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Salient. Official Newspaper of Victoria University Students Association. Volume 40, Number 3. March 14, 1977.

Obstacles To Zimbabwe Independence

page 10

Obstacles To Zimbabwe Independence

Photo of a man holding out his hand

Introduction

The overall significance of the Geneva talks was that they represented the latest attempt of Imperialism to ensure a neocolonialist solution in Zimbabwe. This involves setting up a "moderate' black government which in return for its position as a privileged ruling class will ensure that the area remains within the world capitalist system as a dependent peripheral economy. Neo-colonialism is no solution for the mass of the people for whom white rulers are merely exchanged for black while all the institutions which ensure their underdevelopment and exploitation remain intact. Armed struggle poses a threat to the achievement of a neo colonialist solution in that it contains the potential to develop into a strong revolutionary movement and to politicise the mass of the revolutionary movement and to politicise the mass of the people as to the need for a socialist revolution. Thus the need for a quick "peaceful" solution in Zimbabwe.

Imperialist strategy in Southern Africa over recent years is now finding its expression in the Geneva talks shows the attempt to effect this neo-colonialist solution.

Imperialism's Overall Strategy in Southern Africa

Following the emergences of national liberation struggles in Southern Africa during the early sixties, imperialist strategy changed from one of direct support for the white racist regimes to one of "detente" —the attempt to influence those regimes to moderate their racial and colonial policies and to change confrontation between black and white in Africa into "dialogue" and conciliation. Already fruitless diplomatic efforts had been made by the British on "HMS Tiger" and "HMS Fearless" in 1966 and 1968. The recognition of the need for change was set out in the 1969 Nixon Kissinger doctrine which laid the basic framework for US policy in the area US objectives as set out then and still they remain today, were to protect American interests and opportunities in the area and under the guise of containing the "Commuist" threat, to contain the potential of nationalist movements to develop into revolutionary socialist movements. The Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine also recognised the need to minimize the likelihood of direct US involvement in the conflict given the impending defeat in Indo China. Thus the subtle manoeuvres of detente have replaced direct military intervention and US imperialism has worked through its main representative, Vorster and its most willing collaborator, Kaunda of Zambia.

Though the basic strategy was laid down in 1969 and manoeuvres started then, it was only with the collapse of the Portugese empire that conditions necessitated its full implementation. The successes through armed struggle of popular movements in Angola and Mozambique alongside the successes of ZANU especially since 1972 raised the spectre of liberation struggles increasingly developing a socialist perspective, with the ultimate possibility being that the whole Southern African [unclear: bloc] would disengage itself from the world capitalist system.

Thus from 1974 on. 'detente' came into full force with the following objectives. —
  • to gain a quick solution to the Zimbabween situation.
  • to persuade South Africa to surrender its political control of Namibia.
  • to persuade South Africa to make petty changes in apartheid in an attempt to halt the tide of resistance within the country. (Soweto makes this even more crucial now.)
  • to intensify in partnership with South Africa the penetration of the economies of Southern Africa. This has a two fold purpose — an economic one in the sense that the dynamic of South Afric's apartheid economy requires outward expansion to its "natural" trading partners in Africa, and a political one in that the attempt is to so integrate the economies of independent African countries with that of South Africa that they will be reluctant to support a revolutionary struggle in South Africa itself.

Detente's Operations in Zimbabwe:

The 1974 Unity Agreement

As can be seen from the above South Africa plays a pivotal rule and shares an essential identity of interests with imperialism in attempting to stave off the final confrontation in South Africa itself. Thus by late 1974 both had become prepared to sacrifies the Smith regime and began moves to force Smith and the black nationalists to the negotiating table. The result was that a false unity was imposed on the nationalists who were forced to sign a Declaration of Unity (December 1974) and merge into the enlarged ANC. By the time negotiations were attempted at Victoria Falls in August 1975 the Unity Agreement had broken down with Nkomo of ZAPU attempting secret negotiations with Smith, and the ANC under Muzorewa and Sithole not proving to be the easily manipulated body it was expected. These factors together with Smith's continued intransigence meant this detente move was a failure.

The Geneva Talks 1976

Following this failure the armed struggle was intensified necessitating a further move to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The weakness of the Rhodesian economy with half the budget allocated for defence and with large numbers of the work force being conscripted or leaving the country, (especially skilled and professional workers) meant Smith was in no position to resist. Within the nationalist movements themselves events of the last two years have shown similar pressures being brought to bear as surrounded the 1974/1975 detente manoeuvres — the attempt being to isolate discredit and destroy the progressive elements and to find a "safe" leadership.

Parties Behind the Talks The USA — The Kissinger Plan

The terms of the Kissinger plan as announced by Smith indicate why Smith was prepared to [unclear: conce][unclear: acvitability] of majority rule. [unclear: Th] laid down that an interim [unclear: govern][unclear: sould] be established leading up to [unclear: major] within two years, the [unclear: structure][unclear: interim] govern[unclear: ment] ensured [unclear: con][unclear: hite] domination, The Council of [unclear: St][unclear: posed] to draft the new [unclear: constitution] to be made up of equal numbers [unclear: of][unclear: and] whites, thus inevitably [unclear: lead] deadlock. In the Council of [unclear: Minaters][unclear: frican] majority was to be [unclear: rendered][unclear: agless] by the requirement that all [unclear: d][unclear: as] would have to be taken by a [unclear: tw][unclear: th] majority.

Photo of a person climbing a ladder

page 11

This together with the fact that the key areas of Defence and Law and Order were to remain in white hands mean it would be powerless to challenge white interests. The other terms of the plan the lifting of sanctions and cessation of guerilla warfare, and the establishment of a trust fund would enable foreign capital to pour in and boost the white controlled economy.

Considerable confusion followed the announcement of the Kissinger Plan with the Front-line states, who supposedly had been consulted, issuing a communique rejecting the terms of the proposals. Out of all the resulting confusion over what Kissinger presented to Smith what Smith agreed to and what the Front-line states agreed to the following points emerge:
  • Kissinger allowed Smith to believe that the plan constituted a non negotiable "package deal'
  • at the same time he gave Kaunda and Nyerere the impression that the details were negotiable.

Thus by employing, in the words of his senior assistant William Rogers "tactful ambiguity" he achieved his main aim i.e. to create enough momentum to get the parties to the conference table.

By conceding to Smith a considerable white role in the interim government and the cessation of sanctions and guerilla war fare he speeded up Smith s acceptance of the principle of majority rule in two years By presenting the proposals to the Front-line states as negotiable he enabled them to force the nationalists to the conference table on the basis that in principle Smith had accepted majority rule and the details as to the composition of the interim government could be hammered out in negotiations.

South Africa

Since detente was initiated in 1974 it has been Vorster's task to exert pressure on Smith. In the lead up to the Geneva talks his role was to put economic pressure on Rhodesia to enforce acceptance of the Kissinger proposals. This was done by obstructing the passage of Rhodesian goods to South African ports and with holding military aid. The US part of the bargain was apparently a promise to veto any move at the UN to impose sanctions on South Africa (Christian Science Monitor. Oct. 18, 1976) and the likelihood of large scale loans to help South Africa service its debt. According to the London stockbrokers James Capel and Co. the US may also have done a "higher gold price" deal with South Africa in return for the republic's co-operation (Daily Telegraph, Britain, Sept 27. 76.)

The Front Line States

In our analysis of the policies of the governments of the Front line states we recognise that the people of Tanzania Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana have sacrificed a great deal for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Of the five Front-line states Zambia, Tanzania and since late 1974 Mozambique have had the most influence on the liberation struggle because of the dependence of the guerilla forces on them for the supply of personnel and materials. Thounh it is an oversimplification to treat them as a unitary bloc they tend consciously or unconsciously to transmit imperialist pressure on themselves on to the liveration movements and thus are working within the framework of "detente". Of the Front-line states. Zambia has always been the most compliant. It was Kaunda who first formulated the detente policy with Vorster and who convinced Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique in late 1974 that armed struggle should cease while peaceful negotiations were being pursued. This was in keeping with the Lusaka Manifesto, 1969, later endorsed by the OAU.

Photo of three people with machine guns

Zambia was faced with grave internal economic and social problems due to its heavy dependence on the export of copper and on Western capital. The drop in copper prices threatened to lead to the eruption of class struggle in Zambia itself. Thus Kaunda, while publicly supporting the liberation struggle, has increasingly fallen into the position of carrving out imperialism's designs to preserve his own position and that of the ruling party.

Nyerere has been unable to prevent the rise of a bureaucratic class in Tanzania which sees its interests not being with the Tanzantan masses and the socialist programme laid down in the early days of independence but with the West and a state capitalist model of development The economy has come increasingly under the influenc" of Western capital and under the pressure of this situation Nyerere has also fallen into a position of compromising the struggle in Zimhabwe

The governments of Angola and [unclear: Moz] ambique are being subjected to pressure from imperialism and Russia which appears to be obstructing the development of genuinely socialist models of development. The left in both countries is being isolated while the bureaucratic elements are gainig increasing power. (Africa Development, Sept. '76. p.875)

Thus, while considerable differences exist within the Front-line states, they share a basic common Interest in wanting a quick solution in Zimbabwe and in standing to gain economically from the end of guerilla warfare. They constantly have to balance between imperialist pressure their inability to economically support a protracted guerilla war, and the need to be seen to be supporting the Zimbabwean people. Thus they end up publicly supporting the liberation struggle and providing aid with strings while being involved in behind the scenes manoeuvres with imperialism. This is reflected in the report that Kissinger was "continually boggled by the difference between the private and public statements of the Front line presidents". (Sunday Times. Britain Oct 3, 1976). This also explains their need to reject the specific terms of the Kissinger plan so blatantly favourable to white interests. This rejection was described as a "[unclear: tuatioal] move" designed to wrench more concessions from the white government rather than an attempt to close the door on negotiations. (Financial Times Britain, Sept, 27, 1976)

Russia's Role

It can be presumed that Russia would like to intervene in Zimbabwe in the way page 12 it did in Angola — i.e. by backing the grouping with popular support and being able to intervene to put it into power with heavy military aid.

Given that ZANU has always maintained that the Zimbabwean people must be their own liberators and therefore rejects reliance on outside forces, ZANU has never been receptive to Russian influence.

Historically therefore Russia supported ZAPU. However, since the recognition by the US of the threat the Zimbabwean struggle posed to imperialism's interests, it has been faced with the increasingly successful attempts of the US to draw Nkomo to their side. Nkomo a clever politician has been able to continue drawing aid from both.

In the present situation it appears that within ZIPA there are those who favour Russia and that the ZAPU section of ZIP A continues to get Russian aid. (Africa Development, Dec.'76 p. 1233).

Though Russia must realise that the historical process of British colonization in Zimbabwe has produced an economic social structure unsuitable for an Angola type intervention, it appears to be still attempting to vie with the US for influence within ZAPU/ZIPA, in the hope that the US strategy in Geneva fails.

Participants at the Talks Britain

Contrary to the impression conveyed in the Western press Britain is not a neutral arbiter. As the former colonial power and present representative of big business its task is to protect Western interests and to carry out the overall imperialist strategy given that the US having had no formal role in the colonisation of Zimbabwe cannot take a prominent part in negotiations.

Photo of Nkomo and Robert Mugabe

'Patriotic Front' leaders Nkomo (left) and Robert Mugabe.

Bishop Muzorewa — ANC (African National Council)

The African National Council emerged in 1971 out of the desire of ZANU and ZAPU members to form a united front to submit their rejection of the Pearce proposals for a settlement advocated by Britain at the time. Bishop Muzorewa was chosen as President and from that time has been seen by the Zimbabwean people as an expression of their desire for unity. When the false unity of the 1974 Unity Declaration was imposed he became President of the enlarged ANC (made up of ZAPU, ZANU, old ANC and Frolizi.) He was regarded as a compliant figure who could be manipulated into accepting imperialisms designs. This proved not to be the case due to the fact that he worked closely with Sithole ZANU's President, and following the failure of the Victoria Falls talks in August 1976 endorsed Sithole's plan to reorganise the army and intensify the armed struggle.

Inside Zimabawe the ANC is represented by three main groupings: 1. ZAPU; 2. a section of ZANU which recognises Nkomo as leader of the ANC and Mugabe as President of ZANU; 3. ZANU which recognises Muzorewa as leader of the ANC and Sithole as President of ZANU. The fact that the most senior representatives in Muzorewa's delegation at Geneva are ZANU and the fact that over 300 000 people welcomed Muzorewa home, clearly shows the mass support inside Zimbabwe for the Muzorewa/Sithole grouping. The Bishop's delegation also includes representatives of Frolizi, an externally based Zimbabwean organisation.

Sithole — ZANU

ZANU (Zimbabwean African National Union) was formed in 1964 when a militant group split from ZAPU frustrated by the leadership's reformist politics. ZANU maintained that armed struggle was the only method of transferring power from the settlercolonial regime to the African people. Under the leadership of its Chairman Herbert Chitepo and President Ndabaningi Sithole. ZANU grew into a mass movement and especially after the reorganisation of the party in 1969 began to transform the struggle into a people's war by its method of recruiting cadres and politicising the people. ZANU's position that the Zimbabwean people must be their own liberators, the strength of its army ZANLA which has always prosecuted the bulk of the armed struggle and the fact that within it was developing a grouping with a Marxist perspective meant it posed a serious threat to imperialism's neo-colonial strategy.

Events within ZANU since 1972 which led to the assassination of Chitepo and the killing of 500 ZANLA cadres in early 1975 and to the formation of ZIPA in late 1975 (see below) all show the attempt of imperialism and its allies (especially Kaunda) to crush ZANU as a movement. This was further evident in the fact that Sithole was not to be invited to the Geneva talks and was only there finally at the insistence of Muzorewa, due to pressure on him from the internal ANC/ZANU grouping.

NKOMO — ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union)

ZAPU under the leadership of Nkomo always had a reformist perspective and little real committment to armed struggle. Nkomo's desire for personal power was particularly revealed when though he had committed his party to membership of the enlarged ANC he attempted to pursue secret negotiations with Smith and on account of this was expelled from the ANC. He then held an 'ANC Congress" in Salisbury in Spet. 1975 to elect himself President. Smith provided free transport forthe "delegates" and welcomed Nkomo's election as the most "responsible" of the African leaders. Nkomo attempted negotiations with Smith up till March 1976 with a negotiating team that included a lawyer from Lonrho the powerful British multi-national with substantial interests in Southern Africa.

It is important to realise that though Nkomo fulfills all the conditions of a "moderate" leader his attempts to negotiate with Smith failed because of his obvious lack of credibility inside the country and because sufficient pressure had not yet been brought to bear upon Smith. His moves at this time though backed by imperialism and the Front-line states could not succeed because they were so blatantly in isolation from the ANC under Muzorewa and Sithole who had the support of the majority of the people and the new recruits to the army. Nkomo was the only Zimbabwean consulted by Kissinger on his round of "shuttle diplomacy" leading up to Geneva.

Robert Mugabe, — ZIPA

Robert Mugabe. Secretary General of ZANU, is at Geneva as the so called political spokesman of ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army). ZIPA was set up in November 1975 claiming to be a military front of ZAPU and ZANU.

The formation of ZIPA and the support given to it by the Front line states must be seen in the context of imperialisms strategy in Zimbabwe.

Given the failure of the Victoria Falls talks. Nkomo's lack of credibility and the fact that the ANC under Muzorewa and Sithole was not proving to be the easily manipulated body it was hoped the follwoing were necessary to ensure a negotiated settlement and a transition to neo-colonialism:
  • the armed struggle had to be in tensified to force Smith into a more realistic bargaining position over majority rule.
  • the influence of Sithole and Muzorewa had to be minimized as it was clear as things stood any settlement which didn't take them into account would not be acceptable to the Zimbabwean masses.
  • a "new" leadership had to be imposed which could claim to be leading the armed struggle but which would in reality be complaint to imperialist and Front line pressure.

Since its formation ZIPA has claimed to represent the fighting cadres and unity between ZAPU and ZANU yet it has continually had to be propped up by the Front-line states and there have been dissensions in the guerilla camps leading to the killing of those opposed to ZIPA.

It has also mounted a campaign to discredit Muzorewa and Sithole with accusations of corruption and abandoning the armed struggle. In this it was aided by the Front-line states who refused Muzorewa and Sithole access to the camps. Moreover the leadership of ZIPA was implicated by a Zambian Commission of Enquiry supported by Mozambique and Tanzania, as being involved in the assassination of Chitepo and the 500 Zanu cadres many of whom were part of the progressive tendency in ZANU that was developing a Marxist perspective.

These factors together with the consideration that it has been consciously fostered in the Western press all seem to indicate that ZIPA fulfills imperialism's need for a narrowly nationalist movement which will not in reality oppose a neo-colonialist solution.

While it cannot be doubted that there are within ZIPA cadres who desire a principled unity and liberation through armed struggle rather than imposed negotiations the leaderships of ZIPA and the events surruonding its formation, plus the fact that it has arisen precisely at the time when imperialism needs a quick solution, places it under considerable doubt as the genuine representative of the Zimbabwean people and the fighting cadres. The composition of ZIPA with 9 ZANU and 9 NZPU members in its High Command can only be seen as another attempt to destroy ZANU given that ZAPU comprises only 10% of the cadres and ZANU 90%. It is significant that Mugabe, while claiming to be the new President of ZANU, was anxiously seeking a postponement of the beginning of the Geneva talks to allow him time to get a delegation together. This would surely not have been necessary if the position he lays claim to had genuinely resulted from democratic processes within the party.

Moreover Mugabe has been joined at Geneva by other ZIPA/ZANU leaders named as guilty in the assassination of Chitepo but recently released after being found "innocent" by the Zambian Courts. Allied to this grouping is Josiah Tongogara who is portrayed as a powerful military figure. Recently news of his impending return to the camps sparked off a two week civil war between pro Sithole and pro-Mugabe factions, with the former bitterly opposed to his return.

Photo of BJ Vorster and Ivor Richard

Vorster with Ivor Richard (right) during the latter's African tour to 'solve' the Rhodesian problem.

The Patriotic Front

The credibility of ZIPA has been particularly thrown into question by the 'Patriotic Front" the alliance hastily formed by Mugabe and Nkomo for the Geneva talks. From Nkomo's point of view, this alliance with the supposed leader of the guerilla forces, is an attempt to overcome his lack of support within the army. From Mugabe's point of view the alliance with imperialism's favourite is an attempt to gain a prominent place for himself and his colleagues in any interim government that might be setup as a result of Geneva.

As was the case with ZIPA. the formation of the Patriotic Front was consciously fostered by the Front-line states in a further attempt to provide some form of cohesion that could be presented at Geneva. The alliance can thus only be seen as fulfilling imperialism's need transmitted through the Front line states, for its main choice (Nkomo) to appear to have the support of the army. It must also be seen as a further attempt to isolate and minimize the influence of Muzorewa and Sithole.

Progress of the Talks

After two months the talks have inevitably achieved little. Having agreed on a date for independence (March 1, 1976) they have been adjourned to allow another round of diplomacy during which the attempt will be to get enough compromises on the structure of an interim government for momentum to pick up in the New Year.

The talks are still foundering on the intransigence of Smith who seeing in the Kissinger plan the basis for maintaining white domination, is still regarding the structure of the interim government proposed in the plan as non-negotiable.

His hope is that the talks will break down and he will get outside aid including the lifting of sanctions, on the basis that they collapsed because of the "unreliability" of the black nationalists.

The Front-line states, though for reasons indicated wishing to see a quick solution, cannot at the mement compromise to the extent necessary to reach agreement with Smith.

On the question of the structure of the interim government an Anglo-American compromise has been hastily put together which involves a British Resident Commissioner and British officials holding the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order in the interim government.

The fact that the Patriotic Front has been pushing for a British presence indicates their willingness to go along with this compromise in their attempt to seize power.

It was reported that "unless South Africa is persuaded to force more concessions from Salisbury there is no hope of forming an interim government." (Australian, 14/12/76). Given Vorster's need in the face of continued upsurges in South Africa to pose as a statesman bringing "peace" to Southern Africa and to retain the support of US it can be expected he will bring such pressure to bear.

The leaders at Geneva Muzorewa, Mugabe, Sithole, Nkomo and the present ZIPA leadership — are not revolutionartes in their own right. However, it is only in the Muzorewa/Sithole coalition that the revolutionary movement will be allowed to develop without being physically eliminated.

Whether the talks succeed in setting up some sort of sham interim government or whether they break down, [unclear: necessitating] a further "detente" move in the near future, it is clear that any settlement reached under such conditions and as a result of the manoeuvring of a host of external influences in no way will represent self-determination for the Zimbabwean people.

This Article was reprinted from "Hakika", a news heet put out by the Southern African Liberation Centre, Sydney, Aust. Further information about this subject can be obtained from —

National Anti Apartheid Committee,

P.O. Box 9154,

Courtenay Place,

Wellington.