Chapter IX.

In following the progress of our story it will be necessary for us to depart from our friends a little, in order to particularize some of the leading events of the war. As our opinion may be faulty, or that expressed by the characters of our tale may be considered as prejudiced, we will not follow the usual custom in story, and we trust our readers will excuse us copying largely from the despatches before us, in order that we may have at least a truthful account to lay before them.

At this time the hostile Maories vaunted that they would drive the Pakehas (or the English) into the sea, and to carry out this laudable intention on their part, they overran the country, committing all sorts of page 56 depredation, murder, and rapine. At first, indeed, though thoroughly gutting the houses, they left most of them standing, as it was said that they might, when their vaunt was carried out, use them as their dwellings.

Thus they formed marauding parties all over the Province, so that New Plymouth and the two forts, Omata and Bell Block, were in an actual state of siege.

Large armed escorts being required to protect all parties, or supplies to and from them, martial law was of course proclaimed, and free passages provided for all families wishing to leave Taranaki for Auckland, Nelson, or Wellington, where the inhabitants in the most friendly manner offered to shelter the refugees. Many availed themselves of these offers, still several remained, some from the anxiety for those dear to them who were enrolled in the Militia, others from the natural disinclination to leave a place so dear to them—though devastated, still clinging to it, willing rather to face privation there, than dependance upon strangers elsewhere.

On the former account our friends would not quit it, as all the gentlemen of both families had volunteered for service, and they preferred rather to do their own household duties in the absence of servants, who, in the crowded state of the town and the compulsory means used afterwards to force all women and children to leave, gave up their situations and the settlement altogether.

We now come to the second act of the drama, the engagement between the rebels and the troops at Waireka, thus described by Colonel Murray, Captain Cracroft, R.N., and Captain Brown commanding the Militia, by extracts from their despatches. Thus, Colonel Murray states,—

“The plan of operations was, Captain Charles Brown, in command of the Militia and Volunteers, should proceed by the beach, keeping the sea coast, and passing in rear of the Natives, who had built a pah on the Waireka Hills, whist I should proceed by the main road with a view to dislodge a party of rebels reported to have taken up a position at a spot called Whaler's Gate, for the purpose of cutting off the communication between Omata and the town. In the meantime, Captain Brown, should he succeed in recovering the European families, was to join me at or near this spot. On reaching the spot named, I found the road clear and no trace of Natives anywhere near. I accordingly moved on leisurely, with a view to sooner meeting Captain Brown; but on reaching the top of a hill about a quarter of a mile on this side of the Omata stockade, the sound of rapid firing, about two miles and a half towards the sea, made it evident that the Volunteers were hotly engaged. I accordingly pushed on to the stockade, when I despatched Lieutenant Blake, R.N., with his men, supported by a subdivision of the company, 65th Regiment, under Lieutenant Urquhart, with orders to proceed in a direct line to the assistance of Captain page 58 Brown's party, whilst I continued along the road with the remainder of the force to a lane about a quarter of a mile beyond the stockade, which leads from the road down to the sea. About half-way down this lane I turned into the fields and formed line of skirmishers, with the intention also of proceeding to the assistance of the Volunteers, &c. The rebels, however, showed such a disposition to get round our left, and so cut us off from the main road, that I was obliged to abandon that intention, and manœuvre to prevent it: keeping up a fire whenever they gave us an opportunity, as they were covered by a wood and deep ravine, out of which we attempted to dislodge them with rockets. I ultimately took up a position in the lane, so as to secure the main road; and the Natives seeing us retire came down through the wood and ravine, but such an effective fire was kept up wherever they showed themselves that they retired to the bush again. Considering my force, however, too small to keep our communication open, should they attack us in force, I recalled Lieutenant Blake's party and Lieutenant Urquhart's, particularly as the day was far advanced and my orders were to return by dark. I continued to occupy this position until it became absolutely necessary to return, keeping up a frequent fire of rockets on the pah and any groups of rebels we observed. It became necessary, however, to detach Lieutenant Urquhart a second time to drive back the rebels, who were attempting to got up on our right, and between us and the Volunteers, which, having page 59 accomplished, he rejoined me in time to return. I beg to add that nothing I can say would adequately describe the steadiness and gallantry of both officers and men composing my little force. I have but one regret in reporting that I was early deprived of the very able assistance of Lieutenant Blake, H.M.S.S. “Niger,” who was severely wounded.”

Captain Cracroft, in his despatch, states, “In compliance with orders, I proceeded to the Omata stockade, where I was enabled to obtain a good view of the country and of a pah constructed on the crown of a hill about a mile beyond, from which a continuous fire of musketry was kept up upon Colonel Murray's force upon my right, with whom I immediately communicated. It was now about half-past five, and as there was only half an hour's daylight left, I determined to attack this pah at once. I accordingly planted the 24-pounder rocket tube about seven hundred yards from it, and after a few discharges, the men stormed the pah under a heavy fire in the most gallant style; William Odgers, my coxswain, being the first man in it. Having captured the flags and destroyed every thing living in the trenches as far as could be ascertained in the dark, I returned to the Blockhouse. In performing this service, I am thankful to say there were only four men wounded. It is difficult to estimate the numbers opposed to us, nor could their exact loss be ascertained—sixteen dead were counted lying inside the trenches, and several were lying in the road outside.”

The third account is from the pen of Captain Brown—an extract from his despatch to Major Herbert, the officer commanding Militia and Volunteers. It was upon this portion of the force that the brunt of the engagement fell—and with which was Charles St. Pierre—consisting of 52 Militia and 98 Volunteers.

“After a quick march of about two hours we reached the stream Waireka, where it runs on to the beach. We here perceived that the natives were rapidly running down from their pah, about a mile off, on the Waireka hill, to meet us. We were, however, able to get into position without difficulty on the high land in the following manner, under Captain Stapp's directions.

“A company of Volunteers under Captain Atkinson were thrown forward, and reached the high ground on the south side of the Waireka, driving back the natives; but greater numbers of the enemy coming on both flanks, Captain Stapp, who had joined and taken command, ordered a retreat on position No. 1, shown in the enclosed tracing made by the Provincial Surveyor—the position consisting of a house, stacks, furze and rail fences on level ground on the brink of two gullies running out on the beach. From this point Captain Atkinson was moved on to No. 2, to cover the rear of the main body. Lieutenant Hurst with his company occupied No. 3, and was joined by Lieutenant M'Keckney and myself, when I pushed Lieutenant Hurst forward to endeavour to occupy the bush in the Waireka gully, under cover page 61 of which the natives were swarming. Lieutenant Blake with a party of the “Niger's” men having thrown themselves in advance by another route, I directed Lieutenant Hurst to turn his attention to the natives on the lower and open part of the Waireka gully whence they were annoying Captain Atkinson's party as well as our own. Lieutenant Hurst having done some execution, passed across the gully by No. 2 to Captain Stapp at No. 1. The Natives soon made us aware that they possessed pieces of long range, against which our muskets were of no use, and I had to fall back on the scanty cover at No. 3, where I had not been long when Lieutenant Urquhart, 65th regiment, with some 25 men, joined me, as also some stragglers of the Naval Brigade, and some Volunteers from the Omata Stockade under Lieutenant Armstrong, Militia, and Lieutenant McNaughten, R. A. With their gallant assistance we drove the Natives out of sight into a straggling and slight line of cover in the gully that runs into the Waireka, and as I perceived the intention of the Natives was to intercept our line of retreat to the Omata Stockade by occupying the cover of flax between Nos. 3 and 4, I requested Lieutenant Urquhart to leave me a few men, and with the remainder occupy No. 4, thus placing the Natives creeping along the gully, between two fires and securing our communication with the Omata Stockade; to my surprise and regret Lieutenant Urquhart had not many minutes occupied No. 4 before I saw him and his men retire, recalled, as I am informed by page 62 Colonel Murray, by his orders; the position commanded my own, was uncommanded by any other, had open and level country between it and the Omata Stockade, and had excellent cover of flax at the edge of the position to seaward. When the Natives saw them retire, they called out “Ka horo, Ka horo,” and boldly ran along the open part of the gully to the cover on the North side of the Waireka, bringing themselves under the murderous fire of Captain Atkinson, which dropped them in twos and threes about the ground; at this time, finding my position untenable and valueless to the Natives, I ordered our wounded and dead to be carried to Captain Stapp's position. These consisted of one of the Marines of H.M.S.S. “Niger,” wounded in the head and since dead, one militiaman shot through the neck, and Sergeant Fahey of the Stockade at Omata shot dead.”

The scene of this engagement being only four miles from town, the firing was distinctly heard there, causing dreadful anxiety to all who had relatives engaged, and to none more so than the ladies Wellman and St. Pierre. This was not lessened when Walter, who had been wounded in the early part of the day, was brought home in the first ambulance—he was but slightly wounded; still the absence of Charles caused the deepest fear for his safety, and his anxious friends counted the moments waiting for the return of the force. It was midnight ere he came, fortunately unwounded, though dreadfully fatigued from the labors and dangers of the day. The fears of the wretched page 63 inhabitants was a hundredfold increased by the return of the regular troops a little after dark, and without any intelligence of the fate of the settlers, who being engaged on the other side of the hill, their movements or condition were not known.

The Natives engaged at Waireka were of the Southern tribes who were the first to aid Wiremu Kingi in his quarrel with the Governor, and though never joining his forces at Waitara they warred on their own account on the Southern side of the town, having commenced their infamous career on the day previous to the engagement in the village of Omata by the murder of three defenceless men and two little boys—the latter with the most savage brutality. Their next measure was an attack upon the town and a massacre of the inhabitants; this, however, was prevented by the battle above detailed, and although this force was not sent out to fight, but to rescue some outsettlers, whose return was cut off, brought on this disaster to them. Had, indeed, our advantage been followed up on this occasion, it is more than probable that the Maories would not have again molested the settlers; they were, however, unfortunately allowed to retreat leisurely to their own homes, and gaining courage from our inaction, devastated the country round, carrying off live stock and other property to a large amount. During the following six weeks, preparations were being made by both sides for carrying on the struggle, the inclement state of the weather impeding much the military operations.

A large entrenchment was, during this time, commenced and partly completed at the Waitara, about a mile from the mouth of the river, and early in June the detachment of the 40th, which had lately arrived from Melbourne and Hobart Town, now occupied this position.

The rebels, however, were not idle in front, but were actively engaged constructing a very strong Pah about a mile distant on a commanding eminence, covered with high fern, and surrounded by swamps and gullies. Although this Pah was not on the purchased land—as before stated, the cause of the first act of hostilities—yet as a reconnoitering party on the 23rd June was fired on by the Maories (which was immediately reported to Head-Quarters), in consequence of this it was determined to attack the Pah, and reinforcements of about 120 men, consisting of a Company the 40th regiment and a portion of the Naval Brigade, were sent to Waitara, together with two 24-pounder howitzers.

The Despatch of the Officer Commanding on this memorable occasion will be read with interest.

“Camp, Waitara,
“27th June, 1860.

“Sir,—I have the honor to inform you, for the information of the Colonel Commanding the Forces (in reference to your letter of yesterday's date), that I moved out this morning at 5 o'clock with the detail page 65 noted in the margin,^* to attack the new pahs on the mounds on the South East of the Camp, and returned from thence to Camp at half-past 11 a.m.

“The attack was commenced by the Artillery at 7 a.m., at a range of 400 yards to the North West of the pahs. A breach was, however, not made in the large pah of a sufficient size to justify me in ordering the men to assault it.

“During the time the Artillery was playing on the pah large bodies of Maories were seen advancing from the rear and occupying in extended order a ditch and bank, about 400 yards in advance of our right flank, from which they kept up a constant fire.

“Seeing there was no means of entering the pah, I immediately ordered an advance towards the ditch and bank just mentioned, which was made in the most continued and gallant manner, until the men reached a deep ravine with an entrenchment behind, and which they found impossible to pass, it being defended by two, if not even three large bodies of Maories, who were almost entirely concealed behind it; and another entrenchment in rear as well as the very high fern. Here a desperate and destructive fire was opened upon us, and most gallantly returned. Our skirmishers being far fewer in number and exposed in a much greater degree than the enemy, I deemed it page 66 advisable to direct them to join the main body; and our ammunition being nearly expended, I withdrew the whole of the men, and returned to Camp in regular order.

“I regret to have to report that the casualties have been numerous; but when, (as it is supposed the whole of William King's Natives came down to support the Waikato in the pahs, the whole amounting apparently to 800 men, foremost among whom was a European who was shot dead,) it cannot be considered that the number is great, in proportion to those opposed to us.

“Among the deaths I have to lament that of Lieutenant Brooke, 40th Regiment, a young Officer of much promise, who fell in the noble discharge of his duty, and 29 Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the different corps. Among the wounded, Captain Seymour, R.N., severely, and 33 Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the different corps.

“I enclose a return of casualties.

“The loss of the rebels, from personal observations, must have been very great.

“I cannot speak too highly of the gallant bearing of the Officers and Men of all arms engaged, and I would particularly beg to mention the valuable services rendered by the several Officers in command, viz.: Lieutenant McNaghten, R.A., Lieutenant Battiscombe, R.N., Lieutenant Morris, R.M., and Captains Bowdler and Richards, 40th Regiment.

“I would also desire to express my sense of the very valuable services of Captain Seymour, R.N., who was page 67 so good as to accompany me and afford me every assistance until he was severely wounded.

“I feel much indebted to Assistant-Surgeon B. Stiles, 40th Regiment, Assistant-Surgeon Edwardes, R.N., and Mr. J. R. Murray, M.D., Surgeon, attached to the 40th Regiment, for the very efficient assistance they afforded to the wounded in the field.

“And my best thanks are due to Lieutenant Mould, R.E., who attended me, and my Staff Officer, Ensign Whelan, acting Adjutant, Detachment 40th Regiment.”

The intelligence of this affair filled the inhabitants of New Plymouth with consternation, and quickly rumour, with her thousand tongues, spread the news to the neighbouring colonies. Most deeply was it felt in Melbourne, where the 40th Regiment was justly esteemed, and the Parliament of Victoria immediately agreed to request the Governor and General to despatch the rest of the Regiment to New Zealand, the Volunteers being called out to supply their place. The war sloop “Victoria,” previously sent to New Zealand, was now entirely placed at the disposal of the New Zealand Government. A second Detachment also of the 12th Regiment was sent from Sydney, making up an additional force of 600 men. The General Officer at Melbourne, with his Staff, determined to accompany them to the seat of war, and direct the future proceedings. Great, therefore, were the expectations, and all parties were elated at the prospect of more decided and active operations, for the apparent indecision page 68 in not using the prompt measures directed by the Governor in his Despatch dated the 12th July, and which we beg to insert, caused much dissatisfaction.

“Believing that some decided and indisputable success at Taranaki is absolutely necessary to prevent other Tribes from joining those now in arms against us, I have been most anxious to place every available man at your disposal, and have incurred some risk in so doing. You will now have upwards of two thousand men of all ranks and a large force of Artillery under your command, and you will, I trust, be able to stike a vigorous and effective blow on the rebel forces, either on the North or South of New Plymouth.

“In urging this upon you, I beg you not to suppose that I desire you to exceed the bounds of prudence. * * * I do not, of course, presume to offer any advice on Military operations, but I trust you will permit me to say that, though some unequivocal success is absolutely required, * * * and that delay will add to the strength and confidence of our opponents, and weaken both the number and faith of our adherents; no precaution which can be adopted to ensure victory and avoid surpise ought to be neglected.”

The voice of public opinion, expressed in the journals of the day both at home and throughout the Colony, censured highly the officer in command, and a speedy termination of the war was looked for in the change of leaders. The General arrived on the 3rd page 69 of August, and the expectation of an immediate advance on the rebels filled every one with hope. The intentions and acts of the veteran soon dissipated this hope, and in proof of this remark we insert an extract from his Despatch to the Governor:—

“The plan which your Excellency proposes of harassing them by secret, sudden, and constant attacks by bodies of Troops without baggage is, in my opinion, impracticable. It is impossible to surprise them, as the scouts who are constantly on the watch about their pahs will always give them sufficient notice to enable them to effect their escape should they be desirous of doing so, or to prepare for defence if they mean to remain. Experience has proved that to send Troops unprovided with artillery to attack a pah entails certain failure, accompanied with a useless loss both of men and of prestige. I consider it of the highest importance, not only to the successful termination of the present war, but to the future peace of the Colony, that the Maories should become convinced of the superiority of the Troops in warfare, and of the hopelessness of their endeavouring to gain any material advantage over us; and I cannot think that it would be wise or justifiable knowingly to place the Troops in a position in which that superiority would disappear or perhaps be converted into inferiority.”

The day after the General's arrival a rumour ran through the town that a large body of the Maories were about to attack it. This proceeded from an page 70 officer of Militia attached to the Staff, who hastily rode in and informed the General that he had met the hostile natives advancing. The alarm soon sounded; the soldiers rushed to their arms and places of parade; whilst the panic-struck inhabitants rushed frantically from their houses. The streets were now filled with parties of women and children, in all sorts of costume, eagerly hastening to Marsland Hill as a place of refuge, causing a scene for several hours which beggars all description. After this alarm and attendant confusion it was deemed advisable to withdraw the outposts and to concentrate the forces inside the town, leaving a small entrenched camp on Waireka Hill, besides the force at Waitara and the two blockhouses at Omata and Bell Block. A more circumscribed line of entrenchment was without delay carried round the town, and all the gardens and hedges in the suburbs were levelled to prevent a cover to the enemy. Again and again were orders issued, and vessels chartered, for the removal of the women and children; but as these orders were in many instances not complied with, other measures were resorted to, which, evincing a lack of courtesy, and being of a dictatorial character, caused much bitterness against the authorities, which, with a more conciliatory tone, would have proved more effectual.

Mr. Wellman, a leading man in the Settlement, as well as Mr. St. Pierre, who had even a larger property and interest at stake, were not consulted on any matter, and they felt deeply this lack of courtesy towards page 71 them: their interest and that of their fellow-colonists being entirely ignored by the withdrawing of the outposts, and which up to this period protected the property around them. As a natural consequence, by their removal, the marauders became inspired with greater confidence; and, renewing their aggressive warfare, burnt, pillaged and destroyed everything, approaching even to within one mile of the town entrenchments. The policy of this line of proceeding was considered very doubtful by many, but we are not competent judges to form any opinion of its value. It was certainly at variance with the recorded opinion of the Governor, who frequently advised more prompt and active measures and the following up of our successes, which in all probability would have brought this disastrous war to a more speedy conclusion. However, caution was the order of the day, with what results will be hereafter seen.