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Salient. Newspaper of the Victoria University Students' Association. Vol 41 No. 15. July 3 1978

Which Way Vietnam?

page 11

Which Way Vietnam?

Vietnam in 1978

Following protracted armed struggles by the Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian peoples US imperialism was finally expelled from Indochina several years ago. It was a development of far-reaching effects.

The Decline of US Imperialism

First the massive American war machine had been openly and decisively defeated by people's war. It provided immense encouragement to third world peoples struggling against imperialist domination. It also marked the start of US imperialism's strategic decline.

In the early years following World War 2 US imperialism acted as the capitalist world's gendarme, intervening at will around the world. But with its debacle in Indochina the growing strength and unity of the third world and US inability to arrive at a united foreign policy, US imperialism has been forced into a strategically passive role in a world situation which is rapidly eroding its power.

The relative weakness of US imperialism has been brought home by the aggressive rise of the Soviet Union as a contending superpower. In Angola and Ethiopia it has freely intervened with thousands of Cuban ghurkhas while the US remained paralysed by endless debates in Washington.

It is now the Soviet Union which is trying the role of international gendarme. It threatens US imperialism's world empire on all fronts and its offensive can only end in war between the two rival superpowers. The world situation today is a far cry from that which preceded the US/Indochina war.

Vietnam's Regional Hegemonism

Second, the disappearance of the US interventionist forces and the emergence of new tasks following liberation have seen considerable differences arise between the war-time allies of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos.

Here the key factor has been the attempt by the Vietnamese Comminust Party Leadership to use the unity between the peoples of the three countries during the Indochina war as the basis for a Vietnamese dominated "Indochina Federation". This has been a consistent aspect of Vietnamese policy since the foundation of the "Indochinese Comminust Party" in 1930. In essence it means a single state, with one party, one people, one army and one country within a Vietnamese "Indochina".

Although the Vietnamese now prefer the phrase "special relationship" their objectives are clearly the same. Consider the operation of Vietnam's "special relationship" with Laos:

Laos: Sovereign State or Soviet/Vietnamese Dependency?

Laos's significant economic dependence on the Soviet Union and growing military dependence on Vietnam (which has over 30,000 troops stationed in Laos) has seen those two countries come to dominate many aspects of Lao internal affairs. Major national decisions are now made by a Council that is one-third Soviet, one-third Vietnamese and one-third Laotian in composition.

The Vietnamese especially care little for the desire of ordinary Laorians to make their own decisions independently of a Vietnamese-dominated "special relationship". Recently a Lao Comminust Party member complained that numerous blueprints for re-organising Laotian society were "simply Vietnamese documents translated into Lao and implemented without regard for our feelings".

Vietnamese arrogance is increasingly finding its counter in the anger of Lao peasants and Pathet Lao troops. "There have been persistent reports of clashes between Vietnamese troops and Pathet Lao soldiers. In Sayaboury province, a Pathet Lao army unit opened fire last month on a Vietnamese detachment that had camped nearby when the Vietnamese refused to hoist the Laotian flag alongside their own." (Newsweek, May 22, 1978)

Alongside the Vietnamese a contingent of Soviets has arrived in Vientiane. They are hated even more than the Vietnamese. They have behaved contemptuously of the Lao Government, openly hoarding scarce food supplies and black marketeering. They act just like the old western imperialists. One Pathet Lao official denounced them strongly: "The Russians are fat and ugly, running around madly trying to buy up American throwaways. They're just like second-rate Americans."

Photo of Pathet Lao soldiers

Pathet Lao troops on review

Vietnam's "special relationship" in practice has meant lessened independence and increased foreign domination for Lao tians. Having kicked out US imperialism Laos now faces a new threat to its independence and sovereignty - from Vietnamese hegemonism.

Kampuchea

Vietnam has tried to hoist the same sort of special relationship on Kampuchea (Cambodia) and has failed significantly. The history of Vietnamese attempts to dominate Kampuchea is especially sordid.

Two Revolutions - Two Lines

Since its formation in 1960 the Comminust Party of Kampuchea has maintained that the line of the Kampuchean revolution must be decided by the Kampuchean people without outside interference. This has consistently brought them into conflict with the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party which has used its greater size and the fact that it was the focal point of imperialist domination of Indochina to try to dominate the Kampuchean communists and force them into subservience to the needs of Vietnam "for the greater good of Indochina".

During the anti-communist reign of Norodom Sihanouk (which started in 1954 following the signing of the Geneva agreements) the Vietnamese pressured the Kampuchean comminusts to abandon their guerilla struggle. For a number of years no marxist party existed and the revolutionary forces were dispersed and weak. Only a Vietnamese instigated and dominated grouping was present. This accepted the Vietnamese line of no struggle against Sihanouk. It was not until 1960 that a genuine marxist party could be formed. Thus from the beginning of the genuine Kampuchean communist movement the Vietnamese openly interfered and divided the Kampucheans.

In a recent interview Kampuchean Prime Minister Pol Pot described the continuing interference and sabotage of the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. "From 1965 to 1975, when they asked for and obtained refuge in Kampuchea's territory, they took advantage of the friendship of Kampuchea's people to carry out subversive activities, create a separate party, set up a separate power, create a separate army in Kampuchea's territory already under the control of Kampuchea's revolution and in which Kampuchea generously gave them refuge.

"Concerning the party particularly, from 1970 to 1975, Vietnam carried out all the most criminal procedures aiming at annihilating the correct and clearsighted Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea."

In March/April last year a group of Vietnamese agents within the Kampuchean leadership attempted a coup which failed miserably.

Kampuchean soldiers and rightist refugees from Kampuchea are being placed in special "re-education camps" by the Vietnamese where they are taught the 'errors' of the Kampuchean communists and encouraged to struggle against the sovereign government of Kampuchea. In one camp former member of the Kampuchean Communist Party was reported as leading discussions on mounting armed struggle against the Phnom Penh leadership. In front of Vietnamese officials one person in the Ben San camp (Tay Ninh province) declared whe would be returning to Kampuchea "when the whole of the country is liberated ... by the Vietnamese army".

Yet the Vietnamese continue to deny interference in the affairs of Kampuchea! Obviously attempts to overthrow the legitimate Government and Communist Party leadership which they continue to directly aid and abet don't count as interference. Such is the benevolent logic of the Vietnamese's "special relationship". The Kampucheans are paying a heavy price for insisting on a purely "normal relationship" as one Kampuchean official put it.

(A second part of this article further describe the Vietnamese / Kampuchean conflict, deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations and Soviet expansionism in Asia.)

James Morgan