse to reply to unanswerable arguments, on the ground that anonymity is used merely to screen the writer from the consequences of making personal attacks, I have to point out that such reasons do not apply in this case. I attack opinions, not men, and have expressly exempted Mr. Henderson from all blame. It, therefore, concerns the interests neither of Mr. Henderson nor of anyone else to notice me personally. Let my opinions be refuted and I shall be delighted to change them, and recant them as publicly as I express them. It seems to me also that those who set themselves to defend the authenticity of writings so peculiarly anonymous as the Bible, should be the very last to depreciate and contemn anonymous writings as such.

Trusting that the following essay may prove the means of prolonging attention to "this sublime theme," and of promoting a correct consciousness with respect to it, I commend it to the attention of the Rev. A. M. Henderson and of the Early Closing Association.