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Salient: Victoria University of Wellington Students' Newspaper. Volume 31 Number 19 August 6, 1968

Che Guevara — A Vindication

page 5

Che Guevara

A Vindication

Shortly before Che Guevara was murdered at the hands of the Bolivian dictatorship in October last year, he wrote: "Now that the imperialists are blackmailing humanity with the threat of war, not to fear war is the fitting response".

These are typical words from one of the finest communist revolutionaries the world has known—outspoken and directly to the point. However, guerrila warfare in Latin America has met with mounting criticism in the last few years from various points of view within the world communist movement.

The purpose of this article is to explain the strategy espoused by Guevara, and to present a balanced criticism of it, that is. the attitude of the Fourth International. Grave criticisms can rightly be made of Guevara, but when the point of publicly-stated dissociation, or opposition, is reached, then those elements which do this (Maoists, Stalinists, Spartacists), cease to have any resemblance to Marxists.

There are, I believe, four characteristics of the objective conditions in Latin America which prompted Guevara to adopt his particular theoretical position and course of action:

(a) The state of the labour movement. Although many claim to be Marxists, the trade union leaders merely form a 'labour aristocracy'—dedicated to short-term goals and entirely opportunistic and unprincipled in their pursuit of these goals.

The working class parties arc also bureaucratic and opportunistic—many go so far as to openly oppose the guerrillas, as did the pre-revolutionary Communist Party in Cuba, and as today do the Venezuelan C.P. in their opposition to the guerilla Douglas Bravo. Their collaboration with the existing order is thinly disguised by calls for the 'mass line' and 'unity'.

(b) The failure of "armed self-defence". It is a well-known I act that the power of the U.S.A. today is tremendous, and that it will be used wherever necessary in underdeveloped countries to "keep down Communism"— which means ruthless suppression of any worker and peasant uprisings, especially in Latin America. To combat this, a special strategy is essential; as Regis Debray said: "in order to destroy one army, another army is necessary. Fraternity and bravery do not make an army".

Fraternity and bravery are certainly there —one example is the Bolivian tin-miners' strike in 1965 (1). In former strikes the miners had defended themselves, with a militia, dynamite etc., but the viciousness of the American-backed regime was exposed when it sealed off the tin-mining zones, and attacked the workers with infantry, machine guns and aerial bombardment, killing hundreds of workers and their families indiscriminately. Something beyond "armed self-defence" is obviously required . . .

(c) The weakness of the Latin American working class. A socialist revolution cannot be set in motion without the backing of, and involves the accession to power of, the working class—especially the industrial proletariat engaged in large scale manufacturing. This is because their state of exploitation, their "socialised" form of work (contrasting with the dictatorial control over them by the owners and managers), and their spiritual alienation from their work all cry out for an end to the system of private property that holds them, and all mankind, down.

However, in Latin America the proportion of workers employed in the manufacturing sector is small, and is hardly growing at all. Combined with phenomenal population growth this means widespread unemployment, more competition and a pressure towards individual self-seeking on the workers. As well as this a very high proportion of workers are self-employed or in family enterprises, and class-eonsciouness develops very slowly. It is a mistake to think that the Latin American working class is independantly capable of making the "workers revolution. (2)

(d) The revolutionary potential of the peasantry. The peasantry in Latin America have only recently experienced backwardness and domination by reactionary religious customs and beliefs. They are also easily demoralised and disoriented if their uprisings are beaten down. They also show an amazing capacity for changes in political behaviour. from playing nto the hands of urban bourgeois politicos with their promises of 'land reform', to indulging in sustained outbursts of unorganised violence, as happened in Columbia in 1948.

However, they are generally more exploited, and capable of displaying revolutionary aspirations as strong as the workers, though theirs is a petty-bourgeois, not a socialist, revolutionary consciousness. they aspire to egalitarian land ownership and the break-up of large estates.

Even when their ideological inhibitions and sociological divisions are overcome, and .a peasant-based regime is set up, it cannot inaugurate economic growth because the peasant system of production is incapable of producing the required surplus for investment. The regime cannot afford to rid itself completely of the foreign capitalists, who can usually manage to worm then way hack in, with the aid ol locals dissatised with popular government.

Despite all these weaknesses, Guevara said that "under revolutionary and very coherent ideological direction, or under international circumstances which encourage the expansion of the objectives of resolutions initiated for more limited purposes, the peasant class can become a genuine ally and a most rigorous supporter of a deep and total revolution" (3), The question of Latin America became clearcut: "Either a socialist revolution, or a caricature of a revolution", he said.

For Guevara, the means of overcoming these difficulties was, as we know, through guerilla warfare.

The scheme goes something like this. A small guerilla group (not more than 50 men), sets itself up in a carefully selected region, close to the most dissident of the peasantry and yet out of reach of the repressive forces. At first the guerilla group is only concerned with establishing itself and surviving: counter-insurgency experts are well aware that this is the best time to knock it out, before it makes any progress in mobilising the inhabitants.

At this stage the group must be cut off from them, in order to avoid their own betrayal and reprisals being taken against the peasants. They first make their presence known by a sudden attack on the military or on a big landlord.

This 'armed propaganda' cannot but catch the peasants' attention. A few will realise which side is which and some recruits will be cautionsly enlisted. As soon as it is strong enough to shelter a district from reprisal raids by the repressive forces, the band can enter a village, explain the revolution to the people, establish the vital contacts, and enlist a few more recruits.

Gradually, through ever more audacious and widespread attacks more peasants will be drawn into the movement: eventually it is able to split up into two or more columns. and new 'foci' of operations can be created. This distracts more and more of the repressive forces, and permits spontaneous uprisings of the peansants in take place with a measure of impunity—the limitations of armed self-defence are gradually lessened.

Later the guerilla forces become strong enough to establish a fixed base of operations; they will no longer be purely nomadic. Workshops, hospitals and a radio station are established, permitting the formation of a standing army of the people, aided by nationwide propaganda.

The revolutionary determination of the guerilla leaders is proved by deeds: immediately land reform is begun in the base area and the peasant is given something definite and tangible to light for. Mobilisation of the masses snowballs as the guerilla army engages in frontal attacks on the repress forces who become by this stage easily memoralised by attacks on all sides, Country towns can be taken.

The lead taken by the guerillas encourages the long oppressed masses; the sight of victory enables .a powerful release of revolutionary enthusiasm, which in turn strengthens the confidence and audacity of the leadership. At no stage do the peasants push aside these leaders. Finally capture of the big cities is made possible by a workers' insurrection, and with the vast majority of popular support, the guerilla leaders become the new government.

This has provided, says Guevara, three fundamental lessons: "(I) Popular forces can win ;•. war against the army. (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist: the insurection can create them. (3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting".

It would appear also that the four problems I outlined earlier have been overcome. since the vanguard of the proletariat is in power, that is a rudimentary 'worker state' is set up.

Some of the most spurious criticisms of guerilla warfare may now be dispensed with.

"Elitist 'rural war' is one such criticism (5). Guevara's theory and practice show that "it is important to emphasise that guerilla war is a war of the masses, a war of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves".

It is only 'elitist' insofar as (1) initially separation from the people is tactically neccssary in the objective military situation, and (2) leadership is kept in the hands of the guerilla leaders in order to prevent purely peasant (petty-bourgeois) leaders from taking over and converting the revolution into an armed peasant uprising.

Another phrase is "adventurism"(6). The failure of Guevara in Bolivia is now a standard argument supporting this. But in the context of world imperialism and Latin American reaction today, one runs a huge risk whichever way one goes about revolution.

Guerilla war, despite its huge casualty rate especially in the formative stage, is probably safer in the long run than any 'putschist' or insurrectional activities in the cities. Guevara risked his life on many occasions before finally being captured; guerrilla war is dangerous, but to dare all is to conquer all.

The guerilla movement is by some 'Marxists' labelled 'petty bourgeois'. Of course its basis is petty-bourgeois (the peasantry) but it is not in the least inevitable that the leadership be so(7).

In fact most guerrilla leaders in Latin America today consider themselves Marxists, (and in Bolivia Trotskyists have taken guerilla initiatives).

Even if the guerilla movement in Cuba has led to distinct elements of populism, over-centralisation in economic planning, and a prohibition of guerilla factions, the guerilla leaders were well to the left of the Stalinist leaders of the working class, and were not afraid to move stop by step and without hesitation to a workers' state, in response to the reaction of local and American capitalism. No hypothesis about the 'petty bourgeois' guerillas can possibly explain this.

The relationship between Guevara and the Fourth International is one of fraternal critical support.

Guevara, unfortunately, tends to ignore the character of the workers' uprising and takes it for granted that there will be one. In Cuba it was left to the Stalinists to implant their notions of socialism—little more than centralised economic planning and improved living and working conditions.

Guevara fails to mention that socialism entails participant planning, not bureaucratic planning and authoritarian, almost capitalistic labour relations. He is unaware of the dangers of underdeveloped socialist consciousness of the workers—bureaucratic benevolence and something of a personality cull of the leadership.

Photo of Che Guevara

It is very easy and tempting for the leaders to adopt these means, but if they remain a moment longer than is necessary. they become a letter upon the free self-realisation of every individual with his fellows, the goal of socialism.

However Guevara, unlike some of the other Cuban leaders, never bent to Soviet pressure to the extent of attacking Latin American Trotskyism and he specifically expressed regret when told of the arrest of Hugo Blanco.

The Trotskyist Blanco, in the particular situation existing in Peru, saw the need to develop peasant unions as a prerequisite to and the development of a militia whose functions would approximate in the long run to Guevara's guerilla force.

In Bolivia the Trotskyists concentrated their effort in the tin-mines' union organisation but when the American-backed military junta c.ushed resistance there. Cesar Lora—a miners' leader-started up a guerilla front. Unhappily the military forces were able to crush this force fairly quickly.

As the guerrillas say, the independence and self-direction of their movement is vital for tactical reasons, but this does not mean that coordination with workers is therefore secondary.

In fact the problems of coordination are even more crucial because of the influence among the urban working masses of Stalinism, which must be smashed, never ignored.

Che Guevara and Regis Dehray take too much from the Cuban revolutionary experience It is a plain fact that in Cuba there was a much lower level of urbanisation than in most of Latin America today, and Cuba had a large class of extremely depressed landless peasants.

In a few countries the peasants have had the benefits of some land reform (e.g. Mexico and Bolivia) and in others urbanisation is so advanced that guerrilla warfare is an extremely remote possibility (e.g. Chile and Argentina).

Guevara's Guerilla Warfare and Debray's Revolution in the Revolution? appear as recipes, but they must not.be used is such. Any movement that does not start from a concrete analysts of a concrete situation is doomed.

Genuine socialist revolution requires revolutionary leadership in all of its sectors. guerilla, worker and peasant.

In reaction to Guevara's "guerillaist" tendency there is the equally one-sided tendency to advocate "workers' revolutions', the tendency of the Spartacists. The proletariat needs all the help it can get. especially in the most underdeveloped countries of Latin America.

If the peasantry fail to respond, then they must be mobilised. It is purely sectarian to insist, as the Spartacists do. that the workers' revolution is "their job" If there is no armed snuggle, then the revolutionaries must make it, according to the laws of armed struggle, and this, for most of Latin America, means guerilla war on Guevara's lines(9).

Che Guevara personified the internationalist spirit. An Argentinian, he joined in the struggle in Guatemala before joining Fidel Castro training in Mexico. He was one of the foremost figures in the Cuban revolution and held high office in the Cuban government until 1965. when he resigned all his posts.

Next he joined Tshombe's group fighting white mercenaries in the Congo, Me took part in several battles, and after nine months returned to Cuba. Then he went to Bolivia where he was eventually murdered.

The spectacle of a self-styled revolutionary pedantically decrying the dead Guevara for his shortcomings I find particularly hideous.

In no way must this article he construed to mean either that I advocate guerilla warfare in New Zealand, or that I am more interested in Latin American than New Zealand events.

There are two things that I hope can be learnt from what I have said.

Firstly, the position and method adopted by Trotskyism the Fourth International). which aims at forthright criticisms of. and wholehearted support for, all revolutionary tendencies.

Secondly, on balance, We consider Guevara to be one of the great revolutionaries of this century. Even if he did have some theoretical limitations, his moral conduct was such that his commitment to the struggle was absolute; there was no dichotomy between his principle and his practice.

For us in New Zealand, this is the most important lesson that the Che Guevara can teach us.

(1) Debray blames the choice of the strike tactic upon the Trotskyists. who, he claims oppose guerilla warfare. But Livio Maitan in defending the Trotskyist position of the Fourth International (International Socialist: Review (N.Y.), Sept.-Oct. 1967). points out that Debray is confusing that body with the followers of the ultra-left sectarian J Posadas: Maitan did attempt to establish a guerrilla group.

(2) The American Spartacist League, which broke with the Fouth International on this issue of guerilla war. maintain that such a revolution is possible, citing as one of the few empirical bases for this dogmatic, purely 'theoretical' carry-over from European experience, the rapid urbanisation and high percentage of wage labour in the labour force Sec Spartacist No. 11. p. 11 (March-April 1968).

(3) This was also the empirical basis of the Bolshevik tactic in 1917: "The proletariat leads the peasantry, draws it into the movement. gives it an interest in the success of its plans".—Trotsky in The Permanent Revolution.

(4) Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, p. 15

(5) Sparlacist. (March-April 1968) p. 8. This is also a favourite cliche of the Maoists (See. e.g. Progressive Labour (N.Y.) March-April 1968).

(6) See e.g. Spartacist, No. 11, and a reprint from Pravda (The mouthpiece of Stalinism) in World Outlook (N.Y.) Nov. 10 1967.

(7) The Spartacists make this mistake. It springs from a shallow notion of Marx's concept of human nature. Class character. social environment, is substituted for the totality of man's being: that man is rational and moral is by-passed, and a position off sociological determinism is reached. Guevara becomes a "petty-bourgeois rebel", and Bolivar becomes a bourgeois-landlord-statesman" (the latter according to the Socialist Labour League, an English group of ultraleft sectarians). It is forgotten than Lenin was a "landlord", and Engels a "manufacturer". (See Hansen, in I.S.R., Nov.-Dec. 1967, p. 4).

(8) The Fourth International is the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938.

(9) That is why the Fourth International gives its unequivocal support to the Venezuelan guerilla chief Douglas Bravo, in spite of his theoretical shortcomings. Spartacists, on the other hand, adopt the pedantic posture, and use his theoretical shortcomings as an excuse to oppose him.

—Hugh Fyson