With the death of Mr. Nehru earlier this year, the world has lost a statesman of the highest calibre. There are not many world leaders who have thought as deeply as he did about the philosophy and methodology of international relations; and still fewer who, having thought, have striven honestly to put into practice their ideas. His philosophy was noble and honest; his methods gave the promise of a world without war.

India's foreign policy was the direct responsibility of Nehru. Since the 1930s he was the Congress Party's spokesman on foreign affairs, and his authority remained unchallenged, since he combined the External Affairs portfolio with the Prime Ministership. Parliament and the Press gave general approval to his actions, both being Congress dominated.

The Foreign Service, another potential source of opposition in a democracy to the policy of the External Affairs minister, was also behind Nehru.

In fact the only possible challenger to Nehru's supremacy was Krishna Menon, and even he had no motive for attempting to formulate an independent line. He was an intimate friend of Nehru's from the 1930s, and the policy he put forward when he was India's delegate to the UN, was Nehru's, though his methods were certainly more vigorous. Menon alienated many in America by his apparent left wing views, but he is no Communist, and shared Nehru's devotion to Indian interests. He was very much a junior partner to Nehru, and we may safely say that the sole responsibility for Indian foreign policy rested with Nehru.

Coexistence

Overriding all other objects of Indian policy is that of peaceful coexistence. Nehru was not interested in war except in very limited circumstances, for peace served his interests best. India was, and is dependent on foreign investment for economic development. Aside from international lending agencies, this foreign investment comes from the USA. Russia, and Britain—the three countries most likely to be involved in any world war. War would cut off completely this flow of capital, and India's great leap forward would limp painfully to a halt. Nehru's chief aim therefore was to preserve world peace.

While one cannot answer for Mr. Chou's motives, these principles were an undoubted assertion of Nehru's faith in fundamental human goodness—faith which lay at the very heart of all his actions, at home or abroad.

It was Nehru's aim to encourage other nations to subscribe to these principles, thus widening the area of peace and lessening the chances of international conflict. Several Asian countries have in fact done so among them Laos. The Panch Shila are a logical continuation of Gandhi's independence-winning technique of satyagraha or nonviolent non-co-operation, which in its turn was a natural outgrowth of the innately peaceful philosophies of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Non-Alignment

Thus Nehru had a philosophy of foreign relationships. In practice this became the policy of non-alignment. This is not a passive, hand-washing denial of responsibility in international affairs, but, at its best, a crusade for peace. Dynamic neutralism is perhaps a better name for it; the taking of an independent line, not the avoidance of involvement.

Towards the East Nehru was frequently a little too conciliatory for the Americans; but the reason for this seems quite sound. Totalitarian states suppress almost all internal criticism, whereas a democracy works in its continual atmosphere. It follows therefore that Russia and China are more likely to react adversely to it. The East needs humouring while the West does not. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, geography has given India a 2000-mile boundary with Communism. You do not antagonise unnecessarily neighbours much stronger than yourself.

However Nehru's insistence on contin u i n g Commonwealth membership and the core belief in Western institutions, as expressed in the democratic nature of the Indian constitution, gave him equally strong reasons for remaining on friendly terms with the West.

Although Nehru, and indeed most educated Indians, were impressed in the 1930s by Russia's rapid modernisation, they did not approve of the means. Force, violence, compulsion—all these were diametrically opposed to the Gandhian technique of satyagraha. Apparently good ends reached by bad means always turn out to be bad when you attain them. Thus Nehru sought alliance with the East as little as with the West.

Newly-Independent Nations

The newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia presented a special challenge to Nehru. They were obvious candidates for inclusion in the area of peace. From the historic Asian Relations Conference which he summoned in Delhi shortly before independence in 1947, Nehru provided intelligent leadership for the third world.

Other conferences have followed. Their proceedings have been studied with anxious concern in the capitals of both East, and West. Perhaps the most important of the early conferences was that held at Bandung in 1955, at which, sponsored by Nehru. Red China made its debut into international politics. Twenty-nine Afro-Asian countries met around the conference table for the first time and although nothing permanent emerged, were successful in focussing attention on Asian consciousness. Furthermore, it was one of the chief factors making possible the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955.

As a world statesman, Nehru was conspicuously successful. What he said mattered very much to the Afro-Asian nations to whom he provided a leadership lacking elsewhere. The aggressively nationalistic policies of Sukarno. Nasser, and Nkrumah held little appeal against Nehru's apparent peacefulness and sincerity; and they were unable to match his sense of timing or his skilful reading of the international situation.

Important

In East and West, as well as middle, Nehru's views were important. Since he led uncommitted opinion, and influenced uncommitted votes in the UN, what he said about the trouble spots of the world had wide repercussions, and therefore received careful scrutiny.

Of course attempts have been made, and are still being made, to influence Indian opinion, and the results have been highly profitable in terms of foreign aid. The USA has been the largest contributor but the communist bloc is catching up fast. An uncommitted opinion is worth wooing. But the opinion has not yet been won.

However, Nehru's pronouncements on international problems meant little when he was faced with uncomfortable reality on the frontiers of India. He may have tried to combine idealism with the national interest, but the closer the problem was to India, the less was the admixture of idealism. In Kashmir the coexistence is far from peaceful and UN intervention has been firmly resisted. At Goa, non-violence and anticolonialism met and it was the latter that won. The end may have justified the means, but to a Gandhian such a thought should have been heresy. Finally Nehru's basic faith in the goodness of human nature received a rude shock when China violated Indian territory in contravention of the 1954 agreement.

In spite of these apparent failures of Indian diplomacy, I am convinced that Nehru's policy was the right one. For India, as for any underdeveloped country, non-alignment is the only sensible policy, since it encourages aid from both sides. And morals aside, non-violence is a sound policy when modern arms cost so much.

Nehru maintained that mutual trust and good sense should prevail in international relations—but one nation cannot pursue this policy on its own. You cannot be non-violent in Kashmir if you cannot trust the other side also to be non-violent.

In the last analysis, we must trust those with whom we deal internationally, and the world will be the poorer without Nehru striving to put this view forward. At least he had good ambitions which he tried to put into practice not only in India but throughout the world. Surely we should honour his memory if only for this.