Other formats

    Adobe Portable Document Format file (facsimile images)   TEI XML file   ePub eBook file  

Connect

    mail icontwitter iconBlogspot iconrss icon

Typo: A Monthly Newspaper and Literary Review, Volume 3

Privilege

page 14

Privilege.

Recent libel actions have attracted so much attention to the defective state of the law in this colony that no one can doubt that a change for the better is near at hand. There is, however, another matter—in some points closely affecting the law of libel—where reform is even more imperative. We refer to a certain survival from a semi-barbaric state of society, known as Parliamentary Privilege. As it exists in this country, the term by which it is known is not sufficiently comprehensive. For under our system of local government—far better in theory than it has turned out in practice—we have a multitude of village and district governing bodies, from school and licensing committees up to land boards and county councils—all possessing the very dangerous power of giving public utterance to damaging and possibly untrue statements without incurring the usual responsibilities. We hold that such a privilege is wholly unjustifiable. It is not only the source of irreparable injury to individuals, whose characters may be defamed with no opportunity of redress or even of public vindication; but it is demoralizing to the body possessing the power, and is undoubtedly one of the great causes of the lowered tone in the representative chambers in these colonies, so generally acknowleged and deplored. The idea that the independence of a representative is endangered by those checks and safeguards which are found necessary in every other station of life, is altogether fallacious. Even if the moral standard of the members of our legislative and administrative bodies were conspicuously high, the privilege would be an injurious one; but under a representative (?) system like our own, in which extraordinary precautions seem to be taken to make the election of good men difficult and that of men of opposite character easy—the danger is intensified.

Every day's experience proves that those laws which tend to repress the varied developments of private malice are absolutely necessary. The laws against slander and libel are far more effective than the individual conscience in securing the observance of the ninth commandment. And the spirit of the law being in accord with the highest conception of the general welfare, the individual as well as the public conscience is thereby strengthened—the moral and civil restraints operating strongly in the same direction. We hold—and we do not know on what ground our position can be assailed—that there cannot exist any circumstance in which the removal of those restraints is beneficial. The law of libel as applied to the press should be the law of slander as applied to a representative. It should be in either case held to be no offence, but on the contrary, a meritorious action, to give every publicity to a libel (in the legal—not popular sense) when it is (1) true, and (2) for the public benefit. But in either case, the party circulating the damaging statement should bear the full personal responsibility of his action, and on him the onus of proof should lie.

A slander uttered in the halls of Parliament is immeasurably more injurious than one merely circulated by the press. The representative position of the speaker gives it an apparent authority it would not otherwise possess. It secures a permanent place in the official record of proceedings. By means of the press it is spread far and wide. No more solemn responsibility can attach to uttered words than to those spoken under such conditions. Yet the speaker is legally entirely irresponsible, and too often acts as if he were morally in the same position. In time, the tendency of this licence is to bring the whole representative body into deserved contempt. If it were known that members could be required to substantiate their statements, and would be held personally responsible in the same manner as private citizens, the effect upon themselves would be salutary, and the public would benefit in a corresponding degree.

In the local bodies the evil is becoming deep-seated, and is one of the chief obstacles to their usefulness. In a late libel case in the South Island, the idle tattle retailed by certain members, and which entailed heavy expense upon an unoffending newspaper, would probably never have been uttered but for the mischievous protection afforded by « privilege. » We are glad to note that one of the offenders has come liberally to the assistance of the newspaper; but this in no way affects the principle—that parliamentary privilege is evil and nothing but evil.

There are other « privileges, » all granted by members to themselves—the so-called « honorarium » ( « salary » would be vulgar)—free railway passes; gold medals, to avoid the indignity of producing so repulsive an object as a railway ticket; immunity from civil process at certain periods—all of which, so far from securing independence, tend distinctly to degrade, to demoralize, and to lower the tone of our representative bodies. Were the numerous and deserving class of journalists—who on the whole are very far superior to the average « representative, » —to be granted like immunities and privileges, the result in a single year, would inevitably be such a loss of independence and such a falling-off in the moral tone of our newspapers as would be most disastrous to the colony. Fortunately, such privileges will never be granted. Press-men will continue to earn their own living and to bear the responsibility of their own actions (it is being made to suffer vicariously for privileged people that they complain about)—and though we may have no cause to be proud of our representative bodies, we need not despair—for there will still be an independent press.