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The Politics of Aid

The process of war and domination [unclear: not] merely the clash of arms on the [unclear: battlefield] but also involves subtle [unclear: strategies] to gain support and infl-[unclear: uence] people. For example, for the [unclear: to] continue the war in Vietnam, [unclear: support] must be won from both the [unclear: conservative] and reactionary elements [unclear: Vietnam] and the US, and from [unclear: those] who have a humanitarian conse[unclear: quence] about the suffering of the Vietnam [unclear: people]. The fears and prejudices of the [unclear: conservative] and reactionary are easily [unclear: prayed] on. Threats of the results of [unclear: non]-compliance in Vietnam, The im[unclear: portance] of a 'honda-culture' and the [unclear: benefits] of civilisation', to satisfy [unclear: growing] materialistic demands, and [unclear: especially] horror stories of the Vietcong [gap — reason: illegible][unclear: sily] remove any doubt in reaction[unclear: ary] minds.

More difficult, and more subtle [unclear: the] appeal to humanitarians for supp[unclear: ort]. Through aid and charity agencies, [unclear: is] support can be chanelled directly [unclear: back] up the military force. The US [unclear: government] aid is unashamedly keeping [unclear: Thieu] going, in fact, providing at least [gap — reason: illegible][unclear: 0%] his total budget, but there is [unclear: ther] aid, both from governmental and pr[unclear: ivate] sources, that unwittingly serves [unclear: the] same purpose.

NZ's contribution under the [unclear: Labour] Government of such items as [unclear: Police] boat hulls 'to prevent smuggling' [gap — reason: illegible][unclear: very] easy to see through. Other aid [unclear: more] devious in its mode of operat[unclear: ion].

After the Paris Agreement of Jan. [unclear: 1973], the Nixon Administration was [unclear: constrained] by a defiant Congress in [unclear: the] amount of 'humanitarian' aid that [unclear: could] contribute. The response was [unclear: to] crank up funds from the semi-govern[unclear: ent] multilateral 'aid' agencies, all to [unclear: various] degrees under the thumb of [unclear: Washington,] to bolster the Thieu econ[unclear: omy] and the programme of repression. [unclear: The] Asian Development Bank, the International Development Association, the World Bank and the Agency for International Development were enlisted to pump funds into Saigon.

The voluntary agencies have an even less obvious but never the less just BS important role to play. The Inodchina Resource Centre, an American based organisation conducted a recent survey into the almost twenty voluntary agencies operating in Vietnam. World Vision, subject of some recent criticism from MP Russell Marshall, is one of these agencies. The report summarises: 'Generally we found that the more an organisation professed its 'strictly humanitarian, non-partisan character' the more dubious were its operations and the more investigation required. Often an agency was up to its neck in activities of a highly partisan, political nature, without the full understanding or consent of its home constituency or even some of the field personnel. Not suprisingly, these involvements tended to to correspond to the interests and involvements of the US Government.'

The humanitarian appeal has an obvious draw. The charity is immediate and direct. A suffering victim, innocent of the activities of war and politics is helped by someone in a more fortunate position. But as the Indochina Resource Centre report continues ... 'a century of foreign intervention in Vietnam and the resulting struggles chaos and death have made ever the simplest motions of daily existence pregnant with political choice. Humanitarian donations of aid, coming from those with purely sympathetic good intentions, help alleviate the difficulties of daily existence, but also force the political choice, not always immediately apparent.

Generous giving can thus naively contribute to the support of a political system. This can either arise through a continued naivety in the policies of the aid agencies, or a deliberately chosen political policy of the organisation that is not necessarily communicated down to the supporters. This has meant that 91% of all the aid from voluntary agencies has gone to US. Thieu controlled areas. Ironically both the US Government military and aid budgets go to the same side, A survey conducted by the Indochina Resource Centre in 1973 showed that: 'Of the 35 US voluntary agencies then carrying on some degree of work in Vietnam, not more than four sent assistance to persons in North Vietnam or the PRG zone, of South Vietnam. This, despite the fact that the worst bombing, artillery shelling, ground fighting and defoliation occurred in precisely those areas. In short, voluntary agencies chose to give the least assistance where it was most needed.' No amount of proclamation that Vietcong' prisoners are also treated without bias by medical team personnel can hope to change that discrimination.

The purposes to which the funds are put also reveal this bias. Catholic Relief Services 'co-operated in a plan to raise the salaries of Saigon combatants. At the bequest of General William Westmoreland, CRS contributed vast amounts of food and clothing to army personnel and dependents. Seven eighths of all food distributed by CRS in South Vietnam in 1967 went for this purpose'.

The strategic hamlet programme designed to separate the 'fish from the sea' i.e. the political activists from the people, insidiously relied on humanitarian aid given in good faith for relief of suffering. The military forcefully herded these people into concentration camps, where they were then reliant totally and degradingly on aid for shelter, food and clothing.

In the late 1960's some groups became critical of the politics surrounding their role. International Voluntary Services were forced out as a result of this criticism in 1971. Most other groups continued to operate in the same cosy manner as in the past, in the strategic hamlets, providing intelligence and allowing Saigon to continue issuing military statements about how such and such aid was 'concrete proof of international solidarity and understanding'.

Not only was the situation in Vietnam adversely affected but an image was created for external consumption. As the report states 'Lacking intimate association with patriotic Vietnamese or the vibrant history of Vietnam, returning volunteers often tended to communicate or reinforce an image of Vietnamese farmers who were simple and politically neutral, who merely wanted to be 'left alone by both sides' to till their rice fields. It was a mistake that even the most perceptive aliens, Chinese, French, Japanese and Americans had each paid for in blood in their own times'.

The sentiments of the patriotic Vietnamese are entirely different. Wilfred Burchett, the Australian journalist, spoke of this matter to Salient on his visit to NZ in April 1973. He said, 'I can quote the words of Pham Van Dong when I spoke to him at the beginning of February. They're absolutely determined to remain masters of their own house and to rebuild in their own way, with their own plans and with their own people. 'Masters of their own house', that was the key phrase he used. They don't want multilateral aid from international agencies at all because they consider them to be very dangerous sorts of organisations, and they've studied what's gone on in other countries, which apparently gained their independence only to lose it economically. They want bilateral aid. What they really need are freely disposable funds on which there are absolutely no conditions attached whatsoever'.