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Salient. Victoria University Student Newspaper. Volume 38, Number 7. 15 April 1975

Indochina Today — Vietnam: The Triumph of People's War

page 9

Indochina Today

Vietnam: The Triumph of People's War

In recent weeks the people's liberation armed forces in south Vietnam have rapidly extended the area of control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). Press reports indicate that by the end of the first week of April at least 18 provinces and more that 75% of south Vietnam had been liberated completely.

Following uprisings in the Central Highlands and heavy defeats in set-piece battles in Quang Tri province, Thieu was forced to pull out of the strategic provinces of Darlac, Kontum and Pleiku. What was meant to be an orderly withdrawal to set up shorter defence lines rapidly turned into a rout.

Major cities like Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Quang Ngai were liberated in short order, with the Saigon troops other retreating in great confusion or going over to the people's side with their weapons. In Hue at least 10,000 were captured without a fight. In some places the puppet troops abandoned their positions faster that the people's army could capture them.

Popular uprisings have played an important part in the swift victories. At Da Nang the people of the area engaged in political work, urging Saigon officers and soldiers not to fight and die for an unjust cause. The people helped deserters and those who rose up against diehard officers. The people worked to prevent the destruction of public utilities. Within hours of its liberation, Da Nang's water and electricity systems were functioning normally and order and security were established rapidly.

What has happened in south Vietnam recently is the simultaneous application of the final phases of people's war. The encirclement of the main cities by the countryside, essentially by local guerrillas and regional forces, had reached such a degree that the regular forces had only to hit key points — such as Ban Me Thuot — and Thieu's house of cards collapsed. Encirclement is being replaced by seizure of the cities. For example, in Pleiku and Knotom provinces Thieu has controlled only the provincial capitals for years.

The recent fighting marks the defeat of Thieu's strategy of 'special uprising', about which our local press, so vocal about orphans and refugees, has said nothing. Since the beginning of the year Thieu has engaged in a campaign of intensified attacks against the PRG zone of control, marked primarily by bombing and artillary raids as well as ground assaults against villages and hamlets from the Northern province of Thua Thien to the southern My Tho province in the Mekong delta. This campaign had full support, arm shipments having been stepped up since early 1975. Several hundred Air Force personnel were sent to assist Saigon's logistics and aircraft maintenance.

In the people's war what is crucial is not so much the territory gained but the destruction of the enemy army. It is people and not weapons which are decisive in warfare. With its low morale resulting from serving US aggression, the brutality and corruption of its leading officers, the Saigon army is crumbling rapidly.

Desertion rates were already running at 24,000 per month (more than 25% of the Saigon army annually) before the present fighting. At the end of March more than one third of the puppet army had completely disintegrated, most of the crack troops having been put out of action in the very first days of fighting.

Equipment totalling more that US $1,000 million has been lost to the PRG. A total of 600 trucks, 400 jeeps, 255 M l13 armoured personnel carriers, 60 M48 tanks, 150 105mm howitzers and 60 155mm howitzers were left behind intact by the Saigon troops, according to US sources. In addition vast quantities of weapons were lost by the ranger and militia forces which just melted away.

In contrast the people's army has remained in strength having taken few casualties in the fighting. Its main force is standing ready to drive towards Saigon from all directions — from Tay Ninh province, the Delta and from north of Saigon — if it should be necessary.

The Paris agreement is still the solution to the Vietnam problem. If Thieu and his US masters had not consistently violated the Paris agreement from the day it was signed, the war would have ended long ago. If democratic rights had been given the people of the Saigon controlled areas, if the 200,000 political prisoners had been freed and if Thieu had agreed to form the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, the fighting would have ended.

The PRG showed great restraint in dealing with the Thieu regime. For nine months it avoided large-scale fighting, often giving up liberated territory to try and facilitate the implementation of the Paris agreement. It advanced many logical and reasonable proposals at the negotiating table to settle south Vietnam's internal affairs in the spirit of national reconciliation and national concord.

It was not until October 18, 1974 that the PRG came to the conclusion that it could no longer deal with the Thieu regime and called for its overthrow and replacement by a new Saigon administration which would agree to responsibly implement the provisions of the Paris agreement.

The PRG still considers itself bound by the Paris agreement. Where it has liberated cities, the PRG has moved to form local administrations which include elements from the Third Force former Saigon Functionaries who have broken with the Thieu clique. It still envisages a national coalition government composed of three equal parts/segments, the PRG, a new Saigon government without Thieu or his present supporters, and a third force element Such a coalition government will give effect to the basic political provisions of the Paris agreement.

In the newly liberated areas the PRG has put forward a ten-point programme which includes guarantees of freedom of religion, private property and equality of sexes. PRG officials are not to 'encroach upon even a needle or thread of the people'. Officials of the Saigon regime can continue at their posts provided they genuinely break with Thieu and come over to the people, And foreigners working in their areas, including Americans, are able to continue their work provided they are not saboteurs or spies. For example, the doctor who was head of the Bau Me Thout Public Health Department under the Thieu regime continues to serve the health needs, of the people of Bau Me Thuot although now under the PRG regime.

Vietnam has come to yet another crossroad. For its part the PRG will continue to annihilate the Saigon army and consolidate its position in the newly liberated areas. It will continue its call for the overthrow of the Nguyen Van Thieu clique and its replacement by an administration willing to implment seriously the Paris agreement which embodies the Vietnamese people's desire for peace, independence and national concord.

The US response is the big question. The Ford administration has reaffirmed its determination to persue the war. Huge military supplies are being airlifted into Saigon. Two aircraft carriers, many helicopters and marines have been dispatched to Indochina. Ford has called on Congress for a further billion dollars worth of aid.

Representing that section of the US ruling class wanting to cut its losses, the US Congress is in no mood to respond and this will constrain the Ford administrations ability to manoeuvre.

Whatever happens the United States will not be able to reverse the movement towards complete national liberation set in motion by the Paris agreement.

Despite the dispatch of more than 600,000 ground troops, the Seventh Fleet, tens of thousands of planes and helicopters, attempted ecocide, the dropping of nearly 8 million tons of bombs and expenditure of nearly 200,000 million US dollars in direct military spending, the US failed to force the Vietnamese to their knees. On the contrary, the Vietnamese smashed the special war tactics of 1960-65, the open-ended escalation of the Johnson administration in the Tet Offensive and the Vietnamisation programme in the Easter offensive of 1972.

If the United States should recommit troops to south Vietnam, under whatever pretext, even heavier defeats await it on the battlefield. With their political and military line, the Vietnamese people will win!

Provincial boundaries Areas controlled by the Republic of Vietnam, Areas controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government. CAMBODIA SOUTH CHINA SEA