New Zealand has a very small war-machine. Could it, in all seriousness, do what presumably it is meant to do: defend us? Do we possess in our treaties and forces a comprehensive all-risks lowpremium coverage?

Defence in New Zealand, except when we're actually fighting, never seems like a life and death matter. It always has a low priority. Two weeks ago, a sum of about £25 million allocated for capital spending on defence last year was. apparently, returned to the Consolidated Fund, unspent. No orders were placed because, in tightening up the economy, defence is one area where saving can apparently be made.

Our isolation and complete lack of sense of threat produces this funny attitude. As against comparative "developed" countries we now rank among the smallest anywhere as an armed power.

We give very little time and emphasis to our military capability. This is both the cause and the result of an excessive dependency on our present large allies, Britain, America and Australia. This might prove some day to be a dangerous and vicious circle.

First, our lack of arms against what will prove to be not a small but a very big threat to get this far. involves us in our present three treaties. These assume that our national interest which we are defending goes beyond our shores to the minor allies in Asia, and to general stability in the area. Fair enough. But second, we are involved in three treaties — SEATO. ANZUS, ANZAM—all three of which could be invoked at once, all three of which could involve a substantial number of our forces at a very distant incident, and any one of which could involve us gradually in a very big war.

So our few forces mean three treaties and substantial obligations to fight which we (couldn't do. without, say. conscription. Reverse the argument, build up the forces in alliance with Australia to give us safety and flexibility of response, and we could rehash or even scrap the treaty system.

Australia. Britain and the USA are each tied by treaty to come to our defence. In exactly what situations they would do so is rather up to them. The wording of the treaties can be taken in at least two ways. However, as we are unlikely to be beseiged or invaded in isolation, each power will probably be fighting long before we're hit. Except for the vulnerability of the sea-lanes, our isolation from Asia, the only area which really threatens, makes the treaties quite excessive for almost all conceivable situations.

Unfortunately, for the price of our treaties, we are substantially committed to fighting in other people's wars. The direct relevance of. say, a war in East Asia to ourselves is usually interpreted by a process vague to the point of absolute inpenetrability. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that either Britain or America, on whom we now rely for help in our defence, will stay indefinitely in the area. With an end to the war in Vietnam, and a new administration in Washington, the Americans might be very glad to start pulling out.