Nuclear war

5	A general nuclear war.

This list is not exhaustive. Nor is it in order of probability. One stage could rapidly move into another. However, it illustrates the variety of threats for which we have to plan. The commonest sort of war in the nuclear age is the relatively small, but still possibly serious, brushfire type, fought with conventional weapons in a limited area like Vietnam. The biggest power's have been marginally or centrally involved in most of them.

America's interest has been, predominantly, the containment of Communism while it turns from the ideological society to the managerial society, as it appears to be doing in Russia. This, naturally, will take rather longer in an underdeveloped country like China, so America is following a policy which could be very long-term and possibly self-defeating. So America is likely to be involved, with us. in most of the ideological wars coming up.

Britain sees her military role in Asia, as anywhere, as being more a peace-keeping one. Here again, with the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, we could be involved in a foreign war. Britain's main advantage as an ally in this area is that she is likely to be able to police the main searoutes.

In short, our present lack of flexibility in our defensive arrangements and forces makes us less, not more, safe than we would otherwise be because it causes us to be so intimately tied in with the major powers. Little powers are always unwise to place their faith entirely in big powers. Big powers have many conflicting interests. For Britain and America, many of these do not relate to Asia at all. For instance, take this hypothetical case. Russia wishes to fulfill some modest ambition in. say. Asia, so to keep American involvement at a minimum she starts a threatening build-up around Berlin.

It is this kind of balanceof-threat situation, going on all the time, which could act on us like a vice. With four nuclear powers in this areaChina. America. Russia and Britain—and with French nuclear submarines now being, perfected, the situation has its complications. Imagine Japan land India both producing weapons and delivery systems.

The short-term answer to New Zealand's defence problems is complicated by the serious situation of our overseas reserves. All our material purchases require dollars and sterling. But in the long term, our spending could be at least brought in line with that of Australia's on a per capita basis. How it would be spent is a tricky matter. If we really committed ourselves to fielding a joint team with Australia, obviously the more complementary the weapons the less the strain on logistics.