1. The Metaphysics, of Language of Abortion.

With any talk on subject, especially one involving philosophical analysis, one must be clear in what one is talking about. For example, one can of course define the words 'human being' to mean whatever one wishes, allow the category 'humanity' to include whatever one wants. Nature does not have the distinctions we use embedded in it, we impose them. Perhaps upon a certain suggestiveness, perhaps not; certainly for the explicit or implicit purposes we have. For the problem of when human life begins, there can be no settling by recourse to any empirical tests, there can't be such tests. This is a problem of language: what it is one means by one's terms, what it is one includes in one's categories.

One important language problem in discussion on abortion is that of the confusion of identifying 'human being' with moral being'. It doesn't follow simply from the fact that something is called 'hum-in being' that it has any official status: one assigns this, and not in metaphysics, one's description or attitudes about the world, but in ethics. Values are not found in the world as objects are, we impose them. Strongly, whether one regards the foetus as human or not is irrelevant to how one ethically regards or is to treat it.

2. The Ethics of Abortion.

(1) Upon first entering ethical discussion one must do tidying-up and specifying, more of the categories-game. But these categories are ethical ones, those of exclusion or inclusion in 'the moral universe': that set of things, not just objects, but moral agents, owing and being owed rights to each other. Having specified a moral universe one then produces or finds an ethical system (humanist, altruist, utilitarian), and then sets to work talking morality.

(2) People regard their pets and possessions, even institutions, as human in some degree, or they don't but treat them as if they figured importantly in the moral universe. If one includes the sygote-embryo-foetus (any or all) in this universe, then there are certain consequent obligations on one; if one doesn't, then perhaps other consequences. Let us consider the foetus is included. So, the killing of it amounts to homicide (murder or manslaughter). However, abortion as homicide is justifiable in various moral situations, depending on the ethical system; e.g. the principle of the lesser of two evils may be allowed in that system, the mother may have a precedence assigned by the system, the society may have rights (eugenic policies); even the child of later life too may have rights, protection from itself (as with some therapeutic abortions).

(3) The big question is not whether abortion is justifiable, it is depending on the system one uses; rather it is how many justifiable situations of abortion does one's system allow?

Of some groups of ethical systems:

—Humanist ethics, many situations are justifiable;

Christian ethics certainly regard many situations as justifiable (RC ethics as Christian also do—rather they could, many have inconsistent shorings-up to prevent this). For those systems not having the foetus in the moral universe, abortion is considered pragmatically, not morally.

If the foetus is included in the moral universe, it has absolute rights no more than do other moral agents. The rights it does have depend upon the ethical system with which one considers the situations of abortion.

(4) I hope it is reasonably clear what the sort of position any moral agent would be in if deciding, in terms of a system, about whether abortion is justified in some particular case. However, this is but a part of the ethical picture of abortion; the state, the society, is also involved with ethical things. From what one may do 'according to one's rights', to what one practically can or may do, is a leap into a broader area.

3. Ethics and Politics: Abortion Law Reform.

(1) For any society there can't be any one morality effectively and justly imposed on all (Calvin's City of God—Geneva was not for human beings); and in a secular, plural society we don't want any attempts to forge such a domination, as the price is invariably human suffering and loss of life, which we value highly. Abortion is a moral matter, what is to be the state's stand? One could say, if the society can't deal properly with ethical matters, as properly as they ought to be dealt with, then it shouldn't deal with them. This is extreme and ill-grounded fact. Societies deal fairly well with ethics, and the ethical element, if there, can't be avoided (with impunity). All political values, all values, have ethical aspects or ethical values bound with them.

If the state can't avoid them, how shall it deal with them? Very carefully. In the secular, plural society, the state is to seek an ethical base, not the one of the majority of its citizens, as this would be a political solution to the problem, and one resulting in the prohibition of the minorities acting freely as they deem but, rather one that ranges over ethical views (supra-ethical). The state, not having an ethic if not concerned to judge thoughts and views as wrong; rather it deals with accommodating the maximum of minorities and their beliefs with the majority. It looks not whether there is right or wrong but is concerned for the physical well-being and damage of its citizens.

(2) The state New Zealand, a reasonable approximation to the model of the secular plural society, does take a moral stance on abortion:

abortion is only legal when done (in good faith) for the preservation of the life and health of the mother.

It seems to be that the justification for this would be one proclaiming protection of the quantity of the citizenry: the foetus is implicitly assigned moral status, abortion is murder except in the situations where some citizens might squeal loudly, or can be said to have done so. Not good: the ethical matter of the state's role is avoided by making abortions reasonably easy, a political solution.

Of course, one can't blame politicians for making political solutions, rather for making poor ones or unjust ones. The politicians wish to avoid all political problems: they'll decide only when on the precipice. Should an ethical matter need solution, the politicians know they're on safe ground. With truth, mercy and justice, ethics is not to be criticized: its like waving the flag. If the citizens still hanker after justice, the politicans if minimally cunning (recently, they weren't even that) will avoid the sticky stuff and silence the lobbyists with cabinet decisions and other pragmatics. Preferably we want the state to have an ethical concern...

but on the supra-ethical level described above, a concern for the maximal accommodation and minimal harm to individuals and minorities.

(3) Here as one is concerned with pragmatic solutions to the supra-ethical problems, one can bring in facts. I shall bring in Durkheim. Given that the number of abortions for any society is roughly constant from year to year, and so abortions are the sorts of things which can be administered in hospitals, then it is the state's responsibility to see that there is a service provided which is the cheapest and safest available.

(4) In as much as the Remuera Clinic was providing this and had the finest counselling service in the land, the state ought to make sure the Clinic is at least allowed to continue in its present manner. Afterwards it ought to duplicate or promote clinics like the Remuera Clinic in other centres.

Inasmuch as there is a wide range of opinion as to the inclusion or exclusion of the foetus for the moral universe, and many different ethical systems, then the state must flee this area, and repeal legislation that enforces one view over another. No-one is suggesting that abortions be made compulsory in law; no-one is suggesting that doctors (especially any unprincipled ones) would leap upon a liberalization and be prescribing abortions as if asprin.

All these naughtinesses do not favour discussion but fragment it into the disjointed stating of opinions, leading only to inflaming of the guts-feeling of one's opponent, the satisfying of one's own convictions.

There can be a rational discussion if one wants it: in an issue as psychologically ramified as abortion can be, rational discussion can cease if prevented (when it does one then starts fighting). A rational examination of the ethical problem of abortion can even be therapeutic, it should be taken up.