Having quoted the repeated enunciations by the Imperial Government itself of the doctrine of exclusive responsibility m native affairs, 1 proceed to illustrate by a few examples the method by which it has carried that doctrine into practice. For that purpose I shall take cases where the Governor and his responsible advisers differed in opinion: not only because they are naturally the only cases which have been' worth recording in despatches, but because no number of instances of agreement of opinion between two powers can place beyond doubt which was the superior, or with which rested the responsibility of action.

The course which the administration of affairs practically took after 1856 agreed exactly with the special policy of the Governor. Action or inaction was in his hands "in all matters affecting Imperial interests, including all dealings with the native tribes, more especially in the negotiation of the purchase of lands." The system of double government early became irksome to the colonial half of the administration; yet there was no perceptible personal page 22 irritation between the Governor and his Ministers, or the party which supported the Ministry in either branch of the Legislature. There was necessarily some antagonism, but no such conflict as to lead the Legislature into deliberate acts of obstruction to the Governor's policy, such as no doubt were at any time within their power. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence of the readiness of both Houses to lend their assistance in a liberal spirit, if not always as approving-that policy which was beyond their reach, or in a way to gain his Excellency's cordial approbation.

It has sometimes been asserted that the Government of the natives was in the first instance reserved to the Crown, and the administration of it subsequently impeded, by the illiberality of the colonists in matters of supply. I will not go so far as to say that Governor Gore Browne did not encounter any difficulties in this respect, but I will proceed to shew that in the main his needs for purposes connected with the natives were fairly and even generously provided for by the colonists.

Governor Browne, in 1856, estimated the contributions of the Maori people towards the general revenues at £51,000 for the ensuing year. For the same year, when it was over, the Colonial Treasurer calculated that those contributions had amounted to a little over £17,000. [Parl. Papers, N. Z, July, 1800, p. 338, and 27th July, 1860, p. 84.] These two estimates (for they partake of the same character), can as little be reconciled as other contradictory opinions upon native affairs. The grounds of each estimate are given at full length. At least the colonists did not propose to themselves any gain from the taxation of the native race. The page 24 Colonial Treasurer, Mr. Richmond, states as the conclusion of an elaborate calculation, from which he educes the result above mentioned:—"The practical conclusion is, that in those years in which the demand for native produce has brought the Aborigines large profits in the European markets, and in which they have consequently largely availed themselves of the advantages of a civilized state, their contributions to the revenue have constituted a fair, but not it would seem more than a fair equivalent; whilst in years of slack demand, those contributions do not probably exceed the sum returned to them in direct and exclusive governmental benefits.'' [Parl. Papers, 27 July, 1860,p. 35.]

The important session of 1858 is the only one by which the policy of the colonists towards the Aborigines may fairly be judged; for it was the first session after the establishment of a responsible Government, and it was the last that was free from the excitement of civil war. The "native" legislation of 1838 consisted of five acts—for the constitution and regulation of "native districts"—for the administration of justice in those districts—for the support and management of native schools—for the colonization of mixed settlements—and for the recognition of aboriginal title to land in such a manner as to give to individual natives, under conditions, the rights incident to landed property. To all of these but the last the Governor was a consenting party. But the "Native Territorial. page 25 Rights Bill," as the last was termed, contained provisions to which he could not agree. Among other objections and the chief of all was that, not the Governor, but the "Governor in Council," was empowered to act. The Council consisted of the colonial responsible advisers. It is surely most important to notice that this attempt by the colonists to obtain power in the administration of native affairs was promptly resisted by the Governor, as contrary to the principles which had been accepted on both sides. Because also the effect of the hill would be to do away with the pre-emption of the Crown over native lands, and to introduce a system of direct purchase by individuals, it was deemed in the highest degree dangerous to the peace of the, country. For other reasons the measure was considered unjust to the Maori. The Governor was not called upon to exercise his right of veto, a provision within the bill itself reserving it for Her Majesty's assent. But a similarly independent course was taken; His Excellency forwarded the bill, and begged the Secretary of State to advise the Queen to refuse her assent to it, which was done. [See Despatches from the Colony, Nos. 1—6, with enclosures; and to the Colony, No. 1; in Parl. Papers, N.Z. 17 July, 1860.] The course taken by Governor Browne arose entirely from his sense of separate responsibility; it would have been impossible under any other system than that of the double Government. It proves both that Imperial Representative car- page 26 ried out the doctrine of exclusive responsibility into practice, and that when any act of the colonists seemed to infringe upon that doctrine he was able to defeat the attempt.

The temptation to enter into the merits of the questions at issue in the "Territorial Rights Bill" must be resisted. It is enough for my present purpose to show that a constitutional conflict arose, and that the Imperial Government defeated the colonists. I think further that a perusal of the Blue Book will show that the contest was one of argument only, temperate and fair; and that the colonists attempted to bring no undue pressure to bear upon the Governor.

Another important example of the same kind is on record. I regret that the Parliamentary Papers which I have been able to consult do not furnish me with all the documents, and that I must therefore refer to the printed papers of the Colonial Assembly, which are not so accessible in this country. But the facts which I wish to recall are too well known to require specific proof, I refer to the policy with which the 'King' movement among the Waikato tribes was treated in its earlier development. [See Report of 'Waikato Committee'—Appendix to Journals, Home of Representatives, N.Z., 1860; pp. 111 to129.] This movement was regarded by the Colonial Ministry of the time as indicating a desire for law and order j that is for a stronger government than then ruled those tribes. The Governor's special page 27 advisers in native affairs, on the other hand, considered the movement to be merely one of trifling local and evanescent consequence, originating in the ambition and restlessness of the young men who desired to rival the older chiefs. At a later date, the movement either assumed or was recognised for the first time as possessing the character of a wide spread organisation for procuring the absolute independence of the Maori race. But in 1858, though there had been already much reason for studying the symptoms of the movement, politicians had not advanced beyond the first two opinions, between which they were divided—the representatives of the colony on one side, those of the Imperial Government on the other. The Resident Magistrate at the head-quarters o: the movement, Mr. Fenton, held the first opinion, and was energetic in his attempts to guide what he thought a movement in favour of law and order to a safe and legitimate result, by bringing English Government within reach of the natives in a shape adapted to their customs. In these efforts be was supported by the Ministry, who tendered their advice to his Excellency accordingly. The Governor however, true to his rule, did not suffer himself to le guided by this advice, even though he might at first approve of it. He sought counsel from the head of the native department, whom he was justified ii assuming to have a more exact knowledge of the history, and a more intimate understanding of the deigns of the Maori page 28 people. He acted upon the opinion entertained by these gentlemen, that Mr. Fenton's policy was alienating the old chiefs, in whom confidence ought to be placed; that to treat the movement as important was to make it so; and that to neglect it was the only safe treatment. Mr. Fenton was therefore recalled from the Waikato: the work that he had begun was undone, and the King Movement was left to itself. It is of no importance for the present argument, whether the colonial policy were right or wrong; possible neither may have been the right one. But every one must confess that no more important question than this could have been presented for solution to those holding the reins of government, even though peace had never afterwards been broken; and that the positive rejection of the advice tendered-on the part of the colony on this occasion, and the deliberate undoing of the work of which the Ministry approved, remove from the latter any sort of responsibility for whatever consequences may be traceable to the progress of the King Movement.

It must now be conceded that both in the theory of native government and in the administration of its functions, as well legislative as executive, the Imperial Government has rigidly reserved from the Colony, and to itself, all real power.

It must be admitted also that Governor Browne, during the period preceding the first indications of a Maori outbreak, shewed no want of firmness in his purpose, suffered no departure from established rule, page 29 and exhibited no symptoms of weakness before an antagonistic legislature. On the other hand he was on excellent terms with his colonial advisers. And he observed what he took to be the spirit and letter of the Constitution as completely to permit the self-government of the colonists in their own affairs as he did to prevent their interference in matters relating to the native population. Where, in the latter casej he and his advisers differed, as their advice was not put to the test of practice, it i3 impossible to say that they were more often right than he. And it is as little likely that he was ever induced by jealousy of them to take an opposite view as that he submitted to their view through carelessness. I assert this, not that any words of mine can raise or lower Colonel Gore Browne's character, but because a true view of his relations with his advisers and the colonists is necessary to a proper understanding of the question at issue.