[We thank Miss Pearce for the reasonable tone of her letter in all except the first paragraph.

Miss Pearce's letter may be paraphrased—there was no moral obligation, and even if there were, we didn't accept it as important

The moral obligation is made much clearer by the tone of her letter. It is quite clear that the attitude of the executive was that it alone was to be judge of the fitness of anyone for assistant secretary. That the candidate (who had not been "defeated" by any "margin" at all) was favoured by exactly one-half of the association did not seem so important to the executive as the fact that they didn't like him—to put it in crude terms. What the association thought was "entirely unconnected" with the co-option. Really? The last paragraph, of course, doesn't make sense at all.

Miss Pearce then advances the justification—a "practical reason" apparently outweighing the candidates excellent experience on Executive and on club committees—that the person was not on the phone at home or at work. At the time of the first appointment he was on the phone at [unclear: work] the executive were aware of this. At the time of the second [unclear: appointment he] was on the phone both at home and at work—and the executive were aware of this again. And now what is the [unclear: story]

The sum of it is [unclear: that] the [unclear: executive] considers itself a better [unclear: judge] of suitable administrators than the people who are to be administered. Elite theories of this type are dangerous in VUC as elsewhere, even when, as in this letter, they are only implicit.—Ed.)