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A selection from the writings and speeches of John Robert Godley

On The Military Defences of Colonies

page 255

On The Military Defences of Colonies.

The following papers are included in this publication because they were Mr. Godley's work. It was at his instigation that the subject was taken up by the War Office, in which he then held an important post: The Departmental Committee appointed to investigate the subject of Military Defences for Colonies consisted of himself, Mr. Hamilton, the Under Secretary for the Home Department, and Mr. Elliott, the Assistant Under Secretary for the Colonies. Mr. Elliott's separate Report is added in order that Mr. Godley's Memorandum which follows it may be intelligible. The evidence given by Mr. Godley before the Committee of the House of Commons appointed to consider the Reports is also added to complete the subject. The latter may be said to have been the last public work in which he was engaged before his death in five months afterwards.

Report of the Committee on the Expense of Military Defences in the Colonies.

From Sir Benjamin Hawes to Mr. Merivale.

War Office, March 14, 1859.

Sir,—

I am directed by Secretary Major-General Peel to request that you will represent to Secretary Sir E. B. Lytton that so great is the difficulty and embarrassment occasioned to this Department by the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies, that Major-General Peel feels it to be highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies concerned on the subject.

So long as the Secretary of State for War was also Secretary of State for the Colonies, the inconvenience referred to was of course less seriously left, inasmuch as the Minister who filled the joint offices possessed means of information as to the actual requirements of the Colonies, and their ability or not to defray the cost involved, which enabled him readily to decide for himself how far it would be proper to grant or to refuse page 256demands submitted to him from time to time for troops, military stores, &c. The duty and responsibility of dealing with such demands, and of explaining and defending to Parliament the expenditure incurred or proposed in respect of them, now devolve on a Minister who has no official knowledge of the political and social circumstances of the Colonies, and no means of communicating with Colonial Governments. It appears to General Peel that the adoption of arrangements which should define the respective liabilities of this Department and the various Colonial Governments, in respect to military expenditure, would relieve the Secretary of State for War from the difficulty in question, and would at the same time be more conducive to the interest and convenience of the Colonies themselves.

That such arrangements are practicable, and, where they do exist, are found to work satisfactorily, is proved by the example of Malta, Mauritius, the Ionian Islands, and Ceylon, which pay a contribution into the Exchequer in aid of military funds; and again by the example of New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, which pay for military buildings and defences, and which are to defray the pay and allowances of any troops whom they may require beyond a specified number maintained from the Imperial Exchequer. Major-General Peel would now propose to extend the principle of those arrangements to the rest of the Colonies, with such modifications as the variety of their circumstances may render necessary.

The general principle to be borne in view in negotiating with Colonial Governments on this subject would be, as General Peel conceives:—1st, that England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign civilised nations, and (in a less proportion) of formidable native tribes; but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence. On the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should page 257also contribute its share by maintaining, at its own expense, a local force, or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and, 2nd, that military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect; and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown upon local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it.

These being the general principles on which General Peel conceives that the arrangement to be entered into with the respective Colonial Legislatures should be based, he would, in the event of their being concurred in and adopted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury (to whom a corresponding communication has been made), suggest that the business of preparing for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government a scheme for the application of them to each Colony, should be confided to a committee, consisting of three members, one to be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, one by the Lords of the Treasury, and one by the Secretary of State for War.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) B. Hawes.

H. Merivale, Esq., &c., &.,
Colonial Office.

Report.

In obedience to the instructions which we have received, we have inquired into and considered the relations of the Colonies of Great Britain to the mother country, as regards the expenditure on their military defence.

page 258

The duties imposed on us were explained in a letter from General Peel, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 14th March 1859, in consequence of which the committee was appointed. A copy of the letter is appended. In that communication General Peel states:—

That he feels great difficulty and embarrassment from the absence of any fixed and recognised principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State for War, in determining the numerous questions of military expenditure which are continually arising in most of the Colonies; that he considers it highly desirable that steps should be at once taken for coming to an understanding with the several Colonies on the subject, and that it appears to him that the adoption of arrangements which should define the respective liabilities of the War Department and the various Colonial Governments in respect of military expenditure would relieve the Secretary of State from the difficulties in question, and would at the same time be more conducive to the interest and convenience of the Colonies themselves.

The principles suggested by General Peel as the basis of such arrangements are as follows:—

  • 1. England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign nations, but in no case, except where such Colonies are mere garrisons kept up for Imperial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence; but, on the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share by maintaining at its own expense a local force; or, if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Imperial garrison; and,
  • 2. Military expenditure, for purposes of internal police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect, and the preservation of internal peace and order being properly thrown on local authorities, both because it depends upon their own legislation and page 259management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it.

General Peel concludes by proposing that a committee shall be appointed to prepare a scheme for the application of these principles to each Colony.

In conformity with these views, which were concurred in generally by the Lords of the Treasury and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, we submit the following Report:—

We desire to state at the outset, that while willing to apply our best judgment and means of information, in obedience to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, we feel sensibly the peculiar difficulties of the task imposed upon us. Few political questions involve greater difficulties and matter of more grave consideration than the relations between England and her colonial possessions—relations to which, as a whole, whether we consider the extent of those possessions, the diversities of race, interests, position, and circumstances which they comprise, or the various titles of conquest, treaty, and colonisation by which we hold them, there appears nothing even remotely analogous in the history of the world.

In suggesting therefore, changes of an important character in those relations, we feel that we are dealing with questions of policy which properly belong to the higher departments of Government, and that our plans may be open to practical objections of which we have no means of estimating the force.

But though conscious of our disadvantages in this respect, we have thought it our duty not to shrink from stating fully and plainly our own conclusions, however imperfect, on the matter referred to us, especially as Her Majesty's Government will have no difficulty in applying to them the necessary qualifications.

The first point to which it is our duty to call attention is the fact that the Colonies of Great Britain may be said, speaking generally, to have been free from the obligation of contributing, either by personal service or money payment, towards their own defences—a state of things which we page 260believe to have no parallel or precedent in the case of any other organised community of which the history is known.*

We subjoin a return of the military force and the expenditure for military purposes in our Colonies for 1857-8, the last year for which we have complete accounts. It will be seen that, including the cost of the Cape German Legion, the military expenditure amounted to £3,968,599. Of this only £378,253 was contributed by the Colonies, being less than one-tenth part of the whole; and of that contribution about two-thirds were paid by three Colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, and Ceylon. It is remarkable that no Colony except Canada, and, to a very small extent, Victoria, the Cape, and one or two of the West India Colonies, had organised a militia or other local force.

We consider that this immunity, throwing as it does the defence of the Colonies almost entirely on the mother country, is open to two main objections. In the first place, it imposes an enormous burden and inconvenience on the people of England, not only by the addition which it makes to their taxes, but by calling off to remote stations a large proportion of their troops and ships, and thereby weakening their means of defence at home. But a still more important objection is, the tendency which this system must necessarily have to prevent the development of a proper spirit of self-reliance amongst our Colonists, and to enfeeble their national character. By the gift of political self-government, we have bestowed on our Colonies a most important element of national education; but the habit of self-defence constitutes a part hardly less important of the training of a free people, and it will never be page 261acquired by our Colonists if we assume exclusively the task of defending them.

Next to the inadequacy of the contributions of our Colonies towards their defences, the most conspicuous defect in the present system is its inequality as among the Colonies themselves. For example, the colony of Victoria paid in 1857-58 about two-thirds of its ordinary military expenditure, and has this year in addition voted large sums for fortifications. In the same year, Ceylon paid about two-fifths, and Canada one-fifth part respectively, of their whole military expenditure; while Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Tasmania, New Zealand, and many other Colonies paid nothing at all. Above all, there is the gigantic anomaly of the expenditure on the Cape. We cannot avoid calling the especial attention of Her Majesty's Government to the drain on British resources which has resulted from our undertaking the defence of this Colony, and to the inadequacy of the benefits resulting to British interests. As affording a field of emigration, a supply of our wants, or a market for our produce, our connection with the Colony has not been, comparatively speaking, of any considerable advantage to us; in fact, the only direct object of Imperial concern, is the use of the roadsteads at Table and Simon's Bays. Yet in 1857-58, a period of exceptional tranquility, we had at the Cape, including the German Legion, a garrison, or rather an army, of 10,759 regular troops, and the military expenditure alone was £803,687, equal to more than one-fifth of the expenditure on the whole of the Colonies, including the Mediterranean garrisons. Since that time the force has been materially reduced, but this year new works have been begun (at the expense of the Imperial Treasury); and the general officer commanding has informed the Governor that if they are to be completed, manned, and armed, he will require an additional force to be placed at his disposal of at least four regiments of infantry, 850 artillery, 400 cavalry, and a proportion of engineers. On the other hand, the whole contribution of the Colony to the enormous cost of its defence consisted in page 262a small body of frontier police, the expense of which was £34,403.

Nor is the inequality in our mode of treating our Colonies less remarkable than that of their contributions. For example, though the people of Victoria contribute, as we have shown, most liberally and largely, we have lately, at great expense and inconvenience, removed part of the regiment quartered there, on the express ground that Victoria refused to pay for more than four companies, to Tasmania, which not only does not pay for those troops, but contributes nothing in any shape to military purposes. Again, we have removed the troops from Antigua, on the ground that the Colony would not provide barracks for them, to Barbadoes, where we provide barracks for them ourselves Again, Canada is the first British Colony which has set the example of organising a militia; she has done this entirely at her own expense, including the arming and clothing of the men, and we have refused to contribute anything towards it, going so far as to demand payment for some great-coats and smooth bore muskets, which happened to be in store on the spot, and which we issued to them. Yet at the same time, we are distributing, gratis, from the store at Quebec, a large quantity of the best Enfield rifles to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, for the use of volunteers, although we have never been able to induce those Colonies to organise a militia, or to contribute one farthing, in any shape, towards their own defence.

A further anomaly exists as regards the issue of "colonial allowances" to Her Majesty's troops. In some Colonies, viz., Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Ceylon, and Mauritius, very liberal allowances are given by the Colonial Governments to the officers, and, in the three first cases, to the men, over and above what they are entitled to by regulation. The results of this exceptional liberality are,—

  • 1. That the Imperial Government is in a manner forced to give corresponding allowances in neighbouring Colonies, although it may not consider them to be called for. This is page 263actually the case as regards Tasmania and New Zealand, where the Secretary of State decided that the time was come for such allowances to he discontinued; but where it was found practically impossible to carry that decision into effect so long as the neighbouring Colonies continued to give them. 2. That troops serving in Colonies of which the Governments are not so liberal are placed at an invidious and unjust disadvantage; there is as much reason for giving extra allowances at Jamaica and Demerara as there is at Ceylon or Mauritius, although the former do not choose to give them, and the latter do. 3. That the remuneration given to the Queen's troops, enlisted for general service, is made to fluctuate at the pleasure of Colonial Governments, and according to the state of their finances; which appears to us objectionable and improper.

It is not surprising that a state of things so anomalous and irregular should lead to disputes and confusion. Not a year passes without the occurrence of difficulties and discussions with regard to the respective liabilities of the Imperial and the Colonial Governments in every part of the world; and it is to be observed, that such questions are never settled; they are adjourned for the moment, leaving behind them often much soreness on both sides, and the Imperial Government almost invariably yielding the points at issue; but the next year, or the year after they are raised again, there being no recognised principles of mutual relations to which appeal can be made, or upon which a permanent settlement can be founded.

Having pointed out, as above, the evils of the present system, we proceed to submit our proposals for altering it. Before doing so, it will be convenient to state the general principles on which we believe such alteration should be founded.

In the first place, while we recognise to the full extent the obligation which devolves on Great Britain of assisting her Colonies to defend themselves against foreign enemies, we maintain also that this obligation is discharged by doing, or page 264offering to do so, on fair and liberal conditions; and that she is by no means bound to relieve them of the whole responsibility of self-defence. It must be borne in mind, that the interests of the Colonists in repelling aggression upon them is primary and direct; that of Great Britain indirect and secondary. While, therefore, it seems right that the Colonists should, as a rule, decide on the extent and nature of their own defences, and have generally the control and management of them, it is unjust to throw the whole burden of expense on the less interested party.

In the second place, we submit that a system of defence, based upon the presence of Imperial garrisons, in every part of the empire, is as inefficient as it is burdensome; and that the right system would be one based on local efforts and local resources.

All history shows (what is indeed evident à priori) that the maintenance of dominion over scattered and distant territories depends either on the nature of the countries and their population, or upon the command of the sea. It is not physically possible, even if it were desirable, to maintain in fifty Colonies expensive fortifications and garrisons, adequate to stand regular sieges against powerful expeditions. With great efforts and at enormous expense, for what are supposed to be great objects, a few such garrisons are maintained out of Imperial resources at military posts, and with them we do not suggest any interference; at least they are calculated to effect the objects for which they are intended. But no nation could carry out such a system all over the world; no nation, in fact, has ever carried it so far as this country now does in the exceptional instance to which we have referred. The retention of the rest of our Colonies must depend not upon their garrisons, but upon the other means of defence which we have mentioned. The principal defence of such Colonies, so far as it depends upon the mother country at all, consists in her naval superiority; the real question as regards those which have no inherent powers of resistance being, not which power page 265can first occupy the disputed ground, but which, on the whole, and in the end, can bring the greatest amount of force to bear upon it. For example, if we have 1,000 men in Jamaica or Trinidad, it is probable that we may lose them when the French or Americans can bring 2,000 or 3,000 to bear on them, and so on.

Colonial garrisons (when not very large, and in first-class fortresses,) have always found themselves in traps, and at the mercy, of naval expeditions. Take the case of the Cape in the revolutionary war, when it had only 20,000 European inhabitants. For many years the Dutch had had a large garrison there, kept up at great expense, with a view, of course, to its defence in war. In 1795 a British expedition landed, and almost without resistance, the garrison laid down its arms. We restored the Cape to the Dutch at the peace of Amiens, and, untaught by experience, they sent another garrison there. When the second war broke out the same thing happened, and we got a second batch of prisoners of war. In short, our fleets employed themselves, during the first years of the war, in sweeping up, as it were, into a net all the colonies belonging to all other nations, in every part of the world, and in making prisoners of their garrisons; and there is hardly a single instance where there was resistance, worthy of the name. In the event of another war, if we retained the command of the sea, we could take Java, Martinique, and Gruadaloupe, whenever we thought it worth while. On the other hand, we should lose all our Colonies which do not possess natural and internal means of defence, if we had for our antagonist a power, or a combination of powers, able to command the sea and desirous of taking them.

The condition, then, of a successful attack on any such Colony, would be either permanent command of the seas, or such a temporary command as would enable the enemy to land an expeditionary force powerful enough to conquer the country, and hold it against any subsequent attacks on our part. In neither of such contingencies would the present page 266garrisons be capable of defence, especially as, with very few exceptions, the fortified places in these Colonies are so weak as to afford them hardly any protection; and accordingly, at every rumour of war, there comes from the Governor of every Colony a cry of distress, representing his unprotected state, and asking for reinforcements.

It is true that these garrisons, though insufficient to stand regular sieges, may sometimes be able to repel what are called "insults," i.e., aggression by flying squadrons or partisan bands. But such an object is not worth the expense of keeping up permanent garrisons in open towns. It is inconsistent with the practice of modern warfare to plunder private property, and the Government property at such places is hardly ever worth plundering. Indeed, fortifications and garrisons, unless really strong, are more likely to do harm than good, the towns being more likely to suffer m the engagement than if they were totally undefended. Besides, these are contingencies which local efforts should meet, both at home and abroad. The general Government has enough to do in providing for the defence of the country at its vital points. It is obviously incapable of protecting every commercial harbour and colonial capital. It is to be remembered that the question is one of comparative advantages and claims. Deducting the garrisons of the Mediterranean stations, and of the other Colonial possessions which are simply military posts, in 1857-58 about 27,000 regular troops were employed, and more than £2,000,000 of money was spent on the military defence of the rest of the Colonies; and we cannot but feel convinced that those troops, and that money might be more usefully employed, indeed more usefully for the Colonies themselves, because in a manner more conducive to the general security and welfare of the Empire. There are between four and five thousand men, for example, scattered about, in detachments of a few companies each, in the West Indies; and yet there is not a post in the whole command which they could hold for a week against a hostile expedition. It seems to us clear that that page 267number of soldiers would be far more serviceable to the Empire if stationed in England, and that the cost of them, spent on sailors, would contribute more effectually to the defence of the West Indies themselves, than the present arrangement.

We have said that, so far as assistance from the mother country is concerned, the chief thing which most of our Colonies must look to for defence against foreign enemies is our navy. But a more efficient safeguard for most of them is to be found in their situation, and in the numbers and character of their population. Take, for example, the case of the provinces of British America, which are the only Colonies exposed to aggression by land. Of these the whole question of the successful defence depends on the wishes and feelings of the people themselves. If they were ill-affected, or even indifferent, no possible military efforts on our part could defend them in the case of war with America. On the other hand the Americans could never subdue and retain in subjection the British provinces, so long as the latter are determined not to accept their dominion. It is quite true that we could assist the Colonists very materially, but it is not necessary to keep up garrisons in time of peace for that purpose. No invasion of Canada by any power but the Americans is even conceivable; and no serious invasion of Canada by the Americans can be made without many months of preparation. They have no machinery or organisation for such an enterprise; while in much shorter time we could send troops there, if we wished it and could spare them. Against incursions by "filibusters" or "sympathisers," the Canadians ought to be, and are, quite able to protect themselves. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact, that no Colony having more than 20,000 European inhabitants has ever been conquered by a foreign enemy, except in the single instance of Canada itself, of which the population, at the time of its conquest, was 60,000; but which was in the singularly unfavourable position of being the only French colony in that part of the world, and attacked, therefore, not page 268only from the seaward by a power superior at sea, but by a warlike population of British colonists on its land frontier.

We repeat, then, that the real and sufficient protection to the independence of our Colonies consists, either first, in their remote and insulated positions, which make it highly improbable that any power could or would organise naval and military expeditions sufficiently powerful to take and keep them, or, secondly, in local circumstances, such as the nature of the country and the character and numbers of the population, which render it practically impossible to invade and conquer them, at any rate before assistance would arrive from this country. The West Indian Islands come under the first category; British North America under the second; Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, and the Cape under both.

We have said enough to explain and illustrate the proposition which we began by laying down, viz., that it is not necessary or desirable for the interests of the Empire generally, nor in reality of the Colonies themselves, to undertake their defence by small and scattered Imperial garrisons. We now come to practical recommendations. Two plans only have suggested themselves for obtaining from the Colonies a reasonable contribution towards their military defence.

One is the extension to all the Colonies of an arrangement made by Lord Grey (and modified by Mr. Labouchere) with New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. By that arrangement it was provided that the Imperial Government should maintain in each of the Colonies referred to, such a body of troops as it considered to be, in Mr. Labouchere's words, "sufficient for Imperial purposes," and that the Colonies should pay for all military buildings and other local defences, as well as for any troops beyond the force above specified, which they might ask for and obtain.

This arrangement has undoubtedly many advantages, and, as regards the Colonies in question, it has been very favourable to the British Exchequer, inasmuch as they pay by far the page 269larger proportion of their military expenses. Nevertheless, we do not recommend it for general adoption, for several reasons. In the first place, we do not consider that the basis on which it rests is sound. We think, on grounds which we have already and fully explained, that it is not desirable "for Imperial purposes," to scatter small garrisons, in open or ill-fortified places all over the world, to which the system in question practically tends. In New South Wales, the force decided upon as "necessary for Imperial purposes" is four companies of infantry; in Victoria, the same amount; and in South Australia one company. Whilst this dispersion is admitted to be very prejudicial to discipline and organisation, and to involve the necessity of a disproportionate staff, we believe the force thus disposed of is not so usefully employed "for Imperial purposes," as it might be at home. We believe Imperial interests to be best consulted by keeping garrisons only in places which are calculated to resist invading expeditions, and by making the garrisons in those places really efficient and adequate.

Secondly, we do not understand how any arrangement founded on these principles could be made equally applicable to the fluctuating circumstances of different periods, especially to peace and war. If it be held, for example, that four companies are necessary "for Imperial purposes" at Sydney in time of peace, it seems to follow that a larger number would be necessary in time of threatened war, and a larger still in time of actual hostilities; in short, that the number required would fluctuate in proportion to the danger; while, whenever the force was augmented or diminished, a fresh negotiation would have to be entered into for the purpose of determining the respective proportions in which the expense should be defrayed.

Thirdly, we dissent from the argument founded on joint interest. If England was considered bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies merely because she is interested in their defence, it might fairly be argued that the page 270obligation is reciprocal, and that the Colonies, being deeply interested in the safety of England, ought to contribute systematically and habitually towards the defence of London and Portsmouth. But the ground on which we hold that England is bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies is, that the Imperial Government has the control of peace and war, and is therefore in honour and duty called upon to assist them in providing against the consequences of its policy.

Finally, we believe that if we take upon ourselves the initiative in the defence of our Colonies, by assigning to them garrisons, however small, those garrisons will be taken as symbols of our responsibility, and their presence will tend to perpetuate the main evil of the present system, namely, the dependence of the Colonies on the mother country for defence, and their neglect of local efforts.

Having come for these reasons to the conclusion that it is not desirable to confirm and extend the arrangement referred to, we submit, as the result of careful and anxious deliberation, the following plan for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government:—

We propose to divide the Colonies (so called) into two classes. The first class would consist of military posts, in which, for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of the particular countries in which they are situated, the Imperial Grovernment thinks it necessary to maintain garrisons—such as Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, Bermuda, and a few more of similar character. So long as these posts are held at all, they should be adequately fortified and garrisoned, but we are of opinion that as the garrisons of them are maintained without reference to the wants and wishes of the inhabitants, they should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any general scheme of Colonial contribution.

The second class would comprise all the rest of the Colonies, that is, all those where troops are stationed primarily, if not exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties, and page 271properties of their inhabitants. We propose that, as regards these Colonies, the system of defence should be founded on two simple principles, colonial management, and joint contribution at a uniform rate. We propose that the Imperial Government should call upon each Colony to decide on the nature of its own defences, and the amount of its garrison, and should offer to assist it by bearing a share (say, half, or any other proportion which may be fixed), of the entire cost; specifying at the same time a maximum sum beyond which this country should not be called upon to contribute without a further agreement. It seems to us essential that this arrangement, if adopted at all, should be uniformly applied, in other words, that adhesion to it should be a sine qua non of our incurring any expense in the defence of a Colony of the class now under consideration. If it were adopted, some Colonies might choose to form a militia or to have corps enlisted for local service, like e.g. the "Canadian Rifles." In these cases they would organise and pay their forces as they might think fit, and the Imperial contributions would be paid into the Colonial exchequer without further interference than would be necessary to satisfy ourselves that they were expended in accordance with the agreement. Other Colonies might prefer being garrisoned by troops of the line, and paying their fixed share of the entire expense of such troops. In these cases the Imperial Government would first consider whether it could spare them; and would assure itself that the number asked for was sufficient for its purpose, and not open to the objections which exist to small and scattered garrisons, and also that the force would be adequately provided for as regards pay, allowances, and barracks; and it would only send the troops in case of their being no objection on any of these grounds. It would also be necessary to have a clear understanding that all the troops so sent would be at the disposal of the Imperial Government in case any emergency should require them to be withdrawn.

We find that a plan very similar to this was proposed by page 272the Governor of New South Wales—Sir W. Denison—and his responsible advisers, to Her Majesty's Government, and supported by the Governor in an important dispatch, dated 14th August 1856. The proposal of the Colonial Government was: "That whatever may be the mode in which the military force "in a Colony may be raised and organised, the mother country "and the Colony shall contribute towards its expense in equal "proportions, and that the Government of the Colony should "have the responsibility of determining the amount of that "force, whether in peace or war." It goes on to offer, as part of the same arrangement, to bear exclusively the cost of keeping up all fortifications, barracks, and all military buildings, on condition that those then existing should be handed over to the Colony; thus accepting considerably more than half the annual cost of the whole military defence, and making the proportion of the respective contributions a varying one. In reply to this dispatch, Lord Stanley wrote (11th March 1858) in the following terms:—"This proposal has the great "merit of simplicity, and of being calculated to dispense with "minute changes of plan, and to obviate disputes. But as it "would seem difficult to adopt it unless your further proposal "were incorporated with it, that the Colony should possess, "through the vote of its Legislature, the responsibility of "determining the amount of force which should be maintained "in it, both in peace and war, Her Majesty's Government, as "at present advised, do not see in what manner the suggestions "of the Colonial Government can be carried out without "compromising the independent action of the central Government "of the Empire. If every Colony were to assert a voice "in this matter, I do not see in what manner the general "defensive arrangements of the Empire could be conducted."

"Her Majesty's former advisers therefore came to the "opinion (from which, as far as I have yet been able to consider "the subject, I see no reason to dissent), that for the "present it was better not to alter the present system."

It will be seen that the refusal of the Secretary of State to page 273entertain the proposal was expressed in very qualified terms, and that it rested entirely on a single difficulty, which we cannot but think may be easily removed. It is, that if each Colony settled the amount of its military force, the general defensive arrangements of the Empire might be interfered with, which we understand to mean that if a Colony had the right of fixing the amount of its garrison, it might ask for more troops than the mother country, having to consider the general defence of the Empire, could spare. It appears to us that this difficulty may be obviated by retaining in the hands of the Imperial Government the power of deciding whether it could spare the troops asked for, and refusing them if it could not. Indeed, such a power must be a necessary incident of any arrangement, including that made by Lord Grey with the Australian Colonies; and under the one which we propose it would involve no hardship on the Colony, which would only pay its share of maintaining the troops which it actually got. India, which pays for all the troops we send her, only gets those which we can spare, and so it must be with every part of the Empire. But, in fact, we feel confident that the difficulty would never arise. If the Colonies paid half, or any large proportion of the entire cost of the force we sent them, they would, in almost every case, reduce that force far below what we now maintain there, and trust to local efforts for defence.

There is one objection which is likely to be urged against our plan, which we think it better to notice by anticipation. We mean an objection to laying down a uniform rate of joint contribution. It may possibly be said that one Colony is more exposed to foreign aggression, or less able, through poverty or the nature of its population, to provide against it than another, and that we ought to apportion our aid to the wants of each, not to the amount of its own efforts. The objection in question is founded on a different view of the nature and ground of the obligations of the mother country from that which we entertain and have endeavoured to express. We consider those obligations to be founded on the peculiar relation page 274between the mother country and the Colonies, by which the exclusive control over peace and war is vested in the former, and that relation, it is needless to observe, is uniform and common to every Colony in the Empire; but it is not in accordance with possibility that we should equalise the natural advantages and disadvantages, whether in relation to military or civil affairs of the different Colonies respectively. Just as the richer and more favourably circumstanced among them are able to have more expensive and complete systems of civil administration, more highly paid officers, better schools, hospitals, and gaols, so it is natural and inevitable that they should have, if they please, more effective and costly defences. Poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones: and, as regards the particular disadvantage now in question, it is to be observed, that the poorer the Colony the less is the temptation to attack it. Practically, too, the difficulty of estimating the respective needs and resources of Colonies would be so great, that any system of defence, founded on such estimate, would lead to as much injustice, discontent, and unsettlement as that under which we now suffer; while the plan of apportioning our contributions to local efforts would have a direct tendency to effect our main and primary object, the encouragement of the latter.

It is almost needless to say, that while persuaded of the feasibility as well as of the advantages of the plan which we recommend, we are not insensible of the difficulties which Her Majesty's Government will meet with in applying it. Nor do we for a moment suppose that it can be brought into full operation at once by a circular dispatch followed by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops. If it be adopted at all, it should be carried out with undeviating impartiality and firmness, and the Colonies should be made to understand from the first that the decision of the Government on the subject is final and irreversible. But it should also be carried out considerately and with caution; the Colonies will require time to organise systems of local self-defence, and in the meanwhile page 275they should not be deprived of the protection to which we have accustomed them, if it be clear that they have bona fide accepted the arrangement proposed, and are preparing to act upon it. We venture further to suggest that it would be wise and just to show the utmost liberality to them in making the preliminary arrangements. For example, the Imperial Government possesses in every Colony considerable and often very valuable property, which has been acquired and retained for purposes of defence; when the responsibility of that defence is transferred to the Colonies, it is clearly right that the property should be transferred to them also. The same course might be pursued (though on different grounds) with respect to the armament of forts and batteries, and even to the stores which might happen to be on the spot, and appropriated to local purposes. In short, every possible pains should be taken to let the Colonies see that the course decided upon is adopted with a view to the permanent advantage of themselves as well as of the mother country, and that there is no wish on the part of the latter to drive what is called a hard bargain with them.

In conclusion, the principal advantages of the plan which we recommend are as follows:—It would involve a great saving to the Imperial Exchequer, not only through the direct contribution of the Colonies, but also, as above intimated, by the general reduction of Colonial garrisons which would inevitably follow. At the same time on inordinate burden would be imposed upon the Colonies, seeing that it would rest with themselves to determine the amount of their respective armaments.

It would be equally applicable to peace and war; a Colony finding itself exposed to danger, would increase its military force, either by asking us for more troops, or by local measures of defence, of which the mother country would bear its fixed share of the expense.

It would stimulate the patriotism, self-reliance, and military spirit of the Colonists, by throwing on them the responsibility of directing their own military affairs.

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Above all, it would convey, in the most marked and emphatic way, the determination of the mother country, that the Colonies should be governed through and for their own people. It would show that we rely on their loyalty and attachment, and on nothing else; that we have no wish to preserve our connection with them by force; and that, therefore, we regard not only without jealousy, but with sympathy and pride, the growth of their military strength, and the cultivation of that martial spirit which is their best defence. It is in this point of view particularly that we consider the question, whether, in the organisation of Colonial defences, the mother country or the Colonies should take the initiative (that is, whether we should defend them with their assistance, or they defend themselves with ours), to be of the utmost importance; to depend, in fact, upon whether one or other of two opposite views of colonial policy be deliberately adopted; and we emphatically repeat, that it is mainly with reference to these fundamental principles, and not to a calculation of how much money we can obtain from the Colonies, or save to Great Britain, that we recommend the plan proposed and explained in this report.

One member of the Committee, Mr. Elliot, finding himself unable to agree in the whole of our Report, and consequently to sign it, has appended a Memorandum, explaining to what extent he differs from us, and his reasons for doing so.

(Signed) Geo. A. Hamilton.

John Robert Godley.

January 24, 1860.

[The following is the Return referred to in page 260, showing the Force stationed in the Colonies, and the Expenditure incurred for their defence, by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively, during the year ended 31st March 1858.]

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defence expenditure in the colonies

* It is worth while to note, as showing by contrast the liberality with which England treats her Colonies, the financial relations between those of the only two European nations besides ourselves which possess Colonies of any importance, and the mother countries. In 1857 (the last year for which we have been able to obtain a financial statement) the surplus revenue paid by the Dutch Colonies into the metropolitan exehequer, after defraying all their military and naval expenses, was 31,858,421 florins (about £2,600,000. The estimated surplus revenue from the Spanish Colonies for the past year 115,000,000 reals (about £1,150,000.) Ministerial Statement in the, Dutch Chambers; (Journal of the Hague, November 9, 1859.) Anuario Econumico-Msiradistico de Espana for 1859.

See note at the end of this Report.