Via Media, Deo Volente

Swen and Veritas are at opposite ends of the scale of bias and cannot see the full scale for this reason. I hope you will approach a third opinion to clear the problem.

I agree with Veritas that we cannot definitely state there is no God. Some force propels our life and universe, and until this can be explained mechanistically there is always a possibility that the force is some Conscious Being. But allow me to consider Veritas's proofs for such a Conscious Being.

Proof I: It is clear that there must be something which makes things move, but it does not follow that this force is an eternal being. It is just as conceivable that the force is mechanistic, and in our existing state of knowledge we have proof of neither possibility. Theism or atheism in this sense are a matter of faith, although the mechanistic approach certainly explains the facts as we know them in a more realistic manner. To postulate a God is to add nothing to knowledge.

Proof II: It must also be admitted that there is order in the universe: order "being a human concept of the arrangement of means for some end. Granting that there is order, thus does not imply there is a conscious end. Surely means may grope blindly through order to some end unknown to any consciousness. Because we cannot know ends we have no theoretical right to postulate that someone must know the end.

"This order we find in things requires a final ultimate cause or the problem is recreated." A typical statement from a soul-bound fanatic. Why should the order require an ultimate cause? No useful assertion can be made on this matter. Further, postulating an Infinite Being to solve the problem explains nothing: if the Being is not finite, the problem of motion is not solved but merely postponed. A useless link is added to the chain of knowledge.

An example of Veritas's confusion is illustrated by a small inconsistency in his letter. A very true statement is made in the first paragraph:—"It is impossible for anyone to give a full explanation of an infinite problem." If he believes this, why is it that "a series of movers cannot be produced into an infinite number"? He surely means we cannot conceive of such a process, not that it is impossible. The main contention that Swen puts forwards, the doubtful existence of a Conscious Being's influence in our world, is of interest in this connection: it points away from the use of God as a cause, and indicates a mechanistic approach as a better description.

I would advise Veritas to think clearly for himself, not take his views from books and attempt to combine them by the use of words: his piecemeal effort leads to inconsistency. After this minor homily, allow me a final summing-up.

We can see some force in the universe but as yet there is no proof for either a Conscious God or mechanism. The mechanistic ideal has an advantage by explaining what we think we know much more satisfactorily than the idea of a God does. And mechanism has a future, it may explain more as knowledge progresses, while the idea of a Conscious God confuses the issue by placing an extra stage between what [unclear: we] know and what we would like to know.