Chapter I.

It is from a deep conviction of the injurious influence of Phrenology on the public mind, that I have ventured to write the following pages, with a view of awaking rational doubts as to the truth of this supposed science. It is because I believe low views of man make him low; whilst a lofty estimate of his moral and intellectual motives, elevates his aims, and deepens his convictions of power and responsibility, that I have felt it my duty to state in this essay what 1 think important to others.

It is on account of the evil tendencies in this materializing philosophy, and because of its utter incapacity to benefit the world, whose progress depends on knowledge, thought, and principle, and not on bodily organization, that I have given this subject some degree of earnest attention. Such are my motives, and I trust they will be so accepted, both by the reader and by Him through whose wisdom and power we are fearfully and wonderfully made, both in body and in mind.

There are difficulties in the way of a person opposing Phrenology; he must oppose popular prejudice, and there are few who do not know the effect of prejudice relative to an individual opposing a popular theory, in rendering his motives and arguments liable to be underrated, misunderstood, and misrepresented. People love their opinions as they do their old friends, and it is no easy matter to attack them; in the onward progress of humanity, there are certain stages in which truth is in a minority, but the work of truth has changed minorities into majorities, in which in the long run it surely ends. There are two things demanded of all advocates of Phrenology, as in all other doctrines, namely, definition and proof. What is meant, and why it is assumed; explanation of the point to be received, and a reason for receiving it. Now this I hold stops Phrenology at the outset; they do not know what they mean, and therefore cannot tell others.

And judge now whether an intelligent answer has ever been furnished to the question I have proposed, namely, definition and proof of what an organ of thought is. From the assumed organs in the usual order as given, we shall see that it is clearly proved, according to quotations of Gall and other phrenologists, that the same faculty or organ does many contradictory things, and that different organs do the same things, and that the whole may be reduced to less than half, and that several are merely modifications of one.

And it will be seen that this arrangement of faculties shows ignor- page 5

Frous, oculi, vultus persae pe mentiuntur.—Pope. (The forehead, eyes, and features, often deceive.)

ance of their nature, being probable cross divisions, and that nature does not provide organs based on such grossly false inductions and general illogical principles. We may indeed comprehend the Anatomist, who states that, on dissecting the cranium or skull, it is found enveloped in a very fine membrane, full of bloodvessels, with a second membrane much thicker and stronger adhering to the internal surface of the cranium, and between these a third membrane, so very delicate and transparent as to be scarcely perceptible; and we may also venture to reflect on the fact, that the brain is the common centre from which the nerves communicate sensation to the whole body, and which enables the senses to receive the impressions which they convey to the soul; but who can explain and enforce the doctrine of phrenologists of thirty-seven compartmental divisions for character guessing. What, indeed, would be the reflections on the infinitely wise Creator, if it were, as phrenologists assert, that some men are made to be murderers and the like. Are not such reflections too humbling even to think of? Phrenologists must admit, that the proposition I have made, namely, definition and proof, as reasonable. There are few persons who deny the propriety of such a demand in all sceptic questions at least; first, what do you mean, translate into English; secondly, give your proofs. It is simply required that phrenologists give the same explanation as is given, say by a physiologist, of any other organ; namely, the functions and processes, with the adaptation of the organ; as the air cells of the lungs, the oxygenization of the blood, the digestive process, and the chemical elements which decomposes, etc., or the ducts which convey secretions through that part of the blood which enters the heart, and issues thence physical reasons for the blue veins,—c. What analagous process do they discover in the brain? As yet they have detected none at all, and know not what they say or whereof they affirm. So, a fevered brain should disorder thought, but not prostrate the entire frame and destroy the bodily life. Therefore the brain has a sensitive and vital function, consequently has enough to do without thinking.

But, perhaps, the argument on which phrenologists rely the most, is the supposed stoppage of mental operations by brainal injuries. Now, what stops a process is not necessarily the means of carrying it on; many can stand in the way who yet cannot do the work. Phrenologists have provided in brainal organs for the operations of the five senses, and they assert that no such internal organs are requisite; yet a diseased brain, or the severing of the connexion between the brain and the, optic nerve, produces blindness; still brain is not the organ of seeing, but conveys the conditions essential for the groundwork on which the picture is to be formed. A person cannot see with his eyes shut, or when blindfolded, yet the eyelid and handkerchief are not the organs of vision; we cannot see without light, yet light is not the organ of seeing; therefore what is essential to a process, or whose presence or absence may interfere with a process, is not page 6

Ex habitu homines metientes. (Estimators of men from their outward appearances.) Coke's definition of phrenologists.

necessarily the organ of a process. That is, if injuries or conditions of brain do disturb thought, it is not therefore the organ of thought. Why is one born deaf, also dumb? Because speaking depends upon hearing; for he that could never hear, could never speak; yet, is hearing the organ of speaking? certainly it is not, though speaking depends upon it. Therefore, again, what being out of order may prevent a process, is not consequently the organ of that process. This I think nullifies all phrenological stirring accidents. They only show that the brain may stop thought, not that it can carry on thought. Its states interfere with our reception of outward views, and with our communication of inward process, just as the atmosphere being thick obscures the sun, but is not the organ of vision, it is only the medium which, admits or presents objects of vision; so of the brain as to our twofold connexion with outward nature; it affects, first, our capability of perceiving intimations of sense, and, secondly, our bodily action upon outward things; but it does not interpret the intimations of sense, nor decide upon the appropriate actions which it may physically enable us to perform. Press the question, what is an organ of thought? upon any phrenologist, and then conclude on the replies received, whether it does not simply amount to this. The brain is nobody knows what; and then say whether such a science is not an insult to the common sense of mankind.

If, then, leaving this point, we come to their proofs, that the brain is this uninterpreted organ, what is adduced. First observe that the first general motion of the brain, that as a whole, it is the organ of thought, is held by those who deny Phrenology, which, properly speaking, is not that the brain is the organ of thought, as their first assertion generally runs, but that it is a set of organs of thought. Here are multiplied mysteries; and the second point contradicts the first, since the brain cannot be both the organ and seventy half-organs. Phrenologists sometimes ask what the brain is for, if not for thought. Now, if we could not tell, this would not prove that the brain is for thought. A man who knows the classics, may be shown a book written in some language unknown to him and told it is Greek; he replies, it certainly is not Greek; but is asked, if it be not Greek what language is it? I do not know. Then it must be Greek. If the horse is neither black nor white, of what color is the horse at all? This is Hibernian demonstration.

But we do know that the brain is for something else besides thought; viz., not only for supplying that nervous energy which gives vitality to the organ of sense and motion; but also for supplying something essential to bodily life. This is plainly proved by the fact, that brain fever is often fatal; whereas, if the main function of the brain were to think, then brain fever should only disturb the mind, and leave all bodily functions in full vigor. If the eye be injured, it interferes with sight, but with nothing else; a defective ear produces deafness, but does not touch the health.

It may be asked what is the body without the head, and the reply page 7

Coruntur in agendo virtutes.—Tacit. (The virtues of a man are soon in his actions.)

is, just as good as the head without the body. The brain is nothing without blood, for withdraw this from the brain, and what can we do" therefore blood is the organ of thought; or take the wind out of a man and what can we say to it; therefore it is the organ of thought; or prick the heart with a penknife, and what then? or go without food,—therefore, thought is merely digestion; whereas, all these things, including the brain, are essential elements of life and health, bodily organs for bodily processes; whilst the mind alone does mental work.

That volition itself is no brainal process, but bodily in its expression, mental in its nature, is plain from the fact, that in cramps or rheumatism, or in sleep, as in disturbed dreams, we mill to speak or flee, and cannot move; because the bodily machinery is in wrong condition : therefore the consequent bodily act, not mental volitions, depends on bodily organization. Many persons attempt, that is, will actions after they have lost the bodily power, therefore bodily power is not will, which prepares for the next principle, that the brain is only useful in preserving the proper condition of the organs of sense and motion, by which alone, mind manifests, but does not perform its operations.

Just as the heart prepares the brain for its work; since without blood there is no more vitality or exhibition of life or mind, than without brain, yet, blood is not called the organ of those functions which it fits the brain to perform; but without blood the brain is disabled: so without the nervous energy from the brain, which is the heart of the nervous system, (which supplies the circulation and so gives susceptibility and power) the limbs and senses cannot perform their part. Yet their part is their own function; the brain gives only the conditions of vitality; which the heart first gives to the brain. Nerves of sense and motion as existing in the brain, are only conductors of nervous energy, from its reservoir, to give susceptibility and power to the organs of sense and motion, which alone are actively and proveably employed in the process. But this is purely a question of receiving impressions and communicating results;—of sensation and action, not a question of thought, which is the immediate mental work.

It is to be observed then, distinctly, that all this has no relation to the operation of thought; but to the communication of results, which cannot be communicated by brain at all, nor by sense and motion without the healthiness of condition, which alone brain helps to supply, whilst the brain itself in common with all, depends solely on the blood.

The blood is an essential condition of everything, yet performs not any functions for which it prepares. The brain is still more subordinate, being itself dependent on the heart. And neither of them could do anything without mind. The lungs and atmosphere are requisite for oxygenising the blood; without oxyen blood and brains are nothing. This method, according to the requisites of induction, page 8

Non semper ea sunt quæ videntur.—Phaed. (Things are not always what they seem to be.)

meets all stunning accidents, and removes all logical necessity for guessing at brainal thinking processes. The relation of the brain to the nervous system, and of the nervous system to the mind, may be partially understood by the following brief observations. By nervous system is meant here the organs of sense and motion: the brain gives sensibility to these through the channels of those parts in the brain called nerves of sense and motion; which I take to be the conductors (to the appropriate organs) of the nervous energy generated in the brain, and essential to the healthy exercise of the separate and specific functions appropriated to the bodily organs, eyes, ears, hands,—c. The brain gives sensibility and vigor to these, just as the heart gives health to the brain; but the brain no more performs their functions, than the heart performs the brain's functions. Yet, as when the heart or circulation of the blood is defective, the brain suffers, so when it is injured, the organs of sense and motion are impared. Consequently the two connexions with outward things, perceiving them by sense, and acting on them by motion, are cut off. Sensation gives orders and materials, the mind receiving them by sense, weaves them into a piece by a spiritual process, and returns articles thus manufactured by the delivery-cart of motion, including speech and writing. A masterly article appeared in the Edinburgh Review in September, 1856, on guessing at brainal thinking processes, and is summed up in the following words which it will be seen damages the entire system of Phrenology:—

"1st.	There is not the least reason to suppose that any of our faculties but those which connect us with external objects (our senses), or direct the movements of our bodies, act by material objects at all; and that the phrenological organs have no analogy whatever with those of external senses.
"2nd.	There neither are, nor can be, any such primitive and original faculties, as the greater part of those to which organ are assigned by the phrenologists.
"3rd.	If the 37, with organs of which they have covered the whole skull, are admitted to exist, it seems impossible to refuse a similar existence to many hundreds of thousands of the same kind, for the organs and operations of which they have, however, left no room !"

But now, to pursue the argument in reference to the brain; and here I observe that all bodily injuries of stunning blows only shut up the factory. No one can get in or out; but this does not prove that the doors are the machinery and organs of manufacturing—only that being shut no raw material nor order is given, and no wrought article returned.

Besides, in all such cases the observer is outside, and therefore knows nothing of what is going on within; the exhibition room is closed, and no new orders are received, but the old ones are being executed: otherwise, when a man is locked up in a chest, he being then unable to manifest mind till you open it, the inference is that the page 9

Flebile ludibrium. (A deplorable mockery.) Such is the definition of Phrenology as given by the "Edinburgh Review."

chest is the organ of mind because it can lock up mind : now, the sailor who fell down from the mast was locked up in such a chest, and the doctors unlocked him and restored him his look-out, and active bodily power : and thus sensation and volition returned. But other injuries of the brain which do not thus turn the body into a prison or iron chest, do not always nor generally injure the mind : many causes might doubtless be quoted from the first physiologists to prove that wounds have often vastly improved the mind.

The "Edinburgh Review," to which reference has before been made, says, "that there is not the smallest reason for supposing that the mind ever operates through the agency of material organs, except in its perception of material objects, or in the spontaneous movements of the body which it inhabits;" and this degrading science rests upon an assumption for which there is neither a shadow of evidence nor any show of reasoning. It is very true that in our present state of existence the mind is united, in some mysterious way, to a living and organized body—and that when the vitality of the body is suspended, all the functions of the mind, and indeed all the indications of its existence, cease and disappear also. The mind's functions, however, never appear; they are objects of consciousness, not of sight; only its indications by action, speech,—c., ever appear; it is the seer but is not seen. Certain actions of the brain, too, we find, are necessary to the bodily vitality, and not of the brain only, but of the heart and lungs also; and if these actions are disturbed, even for a moment, the vitality of the body, and along with it, in so far as we can judge by our senses, sensation, consciousness, and all the other mental operations, are extinguished or suspended.

But this affords no sort of proof that the mind, when it is not percipient of matter, acts or is affected by material organs of any sort; and certainly, no proof that the organs are in the brain any more than in the heart or lungs. If the head be greatly injured or strongly compressed all the faculties and functions will no doubt be destroyed. But the same effect will follow, and even more suddenly and completely, if the motion of the heart be stopped, or the cavity of the lungs be filled with unrespirable matter, although the brain remains perfectly sound and unaltered. Insects continue to perform all their functions after their heads are off; and cold blooded animals live and move in the same predicament. The use of the brain is to keep open two communications—from nature to us and from us to nature. From us to nature by actions, speeches,—c. From nature to us by means of the internal senses. Now, look at the relations of these to the mind? First, they constitute the earliest training, because they are primary occasions of the mind's exercise: waking up its attention. Hence, those with deficient senses, as deaf mutes, or blind persons, are proportionately restricted in subjects and occasions of thought. Whilst in a usual way men are sane only by the aid of their senses, they know when they answer a bell, or turn a corner by some outward mark; this is being in their senses, and is all about their sense; page 10

Qui medics vivit misere vivit.—Ovid. (He who lives by prescription lives wretchedly.)

whereas, the few who by the occasions of sense have also cultivated thought, especially in reading by sensible signs of words the thoughts of others; these are more than in their senses, they are in their understandings. If, now, they be deprived of any sense, as seeing, their sanity is preserved by the habit of reflection previously acquired, they have already materials, and this is why Milton could write his "Paradise Lost and Regained," while, if he had been born blind, he could not have done it. But he had used his eyes, both in reading and writing immensely.

Milton, then, did not compose his poem without the advantage of eyes, but filled every line with what he had seen in nature and read in book: and though while inditing he was blind to outward objects, he was ever reading over those stories of books which he had already placed in his mental library, and for which Phrenology affords no room. Milton, by the use of his outward senses, had acquired eyes inside his head, where every wise man's always are, and with these he could proceed successfully.

He was no brain man, but had a soul for work, without which we have obvious instances that brain is but so much stuffing, and produces only stuff. But it is degrading to introduce such a science as Phrenology alongside such a man, or to put it in competition with that purer and more natural and refined system of human nature, the philosophy of mind and body, and their mutual relations; for it is by countertraining and better tastes that an effectual check will be given to this vulgar science of Phrenology, by the natural disgust of minds better informed.

But phrenologists hold that brain is the manifester of mind. In consequence of the undefined language of phrenologists, they can readily shift their ground under the same supposed topic; hence, while speaking of brain as the organ of thought, they slide into manifester of thought. Well, I will endeavour to expose this fallacy. Mind cannot be manifested by brain, which cannot manifest itself, being enclosed in a bone box, and no brain could open it; it requires hands to manifest brain, which of itself manifests nothing, whilst manifestation of thought and manufactory of thought, dome of reason and organ of reason, palace of soul and instrument of soul, are very different things, but pass for one another in phrenological dialect. We read of varieties of misfortunes to orators; one is afflicted with blisters on his tongue, which prevent his speaking. He has no blister on his brain, nor on his phrenological order of language. Now, take his pen away, and ask his mind something. All the brain in the world manifests nothing; it is the work of writing, speaking, painting, acting,—c., that manifests mind, nothing else can do it. And brain alone can do no work, never say a word, nor hear a word, nor make any signs. Lift the skull off and watch it, see what mind you learn, but further, use your own brain only to learn it with, that is, shut your eyes and let your brain see it,—have your hands tied behind you and let brain feel it.

Nothing can be done or manifested without the other bodily organs, however perfect brain may be. The new method of teaching the blind by raised letters is a beautiful illustration of the fact, that the senses of the body are the only channels for communication between mind and mind; no one after Milton will be able to say of blindness, "wisdom at one entrance quite shut out." But the affecting and interesting case in proof of this argument is that of Laura Bridgman, in the Boston Institution for the Blind.

The following Notes of a Tour in the United States of America, are given by the Rev. W. Chambers, in February, 1848:—"I know not where the world presents such a phenomenon as Laura Bridgman, born deaf, dumb, and blind; and yet, through the single sense of touch, the only avenue to her mind, acquiring and exhibiting wonderful proficiency in all useful knowledge. It was indeed a sight to see her stand before an embossed map, or beside a globe, on which the outlines of sea and land, rivers and mountains are raised, holding her teacher's hand in one of her own, and from the rapid motion of its fingers ascertaining, the questions proposed; then passing her other hand over the rough surface of the map or globe, and pointing out any place she had been asked to show; answering with her fingers, through her teacher, any question that might be put, and could only be put to her in that way, and manifesting thorough intelligence on all subjects, and a capacity for acquiring any amount of information. The puzzling question was how to begin to communicate with a being, having no eyes to see you, no ears to listen to you, no voice to tell whether you were understood or not, but dwelling in darkness as deep, and in silence as unbroken as that of the grave. The effort, however, was made, and succeeded. Step by step the abyss was crossed, and now a highway of communication is established between that region of silence, solitude, and night, and the busy sun-lit world around, and the vast universe beyond, and the immeasurable and eternal world to come. The eyes of the blind are opened, the ears of the deaf are unstopped, and the tongue of the dumb has been made to sing. The exile dwells no more alone, but passes into the abodes of men, and holds companionship with kindred minds, nay, ascends to heaven, and rejoices in communion with angels and with God ! Never was there a more signal triumph of wisdom and patience over obstacles which at first seemed insuperable. Laura is now herself a teacher of the deaf, dumb, and blind !!" Such are Mr. Chambers' notes about Laura Bridgman.

Now on this, one simple question may be put: Had Laura Bridgman lost her fingers, how much mind would her brain have manifested or received? The organs or branches of a tree do not manifest mind, its tendencies, capabilities, or acquired powers; otherwise we should require no other source of evidence for Phrenology than skulls, without the least reference to corresponding character, or the concomitance between "my eye," and the faculty of language. But some proof is adduced from quite a different source than the head, namely, page 12

Esto quod esse videus.—Plaut. (Be what you seem to be.)

from the character exhibited or manifested in action, it is manifest enough that the brain is not the only manifester of mind.

It is by the fruit that we know the tree, not by the tree that we know the fruit. A philosopher who had never seen or heard of a fig-tree, could not tell by any examination what fruit it would bear; but having seen the results, and given a name to these products,—figs: he would then call it a fig-tree, according to its kind of fruit; this nature he learns originally not from the tree, but from what it bears. So Gall and others first gather fruit in observation of character or of mind manifested, then afterwards examine the head or tree, and name each pair of the seventy branches, according as its imagined prominence coincides with the separate and distinct manifestations of fruit in the life. Therefore, they never find a manifestation of mind in the brain, but by observation of actions they find the mind's tendencies, and having gathered a little unripe fruit, they name whatever organ they pitch upon after they find independently, and before looking at the organ; thus they find veneration in the sincerest worshippers, then having got the manifestation of mind, they look for a brain lobe; first they think the organ might be boldness, then they think it to be a bump at the top of the head; but the bump does not manifest to them the nature of veneration, this is manifested in action, therefore not by brain. But the grand misfortune of the trees is that they bear no fruit at all; nothing grows in the organs; all fruit is in the character and in the action; it oozes out into the fingers' end into a book, a painting, a building, a mechanical contrivance,—c., or glances out of the eye, or echoes forth from the tongue. These are the branches on which the fruit grows; we gather nothing but hair by shaving the head, and, therefore, if a tree be known by its fruit, those trees having no fruit cannot well be known in that way, though as timber they do for fuel, or for a wooden pavement.

Again, not only is the tree known by its fruit, but the fertility of the tree is known in the same manner; we cannot tell by size and manifestation what number of apples will grow next year on the biggest tree, perhaps the gardener may guess from the average "yield" of past years, but the safest plan is to wait for the gathering.

Whilst it is certain that the greatest produce of all sorts is produced from the smallest area of earth, by the concentration of human labor, of which mere measurement takes no notice; which in character is not manifested by brain, but by the lessons learned, the books read, the answers given, and the skill exhibited in action. From all this it is a very safe and obvious conclusion that the brain is not the manifester of mind, especially if we do not forget the assertion, that it is possible during life, by fixed laws of size,—c., to decide upon the character and powers of the mind from the proportion and conformation of the brain; for it is observable that the brain itself is not manifested during life, and, therefore, cannot manifest anything else. We do not usually see brain at all; we see hair, or baldness,—a cranium, but never brains. So that the great manifester is hidden page 13

Sæpe est sub pallio sordido sapientia.—Coke. (Wisdom is often found under a mean cloak.)

till the mind departs. Whilst the proportion of the brain does not always correspond with the skull, which may be thick all over, or thick in places, or not filled up inside; matters that should make fumblers modest Whilst the exercise of the brain, which makes all the difference, is not made manifest outside the skull.

That brain does not develope mind is obvious; a man is awake half the night, and lays down a scheme or an argument; but who knows anything about it till he speaks in a meeting, acts in business, or writes on paper?

Books, not brain, are the grand manifesters of the author's intellects; otherwise, give us a stereotyped edition of Milton's brains, or embalm his head, and bury his books,—what then should we learn of him?

Let a witness send his cranium into court, and the jury will find nothing instructive in the subject; otherwise it would save much time and expense to get a phrenological manipulation of plaintiff, defendant, lawyers, and judge; and deduce scientifically the whole business in a phrenological way. This point is triumphantly proved from Phrenology itself. Take any of Gall's discoveries,—what did he discover first, the faculty of mind or the supposed organ of brain? He found the faculty first, therefore the brain did not in him originally manifest the faculty; but by the clumsy inference of a false induction, the skull is now taken as an index of capacity, which capacity is a very wide word, since any man is capable of being an angel or a devil. Gall, then, first finds a faculty of language from the fact of readiness in getting up lessons by heart; this getting and reciting was therefore the only manifester of the faculty; so that if Gall's companion could not have spoken or written from memory what he had learned, the mind would not have manifested itself in that capacity; therefore, speaking or writing, and not mere brain, are the manifestations of mind. Also, in finding out self-esteem, a man tells Gall he begs because of the honor of his ancestors; well, in this plain hoax, what manifested the man's mind? Evidently his words; and Gall, having thus found the mind manifested, felt on the man's head for an unnamed bump; then that bump did not manifest the faculty, but the observation of conduct taught the existence of the faculty, and after this discovery Gall began feeling the man's head. This is true of every phrenological discovery; and so palpable is the distinction, that conduct and speech alone manifest mind, that Sidney Smith, in his "Principles of Phrenology," gives two points as constituting the science. "Phrenology," says the writer, "is the philosophy of mind; it is based altogether on observation of correspondence, cerebral projections, and mental manifestations." Their mental manifestations are quite different things from cerebral projections, and must be known in conduct to be compared with the head; therefore, conduct and not cerebral projections is the manifester of mind. Let phrenologists understand and answer this reasoning before they are permitted to reiterate to the world such contradictions and baseless assumptions.

And now, further, as to size of brain being the measure of Mental Power. Three things are essential to Phrenology at its outset:—1st. Organs of thought; 2nd. their size measuring the power of the supposed faculties; and, 3rd. whence character guessing takes place. In a science every technical phrase and word is defined. Phrenology has in definition, faculty! size! organ! all indefinite. The explanation of an organ is fairly abandoned; this ought to upset the science, or to name it, "the science of I know not what."

Size and power seem big, strong words, but are as vague as the rest. We have shewn, first, they have no measure of size. "The gradations are thus denoted: very small; small; rather small; moderate; rather full; full; rather large; very large."

Now, is this any definite measure,—rather large, as big as a bit of chalk? Then, where is the accuracy of the science? Further, it is not size of brain, but the relation of the head to the body, and of the organs, not to other heads, but to the organs of the same heads. Then all busts are useless; for they, first, have not the size of the body given; second, are not to be compared with each other; thirdly, have no average standard head with which to be compared in the whole character.

First, then, there is no measure of size. It is quite slippery under the fingers. Second, there are several deductions before the pretended "rather large" is to measure the character. Temperament, exercise, counteraction, to be reckoned,—confusion worse confounded. Third, taking the rude guess of the relative size of head to body, size here again is no measure of power; for, whilst the average weight of man's brains is 491½ oz., and woman's 44 oz., a difference of 5 to 6 oz., yet the relative size of woman's brain, compared with her body, is, within a fraction, the same as man's. The proportion of brain to body being in woman 1 to 36.46, in man 1 to 36.5,—an appreciable difference; therefore, according to Phrenology, woman has the same power as man.

Again, relative size is not the measure of power, "for the proportionate weight of brain to body at birth is greater than any other period, being in boys 1 to 6.85, in girls 1 to 6.5." Infants have, therefore, about six times more power than adults. Is their mind correspondent? From the age of 1 to 10, there is a great relative decrease; the proportion becomes 1 to 14; therefore, the mind may be lessened about one-half. From 10 to 20 it becomes about "1 to 30," a still greater diminution of proportionate size of brain, and less intellect. After 20 years of age the general average of 1 to 36.5 prevails. Less intellect still. But what is worse, beyond the period between 31 and 40, there appears a slow but progressive diminution in weight of brain of one ounce in ten years. But is 40 the beginning of manhood, and have the wisest works been achieved when the brain is thus not only relatively, but absolutely smaller! The whole progress of the brain is backwards; the growth of the mind is forward. Then size cannot be the measure of power. "Gall and Spurz- page 15

Sat pulchra si sat bona.—Pliny. (Handsome enough if good enough; or, Handsome is who handsome does.)

heim were of opinion that the brain grew until the fortieth year." They must have written afterwards, in the decline of their brains; when men's minds get sounder.

Again, whilst man's brain, in relation to the weight of his body, is heavier than that of animals, there are some exceptions. In the following specimens, selected from "Cuvier's Natural History," the brain is heavier, and in some lighter, relatively to the body, than it is in man :—Blue-headed tit, 1 to 12; canary, 1 to 14; goldfinch, 1 to 24; linnet, 1 to 24; monkey (small), 1 to 22; field mouse, 1 to 31; rat, 1 to 76; cat, 1 to 156; dog, 1 to 305; horse, 1 to 400; elephant, 1 to 500. These specimens are sufficient, and demonstratively overthrow Phrenology. The tit should be three times more powerful than man, having just three times more brain in proportion to body! The canary, linnet, goldfinch, small monkey, and field mouse, beat him hollow. While the cat beats the rat just 2 to 1, the dog is just three times stupider than the cat, and six times stupider than the rat. The horse and elephant are brainless beyond comparison, that is, phrenologically; while, in reality, the horse, elephant, dog, and cat, are the most intelligent of the lot! There is no escape from this; if is not the actual size of the brain, nay, the actual size of a whale's brain is 2 lbs. larger than man's, reckoning man's at 3 lbs.; and an elephant's brain, according to Sir A. Cooper and others, "is between 8 and 10 lbs.," about three times larger than man's. Therefore, actual size is not the measure of power; and that relative size of the brain to the body, the only measure left, is no measure of mental power, is proved by all previous instances. Whilst in addition, the absence of exercise is one discount, temperament another; then adhesiveness, concentrativeness, firmness,—c., are all employed to intensify the other organs; therefore, if we have intellectual faculties large, that largeness is no work of power, if these overlookers and regulators (who keep the others at work) should happen to be different. Further, if destructiveness be large, it will account for murder, nothing else is looked for; whilst if conscientiousness, who use a moral whip and reins, be large, and has not kept destructiveness in order, the evasion is, conscientiousness has not been exercised; therefore, its size is no index of its actual power. Whilst if we find another head with small conscientiousness and large destructiveness, yet free from murder, the answer is again, destructiveness has not been exercised, or conscientiousness greatly stimulated, then size is not the increase of power.

There is another palpable failure in the doctrine of size and power, namely, that whilst phrenologists are fond of the blacksmith's arm illustration, its increase by use, and the power indicated by larger muscles; yet the illustration in this respect, that a large arm is the absolute measure of power, a large muscle on a larger animal can exercise a proportionate greater amount of strength, in an elephant for instance; whereas the larger brain of the elephant, it being three times greater than man's, is not able to do the proportionate work.

At once phrenologists fly to relative size, and say its brain is to be measured in proportion to its body; but is this true of the muscular power of the elephant and blacksmith? If so, the smith should be stronger than the elephant. The doctrine of size and power fails therefore in every light in which it may he regarded. There is no consistency in the theory, whilst neither absolute nor relative brain is the measure of mental power.

Finally, on this point we may inquire, by what means men have been cheated into the belief of this false doctrine? It has been by the phrenological method of confounding two different things, physical size in relation to physical power, with size of brain in relation to mental power. The deception is gross, and succeeds only by gross boldness. Size is the index only of physical strength, not of sensibility nor of thought; a bar of iron one inch in diameter is stronger than a rod of a quarter of an inch; a beam is stronger than a walking stick; a blacksmith's arm is bigger and stronger than a lady's, and his head may no doubt be larger than Mrs. Somerville's, but the probability is that there is not so much in it. Physical power alone is measured by physical size; but everybody knows the proverb—"big head and little in it." Again, size, phrenologists say, is the measure of power; and yet, it has been well observed, that "the most important ones purely intellectual of the faculties, have on the whole very small organs assigned to them."

All the reasoning and reflective powers are crowded into a small area on the forehead and temples; and look at the eyebrows, in which five or six organs jostle one another. Sir Charles Bell observes, if we look at the skull in front, we may consider the orbits of the eye as crypts under the greater building. And there under are groined, that is to say, there are strong arched spines of bone, which give strength sufficient to permit the interstices of the groinings, if they may be so termed, to be very thin.

Betwixt the eye and the brain the bone is as thin as parchment; but if the anterior part of the skull bad rested on this, the foundation would be insufficient. This is the purpose of the strong ridge of bone which runs up like a buttress from the temple to the lateral part of the frontal bone, whilst the arch forming the upper part of the orbit is very strong; and these ridges of bone, when the skull is formed with what we call a due regard to security, give an extension of forehead! Although they are solid arches, connected with the building of the cranium, and bear no relation to the surfaces of the brain, both the earlier and later craniologists would have persuaded us that their forms correspond with the surfaces of the brain, and indicate particular capacities of talents. Power, then, is measured by size only by the smallest size. If we examine other organs, it appears that smallest is favourable to delicacy of perception; a small eye is better than a great one, and this eye is enlarged by exercise; the student's eyes do not grow bigger; the ploughman's hand does, but it is exercised physically, whilst the slenderest and most delicate page 17

Respicere exemplar vitae morumque jubebo Deotum imitatorem, et veras hinc ducere voces—Hor. (I would direct the learned imitator to study closely nature and manners, and thence to draw his expressions to the life.)

fingers become the best instrument by which a quickened mind either receives intimations or performs operations. .

In these impressions and exercises, which are the most closely connected with mind, smallest is no advantage; and though we do sometimes say, "little pigs have long ears," when we wish to preserve a secret, it is not found that large ears are signs of power, or a donkey would have the advantage in any intelligent audience; an elephant's trunk is larger and has more power than a man's nose, but might not be so good an instrument for judging the ingredients of a compound odour. If phrenologists have a definite measure of size, three barleycorns to one inch, instead of turning their barley into malt and getting obscured by words, without measured meaning; there is no relation between their measure, a fullish organ and a fullish faculty.

Then, how can phrenologists 'pretend to judge scientifically of character from size of organs. Undoubtedly, with 37 guesses at habits and dispositions, they must hit upon some feature; they cannot help it. But add the difficulty of judging character, to the difficulty of guessing size of organs, activity, exercise,—c., and see how the character business looks. We have already pointed out the chief difficulties of judging. Who decides? Few men are judges of character; most judge nastily from a single action, and finding the organ for this mentioned by the phrenologists, will forget to look at anything else. Then, besides this difficulty, consider the next,—the width of the faculties, any one will do for several thing's; a reformer and a murderer are both destructive. Sturge and Napoleon, both combative and destructive, one for peace the other for war; the organs and faculties are thus bits of india-rubber. Thus destructiveness, originally found in connexion with carnivorous stomachs and teeth, and intended to fulfil the command, "kill and eat," is exercised in murderers who do not eat their victim. A phrenologist says, killing a sheep and killing a man are both the same, namely, destructiveness; but though the law does not hang the sheep-killer with the murderer, because (while they are the same phrenologically) they are different. How then can these two things, the act of a butcher and the act of a murderer, come from the same original principle? Then further, the after evasions not exercised, no concentrativeness contracted by others. Indeed, there seems such an infinite number of corners in this system, that any head may be made to fit anything.

Then the plain failures of phrenologists:—The "Edinburgh Review," of October, 1856, says:—" We have known some, and have heard on good authority of many, cases of flagrant and most ridiculous blunders committed by phrenologists of the greatest eminence, which they had neither the candour to acknowledge, nor the boldness to deny." Dr. Holland says—"During some intercourse with Gall, and more frequently with Spurzheim, I had opportunities of noticing the failure of their judgment," "even in cases where the peculiarity of the external conformation, or some quality of mind, made it almost needful that the doctrine should rightly indicate the relations on page 18

Vera gloria radices agit, atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam flosculi, decidunt; nec simulatum potest quidquam esse diuturnum.—Nepos. (True glory strikes root, and even spreads; all false pretensions fade speedily, like flowers; nor indeed can any counterfeit be lasting.)

which it professes to be based." The following-are some of the indications of the character guessing. First, the equal chance of affirmative or negative, as to each particular quality predicated. Second, the plea of a balance of some indications by others and opposing ones. Third, the want of exact definition of many of these qualities or faculties; making it difficult to arrest for error where there are so many ways for retreat. Fourth, the incidental discovery of character by other and more ordinary methods. Looking at the chances and facilities thus obtained, it may be affirmed that the number of true predictions in Phrenology is less miraculous than it would be were this number not to exist. The coincidences are not more frequent or remarkable than the assured average of chances would make them. The want of definition, as to what precise Quality belongs to any organ, is amazing. It would be too tedious to dwell at large; the incidental discovery of character by other and more ordinary methods is sufficiently obvious from the following illustrations.

We have all an instinctive or an instantaneous apprehension of the general character of persons, and the class of society they belong to, consequently their probable culture by those general appearances. A smock-frock and certain indescribable but easily recognised rusticated air may indicate a milk-man; from these signs you may feel his head, and surprise him with the information that he would be very sorry if his cow died. From his organ of combativeness you may predicate his impatience when the butter is spoiled in churning. A white neckcloth, together with black in its various conditions, smooth and sleek well brushed but napless, rather than of brown—c., together with various ties of the neckloth, will, to a good judge, indicate either a preacher in the various grades of clergymen, Dissenter, Wesleyan,—c., or whether a waiter or a linendraper.

A skilful observer may soon distinguish these marks, especially as helped by manner, style of speech, kind of introductory observations, all which are dialects or provincial marks by which we guess at once at the world in which the subject's mind is imprisoned. Corduroy trousers will speak volumes, so will a fustian jacket; and if the patient dresses up to deceive you, observe whether he does not look as if he felt like Sunday, and as shut up in his Sunday coat; perhaps he turns up his cuff's to save them, and that reveals all. A shooting jacket will give the data to as good a character as any phrenologists ever gave from the bare sight of a bust without other means of guessing.

Before dismissing this argument, I may remind phrenologists that other sciences have equal claims; for to say nothing of Nasology, Physiognomy, Chiromancy, and that fortune-telling which belong to gipsies, there is handwriting-ology, which satisfies many with their characters quite as well as Phrenology does others. There are many professors in the field, and amongst them several lady-character mongers. But it should be observed, no phrenologists believe in their science, for whilst they may on the strength of it educate a child for a profession in which he is beggared by incompetence, that is a small page 19

Veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione et incertis valescunt.—Nepoh. (Truth is established by scrutiny and deliberation; falsehood thrives by precipitation and uncertainty.)

affair: none would lend a thousand pounds, nor even trust twenty on the security of an organ; but all require the conscientiousness called "legal security." It does for them to recommend to others, but in all material interests of direct pounds, shillings, and pence, they are unscientific—the education of children is of course immaterial. Admitting the phrenological method of escape, this counteracted by that,—c., it would not be difficult to maintain with equal ease the truth of any system of Phrenology in which the names of the organs are all reversed, and benevolence put into the place of philoprogenitiveness, and so on. The following are a few of the difficulties in the way of proving Phrenology by guessing character. First, we cannot easily catch them out when they are moving, because of the evasions we have mentioned. Second, they have no accurate means of proving that they are right, because of the difficulty we have shown in judging of character, through the many warping circumstances of envy, jealousy, friendship, favor, hatred, rashness. These and corresponding objections are in the way.

Phrenologists do not, of course, record their failures; and are often ignorant of their failure or success, whilst others can seldom judge; the persons examined are partial; so are their friends; often the examiner is interested; few can distinguish character with any clearness. None know themselves perfectly, and all know others worse; the person examined may begin to fancy he has what he never before dreamed of, or would have if cultivated, or if not counteracted by others; whilst people in general notice only that one out of 37 points in which they have known or misknown the individual. Nor are they very nice in discriminating whether the action which they remember really sprung from the principle in question.

"They know what's what, and that's as high
As Metaphysics art can fly."

This impudent system aspires to measure all men, and to decide from bumps their fitness for the bar, the pulpit, the bench, clerkship,—c.

It was ascertained that the size of Dr. Chambers' brain was very small. Cuvier, who wanted only one organ, namely, comparison, for his comparative anatomy, had sixty-four ounces of brain; whilst Chambers, with his vast range of knowledge and noble character, had, I believe, but fifty-three ounces. Yet his size outmeasured the power of all phrenological "mighty minds" should it not be mighty brains.

This science of character mongering from head fumbling, may further be understood from the following observations of Coleridge and the "Edinburgh Review."

Coleridge, who, in his Table-talk, says of Spurzheim—"He is dense, and the most ignorant German I ever knew." Coleridge gives in his Odes to Reflection another noted instance of the failure of Phrenology. The very marked positive as well as comparative magnitude and prominence of the bump entitled benevolence on the head of the late murderer, John Thurtell, has woefully unsettled the faith of many page 20

Formosos sæpe inveni pessimos, et turpi facie multos cognovi optimos.—Ovid. (I have often found the good looking to be very knave;, and I have known many with ugly features most worthy men.)

phrenologists; at present, and according to the present testimony, we must be content to say that John Thurtell's benevolence was insufficiently modified by the unobtrusive and unindicated convolutes of the brain, that secrete honesty and commonsense. The organ of destructiveness was indirectly potentiated by the absence or imperfect development of the glands of reason and conscience, in this unfortunate person !!

The "Edinburgh Review" observes:—"It is a matter of notoriety that men with large beads are not generally of superior endowments, nor those with small deficient in understanding; that mothers are kind without the hinder protuberance; many men witty without triangular prominences beyond the temples; that, in fact, we never happened to meet with any one individual in whom a marked peculiarity of disposition or character was accompanied with the appropriate bumps; that we daily see remarkable enough bumps on the heads of very ordinary people; that most with whom we have conversed have made the same observations; that we have known and heard from good authority of many cases of flagrant and ridiculous blunders committed by phrenologists of the greatest eminence; that very many of its most zealous advocates seem to have been seduced into belief, by having had organs discovered for talents and virtues 'they had never been suspected of possessing.' "

One grand advantage which, however, makes phrenological characters all worthless, may partly be understood by what has been often noticed in finding organs of murder after a jury has convicted; for having a knowledge of certain characters from history, and the means already pointed out of eluding one prominence or supplying it by another, any phrenologist can make any set of organs appear to agree with any given character.

The phrenologists, in all great cases, take up great men whose points are known; they have, therefore, only to give the "go-bye" to bumps which do not bear on the known points; and if the required ones are small, to say they were in activity, and intensified by large concentrativeness, which on any emergency will multiply by ten any organ you wish to enlarge.

Swift is a fine instance, proving how little faith can be put in phrenological manipulation; how much those bumps enlarge under the fingers which are supposed to belong to faculties prominent in the subject. And the phrenological portrait of Swift gives out very large, and this is true of his character, but not of his head. The "British Quarterly Review" gives ten striking heads measured on mathematical principles; four of them murderers, Haggart, M'Kean, Pollard, and Lockey; and six not murderers, Burns, Swift, La Fontaine, King Robert, Heloise, and Stella: when it was found that one of the murderers, Pollard, had by far the best head of the whole—a head which ought to have been a Milton or a Shakspeare; but Swift was proved to have had less phrenological wit than any of them.

We evidently want something more consistent and logical than page 21

Tu recte vivis, si curas esse quod audis.—Plaut. (You live well if you make it your care to be what you seem.)

this fortune telling and character mongery, from whatever point considered. It is an inductive science of taking people in; turning philosophy to a poor account.

But now a word in reference to the classification of the faculties. We have already seen that the five external senses have no brainal organ, and that this is admitted by phrenologists; few persons, however, consider sufficiently what vast mental operations are connected with the exercise of the senses, as the mind reads and interprets their intimations. It is plain that we seldom, if ever, think without language; therefore, our thinking is inward talking; for, take away our words, and you destroy literature and knowledge, and render thought stagnant; consequently, thought is mental language; therefore, our faculties of thinking should all be comprised in that one faculty and organ. Things can never manifest the mind, therefore we have the short-hand notes or marks, names and words, as suggestions or reminders, and we reason upon those words or marks; therefore, language is nothing else but all faculties together, hence logic is but the grammar of thought, and lays down the rules of exact expression of what goes on within. This simple point upsets Phrenology altogether; for we find there a separate faculty for language, which is the process of every faculty. In devotion or veneration we pray, but, whether by audible voice or mentally, we think words. Now, to say that each organ or faculty does use the organ of language, is to introduce the utmost confusion, and language must be tired out to do all the work. Besides, its size should be in proportion to its exercise, therefore it should be as large as all the rest together; but it is not,—consequently, while language is our universal faculty, mental process, it is not done in that little organ. It must be remembered, then, that language is the proper work of every intellectual faculty, and it is associated minutely with all our moral sentiments, for language deals in all those styles, just as we have books on mathematics, classics,—c. Indeed, as all knowledge lies in books, so all thinking lies in language, or thinking could not be expressed; but we shall here confine our attention to one important point in connection with language, written or oral. First, observe, that all we hear is sound, therefore if there be no inward organ of hearing, there can be no inward organ of music or tune; for, take hearing away, and what tune can men appreciate? So also of size, as intimated to sight; and of color, the only thing directly seen, yet seeing is no brainal organ, but color, the thing seen, is judged of in the brain. Leaving this as a disproof of the organic arrangement, let us briefly try to estimate the faculties involved in language.

In speaking, language directly addresses the ear by sound; in writing, it addresses the eye by form and color; yet neither ear nor eye has, phrenologically, any thing to do with what addresses them alone. Every faculty has its objects, yet the form or sound of language is the object of the eye or ear; the sense or meaning of language is the object of the faculties conversant with the subject, as page 22

Sapientia prima stultitia caruisse.—Hor. (The first step towards wisdom is to be exempt from folly.)

veneration has to do with the subject of language or religion. Then, what object is left for the organ of language, if the sound and form belong to ears and eyes, the sense to other organs? Language must be without an object, or what other object is there besides sound and the sense, neither of which belongs to language. The dilemma is increased at the next stage, when it is explained to phrenologists that language, as the sign of ideas, is necessarily the chief, if not the sole exercise of all the faculties; and, therefore, we should have only the organ of language, which should be so prominent as to push our eyes staring out of our heads. The explanation and proof of this are very simple, for the expression is only an audible or visible sign of the inward process, which process is consequently only language.

This line of reasoning we fixed confirmed by a work in which both a similar argument (though for a different purpose) and a beautiful illustration are contained, which is well worthy the attention of phrenologists; the title is "Easy Lessons on Reasoning," by Archbishop Whately. The faculty of abstraction,—at least, the ready exercise of it in the employment of signs, seems to be the chief distinction of the human intellect from that of brutes. There is, as is well known, often displayed much intelligence of another kind in cases where instinct can have no place; especially in the things which have been taught to the docile among domesticated animals. But the faculty of language, such as can serve for an instrument of reasoning, that is considered as consisting of arbitrary general signs, seems to be wanting in brutes.

They do possess in a certain degree the use of language, considered as a mode of communication; for it is well known that horses, dogs, and many other animals, understand something of what is said to them; and some brutes can learn to utter sounds indicating certain feelings or perceptions. But they cannot, or at least from their great deficiency of the power of abstraction, be taught to use language as an instrument of reasoning; that we do, necessarily, employ abstraction in order to reason, it will be perceived from the foregoing explanations and examples; for you will have observed that there can be no syllogism without a common term. And, accordingly, a deaf mute, before he has been taught language, either "finger language or reading," cannot carry on a train of reasoning any more than a brute. You will find accordingly, if you question a deaf mute who has been taught language after having grown up, that no such thing as a train of reasoning had ever power through his mind before he was taught. If, indeed, we did reason by means of those "abstract ideas" which some persons talk of, and if the language we used served merely to communicate with other men, then a person would be able to reason who had no knowledge of any arbitrary signs. But there are no grounds for believing that this is possible; nor consequently that "abstract ideas" (in that sense of the word) have any existence at all.

The signs, that is, common terms, we are speaking of as necessary for the "reasoning" process, need not be addressed to the ear. The page 23

Nihil est quod non expugnet pertinax opera, et intenta ac diligens cura.—Pliny: (There is nothing which persevering industry may not overcome, with continued and diligent care.)

signs of numbers,—the figures 1, 2, 3, 4,—c., have no necessary connexion with sounds, but one equally understood by the English, French,—c., whose spoken languages are quite different. And the whole of the written language of the Chinese is of this kind. In the different provinces of China, they speak different dialects; but all read the same characters, each of which, like the figures 1, 2, 3,—c., has a sense quite independent of the sound.

And to the deaf mutes, it must be so with the kinds of language understood by them, whether "common writing" or "finger" language.

There has been some very interesting accounts published by travellers in America, and by persons residing there, of the girl Laura Bridgman, who, as is well known, has been from birth not only deaf and dumb, but also blind. The remarkable circumstance in reference to the present subject is, that when she is alone, her fingers are generally observed to be moving, though the signs are so slight and imperceptible that others cannot make out what she is thinking of; but if they inquire of her she will tell them. It seems that having once learnt the use of signs, she finds the necessity of them as an "instrument" of thought, when thinking of anything beyond mere individual objects of sense. And doubtless every one else does the same; though, in our case, no one can, as in the case of Laura Bridgman, see the operation; nor in general can it be heard, though some few persons have a habit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves, or, as it is called, "thinking aloud." But the signs we commonly use in silent reflection are merely mental conceptions of uttered words; and these, doubtless, are such as could hardly be understood by another, even if uttered audibly; for we usually think in a kind of short-hand, if one may so use the expression, like the notes one sometimes takes down on paper to help memory, which consists of a word or two, or even a letter, to suggest a whole sentence; so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one else. It has been observed also that this girl, when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has her fingers frequently in motion; being in fact talking in her sleep, i.e. speaking mentally; she used outward signs, we inward ones.

This, then, is a fact better than all phrenological coincidences, shewing, that we cannot think to any extent without language, as the grand process and instrument of thought; that in cases of persons learning late, the outward method of expression is used along with inward motions of those signs; that this young woman used her fingers in thinking out; as many speak in dreams and in waking thoughts, and as those unaccustomed to reading much, or learning late, read with their lips as well as with their thoughts, moving the mouth with the word, showing that the inward process is one of words, which they, from want of facility, keep steady by the outward sign. Since then our main mental processes are language, (if we used brain in thinking,) we should want only the organ of language, therefore Phrenology is false, for it gives other organs.

"We may reject Phrenology, because of Physiology and Philosophy. Physiology, which has found no organs, and defined no methods of performing the functions, and which especially proves the most relative brain where there is the least intelligence. We may reject Phrenology, because of Philosophy, which teaches the spirituality of mind, and of mind's processes; which teaches the unity of the mind, and denies the division, compound mixture, and absurd nature of phrenological faculties. Philosophy teaches, that sentiments come not from organs, but from thought; and this accords with the entire course of history, in proving that advancement and education are from moral and spiritual truths, and from no physical organization; and thus places a man's character in no mould of his cranium, but in the judicious employment of his faculties in scientific, moral, and religious truth; gives him a lever to elevate his depressed fellow-countrymen, and the grand spiritual engineery that shall convert savages into civilized beings, and save from degradation those unfortunate races Combe consigns to hopeless cranial bondage; thus it is that a true knowledge of man is man's best friend,—a knowledge that gives power, whilst false views are the ignorance which increases their weakness, and makes them the prey of their own folly and of designing men."—Edinburgh Review.