Confiscation.

That was an episode, but it revealed a mere crack in the relations between the Governor and his Ministers. A far larger question opened up a deep fissure that threatened to yawn into an impassable gulf. Grey was not from the first intractable. Two bills were passed through both Houses—the Suppression of the Rebellion Act, and the New Zealand Settlements Act—which Sir John Richardson, afterwards Speaker of the Legislative Council, described as "savouring of the darkest periods of legislation,'' and which Sir Frederick Weld, afterwards Premier of New Zealand, denounced as "unconstitutional and tyrannical." The first was Draconian, and page 154the second provided for a measure of confiscation of Native lands as a consequence of the war. The extent of land to be confiscated was left indefinite, and Grey made no difficulty in giving the Royal Assent in December, 1863, to both Acts. They appeared in a different light to the incorruptible Sir William Martin, now retired from the Bench. The old Chief-Justice wrote and this time published, in November, 1863, a pamphlet where he said that the proposals of the New Zealand Government had aroused in him "a feeling of sorrow, if not of shame," and Grey, forgetting that, sixteen years before, Sir William had loyally stood by him, attacked his old comrade-in-arms. He feared that Martin's Observations "might be misunderstood by persons at a distance," and he assured the Duke of Newcastle, in transmitting the Acts, that he would see to it that the confiscation was "not carried too far." The sequel throws a lurid light on the assurance.

The battle raged on this line all through 1864. The Duke of Newcastle had reluctantly assented to the proposed measure of confiscation on the strength of Grey's assurance that it was to be kept within reasonable limits. His successor, Mr. Cardwell, was less pliable. He agreed to a measure of confiscation only because none could be carried out without Grey's concurrence. He relied on Grey's "sagacity, firmness, and experience" and on his "long-recognised regard, as well for the interests of the colonists as for the fair rights and expectations of the Maori race.'' The greater part of the cost of suppressing the rebellion had been borne by the Motherland, which had therefore, as represented by the Governor, a right to a deciding voice on such a question. He laid down large principles and deduced from them a law of moderation regarding the amount of confiscation that would be consonant with natural equity. The Ministry was not prepared to listen to counsels of moderation. They affirmed that 3,000 colonists had taken service on the understanding that they would be assigned farms scooped out of the confiscated land, and they said that they intended to enrol 20,000 men, who would all of them be page 155settled as military pensioners. The wranglings and bickerings between the Governor and his Ministers were incessant. A violent scene took place one day, May 28, 1864, in the Executive Council. Grey then positively refused to issue certain Orders in Council, relating to proclaimed districts, till he had definitely ascertained what extent of land the Ministry proposed to confiscate.

On the demand of the Governor the Ministers stated the extent of the confiscation they proposed. They craved territory enough to defray the war expenditure and provide for military settlements. Once Grey had definitely ascertained that it would amount to eight millions of acres, he unhesitatingly opposed it. He resisted it as "contrary to law and equity, contrary to his duty to the Imperial Government, and not in accordance with the responsibilities imposed by the presence and aid of the British forces and the expenditure of large sums of British money.'' He would not drive a nation to despair. He drafted a proclamation, offering a free and absolute pardon to all Maoris who surrendered, took an oath of allegiance, and made such cessions of land as the Governor and the General (not the Ministry, it will be observed) approved. Should Ministers refuse to acquiesce, he would adhere to his intention of issuing the proclamation. His decision excited the wrath of the Colonial Ministry. Hostile and angry communications passed between the Ministry and the Governor. It rained minutes and memorandums. A witty ex-Minister said they were living under a Memorandummiad; the historian describes it as a slough of despond. The Secretary of State supported the Governor, urging him to act on his own judgment. With this force at his back the Governor felt strong enough to defy his Ministry. "A just, satisfactory, and permanent peace has been indefinitely postponed by the vacillation and indecision of his Excellency.'' So wrote Attorney-General Whitaker, and with this Parthian arrow the Ministry passed away.

It was succeeded by a Ministry with Sir Frederick Weld as Premier. Suddenly, the Governor showed himself unexpectedly pliable. He had always held a high page 156opinion of Weld, who belonged to an old English Catholic family, and had something of the manners that stamp the caste of Vere de Vere. In 1876, when Grey was an unofficial legislator, he warmly eulogised Weld. He was now willing to do for Weld what he refused to do for Fox or Whitaker. On December 17, 1864, he issued a proclamation confiscating "all the lands in the Waikato taken by the Queen's forces," and all lands north of a certain boundary line, practically the whole of the Waikato plain. As Mr. Rusden wittily says, the Governor's conscience had stretched from Ngaruawahia to Raglan. In 1867 General Peel left the Disraeli Ministry because there was nothing so elastic as the conscience of a cabinet Minister. Only three years earlier he might have found that there was one thing more elastic still—the conscience of a colonial Governor.