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History of New Zealand. Vol. II.

Chapter xiii. — The Weld Ministry

page 267

Chapter xiii.
The Weld Ministry.

Mr. Weld's propositions being committed to paper, Sir George Grey wrote: “If a majority of the General Assembly concurs in them, it will be the Governor's duty to aid to the best of his ability in carrying them out.” Mr. Sewell, Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Richardson (in the Council), Major Atkinson, and (in December) Mr. Mantell, accepted office on the terms thus arranged. The Houses, summoned to meet for despatch of business on the 21st November, had by successive proclamation on the 19th and 22nd been prorogued to the 23rd and 24th while the Governor sought for advisers. When on the last-mentioned date they assumed office he thanked the members for responding at an unusual season to a summons rendered imperative by the state of the colony and the resignation of his advisers. Acting on his individual responsibility he had offered terms of pardon to natives in arms against the Queen. It was his intention to take prompt steps to restore order in the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui districts. The speech dwelt upon the principles embodied in Mr. Weld's memorandum on acceptance of office. After an attempt, (defeated by 29 votes against 17, amongst the Representatives,) to postpone the removal of the seat of government “until provision has been first made for constituting the province of Auckland a separate colony, to be ruled by a Governor appointed by Her Majesty and a Legislature to be chosen by the inhabitants thereof,” addresses were carried in both Houses which were cordial in character, but reserved for consideration the question of self-reliance in internal defence and the assumption of colonial responsibility as proposed by Mr. Weld. It is grateful to record the fact, that in page 268 office Mr. Weld condemned the Suppression of Rebellion Act as vigorously as when he was a private member. “It was unnecessary and unconstitutional, taken from a bad type of barbarous ages. All that can be said in favour of this disgrace to our statute-book is that it has been a dead letter.” Mr. Sewell as Attorney-General resumed the lead in the Legislative Council, and moved resolutions accepting the propositions of Mr. Weld. Mr. Whitaker moved an amendment to the effect that temporarily New Zealand ought to be divided into two colonies—the southern administered on the principle of ministerial responsibility; the northern on a system enabling “the Imperial Government to exercise such control over the management of native affairs as will enable Her Majesty's Government to take such measures as it may deem necessary to suppress the present rebellion, and provide safeguards against rebellion for the future.” By 10 votes against 9 Mr. Whitaker's motion, so strangely opposed to his acrimonious contentions with Sir George Grey, was rejected; and the Address accepting Mr. Weld's principles was adopted by 16 votes against 2, on the 6th December.

In the House of Representatives Mr. Weld moved, on the 30th November, resolutions condemnatory of joint responsibility of the Governor and his advisers in native affairs. Divided Councils, vacillating policy, and needless expense were imputed to it. “Recognizing the right of the Home Government to insist upon the maintenance of this system of double government so long as the colony is receiving the aid of British troops,” the House was invited to accept the alternative, to request unconditionally the withdrawal of the whole of the land force, and ask that the Governor should be guided entirely by his “advisers in native as well as ordinary affairs, excepting upon such matters as may directly concern Imperial interests and the prerogatives of the Crown.” It was thought that a precipitate withdrawal of the troops was rash and dangerous. After adjourned debates, and a failure by Mr. Graham to provide for separation of New Zealand in the manner aimed at by Mr. Whitaker in the Council, friendly resolutions were carried by the Minister of Defence, Major Atkinson, without a division. They expressed loyalty to the Crown, gratitude to the mother country, and thanks to Her Majesty's forces. They trusted page 269 that Mr. Card well's instructions had been issued to meet a temporary emergency, and would lapse when a normal state of things could be restored. “Without disputing the claim of the Imperial Government to exercise a reasonable control over policy upon which the restoration of peace must necessarily depend whilst the colony is receiving the aid of British troops,” they averred that divided councils had produced great evils and expense: “That nevertheless the colony is resolved to make every further possible effort to place itself in a position of self-defence against internal aggression, with a view to accept the alternative indicated by the Home Government, namely, the withdrawal of Her Majesty's land forces at the earliest possible period consistent with the maintenance of Imperial interests and the safety of the colony; thereby enabling the Imperial Government to issue such instructions to his Excellency the Governor as may permit him to be guided entirely by his constitutional advisers in native as well as in ordinary affairs, excepting upon such matters as may directly concern Imperial interests and the prerogatives of the Crown.” Substantially Major Atkinson's resolutions were the same as those adopted on Mr. Sewell's motion in the Council. Both Houses had therefore agreed upon a new starting-point, which was to furnish endless disputes in after years. Almost all men of political note had supported it, however, and from danger of internal interference it seemed free. Mr. Dillon Bell, Mr. Domett, Dr. Featherston, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Fox, Mr. Mantell, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Weld, Mr. Cracroft Wilson, Mr. Crosbie Ward, Mr. Swainson, Mr. Sewell, Major Whitmore, and (after rejection of his attempt to bisect the colony) Mr. Whitaker, were sponsors of the new scheme. The electoral roll of the colony at the time was less than 30,000; or less than that of any suburban constituency around London. The fate of the Maori race was to depend on about the number of voters which sends two members to Parliament from Edinburgh.

The session was short. An Act was passed enabling the Governor in Council to raise the interest on the loan for £3,000,000 (1863) from 5 to 6 per cent. A Debenture Act authorized the issue of short-dated debentures (three years) at 8 per cent, interest in anticipation of the loan for £3,000,000. page 270 A Customs Act, with the hope of increasing the revenue to the extent of £190,000, raised the rate of duties on imports. A Public Works Land Act authorized the taking of native lands as well as those of Europeans on the giving of compensation. A New Zealand Settlements Amendment Act, intended to comply with Mr. Cardwell's requirements, was adopted. Minor Acts and Private Acts need not be enumerated, although there were several, dealing amongst other matters with railways at Canterbury. An Act to provide for a mail service by Panama was passed. On the 13th December, the Assembly was prorogued with the assurance that, before the expiry of the current financial year, it should be convened at Wellington. On Mr. Fitzherbert's motion the House had resolved that it was not expedient to accept the offer of the Imperial Government to guarantee £1,000,000 of the loan for £3,000,000. The objections stated were that priority of charge was required for the guaranteed portion, and the territorial revenue was to be included in the security. It was resolved that the accounts should be adjusted, and “the true and just balance found due from the colony” should be paid. But resolutions provide no funds. A loan implies a lender, and confidence of capitalists is not engendered by mere words. Confronted by the financial difficulty in their studies the Ministers found it looming large. On the 3rd January, they pathetically appealed for relaxation of the rule as to contribution towards army expenses. “If from any cause the withdrawal of Her Majesty's land forces should be delayed for any lengthened period, and the terms now imposed by the Imperial Government should be insisted on, the colony will be wholly unable to bear the burthen, and financial ruin will be the result.” Because the House had thought it rash to withdraw the troops suddenly Mr. Weld had slightly changed his front, and looked for delay. He found the weight of delay intolerable. Look where he would there was trouble. But the tender mercies of Britain could be appealed to. New Zealand was a very young colony, founded by “the Imperial Government, and may not unreasonably look to it for help in time of need like the present.” It was true that peace existed, but measures then being taken between Taranaki and Wanganui “would involve the colony in heavy cost.” Subject to their present appeal ad misericordiam, page 271 the Ministry would give effect to the resolutions of the House, and enter upon the question of accounts with the Imperial Government. If the war expenditure of the colony had not been brought about by the original sin of the Taranaki settlers, of Mr. Stafford, Mr.C. W. Richmond, and others, it would indeed have been entitled to commiseration. Mr. Fitzherbert, the Treasurer, in his financial statement (December, 1864) had shown that of the one million sterling sold or hypothecated the colony would only receive £810,000. He was not sanguine enough to expect more than £1,620,000 for the remaining £2,000,000 authorized by the Loan Act. Anticipation and discount, the one ever more exorbitant, the other ever more difficult, were the keys to the windy treasury of the colony. It is not wonderful that the lands of the Maoris were still eyed eagerly as the talisman of redemption. The claims of the British Treasury could not be dismissed, but might be discussed. Discussion would put off the day of reckoning, and meantime the spirit of their countrymen would shrink from abandonment of the colonists. The vitality of the new Government depended on discussions in the parlour of the Bank of New Zealand. An agreement was arrived at on the 29th December. The Bank was empowered to issue debentures for £750,000, £50,000 of which were to be offered in New Zealand, £200,000 in Australia, and half a million was to be offered in London. The interest was to be 8 per cent. The Bank was to receive 7 instead of 5 per cent, on its overdrawn account, and to have power to hypothecate the debentures in case of failure of sale, the Government bearing the expense of hypothecation. The Bank was to have a commission of ½ per cent. on negotiation. These terms appear more like the bargain of a young spendthrift than the state paper of a nascent nation; but, such as they were, they form the warp of its life. The Inspector of the Bank went to Australia, but capitalists were obdurate. “The chief causes of failure were,” he reported, “the general ignorance which prevails as to New Zealand affairs, and the impression that the colony is involving itself in debts, the redemption of which will be problematical.” One capitalist in Melbourne offered to take £10,000 of the debentures at 10 per cent. discount, but to such an indignity the Inspector would not submit. To receive £9000, pay £800 a year for three years, page 272 and then to pay £10,000, was more than needy New Zealand could undertake. Some trifling sums were obtained at about par, and a friendly bank in Melbourne lent for six months £40,000, at 10 per cent, per annum interest. Out of the abundance of capital in London a small portion was attracted by the hope of 8 per cent. Yet less than £200,000 were obtained within a month of the submission of the debentures. The cost of colonial defence was at the time nearly £450,000 a year. Military settlers at Waikato and Tauranga cost, in pay and rations, more than £156,000 a year; and with Taranaki, White Cliffs, Opotiki, Waiapu, and contingent hospital expenses, military settlers required nearly £300,000 a year. Notwithstanding a favourable turn in the London money market New Zealand stock was practically unsaleable in May, 1865. In March the Ministers drew up a memorial, entreating assistance. They admitted that good faith required payment of the debt of the colony to England. They had transferred £400,000 (4 per cent, debentures) to the Imperial Government, and they left it to that Government to hold them as securities, or to cover them with a guarantee. They appealed to Sir George Grey to testify that they had never proposed “to recoup war expenditure by hasty and indiscriminate sale of confiscated land,” and that they had “co-operated with him in a just and temperate policy” towards Maoris. They hoped that the English Government would recognize the claims of the colony, “either by covering the remainder of the three million loan by the Imperial guarantee, or by making to the colony an annual grant in aid of extraordinary expenditure for the next four or five years.” Sir George Grey supported their appeal for the guarantee, which would cost the mother country nothing, aid the struggling colony in its manful efforts, and might enable both races to live in peace in future. Mr. Cardwell in July unequivocally declined. Were he to ask Parliament to consent he would be reminded that already the Imperial Treasury had disbursed two millions for New Zealand, and that the resources of the colony, as represented by Mr. Reader Wood in applying for the former guarantee, were such as to refute the supposition that it could require a vote in aid.

The effect of these negotiations was to harden the resolution page 273 of Mr. Weld and his friends to dispense with British troops and rely upon a small force trained for bush-fighting, and aided by the pugnacious Maoris, who, ever prone to tribal wars, were reckoned upon as available for a native militia. Mr. Weld, however, alleged that he desired to avoid, if possible, the “setting of tribe against tribe,” and hoped that the union of the Pakeha and the Maori in the battle-field would “strengthen the good feeling between the races, besides being a great assistance to the colony.”1 Within a week of the end of the session the Governor issued a proclamation (17th December, 1864) to confiscate Maori lands. He had staunchly contended against the schemes of Whitaker and Fox, but he did not, when Mr. Weld was in office, insist upon procuring land by cession rather than by seizure. The land to be taken was “all the land in Waikato taken by the Queen's forces,” within specified lines from “Pokorokoro in the Gulf of the Thames,” by Maungakawa in the Waikato district, Pukekura, Orakau, the Puniu river, the Pirongia mountain, Whaingaroa harbour, the coast to the Waikato Heads, thence by the river Waikato to the Maungatawhiri river, and northwards circuitously to the point of commencement. In addition “all lands northward of the above boundaries belonging to rebel natives or tribes up to and as far as the waters of the Manukau and the Waitamata” were declared confiscated. It was added: “The land of those natives who have adhered to the Queen shall be secured to them.… To those who have rebelled but who shall at once submit… portions of the land taken will be given back for themselves and their families. The Governor will make no further attack on those who remain quiet. Those guilty of further violence he will punish as he has punished the Waikato tribes.” Between Wanganui and New Plymouth he would “take such land belonging to rebels as he may think fit;” would make roads where he chose; would assure to the peaceful the “full benefit and enjoyment of their lands,” but would except from the amnesty those who had committed murders. Mr. Weld's Ministry had stretched the Governor's conscience from Ngaruawahia to Orakau. The great Waikato plain between the waters of the Horotiu and the Waipa was accorded to the demands of Weld, though refused to Whitaker.

1 ‘Notes on New Zealand Affairs.’ F. A. Weld. London: 1869.

page 274 Kawhia was left, but from the Puniu river to the waters of Waitemata the natives were exiled; and in Taranaki the will of the Pakeha was to declare whether any footing on a rock should be left for the sole of the foot of a Maori. Mr. Cardwell's wisdom was discarded in the new-born concord of the Governor with his fresh advisers. Some qualms were felt even in the Cabinet about the proclamation, for we find that before the General went (January, 1864) to Wanganui, a new proclamation disclaiming any “desire to take lands of the rebel natives as a source of profit” was “unanimously approved” in the Executive Council. It limited the area to be confiscated on the west coast, and was to be entrusted to the Native Minister, who was to accompany General Cameron on an expedition to Wanganui. It was cancelled lest it should “embarrass his military operations.”1 It would have been strange if a Ministry containing H. A. Atkinson, one of the Taranaki Maori-haters, had abstained from war. The session had barely, come to an end when a Ministerial memorandum declared it necessary to act at Taranaki and Wanganui; to form military settlements and roads between the two places, and as soon “as circumstances may permit to occupy as a military settlement a block north of the mouth of the Waitara river.”2
The General quickly showed that he had little confidence in the moderation of the Governor's advisers. “If the extensive scheme of confiscation, road-making, &c., contemplated by Ministers (in which I do not know whether you concur or not) is to be carried out, I think we ought to apply at once for re-enforcements.” The carrion-birds which, under the name of contractors, batten upon the miseries of war, growing to redundance like weeds upon a dunghill, had not failed to find a home in New Zealand. It was natural that the regular army should recoil from a service in which a quarrel had no sooner died out in one quarter than it was revived in another. When the Waikato chiefs withdrew from Taranaki, Governor Browne proposed to make war on Waikato. When Waikato was desolate Tauranga was pounced upon. When Tauranga was at rest

1 N. Z. P. P. 1879; A. 8.

2 The gradual encroachment deserves notice. In 1859 the Government said they were willing to leave Rangitake unmolested on the north bank.

page 275 war was to be transferred to the west coast at Waitotara. The General went to Wanganui on the 20th January, and wrote on the 21st: “The more I think about it the more I am convinced that we have done wrong in bringing war into this hitherto quiet settlement.” A Major in the service had written to him before he left Auckland: “One thing is very certain, and that is that the men who sold the (Waitotara) block had no right to do so, and it is the old Waitara dodge for getting up a war, and the consequent military expenditure at Wanganui.” On the 28th January, the General (in a private letter subsequently laid before the Assembly) wrote: “I have made inquiries about the purchase of the Waitotara block, and have reason to believe that it was a more iniquitous job than that of the Waitara block. I am not surprised that the natives have opposed our road-making. The Government at home ought to be made acquainted with the true history of the business.” When the General was requested to furnish the grounds of his objections he declined to do so. In surveying the field of operations he found that the Maoris were entrenched in a stronghold—the Weraroa pah— within 20 miles of Wanganui. As early as the 28th January he wrote: “I consider my force insufficient to attack so formidable a work as the Weraroa pah.” Posts, escorts, and protection of Wanganui would diminish his strength, and “instead of 1100 men, my present available force, I should require 6000.” A short distance beyond Weraroa was the Waitotara river. The General proposed to cross it, and proceeding northwards to establish a post at the Patea river; but his plans seemed vague, for he declared that if he should succeed he would “have but a small force left for anything else.” No advantage to the north of the Waitotara river would compensate for losses near Wanganui by irruption of rebels. In the bitterness of disgust he exclaimed: “All the well-to-do settlers are, I believe, aware of the folly of this cruise and deprecate the war, but the shopkeepers and settlers greedy of land of course delight in its continuance.” He was early compelled to fight. Near Nukumaru, close to the Weraroa, the Maoris, under Hone Pihama, attacked his “picquets so suddenly that they were forced back some distance before re-enforcements could arrive.” On the right they penetrated to within 100 yards of the camp. The English loss was considerable, page 276 but it was thought that the Maoris had suffered more, although only 11 killed and 2 wounded were found. The friendly natives on the river, under Hori Kingi, Mete Kingi, and others, who had fought at Moutoa, were attacked by the rebels, but beat them off with loss of 25 killed and 4 captive chiefs. The victors had to deplore the death of the chief, John Williams, the principal actor in the capture of the murderers of the Gilfillans in 1847. The country was difficult, the enemy numerous and daring. “I would, therefore, recommend that your Excellency should apply by the first opportunity for a re-enforcement of at least 2000 men, and for a still larger re-enforcement if, in addition to the occupation of the country between Wanganui and the Patea, the road between Taranaki and Wanganui is to be opened; and more land is to be confiscated and occupied north of the Waitara, which I understand is to be the plan of the Colonial Government approved by your Excellency.” It is disheartening to reflect that at this very period there was in the British army, left (as far as official neglect could cause such a catastrophe) to rust from misuse, one of those rare geniuses for war and for rule of mankind which fitfully appear upon the earth. Charles George Gordon, after performing in China feats unsurpassed by Greek or Roman,— after winning battles and taking cities with troops a tithe in number of his enemy and composed of the same material,—when his work was done modestly retired, unenriched by spoil, leaving behind him a moral lesson which the Chinese ruler could admire though not comprehend.1 Soochow had fallen in 1863, and till the Chinese Government apologized for the slaughter of surrendered enemies, and had guaranteed that where Gordon was present at a capitulation nothing should be done without his consent, his troops were idle for a time, during which he might

1 Prince Kung declared to the English Minister, Sir Frederick Bruce: “We do not know what to do. He will not receive money from us, and we have already given him every honour which it is in the power of the Emperor to bestow; but as these can be of little value in his eyes I have brought you this letter, and ask you to give it to the Queen of England that she may bestow on him some reward which may be more valuable in his eyes.” The Ministries of Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell must divide the shame of not seeing that to send so just, so bold, and so humane a hero to New Zealand, would have been better than to leave him to rust. In after years the Khedive of Egypt was wise enough to seek his services, which were as striking in Central Africa as in China.

page 277 have been withdrawn for the direct service of his country. When a guarantee had been given that no wrong should be done to prisoners submitting to his arms, Gordon resumed operations; but he left China in 1864, and might have been entrusted with the command in New Zealand, where his gallantry, wisdom, humanity, and piety would have made their mark and honoured his country. He received brevet distinctions, and was in process of time remitted to a paltry staff appointment—at Gravesend.

General Cameron strengthened his force by withdrawing troops from Wellington, and from Taranaki, and crossed the Waitotara on the 5th February. The Maoris retorted by killing a settler and a militia soldier who was “out contrary to orders, plundering a Maori settlement.” There was panic among the settlers. The General sent 150 men to Wanganui, and asked the Governor to repair thither to consult with him. The savage Hau Hau fanaticism was not only rife at the west coast. The prophets, finding the General bent upon war. made a diversion at the east. Two of them, with Hori Tupaea of the Ngaiterangi, and Tiu Tamihana of the Ngatihaua, undertook to stir up the tribes. Colonel Greer, still commanding in the district which he had quelled at the battle of Te Ranga, was informed of the invasion, and wrote to the Arawa chiefs. “This is my word to you; when they go into your country, catch them and fetch them up to me.” The invaders were on the Maketu river expecting others to rally round their flag. The Arawa chiefs pursued and captured the whole party of 50 on the 8th February. The prisoners were, after a march of 38 miles, delivered to the English. Hori Tupaea, who had been captured separately when unarmed, expressed his regret to Colonel Greer, and offered to take the oath of allegiance. He had been deceived. The Colonel allowed him to remain on parole in the camp. The Governor accepted the penitent's promise to assist in quelling disturbance, to reside where the Governor might direct, and to observe the terms accorded to the Tauranga natives in the previous year. The blow given to the Pai Marire faith was severe, but the hostile natives were enraged against the Arawa chiefs, and tribal wars were anticipated. It was unhappily clear that the Hau Hau tenets had been accepted in many tribes and page 278 it was impossible to guess where or when some new atrocity might be perpetrated to sicken the English of the land, and drive them away in loathing.

Early in March the Governor was at Wanganui, having on the 4th requested his advisers to furnish him with a full and explicit statement of their objects, as he feared there was an impression abroad that the war was prosecuted for the profit and gratification of the colonists; an imputation which the Ministry denied in a formal document on the 20th March. At Wanganui, the Governor found that the existence of the Weraroa stronghold was damaging the reputation of the English. The Hau Haus had made a triumphant song about it. They said their prophet had waved his arms, and the General and his men were fain to skim along the coast like seagulls. The native allies asked permission to attack the pah. The General was amused at their presumption in thinking the task easy. On the 8th, he wrote to the Governor; “I would strongly advise your applying for a re-enforcement of at least 2000 men from England.” Without them the coast-line between the camp (at Patea) and Taranaki could not be occupied. The Ministry would not concur with this proposal, and the Governor agreed with them. He believed that before long the natives would “submit in nearly all parts of the island,” and that the war might be terminated before re-enforcements could arrive. And now another horror cast its lurid glare upon the times. When Captain Lloyd's head was carried away, in 1864, it was at Pipiriki, about 80 miles up the Wanganui river, that it had been placed on a pole, and there the frantic fanatics danced round it in furious orgies, rushing up, biting it, and treating it with brutish indignities. Again, in 1865, the baked head of an English soldier was taken thither by fanatics led by Patara and Kereopa. They were to stir up the tribes in the Bay of Plenty. At the same time the prophet Te Ua did not counsel assaults upon colonists. His written instructions were: “While on your journey do not interfere with those whom you may meet. Do not quarrel with the Pakeha.… At Turanganui give Hirini te Kani the flag and the man's head.” On the way, 200 of the Uriwera tribe were indoctrinated. The head was used as a mystic symbol. Terror caused by it took possession of each as page 279 it was shown to the file of Maoris; and each sprang out of the row in turn. Kereopa, the officiating priest, then said: “You are now possessed of the Deity. Let the widows of those who fell at Orakau approach and vent their anger on this head and on the Pakeha prisoners.” The maddest of them obeyed him.

On the 1st March, the Rev. Carl S. Volklner and the Rev. T. Grace, missionaries, arrived in the Opotiki harbour. In February, a lady living at Whakatane wrote to warn Mr. Volkner to stay in Auckland, for mischief was on foot. It was not till the bar was crossed and regress was impossible that the voyagers saw assembled by the river-side a band of the Pai Marire. Patara and Kereopa, after turning the hearts of disciples to ferocity at Taupo, Uriwera, and Whakatane, had arrived at Opotiki. The vessel was in their power as soon as she was anchored. The missionaries were ordered on shore in the afternoon. The vessel was rifled and her contents were placed in a store of which the Maoris kept the key. A violent Hau Hau meeting was held at the Roman Catholic Chapel. It was strange that as in China the Tae-ping (Great Peace) rebels professed to link with direct revelations through their chiefs, some Christian tenets, so the Pai Marire (Good Tranquillity) desperadoes, when throwing off their allegiance to the Queen and disavowing the religion of England, assumed a portion of the Roman Catholic cult. The Scriptures were to be burnt, but the Virgin Mary was ever to be present with the Hau Haus, who were to slay and devour their foes. The Christian Sabbath was no longer to be respected as in England. There was to be no marrying or giving in marriage, for by promiscuous intercourse, under the rule of priests gifted with supernatural powers, the Pai Marire would be as the sand of the sea-shore for multitude. The first profession of these tenets had disgusted the manly Wi Tako. The king-maker was about to condemn them. On the 1st March, the Hau Haus kept up their orgies in the Roman Catholic Chapel beyond the mid hour of night. The captive missionaries and sailors heard the horrid din. A Taranaki native guided them to an enclosure in which to rest. The sailors joined heartily in reading the evening psalm. In the morning the very air seemed full of omen that some dreadful deed was to be done. Mr. Volkner paid to a Maori widow a small legacy which it was his custom page 280 to disburse to her. She said nothing to warn him, but in half-an-hour twenty armed men appeared, performed some cabalistic rites, and called on Mr. Volkner to go with them. Mr. Grace wished to join him, but was forced back, and locked up under guard. His turn, he was told, would come next. Two hours he was in agony about his friend. Heremita, who had led away Mr. Volkner, returned and conversed with the guard. Mr. Grace heard the words (in Maori) “hung on the willow tree.” They went to his heart. He told the sailors, who said: “All is over.” They were called out and marched between files of Maoris past the open space near the church. They were robbed and shut up in a house with their hands tied behind their backs. Mr. Grace inquired about Mr. Volkner, but no word was vouch-safed. The murderers shrunk from telling what they had done. Yet they had taken possession and slain in open day. Before Mr. Volkner's arrival his house had been broken open, his goods sold, and war-dances were held in his church. When they seized their victim they dragged him with a rope round his neck, and hanged him on a willow tree. But the ruffian Kereopa would not wait for gradual death. The body was lowered, and Kereopa fired upon it. Again it was raised with violent jerks. The Maori wife of a European told her husband what she saw. The Roman Catholic chief Hiki remained in his pah during the murder. The body was carried to the Protestant chapel. Kereopa told Hiki to come and see. Hiki saw. Kereopa said: “I have killed him, now you cut off his head.” Hiki did so. Kereopa then called on all the hapus, men, women, and children, to come and taste Volkner's blood. They did so. Kereopa then scooped out and swallowed the eyes. Patara was absent making converts, and it was not supposed that he would have joined in the atrocities, for although he had assisted in plundering Volkner's house, he left a letter warning Volkner not to return to Opotiki; and after Volkner's murder he disclaimed any participation in it, and called Kereopa to account. Mr. Grace and his companions were led to the house of a Mr. Hooper, who was ill. Six or seven natives, four sailors, the sick man, and Mr. Grace were shut up in one room. After an hour and a half they were unbound. Previously a Maori had lifted a panikin to the mouth of each to let them page 281 drink water. Mr. Grace asked why they were unbound. The answer was: “A time to bind and a time to loose, a time to kill and a time to make alive.” Shut up in the suffocating atmosphere of the small room, the prisoners passed the day and night. “As I lay awake,” Mr. Grace wrote, “I could distinctly hear the confusion, dancing and shouting going on in the Romish chapel, and also in the church.” He commended himself and his companions to “the watchful care of our Heavenly Father.” In the morning (3rd March) he found a Prayer-book. The wonderful Psalms of David touched him, as they have touched the spirits of so many myriads of mankind, with a graciousness not of this world. “Some of the Psalms for the day” (he wrote) “appeared written for the occasion.” In the comfort of the resurrection and the hope of awaking in the Divine likeness, the soul of the prisoner found strength. Patara had been sent for to decide upon Mr. Grace's fate, at a meeting. Throughout the 3rd and 4th of March there was suspense. On the night of the 4th, Patara returned. Mr. Grace sent a message to him in the morning. He passed the prison, shook hands with Mr. Grace, and spoke a few words. An hour afterwards the prisoners were summoned to a meeting in Mr. Volkner's church. Three hundred natives were assembled. The Taranaki fanatics seated themselves within the communion-rails. Europeans were present also. Patara denounced soldiers, Ministers, and Englishmen. For all Jews, Frenchmen, Scotchmen, Austrians, and Germans, he had love. Natives brought charges against the murdered Volkner. He had gone to Auckland as a spy, a cross had been found in his house, therefore he must have been a Romanist and deceiver, and he had returned to Opotiki after being told to stay away. Mr. Grace defended his dead friend; and though Patara replied, he said nothing in justification of the murder. Mr. Grace was attacked for going to Taupo recently, and for sundry supposed faults. The land question was the subject of a long harangue, to which he replied that neither Volkner nor himself had any land. Ransom was proposed by Mr. Grace, or exchange of prisoners. The Maoris agreed to take Hori Tupaea in exchange, and the captain undertook to carry the proposal to Tauranga. Mr. Levy, brother of the captain, was to remain at Opotiki, and the page 282 captain was to continue to trade. On the 6th, Patara started inland, ordering that Mr. Grace was to be kindly treated, and permitting him to write to his wife. Mr. Grace assured him that Hori Tupaea (who was released by Sir George Grey) was already at liberty. On the 7th, Patara sent his letter as to the exchange, but the captain (although as Jews he and his brother were supposed to be favoured by the Hau Haus) was anxious to break the stipulations of the trial and carry away his brother. He cursed and swore at Mr. Grace, who argued against such a course. Mr. Agassiz, a resident, recommended Mr. Grace to pacify the captain by giving him a statement that the loss to the ship was occasioned by the presence of the missionaries. On the 9th, he gave it, but the captain refused to promise to carry Patara's letter to Tauranga. The natives still detained the captain's vessel. On the 13th, Eparaima, a native of Turanga, who knew Mr. Grace when he resided there in 1853, arrived with a message from a Pai Marire prophet, desiring Mr. Grace's release. Eparaima wept much, and went inland to a meeting to plead for his old acquaintance. On the 15th, Eparaima started to obtain further help; but it was ominous that on that day the Pai Marire raised a new pole for their worship, and a feast was to be held. Captain Levy's vessel was detained by want of a breeze. But help was at hand where least expected. The murder of Mr. Volkner, far from rousing the natives generally to like atrocity, had shocked them.

An insolent letter was written by the fanatics from “Opotiki, Place of Canaan,” to “the office of the Government, Auckland.” It purported to be from the committee of the Ngatiawa, Whakatohea, Uriwera, and Taranaki. “You crucify the Maoris, and I also crucify the Pakehas. But now release unto us Hori Tupaea and his companions, and we will then let go Mr. Grace.” The date of the letter was the 6th March. From Whakatane, however, chiefs of the Ngatiawa, from Turanga, from Maketu, from Rotorua, from Huria, letters were sent to denounce the shedding of the innocent blood of the missionary. The Arawa at Maketu denounced the Ngatiawa because they had not actively prevented it, and threatened them with war.

H.M.S. ‘Eclipse,’ under Commander Fremantle, reached Turanga page 283 on the 13th. The sailor and Bishop Selwyn found Bishop W. Williams amidst 300 Maoris, most of them armed. They had assembled to decide what they should do about the Pai Marire, some of whom were within a mile and a half of Bishop Williams' station. Bishop Selwyn addressed the assembly with fervour, but they could not be induced to take arms against the murderers. They alleged that their doing so would endanger Mr. Grace. They wrote to Hori Tupaea, urging him to go forward to assist Mr. Grace. The Bishop and his friends strove in vain to persuade the natives to dissociate the liberation of Mr. Grace from a demand for the release of Tupaea. Two Turanga natives went with the man-of-war to aid the object of the letter. On the morning of the 16th the ‘Eclipse’ was off Opotiki. The Turanga natives were landed in a boat. Captain Fremantle gallantly desired to go on shore to rescue the captive; but the Bishop urged that such a course “might endanger Mr. Grace's life, as horsemen were seen scampering to and fro along the beach, and it seemed impossible that Mr. Grace could now escape unobserved.”1 Meantime the three masts of the ‘Eclipse’ had been spied by a Maori from Mr. Grace's place of detention. Captain Levy and his brother got into a canoe and paddled down the river, refusing to let Mr. Grace accompany them. The landing of the Turanga natives had made a commotion. Shouting, ringing of the bell of the Roman Catholic Chapel, galloping of messengers to summon a meeting, distracted the settlement. Mr. Grace begged some to stay with him, but they said they would be killed if they did so. He was left alone for an hour and a half, and “felt forsaken on every hand,” but found consolation in committing himself to the care of God. Then the boat returned. The captain had been sent back from the man-of-war to procure a friendly native, who, however, had gone to the Maori meeting two miles away. The captain busied himself with getting goods into the boat. A young man named Montague told Mr. Grace he would be taken into the boat if he would go quietly to the river-bank. He did so. None but an old woman saw his escape. He lay in the bottom of the boat till he was taken on board of the ‘Eclipse,’ after fifteen days' companionship with horrors. But the two Turanga natives

1 Letter of Bishop Selwyn, 16th March, 1865.

page 284 were detained because of his escape. Commander Fremantle had towed Captain Levy's schooner out with boats, and no European but the trader, Agassiz, ventured to remain at Opotiki. It was fortunate that the bloodthirsty Kereopa was not the ruling spirit. Patara, after fourteen hours' of anxious negotiation, principally conducted by Bishop Selwyn, permitted the Turanga natives to return to the man-of-war.

It was afterwards officially testified that the labours of Bishops Selwyn and Williams had a salutary effect in repelling Maori sympathy from the Hau Haus. Some who had previously sympathized were roused to a sense of shame. Friends of the English were kindled to activity. The Arawa were eager for vengeance, and to prove their loyalty to the Queen. Bishop Selwyn himself, fresh from the scene, thus addressed the third Synod of his Church at Christchurch in 1865: “The war, which seemed to have come to an end, was renewed by the perversity of a few misguided men. Mixed with the new element of the confiscation of land it acquired a bitterness unknown before. The missionary clergy were believed to be the agents of the Government in a deep-laid plot for the subjugation of the native people. Our congregations melted away; our advice was disregarded. Exasperated by continued defeat, and loss of friends and relations, many became reckless. The feeling grew among them that they would abandon the religion of their enemies and set up one of their own. An impostor from Taranaki placed himself at the head of the movement. Pretended miracles, unknown tongues, inspiration from heaven, messages of angels, were alleged as usual in support of the imposture. The delusion spread and reached the east coast. New tribes were to be startled and overawed. A leader of inferior rank demanded of the people of Opotiki the sacrifice of their own missionary. No other life was touched of the many white men who fell into their hands. It was a murder of fanaticism.… Our first martyr died at peace with his enemies, and prayers for his murderers.”

Whether Te Ua was fanatical at the first, or merely in wild despair like many of his accomplices he sought to strike terror, and was prepared if need be to die a bloody death, must be matter for conjecture. The Maori was ever superstitious. It was on the mysterious influence of “tapu” that his primitive page 285 polity was based. Though that polity had been well-nigh over-thrown by Christianity, it had reasserted itself with hideous additions when the belief was accepted that the missionaries were leagued with the Government to rob and to subjugate the Maoris. In 1847, Sir William Martin had predicted such a result. Mr. Maning had declared that the rise of strange delusions, and belief in supernatural powers displayed in the person of priest or chief, were incidents often repeated in Maori life. The imputed unholy alliance between the missionaries and the Government had engendered the new Maori chimæra.1

Pouring out his sorrows to a friend in England the Bishop said: “Oh! how things have changed!—how much of the buoyancy of hope has been sobered down by experience!-when instead of a nation of believers welcoming me as their father, I find here and there a few scattered sheep, the remnant of a flock which has forsaken the shepherd. Think of my hanging on to a grapnel off Mr. Volkner's mission-station, not daring to land as Coley (Bishop Patteson) and I are accustomed to do at some heathen island visited for the first time. At this place I do not know how far it is right to go among my people, though in former times peace or war made no difference in their willingness to receive me. At present we are the special objects of their suspicion and ill-will. The part which I took in the Waikato campaign has destroyed my influence with many. You will ask, Did I not foresee this?—and if so, Why did I go? I answer, that though 10,000 men were sent from England no military chaplain arrived at head-quarters till the advance had reached its furthest point in Waikato. Then there were many wounded Maoris brought in from time to time to whom it was my duty to minister. Add to this that two of our mission-stations, (those of Mr. Ashwell and Mr. Morgan) had been occupied by a native clergyman2 and catechist, whom no threats could induce to leave their posts after the English missionaries were advised to retire. It was my duty to see they were not injured when our troops advanced, and this made it necessary for me to be in

1 Δειυὸυ ἀποπυεíονσα πνϱὀς μέυοσ αἰϑομέυοι. ‘Iliad,’ vi. 182.

2 Rev. Heta Tarawhiti. The reader will learn in what manner the Colonial Government endeavoured to make Tarawhiti suffer for his brave devotion.

page 286 the front, and thereby to expose myself to the imputation of having led the troops. This has thrown me back in native estimation more, I fear, than my remaining years will enable me to recover.… But what are my sorrows compared to those of the Bishop of Waiapu (W. Williams), who had completed his quarter of a century at Poverty Bay, and after constant effort and anxiety had just begun to rest upon a settled system, with a thriving college, seven native clergymen, a Diocesan Synod meeting annually, in which the proceedings were conducted entirely in the native language… ? In the midst of these sorrows we have solid comfort in the sight of the stability of our native clergymen, who have never swerved from their duty.… The real cause of war in New Zealand has been the new Constitution, and the cause of the greater bitterness of the strife has been the new element of confiscation introduced by the colonists against the will and express orders of the Home Government.” (The argument that a Maori would feel more than anything else the punishment by confiscation might have) “some force if the Maori had committed some real crime of which he was conscious, but when he believes that the Englishman has only been waiting his time to do what he has now done, and that the land was doomed as much if the owners were innocent as if they were guilty, then confiscation becomes in their eyes simple spoliation and has none of the effect of punishment. Certainly nothing could look more like a determination to provoke a quarrel than the Waitara business.… The Hau Hau superstition is simply an expression of an utter loss of faith in everything that is English, clergy and all alike.… This is the result of seeking first ‘the other things’ except the ‘one.’… O earth! earth! earth! such has been our cry. The Queen, law, religion, have been thrust aside in the one thought of the acquisition of land.”1
It has been seen that the liturgy of the Hau Haus was compounded partly of elements supposed to be Roman Catholic, and that Kereopa and his comrades enacted many of their orgies in a Roman Catholic chapel at Opotiki before they murdered

1 Bishop Selwyn to Rev. E. Coleridge, 26th December, 1865; vide ‘Life of Selwyn. London: 1879. In 1881 the Bishop of Wellington (the Octavius Hadfield of Otaki, in 1839) assured the author that it could still be said with truth that no native clergyman had swerved from duty.

page 287 Volkner. They were ruffians and fanatics, but they could see what, even if he saw it, did not repel the first Marquis of Ripon from subjugation to a foreign yoke. They knew that a recognition of the Pope of Rome was treachery not only to the Queen, but to the very essence of English freedom. Obscured, betrayed, at times wounded almost to death, yet ever again bursting from its bonds, that English freedom of Church and State which preceded and survived the House of Normandy, and was in important particulars maintained by the greatest of English monarchs (Edward I.), was repellent at all times of foreign authority. For that reason the Hau Hau Maories courted the religion of Rome as a means of breaking down the loyalty of their countrymen to the Queen. There were some Roman Catholic Maoris in the district where the Rev. O. Hadfield had laboured from 1839 until 1865. When he was supposed to be in personal danger of attack from the Hau Haus (after the murder of Volkner), the Roman Catholic Maoris offered to protect him if he would flee to them. Their “mana” would be his defence. He answered that he was ready to lay his bones at Otaki, whether after violent or natural death, but nothing would induce him to move from his post; and his gallant bearing endeared him to all his neighbours so much that with the aid of the son of Rauparaha the efforts of the Hau Haus utterly failed at Otaki.1

The murder of Volkner revealed the savagery of which the new superstition was capable. If the fanatics could not meet European arms in the field, they could murder in the east and in the west. By singling out a pastor like Mr. Volkner in the midst of his flock, which dared not raise a voice in his favour, they had shown not only that no compunction was amongst them, but that the more eminent the victim the more grateful was his slaughter to the wild faith under cover of which they had sprung back at a bound to the savage and sickening cannibalism which had been a religion amongst them in the days of heathendom.

Where then was the centre of the new faith? Where best

1 Bishop Selwyn, hearing of Hadfield's danger, wrote (7th June, 1865): “I am ready to join you, if you think I can be of any assistance, but I do not like to come without first communicating with you, as I am now suspected and slandered by all the king natives.”

page 288 could it be sought and strangled? Its cradle was in the west, where the rape of the Waitara had led to desolation of Maori homes, but it found aliment wherever the policy of the Taranaki settlers was known. The gallant Wi Tako Ngatata went to the east coast to prevent its spreading. The settlers at Poverty Bay expressed in April, to him and his companion chiefs, their grateful sense of services conferred during his stay. “Notwithstanding that your own lives have been threatened, you have done your utmost to strengthen the hands of those who have been exerting themselves to save this district from those troubles which seemed to be coming like a flood upon it, and under the Divine blessing your efforts have been so far successful, that the influence of the Hau Hau party has very considerably diminished since the time of your arrival; and Patara and Kereopa have both left the district with their followers, having been unable to stand their ground against the opposition which has been brought to bear against them and their pernicious doctrines. May God preserve your own district from those troubles which you have shown yourselves so solicitous to avert from this.”

Ihaka Whanga at Nuhaka, and Kopu at Wairoa, local chieftains on the east coast, boldly met three hundred Hau Haus, and at great discussions in April stemmed the tide of fanaticism. At about the same time (June) Tamihana te Rauparaha foiled the Hau Hau emissaries who visited Otaki to spread their doctrines. At Sir George Grey's request Captain Luce of H.M.S. ‘Esk’ visited the chiefs on the east coast in April and May, encouraging them to remain faithful to their religion and to law and order. With Mr. Fulloon as interpreter, he attended meetings which were apparently successful in instilling confidence; but he thought the Maoris were everywhere in a state of unhealthy excitement. The Bishop of Waiapu had left in displeasure, and his departure had shamed many Hau Hau converts. The ineffable capacity of depravity in man came before Captain Luce in a strange shape. A deserter from the 57th Regiment had been a companion of the Pai Marire.

Captain Fremantle having returned in May with the ‘Esk,’ had a skirmish at Opotiki before daylight, while unsuccessfully attempting to surprise a party of natives believed to be implicated in the murder of Volkner. At Awanui, Tiwai, a friend of page 289 Volkner, pointed out one of the murderers, a half-caste, to two sailors disguised as Maoris, one of whom succeeded in grasping him by the hand before suspicion was aroused. He shook off his assailants and escaped amid shots from revolvers. Kereopa was in the interior. Patara with armed men held colloquy with Captain Fremantle on the 24th May. The chief “appeared quite prepared against a coup-de-main, and confident in his strength held a hunting-whip under his arm, but had evidently a pistol in each pocket.” He denied complicity in the murder, and acquiesced in a proposal that he should return to Opotiki. It was satisfactory to know that at Kawhia Rewi repelled the idea that he or his tribe had sanctioned the murder.

Mr. George Graham being about to visit Waikato, in May, volunteered to meet the king-maker and other chiefs, and persuade them to take the oath of allegiance. Sir George Grey empowered him (9th May) to assure them of his friendliness, and desire to treat them with generosity, to bring prominently before them his letter of the 16th December, 1863, promising them kind treatment after the fall of Rangiriri, and to explain the proclamation of December, 1864, proffering pardon while confiscating land. In May also the Native Land Purchase Department was abolished, and it was notified that cessions of land would be negotiated for under the Native Lands Act of 1862 (to which the Royal assent had been given on the recommendation of the Duke of Newcastle in 1863), the operation of that law “rendering the continuance of the Land Purchase Department unnecessary.” A proclamation issued in April denounced murder, cannibalism, and other revolting acts of the Hau Haus as repugnant to humanity, and called on all well-disposed natives and Europeans to aid in repressing them.

Mr. Graham saw the king-maker face to face, and weary of his country's woes the patriot, who had been baffled rather by the crimes of others than by his own mistakes, agreed to take the oath of allegiance at Tamahure before Brigadier-General Carey. The latter rode thither from his camp at Te Awamutu on the 27th May. Mr. Graham preceded the chiefs, bearing a paper written by the king-maker in these terms, which he was willing to sign under the British flag: “We consent that the laws of the Queen be the laws for the king (Maori), to be a page 290 protection for us all, for ever and ever. This is the sign of my making peace, my coming into the presence of my fighting friend General Carey.” When Waharoa arrived with his friends, he dismounted and walked uncovered towards Carey, who shook hands with him. The covenant was signed by the chiefs, and by Carey and by Graham. Te Waharoa said little, but he requested that the Governor would appoint a Commission to inquire into his character, which had been maligned, and would allow him to see again the face of his friend Tui Tamihana. The Governor telegraphed the submission to the Secretary of State, and wrote to Te Waharoa, who answered him from Matamata.… “All I think of is that peace is made. There is rest,— a breathing—from the weariness and fatigue of working this evil work of war. The weapons of war have been cast away.” Important no doubt was his submission, and the Hau Hau brutalities had unwittingly tended to bring it about: but as Te Waharoa had failed to restrain Rewi in 1863, so it was certain that he could do nothing to check those whom Wi Tako had called madmen when he spurned any further connection with them. It seems fitting to couple the king-maker's submission with the atrocities which conduced to it.

Sir George Grey was at Wanganui when Mr. Volkner's death was reported. Friendly chiefs there had just guaranteed to the principal chiefs at Pipiriki, full pardon from the Government on submission. One of them, Topia Turoa, had come to Wanganui on the 14th March, to consult about the guarantee. That night the murder of Volkner was made known, with the horrible addition of the orgies round the soldier's head at Pipiriki, where Topia had been an accomplice in sanctioning the expedition to Opotiki, although from his youth he had been brought up in familiarity with Englishmen. The Governor saw Topia, who said (15th March) he had no desire to be there, but had come because he was sent for. He would not take the oath of allegiance. The Governor declared that Topia was responsible for the murder by having acted as a Hau Hau priest at Pipiriki, but as he had come to Wanganui under arrangement with Hori Kingi, Mete Kingi, and others he might depart. If even now he would take the oath of allegiance the promises made by the chiefs should be respected. “To-day he may page 291 return up the river. To-morrow a large reward will be offered for his seizure; and if caught, he shall be tried for murder.” Topia replied: “You say that I am implicated in the murders of Mr. Hewitt and Mr. Volkner. It is correct.1 I am implicated in them, and also in the work of the Hau Hau.” The Governor asked Mete Kingi if the chiefs knew that Hewitt's head had been at Pipiriki when they made peace there. Mete Kingi, Hori Kingi, and others said No; and Topia coolly said: “The head had passed on when Hewitt was killed; it was another head.” He added that he had made peace with Hori Kingi, but not with the Europeans. “If you choose to arrest me now, you can. I am willing to be arrested without offering resistance. Do not think to frighten me into taking the oath of allegiance by threats. I will not take it.… I quite agree with what you say about offering a reward for me to-morrow.’ The Governor said: “He had better go at once. I will have no further intercourse with him. Topia left, and the friendly chiefs endeavoured to procure his submission; but he would do nothing more till he had consulted his friends. In after years he was to render signal service to the English. By the Governor's direction a body of friendly Maoris with 200 military settlers under Major Atkinson, the Minister of Colonial Defence, took possession of Pipiriki on the Wanganui river on the 3rd April, but did not capture Topia.

The relations of the Governor with the General were about to be galling to both, and injurious to the service. In apprising the General of Mr. Volkner's death, the Governor told him that it was an ancient custom with Maoris to endeavour to draw off an enemy's forces by committing some horrible murder far away. The murder of Mr. Volkner was marked with all characteristics of that custom. The General on the 14th March attacked a body of Maoris near Patea, and drove them off with some slaughter. One European killed and three wounded, formed the English loss, while eighteen Maoris were found dead, and many more were wounded. The Governor having remarked that the submission of the natives generally might he looked for at

1 It was by implication only that Turoa could be accused of complicity in Volkner's murder. It has been seen that Kereopa's commission from the prophet Te Ua forbade violence towards Europeans.

page 292 an early date, the General in a friendly letter replied: “Their submission never appeared so far off as at present.” On the 17th March, he asked whether in face of probable serious loss in the attempt the immediate possession of the Waitotara block was of such consequence that he was to attack the Weraroa pah, or continue his advance to Taranaki. Sir George Grey said that the question of possession of the Waitotara block had never entered into his calculations. However important the capture of Weraroa was to prevent wrong impressions on the Maori mind, and dominate the adjacent country, in the face of the General's opinion that he had not sufficient force for the task, he could not request him to take it. There was some trouble about obtaining advances from the commissariat chest to the Wanganui militia, but the General gave the requisite orders, grumbling at the same time at the occupation of Pipiriki. If it was to be taken because Captain Lloyd's head had been exhibited there, almost every rebel settlement would have to be occupied in the island. “We have too many irons in the fire.”

In April the Governor sailed for Wellington and the east coast to make inquiries about the murderers of Mr. Volkner. On his way the Ministry advised with him not only on that subject but about rumours, that war was being carried on for the profit and gratification of the colonists, which they warmly resented. On the 7th April, Sir George Grey in a memorandum communicated to his advisers, sympathized with them, and suggested that military aid accompanied by such remarks as those of General Cameron was so undesirable, that it would be better for the colony to see the military force reduced and rely on its own resources. On the 8th, the Ministry concurred; declaring that it could not be hoped that the zeal and energy required for success in the field would be displayed by any officer, however distinguished, in support of a course branded by him with such severe reprobation. The Governor on this occasion wrote his despatch suggesting the withdrawal of troops and an Imperial guarantee for three millions, or a Parliamentary grant for four or five years, which, as has been seen, Mr. Cardwell declined to sanction. On the 4th March, without mentioning the General's comments upon the Waitotara block, the Governor page 293 had recommended that inquiry should be instituted with regard to the purchase, as disparaging rumours had reached him. The Ministry were willing that Sir William Martin should be appointed a Commissioner for the purpose, but they wished to know the name of the Governor's informant. When asked at a later date for his reasons for believing that the purchase was an iniquitous job, the General, whose relations with the Governor were then unfriendly, replied that it was no part of his duty to collect information on such a subject, and he declined to enter into any correspondence with the Governor about it; but he would acquaint Her Majesty's Government with the information on which he had formed his opinions. It was true that the old lust for the Waitara raged in the minds of many. The Defence Minister, Major Atkinson, was one of the Taranaki conspirators who forced upon the Government the robbery of Te Rangitake. But specific proofs were not available for the General. It was difficult for him to show how the passions of men prompted their acts. When he furnished his reasons, they were resolved into a conversation with a stranger.

Facts about the Waitotara block were laid before the New Zealand Assembly in 1863. Dr. Featherston and others indignantly repudiated the General's inferences. General Cameron should have applied his intelligence to the quarrel between the Maori and the colonist at an earlier date. If he could have averted the crossing of the Maungatawhiri he might have had no need to protest against the purchase at Waitotara. There was open rupture between the Governor and General about a private letter of the latter (30th March) concerning the Weraroa pah. To have assailed the natives in a position so advantageous to them would not have punished them. “I have no doubt they would have been delighted if we had attacked their pah, and that they have been as much disappointed at our not attacking them as you and Mr. Mantell (Native Minister) have been. What is it to Mr. Mantell1 or to any other Colonial Minister how

1 The General was unhappy in singling out Mr. Mantell for reprobation. His voice and pen were often used more eloquently than the General's in demanding justice for the Maoris. The Governor was equally unhappy about the same time. It was in April and May, 1865, that he was lamely defending himself against Mr. Fitzgerald's criticisms on the seizure of the Tataraimaka block, the building of a barrack within the territory of Tawhiao, and other preludes to the invasion of Waikato. Mr. Fitzgerald was to become his Native Minister in August, 1865.

page 294 many British officers and soldiers we lose in any operation they recommend, so long as the policy they advocate is carried out. And I confess that this is a point which it appears to me has never sufficiently entered into your calculations.… I have a grave responsibility in the matter, and having already lost a great many valuable officers and men in attacking pahs I think I may be excused if I am somewhat cautious in undertaking operations of that description without the most absolute necessity.”

This imputation of carelessness of soldiers' lives had roused Sir George Grey's wrath, when, on the 7th April, he recommended his advisers to dispense with troops; and when, on the 9th, General Cameron informed him that he had sent copies of the correspondence to the Secretary for War, the Governor cast the button from his foil, regretted that such imputations should have been made against himself and the Ministry, still more that they should have been sent to England unaccompanied by any reply, and added: “You will, I am sure, feel that I cannot after this continue a private correspondence which subjects me to difficulties of this nature” (17th April). The familiar style of friendly address between the Governor and General ceased with this letter, which the latter merely acknowledged. The General was in ill humour with his campaign. He followed the Governor to Auckland to obtain definite instructions. On the 3rd May, he grumbled at the publication by the Ministry of the Governor's memorandum about rumours that the Waitotara purchase was iniquitous. Though the Governor had not pointed out the General as the author or abettor, the Ministers' personal attack on the General showed that they “were fully aware of the person to whom the memorandum was intended to refer.” He would forward copies to England to show how, while engaged in the field, he was attacked behind his back. The Governor immediately furnished the incensed soldier with copies of his despatches to Mr. Cardwell, a courtesy which, at a later date, the General declined to reciprocate, illogically averring that it was unadvisable to comply with the Governor's request at the time, and that there was nothing in the despatches of which the Governor was page 295 ignorant. The Governor had already said that he wished to see them, because Mr. Cardwell wrote that there was a discrepancy between the General's despatches to the War Office and those of the Governor to the Colonial Office. He informed the General that Her Majesty's Government must determine whether the General was justified in creating secretly wrong impressions, “and in now shrinking from giving me an opportunity of giving explanations regarding my proceedings (which I have been called on to furnish), by refusing to acquaint me with the statements you did not hesitate to make, but dare not produce” (10th June). The General replied that he cared not what construction his Excellency might be pleased to put upon his actions. Each blamed the other for unduly communicating, to third persons, confidences which should have been kept sacred.

At this time a very crippling blow was aimed at the position of the Colonial Government; for although Mr. Weld professed a self-reliant policy, he, like others, used Imperial troops. The Commissary-General, Jones, suggested that the presence of the Governor and two Ministers at Auckland made it convenient to settle the long open question of supplies to the Colonial Government as advances from the Imperial chest, which Mr. Jones thought might fairly come to an end in a few weeks, except in such special cases as might be, on precise application, approved by the General. The power of the colony to repay the advances seemed to Mr. Jones “very problematical.” The General concurrred with Mr. Jones, and (5th June) forwarded his letter to the Governor, proposing to cancel all existing authorities (for issues of pay and rations) on the 1st August. On the 9th June, Sir George Grey seriously presented the aspect of affairs to the General's consideration. “If you choose to cancel all the existing authorities… I cannot prevent you from taking such a course, and the colonial officers shall be instructed to afford you any information; but I think it my duty to state why I think it would be disadvantageous to the colony as well as to the Imperial Government that you should at the present time follow” such a course. Negotiations in progress should be speedily closed; the regiments to be ordered to England, and the occupation and maintenance of posts should be decided upon; and the extent to which the commissariat should assist in that maintenance page 296 should be determined. On the 21st June, the General intimated that he would refer the commissariat question to the Secretary for War. As to Weraroa, he had frequently explained his opinions, and the commanding Royal Engineer “fully concurred with me, that a siege of the position is not advisable at this season of the year.” The Governor told the Secretary of State that he believed no other commander in New Zealand had ever gone into winter quarters, and that it was pernicious to leave rebels undisturbed for months close to Wanganui.

General Cameron remained at Auckland, writing despatches to countervail the effect of those which Sir George Grey had sent to England. The reputation of a Governor who had earned distinction, might, he feared, overpower his representations, and on one occasion he specially sent a steamer to Australia to expedite the reading of a despatch in England. The cause of so costly an experiment was the publication, for the use of the Assembly, of the protest of the Ministry against the General's imputation that they were careless of the lives of British soldiers.1 Despatches from Mr. Cardwell and from the War Office contemplated the sending away of five regiments from New Zealand at an early date. Mr. Cardwell wrote (26th April, 1865): “The Secretary of State for War will send no re-enforcements to General Cameron, but will repeat the instructions already given for the withdrawal of five regiments with as little delay as possible, consistently with the safe execution of my instructions to you. On your part you will confine your requirements for the assistance of General Cameron within the limits which I have prescribed.” The Governor's position was oppressive. He was

1 He reported the cause to Sir George Grey, upbraiding him at the same time for communicating the contents of private letters to the Ministers. The Governor replied that the accusations were so serious that they could not be slurred over. The letters containing them could hardly be called merely private, nor had the General treated them as such, for he had himself sent copies of them to the Secretary for War, without giving the Governor or his advisers an opportunity of commenting on them. The Governor had warned his advisers that they ought not to treat the letters as official unless made public by the General. When they were informed that the General had sent copies to England they published them without informing the Governor of their intention, but under the circumstances he thought them entitled to choose their mode of defence against the charges made against them

page 297 supposed to be responsible for the intention of campaigns, and the rebel stronghold stood, idly scanned by British troops, far outnumbering the garrison. Those troops, moreover, must soon depart. The General Assembly was to meet in July. How could the Governor meet it without shame? The General would shake the dust off his feet. He had tendered his resignation in February, and in June he received permission to return to England. He had power to delay his departure, but, looking at the relations between himself and the Governor, saw no advantage in remaining. This was, he said, the fault of the Governor and his advisers. The native garrison was weakened, and in the end of June there were divided counsels in Weraroa. Rangihiwinui wrote to the Governor that a dispute between the military and the militia had impeded the surrender of the pah. The military authorities would settle no terms without consent of the General, who was in Auckland. Several chiefs carried the letter and gave explanations. Sir George Grey wrote to the General. He withdrew himself from the question of removing troops, in which the General left him no power, and begged the latter to act on his own discretion. He enclosed a ministerial minute urging the withdrawal of the troops, and complaining that the General's inaction had marred the campaign. But he did not content himself with writing. He determined to give the General a lesson in the art of war before he quitted the colony. The fiery Von Tempsky had, on the 24th June, tendered his resignation, because the army was not permitted to help him at Weraroa, in consequence of the interpretation put upon the General's orders. The Wanganui Maori contingent was indignant because restrained from attacking the pah.

At Wellington, on the 12th July, the Ministry formally announced that, on the meeting of the Assembly, they would resign. They had on the 11th, with equal formality, declared that they could not recommend an appropriation of £40 per head for Imperial forces in the colony. General Cameron's unfounded charges, and his inactivity, which marred the success of even Colonel Warre's proceedings at Taranaki, prompted the Ministry to abstain from recommending the appropriation for the troops. They based their resignation on the General's conduct. He influenced, if he did not guide, the Imperial page 298 Government. He conveyed hostile criticisms and imputations, and when called on for explanation or information refused to give either. They gratefully acknowledged the constitutional support and efforts of the Governor; they did not doubt the approval of the Assembly; but such an irresponsible authority as that arrogated by the General made their resignations imperative. The Governor enclosed their minute to the Secretary of State, and feared that great political embarrassments would arise. Within a week Sir George Grey was in the field before the Weraroa pah. Already it was suspected, if not known, to be weakly garrisoned. The friendly chiefs had nearly procured a capitulation. Three hundred and eighty Maori allies were camped 2000 yards from it; 130 cavalry (called Bush Rangers), with Major Von Tempsky, were encamped 800 yards from it, and Major Rookes of the militia, under whom Von Tempsky served, was in the Perikamo pah, about 400 yards from Weraroa. Brigadier-General Waddy was with the Governor. Pehimana and Aperahama, chiefs from the pah, awaited his arrival on the 17th July. They admitted that Weraroa pah was built on English property, and were willing to put it in the hands of Hori Kingi, the Wanganui chief friendly to the English. They wished for time to remove the women and children. The Governor granted it. He asked if Hori Kingi would take possession. Hori Kingi had no confidence in Pai Marire fanatics, and declined. The Governor said he would do so, and the chief must accompany him. The rebel chiefs returned to Weraroa to make preparations to receive the Governor. A white flag was flying. The Governor, General Waddy, Major Gray, Captain Bulkeley, Colonel Trevor, and Mr. Parris the interpreter, rode towards it. They were met by Maoris, one of whom inquired whether time to remove women and children would be given. “Yes, that had been arranged.” Were they to be punished for their rebellion? The Governor said all would be pardoned except murderers; and those who returned to their allegiance would be treated in all respects like the Queen's European subjects. The natives said all was satisfactory. Aperahama came out of the pah and requested the Governor and Hori Kingi to enter it. Hori Kingi rode to Sir George Grey's side, saying: “Oh Governor, do not let us go in. Ride up and touch page 299 the fence with your hand, and let that satisfy you. Do not let us go in.” Other natives begged him not to go in, saying that the people in Weraroa were “fanatics, given up to old customs.” Nevertheless, the Governor, Hori Kingi, Hori Kerei, and Mr. Parris, rode on. At 30 yards' distance from the pah, the Hau Hau priest came out and told the natives not to allow the cavalcade to approach nearer. Hori Kingi's keen eyes detected that the guns were prepared in the pah. Chiefs of Weraroa, friendly to the Governor, stood between him and the pah, and begged him to desist. After a time he rode away. Pehimana and Aperahama had not been treacherous, however. Failing to prevail on the garrison to surrender the pah, the former immediately gave himself up. The latter surrendered on the following morning. On the 18th, the garrison made further pretences of surrender, vainly asking the Governor by letter to send away the soldiers.

The Hau Haus did not rely only on diplomacy. Topia Turoa, who bearded Sir George Grey in March, was on the war-track. Captain Brassey, commanding at Pipiriki, was assailed. Friendly natives warned the Governor, and no time was to be lost. On the 19th July, Grey asked General Waddy if his instructions from the General permitted him to invest Weraroa. That officer replied that he could not do so without orders from General Cameron. On the same day the Governor asked if General Waddy would under the circumstances without delay establish a post of 400 men near the camp of Major Von Tempsky, and thus furnish a moral support to the local forces and friendly natives; sending also a detachment of artillery to keep down the fire of the besieged while the local forces and natives worked their way up to the assault. The brave Brigadier consented, alleging as his excuse the time that might elapse if he were to wait for the General's orders from Auckland. The available force consisted of 473 men, viz. 25 Wanganui cavalry, 139 Forest and Bush Rangers, 109 native contingent, and 200 friendly Maoris. In round numbers, therefore, two-thirds of the force were Maoris. Though perched on a high point from which precipices or steep banks descended about 300 feet to the Waitotara river and the Koie where they joined their streams, Weraroa could be commanded by still higher ground on the page 300 opposite or right bank of the Koie, where there was good cover for riflemen. The pah was placed rearwards to the Koie and Waitotara. Its front was strongly fortified, and palisaded rifle-pits seemed to guarantee the darling object of Maori warriors,— the certainty of inflicting loss on their enemy before quitting, if needful, their stronghold. The valleys of the Waitotara and Koie were exposed to fire from the pah, and no danger was apprehended in the rear. A pathway led across the Koie stream, and on the Karaka ridge on the other side was a redoubt built by the Maoris to cover retreat from Weraroa, and facilitate supplies and re-enforcements across the Koie valley, about 500 yards wide. Hori Kerei, to whose father the Karaka range had belonged, explained on the ground the peculiarities of the surrounding forest. At two o'clock in the morning on the 20th July the plan of attack was fixed upon. The Maori allies and native contingent officers unanimously agreed that it was sound. The Karaka height was to be occupied by surprise, a circuitous route to it being taken through dense forest; and thus Weraroa was to be rendered untenable. Early on the 20th, Colonel Trevor arrived with 100 men of the 14th, and encamped on the left front of the pah. At ten o'clock Captain Noblett brought 100 of the 18th, and pitched his tents near those of the 14th. At half-past twelve the colonial and native forces were paraded; and then, by a road unseen from the pah, moved off for the Karaka heights. The weather was cold and rainy. Major Von Tempsky was ill, and Major Rookes took command of the expedition to Karaka. The brave and intelligent Rangihiwinui accompanied him. In front of the pah was Sir George Grey with a few friendly natives, and the moral support of 200 British soldiers, aided by the empty tents which the defenders of the pah believed to be occupied. Till daybreak on the 21st the success of the Karaka expedition was unknown in front of Weraroa. Then some dropping shots announced that Major Rookes and Rangihiwinui had done their work. Cheers were heard from the height, and confusion was in Weraroa. After a march of six hours Major Rookes had gained his position. At half-past four he surprised a native village and outpost, capturing 50 prisoners with their arms, and two kegs of ammunition. They comprised a re-enforcement on the way to join the rebels page 301 in Weraroa. They incommoded him, and he was busy entrenching his position; he could not send them away without dangerously weakening his force. Captain Ross arrived with a letter from him at ten o'clock on the 21st. Colonel Trevor allowed some of the 14th Regiment to guard the prisoners in conjunction with 50 Maoris whom Sir George Grey told Major Rookes to send as escort. To increase the force in front of the pah, the Governor earnestly requested the Colonel in command at Patea to send 200 men immediately to place themselves under command of General Waddy, who was expected on the ground. Captain Brassey was in danger at Pipiriki, and the Maori allies were to help him after the capture of Weraroa. Sir George Grey congratulated Major Rookes.… “We shall make a sham attack on Weraroa from this side to-morrow morning at day-light, and seize a position ourselves.… P.S.—I rely on your having picked shots to give them no peace by day, and ambuscades well planted every night, so that nothing can get in or out in safety.”

To Mr. Cardwell the Governor wrote that his strategic arrangements were defective in one point of view. The force in front was too small; but “the critical position of Captain Brassey and his small force at Pipiriki made it necessary to risk a great deal, and I think that no risk greater than what ought under such circumstances to have been run was incurred.” Major Nixon reported from Wanganui that trustworthy information had arrived that 400 Hau Haus were preparing to attack Captain Brassey. Maori allies wrote to the chiefs before Weraroa: “Friends, the enemy have closed the way to Pipiriki by occupying Te Puha. They have drawn near to the Pakeha; be quick hither.” Before Weraroa the friendly chiefs viewed with alarm the smallness of the force. Blood was thicker than water, and it was felt, though not expressed, that on an emergency Colonel Trevor would convert a moral into a physical force. But the number of the garrison was unknown. Rumours described them variously, from 200 to 600 in number. To remove the just apprehensions of the chiefs, Colonel Trevor ordered up 50 men from Nukumaru, and a like number from Waitotara. Though the 200 men expected from Wanganui had not arrived, and the 200 men at Patea had only just been asked for, the page 302 siege was to be carried on. Colonel Trevor was ready to make his sham attack in the morning. Before sunset the best marks-men in Major Rookes' force dropped rifle-shots into the pah, using sights for a range of 600 yards. The rebels were seen to be in confusion. The Karaka heights commanded their position. They knew not how few were those permitted to fight against them; and their opponents knew not how few formed the garrison. They fled down cliffs and precipices. The Maori allies with Major Rookes perceived that Weraroa was evacuated. At daylight it was entered and handed over to Colonel Trevor by the few Maoris left within it. Far less time was spent in taking than General Cameron had consumed in writing about it, and not a man had been lost. The English knight to whom an Irish garrison surrendered when they saw him bring from the forest a charred log on wheels, which in the Plantagenet days they mistook for a cannon, had been successfully imitated by Sir George Grey, though if the garrison had been as numerous as when General Cameron declined to attack the pah, the result might have been different. The heavy guns ordered from Waitotara were countermanded. The officer at Patea was requested to keep back the 200 troops asked for on the day before. At half-past two in the morning of the 22nd the Governor wrote to Captain Brassey: “I have been in the greatest concern at your position, but have felt the utmost reliance on your courage and prudence, and on the bravery of your men. In the mean time I have risked everything here, to be able at the earliest moment to help you.… We go into the pah at daylight, and at the same hour a large force starts to rescue you. A messenger will take this to you who will manage to get through the enemy. Hold out bravely; within a few hours after you get this you will have help.”

The ‘Gundagai’ steamer and canoes carried the relieving forces. Amongst them were the chiefs Hori Kingi and Te Kepa Rangihiwinui. After the expedition had started a letter was received from Captain Brassey. It was dated 21st July, and announced that he had been attacked on the 19th, but had beaten off the enemy. Ensign Cleary and Sergeant Gourd only were wounded. There were 20 or more casualties amongst the enemy. The Hau Haus were guarding the way to Wanganui. Captain Brassey had page 303 promised the Maori letter-carrier £15 for taking his letter safety to Major Rookes. As some of the rebels could read English the gallant captain added this postcript: “Sumus sine rebus belli satis.” “My cry, if I could make it heard, would be—the M ! M !!” On the 1st August relief reached him. Mete Kingi, Hori Kingi, and others congratulated Captain Brassey in speeches which were published, as was also Mete Kingi's narrative addressed to the Governor. The thanks of the Governor for the conduct of all officers and men engaged in the operations were given in the warmest language. He was not doomed to win applause from his own superiors. The War Office after long incubation hatched new Orders framed to prevent a Governor from interfering, successfully or otherwise, with conduct of a campaign.1

The Ministry on reading Mr. Cardwell's despatch of 26th April, gathering from it that “the discretionary powers recently vested in the General had reverted to the Governor,” and being informed that the General's resignation had been accepted, withdrew their own. The Governor told the Assembly that their resolutions in favour of a withdrawal of the troops had been forwarded, and that recent despatches led to an inference that such a policy would be adopted. Pending the decision of the Home Government he had determined to avail himself of the services of the troops in establishing order between Taranaki and Wanganui. “Contrary to my anticipation, however, considerable delay took place, which involved consequences fraught with disaster, and which led to fresh outbreaks in other parts of

1 Mr. Weld, in July, 1865, wrote a letter to Lord Alfred Churchill, thanking him for advocacy in Parliament of the policy of the New Zealand Government. It was sent to the ‘Times.’ It spoke of the intention of the Ministry to resign, because “all is upset by the political action of Lieutenant-General Sir D. Cameron. He has been writing secretly to the Government, making accusations against the Government and the Ministry, and will not give the particulars or the grounds of his attacks, so that for months we have been condemned unheard… The Governor has been very badly treated, and it will be of course impossible for him to remain in office unless General Cameron is at once recalled… I can hardly believe that 600, or at most 800, half-armed fanatics could battle for months, in a comparatively open country, with upwards of 6000 well-armed Englishmen unless the General was acting upon political motives.” Though it was not written for publication, it was not to be wondered at that Lord Churchill published the letter.

page 304 the colony. I therefore ordered the colonial forces to advance against the Weraroa pah—a movement which has resulted in its capture. The thanks of the colony are due to Major Rookes commanding, and to the officers and men of Her Majesty's European and native colonial forces engaged in this important operation. I also recognize the readiness with which Brigadier-General Waddy, C.B., Colonel Trevor, and the officers and men under their command, afforded me all the assistance that was in their power, though precluded by their orders from taking any active part in the operation against the enemy's stronghold.”1 To the zeal, energy, and ability of Colonel Warre commanding the Imperial and colonial forces at Taranaki, and to the devoted courage of the loyal natives, the Governor paid high tribute. Confident in the capacity of the loyal residents he would issue orders for the return of five regiments to England. He was about to invite certain chiefs to Wellington, and to lay before the Assembly a Bill enabling him to appoint a commission of chiefs to advise upon the best means of obtaining parliamentary representation of the Maoris. (It will be remembered that Mr. Fitzgerald's proposition on the subject was only rejected by a majority of three votes by the Assembly in 1862.) The manner in which the credit of the colony was impaired by the provincial loans in the English market, with some minor matters, was submitted to the serious consideration of the Assembly. Ten new members, nearly all from the Middle Island, had been called to the Council. A Representative having made light of the capture of the Weraroa, attributing it in some degree to General Cameron's previous engagements in the neighbourhood, Mr. J. C. Richmond, the Colonial Secretary, retorted that the General had gone to Weraroa and had seen no way to take it. “Sir George Grey had at once found its weak point, acted on the discovery, and taken Weraroa without bloodshed. General Cameron had come as one of England's promising Generals. He would go back reduced to the reputation of being good enough to lead a regiment which would go anywhere without

1 On seeing this paragraph General Cameron wrote from Auckland: “I positively deny having given any orders to Brigadier-General Waddy, Colonel Trevor, or any other officer which prevented them from taking any active part.”

page 305 leading, whilst Sir George Grey would retrieve a reputation that seemed waning at home, and add to his former character that of a prompt and able General.” Cordial addresses in reply to the speech were carried in both Houses; by the representatives without a division on the 1st,—in the Council, by 20 votes against 2, on the 3rd of August. Mr. Stafford assailed the Government for making roads at the point of the bayonet. Mr. Weld retorted that the House in agreeing to the Roads Bill was pledged to enforce the making of them even at the bayonet's point. He qualified the imperiousness of his tone by urging that the representation of Maoris in Parliament should be accorded.

The General was not tardy in the new campaign allotted to him. His occupation in New Zealand was gone. He hastened to England to stir the War Office against the audacity of a civil officer in taking command in the field; a dangerous innovation, which required to be nipped in the bud. Sir George Grey reported that Colonel Warre marching southwards from Taranaki had met Colonel Weare marching northwards from Waingongoro, and trusted that these events would convince the Secretary of State that he had rightly declined to ask for more troops when importuned by the General, and that if Colonel Warre had been permitted, as requested by Sir G. Grey, to advance from Taranaki when the General marched from Wanganui, the war would have been ended, and vast colonial and Imperial expenditure saved. General Cameron in his last letter about the campaign (26th July), warned the Governor that he would address the Secretary for War on the subversion of discipline, and consequent confusion and disorder, countenanced if not encouraged by the Governor. In unhappy ignorance that Weraroa had already fallen, he defended his indolence about its capture. “All that was to be done was to make the necessary preparations, so that no time might be lost as soon as the weather admitted of the operation being undertaken. In a despatch of the 7th instant, I informed the Secretary for War that I intended to undertake the attack as soon as the weather allowed.” More than common chagrin must have possessed the writer of such a despatch when in a few days he learned that the task which he looked upon as more than could “be done” page 306 had been achieved without loss. If there was in the War Office a spark spretœ injuriœ auctoritatis, he would set a torch to it without delay. In his fury he would include the successful soldier, Colonel Warre. “Privately or semi-officially” he asked certain questions which Colonel Warre answered frankly. The General rejoined (26th August): “It was not without good reason that I asked you the questions, and I fully expected to find what you admit—that you have been in the constant habit of giving your opinions to the Governor and Colonial Minister freely on military subjects of every kind without my knowledge. I can hardly believe that your conduct will be approved by the authorities at home.” He left without giving Colonel Warre opportunity to explain. That officer, in self-defence, informed the Governor that he had exceeded his object when writing to the General, who had arrived at a conclusion contrary to the one intended to be conveyed. “The admissions in my letter to Sir Duncan Cameron were confined to the expression of my opinion privately on all subjects connected with the native insurrection, and in replying to questions verbally on subjects that your Excellency or Ministers, while resident at Taranaki, may have put to me. I appeal to your Excellency whether I ever presumed to offer such opinions as ‘advice,’ or whether I ever originated or suggested any military operations opposed to the known wishes or views of the late Lieutenant-General Commanding.” Sir George Grey sent the appeal to England, with his own assurance that as far as he was concerned the statement of Sir Duncan Cameron was wholly untrue, and he trusted inquiry would be made. It was “but a perilous shot out of an elder-gun that a poor and private displeasure could do” against a General still highly commended and recently knighted in England, and who as he chewed the cud of indignation on the way to Australia, so far lost temper as to write an angry letter to Sir George Grey and insert it in a Melbourne newspaper before it could reach him to whom it was addressed. He charged Sir George Grey with having told General Waddy at Wanganui that had the latter arrived before Weraroa, the Governor would have left the command in his hands. Sir George Grey admitted the charge. “I knew him to be a good and gallant soldier, anxious to do his duty; and I believed if I page 307 only got him into the fray, he would have fought his way well through it, whatever his orders were. The moment therefore I saw him thoroughly engaged in the affair, I should either have left the place, or have served on his staff, if he would have allowed me to do so.” The retort, by comparing Waddy to Cameron, might be effective; but risk to Imperial interests if Governors should in other places involve the Queen's troops in war without the sanction of their commanding officer was too obvious to allow it to be hoped that in this instance success would be honoured. Sir George Grey had done much, but— he had not conformed to military etiquette.

The judgment of the War Office under Earl de Grey in such a case could hardly be doubted, even by those who could not foretell the remarkable treaty of Washington in 1871, by which, under the presidency of the same nobleman, it was determined to scatter international rights and duties to the winds, and coin new terms under which England should admit having done wrong where no wrong was done, and pay a penalty so large that its receivers were unable to apply it in terms of the bond. The decision, or rather indecision, of the War Office, may be told in few words. Lord de Grey thought that Sir Duncan Cameron “had not assumed to himself any latitude inconsistent with the high position he filled” in corresponding with the War Office about the affairs of New Zealand. He admitted that Sir Duncan Cameron ought to have furnished the Governor with copies of despatches “other than those relating to discipline and military routine.” Instead of reprimanding the General for breach of propriety, of a distinct rule of the colonial service, and of a Horse Guards' circular letter (dated February, 1859), he said he would draw the General's attention to the Horse Guards' letter with a view to its being conformed to in future. Sir Duncan Cameron was, it appeared, “not acquainted with the contents of the Horse Guards' letter.” Never was there a grosser instance of a man being less wise than he seemed. Sir Duncan Cameron had left, and was known to have left, New Zealand nearly two months before this injunction was issued. For the General to disobey orders was venial. But Lord de Grey thought Sir George Grey inexcusable for showing to his Ministers the private letters in which they were traduced. page 308 Lord de Grey did not consider the fact that the calumniatory letters had been transmitted to himself justified their being shown to the Ministers, or published by them with their defence, and yet he himself had laid some of them before Parliament without giving Sir George Grey an opportunity of explanation. Mr. Cardwell (25th September), in forwarding Lord de Grey's inane despatch, partially modified its offansiveness to the Governor by saying that it was to be regretted that General Cameron had not observed the regulations. “One of the mischievous consequences of this departure from the rules of the service on his part, probably has been that you, not unnaturally, have suspected that reports had been made unfavourable to yourself and your Ministers to a greater extent than you will find to have been the case.” Mr. Cardwell, assuming that General Cameron's version was correct, pointed out that when the confiscation measures were objected to by the General, the Governor ought to have referred the matter to England, with the General's comments, so that the Secretary or Secretaries of State might decide the matter. It was perhaps impossible to do otherwise than assume the truth of General Cameron's statement that the proclamation of 17th September, 1864, confiscated so much land as to render necessary an augmentation of troops in New Zealand, and was therefore unwise. But by the return mail Sir George Grey forwarded a minute written by the General on the 16th December, 1864, upon a map showing the confiscated lands. The minute declared to the New Zealand Ministry what in the General's opinion “might fairly be considered as conquered territory.” Of two lines, denoted by him, the one selected in the proclamation of the 17th December was that which included least land. How then, asked Sir George Grey, could he suppose that the General objected to the proclamation, and why was he left in ignorance that on the 7th January, 1865, the General had written to the Secretary for War to complain of the terms of the proclamation, which were as much his own measures as the Governor's? The reader need not be wearied by further beating out of the question. The Governor wrote despatch after despatch, which Mr. Cardwell curtly acknowledged and referred to the War Office. Lord de Grey received an explanation from General Cameron, but “did page 309 not think it necessary to send a copy” to Mr. Cardwell, considering “that the time had arrived for putting an end to the painful dispute.” In vain did Sir George Grey appeal for vindication of his character. Lord de Grey's stolidity was more impregnable than the Weraroa pah. When the irate Governor so far officially forgot himself as to state in terms that the General's accusations were “malicious and unfounded,” Cameron was as safe behind the plumbean De Grey as the Hau Haus had been from him behind the Weraroa palisade.

When the Marquis of Hartington (who had been Under-Secretary) became Secretary for War, on Lord de Grey's translation to the India Board, it was hardly to be expected that he would reverse the injustice of his late superior. Mr. Cardwell announced that the new Secretary agreed with the old one.

The skill and gallantry displayed by the colonial forces and friendly natives at the capture of the Weraroa pah were hailed with satisfaction by Mr. Cardwell. As to his personal share the Governor was informed that his assumption of so large a share in the direction of military operations, in presence of the regular forces and of their officers, had given rise to questions on which he would be subsequently addressed.

The proverb that “nothing succeeds like success,” was falsified in Sir George Grey's case. What Lord Palmerston would have done if he had lived, cannot be told. He died in October, 1865. His weaker successor, Earl Russell, either did not try, or failed, to do justice. Sir George Grey was never thanked, although that he had sinned against no defined rule was established by the fact that new Army Regulations were found necessary to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophe which Sir Duncan Cameron had sustained. It was laid down that a Governor, though Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, “is not therefore entitled to take the immediate direction of any military operations.” Sir George Grey told Mr. Cardwell that he had expected to incur animosity by proving that success could be obtained in the field without the sacrifices sometimes made in New Zealand. He would bear the penalty cheerfully. He knew he had done his duty, and that knowledge would sustain him under any attacks, or under any censures or inconveniences page 310 to which Her Majesty's Government might from want of information subject him.1

Some changes were made in the Ministry during the session of 1865. Mr. Mantell retired from the office of Native Minister in July, and early in August Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald, “the orator of New Zealand,” accepted it. He was notable for his desire to accord representation in Parliament to Maoris, and in a few weeks the Governor formally promulgated his readiness to confer with the Maori chiefs as to the manner in which that representation should be conferred. It may be recollected that within a few months of Mr. Fitzgerald's acceptance of office, Sir George Grey had described him as understanding neither Englishmen nor barbarous men.

On the 2nd September, 1865, two important proclamations were made. By one, “with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of the colony,” the Governor confiscated large specified blocks of land belonging to the Ngatiawa and Ngatiruanui tribes. The lust of the Taranaki settlers was gratified at last. The garden of New Zealand was laid bare to their ravages, from the White Cliffs to Waitotara. The Governor in Council, “satisfied that certain native tribes or sections of tribes… having landed properties… have been engaged in rebellion… doth hereby set apart as eligible sites for settlement for colonization (lands described), and doth declare … that no land of any loyal inhabitant within the said districts, whether held by native custom or Crown grant, will be taken except so much as may be absolutely necessary for the security of the country, compensation being given for all land so taken; and further, that all rebel inhabitants of the said districts who come in within a reasonable time and make submission to the Queen will receive a sufficient quantity of land within the said district under grant from the Crown.” The other proclamation

1 One passage in a despatch of 11th December, 1865, was ill-adapted to win favourable consideration for the Governor. “I assert confidently that Sir Duncan Cameron in making such gross accusations against me privately to Lord de Grey, one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, and his Lordship in privately receiving them, are the wrong-doers, and not myself in treating these accusations as publicly made, and in meeting them as having been so made.” The functionary who thus wrote of one Minister to another courted the spurns of which he complained.

page 311 was in the name of the Governor, and did not refer to advice of the Ministry. He declared that “the war which commenced at Oakura was at an end: “that sufficient punishment had been inflicted upon the tribes who had taken arms, their war-parties had “been beaten, their strongholds captured, and so much of their lands confiscated as was thought necessary to deter them from again appealing to arms.” None would be prosecuted for past offences except those concerned in certain barbarous murders which were enumerated as having occurred between March, 1860, and July, 1865, when Mr. Fulloon was killed at Whakatane. Eight occasions were specified, and some of them were not solitary murders. Te Pehi was specially excepted from pardon because “having taken the oath of allegiance… he violated (it)… and treacherously attacked the Queen's troops at Pipiriki.… Out of the lands which have been confiscated at the Waikato, and at Taranaki, and Ngatiruanui, the Governor will at once restore considerable quantities to those of the natives who wish to settle down upon their lands, to hold them upon Crown grants, and to live under the protection of the law. For this purpose Commissioners will be sent forthwith into the Waikato, and the country about Taranaki, and between that place and Wanganui, who will put the natives who may desire it upon lands at once, and will mark the boundaries of the blocks which they are to occupy. Those who do not come in at once to claim the benefit of this arrangement must expect to be excluded. The Governor will take no more lands on account of the present war. As regards the prisoners now in custody, the Governor will hold them until it shall be seen whether those who have been in arms return to peace. If they do so the prisoners will be set at liberty.… The Governor now calls upon all the chiefs and tribes to assist him in putting a stop to all acts of violence for the future.… The Governor is about to call a meeting of all the great chiefs to consult with his Government as to the best means whereby the Maori people may be represented in the General Assembly, so that they may henceforth help to make the laws which they are called upon to obey.… Her Majesty the Queen desires that equal laws and equal rights and liberties may be enjoyed by all her subjects in this island, and to that end the Governor in the page 312 name of the Queen publishes this proclamation.” It is necessary to note the distinct declarations that the Governor would respect the possessions of the loyal; would “at once restore” lands to the Maoris; and that Commissioners would “be sent forthwith” to put the Maoris in possession and “to mark the boundaries.” It will be seen hereafter that these promises were left unfulfilled by Ministry after Ministry, and that the turmoil at the Waimate Plains caused by glaring violation of these promises extorted a Royal Commission in 1880, composed of Fox and Dillon Bell, who were constrained to admit that not only these but repeated promises were broken, and even solemn awards of Courts in favour of Maoris were never carried out. The murder of Mr. Fulloon, specially alluded to in the Governor's proclamation of peace, requires consideration in order that the condition of New Zealand in 1865 may be understood.

On the capture of Weraroa regular war was deemed at an end, and the savage murders by Hau Haus were not allowed to prevent the proclamation of peace. They indeed, like missiles hurled in the darkness, smote the colonists and made them shudder. Plotted in secrecy, they were executed with hasty and cunning ferocity. On the 22nd July, emboldened by the spread of their faith and their impunity after Volkner's death, the Hau Haus murdered Mr. Fulloon at Whakatane, together with the captain and all but two persons on board the cutter ‘Kate,’ which took them thither. They burned the cutter. Mr. Fulloon, a half-caste Maori interpreter, had been allowed by the Defence Minister to call at Whakatane, at his own request, for the purpose of checking the spread of disaffection. In September, in disregard of the old Maori sense of honour, Kereti Te Ahura, a Maori policeman, while engaged in carrving the Governor's peace proclamation, was mortally wounded and robbed near Weraroa by an ambushed party, but was rescued in time to enable him to make a dying deposition identifying some of his murderers. The Governor offered a reward of £1000 for bringing any of the murderers to justice. Mr. Broughton, an interpreter, in obeying Colonel Waddy's orders, was decoyed to an interview on the west coast and murdered. These and other atrocities Mr. Weld's Ministry saw partially punished by the capture of Opotiki in September.

page 313
The fall of the Weraroa pah permitted the withdrawal from the west coast of an expeditionary force of 500 men, composed of military settlers, of Bush Rangers, of the native contingent, and Wanganui Yeomanry Cavalry. H.M.S. ‘Brisk’ aided the landing of the forces in the east, in September, 1865. The native contingent, spread in skirmishing order on reaching the shore, drove the enemy before them, captured a pah, and occupied Opotiki. Captain Hope, of the ‘Brisk,’ wrote: “They were the admiration of all of us. We could see it all from the ship, and it was beautiful.” Special thanks were conveyed to Captain Hope by the New Zealand Government. Major Brassey was in command of the land expedition, and although a want of concord with his subordinates militated against his success, the Pua pah fell into his hands in September, and the enthusiasm of the Whakatohea tribe for the Hau Haus waned sensibly. Some of them voluntarily surrendered with their arms in October. Kereopa was surprised and narrowly escaped capture in the same month. A few prisoners were taken. The Arawa tribe, mean while, displayed signal energy. In September, 1863, they had incurred tribal animosity by preventing the Ngatiporou, Ngatiawa, and others from passing through their territory on the way to Waikato. In pursuing the murderers of Volkner and in resisting enemies they neglected their cultivations, and suffered in killed and wounded. When Fulloon was murdered, Mr. Mair (Mr. Meade's companion at Lake Taupo) started from Lake Tarawera with 200 Arawas, while 150 others proceeded down the coast from Maketu. On the 16th August, the two bands attacked different pahs without success, having no artillery. They then effected a junction, and harassed the Hau Haus, but were unable to attack the pahs, and waited for assistance from the Opotiki colonial force. Being disappointed, they detached an expedition which seized all the canoes at Whakatane, where Fulloon had been murdered. Taking some canoes by the river, and dragging some across a belt of land to a lake in the enemy's rear, they stopped his supplies. The Hau Haus evacuated their pahs on the 10th October, retreating in canoes to the Teko pah on the Rangitaiki river. On the 17th October, the Arawas, still accompanied by Mr. Mair, by Hemipo the guide of Mr. Meade, and by his friend Poihipi Tukeraingi, invested Teko. On one page 314 side was the rapid river, on three other sides smooth declivities. Three lines of palisading, with flanking angles, three rows of rifle-pits and breastworks, contained a fort 90 yards long and 45 yards wide, within which each hut was fortified. A covered way communicated with a landing-place on the river. Three saps were commenced, and under shelter of undulating ground had, in spite of heavy musketry fire, been carried so far that in two days the Hau Haus asked for a truce to arrange terms of capitulation. Firing was suspended for 24 hours, but the sap was proceeded with. Hemipo, whose eloquence aided Mr. Meade at Tataroa, now applied it to save his father Ngaperi in Teko, whom he persuaded to come out of the garrison with more than a score of friends. None of them being implicated in murders, Mr. Mair allowed them to join the loyal Maoris. When the sap was finished close to an angle, and the covered way cut off, the Hau Haus were summoned to surrender. If the place were taken by assault they were promised that no quarter should be given. They laid down their arms. As they marched out, the victorious Arawas leaped from their trenches with a yell, and under the guidance of old Poihipi Tukeraingi danced with fury the maddening war-dance of triumph while the captives stood dejected, and the ground around them shook with the tramp of their conquerors. Amongst the captives were nearly 30 suspected murderers, of whom Mair took possession on behalf of the Government. The remainder were held by the Arawa as prisoners of war. Mair handed his prisoners to the force under Major Brassey, and a court-martial was held early in November upon them. The evidence of two half-caste lads was deemed sufficient to convict many of them of complicity in the murder of Fulloon; but when the sentences were submitted to the Government it was found that the proceedings had been irregular. The offenders were nevertheless indicted again with others before a criminal court. Thirty-five were convicted of murdering or of being accessories to the murders of Volkner and Fulloon. Several were executed; others were sentenced to hard labour. Some were pardoned in after years. The men from Wanganui after these exploits returned to the west coast1 to assist

1 A more detailed account of the expedition may be found in ‘Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand.’ (T. W. Gudgeon.) London: 1879. He complains of the mutinous spirit amongst the Maoris, but excepts from censure Major Kepa, “probably the best Maori officer in New Zealand,” and Lieutenant Wirihana. He tells a singular tale of daring shown by Winiata. During the firing on the Pua pah, Winiata “suddenly rushed to the pah, and regardless of the fire of both friend and foe placed his hand on the palisading, shouting that the pah was his.” That night the enemy pulled down some of their palisading under pretence of surrendering, and rushed out, firing a volley to disconcert the besiegers. In the morning, when the “native contingent were sent forward to attack,” the pah was found abandoned to Winiata and his comrades. Another instance of Maori character is given by Mr. Gudgeon. Amongst the Wanganui men was a prophet Pitau, who, when the expedition started, prophesied: “You will succeed in all things, O Wanganui!—only one man will die, and he will be Pitau.” In the skirmishes Pitau risked his life as if desirous to prove the truth of his prediction. On leaving Opotiki a boat was swamped by the surf, and Pitau was drowned, while all his countrymen escaped by swimming. Mr. Gudgeon thought that Pitau preferred death to loss of “mana” as a prophet, and purposely sunk in the sea.

page 315 General Chute. The Governor reported (5th December, 1865): “Our native forces have arrested 17 natives out of the 23 who are believed to have taken a part in the murder of Mr. Fulloon.”
There were other friendly Maoris besides the Arawa on the east, to whose doings it may be well to refer at this time. Ropata Wahawaha the Ngatiporou chief and Mokena Kohere distinguished themselves, though in so doing they opposed men of their tribes. Although Patara rebukea his brother-prophet, Kereopa, for the murder of Volkner, and declared that his mission was merely religious, he was active in inculcating Hau Hau doctrine. From Opotiki he went to Poverty Bay, where he seems to have counteracted Kereopa sufficiently to save some European lives, and thence he travelled through the Rangowhakaata and Ngatiporou territories towards the East Cape, making large numbers of proselytes. Ropata Wahawaha, Mokena Kohere, and Henare Potae, resisted the infection, and applied to Donald McLean for fire-arms to enable them to defend themselves, and contend in the field against the fanatics. McLean consented. As early as June, 1865, Ropata, with inferior forces, encountered his misguided countrymen, and lost some men, inflicting losses in return. By a brilliantly-executed stratagem of a nature not unknown in ancient Maori warfare he established his reputation. He placed an ambuscade in a creek, and made his army feign a retreat so rapid as to look like page 316 flight. At the creek many of the fliers adroitly strengthened the ambuscade, and several of the pursuers fell, while the startled remainder fled in confusion. It was believed that unless McLean had supplied the needed fire-arms Ropata and his friends would have been murdered, or compelled to adhere to the new tenets which the majority of the tribe had embraced. At McLean's request, the Weld Government sent a force of Europeans to co-operate; and in August, 1865, several pahs were taken, and many Hau Haus were slain. Learning from Henare Potae that the foe had mustered in force at Pukepapa, near Tokomaru, Ropata marched rapidly thither with 100 men, and captured the pah. Some prisoners were taken, and were spared; but a local historian thus records the Maori rigour shown to others: “Among the prisoners were 11 of the Aowera, Ropata's own tribe, and he gave them a lesson in paternal rule that other chiefs might follow with benefit to their tribes.” Calling them out, and saying that they were to die, he added, “‘I do not kill you because you have fought against me, but because I told you not to join the Hau Haus, and you disobeyed.’ So saying, he shot them one by one with his revolver. This affair well finished, the two chiefs advanced upon another Hau Hau position.”1 This was in August. At Pukemaire, in September, the Hau Haus were found to have fortified themselves on a hill. Two wellconstructed pahs were connected by a covered way. Five hundred occupants were in them when Captains Biggs and Fraser with Ropata approached the position in cold and stormy weather. A sap was driven near the works, and a Maori, Tapeka, threw a strong rope (with a bar attached) over the palisading. A Hau Hau cut the rope. Another Maori, Watene, again threw the rope, by means of which Ropata hoped to make a breach by pulling down the palisading. A Hau Hau rushed forward to cut the rope again, but the prompt Watene shot him, and before the dangerous service could be performed by another, a considerable width of palisading was torn down, and the capture of the pah seemed certain, the outworks at one point being in the hands of the assailants. But two Europeans were killed

1 ‘Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand,’ by Lieutenant and Quarter-master T. W. Gudgeon, Colonial Forces, New Zealand. London: 1879.

page 317 and two wounded; while five of Ropata's men were wounded, and Fraser (become a Major) called off the forces. The weather was bitterly cold. One man died from exhaustion on the road; and Ropata, who had entered the breach among the lirst, was so numbed as to be unable to put a percussion-cap on his gun to shoot an enemy who fired at him. Fraser reported that the “rain came down in torrents.” The Maori ardour “was damped,” and “our ammunition ran short, the baggage not having come up as ordered, and I was obliged to withdraw my force about 3 p.m.”1 The retirement from Pukemaire was not caused by any consideration for the lives of the defenders. On a previous occasion (2nd August), Major Fraser having captured a pah close to Waiapu, by a design propounded by Mokena Kohere, wrote: “The bayonet and rifle soon did their work, and the pah was ours. The enemy asked for no mercy, and evidently expected none. The killed in the pah amounted to 22. We took seven women prisoners.” On this occasion the Hau Hau losses (in a few days) were reported as 87 killed, 33 wounded, and 47 prisoners, of whom 42 were wounded. Ten Europeans were wounded; of the Maori allies 15 were killed and 14 wounded. Besides Mokena Kohere, the chiefs Kopu and Ihaka Whanga (who had received the thanks of the colonists by resisting to their teeth the Hau Hau missionaries) took part in the action. Fraser wrote: “The chief Mokena has given us every assistance in his power, and has uniformly shown us great kindness.”
Before the assault on Pukemaire could be renewed the enemy retreated towards Hungahungataroa near Kawakawa. Pukemaire was destroyed by the colonial forces. Biggs, with about 30 volunteers of his own corps and military settlers, and 100 Maoris under Ropata, followed the foe through the mountain forest. Fraser, with 60 Europeans, and the same number of Maoris under Mokena, journeyed by the coast, intending to effect a junction with Biggs. Before he could reach the rebel haunt he heard from a Maori woman that Biggs and Ropata had invested it, and that the Ngatiporou Hau Haus would probably

1 Despatch, ‘New Zealand Gazette,’ 1865. Lieutenant Gudgeon does not record Fraser's published reasons, but says that when success seemed assured, “Major Fraser suddenly ordered the whole force to return to Waiapu, and the chance was lost” (p. 86).

page 318 surrender if their lives were assured. Fraser sent an order on the subject to Biggs. Meanwhile Ropata with the other branch of the forces led the advance-guard, crossing and recrossing the stream in a gorge which led to the rebel stronghold. On nearing it Ropata's band, composed chiefly of his own trusty blood relations, found and shot an enemy in a plantation. Biggs and Ropata then reconnoitred the position. Perched on a hill with two precipitous sides the hunted Hau Haus seemed prepared to sell life dearly. Firing was commenced in the usual manner. It was determined that, while the main body occupied attention in front, Ropata and Biggs with chosen followers should scale the cliff in the rear. The unencumbered Maoris rapidly performed their part,1 while the Europeans in impeding costume toiled behind, although Cornet Tuke led them gallantly. A point was reached from which a plunging fire was poured upon the besieged as they faced their foes in the front. A Hau Hau in a tree was fired at by Ropata's order, and he shouted, “Do not fire, lest you hit me.” Ropata commanded him to come down. He was recognized as the powerful Pita Tamaturi. Biggs came up as Ropata seemed about to shoot him, and asked who he was. Ropata answered, “The man who has brought all this trouble on Ngatiporou, Pita Tamaturi, who brought the Hau Hau religion amongst us.” Biggs shot the man. The place was no longer tenable, and in compliance with the message from Fraser, received at this juncture, Biggs offered safety to “all who were willing to give themselves and their arms up. After about an hour's negotiating the Ngatiporou in the pah consented to do so.”2 Ropata's influence persuaded them. They strove to hoist a white flag in token of submission, while their savage and desperate Taranaki comrades struggled to prevent them. Ropata called on his misguided Ngatiporou fellow-tribesmen to come out, hapu by hapu, and they came, surrendering their arms. The Taranaki fanatics, unable to

1 “The Maoris, bootless and tronscrless, went up the cliff with tolerable ease, but the Pakehas, encumbered by civilization, laboured behind” (Lieutenant Gudgeon's ‘Reminiseences’). Fraser reported that the cliff was most precipitous, and that “great credit was due to Cornet Tuke and the men who followed him.”

2 Despatch from Biggs, 11th October, 1865. ‘New Zealand Government Gazette,’ 1865, p. 346.

page 319 arrest the surrender, and apprehending that their own fate would be less tolerable than that of Ropata's people, scorned to associate longer with the recreants who had broken through their palisading for purposes of surrender. Defiantly, though few in number, they burst through their ramparts in another direction, and dashed down the precipitous cliff, three of them being shot in the act. Before they fled one old man among them said: “If we remain here longer our bodies will soon be the ashes of this pah.”1 Two of Ropata's men were killed in the siege, and 12 of the enemy. The captured Ngatiporou whom Ropata spared were 500 in number, three-fifths of them being women and children. Hungahungataroa was taken in October, and practically Hau Hauism was extinguished among the Ngatiporou. Ropata had established his reputation amongst his people as a general, dreadful in war, but not intemperate in peace. To the submissive he was forbearing, and they could dwell in safety. Leaving the runagates in scarceness, the colonial forces were diverted to Poverty Bay, whither Kereopa had proceeded after the murder of Volkner. The brave Bishop Williams was told by his Maori friends that they would seek out and expel the murderer or hand him over to the Government. He doubted their power to withstand unaided the prevailing tendency to the new cult, and in spite of their remonstrances accompanied them. They found Kereopa at a village where he had already seduced the inhabitants by his wiles, and where the Bishop's friends, before their pastor's eyes, yielded to the example of their countrymen. After friendly reception of them Kereopa offered his hand to the Bishop, who refused to take it. Being asked the reason, the Bishop replied: “Because I see blood dripping from your fingers.” The murderer shrunk back “like a guilty thing:” but the Bishop

1 Lieutenant Gudgeon (in his ‘Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand’) says of this man: “He was right in his judgment, for Biggs and Ropata fully intended to sacrifice them all; but they, now fully alive to the fact, dashed out of the pah as desperate men will do, and sliding over the precipitons cliff, most of them escaped” (p. 88). The above narrative is drawn from Mr. Gudgeon's book, corrected or amplified by the various reports of the officers concerned. If this assertion of Gudgeon be true, Biggs did not intend to comply with the order to extend clemency which he acknowledged (in his despatch) that he had received.

page 320 could not sway his own people, and returned sorrowfully home It was reported that Kereopa afterwards suggested the murder of the Bishop, but the tribe would not allow such a crime to be committed. An old chief, Wi Haronga (who had been a catechist), with a faithful band mounted guard nightly to protect his pastor. When the Bishop, powerless to prevent the moral contagion, left the district in displeasure, the same Haronga guarded his property.
In November, 1865, there had been a large number of Hau Haus, or presumed enemies, gathered at Waerengaahika, a pah situated not far from the abandoned residence of the Bishop. Donald McLean called upon them to surrender their arms, threatening that in case of refusal the dreaded Ropata and Biggs and Fraser would appear upon the scene. The Hau Hau chief Rararuhi Rukapo scorned the proffered terms. The forces arrived, and there was intermittent firing on both sides. On Sunday morning a large number of the rebels approached the English trenches with flags of truce. A volley was poured upon them. Some rushed back to their pah. Some fell to the ground and feigned death. More than 60 were left dead on the field. After a few days the pah was taken. In it were found 63 dead Maoris and more than 70 wounded.1 There had been screaming of women and children while the firing subdued the pah. One hundred and sixty stand of arms were captured. Whether needed for self-defence or war, such a loss was fatal to the losers in such a bloody time. Other small parties in the vicinity were attacked successfully, and many of the Hau Hau chiefs were killed. Major Fraser made a seizure which was to cost New Zealand dear. In the allied ranks was Te Kooti, who always asserted and of whom it was admitted that he had fought for the English at Waerengaahika. Fraser suspected that he had held communication with rebels. In a postscript to his despatch announcing the fall of Waerengaahika he

1 An eye-witness recorded a daring act of Renata Tupara. After a skirmish in which some Hau Haus fell, three of Major Fraser's men, while reconnoitring, saw the bodies of Renata Tupara and two others on the ground. Hearing a noise, after they passed the bodies, they looked round and saw him running away with two guns. He had risked his life to secure them, and feigned death as the Europeans passed. Although fired at, he escaped into the pah.

page 321 laconically said:1 “I have made just now a prisoner of a native called Kooti on suspicion of being a spy.” It was known that the captive had a relative among the enemy. He was not committed for trial; but having been thus arrested without warrant was shipped off to the Chatham Islands by Mr. Stafford's Government, without writ or authority of any kind; and the wrong done to him was to be written a few years later in terrible characters of blood. No one seriously believed that he was guilty of treachery at Waerengaahika. Lieutenant Gudgeon in his ‘Reminiscences’ of the war, says: “There does not appear to have been much truth in the charge, for the men whom he was accused of communicating with were a hundred miles off, nevertheless he was shipped away without trial, and, as many persons assert, without cause except that he was a troublesome, daring man… it is certain that all the after atrocities committed by him were dictated by a revengeful spirit against those who caused his deportation.” The reported firing upon the flag of truce called for inquiry from the Ministry of the by no means scrupulous Mr. Stafford, who became Premier in October, 1865. In a despatch from Waerengaahika (21st November), describing the capture of the pah, Fraser had said that the rebels approached in a large body with a flag of truce. “We, however, providentially did not pay any attention to their flag, as no flag of truce should be respected carried by such a large body of armed men, and I ordered them to be fired on before they could come up with us.” Whether the Maoris at the last moment, seeing the force arrayed against them, desired to close with Donald McLean's proposals, or whether they were practising the deceit attributed to them by Fraser, there is not evidence to show. But Fraser and his comrades, when called upon (2nd December) to explain why he paid no attention to a flag of truce, defended themselves by statements which could only find credence on the supposition that his original report was untrue. They asserted that they did pay attention to the flag, and that the order to fire was not given until a small red cross in the corner showed that it was not a flag of truce.2 Biggs wrote,

1 N. Z. P. P. 1864; A. No. 6.

2 Lieutenant Gudgeon, in his book on the war, without assigning reasons, gives a third version at variance with Fraser's earlier and later statements. Fraser mistook the character of the flags, and “called out to the men not to fire upon flags of truce. Luckily Biggs was present; he knew they were fighting flags, and before the mistake could lead to serious consequences, ordered the men to fire.”

page 322 that “even supposing it to have been a flag of truce, which it was not, after the treachery which the Hau Haus had been guilty of in wearing our badges, I consider that, accompanied as it was by such a large number of armed men, you would have been very much to blame had you allowed the fanatics to come any nearer our position without firing upon them.”

The Government spared no trouble in reducing the east coast to the peace of death. In January, 1866, Major Fraser accompanied the chiefs Kopu, Ihaka Whanga, Karauria, Ropata, Hotene, and Paura Paura, who led 520 men from the Upper Wairoa to Waikaremoana. Biggs advised that the force should march in two columns. Ropata contended that in such a rough country the difficulty of making a simultaneous attack with two forces marching by different roads made the plan of Biggs unwise. Ropata's counsel prevailed. The advance-guard encountered an ambuscade. Ropata scaled a hill and stormed the enemy's rifle-pits on the right; Ihaka Whanga though wounded in several places cheered his men in the gorge; Kopu attacked rifle-pits on the enemy's left, and the Hau Haus were driven headlong, chased by a picked body fewer by far than the fliers. Fraser drew “particular attention to the bravery of Ihaka Whanga, and the skill with which Kopu and Ropata outflanked, routed, and followed up the enemy.” The Hau Haus fled past Onepoto at the Waikaremoana lake, and that stronghold fell into possession of the conquerors. A council of war was held on the following day, at which the chiefs decided to shoot four prisoners, three for “having come from other places to fight the Government,” a fourth for “having previously fought against it at Tauranga.” Major Fraser reported the fact as if such a finding and immediate sentence called for no comment. Lieutenant Gudgeon in his ‘Reminiscences’ avers, that one of the prisoners was a chief of high rank; that Fraser told Ropata “the chief ought to be shot”; that Ropata said, “Shoot him”: that Fraser did not act upon his own advice; and that, “some hours after, finding Tamaionarangi still alive, page 323 Ropata said: ‘You all seem afraid to shoot this man, but I am not’; so saying… he shot him.” Thus was war conducted in the name of the Queen of England. No time was lost in confiscating nearly half a million of acres at Opotiki. A word must be said as to the reward which the Government gave to some of their Maori allies. The Arawa had ever been staunch. Had Mr. Weld remained in office their gallantry would perhaps have been more suitably acknowledged. It is painful to find Poihipi Tukeraingi and others petitioning for justice in 1866. “We paid no heed to the fact that it was the time of putting seed into the ground. We thought not of our wives and children, but only that the Pakehas were to be our parents.… We worked on till the work was ended.… Now we have given up those wicked men into your hands; not one escaped from us; neither did you give us any Pakehas to assist us. The only thing you did was to supply one half of the food, I myself finding the greater portion. Eighty days did we stand up to fight. We did not make a backward movement. The Native Minister came to Maketu. He expressed in words his recognition of our services, but it occurs to our minds that thanks expressed in words only will not keep us alive. That Minister then pleaded that the Government was poor, and told us of a sum of £1500. We were much troubled because the amount was so small, and we wept for our wives and children.… Look also upon the fatigue we endured, and our having plunged into the midst of death in scorn of consequences. Suppose it had been Europeans instead of Maoris, would they have been satisfied with this pay,—£2 5s. per man for three months?… Look upon the money spent by us in this work as compared with the army which you landed at Opotiki, to capture Kereopa and Patara, and which did not accomplish its purpose. Look at the cost of that army. Was it not £40,000 ? To us simple-minded persons it appears that the Government is not poor, inasmuch as it can afford to throw money away upon work which fails in its objects.” These allegations could not be contradicted. Returns showed that in 1864, 1865, and 1866, the Arawa had received about £3000 in rations, £250 as pensions to widows of those who had fallen in battle, and £2600 in money; the last award being £1500, in May, 1866, against the insufficiency of page 324 which they remonstrated. The Native Minister who recommended it was Colonel Russell. Mr. J. C. Richmond informed the committee to whom the petition was referred that the services of the tribe had been “emphatically acknowledged by the two last Ministers,” and that though Colonel Russell gave no distinct promise, he “hinted” in May, 1866, at Maketu, that if the tribe would subscribe for schools and roads the Government might supplement their gifts by grants of like amount. The committee recommended the adoption of this suggestion, and their report was ordered to be printed for the use of members of the House. The sympathy of Mr. Stafford's Ministry went no farther, nor did any member suggest in either House that the Arawa should be fed by further words. The Legislators were busy at the time with a Customs Bill, Land Bills, a Superintendents' Deputy Bill; and, as confiscation had not been sweeping enough, there were amendments required in the Native Reserves Act, although the Native Minister was told in April, 1866, that the session of 1865 had demonstrated the enormous facility with which the Maori reserves could by parliamentary manœuvres be translated into English. The process must be described.

The manner in which the General Government and the Otago Provincial Government conspired to defraud the Maoris of their reserve at Prince's Street in Dunedin; the aid afforded by Mr. Stafford in procuring the Governor's signature, and the obstinacy with which the crime was adhered to after exposure, are too significant to be passed over. The early purchases in the Middle Island (1844) from the natives by the Government, through the agency of Captain Symonds; Mr. Kemp's deed of purchase of the Otago block; and Mr. Mantell's subsequent employment as Commissioner for acquiring lands in the Middle Island, must be borne in mind. Between 1848 and 1856 Mr. Mantell acquired about 30,000,000 acres for about £5,000 plus certain promises, which were accepted by the Maoris on the strength of his word, and which the colonists with a few noble exceptions have deliberately and pertinaciously broken. In 1852 he urged that a small reserve should be made for the convenience of natives visiting Dunedin. Governor Grey consented, and what Mr. Mantell called “the only suitable piece of land page 325 now vacant,” was formally reserved by the Governor,1 at the east side of Prince's Street in Dunedin. It contained three acres. Mr. Mantell was in London in 1856 before it was known that special danger impended over the reserve, but not before his indignation had been roused by the oft-repeated repudiation of promises made by himself and other representatives of the Government. Mr. Labouchere, the Secretary of State, refused to see him on the subject. The correspondence which ensued was lengthy. Mr. Labouchere rejected a suggestion to invite Mr. Justice Martin's aid with regard to the questions raised by Mr. Mantell; who replied that by reference of them to the Governor, who “not incorrectly defined his position as that of a cypher, the Imperial Government practically repudiates the obligations which I had thought it in honour bound to fulfil. I have now only to hope that the General Assembly may take a more enlightened and humane view of the subject.” On the 18th August, 1856, he told Mr. Labouchere: “As you have refused to entertain the claims of the Ngaitahu natives to those benefits which were promised to them on the cession of their lands to the Crown, and it is therefore very doubtful whether those claims will be satisfied, I cannot while such doubt exists continue to hold office in the Department.” He cast away the offices he held, as he could “approve neither of the principles upon which the acquisition of native lands” was “conducted, nor of the policy of the Local Government toward the natives in either island.” The correspondence was referred to Governor Browne; and Donald McLean, then Native Secretary, furnished a commentary which can only be accounted for on the plea that his position rendered necessary a proficiency in those arts of Sir Pertinax MacSycophant which did not commend themselves to Mr. Mantell. The Governor had, in the opinion of McLean, done much at “great personal inconvenience;”—”with the exception of the education of the young, for which purpose there are no funds at your Excellency's disposal, I do not perceive that any neglect has been evinced towards the natives referred to by Mr.

1 Letter from Colonial Secretary Domett to Mr. Mantell, 6th June, 1853 Most of the facts will be found in the ‘Compendium of Official Documents relative to Native Affairs in the South (or Middle) Island,’ compiled by Alexander Mackay, Native Commissioner. Wellington: 1873.

page 326 Mantell.” After this reference to the position of Mr. Mantell, whose voice will be heard again with regard to the native reserve at Dunedin, the proceedings there may now be narrated. After the ominous act of Governor Browne at Waitara, in 1859, we find two of his advisers, Stafford and Richmond, at Dunedin, arranging preliminaries with the Superintendent of Otago, Captain Cargill. The Governor was with them. The way had been paved for them by a convenient report from a Commissioner of Crown Lands, who suggested that the previous Governor exceeded his powers in making the reserve. The Provincial Government had already encroached on the reserve by forming immigration barracks. But it was deemed convenient to remove to another site the attention of any natives who could claim the use of their reserve when visiting Dunedin. Cargill allowed accommodation to be made for them on land held in trust as a site for public buildings. When sufficient time was supposed to have elapsed a new Superintendent, Major J. L. C. Richardson, took another step. The discovery of gold-fields gave sudden value to commercial sites. Authority was obtained for a Commissioner of Crown Lands, the convenient Cutten, to let reserves, and in February, 1862, a portion of the coveted plot was let in sixteen allotments for one year for an aggregate sum of £2136 12s. 9d. The deposit money was placed by Cutten “under a separate head from other Crown revenue, to await instructions for its disposal.” That such a sum should go towards fulfilment of pledges made to Maoris was repellent to Cutten as well as to the Otago Provincial Council. In November, 1862, Cutten asked for leave to pay on demand of the Town Board the cost of making a footpath (£604 12s. 1d.). Precise as to the amount, he gave no hint that the reserve had been even claimed on behalf of the natives. The authorities in Wellington “suspecting” it to be “a native reserve,” instructed him to give further information and in the “mean time to refuse payment of the rate.” After a month he furnished a report, admitting that Mr. Mantell had recommended the reserve, but concealing the fact that the Governor had complied with the recommendation, and urging that the rate should be paid. In July, 1863, the Treasurer (in Domett's Ministry) authorized the payment. The accumulating annual rents amounted to page 327 about £6000 in 1864, and under the administration of Whitaker and Fox the Otago Provincial Government thought they could depend upon support in an attempt to impeach the validity of Sir G. Grey's reservation for the natives. Mr. Harris, Superintendent of the province, plied Mr. F. Dillon Bell with arguments which were conveyed to Mr. Fox. Mr. H. T. Clarke, the resident magistrate at Invercargill, was authorized “to go into the matter with the Provincial Government and Mr. Cutten, and to report.” He forthwith visited Dunedin and waited upon Harris and Cutten, but “could not obtain any positive information on the subject.” They had no desire for an honest inquiry. “To draw from the provincial authorities the point at issue,” he wrote a letter, asking for their statement and any documentary evidence in support of it, and “promised to call for an answer in six weeks. I did so, but no answer was ready, nor have I since received any reply.” Mr. Clarke, for whom one feels instinctive respect because conspirators shrunk from him, examined the original (Kemp's) deed of 1848, and found these words duly attested in English and Maori by English officers (R. A. Olliver, Commander H.M.S. ‘Fly’ being one): “Our places of residence and our cultivations are to be reserved for us and our children after us, and it shall be for the Governor hereafter to set apart some portion for us when the land is surveyed by the surveyors.” “This, I presume (he wrote to Mr. Fox 24th October, 1864), apart from any other power which the Governor may possess, should set the question at rest.” Mr. Clarke was to learn the melancholy difference between what should have been, and what was, the conduct of affairs in New Zealand.
The Whitaker-Fox Ministry left office in November, 1864, and there was a prospect that Mr. Mantell, as Native Minister, might stay the injustice on which the Otago authorities were bent. He brought the subject under the notice of Sewell, the Attorney-General. It appeared that it was not until Sir George Grey had left the colony that doubts were suggested as to his power to make the reserve. Mr. Weld, in March, 1865, thought the matter ought to be dealt with, and the Otago Superintendent (Harris), fearful lest justice should be done, intervened with a plea that the reseive, if made at all, was made without “the sanction of the local authorities at Dunedin.” He averred page 328 that he was instituting a search “to discover some documentary evidence” such as Mr. Clarke had asked for in 1864. It is difficult to believe that he thought he was telling the truth when he wrote that he was not “fortunate enough to see Mr. Clarke” on his second visit, that he could discover no letter from him in the office, and that he “concluded that Mr. Clarke was satisfied that the objections verbally urged by (Harris) were sufficient to deter the Government from taking further steps” for (what Harris called) “alienation of the public reserve in question.” Major Richardson (Postmaster-General in Weld's Ministry), was at Dunedin at the time. He was a representative of the district, and Harris was warned by him that as the “Government had arrived at the conclusion that no claim exists on the part of the Provincial Government,” it was evident “that not a mail should be lost in making known” to Mr. Weld any claim to be made. Thus stirred, and hearing with agony that the Commissioner of Crown Lands, Cutten, had been ordered to pay to the Sub-Treasurer of the General Government the rents in hand (£6031 18s. 9d.), Harris formulated his claim. Its spurious nature may be gathered from the fact that he founded it partly on intentions implied in letters written by officers of the New Zealand Company in 1847; i.e. before the natives had sold the Otago block to Mr. Kemp. The Provincial Council supported him by a report which was equally irrelevant Some of the original settlers would, they said, have insisted in 1848 on selecting the “very spot” if they had not trusted that it would be used for “public purposes.”1 Mr. Richardson in June did battle for his covetous constituents. He regretted (June, 1865) that Mr. Mantell had, in the memorandum put before Sewell, recorded that in 1861 it had been urged that the reserves at Port Chalmers and Dunedin were “too valuable for the natives.” Such grounds would be “evidently most unfair.” He did not know whether there was “any documentary evidence to show that such a plea was ever seriously urged.” Richardson only desired “a fair hearing” for the province. Mr. Mantell drew

1 The pliant Cutten, in his report of 1858, burlesqued the settlers' claims. He insinuated that they were anterior to those of the Maoris. The Governor could not (he thought) reserve land for natives which had “been already set apart” by the Otago Association !!!

page 329 up a minute on the case. No unbiassed mind could fail to agree with it. The absurdity of impugning the Governor's power to make the reserve was brought into bold relief by proof that at the date of the reserve both the Otago Association and the New Zealand Company were defunct, and on the Crown had devolved any control which might previously have been vested in them. Mr. Mantell relieved Richardson's mind by admitting that he knew of no documentary evidence of the plea that the land was “too valuable for the natives.” But Richardson had urged it to Mantell in a conference, though Cutten “immediately protested against it. For me, my surprise at such an argument from such a source deprived me for the moment of the power of replying. While I willingly acquit my honourable colleague of having the least desire now to advance such a plea, I cannot believe with him that it is one which would find no advocates in Dunedin, or indeed any other town in New Zealand.” The Attorney-General gave his opinion on the 29th June. It was clear. The land had been duly reserved for the natives, and there was no “ground upon which either the Provincial Government of Otago, or any municipal body” in Dunedin, or any private individual, could impugn the reserve. The rights of the New Zealand Company had devolved on the Crown by surrender of their charter in 1850. “The right of the General Assembly had not come into existence under the Constitution Act” when the Governor, armed with all the “rights and powers vested in the Crown or the company, amongst others the power of setting apart reserves,” exercised them in making the reserve at Prince's Street. The company had done nothing to bind even its own discretion as to the land when the charter was surrendered; the province of Otago was not even in existence when the reserve was made, the validity of which “cannot now be impugned” on behalf of the province, the dead Otago Association, any “aggregate body of settlers, or any individual purchaser.” Mr. Sewell under-rated the rapacity of the men of Otago. The land was indeed, in the eyes of Richardson and his accomplices, “too valuable for the natives.” Governor Browne's verdict that, recte aut quolibet modo, some colonists would seize on Maori lands was to be glaringly exemplified. The Otago Provincial Council requested that no Crown grant might be page 330 issued till they had “had an opportunity of appealing to the House of Representatives.” The Assembly met on the 26th July. On the 1st August a Select Commitee was appointed. Mr. Reynolds from Otago was chairman. Mr. Stafford was a member. On the 25th August, 1865, they reported that “after careful consideration” as to the equity of the case, they had “arrived at the conclusion that the land was wrongfully set aside for the use of the natives,” and that a Crown grant ought to be “issued in favour of the municipality of Dunedin.” The report was unanimously adopted in the committee, but a like disgrace did not befall the House. Mr. Mantell moved that as the land was claimed as a native reserve the claim should be decided upon by the Supreme Court, and the Government should facilitate the trial. Such a dispute submitted to such an assembly could find but one solution. Mr. Mantell was defeated by 29 votes against 17. With bitter irony Mr. Mantell (1866) wrote that, though he was willing to believe the proceedings perfectly parliamentary, it forewarned all who took an interest in Maori rights that “the time might not be far distant when by precisely similar and equally parliamentary action there may remain in the whole Middle Island, and in any part of the Northern Island in which our perceptions of justice are not strengthened by our fears, not one acre of Maori land or Maori reserve which shall not have been appropriated to provincial uses.”

Justice may halt, but it is grateful to reflect that she was not without a witness to denounce at the time the flagrant contempt for right which a majority of the House was so ready to display. Mr. Weld deserves perhaps peculiar honour. He was warned that if he would not sanction robbery, he would lose certain supporters. The ignoble threat was despised. Those who made it were more firm in falsehood than they had been in faith, and Mr. Vogel was able as an ardent advocate of provincialism to move a resolution about the appropriation of a Stamp Tax which caused the deserted Weld to resign. By retributive justice upon the deserters, the advocates of provincial privileges were in their turn abandoned by Vogel. Mr. Weld retired, and Stafford became Premier on the 16th October. The parliamentary session ended a fortnight afterwards, and the way was clear for the Dunedin intriguers. Stafford, who had supported them openly page 331 would not withhold secret aid. The pliant Commissioner of Crown Lands applied on the 4th November for a grant of the reserve to the Superintendent of Otago. He was careful not to describe it. He said it was needed for “public utility.” The schedule containing it mentioned it as “a piece of land situate in Prince's Street, Dunedin.” The description of another grant, applied for in the same schedule, specified the number of the block and of each section thereof, with the purpose in view—a “public hospital.” Mr. Stafford, who knew the ground well, and had with Mr. Richmond examined it in 1859, affected not to observe that the application related to the reserve reported on by the Select Committee on which he had served. He suggested (21st November) to the Superintendent of Otago, Thomas Dick, that “the object of the trust” should be more particularly specified. Dick, with equal affectation, requested that the land should be granted “as a reserve for wharves and quays.” But the plot was to be effected by stratagem. It might be that Sir George Grey would have qualms of conscience if proved to have knowingly signed the grant against the issue of which Mantell, Fitzgerald, Weld, Sewell, and Fitzherbert had openly protested. It was made to appear that the grant was inadvertently signed by the Governor on the 11th January, 1866. As the circumstances were investigated by the Native Affairs Committee in 1877 on the petition of Taiaroa, a Maori representative, two witnesses—Sir George Grey and Mr. Stafford—are perhaps entitled to explain in their own words the part they took in issuing the grant. Both attributed the culmination of the long conspiracy to inadvertence. Sir George Grey said: “Discussions had taken place between myself and law officers, and I had resolved that I ought not to sign the grant until the matter had been further discussed. A number of grants were presented… I believed that one of them… was the grant for this land, but I could not positively identify it. (The vagueness of the schedule will be remembered); and as the Colonial Secretary (Stafford), who presented the grants to me, was perfectly satisfied that it was not the grant for this reserve, I signed it. Subsequently it turned out that the grant had been signed. It was done under a mistake… It was discovered the same day that the grant had been signed improperly, and the Government tried to recover page 332 possession of the grant, but it was found that the grant had been sent off that day in a vessel going to Otago, and in that way the land passed… Mr. Stafford found out that the mistake arose from the negligence of a clerk in the Crown Lands Office.… Mr. Domett, then Commissioner of Crown Lands, whom I sent for, told me how the error had occurred.” Mr. Stafford testified: “As far as I can recollect, I think it probable that neither the Governor nor myself were aware when that particular grant was signed… I think it is very probable that this grant may have come up inadvertently with a number of others, and in the same way may have been sent on by me to the Governor for his signature. I have used the word ‘inadvertently’ because I have some recollection—I will not be quite positive1 about it—that I had given a special instruction that that grant should not be sent on for signature without my attention being called to the fact.… I believe, although I will not be absolutely positive at this length of time, that I gave (such) instructions.… I have been informed that Sir George Grey, who was then Governor, has stated that he put some questions to me with regard to this grant. I have no recollection (that he) ever put questions to me about any grant whatever at any time. But if Sir George Grey says he is perfectly certain he did put such questions to me, I am not at this length of time prepared to say that he did not, but I have certainly no recollection of (his) having at any time questioned me as to a grant, and I think if such an occurrence had taken place I should have recollected it.…”

The doctrine of probabilities coined by Mr. Stafford in 1877 needs not the wit of Pascal to expose it. The Governor had written in 1867 that “his responsible advisers” advised him to sign the Crown grant. Mr. Stafford might perhaps refuse to accept the Governor's evidence. But his own words convict him. If he had been honest, in the first instance, he would have ordered, not that the “grant should not be sent on for signature without (his) attention being called to the fact,” but that it should not be sent at all, or even be prepared. If he and his colleagues had been honest, their first step after what they chose

1 Positive assertion on this point would have somewhat jarred with the recollection of Stafford's connivance in supporting the grant in the House shortly before he presented it for signature.

page 333 to call “inadvertence,” would have been to assist the Governor in the immediate revocation of the grant. The Governor himself did not display the vigour shown by Sir W. Denison in Sydney when his Minister declined to put the seal to a grant of which the issue was demanded by law. Sir W. Denison said that if his adviser would not affix the seal he (Sir W. Denison) would do so; and acted accordingly. It satisfied the New Zealand authorities to commit a wrong, to attribute it to the blunder of a clerk,1 and to make no attempt to redress it. The conspirators at Otago affected no concealment, and made no excuses. Their next step was calculated to undeceive any one who professed to have been misled before. On the 29th January, the Dunedin town-clerk applied for “certain moneys in the hands of the General Government on the account of the reserve lately known as the Maori Reserve, Prince's Street, South Dunedin.” There was no unwillingness to define the land as the Maori reserve after it had been purloined. Mr. Stafford did not protest that the grant had been inadvertently made, but thought there was “no power to transfer” the accrued rents, and would introduce a Bill in the “next session for determining doubts as to the appropriation of the land and the funds arising out of it.” A general election was held in March, and Cargill, Macandrew, Dick, Reynolds, and Richardson, were again returned, and Stafford was loth to offend them. Richardson became his colleague in August, 1866. The chief Taiaroa, hearing of the fraudulent grant, wrote (5th August) to the Governor: “It was wrong to

1 As these pretences may appear incredible in England unless vouched by a responsible Minister, it may be well to quote what Mr. J. G. Richmond (a colleague of Stafford) wrote in October, 1867: “The Government proposed an amicable suit… The Provincial Council never acquiesced… Mr. Stafford was advised that to bring the matter into Court a grant must issue to one party or the other, and had intended to recommend a grant, but in the mean time, inadvertently as regards his Excellency and the Colonial Secretary, a grant which had been prepared on the authority of the resolution of the House of Representatives was presented for signature and issued.” Mr. Richmond exempts others from the excuse he pleads for Stafford. Moreover, though Stafford's offer to try the matter before the Court was made nine months after he had issued the grant, Richmond's memorandum implies that the offer preceded the grant. Shortly after these transactions the Governor told the Secretary of State that the debates, legislation, and Acts of the Assembly would be “admitted to be creditable to their humanity.” If so it was of low type.

page 334 take away our land without cause.” After long delay Mr. Stafford (16th October) told the Superintendent of Otago that the Government were “of opinion that the question of the validity of the grant should be submitted to a proper judicial tribunal.” He proposed to bring the matter before the Supreme Court by Writ of Intrusion. Mr. Dick replied: “I decline to try the validity of the Crown grant by the course proposed, on the ground that the Provincial Government cannot recognize any Maori right or title to the reserve in question, which point, it it was understood, had already been definitely decided by the General Assembly.”

In 1866 Stafford introduced a Bill “to declare the Superintendent of Otago entitled to receive” the rents held by the Government. The Lower House passed it without amendment. In the Upper House it was “ordered to be read a second time that day six months.” The foiled conspirators renewed their efforts in 1867. The Parliament had no sooner assembled in July, than Harris, Reynolds, Vogel, and Macandrew (Superintendent of Otago as well as a representative), with twelve other legislators, in a formal document urged Stafford to pay immediately without aid of law the coveted rents. They made no reference to the rejected Bill of 1866, but pleaded that great injustice would be done to the Dunedin municipality if the accrued rents which it had calculated upon should be retained for the defrauded Maoris. The elastic Stafford consented “that the payment requested should be made,” and would “consider in what manner this can be legally effected.” It was found that, as the reserve was vested in the Superintendent of the province, he (Macandrew) “only, and not the Corporation of Dunedin, could be recognized as the recipient of the rents.” Stafford was advised that, as proceedings were threatened in order to obtain “a declaration of the invalidity and cancellation of the Crown grant,” he would not be justified in handing over the accrued rents without an undertaking on behalf of the province, that in the event of the grant being declared invalid in a court or by the legislature, or in the event of the right of other persons to the rents being established, “the moneys paid over will be refunded to the Colonial Treasurer.” On receipt of such an undertaking Stafford would part with the money. Macandrew, page 335 on the 25th July, refused to contract such an obligation; and on the 30th, Mr. F. Dillon Bell placed his services at the disposal of the conspirators and introduced a similar Bill to that of 1866.

Meanwhile the rightful owners were not silent. John Topi Patuki, on his “own behalf, and that of the Ngaitahu and Ngatimamoe tribes,” prayed the Governor (15th July, 1867) to permit and enable them to ascertain before the Courts “whether or not a remedy can be found for a great wrong and infringement of our rights which we conceive to have been committed.” They had received no warning of an intention to take away the reserve; they believed the grant to the Superintendent “illegal and void,” the land having been reserved for the tribes, and Patuki prayed for leave to institute proceedings by scire facias, in the name of the Crown or otherwise, for obtaining the repeal of the grant. His solicitor was informed on the 18th July that the Governor would allow the “use of the name of the Crown” in the proceedings, but expressed no opinion as to the validity of the grant. It is almost needless to say that the upright Mantell was consulted. On the 25th July, Mr. J. C. Richmond, “understanding that he had consented to assist the natives,” informed him that a sum not exceeding £200 would be at their disposal in prosecuting the suit. On being applied to, the Attorney-General (Prendergast) returned the writ with the endorsement (6th August), “upon the usual bond for £500, let the writ issue.” Mr. Mantell wrote (7th August) to Mr. J. C. Richmond, that, as the Government held the accrued rents, exceeding £6000, he had no hesitation in asking him to indicate how the Attorney-General's demand was to be acceded to. On the 19th August, Richmond informed Mantell that the “Government having at or near the time of my promise (of pecuniary aid), entered into an arrangement altogether inconsistent therewith, have considered it proper to withdraw the guarantee in question,” admitting at the same time responsibility for costs incurred to date. The “arrangement” proved to be Stafford's obedience to pressure. He agreed to pay the accrued rents to Macandrew without prejudice to any rights of the natives. The motive of the arrangement was to ensure that no part of the rents should be available for the Maoris. They were to be defrauded of the income as they had been defrauded of the page 336 estate. On the day on which Richmond revoked his promise, Mantell sent to the Governor a petition from Patuki to the Queen. It referred to the honourable engagements entered into by Her Majesty in the treaty of Waitangi, and prayed that any Bill, deciding by legislation questions which ought to be tried judicially, might be disallowed. When the Maoris parted with their lands, they were not “accustomed to scrutinize narrowly deeds” submitted to them for signature, but were “ready to regard as equally sacred and binding” assurances made to them in Her Majesty's name by one of her officers. The petition set out the facts of the case, and the objections to the Bill then before the New Zealand Parliament, wherein the Maoris were unrepresented. Similar petitions were laid before both Houses of the Assembly. Mr. Mantell was justly indignant. Misled by Richmond's recanted promise he had incurred expenses. Patuki had journeyed to the south, and had tendered the bond for £500 demanded by the Attorney-General. “Whether” (Mr. Mantell bitterly said) “that unfortunate chief can withdraw this guarantee with the facility which you appear to believe attends a similar but far less justifiable act on the part of the Government, the Attorney-General can inform you.… In this dilemma the Government proposes now to assume a position of absolute passiveness, withholding from suitors of its own creation enough of their own money to pay their expenses.… Of the choice thus made by the Government there is, I fear, but one opinion open to any man who cares for the reputation of the colony and his own honour.” Richmond, 26th August, replied that Mantell's injurious remarks would require notice when “a more temperate view” could be taken, and that the Bill before Parliament had been amended so as to make it clear that it did not confirm the Crown grant or prejudice suitors. Expenses authorized by Mr. Mantell before Richmond revoked his promise would be paid. The Bill brought in by Mr. F. Dillon Bell, on the 30th July, “declared that the Superintendent of the province of Otago, and his successors, are entitled to the said sum of £6031 18s. 9d.

On the 6th August, on Mr. Bell's motion, his Bill was laid aside, because “the Government had taken the matter up.” On the 7th, Stafford introduced a similar Bill, but said that it had no other object than to enable the Treasurer to pay certain page 337 moneys to Macandrew, in trust for certain purposes. On the 23rd August, the Petitions Committee recommended (on Patuki's petition) that a clause should be inserted in the Bill to the effect that nothing contained in it should “prejudice the claim and title of the petitioner and his tribe.” On the same day Stafford agreed to omit from his Bill the words, “it is hereby declared that the Superintendent of the province of Otago and his successors are entitled to the said sum of £6031 18s. 9d.” It was trusted that if macandrew could lay hands on the money, the Maoris would never recover it. The Bill was read a third time on the 10th September, and sent on the 12th to the Council, in which Mr. Mantell had a seat. There would seem to be an atmosphere in an Upper House which renders it more trustworthy when honour is involved than the more eager and unscrupulous Chamber, chosen, not so much because the general characters of its members command respect, as because at the period of election they profess concurrence with the clamour of the hour. Drawn from the same elements as the representatives, but by a different process, the Council dealt differently with Patuki's petition that the Bill might not be passed, but “that the whole question be dealt with by a judicial tribunal.” The petition was referred to the Committee on Public Petitions. On the day on which the Bill reached the Council the Committee reported on the petition, that, “inasmuch as the question referred to them… appears to be one which can only be equitably and satisfactorily decided by the Supreme Court, in which it is shown that an action relating to it is already pending, the prayer of the petitioner be acceded to, and that no measure in any way affecting the question should be entertained until such decision has been given.” The Council read the Bill a first time on the 12th September, but on the 17th, on the motion of Mr. Menzies, adopted without a division the report of the Committee on Patuki's petition. The Bill lapsed. But while the Houses were still in session, Stafford (24th September) audaciously paid the accrued rents to Macandrew, who, to secure them, consented on the 12th September to give the guarantee which he had previously refused. So hurriedly was the misappropriation effected, that in the next session a Select Committee of the Lower House reported that it was irregular, and that under page 338 all the circumstances, “special reference being had to the loss of the Bill which was introduced for the purpose of authorizing the payment, the money ought not to have been paid.”

The later arts practised by New Zealand public men in consummating the fraud by which the Maoris were robbed of their reserve at Dunedin, concern the time when the scire facias writ was issued and argued, and an appeal to the Privy Council was made. Maori members had then, taken their seats in the Assembly, and Taiaroa, who represented the southern Maori district, exercised some influence, though he could not altogether thwart the designs of Macandrew and his abettors. Some minor portions of the conspiracy which Stafford's Government aided in 1867 may be briefly alluded to. While apprehensive that the loss of the Bill of 1867 might prevent his acquisition of the accrued rents, Macandrew trafficked with the Government to induce the Maoris through their solicitor to accept another piece of land instead of their own, and promised to spend £1000 in enclosing and building on it a hostelry.

The Ministry kept back Patuki's petition (of 17th August) to the Queen until October, when they had paid the rents to Macandrew. Sir George Grey sent it on the 8th October, with an explanation from Mr. J. C. Richmond, who said it had “been held back in the hope that an arrangement of an equitable kind might be effected by the two claimants—the province and the Ngaitahu tribe.” Mr. Richmond said that the fraudulent grant to the province was “inadvertently as regarded his Excellency and the Colonial Secretary presented for signature and issued.” The Governor told the Secretary of State that his “responsible advisers inadvertently advised” the signing, which he did “in ignorance of what (he) was doing.”1 Another meanness was perpetrated. A memorandum written by Mr. J. C. Richmond on the 26th October, 1867, informs us that “his Excellency stated that he thought the expenses of a suit for testing the validity of the grant should be borne out of the accrued rents of the reserve. That fund is no longer in the Treasury.” But

1 The Governor added that he had “sincerely desired that the case should have been compromised in a generous spirit towards the natives in the Middle Island, who parted with large tracts of land to this Government for an almost nominal consideration.”

page 339 the Ministers would not object to his Excellency's taking money for the suit from “other rents of native reserves;” and the Governor accordingly directed the payment of £400 to be advanced out of “moneys arising from native reserves” in which the Ngaitahu tribe was interested. Thus the tribe were first robbed of their reserve and mulcted of other property in their effort to obtain justice. It was ordered in the Executive Council that the moneys advanced should “be repaid with interest thereon as shall be hereafter directed.”

The reader may desire to know what was the response of the Secretary of State to the petition of Patuki. The Duke of Buckingham (21st December, 1867) informed Governor Bowen that it had “been laid before the Queen, but I have been unable to advise Her Majesty to take any steps in relation to it. I observe, however, that the Bill to which he refers, and which appears to have been intended to legalize the provisional use by the Otago Government of £6000, is alleged to have been withdrawn.” If the Duke had observed the larger questions at stake he kept silence about them. As far as he was concerned the Queen's honour and the guaranteed rights of the Maoris were remitted to the mercy of Macandrew. How it would be exercised may be inferred from the fact that on one occasion Macandrew being arrested for private debt while Superintendent of the province, used his power as such Superintendent to issue a proclamation, and declared his own house a gaol in order to defeat the law. The only safeguard to which the Maoris could look was the dread by their conspiring enemies of exposure by the keen and capable Mantell. But past experience had bitterly shown how difficult it was to wring from public men in New Zealand any justice to Maoris, or to extort respect for the plighted word of the Queen.

In the year following that in which Mr. J. C. Richmond wrote that the “Ministers would not object” to the Governor's abstraction of Maori money to enable the surreptitious grant to Macandrew to be tested, a Native Lands Court was held in the Middle Island, and a glance at its proceedings is needful. It sat at Canterbury during that portion of Mr. Stafford's administration which followed the junction of Mr. Hall with his old opponent. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Mantell to attend as a witness, page 340 and he did so. In delivering judgment on one (the Rapaki) case submitted to them, the Court said it “could not fail to be struck with the remarkable reservation (in the Ngaitahu deed) by the vendors of all their ‘pahs, residences, cultivations, and burial-places, which were to be marked off by surveys, and remain their own property.’ This provision has not, according to the evidence, been effectually and finally carried out to the present day, nor has any release been sought for by the Crown. … The Court feels very strongly that it would be greatly to the honour and advantage of the Crown that the stipulations and reservations of these deeds of purchase should without further delay be perfectly observed and provided for.” One claim (Kaitorete) comprised a strip of land (between Lake Ellesmere and the sea at Bank's Peninsula) of from 12,000 to 15,000 acres, and the power of the Government was brought to bear against the claimants, Heremaia Mautai and his friends. Mr. Rolleston, under the style of Crown Agent, acted for the Government, and had subordinate aid. Mr. Hall was present to assist if higher power should be needed. The Chief Judge Fenton sat with a Maori assessor, Pukuatua, an Arawa chief. On the 28th April, 1868, Mr. Hall intervened; and after discussion between himself and counsel on both sides the case was adjourned, “in order to see whether any arrangement could be made in the matter,”1 between the Government and the natives. No agreement was arrived at, and to coerce Mr. Cowlishaw the Maori counsel, Mr. Hall signed an “order of reference” of a singular character under the Native Lands Acts 1865 and 1867. The 83rd section of the Act of 1865 enacted that with regard to agreements past or future made between Maoris and officers treating for cession of lands, the Governor might refer the agreements to the Court for determination, but it excluded until the 31st December, 1866, any outstanding agreement, “unless the Governor shall otherwise direct.” The Act of 1867 prolonged the exclusion until the 31st December, 1868. Many months would elapse before that exclusion would cease to operate, and the Governor was not present to “direct otherwise.” But few

1 ‘Compendium of Official Documents relative to Native Affairs in the South Island.’ Alexander Mackay, Native Commissioner. Vol. ii. Nelson: 1872.

page 341 New Zealand statesmen regarded the law when Maori interests were at stake. Mr. Hall, on the night of the 28th April, signed an order referring the agreement of 1848, and wrote that he did so “by command.” Mr. Cowlishaw objected that the Government could not thus interfere when the case seemed unfavourable to them. Mr. Williams for the Crown resented such an imputation, but confessed that “after hearing Mr. Mantell's evidence and that of the natives, the Crown were willing to admit that the reserves intended to be made under the incomplete Ngaitahu deed had never been carried out.… When it was found that the natives had a claim to more land than was reserved for them the Crown wished to refer it to the Court, to say what quantity of land should be reserved in addition, and declare that the Ngaitahu deed should be completed by a release from the natives.” The Judge over-ruled Mr. Cowlishaw's objection to the arbitrary stoppage of a case in course of trial. Mr. Fenton admitted that the Governor's “powers were of a very wonderful kind,” but the power “to make a case an order of reference was trifling as compared to that given by other clauses of the Act.” Cowlishaw urged that an ex post facto use of the power could not have been intended by the Legislature, and proposed to put it in evidence that the Governor had “never authorized Mr. Hall to refer the matter to the Court.” Williams retorted that if Cowlishaw persisted “the Crown would be driven to take an extreme course.” Mr. Hall added to his signature—” a member of the Executive Council of the Colony of New Zealand”; and the Judge said that the Court was “bound to presume that the Order of Reference was duly authorized by the Governor; the Governor's signature was not necessary, and it was presumed that Mr. Hall acted on his authority until the contrary was shown.”1 Under this strange ruling the order was admitted, maugre Mr. Cowlishaw's objection, and the Judge said he would “proceed with the case with increased powers.” After such preliminaries the result was almost visible. Evidence was, however, taken, but the Order of

1 It appears from a speech made by Taiaroa in Parliament (21st July, 1881), that Hall evaded examination. “Cowlishaw rose in his legal apparel and pranced about the Court, but he failed to find the Honourable John Hall because that honourable gentleman had got on his horse and gone to his own place fifty miles off.” The Governor, Sir G. Bowen, was far away, unconsulted.

page 342 Reference was the weapon on which Mr. Williams relied. To Mr. Cowlishaw's disparagement of the vague conveyance (in Kemp's deed of 1848) of lands to William Wakefield—” there was nothing to show what had been sold, or the terms upon which the land was sold,” Mr. Williams retorted that such an argument would concede “to the present claimants… a share in the whole of the Ngaitahu block.” Judgment was reserved; but “the wonderful powers” which the Judge had recognized seemed to ensure its tenor. When it was delivered (on the 5th May) the Judge, at the entreaty of the Native Assessor, “hoped that the (triumphant) Government would give fisheries to the natives wherever available.” Mr. Rolleston asked “the Court to mention the extent of land to be awarded,” but Fenton shrunk from the task. There was an adjournment, with a view to ascertain what reserves the Government would consent to include in the new deed to be extorted under order of the Court, and on resumption of the sitting Mr. Rolleston consented to inclusion of “eel-weirs and fisheries” in the reserve, but stipulated that they should “not interfere with the general settlement of the country” —of which the Government would remain the judge. The elaborate judgment demands notice. The case was declared to be “of vast importance, immediately concerning the title of the Crown to nearly the whole of this and other provinces, and raises points of a difficult and conflicting character. And the Court feels that it is scarcely a fit tribunal for the determination of such important legal principles, and such great constitutional questions.” The Judge could scarcely impugn the good faith of the Queen in entering into the treaty of Waitangi, although he remarked, “the conditions laid down by Vattel and other writers on international law were not fulfilled in it. As, however, it constituted the foundation on which the English sovereignty was built up,… it must be accepted as a valid treaty forming part of the law.” After such an exordium it might have been expected that the judgment would be built upon the acknowledged foundation. But such a course would have jarred upon many minds in New Zealand. The Judge thought it “necessary to inquire what is the interpretation put by the Crown” on the treaty, and he raked from the charter, sent by Lord John page 343 Russell to Hobson in 1840, a phrase that the Letters Patent should not affect the Maori rights to lands now actually occupied or enjoyed by such natives.” This “idea,”… that the Governor might grant all lands except those “actually occupied by natives,” led to an Instruction (5th December, 1840) to survey “all the lands” in the colony. But while quoting that phrase the Judge did not notice another in the same Instruction: “It is our further will and pleasure… that you do especially take care to protect (the native inhabitants) in their persons and in the free enjoyment of their possessions.” This omission was much; but it was not so glaring as the absence of all allusion to the reiterated pledges of every Governor of New Zealand to maintain for the Maoris, in the words of the treaty, “full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests and fisheries, and other properties which they may collectively and individually possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession.” It would have been better for the Judge to recall the noble rebuke administered by Lord Stanley to the New Zealand Company in 1843, than to construct a shadowy idea under which the treaty might be eluded. But his mind seems to have been clouded.

The reader will remember the wiles of Lord Howick in the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1844; how he strove to give effect to them by his Instructions in 1846; how Sir W. Martin and Bishop Selwyn resisted him; how Governors Fitzroy and Grey were constrained to reiterate their assurances that the Queen would honourably maintain the treaty, and how Earl Grey himself was compelled to convey the same assurance in the name of his Sovereign. It ought to have been impossible to cite the nefarious and recalled Instructions of 1846 as cogent, and yet the Judge cited them as a distinct indication of the “view taken by the Imperial Government,” though he admitted that it was “objected to by the natives, and was never carried into practice, and in fact could not have been in a peaceful manner.” Earl Grey would have limited Maori rights to the land “actually occupied or used by means of labour expended thereon,” and the millions of acres not so occupied or used which the Crown had purchased from the natives, practically refuted the “idea” to which Mr. Fenton catachrestically referred page 344 in 1868. Dismissing the treaty he nevertheless found that between 1846 and 1851 a “change took place in the interpretation put by the English authorities on the territorial rights of the aborigines:” but he did not state that the pretensions of Earl Grey were never entitled to be called the views “of English authorities”; that they differed from Lord Stanley's decision; that they were never adopted, but on the contrary were crushed in Parliament by the eloquence and influence of Mr. Gladstone,1 and others; and that Mr. Labouchere in introducing a Bill which abandoned those pretensions promised that the treaty should be “scrupulously and largely interpreted,” which assurance he hoped would satisfy Mr. Gladstone that there was no intention on the part of the Colonial Office to “take any course upon the question of waste lands in New Zealand inconsistent with the rights guaranteed to the natives under the treaty of Waitangi.” Mr. Fenton confessed that in the Constitution Act of 1852, passed when Lord Derby was Prime Minister, “the unoccupied territory in the hands of the aborigines” was “regarded as their distinct and admitted property.”

Such being the case it might have been thought impossible to deny Heremaia Mautai's claim to compensation if he could prove that he had received none. For the convenience of the colonists it had been the custom to enter into possession and compensate owners afterwards, ever since the days when Mr. Spain permitted the proceeding rather than eject the settlers whom Colonel Wakefield had improperly located at Te Aro, in Wellington. The process was not a just one. It ignored the tribal rights guaranteed by the Queen. Yet, though not altogether laudable, it was a clumsy attempt to compensate men who had been robbed. But Mautai was not supported by a powerful tribe. The colonists were numerous and powerful in 1868. They had been few and feeble in 1841. When Mautai declared that he had never consented to the sale, was no party to the contract, and had received none of its fruits, he was asked to name his “hapu.” When he declined to say more than that he belonged to “all Ngaitahu” (Ngaitahu katoa), the fact that

1 “As far as England is concerned there is not a more strictly and rigorously binding treaty in existence than that of Waitangi.”—Mr. Gladstone's speech.

page 345 “some of his immediate family” had received money was held sufficient to disarm his claims. “The Court cannot recognize individual ownership of native land.… The contrary doctrine was endeavoured to be set up by the Government in the celebrated Waitara case, but all aboriginal New Zealand protested against it.… We cannot allow Heremaia to set up a doctrine because it now suits his interest, against which all his countrymen have so energetically protested. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, is the maxim, and the Maori custom is that the individual must (as regards native land) be bound by his tribe in their external relations.”

Mr. Fenton wronged Te Rangitake. That chief never claimed that his rights barred those of others. He never denied that Teira had tribal rights within the Waitara block. He admitted them. “The land belongs to Teira and to all of us,” was his contention: and it harmonized with that of Heremaia at Kaitorete. If any Ngaitahu could prove that he had not been consulted, had had no opportunity of protesting, and had shared in none of the results of the Ngaitahu purchase, he was fairly entitled to be heard, and not to be stopped by Mr. Hall's fabricated order of reference, and Mr. Fenton's adapted judgment. It might have been deemed difficult to do away with the admissions that the treaty of Waitangi and the Constitution Act of 1852 recognized and guaranteed the rights of the Maoris over all waste lands in New Zealand; but legal sophistry can weave webs in which elaborate details supersede principles. Mr. Fenton descanted upon the rise and fall of the New Zealand Company. Mr. Cowlishaw had impugned, on various grounds, the validity of the Ngaitahu deed of 1848. Mr. Fenton retorted that “the two laws on which Mr. Cowlishaw relied for avoiding the deed” were repealed, and “the provision in the Constitution Acts was not retrospective.” He was wisely silent as to the plain terms of the treaty. He was of opinion that the Ngaitahu deed was sufficiently bad in itself to convey no rights to Colonel Wakefield or his principals, the New Zealand Company, but that “by the common law of the empire that deed did suffice to extinguish the title of the tribe Ngaitahu in the lands described,” although made in presence of and attested by a commander in the navy, who seemed to represent good faith on the page 346 part of the Crown. There was “abundant evidence of the existence of a parol agreement of the Ngaitahu tribe or a majority of them to sell to Wakefield.” The Crown adopted the contract; Mr. Mantell “partially reduced it to writing by making a memorandum of the receipt of £500 in part payment.” … “Now the maxim is, Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur. Seemingly unconscious that every word he uttered was a stab at the treaty of Waitangi and the honour of England, the Judge discussed whether “the part performance (of the parol agreement) had been sufficient to render powerless the Statute of Frauds,” which required all agreements relating to lands to be in writing. He cited many English decisions, and beat the New Zealand air, but did not approach the Kaitorete case. “The Court (he concluded) is of opinion that though the several payments made by Mr. Mantell would not of themselves suffice to prevent the operation of the Statute of Frauds… yet those payments combined with the receipt and the amended plan, and the subsequent acts of ownership exercised by the Crown (for a piece of land has been granted) would form sufficient ground to cause a Court of Equity to compel a specific performance, and it will be the duty of the Court under the order of reference to ascertain all the terms of the contract, and to make such orders as will secure the due fulfilment of them by the Crown on one side, and the Ngaitahu tribe on the other.” He dismissed Heremaia's tribal claim as spurious, and touched upon the proved fact that the tribe had exercised of old, and after the Ngaitahu purchase, rights of fishery on the land, which would be regarded in the decree for specific performance. He gave judgment (he said) for the Crown, but it was a violent figure of speech, for the Crown was dishonoured by disregard of the treaty, and was even made a party to a quibble which confiscated the Maori rights on the plea that the Maoris had forfeited their treaty rights by joining in a transaction with the Crown. There were legal maxims which Mr. Fenton did not cite, but which were more cogent than that with which he professed to set aside the Maori claims. Kemp, as Commissioner for the Crown, made the Ngaitahu purchase. It was at his solicitation that the Maoris signed the Ngaitahu deed. Volenti non fit injuria. Even if the supreme authority of the treaty page 347 had not protected the Maori rights it could not be pleaded that the Crown was wronged by the presumed sale, which was the act of the Crown by its accredited officers. Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. If the act was wrong the Crown could take no advantage of it. These were maxims not only of English but of more ancient jurisprudence, and ought to have made the Kaitorete judgment impossible. At the closing of the Court at Canterbury, the Judge, nevertheless, expressed his “recognition of the justice, which bordered on liberality, with which the Crown had met the claims of the natives.” Some cases had been dismissed; in some the Maoris were successful; in others it seems that the Crown avoided adverse judgment, for they are recorded as “withdrawn, the grant having been prepared in the claimant's name.”

The Court proceeded to Otago, where Taiaroa and many others appeared before it. When the case of the Maori reserve in Dunedin was put before the Court, Macandrew pleaded to the jurisdiction; the convenient Cutten produced the Crown grant, surreptitiously obtained; the application of “Taiaroa and others was dismissed, evidence having been given that the land had been granted to the Superintendent of Otago;” and the applicants were instructed through an interpreter that “they would have to go to the Supreme Court.” The fraud practised at Dunedin was nevertheless proved, aliunde, by a judgment delivered as to a Maori reserve recommended by Mr. Mantell at Port Chalmers simultaneously with that at Prince's Street, and granted in like manner by the Governor to the Maoris. Mr. Mantell described the reserve made in 1853. Counsel for the province opposed the Maori claim on the ground of want of power in the Governor to make the reserve and on many technical points; Cutten declared that the land was “selected in Great Britain in 1847.” It appeared that on a portion of the reserve a Presbyterian church had been built. The Court postponed a decision on that point for further hearing,1 but delivered an elaborate judgment as to the remainder, to the effect that “no grounds whatever had been shown to justify the Court in saying that the Governor was

1 After some days it was pleaded that the Church “had not had sufficient time to get together the evidence required,” and their case was adjourned sine die

page 348 not justified in doing what he has done.” A Crown grant was ordered to be issued to Taiaroa, Patuki, and others. Mr. Mackay, the Native Commissioner (from whose careful compilation these facts are drawn), lost no time in guarding against any tampering with lands awarded by the Court to the Maoris. The grant of the Prince's Street reserve to Macandrew had evinced the immoral capacity of the province. Mackay at once transmitted to Cutten a schedule of the lands awarded, with a request that Cutten would “take the necessary steps to withhold from sale the lands” described (29th May, 1868). Macandrew, indignant at the awards, appealed to the Governor (17th July, 1868) against the proceedings. His voluminous despatch was demolished (28th July) by Mr. Domett, then Secretary for Crown Lands, in a memorandum which referred to the treaty of Waitangi, the Queen, her Instructions, and common sense. But Macandrew's power over Mr. Stafford, the Premier, was not exhausted by the procurement of the grant of the Maori reserve in 1866. Stafford is to be found endeavouring to appease Macandrew by a telegram in November, 1868, by suggesting that though advised that there was no force in Macandrew's general arguments, if there were specific objections to “any order or reserve” a re-hearing must be applied for “immediately by telegraph” as time for application would soon expire. An official letter shows that Stafford throughout his tenure of office did not venture to displease Macandrew by obeying the law. Stafford resigned on the 28th June, 1869, and on the 1st October, 1869, Mr. Domett called upon Cutten to explain why the grants to the natives, “detained from execution on representations made” by Macandrew, should not be issued at once. In 1870, Macandrew, still Superintendent and obstructive, appealed against the awards, especially that of 1000 acres at Tautuku, “capriciously” ordered “upon ex parte evidence.” Some of the land would, he said, have been sold in 1858 if the province could have had it surveyed, and he affected to think this assertion a bar to the award of 1868. The Chief Judge briefly repelled the charge of deciding upon ex parte statements, and averred that the awards ought in his judgment to be supported; and no further trace of Macandrew's opposition is to be found except with regard to the reserve at Dunedin, which was remitted by Mr. Fenton to the Supreme Court.
page 349

The manner in which Mr. Hall fabricated the “order of reference,” in order to defeat Heremaia Mautai, would not, perhaps, have shocked the moral sense of the community if it had not jeopardized the release of the Government from further claims. Mr. Hall's equivocal act was not condemned, but it was found necessary to pass an Act “to remove doubts as to the sufficiency of a certain order of reference,”… signed “as by command and on behalf of the Governor.” It was enacted that it should be deemed as “valid and effectual to all intents and purposes as if the same had been made by and given under the hand of the Governor. The Act offered at the same time a crumb to the Maoris by providing that nothing in it or in the Orders of the Native Land Court should extinguish Maori claims in respect of promises of “schools, hospitals, and other advantages to induce (the natives) to consent to the sale of the said Ngaitahu block.” Otherwise, the Act extinguished all native title in Ngaitahu territory.

In December, 1865, Dr. Featherston unveiled a statue of Grief, erected at Wanganui to commemorate the deeds of those friendly natives who crushed at Moutoa in May, 1864, the invaders of Wanganui. He had previously joined in receiving the Wanganui men on their return from the east coast, and he extolled the bravery of the dead and of the living when he unveiled the monument. Having thus paved the way he strove to induce the chiefs to aid General Chute in a campaign on the west coast. Some who had been at Opotiki were discontented at receiving no payment, and Mete Kingi was dissatisfied at their treatment. Dr. Featherston addressed the tribes. Haimona, one of the heroes at Moutoa, sprang to his feet and declared that they would follow Featherston into the field. “Thus” (a local print stated) “terminated one of the most important meetings ever held in the colony. General Chute obtained a Maori contingent of 286 men; but to ensure their co-operation it was requisite that Dr. Featherston should accompany the forces. He joined them on the 2nd January, 1866, and on the 4th the Okatuku pah was captured with trifling loss of besiegers and besieged. The Maori contingent danced a triumphant war-dance by moonlight. Pushing across a tributary of the Whenuakura river (the native allies under Major McDonell leading page 350 through dense forests, ravines, and precipices), General Chute, with about 700 men, approached in rear the fortress Putahi, situate on a wooded hill 500 feet high, abruptly rising and cleft with deep gullies separating the descending spurs. Two hundred Ngatiruanui were supposed to be in the pah. A correspondent of the Wanganui ‘Times’ wrote: “The General desired at first to attack at once, but wisely yielded to native representation of the necessity of deliberation.… Thereby the main defences of Putahi were neutralized.… At 3 a.m. on the 7th the General's force… in perfect silence and darkness ascended the ridges.… The native contingent, under Major McDonell, and Kemp (Rangihiwinui), a really useful lion that day, led the way” to the plateau. By a rush from the wooded shelter, after some firing, Putahi was stormed. A prisoner, after being allowed to tell that the firing had been destructive to the rebels, was, in cold blood, “freed from the cares of this life by one of his own charitable countrymen.”1 Thus wrote the Wanganui reporter. Colonel Weare, of the 50th Regiment, who was stationed at Patea, in obedience to the General's orders placed two ambuscades, intercepted some flying rebels, wounded one, and made another prisoner of war. Colonel Weare2 was with the ambuscade which effected the capture. The Major-General loudly praised the Forest Rangers under Von Tempsky, and the native contingent. Putahi was burnt, and on the following day the contingent destroyed their countrymen's crops, and returned laden with potatoes, which they shared with the troops. On the 9th, General Chute marched across the Whenuakura river to Kakaramia, taking thither Colonel Weare's prisoner of war. On the 10th, scouting parties went out. It was ascertained that the enemy had taken shelter at Otapawa, accessible only by a way shown by the native contingent. There the Ngatiruanui were at bay. On the morning of the 11th January, General Chute left his camp before sunrise, having given orders that the Maori prisoner of war should be shot, in cold blood and without trial. These orders were executed by a party of the 50th Regiment,

1 ‘A Campaign on the West Coast of New Zealand.’ Wanganui, New Zealand: 1866.

2 Colonel Weare's despatch (7th January, 1866) to the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

page 351 and the officer in command shed tears of shame as he obeyed them. Chute, who deserves henceforward the shortest of appellations, marched to Otapawa, where, under cover of six-pounder guns served by the Royal Artillery, the gallantry of the 57th and 14th Regiments carried the fort on the 13th January. In storming it Colonel Hassard of the 57th fell, mortally wounded. Twenty-nine Maoris were found dead; and of the English eleven were killed and twenty wounded. Again Chute loudly praised all ranks. The country was scoured; settlements, crops, and houses were destroyed. On the 15th January, he wrote to Sir George Grey: “All the principal villages and positions up to and within reach of this camp (Ketemari) having been destroyed and the rebels scattered with heavy loss, I propose, in pursuance of your Excellency's instructions, to continue my march immediately towards Mataitawa and New Plymouth by the bush-track behind Mount Egmont.” He abstained from allusion to the murdered prisoner in his despatches. The Wanganui record,1 describing the capture of Otapawa, said: “Three shots from the Armstrong had called forth no reply;… many a one, even to the General, thought that the pah had been abandoned… it lay as silent as a graveyard, and as ominous. Colonel Butler on advancing further could see that the silence was not caused through a want of occupants. The rifle-pits behind the palisading were thickly lined with black heads, and a bush at right angles with the pah swarmed with the black vermin.” Elsewhere the same record stated that the garrison at Putahi included “a fair proportion of ferocious Amazons.” But the Wanganui scribe, like Chute, did not mention the killing of the prisoner of war without trial. Before the march was resumed there was some difficulty in persuading the Wanganui men to go farther from their homes; but Dr. Featherston was eloquent. Hori Kingi te Anaua, the principal chief, by an urgent appeal converted the recalcitrants, and there was a general chorus: “We will go; we will go.” Eighty were chosen for the work. The native contingent, in advance, shot a few rebels, but no resistance was encountered. Food was scarce. Horses were killed and eaten on the way. On the 25th, the General reached Mataitawa, whither the native contingent had

1 ‘A Campaign on the West Coast,’ &c.

page 352 preceded him. On the 26th, with 100 of the 43rd Regiment and an Armstrong gun, he went in a steamship to the mouths of the Mokau and Awakino rivers, but saw nothing worth destroying, and returned without landing the troops. On the 27th, he marched into Taranaki. A triumphal arch was erected to do him honour: and the Superintendent of the province, Mr. H. R. Richmond, presented an address, lauding his sagacity and courage, which had left “no security for rebellion.” Nothing loth to accept praise he answered: “It was a source of great satisfaction to find that our efforts to restore the peace of these districts have met your approval.” He marched southwards past Oakura, and on the 1st February destroyed the Waikoko pah, killing a few Maoris and laying waste an “unusual extent” of cultivated grounds. On the 2nd, Dr. Featherston prudently went before the destroyer, who found on arriving at Te Namu that Featherston had permitted many natives to take the oath of allegiance and avert the destruction of their homes. Chute passed on to Opunake, and there took measures which might, if that were possible, have intensified the savage despair of the Hau Hau fanatics. Te Ua, the founder of their superstition, was peacefully residing there. Mr. Parris, by express authority from Colonel Haultain, the Defence Minister, had permitted him to do so. Chute, in spite of Parris, surrounded Te Ua and his followers and made them prisoners, on the ground that they had formerly been in arms and had not taken the oath of allegiance. Some were released, but Te Ua was sent to Sir George Grey, who exercised clemency towards the captive. Chute seemed confused with elation at having marched through the forest. Men under his control marauded everywhere, robbing friend and foe. Mr. Parris protested, and the Major-General ordered him to go away to Taranaki. There he heard that a peaceful chief, robbed by the army, had joined the rebels. Numbers of stolen horses were sent to Taranaki to be sold by auction. Mr. Parris wrote to the Native Minister: “The scene which took place at the sale-yard was perfectly disgraceful. Nearly the whole of Captain Corbett's company, who have been serving under him as Bush Rangers for the last two months, were present, more or less under the influence of liquor, fighting and quarrelling about the ownership of particular horses, and abusing their Captain and page 353 Lieutenant for having taken away the best of the horses to themselves instead of sharing the proceeds of the whole among the company as agreed upon. The natives for claiming their horses were blackguarded and threatened with violence by the mob, on hearing of which I sent for the horses claimed to be pointed out to the auctioneer, but not to provoke violence.… It is my duty to inform the Government that the friendly natives are beginning to be very much alarmed at the state of things, but I do hope that something will be done to put a stop to the very unfair interference with their rights.”
Taranaki had ever a bad eminence, and its atmosphere tainted even the military. Wiremu Kingi Matakatea,1 distrusting the General, retreated to his residence Nukuteapiapi. Soldiers were sent thither. His property was seized or destroyed, and buildings were burned. Parris applied to Colonel Warre for a pass to enable a chief to seek Matakatea, and “recommend him to come in and refer his case to the Government.” The army under Chute not only would not allow the chief and his followers to communicate peaceably with the refugee, but a Captain of the 43rd disgraced his uniform by ordering them to go before the troops in the attack. They protested, but were told that for disobedience they would be made prisoners. “They2 were thus,” Mr. Parris complained, “arbitrarily compelled to go in front of the troops without a gun in their hands wherewith to defend themselves, to the attack of a near relative.” The brutality of these proceedings was denounced by a Taranaki newspaper, which declared that it would have been better for Taranaki if the march from Wanganui had ended in the town, for the General had left more enemies in the district than he had found. On the 6th, Chute destroyed Meri Meri, and on the 7th finished his course at Patea, welcomed by the band of the 18th Royal Irish with the air—”See the conquering hero comes.” On the 11th, he reached Wellington by ship, and received congratulations on his “complete and triumphant success.” On the 12th, he described his campaign to the Governor. He descanted on the difficulties surmounted. “There were no less than 21 rivers and 90 gullies, the precipitous banks

1 Not to be confounded with Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake of Waitara.

2 N. Z. P. P. 1866; A. No. 8, p. 9

page 354 of many of which presented formidable obstructions to our advance, and required great labour to make them passable.… To accomplish a distance of about 54 miles the force was eight days actually on the move.” He reported the capture of Te Ua who was at his “Excellency's disposal.” His own disposal of his prisoner of war was not mentioned. “I believe that throughout the country traversed by the field force during the last six weeks there does not now remain one fortified position or ordinary village in the occupation of the rebels, who have suffered most severely in loss of life, habitations, cultivations, horses, cattle, and other property.” He enclosed a diary kept by the commanding officer at Waingongoro in January, which showed that all fruit-trees were destroyed. If the Romans in Britain acted like Chute one sees that the words attributed to Galgacus may have been the simple truth. Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

Chute could not find words to express his gratitude for Dr. Featherston's assistance in “sharing all dangers and privations,” and obtaining information which could not otherwise have been gained. The native contingent was praised. Hori Kingi te Anaua, Rangihiwinui, and Haimona, at all times merited his “warmest approbation.” Majors McDonell and Von Tempsky, and Ensign McDonell were highly commended, and Chute intended to report to England the “noble and gallant conduct of the whole of the troops engaged.” On the 13th February, the Governor told the Secretary of State that Chute had “displayed every quality of a great General.” On the 15th February, the Governor eulogized the General at a banquet. The ghost of the murdered prisoner did not rise to mar the festivities, and the General, we are told, “resumed his seat amidst continued cheers which lasted several minutes.” But though banished from that scene the miserable victim must be remembered in these pages. His death became known in England through a letter written by his captor, Colonel Weare, to his brother, a clergyman. “The General received me very coldly for taking this man alive after his intimation of ‘no prisoners.’ However, I told him I could not order my men to kill a man after he had thrown down his arms and surrendered.… The prisoner was taken to Kakaramea, and kept there till the 11th, on which page 355 morning the General left at 3 a.m.; and at 8 a.m. under instructions from the General, this prisoner was taken down to a gully, tied hand and foot, and then cruelly shot to death by some of the 50th.… I have written to the General to know if Captain—–1 had due authority and orders for this act, as otherwise we consider he has cast a stain on the name of the regiment.… Since the leaving of Sir Duncan, the true sentiments of the Governor and his Government have come out towards the Maoris in their urging General Chute on to all these atrocities of killing and no prisoners.” After denouncing wholesale confiscation of land, and narrating cruelties said to have been committed by the native allies, Colonel Weare hoped that “the degrading and brutalizing manner in which this war is now conducted may be known in England, and the troops no longer be allowed to be demoralized by the colonists for their sole selfishness.”

Colonel Weare's hopes were gratified. Mr. Cardwell (April, 1866) confidentially urged Governor Grey “to secure the observance of all the humane usages of war,” and told him that the War Office would communicate with General Chute. Mr. Cardwell could not suppose that the imputations upon General Chute or the local government were incapable of complete reply, but, on the other hand, was not warranted in considering that they were made in bad faith, and regarded them “therefore as calling for immediate and most serious inquiry.” The Governor brought the matter before his Executive Council in a minute—denouncing the statement that the Colonial Government desired no prisoners as “a base and wicked calumny,”—demanding copies of Colonel Weare's letters,—and declining “to receive the communication as a confidential one.” He denounced vigorously to the Colonial Office the practice, which had grown up under General Cameron, of aspersions in private letters, and which had led to prolonged war and misery. He repelled the thought that he or his Ministers urged General Chute to commit atrocities. Had he been base enough to entertain it, the noble nature of many of the officers and men of Her Majesty's forces would have taught him better than to dare so to constrain them. He who tracks the public

1 Though I know the name left blank in the published despatch, there is no object in making known the name of the unwilling executioner.

page 356 men of New Zealand must confess that Sir George Grey, if correct with regard to the army, “protested too much” for the civilians. The soldiers always felt repugnance in waging war brought about by the greed and for the profit of the settlers. They served the Queen loyally, but with shame for the cause of war. The Ministry scarcely deserved the defence made for them. Soon after Colonel Weare's prisoner was shot, Sir George Grey wrote (2nd February, 1866) an elaborate apology for them in contravention of Sir William Martin's views which they opposed. The Governor, forgetful of the suppression laws, and of his recent contests with the rapacity of Whitaker and Fox, and with the Assembly, argued that as a rule public men in the colony had been temperate in times of excitement, and that the Assembly had “shown a scrupulous care for the rights both present and prospective of the native race.… I feel sure that upon the whole the debates, the legislation, and the Acts of the General Assembly will hereafter be admitted to be creditable to their humanity, and to the nation to which they belong, and I have no reason to think that Sir William Martin would not agree with me in the opinion which I have thus expressed.”

Another despatch proves that the shooting of the prisoner was not altogether unknown at the time, and that the Ministry at least were culpable in not instituting a rigid inquiry before the task was imposed upon them.

Sir George Grey wrote (13th June, 1866) that on seeing “a statement in a local newspaper that the troops under General Chute had shot a prisoner who was said to have been known to be the murderer of a soldier, I immediately called the attention of the Minister of Colonial Defence (Colonel Haultain) to the subject. He informed me that I might make my mind quite easy regarding it, because he had been informed that it had been intended to execute this prisoner, but the Superintendent of the province of Wellington (Dr. Featherston), who was present with the General, hearing what it was intended to do, spoke to the General on the subject, who immediately sent orders that the man's life should be spared. Since I have received your confidential despatch I have again spoken on this matter with the Minister for Colonial Defence, who tells me that he subsequently heard that the General's orders arrived too late, not page 357 reaching the place until the man was executed. This is all I know on the subject. My ignorance regarding it is undoubtedly to be attributed to the fact of the War Department receiving communications from their officers even of a confidential nature reflecting on myself without such communications having been made known to me, and to the system very naturally adopted by the military authorities in this country of making most meagre reports to myself of their proceedings, and refusing or neglecting to furnish me with copies of their reports to the Secretary of State for War.”

If Colonel Haultain deceived Sir George Grey, or was himself deceived in the first instance, no excuse can be found for his not prosecuting an inquiry as soon as the death of the prisoner was known. The grief of the officer who obeyed Chute's orders was no secret within or beyond the camp. Sir George Grey's failure to institute a searching inquiry as to the truth of the newspaper report somewhat mars his later remonstrances. The Minister who declared that he “subsequently heard” that the reprieving order arrived too late, would at once have reported the fact to the Governor, and compelled investigation, if he had not been an accomplice before the fact or ready to condone it. As for the General himself, there is no published allegation of his own that he desired to stay the execution, and as he left the camp shortly before the prisoner was shot, there is an air of improbability about the plea made for him. Colonel Weare, when called upon by General Chute to explain, expressed regret for some of his statements which he called camp rumours, not intended for publication. He disbelieved the rumours against the native allies to which he had given currency. As to the supposed order about prisoners, he was courageous enough to repeat: “I certainly myself understood that the Major-General did not wish prisoners.” He regretted having written his letters, and hoped the General “would consider them withdrawn.” By permission of the General he made the same request to the Governor. He regretted “having in a moment of great excitement given expression in a family letter to thoughts which had come hurriedly into his mind, and which he would not on more calm deliberation have felt himself justified in making or entertaining.” The Governor promised that as regarded Colonel Weare he page 358 would request that no further steps might be taken. At this date the charges were unpublished. But Sir George Grey's repulsion of them brought upon him the wrath of the new Colonial Secretary. The Earl of Carnarvon received the despatch addressed to Mr. Cardwell, and determined to flesh his bureaucratic sword upon the memorandum-writing proconsul. Admitting that the charges against the Governor were completely disposed of, he condemned the tone of the despatches disposing of them. Alleging that the Colonial Office had complied with the custom of requiring complaints against a Governor to be sent through himself, the Earl did not see how justice could have been more effectually secured. He professed sympathy with a Governor who thought himself “left without due protection from cruel and unfounded imputations;” admitted Sir George Grey's high character and public services; and told him that his minute to his Executive Council and despatch to Downing Street were so improper that the right course would be to withdraw them. “In this hope I now refrain from considering what would be the duty of Her Majesty's Government should you unfortunately come to a different conclusion.” The Governor did not accept the suggestion. His minute was the only recorded defence against charges standing against him in the Colonial Office. He could not withdraw it. It defended his Ministers as well as himself. He would not desert them. They had unanimously approved his minute and denounced the barbarities imputed to them. As for the language he had used, he could not detect any impropriety, but might be a wrong judge in his own case, and was willing to withdraw or apologize for any phrases improperly applied. He was willing to meet the common lot of men. Wantonly accused of having given effect to a wicked hatred of one class of the Queen's subjects, and having pressed the army of a great and merciful nation to commit shocking crimes, he had striven earnestly to do his duty to the Queen, to his office, to his reputation, to the Secretary of State, to his advisers, and his fellow-subjects in New Zealand. “On a point on which my future reputation rests, I ought to, and must, decide for myself; and I believe that hereafter it will be admitted (if not now) that the course I have taken was becoming to my office, to the great powers with which the Queen and page 359 nation had entrusted me, and to my own long services; and I still trust that your Lordship will concur in this view of the subject.” The Earl did not receive the Governor's defence. He was sensitive where his own honour was concerned, and, with Lord Cranborne and General Peel, quitted the Ministry when Mr. Disraeli, with the adroitness of a clown, abandoned the protestations of years, and changed front on the question of Electoral Reform before an audience which appreciated the grace and audacity of his acting.

The Duke of Buckingham, who received the seals of the Colonial Office, unable to deal seriously with the Governor's despatch, passed over the refusal to withdraw the minute and despatch, and affected to perform his duty by observing with satisfaction the Governor's readiness to withdraw expressions which might be considered improper. Further appeal was made. Weary of continually urging the removal of troops from New Zealand, and of disputes between a Governor and a General, Earl Carnarvon, on the 1st December, 1866, had instructed Sir George Grey that he was not at liberty to exercise any control over the movements or disposition of Her Majesty's troops. There was an exception as to one regiment which might be retained on certain conditions. In Parliament the Earl animadverted (15th July, 1867) on the Governor's conduct, who complained to the Duke of Buckingham that the Earl had misled the House and the country. The despatch subjecting the Governor to the General had been printed in England, but the Governor's answer to it had been withheld from Parliament.1 In it he had declared that, feeling keenly the disgrace to which the Secretary of State had subjected him, it would be his pride nevertheless to serve the Queen “as carefully in disgrace as in prosperity.” At the same time he argued against the adoption of a rule so injurious to the service. To call a man Governor-in-Chief and to exempt from his control the senior officer of troops in a colony seemed improper in the eyes of the Duke of Cambridge, who declared in Parliament (15th July, 1867), that “no more dangerous step could be taken; and for this reason, that the military authorities must and ought to be subordinate to the

1 In return to an Address of the House of Commons, its publication was elicited in 1869.

page 360 civil.” But the Colonial Office had arrived at the conclusion that the Governor was the obstacle to the withdrawal of troops; it was weary of disputes, and cut the knot which it could not untie. The cause which had induced the threat to remove the Governor was not set at rest during his term of office.

Sir George Bowen succeeded him in February, 1868. In that year for the first time were published the letters written to the Colonial Office by the Rev. Mr. Weare, attributing barbarities to the desire of the Colonial Government to have no prisoners. Accusations were contained which had never been made known to the Governor by the Colonial Office. Though then in private station, he promptly sailed to England to demand in person the inquiry which he had vainly asked from the Earl of Carnarvon in 1867, and which the Duke of Buckingham declined to grant in 1868. Rightly or wrongly he had the sympathy of the colonists. Arrayed against him were Earl Granville and the traditions of the War Office. His Ministry had joined him in his first protest against the charge of complicity with the killing of the prisoner. In August, 1867, the Legislative Council; in September the House of Representatives; had earnestly and unanimously addressed the Queen, defending Sir George Grey, and praying that the irregular reception of secret charges might be checked. Their Governor had been maligned. The indictment had revealed the butchery of a prisoner without trial by order of the General. The honour of England was stained. The Duke of Cambridge, at all events, would be guided by a sense of right and a soul of honour. The papers showed that all the facts had not been laid before him. But Earl Granville had no desire to permit the Commander-in-Chief to do justice. Behind a formal veil of politeness he was as obdurate as his predecessors. He would not re-open a question which, he averred, had been decided by competent authority. It was in vain that Sir George Grey, as the Queen's late representative in New Zealand (1866), asked the nature of the decision spoken of, and the authority by which it was pronounced. Those who work in the dark do not drag their deeds to light. Earl Granville cared little whether the Duke of Cambridge might be unjustly charged with the iniquity complained of. It would be forgotten amidst the pressure of new needs. All eyes in page 361 England were intent on the Irish Church. Net because of the alleged injustice of its grey existence, but because it was a party question, the disestablishment of the Church filled the political landscape. The ghost of a Maori could find no room there. Earl Granville improved on the proverb. If it be wise to let a sleeping dog lie, it must be wiser to avoid discussion about a dead Maori, though done to death by an English General. Discussion was objectionable, for though winked at, a foul wrong could not be openly defended in the English Parliament. The case must be strangled. It was unmannerly to bring a slovenly unhandsome corpse betwixt the wind and the Earl's nobility; and he was a fit functionary to reprove Sir George Grey as Hotspur was rated at Holmedon. After one or two supercilious evasions, he declared that he saw no advantage in prolonging the correspondence. It was, perhaps, thought advisable to draw no invidious distinction between a Cameron and a Chute. The first had been knighted, and it was decided to give the same honour to the second. The most notable feature in the conduct of the Secretaries of State was that whereas when Sir George Grey captured Weraroa new instructions were framed to prevent similar feats,—when inquiry was demanded as to the doing to death of a prisoner in cold blood, it was refused, although it was distinctly laid down in the Queen's Regulations that, in all cases of court-martial convictions, sentence of death was to be suspended, until approved, on Her Majesty's behalf, by the Governor. In the case reported by Colonel Weare there was not even a court-martial. If Earl Granville could have destroyed all evidence, his conduct might have been expedient, if not wise, in his own generation. As it was, he only linked himself with crime.

The Earl of Carnarvon succeeded in embittering the relations of the Colonial Office to Sir George Grey. The Governor left him, he said (Dec., 1866), “to learn from the newspapers affairs described by the colonial press as brilliant successes,” which, if impugned in England as merciless attacks upon unoffending persons, the despatches afforded no means of explaining. Sir George Grey furnished an explanation. He was hurt by the imputation; “the more so, in my own case, because I can assure you that your Lordship has written under an entire mistake, and page 362 that I have done nothing to merit the censure inflicted on me.” In July, 1867, the Earl, in the House of Lords, took occasion to express his “full satisfaction at the explanation,” and apologized, not to the Governor, but to his advisers. “I admit my error in this instance, and readily express my regret, because I think now that the words in question were not unreasonably open to complaint on the part of the Colonial Ministers.” In November, 1867, Sir George Grey, referring to the Earl of Carnarvon's speech, wrote (to the Duke of Buckingham, Secretary of State) that if those who were at the head of the Colonial or War Departments, misled by secret correspondence, required blind acquiescence in breach of law and regulations, he owed no obedience in such matters, but he owed a duty to the Queen and empire, and it was right to withstand those who committed violent acts, or supported others in them, with a will as strong as their own, not caring what consequences might fall on himself. The Colonial Office did not allow this protest to see the light until 1869.

While General Chute was marching to Taranaki with a detachment of the native contingent, the main body of that force was left to shoot and to destroy in the Wanganui district. Some of them were stationed at Pipiriki, from which a garrison of the 57th Regiment had been withdrawn. Negotiations were set on foot with the hostile Maoris on the river. Pehi Turoa invited a discussion of terms of peace, and Mete Kingi, with 400 men, in 30 canoes gaily equipped, responded to the invitation. The Hau Haus kept faith. After war-dances, speeches, and feasting, it was resolved that perpetual peace should be maintained on the Wanganui river, but that the men of the coast and the men of the mountains should be free to fight, as they listed, elsewhere. In other districts many chiefs declared allegiance to the Queen. At Lake Taupo, where Mr. Meade was so ill received in 1865, all war was at an end, and many leading men volunteered to assist in maintaining order in 1866.

Sir George Grey wrote (February, 1866) warmly in praise of the west coast campaign, and in compliance with request of chiefs determined to visit the interior. His arrival at Napier induced the Hau Haus to surrender their flags, and take the oath of allegiance under the guidance of Te Hapuku and his page 363 brother, who thenceforward discountenanced Hau Hauism. Wairoa, Turanga, Waiapu, and Opotiki were tranquil. At Maketu the gallant Arawa waited to receive and to accompany the Governor. There also he received a message from Te Heu Heu, who, with the chief next in rank to himself, was prepared to submit. They were almost the only chiefs known to be in arms against the Queen, and in the end of March they also submitted, and agreed to accompany the Governor in his progress. At Tauranga there was trouble. The arrangement made by Sir G. Grey in 1864, after the defeat at Te Ranga, was in danger. Unsurrendered rebels protested against it. Those who had agreed to it seemed discontented. A meeting was held, and the Governor's eloquence prevailed. The chiefs thenceforward assisted in carrying out the arrangements. At Hamilton, on the Waikato river, he had an interview with Te Waharoa, on the 1st May. Rewi, he learned, was at Hangatiki, determined never to look upon European face again. The Governor persuaded Te Waharoa to visit Wellington at the next meeting of the General Assembly to give information on Maori affairs. The island was at peace. The Hau Hau fanaticism was not abandoned by all; but its founder, Te Ua, had renounced it as a delusion under which he had fancied himself inspired. He himself attended the service of the Church of England on board of H.M.S. ‘Eclipse,’ while his former proselytes worshipped around the Pai Marire staff in Maori villages.

Some of these tidings were acknowledged by Mr. Cardwell, but in June, 1866, he was translated to the War Office, and the Earl of Carnarvon ruled in Downing Street. It was not probable that Sir George Grey would receive sympathy. The fact conformed to the probability. The several accessions of the Duke of Buckingham and Earl Granville produced no change. Secretaries of State were weary of Sir George Grey. They suffered from what Mr. Fitzgerald had called the prevailing “Memorandummiad” in New Zealand.

The dispute about retention of troops was destined to encumber the path of many Colonial Ministries. The Weld Ministry survived less than three months after the meeting of the General Assembly in July, 1865, at Wellington, which had become the new seat of government. Mr. Stafford was hostile, but page 364 would not risk a division on the Address. To convince the Maoris of the good intentions of the Government, Mr. Fitzgerald, who, on the resignation of Mr. Mantell became Minister for Native Affairs in August, 1865, with the Governor's sanction published a Maori newspaper. The peace proclamation of September appeared in it. “We must,” said Mr. Fitzgerald in the House, “deal with the Maoris as our forefathers were dealt with. We must occupy their finer and loftier characteristics as well as crush what is base and sordid. We have heard how the Christian nations went to fight the heathen, with the cross in one hand and the sword in the other, and we must take that as our guide; the sword to suppress iniquity, the cross to lead to noble aspirations. I have fancied that I have seen only the sword flaming in the air, while the cross was trampled in the dust.” Mr. Weld and his colleagues intended to appoint two or three Maori members of the Legislative Council, but the project died with the fall of his Ministry. A word must be said as to the Indemnity Bills passed in 1865 and 1866. Their nature suggests that their framers were well aware of the lawless acts which they were needed to condone. When the Bill of 1865, “for indemnifying persons acting in the suppression of the native insurrection,” was sent to England,1 Earl Carnarvon delayed giving any advice upon it. Another Bill was passed in 1866 by the Stafford Ministry, which was in power during General Chute's devastating march. The Duke of Buckingham announced (15th May, 1867), that the Bill of 1865 would be allowed, but that of 1866 would be disallowed for several reasons. “First, that it was so worded as to indemnify not only civil and military authorities and persons acting under them, or under the authority of the Government, but all and every other person and persons whosoever, who shall have done or ordered or directed any matter or thing to be done, &c. Secondly, that owing to the disjunctive form in which the 2nd and 3rd sections are drawn, the destruction of the property of a person suspected to be concerned in the insurrection would be covered by the in-

1 Mr. Stafford drew up a minute to accompany the Acts of 1865. Briefly but significantly it mentioned that proceedings commenced and threatened against persons, military and civil, necessitated the passing of the Indemnity Act.

page 365 demnity
given by the Act, even though such destruction may have been wanton and reckless, and not inflicted or ordered in or about the suppressing or quelling of the insurrection. Thus, if a private individual acting under no authority has wantonly or recklessly destroyed or ordered the destruction of the property of those whom he may have chosen to suspect… he would be protected under the terms of this Act, though such destruction in no way directly or indirectly tended to quell the insurrection, and though the person whose property was destroyed should have proved that he was in no way directly or indirectly concerned in it. In my opinion the Act should have been limited in its phraseology to an indemnity for acts ordered or approved by some responsible military or civil authority; and I may observe that in this respect the Act of 1866 is far wider in its terms than the Act of 1865.” If the Governor's advisers would limit indemnity to acts done with the view and for the purpose of quelling insurrection, or would pass a measure similar to that of 1865, the Duke would advise that Her Majesty should not exercise her power of disallowance. No graver charge can be made against the public men of the colony than is to be found in the terms of the Bill which they framed to give indemnity to the deeds which they knew to have been done. There was little prospect that the Maoris would seek redress in any colonial court; and the Ministry, unable to obtain the indemnity they desired, accepted that which the Queen would allow.1
There was a war of despatches meantime about the retention of troops. Mr. Cardwell cogently, from the first, announced the resolution of the Government as to their withdrawal, and cited the resolutions of the General Assembly on the assumption of office by Mr. Weld. The Colonial Government complained that the inactivity of the General delayed the departure of the five regiments for whose removal orders had been received. The General imputed obstruction to the local government and the Governor. To follow the dispute through all its ramifications would fill volumes. There is no doubt that the General and the Government obstructed one another as to the removal of the troops. They disagreed as to the posts where troops ought to be retained, and disagreement impeded obedience to orders from

1 Act No. 39; 10th October, 1867.

page 366 England. In April, 1865, the Governor and his Ministers astounded the General by urging the withdrawal of all Imperial land forces. In May, the General suggested withdrawal of regiments in a manner to which the Governor with concurrence of his Ministers objected. The House of Representatives when Mr. Stafford was Premier (28th October, 1865), resolved: “That this House, without reference to the general policy of retaining the Imperial troops in the colony, and without admitting any pecuniary liability to the mother-country on that account, desires to record its opinion that under the circumstances stated by his Excellency in the printed papers laid before the House, and especially having reference to the long inaction of the Imperial troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the Weraroa pah prior to its capture, his Excellency exercised a sound discretion in the course he adopted in protesting against the proposed removal of a certain number of the troops in May last, on the occasion when they were proposed to be removed by the General.” The history of the time may be read between the lines of this resolution,—moved by Mr. Stafford in the first instance, but amended by Mr. Sewell (a late colleague of Mr. Weld), who added the justificatory reference to the inaction before Weraroa. Swelling with independence, yet staggering under financial distress; resenting the imputation that they craved military aid to enable them to confiscate Maori lands, and yet loth to part with the soldiers; shuddering at the atrocities of the Hau Haus, and wondering that their countrymen in England did not make it an Imperial duty to stamp them out,— instead of haggling over payment for each man, and keeping a debtor and creditor account of all stores consumed,—the colonists of 1865 needed pity, and would have deserved sympathy if the great crime at Waitara, the origin of their woes, had not been their own act and deed, set in motion indeed by a Ministry, but adopted by the General Assembly.
A matter which Lord de Grey rated as one of profit and loss roused indignation. Major Heaphy of the Auckland Militia was recommended as worthy of distinction. General Cameron and Colonel Havelock had in 1864 been loud in his praise; the former hoping that the Victoria Cross might be awarded to him. Not content with deciding that the Royal Warrant limited the page 367 distinction to officers of the regular forces, Earl de Grey, as if studious to offend, added that the Queen's troops had no chance of receiving that substantial reward in land or otherwise which was open to servants of the Colonial Government. Mr. Weld retorted that the devotion of a colonist was as honourable as that of others, and that when debarred from distinction which only his Queen could confer, his sense of pain was unnecessarily embittered when terms were used which indirectly charged him with sordid motives. Earl de Grey, hardly comprehending the loyalty appealed to, was perhaps insensible to rebuke. In a few years he showed the value of his own patriotism by subjecting himself to a foreign yoke; and those whom he had insulted might rest contented in the belief that he had been incapable of understanding the true honour of an Englishman. To do him justice, it may be added that he was sufficiently acquainted with good manners to apologize for the language which elicited Mr. Weld's censure.1 At a later date, January, 1867, a Royal Warrant ordained that the Victoria Cross should be receivable by colonists or others serving with the regular forces, and Major Heaphy received his reward. The absence of rewards in shape of land-grants to Imperial officers, on which Earl de Grey remarked, was amusingly illustrated in 1866. The Colonial Government proposed to confer a grant of land on Dr. Mouatt, an Imperial officer, who had for some time controlled the local medical staff. The principal commissariat officer thought that he too ought to receive a grant, but the Ministry could not recognize his claim. Forthwith he wrote strong but secret complaints to the War Office against the general management of affairs by the Colonial Government. Mr. Stafford coupled this secret zeal with the rejection of the application for a land-grant, and Sir George Grey demanded that all such applications should be made through the Governor of a colony, as had been the custom in former time. The commissariat officer endeavoured to shelter himself behind a plea that he had made no formal

1 Mr. Weld was ill at the time. The Under-Secretary, Gisborne, drafted the minute. Mr. Weld was loth to appropriate as his own, another man's production, and wished Mr. Gisborne to sign it, but yielded to the argument that as the minute was to be sent to England it should bear a Minister's name. At the present time it is permissible to record Mr. Weld's fine feeling.

page 368 application, but “joined in giving expression to a very general opinion that if Dr. Mouatt received a reward, the head of the commissariat ought to be be similarly treated.” The fact that when the reward was not given secret charges were conveyed to England, in the manner so often complained of, justifies a reference to the circumstance, which in itself is unworthy of record.
The Aborigines' Protection Society urged Mr. Cardwell, in May, 1865, to despatch Commissioners “to investigate all questions connected with native policy.” From Hauraki (the Thames) and from Horotiu (Waikato), Maori letters had reached the Society—urging cessation from war, and abstinence from confiscation. “Hearken ! All the Maoris are agreed on these two points; for the blood of the Europeans is shed in his money, but as to the blood of the Maori it is shed on his own land.” Mr. Cardwell declined to intervene, but the letters were published in the colony with his despatch to the Governor. The petitions had been translated by Mr. C. O. Davis. Those who desired to trample on the Maoris endeavoured to wreak their vengeance on him. They caused him to be prosecuted in 1865 for publishing a “seditious Maori pamphlet,” and for libelling the loyal Arawa. The trial lasted several days. Bishop Selwyn was called as a witness to testify to the probable effect on the Maori mind of the published libel. Maori witnesses were also examined. Davis was acquitted. A similar subject cropped up in the English press at the same time. Mr. Fox, who was writing a book about the war,1 challenged the Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society to produce an address to the Maoris which the Society had sent to the colony. Mr. F. W. Chesson published it with a letter to the ‘Times’ in which he said: “A politician like Mr. Fox—who after vehemently denouncing the Taranaki war in opposition, became the fierce supporter of an equally iniquitous war when he crept into office—and who after filling a blue-book with his miserable wranglings with the Governor and seeking to initiate a general policy of confiscation which would have added tenfold to the horrors of the struggle, was compelled to give way to a better man,—is not exactly the kind of person who can afford to make charges, or to cast imputations upon even the Aborigines' Protection Society.” The address in question besought the

1 ‘The War in New Zealand.’ W. Fox. London: 1866.

page 369 Maoris to be counselled by Sir William Martin, Bishop Selwyn, Archdeacon Hadfield, and other real friends. To this, perhaps, no objection would have been made if it had not been known that in the teeth of their denunciations of its injustice, Governor Browne and his Ministry, and the Duke of Newcastle, had plunged into the Waitara war. But there were other passages which found no favour. Various newspapers attacked the address. A sentence in the ‘Times’ will be sufficient to show their tone. “It is a monstrous piece of extravagance to say not only that these savages have an indefeasible title to all the soil of New Zealand, but that they ought to be maintained in possession of it for ever, to the obstruction of all colonization. Such a proposition needs no contradiction.” The ‘Times’ was thoroughly understood by its friends in New Zealand. The ‘Wellington Independent’ declared (Nov. 1865): “England benevolently tells us through despatches, by the voice of Parliament, and in the columns of the ‘Times,’ that we may exterminate the natives as soon as we please.” The Maoris were not forgotten in the New Zealand Assembly. A Native Rights Bill was passed to remove doubts as to their position as British subjects. The Native Lands Act of 1862 will be remembered as having been passed by the Domett Ministry in a different form from that desired by Sir G. Grey. The proceedings of the Land Court, in ascertaining titles, required confirmation by the Governor; and in 1862 the Duke of Newcastle, professing confidence in the Governor, sanctioned the Act, which was only to come into operation in districts proclaimed by him. By the Native Rights Act of 1865 the ancient custom and usage of the Maori people with regard to title or interest in land was preserved, and the Supreme Court was bound to refer questions of Maori title to be tried in the Native Lands Court. One great work of the Session was the creation of the Court over which Mr. Weld had asked Mr. Fenton to preside. The Native Lands Act 1865, amended and consolidated the laws relating to lands where Maori proprietary rights remained. There was to be a Chief Judge. There was to be other Judges and Native Assessors. Like the Act of 1862, it recognized the right of natives to sell direct to Europeans, and thereby departed from the treaty of Waitangi. The shattered Maori rights were to be readjusted, not completely page 370 but partially. Certain powers of co-operation with the Native Land Courts were reserved for the Governor, the juries were to be composed of Maoris or Englishmen, and the Supreme Court was bound to receive as authoritative the decision of the Land Court. The Judges were to hold office during good behaviour and not at pleasure of the Governor in Council. Mr. Mantell must be mentioned as having taken an honourable part in the preparation of this Act, which when he retired was ably conducted through the House by Mr. Fitzgerald. To Mr. Weld also is due the tribute that under his Ministry the Bill was prepared by Mr. Fenton, whom Mr. Weld selected for the critical post of Chief Judge. To the Native Lands Act Mr. Fenton (the Chief Judge), the Pakeha Maori (Mr. Maning, who was appointed Judge), and many others, ascribed an advance towards confidence and contentment on the part of the Maori race as gratifying to their friends as it was surprising to their enemies. It was the fruit of much care. The Native Minister and the Attorney-General (Sewell) had wisely taken counsel with Sir William Martin before introducing it. That good man's efforts did not cease with the passing of the Act. When, at the close of the session, Mr. Russell became Native Minister under Mr. Stafford, Sir W. Martin put forward his views in a manner which excited the admiration but did not evoke the help of Mr. Cardwell. War should be terminated on terms of cession, not seizure, of lands. Until there were Maori Representatives no Bill affecting Maoris should be brought forward before a draft had been circulated in every district which had accepted English rule, and time had been given for petitioning. No Act affecting Maori land tenure should be brought into operation until the Royal Assent had been obtained and notified in the colony. The Public Works Lands Act, and Outlying Districts Act, should not be brought into operation. The latter might be tyrannically abused. When a supposed criminal had not been surrendered, lands could be seized. “Could this appear to the natives anything but a device for getting land?” Under the former, land could be taken for public purposes without compliance with the equitable provisions which in England were a security against wrong. Mr. Russell “regretted much to find his views opposed to some of those of so good and able a man as Sir W. Martin”; page 371 Sir George Grey lauded the humanity of public men and the forbearance of the General Assembly in dealing with Maori rights; Mr. Cardwell1 declined to assume the responsibility of desiring that all Acts affecting the natives should be reserved for the Queen's pleasure, and Sir William Martin's paper remains to excite wonder at the minds which could be opposed to his reasoning. While Mr. Cardwell was in Downing Street there might be hope of justice. In October, 1865, he had written that native affairs were “not placed in the hands of the Local Government in any other sense than that in which the affairs of the settlers themselves are so placed, and that in cases touching the honour or interests of the Crown, the adherence to treaties entered into by Her Majesty, and other matters of an analogous kind, the Royal power of disallowing Acts is no more abandoned in the one case than the other.” But who could guarantee Mr. Cardwell's continuance in office? He had succeeded a Newcastle, and might give way to a Buckingham or a Granville. The New Zealand Settlements Act was again dealt with. Amended in 1864, it still displeased Mr. Cardwell, who, though he abstained from causing inconvenience by immediate disallowance, and trusted to the Governor's discretion in administration, considered the Act of 1864 unsatisfactory, and held the power of disallowance in case of need. He desired that the compensation to be given to dispossessed natives should depend on judicial decisions, and be independent of the concurrence of political advisers “reflecting the popular opinion of the moment.” The renewal of 1865 made the Act perpetual, but fixed the 3rd December 1867, as the time when the power of the Governor to proclaim districts, and reserve for settlement lands forfeited for insurrection, should cease. A Native Commission Act (1865) was passed

1 Mr. Cardwell (26th April, 1866) read Sir W. Martin's letter with great interest, and doubted not that the “forethought exhibited” would secure for it the consideration it “eminently deserved.” But Her Majesty's Government were “not of opinion that the Home Government could profitably assume that responsibility, or require that delay to occur which would be involved in Sir W. Martin's proposal that Acts affecting the natives should be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.” But the Constitution Act of 1852 (15 and 16 Vict. cap. 72) distinctly preserved a power for the Crown to guard the natives from wrong; and the Queen was pledged to the treaty of Waitangi.

page 372 as a preliminary step towards conferring on the Maori race all rights and privileges of British subjects. Mr. Weld introduced it. Alluding to the exploits of Mokena Kohere, he said: “No words of his could express too strongly what they had owed to the loyal natives.” The Native Lands Act was hailed by Mr. Cardwell with pleasure. The Outlying Districts Act, and the amended Settlements Act, were not disallowed at once; but as they were capable of abuse, the power of disallowance was held available. On the general tendency of the legislation on Maori interests, Mr. Cardwell warmly congratulated the colony.

Early in the session (9th August), Mr. Graham presented a petition from Waharoa, praying that a Commissioner might be appointed to investigate the cause of the war. Mr. Brodie had a notice on the paper condemning the receipt of communications or petitions from natives in rebellion, and Mr. Graham's motion for the reception of the petition was discussed. Mr. Brodie (9th August) denounced its reception, and reprobated Mr. Graham's communications with the rebel chief or rebel race. Mr. Weld entreated the House not to repel the Maori when there was a glimmering of brighter days. Though the language of the petition might be irregular, surely it might be borne with. At least, let the House, “before striking, listen.” Mr. Fitzgerald supported the reception of the petition. When it spoke of Rangiriri as a murder, its language was poetical. Mr. Stafford thought it would be a grievous error to make the petitioner think that Maoris had “nothing to expect from the sympathy or justice” of the House. Mr. Brodie's motion was lost, on division, by 16 votes against 2. On the following day the petition was received. Waharoa's words were heard. “Mr. Fox and his friends have written to Queen Victoria words damaging to my reputation, hence my desire that the whole matter may be seen into, so that it may be found who is right, and who it is that is wrong. Let it be for the law to determine. I agree that some Englishman be appointed as arbitrator—that is to say, if he is an Englishman of good principles, single-hearted, God-fearing, and fearful of doing wrong. I consent to point out an arbitrator.” He would name Sir George Arney, the English Chief Justice. He would abide by the arbitration of any one chosen by the Queen. He recited his efforts for peace. “Did the law protect page 373 Te Rangitake and Waitara? Did a law protect us, our lands and property, at that time? Were the Europeans whom the Governor sent to this island—Europeans who drink spirits, curse, speak evilly, who make light of those in authority,—were these a law? Then did I say, Let me set up my king, for we do not approve of the law. But now, O friends, the law of the Queen is the law to protect my king and the whole people also.”…

Sixteen members voted against the reception of a letter called a petition written by Te Waharoa, in April, before his submission. In it he denounced the conduct of the war. “Look also,—Maoris have been burnt alive in their dwelling-houses.” From a Maori point of view, he argued that the war in Waikato had been unjust. Twenty-seven members decided to receive this document also, and among them were the influential names of Messrs. Dillon Bell, Carleton, Domett, Fitzgerald, Fitzherbert, Graham, Colonel Haultain, Monro, Sewell, Stafford, and Weld. But though they had qualms of conscience with regard to the treatment accorded to Te Waharoa, neither they nor any men in power in New Zealand ever would consent to submit to arbitrament of reason or law the questions he propounded. Nevertheless, something was gained in the cessation of violence. Amongst other proofs of confidence, returns were laid before the Assembly, showing that the number of grants from the Crown to Maoris was rapidly increasing. More than a hundred were in course of preparation at Canterbury alone. It was but a beginning; nevertheless, with cautious kindness on the part of the Government, much might flow from it.

A complicated dispute about a block of land at Manawatu was vainly thought settled to the satisfaction of the natives. The Ngatiraukawa and Rangitane tribes on one side, the Ngatiapa on the other, had almost been at war. Dr. Featherston interposed, and battle was averted in 1865, but the dispute was to be a cause of future dangers. On the 9th August, Mr. Fitzgerald presented a petition from natives at Otaki. They hailed a suggestion made to them by him, and asked that Maoris might sit in the General Assembly. Subsequently the same tribe petitioned that the Maoris might elect representatives to sit on the Commission to be appointed under the Native page 374 Commission Act. Mr. G. Graham vainly endeavoured to incorporate with a general Representation Bill special provision for conferring the elective franchise on Maoris. Mr. Fitzgerald had at the time a notice on the table to provide for special Maori government in the northern districts, but the House was satisfied with neither proposal. Mr. Vogel became the mouth-piece of malcontents, and moved, on the 12th September, that the House had no confidence in the Native Minister (who was thus attracting the goodwill of Maoris), but the motion was negatived without a division. After the retirement of the Weld Ministry, in October, another proposal by Mr. Vogel was brought forward. Each province was to preserve order, subdue its own Maoris, and “enjoy the proceeds of the confiscated lands” it might take from the natives. After discussion this premium for robbery was withdrawn.

When (2nd September) the proclamation of peace was issued, Mr. Colenso made (14th September) a motion condemning omissions from the list of the unpardoned; but in a fuller House the resolution was rescinded on the motion of Mr. Weld. The Prince's Street reserve at Dunedin was the occasion of his losing friends. Mr. Mantell, it may be remembered, had denounced the attempts made to break faith with the beneficiaries under the reserve. Mr. Weld (on an Otago Native Reserves Bill) voted on the side of justice. He was warned that he would lose supporters, and he lost them. Yet the amendment which the majority rejected, and the Government supported, sought to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. When Mr. Fitzgerald tried to introduce a Bill to authorize suitable government in Maori provinces in the Northern Island, the question was shelved for six months, and the Government was evidently failing in strength. Mr. Fox had resigned his seat in May, declaring that it was useless to strive to do good while Sir George Grey was Governor. But though freed from the opposition of Mr. Fox, the Ministry was unsafe. Mr. Stafford was on the watch to overthrow it. Mr. Vogel, in September, on a motion adverse to the financial policy, had found a large following in objecting to fresh taxation until a new Parliament could be convened. He said in a pamphlet, that New Zealand “traded on its weakness in asking England for help.” The ‘Wellington Independent’ called his statement page 375 “a slander worthy of its author.” The propositions of the Treasurer, Mr. Fitzherbert, involved an expenditure of more than £1,500,000. Increase of customs duties and imposition of stamp duties were asked for. It was proposed to repeal the Surplus Revenue Act of 1858, under which sums were disbursed to the provinces; and to give aid, if at all, by annual votes. Each province enjoyed by law the whole of its territorial revenue. But to encroach on provincial privileges was dangerous, and murmurs loud and deep abounded amongst the members. It was resolved to fight to the last against the encroachment. The strife culminated in October. The Surplus Revenu Repeal Bill awaited a second reading. The Stamp Duties Resolutions had, on the 27th September, been carried by a bare majority in a house of 42 members. On the 10th October, the Government referred them back to the Committee of Ways and Means, but only succeeded in doing so by the aid of the Speaker's casting vote, in a house of 40 members. Provincial jealousy diminished the scanty adherents of Mr. Weld still more on the 11th October, when, on a motion by Mr. Vogel,—”that in the distribution of the provincial revenue the stamp duties be placed on the same footing as the customs duties” (of which three-eighths fell to the share of the provinces), the Treasurer had only 16 supporters. Though the Speaker, on constitutional grounds, gave his casting-vote against a resolution which, without a recommendation from the Crown, appropriated revenue by anticipation, Mr. Weld accepted the result as a practical defeat. He had declared that the question was vital, and the division indicated an absence of “that hearty support which would alone justify” Ministers in adhering to their responsibility in the critical condition of affairs, and which would guarantee success in their “policy of self-reliance and self-defence.” To the Governor he expressed their “deep sense of the cordial co-operation always afforded them during their term of office.” In the name of the provinces, which he was afterwards to be the chief means of destroying, Mr. Vogel extinguished Mr. Weld. But as yet he was pulling chesnuts out of the fire for others. Mr. Stafford carried off the spoils. Mr. Weld's friends vainly entreated him to remain in office. Public meetings were held, and there was general discontent at the prospect of a Stafford Administration page 376 Some to whom he applied for assistance declined to serve with him. Mr. Crosbie Ward, an old colleague of Mr. Domett (although in controversy with Mr. Weld at the time), was proof against all entreaties, and Mr. Stafford was fain to patch up a Ministry in which he held three offices, while Messrs. Haultain, Russell, and Paterson, held the remainder. The Representatives deemed themselves entrapped into sanctioning an Administration controlled by Mr. Stafford.

Mr. Weld, though in ill-health, addressed the electors at Christchurch. The Town-hall was crowded to excess. It was resolved that he was the most fit person to represent Christchurch. He accepted the invitation, and wrote a farewell address to his constituents at Cheviot. But in January his medical advisers forbade a continuance in public life; and hoping that his “errors of judgment or temper might be forgiven,” and fervently thanking his friends, to whom he confidently left the trust of his political honour, and the triumph of his principles, he passed from the parliamentary arena of New Zealand. His self-reliant policy elicited compliments from the London ‘Times,’ and from public men. Mr. Cardwell, in December, 1865, specially impressed upon Sir George Grey that the Home Government having accepted that policy as embodied in the New Zealand resolutions of December, 1864, intended to adhere to it. When his despatch was published in New Zealand, the ‘Canterbury Press’ (25th April, 1866) declared that the deserted Mr. Weld was stronger than his treacherous supporters;—”he is driven from office but carries his policy. Mr. Stafford holds office but abandons his policy; all that he opposed is carried; all that he proposed is abandoned.” Mr. Fitzgerald also disappeared from New Zealand Cabinets. A letter from him to Sir C. Adderley1 may properly be cited: “I venture to think that during the two months I held office the colony has asserted some of the most important principles which lay down fixed bases for the guidance of our future policy. A Bill for enabling the Governor to appoint a Commission of Natives and Europeans to inquire how the natives may best be represented in the General Assembly, shows how widely the feeling of the colony has changed since 1862, when, amid general

1 Published in the London ‘Times,’ 20th December, 1865.

page 377 laughter, I first proposed the adoption of this principle. A Bill of still greater importance has declared that all Maoris are British subjects, entitled to all the privileges and protection of British law; and as a great practical result it enables a Maori to bring an action into the Supreme Court, in respect to native lands. The monstrous doctrine that the Maoris were compelled to obey the law, and could be tried and executed by our courts for crime, while at the same time we refused them the assistance of our courts to defend their property, is now, thank God, for ever1 expunged from the jurisprudence of this colony. We have, then, constructed an elaborate machinery for trying cases of native title to land by a Native Lands Court, and enabled the Supreme Court to use this machinery by sending down cases to it for trial.” A Police Bill which authorized the taking of lands from a tribe which might shelter a murderer would provide necessary police funds. Summing up what had been done, the writer added: “These are measures which I am very glad to have had some share in during the short time I have been in office, and which, if faithfully carried into action, will, I believe, change the whole features of the Maori question.” Men who carried such measures had a right to exult in the change. The student of history must remember that Sir William Martin, who was consulted in their preparation, had cried vainly for some such measures in the past, when no man in office would regard wisdom. Mr. Fitzgerald did not retire from the political arena. He stood for Christchurch, and vigorously assailed Mr. Stafford's Ministry. It is impossible to refrain from quoting sentences which bear upon the Waitara war. He had never differed from Mr. Weld except on the Waitara question. He had “distinctly one view, and I took distinctly the other. I devoted myself with no ordinary amount of labour to master that great question; for I saw that it was the great question of New Zealand.… I read and studied every paper… and I came to the conclusion… the more honest that it involved a separation from those whose opinions I valued more than those of any men in the colony… that the Waitara purchase was a

1 Mr. Fitzgerald can hardly be blamed for not foreseeing the violence done and the justice denied to Maoris by the New Zealand Government in 1831–2.

page 378 bad one; and secondly, that even if it were a good purchase it was one for which it was extremely unwise to plunge the colony into war.”1 The meeting resolved unanimously to send “the first orator of New Zealand” to the Assembly. Mr. Stafford's course was troublous when he took office. Rumours were rife that he had obtained a promise of a dissolution, whether supplies were granted or not. Mr. Fitzgerald brought the question before the House. Another of the Weld Ministry, Mr. J. C. Richmond, put a similar question in the Council. Colonel Russell replied, that “No proposal was ever made by Mr. Stafford to his Excellency to dissolve the Parliament before the supplies were asked for.” Thereupon a statement from Mr. Pharazyn was produced, declaring that after he had positively refused to accept office, Mr. Stafford said, “he wished it to be generally known, that under no circumstances could the House turn him out, as in the event of a refusal to grant supplies, he had the power of dissolving without this having been done, and was determined to use it and appeal to the country. He did not wish to use this as a threat, and it would be highly improper to make the statement in the House, but he wished Mr. Pharazyn to make his determination known, in order to prevent factious opposition.” The statement was entered in the Journals, and communicated to the Governor, as materially affecting “the principles upon which the Government of the colony is established.” Indignation was fruitless. Unprepared for consequences, a majority had weakly deserted Mr. Weld in haste, and was compelled to repent at leisure. The Governor signified his acquiescence to the making of any explanation which his advisers thought proper; but his advisers were content with their seats. Mr. Sewell, in Committee, inserted in a Bill to control public expenditure, a clause imposing penalties upon any member of the Executive Council advising, or threatening to advise, during a session, prorogation or dissolution of the Assembly while supplies were unprovided, but on the following day, when some of Mr. Sewell's friends were absent, the

1 Mr. Fitzgerald said: (Had our Native Lands Acts been) “law during the Waitara purchase,—if Te Rangitake could have gone to the Supreme Court to try his case, there would have been no need of war. We should have saved millions of money.” (The meeting cheered him.) But the lives!

page 379 noxious clause was struck out, and Mr. Stafford remained master of the situation when the Assembly was prorogued on the 30th October.

Separation of the islands into two colonies had been seriously discussed. In September, Mr. Russell moved that existing liabilities should be equitably adjusted, and Cook's Strait be made a boundary between two separate colonies. Mr. Weld opposed, and the motion was rejected by 31 votes against 17. From Auckland a petition to the Queen signed by nearly all the European settlers had prayed that a separate colony might be created there. The Weld Ministry strenuously opposed this project, and sent a counter-petition from Hawke's Bay where the inhabitants unanimously differed from their Auckland brethren. Sir George Grey had hinted that some arrangement by which the Imperial Government could exercise control over native affairs in the north until a reconciliation could be effected between the two races seemed essential. His advisers did not agree with him. The north was ill-pleased with the results of the session of 1865. The Provincial Council protested against the new Electoral Act which gave a majority to the south in the House of Representatives. A similar majority existed in the Council. Auckland prayed that it might “no longer be subject to southern legislation.” The southern colonists were “practically not liable to military service,” not exposed to danger, and being “ignorant of native affairs,” might afflict the north with war. Mr. Whitaker, elected Superintendent of the province in 1866, sent a special petition to the Queen at a later date, but Mr. Stafford was as hostile as his predecessor, and Mr. Cardwell held out no hope to the Provincial Council. In a tone almost complaining he said it was “no easy task to retrace the steps” deliberately taken in establishing the existing Government. An ineptitude, rare in his despatches, suggested that local legislation might meet the emergency. Auckland was like a lamb remitted to question with the wolf. The English lion was weary of blunders some of which were his own. No folly is more conspicuous than his who thinks that power over other men's fortunes will willingly be resigned. Yet men continually hug the belief that they can hoodwink crowds, and seduce them into acts which would be like loosening the fastened fangs of a page 380 wild beast. The north was powerless. But the south was only entering upon the heritage which numbers gave it. It complained that it was dragged behind the car of Auckland necessities. In an elaborate address to his Dunedin constituents in 1866, Major Richardson (Mr. Weld's recent colleague) declared: “The fact is that the south has been bound over hand and foot to colonize Auckland.” The expectant south had not long to wait.

The Hokitika gold-fields had been discovered early in 1865. The sceptre was passing into the hands of the gold-seeking adventurers, who had flocked from Australia to the Middle Island; and already one of them was scenting his prey, although Mr. Stafford had not included him amongst his colleagues in 1865.1 There was a “Northern Association of New Zealand” Committee in London which strove to strengthen the hands of the Auckland secessionists; but Mr. Cardwell gave them no heed except by rebuking their vehemence. Mr. Stafford had not allowed the session to close without laying down principles to control the Auckland territory. As adopted finally they asserted that, subject to certain conditions, the confiscated lands in the province should be transferred to the provincial administration for purposes of colonization. The General Government retained control in settling the loyal natives, and those who might “desire to accept the Queen's authority and take grants from the Crown.” The province was to be liable for all sums expended for its advantage under the New Zealand Settlements Act. After discharging such liabilities, the province was to pay to the General Government, out of the proceeds of confiscated lands, 2s. 6d. per acre, and was to provide all compensation awarded to natives (by the Compensation Court) under the

1 Mr. Vogel, in December, 1865, proposed a characteristic plan for dealing with “the magnificent land acquired from the natives”; viz. to submit to a lottery a million of acres, valued at £2 an acre. There were to be 6121 lots, varying from one of 100,000 acres to 4200 of 50 acres. The profits of the raffle were to be expended on immigration, and 18,870 steerage and 170 cabin passengers were expected. “Winners of land not using their privileges” within a time to be stated were to forfeit them. Though the plan reeked of an atmosphere to be found between Shoreditch and White-chapel, the immigrants were to be moral, the “settlements model,” and no difficulties were anticipated with the Maoris.

page 381 Settlements Act, or required to compensate Auckland settlers for losses in the war. Further, the province was, after recouping the sums spent by the General Government on military colonization and Waikato immigration, to “engage to spend” the whole of the receipts “from confiscated lands in colonizing and otherwise for the general advantage of the confiscated districts.” Auckland did not accept these terms without negotiation. In January, Mr. Whitaker extracted from Mr. Stafford a promise to invite the General Assembly to raise £250,000 as a loan to the province to enable it to undertake the cost of colonizing the confiscated lands, and in February, 1866, the Provincial Council on the recommendation of Mr. Whitaker concurred with the proposed terms. Amidst the melancholy proofs of the folly as well as wickedness of the act at Waitara, returns showed that in 1864 more than 130,000 acres were sold in Wellington, nearly 60,000 at Hawke's Bay, and a like number in Auckland, while in the Taranaki province there had been no sale at all. The Council had (25th October) in spite of ministerial opposition remonstrated against the retention of the Imperial troops at the rate of pay (£40 per man) sought to be imposed. A colonial force would be more effective, and Great Britain would be relieved from a useless expenditure. Mr. Stafford was unwilling to attach importance to the remonstrance. He assumed a virtue in not having by new creations swamped the majority in the Council. A Representative Bill had been passed, a new Parliament was to be assembled, and he submitted to the Governor that all the arrangements which he found in operation on accepting office ought to remain undisturbed. He declared that the colony was as incapable of raising the force contemplated by Mr. Weld as it was of paying the “£40 a-head demanded in respect of the Imperial troops,” and this ominous declaration was transmitted to England to intimate that the colonial contribution would be made a matter of dispute. The work of the troops was done. They had conquered Waikato, and could be dispensed with. The ‘Wellington Independent’ (18th November, 1865) did not hesitate to say: “Mr. Stafford's policy is to back up the Governor in keeping the Imperial troops as long as possible, and ultimately to refuse to pay for their services.” When Mr. Stafford took office the return of one page 382 regiment had been arranged, and four others were sent away, at intervals, in 1866. Despatch after despatch from England complained of the delay. Early in 1866 the current of thought in New Zealand concerned itself chiefly with the correspondence about the withdrawal of troops and financial affairs. War was virtually at an end, but the cost of it was draining the resources of the colony. The withdrawal of the troops would diminish the private gains which accompany the supply of provisions and stores of an army. The quarrel between the Governor and the General was still furnishing occupation for talkers, and filling reams of despatches. It is necessary to bear in mind that till the new Parliament assembled in June, 1866, all minds were intent mainly on these topics. In January, Mr. Stafford elaborately described the state of the colony. The ordinary revenue from all sources was £738,000.1 The estimated expenditure was £1,121,000 for the year. Resort was made to the loan to supply deficiency of revenue. Native wars were responsible for £3,396,000. The balance estimated to be due to the Imperial Government was £503,000. The sums due for advances from the commissariat chest were large, and there was a dispute as to the amount. There were counter-claims also for advances from the Colonial Treasury for Imperial purposes. On the suggestion of the Treasury, Mr. Cardwell advised that an officer should be appointed in the colony to examine the accounts with the Commissary-General, Mr. Jones. To the assumption that the £500,000 in colonial debentures could be handed at par to the Imperial Treasury, Mr. Cardwell would by no means agree. The debentures were in the market “at a discount of nearly 20 per cent.” Nothing seemed to be touched in New Zealand which was not a fruitful source of disagreement. When Mr. Cardwell, in November, 1865, received the peace proclamation of September, and the financial statement of Mr. Fitzherbert indicating that the capitation charge of £40 for each soldier would not be proposed to the Assembly, it was at once ordered that the troops in the colony should be reduced to three battalions of Infantry and one battery of Artillery, and these were only to remain on request of the Colonial Ministry and provision for the local capitation charge.

1 Only sums exceeding £1000 are included in these figures.

page 383 They were not to be employed in protecting land taken from rebels, nor to be left in distant and isolated posts. When Mr. Weld's resignation was announced, Sir George Grey was emphatically informed by Mr. Cardwell that no change of Ministry would affect the decision of the Home Government. The correspondence respecting the Weraroa pah and General Cameron exacerbated the instructions on the removal of troops; and when in the end of 1866 the Earl of Carnarvon endeavoured to intimidate the Governor, the confusion into which affairs had been thrown could hardly have been more confounded. The wrongs of Te Rangitake in 1860 had been bitterly avenged upon the colonists, who had been plunged into the Waitara war by the Stafford Ministry as light-heartedly as the French were ushered into the Franco-German war in 1870 by Emile Ollivier. Among the matters for which Mr. Weld's Government took credit in the session of 1865, was the arrangement of terms for conveyance of mails by Panama. A foolish jealousy has sometimes beset the Australian colonies on this subject. Instead of determining that mails from Europe shall be brought by that which is, on the whole, the most regular and economical conveyance, they have vexed themselves and the postal authorities in England by struggling to obtain the sentimental “mana,” or importance of having the terminus fixed at their capitals. For New Zealand there was some excuse, as her easterly position made it probable that letters carried through America from England would arrive in less time than those taken by Suez. Mr. Weld incurred disfavour at Auckland by fixing the port of call at Wellington, but he gained approval at Otago which was brought closer to the coveted privilege.

Early in 1866 writs for election of a new House of Representatives were issued by the Governor. The old names notable in New Zealand reappeared among the three-score-and-ten members, on the 30th June. Sir David Monro, member for Cheviot, again became Speaker. The questions of war and finance pervaded the Governor's speech. Disturbance was almost at an end. Remnants only of hostile bands were at large on the west coast. Some of the ringleaders captured had been “temporarily removed, in 1866, to the Chatham Islands,” and “the hope of return was held out to them as soon as the page 384 suppression of the rebellion and their own good conduct might seem to justify the Government in restoring them to their homes.”1 Murderers had been dealt with by the ordinary tribunals. The majority of the captives had been restored to liberty. The troops were in course of removal, and there were districts for which the Assembly would have to provide force sufficient to maintain Her Majesty's authority. It had been found necessary to appoint a Commission to report on the Civil Service. The tariff was to be revised, and stamp duties—the test which had been fatal to Mr. Weld—were to be imposed. Several new members had been appointed in the Legislative Council, which was thereby enlarged to thirty-five members. With a few amendments in the Council, and with none in the Lower House, the friends of the Ministry carried addresses in reply to the Governor's speech, and Mr. Stafford was firmly seated if not entirely trusted. His manœuvres in 1865, and his assumption of virtue in not having overborne, by new creations, the majority in the Council, were not forgotten. Colonel Whitmore carried, without a division, a resolution that the number of members in the Council ought not to exceed thirty-eight, with a proviso that once, nevertheless, during a session two additional members might be appointed to represent a Government. Subsequent vacancies by death or otherwise were not to be filled up, except to maintain the normal number. A Bill to give effect to this resolution was passed, and sent to the other House. There it encountered the jealousy which springs from self-worship. Though read a second time it was strangled in Committee; a majority, which in justice to the House must be admitted to contain no names of repute, determining to report progress without asking leave to sit again. A ludicrous proposition was made by Mr. Vogel, viz. that after repeated disagreement about a measure, the Governor might summon to the Council the Representatives, who were to be competent to pass the disputed measure—but to be otherwise powerless when seated amongst their victims.

It may be assumed as a fact, recurring with almost the regularity of physical laws, that inferior minds in one house will

1 Speech of Native Minister (A. H. Russell) in Legislative Council, 26th July, 1866.

page 385 view with disfavour whatever tends to strengthen the position of the other. As the power of the purse of itself gives predominance, and as it is, in all imitations of the British Parliament, placed chiefly in the hands of the House which most largely represents ignorance, it follows, almost as night the day, that the power will be sought to be abused, if not converted into tyranny. In quiet times the salutary influence of a Governor may secure serious consideration in appointing senators for life. When pressure comes he cannot, without locking the wheels of the State chariot, bring influence to bear.

There was warrant for Colonel Whitmore's caution. Already Sir John Young (afterwards Lord Lisgar) had, in 1861, consented to overbear the Legislative Council in Sydney by a wholesale creation of members. Circumstances over which neither he nor his Ministers had control doomed his disorderly procedure to failure, but with the rapidity with which discreditable doings in one colony are proverbially heralded in another, the daring act attempted in New South Wales had been bruited in New Zealand, and it was natural that securities should be demanded against similar violence. That they could not, even in placid times of legislation, be obtained, furnished a warning to all who are inclined in weak moments to subject themselves to the possible tyranny of others. Mr. Stafford was not confronted by serious opposition in the Council; but on the 15th August the Representatives, by 47 votes against 14, resolved that his Ministry did not possess their confidence. He was less sensitive than his predecessor, and being again entrusted with the task of forming a Ministry, resorted to the device of securing Mr. Fitzherbert as Treasurer on the 24th August, 1866. Nor was Mr. Weld's Treasurer the only one of Mr. Weld's colleagues who enlisted under Mr. Stafford. Major J. L. C. Richardson and Mr. J. C. Richmond accompanied him in his return to the piebald Ministry which Mr. Stafford thus created, and which contained active members of the conspiracy which defrauded the Maoris of their reserve at Dunedin. A former colleague of Mr. Weld was still discontented with the guidance of Mr. Stafford. On the 24th September, Mr. Fitzgerald moved resolutions which, while reaffirming the resolutions of December, 1864, on the duty of the colony as to internal defence, declared that the whole of page 386 the military should be under the control of the Civil Government, and that its duties ought not to be measured by the amount of military force which the Home Government might choose to maintain in the colony. Mr. Stafford having added words to the effect that the House was prepared “to provide sufficient means for defence,” the resolutions were shelved by 30 votes against 21, the Government voting in the minority, while Mr. Whitaker, Dr. Featherston, and Mr. Crosbie Ward were in the majority.

It was no Pharaoh who had bound the colonists to their task; but it was not made easier for them because self-imposed. They had determined to make bricks without straw, and were aghast at the work they had to do. Thus it was that they could not speak intelligibly on Mr. Fitzgerald's resolution. Similarly when Mr. Whitaker, earlier in the session, proposed resolutions for remodelling the government of Auckland, the Representatives went into Committee upon them, and went out again—agreeing upon nothing. After a week of futile discussion the Speaker resumed the chair. Two financial statements were made within one month. Mr. Jollie, who had become Treasurer in June, made a statement on the 8th August. A vote of want of confidence, moved by Mr. Moorhouse, the Superintendent of Canterbury, was passed on the 15th by a large majority. Mr. Stafford, to propitiate the House, made room in the Ministry for three of the gentlemen whom he had driven from office a few months previously. Mr. Fitzherbert, having reassumed the control of the Treasury, made his financial statement on the 5th September. Some reduction of expenditure was proposed, and the maintenance of an armed constabulary rather than a rudimentary army was declared to be the policy of the reconstructed Government. Mr. Fitzherbert did not propose to deal in 1866 with his former stumbling-block—The Surplus Revenue Act—but hinted that in a future session, the partnership in revenue between the General and Provincial Government would require to be dealt with. The provincial share (three-eighths) of the Customs revenue was estimated at £318,750. Three days before the session was closed, Mr. Jollie proposed a reduction, but failed to convince his fellow-members. A Stamp Duties Bill was passed, and was expected to produce £50,000 a-year.

page 387

The confiscated lands were made a subject of inquiry early in the session, on the motion of Colonel Haultain, the Minister for Colonial Defence. A Select Committee reported that in Taranaki, 1,144,300 acres; in Wellington, 200,000 acres; in Auckland, 1,911,437 acres, had been confiscated. Though instructed to report upon “the best mode of disposing of land available for settlement,” they refrained from doing so. The computation of the extent and value of lands at Waikato was intricate and complex, and at Waikato and Tauranga the lands had on certain terms been handed over to the Provincial Government. At Opotiki, though 480,000 acres had been seized, about half must be restored to the Maoris, of whom about half had remained loyal; and, deducting 25,000 acres for military settlers, and assuming much to be unavailable for settlement, there would remain about 25,000 acres of choice land to be disposed of.1

The Ulysses of the Maori nation kept faith with the Governor. The promise made at Hamilton by Te Waharoa the king-maker was redeemed. Sir G. Grey enabled him to appear without ignominy, for he arrived at Wellington as a guest on board of H.M.S. ‘Esk,’ prepared to give information which might lead to legislation on Maori affairs. On the 10th August, Mr. Fitzgerald presented to the Representatives a petition from him. They not only did not hesitate to accept it; they allowed it to be referred, without previous notice, to a Committee, consisting of Colonel Haultain, Mr. Whitaker, Mr. McLean, Mr. J. C. Richmond, Dr. Featherston, Mr. Dillon Bell, Mr. G. Graham, and Mr. Fitzgerald. His petition was lengthy. The writer had been dwelling “at his place—great darkness and sorrow of heart,”—brooding over the woes of his country. The Governor had made soul and body

1 In 1867 a return showed that 87,000 acres at Opotiki were given to the gallant Arawa tribe who had fought for the English. The Crown Agent reported of 58,000 acres,—”Act not enforced.” Of 96,000 acres “given back to rebels,” he said: “The giving back is but nominal, for the natives would not have given it up. But I was required to make the best arrangement I could.” The balance in the hands of the Government, in June, 1867, was 151,000 acres.—N. Z. P. P. 1867; A. No. 18. In the same return Mr. Parris reported that to the hero of Waitara, Te Rangitake, had been restored 25 acres in the Waitara township. In the Taranaki district loyal natives had received 134,000 acres; military settlers, 106,000; rebel natives, 33,000.

page 388 rejoice by advising recourse to the Parliament, which had power to lift an exceeding great weight. Two wants caused anxiety. “1. That some measure be devised to straighten those curvatures, by reason of which we all fell into error. 2. For Waikato to be given back to me.” He dilated on the first, recounting the evils which brought about and continued the wars. He had throughout sought peace, and condemned savage practices. But, “O friends, because of this did I fully consent to the fighting; because of my women and children having been burnt alive in the fire, which was suffered, rather than the edge of the sword, to consume their flesh. I would not have regarded it had it been only the men.” For himself, since first “we embraced Christianity, when my tribe sought (utu) payment for our dead who had fallen, I did not give my consent. Then I said, ‘Stop; strive to repay in a Christian manner. Let peaceful living be the payment for my dead.’ They consented. I then drew all my enemies to me: they all came, not one continued a stranger to me, but all became related to me in the bonds of Christian fellowship. Then I said, ‘What a good payment (utu) this is for those that are dead, this living peacefully.’” The king movement had fostered peace among Maoris, and therefore he had supported it. “Follow, O Assembly, after me, and measure my steps from the beginning up to the present day. Weigh also my words from the first until now, for everything is weighed; articles of food are weighed, and clothing is sold by measure. Land is also meted out, and should the mind of man not be weighed? Will it not be measured to discover its weight and dimensions?” On the restitution of Waikato he wrote only the words quoted already. He gave evidence, and the Committee recommended that his petition should be referred to the Superintendent of the Auckland province. On other Maori petitions also they reported with some kindliness. Wi Tako, to whom the English owed so much, was a petitioner on the subject of a Compensation Court decision, and was advised as to the procedure he should adopt.

The vain striving of an aboriginal race against the vices which accompany European civilization found a faint echo in a petition from six members of the Arawa tribe, who prayed that a house for the sale of spirituous liquors might not be “suffered to be page 389 established within the Arawa territories.” The effort to confer electoral privileges and representation on the Maoris found no record in the Statute-book of 1866; but some of the earnest-minded were labouring to bring about a consummation so devoutly to be desired, as the acceptance by the natives of the rights of British subjects after they had been deprived at the point of the bayonet of their own. But the Assembly was not idle. In three months no less than 92 Acts were passed. The Settlements Act was again amended. The Native Lands Act of 1865 was supplemented. Waste Lands Acts for Otago, Canterbury, and Auckland gave powers to the provinces in dealing with lands. Various enactments dealt with Treasury bills, and with provincial debts. The Wellington Land Purchase Loan Sanction Act sanctioned a loan to the Wellington province to enable it to purchase from Maoris, at a cost of £25,000, the Manawatu block, the titles to which had long been and were to continue in dispute. Gold-fields, Civil Service, distillation, carriers, inn-keepers, oyster fisheries, registration of electors, and various other persons and subjects furnished titles of Acts, some of which, as usual in self-governing colonies, were almost verbal transcripts of Imperial statutes.

Te Waharoa, after his long estrangement from the English, must have pondered long over the restless activity of the members of that which his countrymen had called “the English Committee.” No subject seemed too large for its power, nothing too small for its notice. With English blood and treasure, and the help of native allies, the hostile Maoris had been put down. The thoughtful chieftain must have speculated whether the repugnance to tradition and rude want of reverence, which characterized the Representatives, might not in the end lead them to trample on the authority of the Queen. Already some of the early servants of the voracious New Zealand Company had been in power. One of them, Mr. Fox, had been chief Minister in 1861, and in 1863, with a fellow-lawyer, Whitaker, had made demands of confiscation which the exile of whole tribes would not have satiated. Then, the Governor and Mr. Cardwell had campelled Mr. Fox to yield; but in 1866 a new order of things had arisen. Mr. Stafford, the head of the Ministry which brought about the great injustice of Waitara, was again page 390 in power. The enemies of the Maori seemed ever able to crawl into office. In published despatches and speeches in England it had been confessed that Her Majesty's Ministers disapproved of much of the confiscation policy which they shrunk from restraining. Te Waharoa was familiar with Scripture, and was now brought face to face with a rod which was thus swallowing up its opponents. Old Maoria was passing away. The “korero” of tribes had ceased to be a power in the land. The Parliament of the Pakeha had become, if not an object of respect, an irresistible engine for good or evil. Te Waharoa went back to his own place, whither most of his tribe had been permitted to return, and died in a few months. His friends said he was broken-hearted. His detractors looked upon his death only as the fall of an additional leaf from the tree which civilization was with propriety destroying. Honourable, kind, peaceful, and Christian, he had yearned for the happiness of his people. He had striven with equal honesty against the inexorable Rewi and the machinations and injustice of English colonists. He had been maligned on both sides. After Rangiriri he had laboured for peace. In Maori manner, he sent the General a token of submission—his mĕrĕ. But for the vanity of Mr. Fox, perhaps peace might then have been secured. When General Cameron's overwhelming forces marched up the valley of the Waikato, the baffled king-maker retreated from stronghold to stronghold, finding no refuge, and bitterly complaining that professing Christians burned women and children in Maori whares at Rangiaohia. “Leave it to be for England,” he said, “to adopt the putrefactions of my ancestors, viz. killing women and children, and burning people alive in their sleeping-houses. The Maori people assented to me, and what I said to them.” It was long before he could see a way of reconciliation. The recurrence of the Hau Hau fanatics to the wild orgies in which cannibalism was not a cruelty, but a rite, was soon followed by his submission.

Sir George Grey did what he could to smooth the way. The tidings of the death of the chief caused one of those kindly messages which have often touched the hearts of Englishmen. “The Queen desires that his tribe may be made aware that she laments the loss which they have sustained. She hopes that the example of his self-control, and the wise advice which he has page 391 bequeathed to them, will lead them to forget the contest which is past, and to unite with their European fellow-subjects in those peaceful pursuits which will best ensure their own comfort and improvement, and promote the prosperity of their common country.” Such a message was worthy to be the chieftain's epitaph. The friend of mankind will part with the noble career of Te Waharoa with admiration and regret. Amongst the many actors in stirring times, on him no reproach can truly be cast From the time when, as Tarapipipi, in 1844, he enforced restitution at Remuera, until he died, receiving such tardy assistance and comfort as Sir George Grey's Government afforded him, he is seen as the embodiment of Christian virtue in a Maori nobleman. He failed to redress his country's wrongs; but, it may be, that success was impossible. After the Duke of Newcastle had sanctioned the robbery at Waitara, it could hardly be hoped for. Te Waharoa's example, nevertheless, justified the grant of representation of the Maori race, which Sir G. Grey lived to see accomplished, albeit scantily, in 1867. The enemies of Te Waharoa strove to assail his character by citing the letter in which he announced that the invasion of Waikato compelled him to arm in self-defence, and by asserting that he subsequently joined the Hau Hau fanaticism. His letter seemed to imply that he would not spare the unarmed; but no deed of his conformed to the letter. On the contrary, wherever his influence was great, chivalrous courtesy to the wounded, as at the Gate Pah, prevailed. In a pamphlet published by Mr. Sewell in 1864 (in Auckland), the author stated that he had been assured by Archdeacon Brown that the expression in the letter was “idiomatic, and that the meaning intended to be conveyed was this: ‘I have determined to join the war-party. I am going to fight. The native practice in war is to spare neither unarmed people nor property. You therefore are in danger, and I warn you to go.’” During Waharoa's last illness no Pai Marire ceremony was tolerated near him. He ever carried with him his Bible; and, so long as he had strength, he read it. When moved from place to place, his tribe as they raised him prayed thus: “Almighty God, we beseech Thee to give strength to Te Waharoa while we remove him from this place. If it please Thee, restore him again to perfect strength; if that is not Thy page 392 will, take him, we beseech Thee, to Heaven.” In fine, when Te Oriori asked, “What shall I do, and the Maoris, your children, when you are dead?” the dying chief, with the Bible in his hand, replied: “You must stand by the Government and the law; if there be any evil in the land, the law will make it right.” It could not be said that his peaceful and pious professions were born of weakness. He had ever shown the same tendency. His father, though he invited missionaries to his territory, abandoned none of the ferocity of the national cult. But it was otherwise with the future king-maker. He had no love for the ways of his ancestors, and grieved his father by shrinking from them. When a missionary was robbed, he followed the robbers, stripped them of their booty, and gave it back to its owner. When he was baptized he declared that he would no more join in war, and he resisted the entreaties of the wilder spirits, who pressed him to lead them in battle. At a great meeting he harangued them with the New Testament in his hand, and his counsels then prevailed. But he did not convert them all, and thought fit to establish for his Christian brethren a separate pah where 400 assembled. On one of the posts of the chapel was a code of regulations in his handwriting, for the government of his Christian community. His restitution of the property seized by his countrymen returning from Remuera in 1844 has been told. His determination not to go to war was pursued, through evil report and good report, until General Cameron crossed the Maungatawhiri. “I am now absolved from my promise,” he said, “for this is a war of defence.” It is vain to wish that all English Secretaries of State, Governors, and Colonial Ministers had had the earnest piety and sense of justice which finally enabled Te Waharoa to stand before his Maker, as a good man who had run his course faithfully in the troublous career forced upon him by the crimes of others.

The New Zealand Government, in 1866, while deprecating the attitude of the troops, expressed a high sense of the value of the naval force. In October, a unanimous vote of thanks to the retiring Commodore was passed by the Representatives, echoed by the Ministry, and applauded by the Governor. After his march to Taranaki, General Chute, pleading instructions from the War Office, refused to move his head-quarters from Auck- page 393 land to Wellington, though repeatedly urged to do so. There were rumours of a Maori rising in October, 1866, but he could see no object in absenting himself from Auckland, where “the usual and regular duties” of his command could “be best conducted.” He complained that the Governor would not reply to his letters asking for instructions as to the posts at which the military were to be stationed, and Sir George Grey curtly told him that, if all the troops were to be withdrawn from the outposts to the chief towns, he concurred with his advisers that the troops would be useless to the colony, and he ought not to express any acquiescence with such an arrangement.

The reports of the Commissary-General in the end of 1866 fanned the flames of discontent. He condemned the use of troops in defending confiscated lands, and urged the withdrawal of Imperial aid. As usual, despatches and counter-despatches were multiplied till they filled volumes of blue-books. Secretaries of State were never tired of repeating that the troops should be withdrawn, and Mr. Stafford (16th May, 1867) declared that the Ministry acquiesced in the withdrawal, because the military had been perverted into instruments for defaming the character of the colony, and the commanding officer had been made independent of the constitutional control of the Governor. Even the withdrawal, however, had been effected “in a manner calculated still further to engender animosity, to inspire the disloyal natives with revived hopes, and the loyal with distrust.” To such a pass had England brought the land of the Maoris by subjecting them to the caprice of the heirs of the New Zealand Company. While Lord Stanley and Sir Robert Peel were in power the honour of England had been safe. From neither of them could have been expected the sanction given by the Duke of Newcastle to Colonel Browne's unjust conduct at Waitara. By neither of them could have been approved the abandonment of England's duty towards the Maori race. Without any evil intention, successive Ministries had subscribed to violations of the letter and spirit of the Waitangi treaty, and basely striven to hide their shortcomings by slinking from the field of action or endeavouring to stifle discussion. All their deeds had become evil when they shrunk from adhering to a just principle. Mr. Cardwell's vigorous tone as to treatment of prisoners cast a page 394 momentary gleam upon Downing Street, but, under his successors, the gloom in what Charles Buller called “sighing rooms” thickened again. There was no sympathy for anybody in New Zealand in that atmosphere. Nor was public intelligence aroused to create a virtue unengendered in Downing Street. With lazy immorality the ‘Times’ remarked in 1863 that unless the Maoris were “shortly reduced to submission, the savage race which has shown itself most capable of civilization would probably within a few years have ceased to exist.” In 1865 the same authority declared: “The Hau Hau fanatics will be at once extirpated, and it is not improbable that their countrymen will eventually share their fate.” In a few years the tone of the caterer for London's gossipers was to become more sprightly. “The simple fact that for every native known to be hostile to us, there was another native known to be friendly, ought surely to have guided us to the true military policy for the colony.… Every Maori has a natural taste for war, and this taste can easily be improved for our benefit.… By enlisting New Zealanders we should combine the martial instincts of the savage tribes with the skill, armaments, and organization of European armies.” On the justice of the case not a word was expected from the ‘Times,’ and not a word was said. What was wanted was to assist the Maori race to disappear.

Dark rumours were rife about a new uprising of hostile tribes in October, 1866. In March, a letter to the Queen, purporting to emanate from the Maori king, had been transmitted through the hands of a chaplain to the forces. Half defiant, half beseeching, it sounded the chords which had been struck by the Maori chiefs throughout the war. It asked that “a great Judge from England” might be sent to put an end to strife. Lord Carnarvon's answer was written in October. At that time the General Assembly had been prorogued, and the wilder spirits among the Maoris were craving for war. The intimation that petitioners must send their prayer through the Governor would have fallen on distracted ears if it had reached New Zealand before the outbreaks of the spring of 1866. A Maori friend warned the Government that at Hawaka, Tauranga, Waikato, Taranaki, Wanganui, Turanga, Whakatane, and the east coast generally, a rising had been planned. “The first intimation of page 395 it may be when the weapon has touched.” The perverse bravery of the Maoris was such that no certainty of final failure deterred them from plunging into an affray. They rejoiced in a present victory when they slew more than they lose. They brought to the beginning of a fight the craft of a conspirator with the fanaticism of a Malay. Confidence in the final result was no anodyne to the fears of colonists whose lives were in danger which stalked like a pestilence and might smite, no man knew where. At Napier the danger seemed most imminent. Hau Hau armed bands were encamped in October, 1866, at Omaranui, a few miles from the settlement. They had made no hostile demonstration, and had not molested the settlers, but Mr. Donald McLean, Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, called upon them to surrender their arms and go to their homes. Having laid his plans with Colonel Whitmore, he told them that if they should refuse to surrender within an hour, they would be attacked. As the colonial forces outnumbered fourfold the number of the presumed rebels it might have been supposed that they would yield. They were surrounded by about 200 militia and volunteers, and a like number of Maoris. They were in a Maori village which they had not fortified. They said they thought the time, one hour, rather short. Colonel Whitmore after two hours told them he would wait no longer. They said “there was no reason to do so as they meant to fight.” They fought for nearly an hour and a half. Their losses were considerable. When the majority surrendered, Nikora appeared to be the leader who induced them to do so. A majority endeavoured to escape across a swamp, but cavalry prevented them from gaining the hills. Colonel Whitmore reported in glowing terms the gallantry of the colonial and native forces. Three were killed and 13 wounded among the assailants. The Hau Haus did not hoist a flag of surrender till 23 had been killed and a like number wounded. Seventy-six prisoners were taken, and the conqueror reported, “Nearly all the turbulent spirits are now killed or taken.” The chiefs Tareha and Renata were conspicuous. “Tareha, with a sword alone in his hand, rushed among the enemy to stimulate his men.” Nine only of the enemy were unaccounted for, and it was not known whether they were “dead in the swamp, where they had been heavily page 396 fired upon,” or whether they had escaped. The peace of death had been enforced. Napier breathed freely. A newspaper declared the action, “the most brilliant affair of this guerilla war.” Lord Carnarvon upbraided Sir George Grey for not informing him that a new guerilla war had broken out, and when told that the newspaper included the action as part of all New Zealand warfare, gracefully apologized in the House of Lords to the Colonial Ministry for his charges against Sir George Grey. When an apology is unavoidable there is exquisite ineptitude in making it to the wrong person. Colonel McDonell on the west coast was distinguishing himself in a manner which at a later date demanded inquiry. He spoke the Maori language with fluency. Mr. Stafford's Defence Minister had ordered him in June to be vigorous in inducing (at Patea and Waingongoro) the surrender of the Hau Haus—the waifs and strays left by the army of General Chute. Mr. Parris was, through the agency of Te Ua (the repentant Hau Hau), labouring to procure their submission, but Colonel McDonell repudiated diplomatic triumphs. He ordered that certain chiefs should wait upon him. They did not attend. He construed their absence as a punishable act of rebellion, and on the Ist August, 1866, in the depth of night, with a large force, surprised an undefended village at Pokaikai, scattering its inmates, some of whom, though women, were bayoneted. A Maori woman deposed that one of the attacking party seized an ornament in her ear, and that when he could not tear it away he cut the ear with his knife and secured his booty. Her father and mother were shot. She was taken prisoner. She complained that it was wrong to attack the village while her husband, Natanahira, was absent to negotiate for peace with Mr. Parris. Colonel McDonell said, “Who is Mr. Parris? I am the person with whom peace should be made.” It was maintained by some, and denied by others, that some of the attacking force were drunk. Hori Kingi wrote to Sir George Grey. Mr. Parris was at the time at Wellington; Sir George Grey asked if he would go at once to the district where the outrage had occurred. The Ministers had an interview with Mr. Parris. He went to the district and was not wholly unsuccessful, though some Maoris would not be persuaded. The words of the woman whose father and mother were shot explained the cause of Maori page 397 distrust. The attack was made at “night; at midnight, when the people were asleep. The sleep was the sleep of fools, for the words of the Governor, sent through Te Ua, had lulled us. My children were lying around me in fancied security.” Subsequent treatment of the woman was not calculated to smooth the way to peace. Colonel McDonell wrote to the Defence Minister: “This morning I released Natanahira's wife and sent her to Otapawa with a letter to the rebels, telling them that if they do not immediately submit, I will carry fire and sword through the country, and give no rest by day or night. I have detained his child as a hostage.” Such an agent was condemned by his own words, and a commission of inquiry was afterwards appointed.1 McDonell requested (31st July) that Parris might be “instructed to cease to communicate with the rebel natives.” but the fumes of Pokaikai, and other villages, and the treatment of Natanahira's wife stunk even in Mr. Stafford's nostrils, and McDonell was desired (8th August) to conform to the instructions of Mr. Parris. On the 12th, he was fired at. On the 30th, Parris reported that the Warea natives refused to submit, and McDonell took the field again, suo more. If Parris had supped full of horrors the commander was free from morbid weakness.

About the time when, in the east, the Hau Haus at Omaranui were crushed by Donald McLean and Colonel Whitmore, McDonell, on the west coast, inflicted severe loss upon the Ngatiruanui at Pungarehu. One of his reconnoitring parties had a skirmish at Ketemarae on the 2nd September and he resolved to build a redoubt at Waihi. The men engaged in the work were often fired at by the natives. On one occasion within sight

1 Some years afterwards Major (become Colonel) McDonell published his own defence in pamphlet form. He stated that on the 3rd August, he “scoured the bush inland of Matutahi; found out and burnt two villages just located… This brought the natives to their senses, and on the 4th August they sent me a message suing for peace…” On the 7th, “I went into the bush with the native contingent, and met them at the site of a village named Ohangae, which had been burnt during General Chute's campaign. There we made peace.… That peace I could have firmly maintained even with the small force then under my command (he had previously applied for 500 more men), were it not for the suicidal course pursued by Mr. Commissioner Parris, to whose conduct must be attributed the subsequent hostility of the natives, and the frustration of all my plans.… All went on well, until in an evil hour, Mr. Parris, who had been to Wellington to earwig the Government, appeared amongst us.”

page 398 of the redoubt an ambuscade surprised a provision-cart escorted by troopers from Patea to Waihi. One trooper was killed, and the provisions were carried off before aid could be sent from the redoubt. The trooper was found hacked to death by toma-hawks Colonel McDonell retaliated on the 6th October by surprising the village of Pungarehu, not far from the Waingongoro river, and near the Maori villages laid waste and burned by Colonel Butler in the beginning of the year. Though General Chute's track pierced through the same country, the hunted Maoris had found a temporary resting-place. The attacking force was about 130 in number, of whom one-third belonged to the native contingent. At daylight Pungarehu was surprised. Major McDonell reported: “As we leapt the fences I called upon the inmates to surrender” [he does not say that he was heard or understood]; “they replied by heavy volleys from the doors and windows of the house. We returned the fire, and rushed to the fortified whares, scraped the earth off the roofs, and pulled down the slabs to fire at the inmates. In several instances they ran out of the doors, and firing their pieces into us tried to escape into the bush, but were shot down. In half-an-hour we were masters of the position, and the firing ceased.… The loss of the enemy I estimate at 30 killed: 21 were counted, and others could not be counted as they were buried in the burning ruins of the houses.” It is a relief to read that nine prisoners were taken. Three killed and four wounded formed Major McDonell's loss. The escaped Maoris or some of their friends rallied in the forest and fired upon their enemies. Major McDonell thought that superior re-enforcements had arrived, and were striving to cut off his retreat. The dashing Rangihiwinui by flank-skirmishes foiled the attempt, and the destroying Europeans left the scene of their exploit. In justifying it, Mr. Stafford said that such a mode of “warfare may not accord with War Regulations, but it is one necessary and suited to local circumstances.”

The Ngatiruanui hapu surprised at Pungarehu was that of Titokowaru and Toi. About a week afterwards a re-enforcement of Maoris from Wanganui arrived in McDonell's camp, and some of the enemy surrendered, saying that the whole of their people would do so, as soon as the subsidence of a freshet page 399 might enable them to cross the Waingongoro river. Toi himself, with 12 men, in a few days tendered his submission. McDonell refused to receive the submission of less than the whole tribe, and told Toi to go away. Toi complied, but six of his people remained. One of them was Katene. He had done his best for his people, he said, and was weary of the war which was destroying them. By degrees his own hapu, to the number of 70, including women and children, joined him Availing himself of Maori manners, McDonell employed Katene as a guide and soldier. The Te Umu pah was destroyed, but the enemy's scouts had given warning, and only two men were killed. A village named Popoia was to be attacked on the 18th October. Katene guided McDonell's force to it during the night, and having reached the edge of the forest unseen, advised a halt till daylight, as it was unwise to penetrate the forest in the darkness. For an hour or two his counsel was respected, but Captain W. McDonell became impatient, and induced his brother officers to discard Katene's counsel. In single file the force advanced on the narrow track, and suddenly, flashing through the gloom, sheets of flame on front and right showed that the foe was on the watch. Captain McDonell fell, severely wounded. The invaders knelt to avoid the bullets which flew over their heads. None could see friend or foe. A retreat ensued. At dawn the force emerged from the forest and the enemy fired volleys from their shelter. Enraged at the indignity, Winiata, of the Wanganui contingent, shouted: “Behold, a challenge! If nothing be done, we shall be disgraced. I go to defy them.” Stripping off his clothes, he dashed back towards the forest, and with insulting words and gestures dared the Hau Haus to fight him in the open space. He was fired at, but not struck. His old Maori comrades consoled themselves in the retreat by saying: “Never mind; the Hau Haus are beaten. They dared not to accept the challenge of Winiata.” The midnight attack upon Pungarehu had put the Maoris upon their guard. Sir George Grey visited the scene of action, and Colonel Rooke with some of his regiment (18th) on the 25th October accompanied McDonell's force. Again the enemy fired from an ambuscade, but the troops rushed forward, and Popoia was captured and burnt. One life was lost in the colonial force. Two Hau Haus were shot. A page 400 plot was laid for Titokowaru's fighting man, Te Waka. Katene was to entrap him in an ambuscade with the promise of a store of percussion-caps. Te Waka, greedy for ammunition, walked into the trap. As he approached the ambush, his treacherous guide, Katene, seized Te Waka's gun and called on his accomplices to fire. Te Waka relinquished his gun and with a bound reached a precipitous river-bank. Before he could hurl himself over the cliff a shot struck him, and with a convulsive spring he disappeared and was found dead at the river-side. Katene was asked why he seized the gun instead of the man. He replied: “You would have spared him. I wished him dead, for he had done me wrong.” McDonell made a vain attempt to surprise a pah, Tirotiromoana, on the 5th November. On the march it was noticed that Winiata, usually the foremost man, remained in the rear of his column. An officer asked the reason. He answered: “I dreamed last night that I was leading the advance as usual, and was killed from an ambush. I felt the bullet; it went in at one hip and out at the other.” The march was continued. A deep ravine was crossed. As the advance-guard mounted the opposite hill a volley was fired from an ambuscade, and a private (Economedes, a Greek) fell dead. Winiata rushed forward to examine the wound. It was as he had dreamed. “Look,” he shouted,—”this man is killed by the bullet I dreamed of. This is the first time he has led. On all other occasions I have done so. My dream has saved my life.”1

Other expeditions proved that Titokowaru's people had retired to various fastnesses. Some were at Te Ngaere, a settlement in the forest, surrounded by marshes which tradition said had once engulfed hundreds of invaders. It was rumoured that some had fled to Te Rangitake's inland shelter at the rear of Mount Egmont. McDonell could do no more in the field. But the Government did something. The survey of the confiscated land was completed from Patea to Waingongoro, and “military settlers commenced to select their land. I also (McDonell explained) selected my land in the district.” The red hand of such a settler having prospered in the west, he was ordered by

1 ‘Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand,’ p. 139. Lieutenant Gudgeon. Mr. Gudgeon adds: “After this incident no one doubted that Winiata had a very strong God of his own.”

page 401 Mr. J. C. Richmond, then acting as Defence Minister, to proceed to Tauranga, and lead the warlike Arawa against hostile Ngatiraukawa, not far from Rotorua. At this point it is good to quote his own language. What he did to the captive boy would perhaps be doubted by the reader unless told in the commander's words. (Finding a small camp) “we at once attacked the position, drove the enemy out, killed two men, and captured a third, a young fellow whom the Arawa wanted to tomahawk, but I spared him for another purpose. In his terror he told me where I should fall in with the enemy's main body, and as he knew that it was more than his life was worth to deceive me, I ordered him to lead on.” The camp was found, surrounded, and attacked. “We killed a considerable number of them.” McDonell was made Lieutenant-Colonel in the Auckland militia, and the stark bodies of the slain Maoris were left to rot on their native soil, for the outnumbered friends of the dead took refuge like foxes in the fastnesses of the forest The new-fledged Colonel was again required at the west, where the surveying of land had been checked by the resilient Hau Haus. He met a hapu of the Pakakohi tribe, and amongst them was Titokowaru, whose subsequent career was to be written in blood, and who was to wrest laurels from McDonell's brow. A display of bayonets glittering in the moonlight, and a warning that even McDonell's “patience had a limit,” secured a triumph for the time, and the surveying was pushed on.
Meanwhile the reproaches caused in England by the tidings of the slaughter at Pokaikai and Pungarehu had reverberated to the colony. Lord Carnarvon1 required official reports concerning events spoken of in newspapers. Mr. Stafford furnished an explanation which contained a retort that the “Imperial Government has ignored the constitutional position of the Governor, and has in successive despatches displayed a sense of irritation and a proneness to take and give offence which are much to be deplored.”… Had the “Imperial Government been properly jealous of the honour of the persons against whom Colonel Weare's charges were made, it would have insisted on a public investigation.” Though written for Lord Carnarvon's perusal this remonstrance reached the Duke of Buckingham's

1 Despatch, 28th December, 1866.

page 402 hands in May, 1867. In March, the Earl had quitted office rather than follow the inconsistencies of Mr. Disraeli. He did more. He protested against them in the face of the hero of debate—the Earl of Derby. As it is agreeable to do justice to those who refuse to do it to others, this allusion to the course of English politics becomes not unseemly. Among the Earl's latest despatches to New Zealand were some which vigorously reprehended the employment of regular troops in defending disputed or confiscated land. “The large confiscations which have taken place have been viewed with the greatest apprehension by Her Majesty's Government,” and, if to be held by force, should not be held by Her Majesty's troops.

But still there lurked in men's minds, even in New Zealand, a suspicion that the occurrences at Pokaikai did not deserve the name of war. The Governor appointed (1868) a commission to inquire into “certain alleged acts of cruelty stated to have been committed” there. The conduct of the inquiry seemed to McDonell “incredible.” The charges had not been specified, and he had to find out from the “evidence what atrocities were being trumped up.” The attempt to “drag the ornament out of the ear of a native woman,” was proved, but McDonell's witnesses denied that it succeeded, and it was sworn that the culprit, a volunteer, was placed under arrest by McDonell. Two members of the commission, Mr. Cracroft Wilson and Mr. J. Cargill, drew up a report (August, 1868), highly favourable to McDonell, and declaring “that no wanton outrage was committed by any member of the enrolled force.” There was a protest by one member, Mr. George Graham. He curtly wrote: “I protest against this report.” He declared the attack on Pokaikai unnecessary, and that by unjustly lulling the natives into security while intending to attack them, McDonell had acted in a manner which might seriously complicate the relations of the Government with the tribe. McDonell averred that the sitting of the commission lowered his prestige in the eyes of the natives, and raised that of Titokowaru, who “commenced disturbances almost immediately after the close of this inquiry.” The motives of Titokowaru, and his deeds, must be told hereafter.

It may be mentioned that Sir George Grey in his explanation studiously avoided any allusion to the attack upon Pokaikai. page 403 He justified that upon Pungarehu on the ground that its inmates were amongst “the worst and most desperate characters in New Zealand,” and said that the “escape” (of McDonell's force) “was a very narrow one.”1

When the Earl of Carnarvon resigned office, in March, 1867, only one regiment, the 18th, had not been ordered to leave New Zealand. It was to be under the direction and control, but not under command, of the Queen's representative. Perhaps no other regiment was the subject of so much correspondence. In October, 1867, the Ministry wrote that they did not ask for its retention, and would not be responsible for any payments on account of it, but they recommended, and the Governor ordered, that the head-quarters and six companies should be stationed at Auckland, two companies at Taranaki, and two at Napier. The Earl of Carnarvon, hoping that Sir George Grey would recall his defence against Colonel's Weare's charges, had refrained from considering what the Government ought to do if Sir George Grey should decline to cancel his despatch. It has been seen that he declined. The Duke of Buckingham, in May, curtly acknowledged the lengthy despatch in which the refusal was couched. In June, replying to a despatch in which Sir George Grey represented that General Chute “allowed him to have no knowledge of the times at which or the routes by which troops were to be marched,” or temporarily massed, and that the Government was therefore unable to warn or act in concert with friendly or doubtful tribes, the Duke regretted the controversies which had so long existed between the Governor and officers in command, and wound up a short despatch with the words: “I shall then also be able to inform you of the appointment of your successor, and of the time at which he may be expected to arrive in the colony.”

The Governor's despatch had enclosed a protest from his advisers against the alleged unconstitutional powers assumed by General Chute as to determining the location of troops. Of this the Duke took no notice. On many occasions it was his habit

1 Lord Carnarvon had not alluded to Pokaikai in direct terms, but Sir George Grey would have done more justice to his office by a comprehensive statement than by confining himself to the Pungarehu affair on the ground that “I can only guess, and I think rightly, that it is an affair which took place at Pungarehu.”

page 404 to trust to the maxim, that if let alone much business will settle itself. The significance of communicating his recall to a Governor in a despatch on military matters was too plain to be overlooked. While it was on the way, various difficulties impeded business in New Zealand. There were disputes about accounts, about underhand reports to the War Office, about removal of troops, and abandonment of military buildings.
On the 27th August, Sir George Grey received the despatch recalling him. The General Assembly was then in session. The Houses had previously conveyed to the Governor their thanks for the prompt and decided manner in which he had incurred the displeasure of the Earl of Carnarvon by defending the honour and character of the colony, and they were not slow to vindicate the man whom they deemed a sacrifice to the offended War Office. In the Council the despatch was no sooner read than on a motion by Colonel Whitmore, unanimously adopted, the House adjourned as a mark of respect for Sir George Grey, and regret at his recall. With equal unanimity, on the 6th September, an address was adopted. Sincere regret at the Governor's recall, admiration of his public and private character, testimony to his ability, self-sacrifice, and activity, and a recognition of the perils, privations, and fatigues he had undergone, formed the groundwork of the address. “We consider that the Imperial authorities have listened too credulously to accusations of the gravest kind, and by acting upon such information before ascertaining its truth or falsehood, they have been led to reiterate against the colonists most unfounded calumnies. … In asserting the honour of the Crown, and maintaining the position of the Governor as representative of the Crown, and the constitutional rights of the colony, as well as in vindicating its character against unjust aspersion, your Excellency has put aside all personal considerations, and has not been dismayed by menace or misrepresentation.” The Council trusted that the great services rendered by the Governor to the Crown and to the colony would be rewarded by some signal mark of Her Majesty's favour. Idle hope! Between the fount of honour and those on whom it ought to flow there lies a region of slime which disfigures the claims of the just but gives false lustre to the base, page 405 like the iridescence which mantles on the surface of a stagnant pool. To have earned the honours of Drake direct from the hand of his Queen was a prouder distinction than to be the chosen knight of ancient tourney. To fawn, and cringe, and lie to obtain the favour of a Secretary of State, and thus obtain undeserved sprinklings of royal grace, is a process which may well bring that grace to dishonour. The system under which a Vogel, a Duffy, and their congeners have been decorated in the name of their sovereign, proved the truth of Herman Merivale's declaration,1 that it deadened appreciation of chivalrous rewards, gave them an ineffaceable stain of vulgarity, demoralized patriotic impulse, and lowered the standard of popular respect for the Crown. The one way in which the Crown could hope to distribute favour duly was by an avoidance of honouring the base, and at least, if it could not discover heroes, to confer distinction on those who would command respect. The Colonial Office at this period seemed bent upon furnishing materials for the censure of Mr. Merivale. If Sir George Grey in his later years unworthily swerved from his former loyalty, his defection may be not justified, but accounted for, perhaps, by the demoralizing agency of the Colonial Office. The Representatives were as energetic as the Council. They were about to record their thanks to the Governor for his conduct respecting Colonel Weare's reports, when the despatch recalling him was laid on the table. On the motion of Mr. Stafford they echoed the sincere regret of the colony at the loss of the Governor, and joined in the encomium of the Council on his character and services. The Governor's reply to the addresses spoke of the heroic work done by the colonists in laying the foundation of an Anglo-Saxon nation. Men who had so laboured together might well find consolation in mutual esteem, and leave their fame and reputation to a grateful posterity for whom they had in truth been labouring. Associated as he had been with them so long in their great work, and regretting with them that the public ties which had bound them were to be rent asunder, it was much to remember that they had presented addresses of which any Governor or ruler might be proud, and to know that while

1 ‘Fortnightly Review,’ February, 1870. Mr. Merivale had been Under-Secretary for the Colonies, and was therefore an expert.

page 406 he lived he should have the pleasure of seeing them labour as of yore to do their duty to their Queen and country.

Earl Granville was Colonial Secretary when the despatches on the subject were laid before Parliament in July, 1869. It then appeared that of the address of the Council no notice was taken by the Duke of Buckingham, and that the despatch (23rd November, 1867), entered as a reply to the address of the Representatives, made no allusion to them or to their prayers, but curtly repeated to Sir George Grey an intimation already made (22nd August, 1867), that Sir George Bowen, the Governor of Queensland, had been appointed Governor of New Zealand. When the insolence of office descends to such petty insults, their reprobation becomes a duty untainted with the meanness of the things condemned. But the studied discourtesy which had been practised was to be partially, though disingenuously, disavowed by the Duke. On the 16th September, the New Zealand Ministers drew up a formal protest—against the subjection of a Governor to a subordinate military officer, as directed by the Earl of Carnarvon; against the rash disposition of troops made by General Chute without concert with the Government; against the conduct of the Imperial Government with respect to Colonel Weare's and other secret charges; and against the silencing of truth in the matter of the illegal killing of a prisoner without trial. As to the recall of the Governor, they recognized the absolute right of Her Majesty to recall and appoint Governors at pleasure, but they regretted that the despatch summarily recalling a Governor who had for 26 years rendered great services to the empire, contained not one word of explanation. “Ministers desire to express their sympathy with his Excellency at having been by so unusual a proceeding subjected to what appears to be a studied act of discourtesy; and they are unable to divest themselves of the belief that the recall of his Excellency has in a great measure resulted from the uncompromising manner in which he has upheld the constitutional position of the representative of the Crown; a position upon the due observance of which the rights and liberties of Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand so greatly depend.”

Forced to say something, the Duke of Buckingham (28th December, 1867) made it as like to nothing as possible, but page 407 rounded off with a palpable equivocation. He had carefully examined the ministerial memorandum, but thought it neither necessary nor desirable to add to what he had written five months before in a despatch which contained no word about the slaughter of a Maori prisoner of war. As if the intelligence of colonists might be slighted with as much contempt as the life of a Maori, he added: “I may observe, however, that the intimation given for your convenience at the end of your term of office, that your successor would very shortly be appointed, seems to be mistaken for a premature recall.” Such an equivocation could not even deceive himself, but it asserted the hereditary right of a Grenville to blunder and to create disaffection amongst distant subjects of the Queen. Fortunately the Grenville of 1867 was less potent for evil than his namesake of 1776.

In acknowledging the formal despatch in which the Duke of Buckingham announced the appointment of Sir George Bowen, Sir George Grey wrote: “I request your Grace to be pleased to state to the Queen that I present my duty to Her Majesty, and in receiving this notification of my Sovereign's pleasure, I beg to be permitted humbly to represent to Her Majesty that in the year 1845, a rebellion prevailing in New Zealand, I was by Her Majesty's commands especially sent to this country, and that when I relinquished the Government in the year 1854 it was my happiness to leave it in a state of tranquillity and prosperity; that in the year 1861, a rebellion having again broken out in New Zealand, I was once more specially sent here; and that it is again my happiness upon being removed by your Grace's advice from this Government, to leave New Zealand in a state of tranquillity and returning prosperity, and that I humbly represent to Her Majesty that I desire to claim no merit for these circumstances, but rather to attribute them to the blessing of Divine Providence, and to the abilities and exertions of Her Majesty's subjects who have advised me and aided me in my duties; and further, that I humbly trust that the almost unanimous voice of Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand, amongst whom I have laboured in Her Majesty's service, will satisfy Her Majesty that I have done my utmost to promote the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants of this part of Her Majesty's page 408 possessions.” The Duke replied that this statement was evidently made under the misapprehension that Sir George was prematurely recalled, but he would “nevertheless lay the despatch before Her Majesty.” There were various ways of keeping his promise, and it may safely be assumed that he took no noble way. Lord Derby, whose generous instincts might have otherwise exercised influence, was in failing health, and on the point of resignation. An alien, except with the buskin, to English life, was about to succeed him, and a gracious Queen was never asked to grant distinction or express common thanks to one who had rendered no common services. No further despatch on the subject was laid before Parliament.

The session of 1867 was marked by the introduction of a Bill to confer partial representation on the Maori race. The Governor congratulated the Assembly on the re-establishment of peace generally throughout the North Island, in no part of which was “systematic hostility” to be expected again. During the recess he had made a journey, partly on foot, and traversed native districts previously deemed unsafe. “I everywhere found the embers of disaffection dying out, and I was received by the Maori population, even in districts recently in rebellion, in such a manner as to inspire confidence in the future peace of the country.” The Assembly met in July, and in August the Maori Representation Bill was brought in by Mr. McLean and Mr. Williamson. Mr. McLean proposed four members, and an attempt to reduce the number to two was defeated in Committee. On the 30th August, just after the despatch recalling Sir George Grey was laid before the Assembly, Mr. Reynolds (notorious for his activity in robbing the Maoris of their reserve at Dunedin) moved that the third reading of the Bill be postponed for six months, but only one “teller” was found on his side when a division was called for. In the Council the second reading was affirmed by 13 votes against 3, and amendments moved in Committee were successfully resisted; Colonel Whitmore's name being found, in each division, supporting the Bill, which was passed without amendment. An Act was also passed for the endowment of Maori education. The Native Lands Act was again amended, and one of its clauses enabled the Governor to refer the Manawatu land dispute to a Court. A Confiscated page 409 Lands Bill enlarged the powers of the Governor. Among nearly a hundred Bills, passed in three months, was one “to authorize a loan of £7,000,000 sterling for the purpose of converting and consolidating the public loans of New Zealand,” and a patriotic Maori might be pardoned for reflecting sadly that the lands which were chargeable to so vast an extent had been obtained for mere trifles; in many instances under cajolery, and in some by wrong and violence. More than £500,000 had fallen into the Colonial Treasury in 1866 from sales of land. The Loan Bill was amended in the Council. A conference failed to reconcile the Committees on the 4th October; but, on the 8th, a second conference was terminated by concession, and the amendments made by the Council were agreed to. By this measure various provincial loans were adopted as charges on the colony. A Public Debts Bill converted provincial into colonial securities. It was introduced late in the session, and was amended in the Council, but an important amendment was abandoned by that body after conference. Four members of the Council protested against the measure because it burdened the colony for the benefit of a few provincial creditors, and because the adoption of provincial debts by the colony bestowed an unjust boon on the bondholders,—the provincial bonds being in the market at a great discount as compared with the colonial. The Surplus Revenue Act was amended so as to relieve the northern provinces of some war liabilities, and Mr. Stafford thus strengthened himself in the House and the provinces at the expense of his consistency. At the latter end of the session he received so much support from Auckland members as to excite uncomplimentary remarks. Mr. Fitzherbert, the Treasurer (who also had been Treasurer to Mr. Weld), with candour which must have amused the House, reminded it that he had in four consecutive sessions made financial statements “not uninterruptedly, for the wisdom or fickleness of the New Zealand Parliament forbade such indulgence in the sweets of office.” Content with driving out Mr. Stafford's first Treasurer, the House could afford to see him financially controlled by the man who under Mr. Weld had been driven from office on a financial question. After many years, the overdraft at the Bank of New Zealand had been swept away. Income and expenditure were page 410 nearly balanced. The ordinary receipts exceeded the ordinary outgoings, and the extraordinary barely weighed down the contrary scale.

Among the causes which had swollen the Exchequer were the presence of an Imperial force, the consequent inflation of trade, and the rifling of the soil, which in seven years had yielded £13,000,000 sterling of its gold. Mr. Weld's efforts had reduced the colonial defence expenditure. It had been nearly £900,000 a-year when he took office. It was reduced in 1867 to ££327,000. Commissary-General Jones had laboured with Major Richardson, a member (without portfolio) of Mr. Stafford's Government, to adjust the claims of the Imperial Government. The claims, as stated by Mr. Fitzherbert, were,—for capitation charge for troops, £353,817 10s.; compound interest capitalized annually, £167,278 7s. 1d.; advances for colonial troops, £582,156 17s. 7d.; miscellaneous, £201,710 14s. 7d.;—total, £1,304,963 9s. 3d. Major Richardson considered that more than half a million of the claim was inadmissible. After much correspondence, Mr. Jones quitted New Zealand abruptly, leaving his task unfinished, and assigning his failure to the fact that Major Richardson's commission pointed to inquiry into subjects beyond mere accounts, into which Mr. Jones had no authority to enter. The counter-claims put forward by Major Richardson were,—for colonial debentures sold at par, £500,000; military roads, £102,875 9s. 10d.; proportion of river transport charges, £97,329 Os. 11d.; miscellaneous, £206,652 4s. 11d.;— total, £906,856 15s. 8d. But besides these claims Major Richardson pleaded that further claims might justly be preferred, arising out of the peculiar relations of the colony and the Home Government when liability was incurred in repressing rebellion. The arguments recurred to the time when the Colonial Ministry under stress of their own misdoings at Waitara gave to Colonel Browne in 1860 a pledge to reimburse the Imperial Government for advances to militia and volunteers. Mr. Stafford's sins had come home to him. To coerce the Maoris he had made pledges of which when again in power he felt the pressure. But the axiom which declares that anything may be proved by figures implies that anything may in like manner be disproved. With much adroitness Major Richardson dealt not only with them, page 411 but with the provocation to war which was represented in general terms, not as the act of its arch-promoters, but as that of Governor Browne. Indirect losses could thus be put forward much as under shelter of Mr. Gladstone's negotiations at Washington in 1871 they were urged by the United States as assets created by new retrospective arrangements. Speaking of Waitara, Major Richardson thought it “sufficient to state that the Governor (Browne) reported that the title of Teira and others having been minutely examined for several months, proved and extinguished by the Crown, a survey had been ordered in the usual manner, and that it was his intention in case of the rumoured resistance of Te Rangitake taking place, to enforce Her Majesty's right to deal with her own subjects without hindrance from any one not having a legitimate interest in the transaction.” On the subsequent revelations that the alleged minute examination of title was untrustworthy—that Te Rangitake and his adherents had indisputable rights—and that in over-riding them the Government had violated the treaty of Waitangi—private and tribal rights, as well as their own repeated promises,—Major Richardson's report was almost silent, though it recorded the formal abandonment of the Waitara block. Those revelations have already been told in part. The result of a legal investigation will follow in due time. As to the Waikato war, Major Richardson admitted that, to avoid risk of murderous invasions, “the initiative was taken by General Cameron”; but with an inconsequential deduction that destroys the historical value of his laboured report, he concluded that the whole war “has unmistakably arisen from the necessity of vindicating Her Majesty's supremacy and the rights of British native subjects guaranteed by treaty with the Crown!” In the hands of such a mispriser of facts, figures might yield equally startling results; but Major Richardson relied mainly on the moral responsibility of the Crown, and the equitable claims of the colony. If the Duke of Newcastle had sternly checked the Waitara injustice, no complicity could have been imputed to the Imperial Government; but as accessary after the fact, he had made it difficult for the Imperial Government to hold aloof from the crime. On this point his colonial associates did not press that they were relieved by his sanction. Yet it was their strongest ground; for, page 412 on the Duke's adoption of the course into which Colonel Browne was led in 1860, the subsequent events followed in hideous order. It may, however, have been felt, though not confessed, by New Zealand statesmen, that the Waitara case would not bear a strong light without revealing that the war of 1860 was not a rebellion, but resistance by a man wronged and attacked in his home. Major Richardson impeached the Imperial claims for compound interest,—denied that the colony was liable after 1st December, 1864, for the £40 per soldier, inasmuch as it had urged that the troops should be withdrawn if the demand were insisted on,—was of opinion that the Imperial Government would withdraw the claim for cost of the New Zealand Fencibles (£68,000) incurred when England was solely responsible for peace; —and after challenging various items, concluded his paper (for which Mr. Stafford expressed the thanks of the Government), by declaring that Great Britain was, as an accomplice in the war and the cause of much expenditure, bound to give substantial aid in lightening the burdens of a colony which “had passed not willingly but by force from the position of a co-operator to that of a principal in the suppression of the rebellion.” The irony of facts was never more severe than on this occasion. Major Richardson as a colleague of Mr. Stafford sent these words to the Governor in July, 1867, and Mr. Stafford thanked him for them with effusion. Nevertheless, in the previous year, facts had been proved at Taranaki which induced the Stafford Government to arrest inquiry, and by private compositions to withdraw from a court of law the further consideration of a case which threatened to show conclusively that the reiterated assertions made on behalf of the Government,—viz. that Teira's claim had been “minutely examined for several months,” found good, and fairly extinguished, were glaringly false. Although the Government eluded judgment in 1866, documents had been laid on the table of the Assembly in that year which refuted beyond all doubt the traditional untruth which the Stafford Ministry of 1866 inherited from its predecessor of 1860, and which Major Richardson endorsed. Those documents will be described hereafter. The financial policy of Mr. Stafford, though brought forward by him who had been Treasurer for Mr. Weld, was not unchallenged. Mr. Vogel impugned it in a motion page 413 which was only rejected after repeated adjournments. Mr. Vogel's criticisms were heeded on various fiscal questions; and it was evident that he was about to be a power in the House, although in an attempt to shelve the Surplus Revenues Adjustment Bill he found only five coadjutors in opposing Mr. Fitzherbert.

Provincial liabilities still irritated New Zealand. In June, 1867, the Otago Council adopted a petition to the Queen, praying that a Bill might be brought into the Imperial Parliament to carve the North and Middle Islands into “separate and independent colonies with such provisions for a federal union” as might seem advisable. Their interests were distinct, and they did not desire to be dragged into extravagant expenditure in the north. Mr. Stafford and his colleagues deprecated compliance with the petition. Mr. Vogel (24th July) moved for a Committee “to inquire into the financial condition of the colony, and to recommend an equitable apportionment of colonial and provincial liabilities with a view to end the indefinite liability of the southern provinces for northern expenditure, and to give the northern provinces the control of northern affairs within their respective limits.” On Mr. Fitzherbert's suggestion the House amended the proposition, resolving to appoint the Committee to ascertain “whether the indefinite liability of the southern provinces for northern expenditure can be limited, and if so whether any recommendation can be made for an equitable apportionment of colonial and provincial liabilities. Whether, and if so, in what manner, the control of native affairs can be conferred on the northern provinces within their respective limits.” Mr. McLean demanded a ballot, and three of the names proposed by Mr. Vogel were rejected. Before the report was presented (30th September) the Surplus Revenues Bill had been passed, and Mr. Vogel could not hope to carry any proposition unacceptable to the Government. But there had been contention in the Committee. On the question that the report do lie on the table—Mr. Stafford having failed to add words requiring that the proceedings of the Committee and all propositions submitted in the Committee be appended—Mr. Hall carried, by 25 votes against 14, an addition “that the protests of the dissentient minority be expunged from the minutes of the page 414 proceedings.” Nevertheless, the pertinacity of Mr. Vogel had given him such a position that Mr. Fitzherbert made him one of a Committee of three members to confer with the Legislative Council on amendments in the Public Debts Bill. The waif from the gold-fields of Victoria was rapidly becoming a leading statesman in New Zealand, in spite of a rebuke administered to him by the Representatives on the 19th September. He had impugned the conduct of the Chairman of Committees. The House declared, by 42 votes against 2, its confidence in the uprightness of the chairman, and that Mr. Vogel's charges were unfounded, and “should not have been made.” The distribution of surplus revenue might well stir men's minds in provinces distracted by debt, war, and massacre. From 1st July, 1858, to 30th June, 1867, the amount distributed was £1,780,000 (omitting fractions). The amount which ought to have been distributed was less by £183,000 than the sum distributed. Auckland had received £25,000 less; and Otago had received £25,000 more than was due, and other inequalities were to be redressed. High above such local differences rose the financial question. In November, Mr. Fitzherbert was accredited to England to deal with: 1. The consolidation of the various loans of New Zealand, and the investment of the sinking fund of the guaranteed loan of 1856 in New Zealand securities. 2. The settlement of all claims between the Imperial and Colonial Governments. 3. The establishment of a mint in New Zealand. 4. The defence of harbours and of the colony, and the disposal of sites hitherto granted for barracks within the colony. There were various indications that the Maoris1 began to look to the law, to the New

1 A singular episode in the changing Maori life occurred early in 1867. The Rev. Richard Taylor was about to visit England. He had been the fast friend of John Williams Hipango, the Christian chief who arrested the murderers of the Gilfillan family in 1846, had accompanied Mr. Taylor to England in 1855, presented in person Maori gifts to the Queen and to Prince Albert, and had in after years fallen in battle against the Hau Haus. The loyal chiefs now sent petitions to the Queen by the hand of Mr. Taylor, who was accompanied by young Hipango. Sir George Grey wrote a despatch, begging that the young chief might be presented to Her Majesty. Sorrow was expressed in the petitions about the taking of Maori lands. They did not know whether the law which confiscated them came from England, or from Wellington. They implored that some of them might be restored. Another subject of bitterness was the absence of Maoris from the Councils of Government. It was not right for one race only to judge. Wrong was thus perpetuated. “An unjust Court is summoned and much money wasted; the Court sits, and all is in confusion,—the spirit is wearied. … O Queen! let your love for us be expressed.” They had fought for her. “If you behold this letter let your reply float over the ocean to us, —to your loving children.” Amongst the petitioners were Hori Kingi, Mete Kingi, and Rangihiwinui. They had no word to say against Sir George Grey. They were satisfied with him, but disapproved of his Ministry. Mr. Taylor besought some mark of distinction for young Hipango. The Duke of Buckingham evinced no sympathy. The petitioners were politely told that they must apply through the Governor, but that the Home Government would not reverse decisions in New Zealand on the matters to which the petitions related.

page 415 Zealand Parliament, or even beyond it to the Queen, to safeguard their rights. Patuki's appeals in the matter of the Maori reserve at Dunedin have been described. Not only the allies of the English, but those who had been in arms against them, were petitioners to the English Committee—the “Runanga nui o Niu Tireni” as they styled the “Assembly of New Zealand.” Horomona Pohio petitioned for inquiry about land paid for, in 1847, by the Government to the Ngatitoa. “This was wrong, as that tribe went across of their own accord, and attacked my people, the Ngaitahu. Therefore we killed some of them by way of utu (reprisal).… The last battle fought was won by us, and so I think the land still belonged to us.” He wanted to know why the disposal of land was not left to the owners.

The Committee did not think it politic to re-open such claims. Two hundred and fifty-six Turanga natives petitioned. “These are our troubles: our land that the Government is constantly trying to take away from us. After the cessation of hostilities some people were transported to the Chatham Islands, but the land was left untouched, neither was there anything said about taking our pieces of land… we inferred the only punishment this people were to suffer was in the dead who had fallen and the prisoners sent to the Chatham Islands. The blood has since dried, during two years, yet the word of the Government that we are to be deprived of our lands has only now come forth. It has been heard only during this year: had it been uttered during the fighting it would not have pained us so much, though page 416 we did not join in the offence of the Hau Haus. Give heed, Assembly of Gentlemen! We are in great trouble by reason of what the Government has done in deceiving us, so that we might lose the whole of the level land of this district. It has been owing to the influence of us, the chiefs, that the greater portion of the country has been kept quiet, and our reward is that we are to be washed away by the tide.” The Judge of the Lands Court had promised to hold a Court; twice they were deceived when they attended.… “We all assembled, but there was no Court. We wondered why we were annoyed everlastingly, and after considering for some time, we heard a word about the land being taken. The life-giving words came first; namely, the Native Lands Court was to be holden here. These were followed by the death-causing words, namely, the land was taken. We have waited for relief by law, but in vain.” Captain Biggs had negotiated with them. “What he wanted was to get all the level country, and we might perch on the mountains. Thereupon we told him it must be left for the Land Court to give us relief. He replied, he would bring the land-taking Court. This was the first time we had heard such a name for the Court, and we were surprised.” They appealed to the “gentlemen elected to devise such measures as promote the peace of the country.”

Their allegations were found by the Committee to be correct. Neither the Native Lands Court, nor the Court appointed under “the East Coast Titles Investigation Act, 1866,” had kept the times appointed and notified. The assembled natives retired disappointed. Mr. McLean's negotiations at the close of hostilities had unfortunately not been acted upon by the Government. When the two Courts failed, Captain Biggs and Mr. J. C. Richmond had failed also to solve disputes. The fiery Captain Biggs then recommended the Government to work under the New Zealand Settlements Act (the land-taking Court), but the Government shrunk from doing so, pending the session of 1867. The Committee recommended that there should be no farther delay in allowing the established Courts to go into operation in the district. After making all possible allowance it is hard to excuse the dilatoriness displayed by the Government at Turanga. A matter small in itself, but like a page 417 spark in a magazine capable of much mischief, reflects little credit on the Government. Eight Turanga natives petitioned for the return of their “very valuable carved house, taken away without pretext by the Government.” Mr. Richmond, a member of the Executive Council, had asked for it, and was told he could not have it. He replied, “That is all. I will cease to urge you.” But after he departed a steamer arrived, and Captain Biggs carried away the house without sanction from the tribe. The name of Rahurui was first in order of the petitioners. The Committee reported that the house (Whare Waikaro) was a very fine specimen of native workmanship, and would be properly taken care of in the Wellington museum; that some money had been paid for it by Biggs to some Maoris; and that the house and land having belonged to rebel natives were, “strictly speaking, forfeited to the Government.” It was admitted that the house stood on the land of the petitioner Rahurui.

There was no prophet to step in and say to the covetous Pakeha—Thou art the man!—and there was little attempt to gloze the transaction, which yet could not fail to embitter the feelings of the disaffected at Turanga, as well as those who were confined at the Chatham Islands, and were expectant of the release of which the Government had spoken to them. On the west coast, Te Kepa Rangihiwinui used persuasions in favour of peace in November, 1867. Titokowaru also called a meeting at Te Ngutu-o-te Manu, a village built after the destruction of Pungarehu. Mr. Booth, resident magistrate at Patea, was present by invitation, and heard the speeches. Mr. Booth reported that Titokowaru had shown untiring energy in bringing other tribes to make peace from the date of the “first overtures for friendly relations.” The Manawatu-block disputes still furnished petitioners, praying that the Native Lands Court might be brought into operation. That Court early obtained praise, and in 1886, the Pakeha Maori, Mr. Maning, officially reported that the Native Lands Act 1865 would “prove the most beneficial action we have ever attempted in native affairs, and that the good effects we may expect from it can scarcely be over-rated.” The removal by that Act of restrictions upon sales by Maoris to Europeans, had been so freely adopted in some page 418 places that the resident magistrate at Hawke's Bay appealed to the Government to protect the Maori from himself. Prima peregrinos obscena Pecunia mores intulit. Suddenly invested with unchecked control, prone to exchange land for the means of idleness and debauchery, the Maori was in many instances parting with his heritage so recklessly that a future of pauperism was in store for him, unless the Government would use their power of declining to assent to the alienation of reserves, and thus debar the existing generation from waste. The Pakeha Maori (Maning) was called upon to exercise a strange judicial function during the Parliamentary session of 1867. Quarrels arose about land, the title to which was to be brought before him. Two Ngapuhi warriors tottering with age stirred up the young, prone as themselves, to fight. Ancient tribal feuds were ransacked to envenom differences. The Judge in olden time had known the combatants, but kept himself aloof to do official justice. The Surveyor asked whether he should carry on the survey, backed by force. The Judge replied that he believed the man must be mad to ask such a question. The case had not come into Court, when two grantees and a claimant had been shot.

In June, the resident magistrate, Edward Williams (a son of Archdeacon Henry Williams), found the two parties on the brink of battle. They were within a few yards of each other, when he rode between them, and out of respect for him they retired; and subsequently agreed that he should be their arbitrator. He had not received the thanks of the Government for his intervention when the disputants met again, and though he endeavoured to interpose they commenced firing before his eyes. On the 10th July, he saw five killed and two wounded as he stood by the Ngarehauata. Fighting was more acceptable than law, and the magistrate's entreaties were disregarded, until, on the 16th July, the death of Archdeacon Williams drew off the sorrowing Maoris to attend his funeral. The scene which followed has been told in relation to his death. Judge Maning's proceedings deserve special mention. Before peace was finally made the hostile parties offered to make a truce, to attend the Court unarmed, and keep the peace while the Court was sitting. He declined to authorize in such a manner, page 419 indirectly, a return to violence after his departure, adjourned his Court sine die, or until hostilities should cease, and intimated that probably all the Courts in the district would be closed. Meanwhile he joined his peaceful persuasions to those of others. The Hokianga chief, Abraham Taonui, aided the sons of the deceased Archdeacon, peace was made, and the land had rest.

Such was the aspect of New Zealand life, while the General Assembly in 1867 was busy with many things—passing an “Old Metal and Marine Store-dealers' Bill,” regulating Friendly Societies, empowering a race-course board at Wairarapa to exchange certain lands, and dealing with the thousand objects which in all communities of Englishmen engross their time, but which, as common to all, require no special notice. The session was the last to be convened by Sir George Grey. The addresses he received from the two Houses and the remonstrance drawn up in his praise by his responsible advisers have been quoted. In December, 1867, he was requested to forward the final testimony of his Executive Council. “When immediately on the receipt of the first intimation that your Excellency would shortly be informed of the name of your successor, both Houses of the Legislature, by simultaneous addresses, marked their high regard for your Excellency personally, and their appreciation of your distinguished public services; and while numerous bodies of colonists hastened to re-echo those sentiments of respect which everywhere greeted you in your late visit throughout the provinces, we abstained from approaching your Excellency with any expression of sympathy, because we could not but believe that, at the close of your career in New Zealand, Her Majesty would have been advised to mark her appreciation of your services; but the tone of the late despatches addressed to your Excellency, impels us no longer to withhold the expression of the sentiments entertained towards you, by those who have witnessed, near at hand, the devotion to the empire and to public duty which has distinguished your long career. Seldom has a Governor been placed in circumstances more trying, and amid duties more conflicting and embarrassing. In so difficult a position we cannot but think that your Excellency might reasonably have expected that you would not have been left unprotected to bear the unjust aspersions to which you have page 420 been exposed. Again and again during the last twenty-six years, where there has been danger and difficulty in the administration of colonial affairs, your Excellency's aid has been invoked by the most eminent statesmen of the day. Sacrifices you have disregarded, and trials have served as opportunities of evincing devotion to public duty, and we cannot but regard it as indicative of the indifference, if not positive disfavour, with which the colonies of the empire are regarded when loyalty, zeal, and high intelligence displayed in the administration of their affairs are passed by without even the courtesy of a cold acknowledgment. Nevertheless, it will be no mean gratification to your Excellency to feel assured that upon your retirement from the Government of New Zealand, it is universally recognized that in defence of constitutional Government, the honour of the colony entrusted to your guardianship, and the best interests of the empire, you have added to your other sacrifices that of the assured prospect of some still more honourable position in Her Majesty's service, or a distinguished retirement from the cares of office. We trust that the day may not be far distant when the high services you have so freely and ably rendered will meet with a fitting recognition. We pray your Excellency to accept these words as expressing the sentiment of Ministers who have had the honour of being associated with you in the administration of the affairs of New Zealand.” The names of E. W. Stafford, William Fitzherbert, John Hall, T. M. Haultain, J. C. Richmond, J. H. Harris, and Major Richardson were attached to the address.

Sir George Grey replied: “It is fitting that I should briefly acknowledge the far more than friendly words which you have addressed to me on my removal from my office of Governor of New Zealand. These words coming from those who not only have seen and known the trials and difficulties I have had to encounter, but who also amidst those difficulties have been my advisers and fellow-labourers, are very valuable to me, and I shall often think of them in my retirement. I will only further say to those who by their advice, by their sympathy, and by their own toils and devotion to public duty, have so often guided my path in difficulties, and lightened the labours imposed upon me, that I thank them for the services they have page 421 rendered their Queen and country; that I also thank them for their affectionate farewell, and that whatever may be the future trials and changes of my life, I shall always think myself fortunate that they were so long given me as companions and associates in the trying duties I had to perform in New Zealand.” The framers of the address could not complain of any terms applied to it by the Duke of Buckingham. Its receipt was acknowledged without a word of comment. Well might Rajah (Sir James) Brooke groan in bitterness of spirit that the fiction that honours were conferred by the Queen could barely make them respectable. Well might one who had been Under-Secretary for the Colonies1 declare that the manner in which distinctions were conferred by the Colonial Office was fitted to degrade them. When the Duke of Buckingham thus superciliously set aside the protestations of the Executive Council of New Zealand with regard to the public services of a man for whom several of them could in no manner be supposed to be prejudiced, there was in a neighbouring colony another man in full career on the path to titular honour obtained in the manner denounced by Mr. Merivale. Convicted of sedition in 1844, but set at large on technical grounds,—reverting to seditious practices but evading the personal risks to which he incited others, for the desertion of whom one of the most resolute among them branded him as “a pitiable blaspheming traitor,”—intriguing against his Sovereign, against his reputed leader Daniel O'Connell, against his country and his oaths in the House of Commons and in a colony,—fawning upon his countryman O'Shanassy in Victoria, until he had obtained a title and a pension, and then spurning the patron whom he no longer needed,—Mr. Charles G. Duffy pursued the primrose way to the favours of Downing Street. They could not convert him from that to which he was in a manner born, but the method of their distribution might sour the minds of others more loyal than he. History has different garlands to dispense, and strikes a juster balance between the ignoble and the worthy. One gathers honour with time, while the distinctions of the other excite disgust.

Sir George Ferguson Bowen assumed office as Governor of New Zealand on the 5th February, 1868. His predecessor

1 Herman Merivale.

page 422 remained in the colony until, at the close of the year, he hastened to England to fight his battles in person, and to press upon the Colonial Office the propriety of doing right in regard to the slaughtered Maori prisoner of war. Sir George Bowen thought it becoming to show public respect towards the superseded Governor. He informed the Colonial Office that Sir G. Grey was to be entertained at a banquet (at which Sir David Monro was to preside), and that, having been invited, he would have much pleasure in evincing his sense of the personal courtesy and consideration he had received from his “able and accomplished predecessor, whose name will be inseparably connected with the history of this colony.”