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7
Alamein Battles

By midnight on June 28 1942 nearly all the scattered elements of the division had reported in on the Alamein Line and we were once more a cohesive force, with the General safely installed in No 2 NZ Hospital at Helwan. However, for the men of the 22nd, and for all the fighting units of the division, the orders during the next two weeks were most frustrating. In the words of the troops, “We were buggered about by experts”, and the term ‘puttees on - puttees off’ was coined. Puttees, which were wound round our boot tops, would be taken off as orders were changed. Orders would come through to move when the troops were half way dug in, toiling away in the blazing sunshine. This happened three times in one day; one soldier complained he had been moved 17 times in 14 days. In between moves, cancellations of orders were frequent.

Water was extremely short and flies were in plague proportions. To add to the worries, the CO, Lieut. Col. Russell, who was very popular, developed trouble with his feet and was sent back to hospital just prior to the battalion's next page 78 action. Major Syd Hanton took over the battalion and was immediately involved in an absolute disaster.

At a higher level, Major General Inglis was summoned to see the Eighth Army commander in chief, Field Marshal Auchinleck, at his advanced headquarters. He was told to reform the New Zealand Division into ‘battle groups’, an order he declined to accept, reminding the field marshal that his primary allegiance was to the New Zealand Government which would surely back him up. Inglis was amazed to discover Auchinleck still persisted with such tactics, with more emphasis given to the defence of the Delta and the evacuation of Egypt than on a determined stand at Alamein, the only effective defensive position left. The staff appeared to be in hopeless disarray and a negative feeling permeated the entire Eighth Army which had now lost six battles in a row and appeared resigned to a seventh defeat.

While our high command was defeatist, Rommel's obsession with speed led to faulty judgment on his part and his intended all out assault on and break through of the Alamein defences petered out within two days. It was a stalemate. Rommel had outrun his supplies and was unable to overcome the stiffened Allied resistance. Although a considerable increase in Luftwaffe bombing caused a great many casualties, particularly on headquarters groups where vehicle dispersal was slack, the arrival of the 9th Australian Division in reserve, added to the presence of the 1st South African Division and the 2nd News Zealand Division, gave Auchinleck a strong infantry and artillery boost to his depleted forces.

On July 10 the South Africans and the Australians launched a successful attack against the Italians guarding the coast road west of Alamein. They took the Tel el Eisa mounds some 10 miles north west of Alamein which, while only about 100 feet high, gave a good observation of the low lying ground to the south. The New Zealand Division was given orders for an page 79 attack on the western end of Ruweisat Ridge and was told to secure its start line, which involved a daylight move of several miles to the west. This was a misguided instruction as the move would inevitably be observed by the enemy. The 4th and 5th Brigades were to take part in the attack. They embussed at 5.00 pm in daylight and were heavily shelled in the debussing area by the alerted enemy defences — Rommel had anticipated an attack in this area and had his troops and tanks in readiness. However, in typical fashion, the Allied attack was postponed and three days of uncertainty followed. As no Corps conference had been held to co-ordinate the attack, General Inglis called for one which was finally held at New Zealand divisional headquarters. At this conference a request by Inglis for tanks to be put under the command of 4th and 5th NZ Brigades was refused.

In the event, the Allied 13th Corps and No 1 Armoured Division had made their own arrangements which were not passed on to the NZ Division. The silent attack started at 11.00 pm on the night of July 14 with 4th Brigade on the left and 5th Brigade on the right. The 5th Indian Division was also brought in to the attack on the right flank. With over six miles to go to the objective, the troops faced a long night.

The 22nd Battalion, from which I had been ‘left out of battle’ to languish at Maadi Camp, was given a mopping up role behind the 21st and 23rd Battalions in 5 Brigade. They reached their objective on time and intact, having collected a number of mostly Italian prisoners on the way. Orders were to dig in on a 1,200 yard front facing north and at 5.00 am this commenced.

Brigadier Kippenberger had just delivered a troop of four 6 pounder anti-tank guns to the battalion and, as he was leaving, the German tanks were seen looming out of the early morning gloom. He made a hasty retreat in his Bren carrier and was lucky to get away unscathed, slipping between two page 80 groups of enemy tanks approaching from the south. Having seen the danger, Kippenberger hurried off to find 2 Tank Brigade of 1 Armoured Division whose job it was to support our infantry on the objective at daylight. He located them six miles behind the objective, near the infantry start line, in a static position, and observing the battle through field glasses.

Kippenberger found their commander — Brigadier Briggs — and, having explained the situation, asked for his support. The rather cool response was to offer to send a reconnaissance tank to investigate, while Kippenberger was urging the whole brigade move immediately. General Lumsden, the commander of 1 Armoured, arrived and, having been briefed, looked at his brigadier and said, “I told you to be at Point 63 at daylight.” Point 63 was the final objective on top of the ridge where our troops were established. Who was covering for whom can only be surmised.

In the meantime, 22nd Battalion, less one platoon under Sgt Keith Elliott, was surrounded by tanks and marched off to prison camp. Sergeant Elliott and his band of stalwarts, who had been on the right flank of the battalion, fought their way out and in the process Keith earned a thoroughly deserved Victoria Cross. His 18 men accounted for 30–40 enemy killed or wounded and took 140 prisoners. Keith himself led numerous charges against enemy strong points and, in the process, was wounded three times. His corporal, Ron Garmonsway, led several successful assaults against machine gun posts and was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal. Sergeant R G Jones, Corporal A B West and Private J R Lancaster were each awarded Mentions in Dispatches, having fought their way back to friendly territory while, over the ridge, the rest of the battalion was marched off in the opposite direction to prison camp. Meanwhile, NZ 4th Brigade was being cut to pieces on our left flank.

With good communications, this situation could have been page 81 avoided. Instead of taking an hour or more to find our tanks, with adequate radios, that did not continually break down, Kippenberger could hopefully have rallied the British tanks to come immediately to the rescue of 22nd Battalion and 4th Brigade. Full blame for such tragedies should be sheeted home to the politicians who did not provide the funds in peace time to ensure our troops had adequate equipment when they needed it.

After Rueweisat Ridge, the depleted remnants of the 22nd Battalion returned to Maadi Camp to re-organise and, with reinforcements and those of us who had been left out of battle, our strength was soon built up to a little over 600. Only about half this number would be in front line companies, the remainder in headquarters company, medical personnel, cooks, drivers, signallers and the host of others needed to support attacking troops. Lieut. Colonel Tom Campbell took over the battalion and we soon joined the division to take part in divisional exercises.

On Sunday, August 23, we had a visit from the new 8th Army commander, General Montgomery, whose promising reputation had preceded him. In stature and dress he was the least impressive of those in the inspecting group. However, he spoke to every officer and left the impression of a man in whom we could have confidence. We also left our impression on him. When speaking to our Bren carrier officer — Bob Knox — a rough diamond, he asked: “What do you think of the carriers?” Bob's reply: “They're no bloody good, sir. They're too slow and too thin skinned” was true enough but hardly the reply the general expected. He continued on, looking thoughtful.

‘Monty’ took control of the 8th Army and from then on his influence could be felt right down to the front line troops. We knew when we were told to put on our puttees, they would stay on and we would complete the task given us. He was a page 82 real breath of fresh air and we were thankful for his presence.

What was left of 4th Brigade was sent to Maadi and took no further part in the Desert War. The decision had been taken to equip New Zealand Division with our own brigade of tanks and our 4th Infantry Brigade had been selected for this role. Their numbers were built up with reinforcements and they were gradually fully equipped with the new, very effective American Sherman tanks.

Our exercises completed in late August, we were slotted into the New Zealand Box near Ruweisat Ridge to prepare for the impending attack. Wisely, Montgomery would not move until he was completely ready and, in the interim, he lured Rommel into a trap by inviting him to attack round our southern flank through a fairly narrow defile after which he was expected to turn north to meet the British tanks waiting for him, hull down and ready. The New Zealand Division was poised to attack Rommel's flank and Air Force bombers were ready to pound his columns.

Looking south, the almost featureless desert, broken only by the low lying Miteiriya and Ruweisat Ridges, stretched for 30 miles to reach the impassable Qattara Depression. This, then, was the final defensive position where Rommel's all conquering Axis forces would be held up and eventually defeated by the Eighth Army. In fact, there were two Alamein battles — the first had been at the end of June 1942 when the New Zealand Division, fresh from Syria, had beaten off five attacks at Minqar Qaim before breaking out and consolidating with the rest of the Eighth Army at Alamein. This was followed by the abortive attack by the Eighth in July. These actions had resulted in the destruction of two New Zealand battalions, including the 22nd at Ruweisat Ridge, and a total of over 4,000 casualties from the division, almost entirely because of lack of British tank support after our troops had reached their objectives.

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The second and main attack, led by General Montgomery, showed the effect one man can have on an entire army. From previously pitiful leadership, we now had someone who knew his business and was prepared to listen and to take advice. Everything went according to Monty's plan and Rommel pulled back after heavy losses and with a very bloody nose. From then on all the focus was on the Alamein battle which was to turn the fortunes of war in the Allies' favour.

Preparations for the coming battle were thorough; the best news of all was that General Freyberg was to have a brigade of British tanks under his command. Numbers in our battalion had now built up to 663 with 310 all ranks actually taking part in the Alamein attack. A full scale battle on the entire front was planned — the division was to attack 200 yards behind a creeping barrage with 1,000 guns to support us. The start line was marked with shaded lights and tapes and, to keep us on course, our Bofors guns fired tracer shells overhead on the battalion boundary lines. There was bright moonlight which helped us to keep contact until the dust and confusion obliterated most things.

On our front, the attack was led by the 23d Battalion; their objective became our start line about half way to our final objective. I had been given command of C Company with the task of consolidating on the final objective just beyond Miteiriya Ridge by attacking in a south westerly direction. The 22nd had three companies forward with my company in the centre. No sooner had we crossed the start line when one of my platoon commanders — Lieutenant O G Wood — was killed and his sergeant took command. Lieutenant Dick Wardell from Masterton, another of my platoon commanders, was wounded and had to be evacuated when we were half way to the objective. A shell splinter lodged in my right arm, leaving it numb for some time, but it soon loosened up.

There was so much shell and mortar fire landing all round page 84 it was almost impossible to pick where our barrage was landing. Enemy machine gun posts gave their positions away by using tracer on fixed lines, so we simply charged them and cleaned them out with grenades and bullets. It was unnerving during a charge to see your own men on your left and right being shot down but the momentum of the attack had to be kept up. We had so many casualties in C Company that Colonel Campbell put us temporarily in reserve, but we soon found ourselves in front again. We reached our objective on time with depleted ranks and with platoons under control of sergeants, so I allotted defensive positions and gave instructions to dig in.

Having sited my own company headquarters, I asked my runner to dig a hole big enough for both of us, a well nigh impossible task in the rocky ground. Sergeant Major Bob Bayliss, an original 13 Platoon man, had been instructed to site his anti-tank gun forward of the battalion's advanced infantry sections. He had passed through our lines about an hour before dawn so I went forward to see how he was getting on. He was in position, busy digging in as best he could with his gunners, and seemed happy enough. I was concerned there was little cover and he was on a forward slope, so I told him to pull back if things got too hot.

In the grey light of approaching dawn, I was making my way back towards company headquarters when a machine gun opened up, spattering bullets in the dust all round me. A troop of three German tanks had emerged in the dim light about half a mile away and I expect I had shown up on the skyline. I hit the ground in a flash and the gunner gave me another burst for good measure. One bullet hit my pack and I felt a stinging sensation in my back. After lying motionless for 10 minutes, as I was very exposed, I got up and ran for the cover of the ridge, passing close to a burnt out British tank. Wham, wham — I was startled to see red hot 88 millimetre missiles passing within inches of me. I ran faster to the protection of the ridge, realising later page 85 that the German gunner had been aiming at the tank and not at a sole, lonely figure running for dear life.

On reaching company headquarters I removed my pack to find out what damage had been done. A machine gun bullet had passed through a magazine full of Tommy gun ammunition without exploding them and had lodged in my back. I could hear a grating noise when I wriggled my back as a projection of bone on my vertebrae had been broken off. A visit from Tom Campbell spelled the end of my Alamein battle as he sent me back to have my wounds attended to. In the process of being evacuated, after I was put on a Bren carrier with several other wounded, the driver backed onto a mine which exploded right beneath me. The concussion knocked me out cold. It had been a brief battle for me but an eventful one and I was taken to a British hospital in Alexandria where the bullet, which had lodged behind my spine, was cut out. I can remember when I came round gradually from the anaesthetic I looked up to see a gorgeous, red-headed Scottish nurse looking anxiously at me and exclaimed involuntarily, “You are an angel!” — I really thought I was in heaven. We became good friends during my recuperation.

Later I heard that Bob Bayliss had been killed on that first morning, October 24, his gun being put out of action after he had knocked out one of the three tanks I had seen. I was saddened, as he had been a good friend and a brave soldier.

News also came through that Major Irvine Hart, the original leader of 13 Wairarapa Platoon in the 22nd Battalion. had died of wounds caused by a stray shell, on November 2. Marked out for promotion, he had been appointed second-in command of the Maori Battalion and had just taken over full command the day before disaster hit. We had been in the Territorials together and, as a barrister and solicitor, aged 35 when he first came into camp, was a senior officer, liked and respected by us all. He was one of this world's finest gentlemen page 86 and, in all the time I knew him, I never heard him speak unkindly of another man. We were greatly saddened by the bad tidings. My thoughts went immediately to his wife, family and friends back home and to his uncle — Brigadier Sir Herbert Hart — my father's deer stalking and big game shooting friend. My home town, Masterton, would go into mourning.

It took 11 days to break the Alamein Line. After seizing Miteiriya Ridge, the New Zealanders remained in the line for four nights and were then withdrawn to prepare for ‘Operation Supercharge’ which was to be controlled by NZ Division. After 10 days of hard slog, on November 2 ‘Supercharge’ succeeded in punching a hole in the German lines, with the British tanks performing magnificently, and a breakthrough was achieved with the Axis forces retreating in disarray.

The 22nd Battalion was withdrawn on November 17 1942, soon after crossing the Egyptian border, returning to Maadi to join 4th Armoured Brigade as a motorized infantry battalion. The 22nd took no further part in the North African Campaign, becoming part of 4th Brigade which was being equipped with the new American Sherman tanks.

As Monty later wrote: “Easily my best Divisional Commander was Freyberg and next came Morshead of the 9th Australian Division.” Rommel had also written about the New Zealanders. After our break out at Minqar Qaim he noted:

“Our men had once again fought with extraordinary courage. Unfortunately, the New Zealanders under Freyberg had escaped. This Division, with which we had become acquainted back in 1941/2, was amongst the elite of the British Army and I should have been much happier if it had been safely tucked away in our prison camp instead of still facing us.”