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NOW that this record of New Zealand's contribution to the war in the
Although comparatively close at hand, the islands of the
My task in writing this book was made easier because of my long association with the land forces which went into the
A little of the material used here has been taken from two surveys I wrote for the New Zealand Army Board after I returned from the Pacific Story and Guadalcanal to Nissan— and from the thirteen volumes of
My sincere thanks are due to the staff of the
In order to keep this narrative in its proper perspective and make it as complete as possible, I have included the briefest practicable account of the part played by the American forces, Navy, Army and Air, of which the New Zealanders were a small part. It is inevitable, however, in works of this kind, that incidents of importance and acts of individual bravery should be overlooked. It was impossible also to record all changes of command; to do so would have cluttered the narrative with lists of names. For any such shortcomings in recording this not unworthy page of New Zealand history I apologize.
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.
By New Zealand, to assist in strengthening the British Navy as well as removing a little of the load from the British taxpayer, and during Parliamentary debates which followed a proposal to borrow £2 million to pay for this gift, speakers displayed some concern for what they described as dangers north of the Equator. By that time Japanese infiltration into the
Her ultimate goal—supremacy in the
British colonies and dominions in the
The Japanese cruiser Ibuki helped to escort the Main Body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to Egypt.
The Japanese move to take advantage of British weakness in the
But he was not the only prophet, as Massey had been. When Admiral Lord Jellicoe toured the
At the conclusion of his tour in New Zealanddolce far niente island outpost it was during Jellicoe's visit twenty years previously. Even by Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth class, he pointed out, could not dock at
Through the years following status quo area, which included
Changing political situations in Great Britain gravely affected the New Zealand's first contribution towards the cost of the base was an offer of £100,000 (half the sum recommended by the then naval adviser) made in status quo area and could therefore be fortified without restraint. Hood visited
In
Prior to the 1914-18 War, Japanese-New Zealand trade interests were not extensive. New Zealand imports amounted on the average to £140,000 a year and her exports to £Panay, and sacked Nanking. New Zealand, with the rest of the world, was deeply concerned by these continued hostilities and by the extension of Japanese trade as she sought to obtain raw materials, particularly wool and scrap metal, from abroad.
Mr. W. J. Jordan, New Zealand High Commissioner in
The first decisive move in an attempt to overcome weakness which daily grew more obvious, was initiated by Savage, who suggested that representatives of Great Britian,
At the conclusion of the conference Major-General Mackesy, the British military delegate, was asked by the New Zealand Government to report on the Dominion's land forces. His report was depressing but inevitable in view of a policy which had shown little interest or enthusiasm in defence matters. His considered opinion was that the New Zealand Army had been allowed to become the Cinderella of the services and that New Zealand was incapable of repulsing any serious landing force. He recommended the immediate creation of a small regular land force of three infantry battalions and the expansion of the Territorial Force. Savage lost no time in appealing for men. On 22 May he asked for an increase in the peace establishment from 9500 to 16,000 men, another 250 for the coast defences, and for every able-bodied man from 20 to 55 years of age to register in the national defence reserve. Additional defence equipment, supplies of which were dangerously low, was ordered from overseas, but before that could be obtained or industry geared for its production, war had overwhelmed
Just as she fought for time in
The prevention of any major operations against
To keep open sea communications.
To prevent the fall of
Mr. Peter Fraser, Deputy Prime Minister, attended the conference and expressed his apprehension concerning defences in the
The fall of
There was no improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations through the first six months of Early in
Although there was no public assurance from the The Lend-Lease Act gave the Government of the
While diplomatic discussions were in progress
Fearing Japanese reaction, the Dutch had declined to attend staff talks at
Late in
Early in November Mr. Saburo Kurusu was despatched to
The Government of the
The Government of
The Government of the
The Government of the
Both Governments will agree upon a plan for stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate and will allocate funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by
After reading this document Kurusu intimated that his Government would be likely ‘to throw up its hands’, but he and the Ambassador asked to see the President and were received by him the following day.
The situation was then critical. The Japanese were reinforcing their troops in
These plans were the outcome of American, Dutch, and British conversations (not made public at the time) held in Admiral Sir Edward Parry, KCB, RN; born Air Chf Mshl Sir Hugh Saunders, KCB, KBE, MC, DFC, MM, Legion of Merit (US); Acbilles 27 Jan 1939–15 Oct 1940; Chief of NZ Naval Staff, First Naval Member of Renown
On 6 December information was despatched from
There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-
President Roosevelt also informed the Thai Premier that the
At 7.50 a.m. on The timing of the attack given is Arizona and the
Several hours after the attack, the Emperor's reply, containing assurances of peace, was delivered to the
Hull knew that
Documents produced during the war trials in
In the regions including French Indo-
French Indo- China and the Dutch East Indies: We must, in the first place, endeavour to conclude a comprehensive economic agreement (including distribution of resources, trade adjustment in and out of the Co-prosperity Sphere, currency and exchange agreement, &c.), while planning such political coalitions as the recognition of independence, conclusion of mutual assistance pacts, &c.
Thailand: We should strive to strengthen mutual assistance and coalition in political, economic, and military affairs.
A further document dated
Although the objective of
French Indo-
We should manœuvre an uprising of an independence movement and should cause
The foregoing measures must be executed immediately after a truce has been concluded with
The Prince of Wales, a new battleship, and the Repulse, a battle cruiser, were lost on 10 December in an attempt to destroy, without air cover, a Japanese convoy off the Malayan coast. It was probably the worst ending of an old year ever experienced in the history of the British Commonwealth. By
By 9 March the Japanese were in full control almost to the coasts of
INFLUENCED to some degree by the Jellicoe report of
In Maj-Gen Sir John Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d.; born NZ Rear-Admiral H. E. Horan, CB, DSC; born Leander,
Concrete plans for the defence of Viti Levu, and the other at Nandali, near
Maintenance costs for the forces established in
Navy £25,680—of which £20,000 was set aside for oil storage tanks.
Army £290,000—including £245,000 for buildings.
Air£692,000—including £400,000 for the purchase of new aircraft, if they could be procured.
The proposed annual expenditure was estimated at:
A meterological organisation costing £3300 was also recommended and later approved, New Zealand to pay 50 per cent of the cost, the By the time the
Leander made a hurried dash to
Before the arrival of the brigade in
Meanwhile, a desirable martial spirit had exercised the Territorial Force, which had been increased to 31 officers and 743 other ranks, who were guarding vital points in the Niagara was sunk outside
Much the same state of affairs existed with a coast watching system which had been organised by the civil administration to cover the islands of the group and report the presence of hostile shipping. Natives maintained a twenty-four hour watch at the more important vantage points, relaying their information by a variety of methods to a central station at Orion, which cruised off the group from 19 to 23 July 1940. Communications were not satisfactorily or efficiently organised until
Deterioration of relations with Achilles, accompanied by Colonel W. H. Cunningham, CBE, DSO,
On 20 September, seven days before Manuganui, Dec 1942–May 1943; SMO Waiouru,
There was much preliminary work to be done in great haste in both New Zealand and
Appointments to 8 Infantry Brigade Group on its arrival in
Early in
When New Zealand troops of the brigade landed in In Rangatira after the traditional speeches of farewell from the Governor-General, Lord Galway, the Prime Minister, the Hon. P. Fraser, and the Minister of Defence, the Monowai,Rangatira ran a shuttle service, transporting the remaining two flights, one of which went direct to
The Crown Colony of
Cunningham decided to defend the two most vital areas on Vitu Levu—the
Two principal camp sites were selected, one at
Force Headquarters opened in the basement of Government Buildings in
At Cunningham's first unit conference on 4 November, areas were allotted and defence roles defined. The immediate task was the denial to a possible enemy of the beaches and harbours in both zones. Four of 35 Battery's 18-pounder guns were despatched to Momi to defend the Navula Passage between the mainland and Malolo Island; the remaining two guns were sited at Lami village to cover the entrance to
Much had been accomplished by the turn of the year, mostly by hard labour and the vigorous use of pick and shovel. Major difficulties were overcome, and the men became hardened to heat, mosquitoes, rain, and improvisation. Those who were allergic to the tropics never became accustomed to any of these things and voiced their sentiments in long, outspoken letters home. Soon their bodies were burnished to the colour of mahogany as they toiled in shorts, hat, and boots securing the defence lines. Gunnery and air problems were discussed by the commander with Colonel A. B. Williams, DSO, AVM Sir Arthur Nevill, KBE, CB, Legion of Merit (US); Matron Miss G. L. Thwaites, RRC; born NZ Maunganui Dec 1944–Mar 1946.
Shortages were the predominating worry, but these could not be met immediately by New Zealand, though appeals had been made overseas for additional equipment. Clothing was a problem which caused irritation among the men. Much of the tropical kit with which they had been issued—shorts and shirt suitable for the climate—was ill-fitting and bore the date of their manufacture in
During the early months of the Maj-Gen Sir Fred T. Bowerbank, KBE, ED, m.i.d., Grand Officer Order of Orange-Nassau (Orani 1941–42; CO 2 Fd Amb (NZ) 1942–43; died
The authorities did all they could to provide amenities, and the residents themselves responded with enthusiasm. Churches of all denominations opened clubs and organised dances and concerts; the small European colony of Government officials and business and professional men opened their hospitable doors as wide as they were able; trading companies organised weekend picnics, and golf and tennis clubs offered the use of their courses and courts.
During weekends and holidays parties of soldiers visited the more distant villages, where they were received by the hospitable Fijians and initiated into traditional kava-drinking ceremonies. From time to time, also, representative Fijians, smart in spotless white sulus and coats of European cut, visited the military camps bearing gifts of fruit and vegetables which supplemented menus not overburdened with fresh foods, most of which came from New Zealand and much deteriorated on the way. Refrigerated space was at a premium during the first year, but large cool-stores finally overcame the food problem. The New Zealand soldier dislikes being deprived of his customary meat, potatoes, and butter in generous quanity, and he soon grew tired of native fruits like pawpaw and pineapple, and vegetables such as yam and dalo were not to his taste. An endeavour to provide fresh fruit and vegetables from Fijian sources cost £500 a month. These were only a few of the growing pains of garrison duty on which 8 Infantry Brigade embarked without adequate provision and little advance preparation.
Although training was hampered by the shortage of mortars, grenades, and sub-machine guns, a certain amount was accomplished and provided relief from the construction of defence works. The brigade was still short of 66 of its motor vehicles in December. Picks, shovels, and other digging implements were so short that units took turns in using those available, and other construction material was obtained from the
As soon as Force Headquarters was established at Borron's, with offices grouped round the main building on the hilltop, a combined operations centre was organised for the smoother and more efficient dissemination of all intelligence information pooled by representatives of the three services. Lieutenant-Commander P. Dearden, RN, Lt-Cdr P. Dearden, RN (retd.); Philomel (executive officer).
Reports from untrained but enthusiastic Fijian coastwatchers were responsible for much fruitless investigation but, however fantastic, they were never disregarded. Submarines invariably proved to be floating coconut logs, including one which was reported to have taken on fresh water and vegetables in an unfrequented bay, and another with the crew busily engaged in cleaning the hull on the beach. Suspicious lights were fishermen on the reefs, using flares at night as they have done for centuries; one aeroplane, complete with navigation lights, was a weather balloon released by Flight Lieutenant W. R. Dyer, of the meteorological staff; gunfire proved to be thunder, which it closely resembles in the tropics, and, on one occasion, a stranded whale threshing madly on a reef.
All such reports were investigated by air, if the weather was suitable. Squadron Leader D. W. Baird, Monowai. When night operations began on a brigade scale in
During January and February of 1941 the men experienced their first real rainy season, when the warm, moisture laden atmosphere produces mildew overnight inside hats and boots and even on tin trunks. With it came persistent hurricane rumours but, as none had visited malua. On 19 February the meteorological section of the
By nine o’clock the wind increased to tremendous force, driving in from the sea a wall of warm grey rain which stung like hail. Two hours later the hurricane was raging at its height. Huge trees toppled and snapped; palms bent so that their crowns of fronds swept the earth like dusters; sheets of corrugated iron whisked through the air like postage stamps or were wrapped round tree trunks like paper. At 11.15 a.m. the wind reached 110 miles an hour, but as the recording instruments broke at that time no accurate record was ever established. Telephone and power lines went down under the weight of wind and wreckage. One military line survived until midday, and when it broke headquarters was isolated from all units except by a wireless link which maintained communication with Namaka only with extreme difficulty.
Late in the afternoon, when the hurricane dissolved in heavy rain, the landscape looked as though it had been stripped by locusts. Tangles of branches, wreckage, and wires blocked streets and roads. Three ships in the harbour, which had escaped from Nauru Island when their convoy was shelled on 6, 7 and 8 December by the German raiders Orion and Komet, were driven high on mudbanks. Two aeroplanes, exactly half the
That evening the quartermaster's store at
In an effort to give variety to garrison life, 29 and 30 Battalions periodically exchanged areas throughout the year. A tour of duty in the
Manœuvres were interrupted by the first of the reliefs, two sections (Rangatira, escorted by HMS Achilles. The remaining 1500 members of the relief did not arrive until the following August. The first departing troops sang their way lustily out of
The defence scheme was drastically modified after a visit from General Sir Guy Williams, KCB, CMG, DSO, military adviser to the New Zealand Government and a former area commander in England with considerable experience in preparing and devising anti-invasion measures. After spending a week inspecting the defences of both
Before this agreement was signed, Cunningham was irked in the execution of his defence plans by long delays in obtaining approval for both works and expenditure from the New Zealand War Cabinet and the Governor of Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m. i. d., MC (Greek), Legion of Merit (US);
The Williams report went very thoroughly into the state of the brigade, listing its deficiencies but commending the work accomplished and the high morale of the troops. It also emphasised the unit shortages of light automatic weapons, first-line transport, and signal equipment; the army required at least 400 beds; the aeroplanes had an operational radius of only 250 miles; reinforcements had been sent to
This report emphasised the difficulties under which Cunningham worked. New Zealand did its best to repair the deficiencies by putting the Williams recommendations into operation as quickly as
A list of the deficiencies as at
There were large quantities of other stores, including signal equipment, still required for
Before the end of July twenty-two soldiers, selected volunteers from the brigade, were despatched as companions to fifteen wireless operators from the New Zealand Post and Telegraph Department to maintain stations scattered through the Gilbert and Ellice Groups, north of
Such a definitely enclosed area was not possible at Namaka and Momi, where an undulating plain ran back from sandy beaches to low hills, but the best use was made of natural features, belts of barbed wire, and demolitions to protect camp areas, the airfield, and a 50-bed hospital at Namaka. Momi became a separate area under the Namaka command, and the two 6-inch naval guns emplaced there in May were enclosed in a system of wire and trenches.
Any detailed account of the work accomplished in constructing these defences implies long hours of manual labour by all troops of all units, including the medical units, and it continued with deadly monotony for months. The achievements reveal the story—one of constant burrowing into the soapstone, a variety of soft rock found in
Until the New Zealanders left
In the last months of Chicago and five destroyers called at
From these tours of investigation the importance of These Public Works men were organised into what was known as the
The successful completion of this project was one of New Zealand's most important achievements in the
From the day the first New Zealand Public Works men arrived in November, construction went ahead without delay as bulldozers, carry-alls, tractors, and a fleet of trucks swiftly altered the landscape. For months the Namaka area lay under clouds of dust which mounted higher and higher in the hot air and tranished all green vegetation for miles around. Although a blackout was imposed in
There was not one anti-aircraft gun in the South West Pacific in Lt-Col R. Bangall; Viti, a small vessel which took the Governor round his scattered island domains, and five patrol launches constituted the naval strength based on
Small detachments of Australians acted as coastwatchers and guarded vital points on Nauru and Ocean Islands.
There was little or no difference in this state of affairs when
New Zealand's available forces at the outbreak of war with Leander, ready for sea at Monowai refitting at Achilles, on her way to
New Zealanders of 8 Brigade Group in Japanese resident in Gale, a small coastal steamer commissioned for service, arrived from New Zealand on Christmas Day and had a shot put across her bows by the shore battery when she failed to give the correct recognition signal as she approached the harbour entrance.
The movement of Japanese naval craft in waters north of Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, had been sunk off the coast of
New Zealand's declaration of war with
Units of Cunningham's force were brought up to strength by reinforcements speedily despatched in two voyages of the Lt- Col A. H. L. Sugden, m. i. d.; Wahine. On Boxing Day, Matua and the Rangatira, which went to Wahine and the Monowai to Australia, Perth, and
The new brigade commanders and their staffs flew to
Reorganisation in
By the end of January the force had been stepped up to 7600 all ranks, with units disposed through the areas they were to hold until their relief later in the year. In a hot and exhausting introduction to the tropics, the men dug, excavated, and erected belts of barbed wire through days and weeks of unremitting toil. Like the earlier arrivals they suffered all the discomforts of mosquitoes, dhobie's itch, prickly heat, septic sores, and tinea which were to harass them during the whole of the These extracts from the letter of an NCO give an idea of conditions as seen by a new arrival and a sense of humour which redeems all discomfort: ‘In early January I arrived at Wahine, with full pack up, we disembarked and climbed into an 8-cwt truck which had been standing in the sun for hours. It was like an oven and we frizzled like pork chops in a casserole. I was given a job in the orderly room at headquarters. Soon the new arrivals were helping with the excavation of more tunnels in underground headquarters. It was back-breaking work pecking away at the soapstone in the tropic heat. At times we were all called on to do our share of digging. For one week when there were rumours of the approach of Japanese ships, the whole camp was mustered at battle stations in the early hours of the morning, while at night we were all engaged in digging pits and gun positions. But there were many amusing incidents to record, for instance when Gosney's mosquito net caught fire half an hour after midnight and Allen rang the general alarm instead of the fire alarm. There were the Saturday mornings when we went down to Death Gully, the hottest place in
In the final reorganisation of the two brigades, in which unit commands were retained by some of the former officers, the 8th was made up of 1
Potter's brigade group was made up of
Artillery during the whole of the
Alarms came frequently during the earlier months of Monowai, outward bound for New Zealand, reported an attack by enemy submarine soon after she passed beyond the protection of the reef. Shots were exchanged as the vessel zigzagged, and she reported that a conning tower broke the surface of the water. Although aircraft searched the area until darkness fell, no trace of the submarine was disclosed and no confirmation of the attack could be obtained from Japanese sources, though it must be added that several enemy submarines operating in the South Pacific at that time never returned to their base.
A fleet of these underwater craft kept headquarters at
Until the arrival of radio direction-finding apparatus late in the days of the force, detection of these elusive craft was difficult. From February 1942 until September 1943, 23 Japanese submarines, of which 14 carried aircraft, operated round the Australian and New Zealand coasts as well as in waters round
All such information was passed by radio to Japanese naval headquarters in the Caroline Islands and transmitted to
If men and materials were haphazard in reaching
By the end of June there were 10,000 New Zealanders in bures, which had the added advantage of assisting the general scheme of camouflaging all camps and defences, because these bures were sited to resemble small native villages. Troops helped with this camouflage by making nets from vau bark to cover gunpits and supply depots, and by planting such creepers as ‘mile a minute’ which quickly covered any newly broken ground. This plant spread with astonishing speed. One excused duty soldier who had times to watch it verified that it grew at the rate of 14 inches a day.
Change was the very nature of the force as heat and conditions took toll of all ranks. In March, General Cunningham was in valided home and Major-General O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO,
Although the air component was part of the
Although reinforcements continued to arrive and strengthen the force after Mead took over, he asked for another brigade group and a divisional reserve of one armoured regiment, one motorised battalion, and one 25-pounder battery, none of which could be supplied by New Zealand. The air component was deplorably weak for the work it was called on to perform, and the navy still practically non-existent. But a large building and construction programme went ahead as materials became available, and in order that these should be satisfactorily distributed, a priorities committee consisting of army, air, and civilian engineer representatives was set up under the direction of Colonel F. W.
When additional ground units could not be made available to Mead, Fijian guerrilla units were formed. These developed from a suggestion made earlier by Major J. V. M. Cauty, MM,
Meanwhile, by The Australia, flagship of Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace, RN, HMAS
Official reports came, too, of the first American offensive action—hit-and-run raids on enemy strongholds in the Marshall Group, Wake and Marcus Islands, and a raid on Hornet on 18 April. Despite them, however, the Japanese continued to move south, and in June were constructing an airfield on the northern coast of
By that time American forces were moving into
Although reinforcements and armament as approved by War Cabinet in April Continued to reach President Coolidge, which was afterwards lost in a minefield off the Santa Lucia. Another 3200 men of the division reached President Coolidge ran a shuttle service between
At the time the force handed over to 37 American Division in
The change-over was effected without incident and began an association with American forces which was to endure for some years. In
Mead remained in
When command in
The majority of the men of what was now sulus and European coats presenting gifts of fruit and vegetables to the soldiers. The Force received the unselfish co-operation of every Government department in
AN unbroken series of retreats and territorial losses of the greatest strategical importance and significance followed the fall of
Time and space were also influenced by command. Soon after
In These commands existed for only brief periods and were created in an attempt to meet a situation which changed radically almost from day to day. But they were soon dissolved, for they were never satisfactory in meeting a grave situation which not only involved the use of all three services of the contries concerned in stemming the Japanese advance, but also had to satisfy the demands and wishes of Governments and the most senior officers.
An attack could not be mounted quickly in the
Because of vital shortages, the first phase of the
Through all the phases of this campaign New Zealand played her part, which began before By
Through early
By the end of
Nimitz's area was again subdivided into three—the North, Central and South Pacific areas, which made the situation confusing to readers of the daily news. Most of the established Allied bases were in the South Pacific area, which lay south of the Equator and west of 110 degress West, joining MacArthur's command off the east coast of
Both MacArthur and Nimitz were responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. There was some conflict of opinion between Navy and Army before the commands were finally settled, after weeks of negotiation during which both
New Zealand at this time was represented in both
Encouraged by their successes after the fall of Australia,
Estimates of the strength of any further attacking Japanese forces varied widely. On
In the light of later knowledge from Japanese sources, the estimates of enemy strength were exaggerated; no attack on New Zealand was ever planned. Orders for a continuance of the attack
MacArthur, from his headquarters in
The mounting of a
The American operations division at first supported a direct thrust at
By 26 June no decision had been reached by Marshall and King, as King was still insisting on a naval commander and that MacArthur should take control at the conclusion of the amphibious stage. King also suggested that Navy begin immediate operations and directed Nimitz to go ahead with plans for an offensive in the
On 2 July King and Marshall signed a ‘Joint Directive for offensive operations in the South West Pacific area agreed on by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’. The operations were divided into three tasks:
The seizure and occupation of Santa Cruz Islands,
Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the
Seizure and occupation of
The South West Pacific and South Pacific boundaries were moved so that
Ghormley flew to
When MacArthur and Ghormley's request for postponement was rejected, plans went ahead. The first offensive of the war against
New Zealand land and air forces were at first excluded from any
Urgent requests for men and equipment went from
Both before and during negotiations for the mounting of an offensive in the
From the time of his arrival in Prince of Wales and Repulse off
New Zealand was beginning to feel the strain on her manpower by
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff recommended placing the situation before Ghormley while he was still in the
Fraser replied that New Zealand was still of opinion that reinforcements for
The suggestion that New Zealand might withdraw her
While the interchange of opinion proceeded through March and April,
Bora Bora, in the French
By May there were 81,000 American troops, including air personnel, in
The first intimation that the
Nash continued negotiations with King, who stated that both he and Nimitz considered the urgent strengthening of the islands would result if the
Even after the arrival of American troops in
From the time the first troops of the relieving force, the American
ON its return to New Zealand the
Although units were much below strength, commanders committed to paper their tactical plans for immediate movement and action, but it was generally assumed that the force would be built up to a full-strength division for service in the
Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, DSO, MC, was appointed to command
In making its decision to employ a division in the
Delays in reaching a decision regarding the size of the force and the role it was to play in the
Four alternative forces were proposed by Ghormley to meet any emergency—Force A, built round one infantry brigade with attached anti-aircraft and coast defence artillery; Force B, the same with the addition of two heavy coast defence batteries; Force C, built round two infantry brigades; and Force D, increased to three infantry brigades, each with additional coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery. Any of these forces, the size of which was to be determined by the Government, was to be ready for embarkation at any time after 25 August, and the proposal was obviously based on the American belief that the battle for
Puttick communicated Ghormley's proposals to War Cabinet on 31 July and recommended the adoption of Force Das a target for reorganisation, using
Although the original intention, as interpreted by Ghormley, seems to have been the employment of the division in a garrison role, other ideas were seemingly held by the planners in
On 10 August, the day before Barrowclough's appointment by Cabinet, Ghormley's headquarters had been informed that New Zealand was planning to provide a division of approximately 20,000 men, as requested, and that it would be available from 25 August, which would have been impossible as the last units of
Divisional headquarters on a reduced scale
One infantry brigade, with an anti-tank battery of 12 guns
One field regiment of sixteen 25-pounder guns
One heavy anti-aircraft regiment of sixteen 3.7-inch guns
One light anti-aircraft regiment of thirty-six 40-millimeter guns
One heavy battery of four 6-inch guns
Two companies of engineers
Signals, supply, and medical units and a small base organisation
This formation was given urgent priority, but the commander was also to proceed with the organisation of a force known as Kiwi C (based on Ghormley's Force C) consisting of 13,500 all ranks and made up of:
Divisional headquarters
Two infantry brigades, each with an anti-tank battery of twelve guns
One field regiment of twenty-four 25-pounder guns
One heavy anti-aircraft regiment of twenty-four 3.7-inch guns
One light anti-aircraft regiment of forty-eight 40-millimetre guns
One heavy regiment of four 6- inch or eight 155-millimetre guns
Three companies of engineers
Signals, supply, and medical units and a base organisation
Negotiations concerning the composition of these forces were in progress before Barrowclough's appointment and continued long afterwards. No New Zealand commander, faced with the responsibility of taking combat troops overseas, was ever so harassed by proposals, uncertainty, and indecision, all of which, despite his initiative and capacity for detailed planning, hindered him from reorganising his division and training to that desired state of efficiency required for an unusual campaign such as island warfare in the tropics. No details of the precise character of the operations were available to him, which was no fault of the New Zealand Army authorities, for even by 7 September the South Pacific commander had not received permission from the Dominion to use the Division. This was revealed when a signal from New Zealand requesting a supply of anti-malarial drugs brought a reply from Ghormley that he had not yet obtained the permission of the New Zealand Government to use its troops, nor did he intend to use them in a forward area while the situation there remained critical. Later, however, South Pacific Headquarters did indicate that the New Zealand force would not be required to carry out opposed landings, but that its role most probably would be to garrison small islands and take part in land attacks on large islands
This question of artillery support was one of the most pressing problems which exercised the attention of the commander during the reorganisation period, and his views on its tactical significance were set out in a long letter to Army Headquarters. His idea of combat teams outlined in his letter was fully developed in training the division:
‘For a long time I have been teaching that success in modern war against a resolute and well-equipped enemy can be achieved only by a much closer co-ordination between infantry and artillery (and tanks if you can get them). I think, and I have long been teaching, that it is altogether wrong to consider the tactical handling of infantry as such in any unit larger than a platoon. I submit it is unsound to contemplate the employment of a company of infantry. One should command a mixed team of infantry, mortars, and guns. In battle a company command should never be a mere command of infantry. He should command a mixed team—a “combat team” as it is sometimes called… One of the mistakes of our British system is the tendency to over-centralise our artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Few battalion commanders and still fewer company commanders have any real idea of how to command a mixed force.’
In the original reorganisation plan only one field regiment was contemplated, but at the same time an anti-aircraft brigade, as part of the division, was to be formed and trained. Barrowclough's comments during exchanges of correspondence concerning the formation of Force A—which he considered unbalanced because anti-aircraft and coast defence guns required adequate ground protection—and Force C brought about changes, though Army did not agree the Force A was unbalanced.
‘From the outset’, he wrote, ‘even with Force C, I am limited to one field regiment of 25-pounder guns. The normal allocation of 25-pounders is on the scale of one field regiment to an infantry brigade, and I submit that until the precise task is known Force A should be mobilised and got ready in New Zealand with a full field regiment and Force C with two such regiments. Should the task, when it is known, call for less, field artillery guns can be left behind. The 25-pounde seems to be the one piece of equipment in which we outstandingly surpass our enemies, and I submit that neither Force A nor Force C can be considered adequately equipped if it has less than the usual scale of these guns.’
The commander also stressed the restricted mobility of such heavy pieces as 3.7-inch howitzers and 155-millimetre guns because, in possible engagements in areas removed from the site of static defence guns, they could not possibly take the place of 25-pounders, and they could be moved only with difficulty.
Because of the unusual composition of the force, the first of its kind New Zealand ever assembled, and its ultimate role, artillery remained a problem and eventually produced an organisation unique in the history of British arms. The division needed to be sufficiently strong to fight with or without the Americans (though it never did), and the necessity for static coast defence and anti-aircraft units, as well as support for infantry, required its artillery to be stronger and quite unlike the normal requirements of a divisional formation in the field. Two staffs were therefore evolved for its efficient operation—one for field and anti-tank units and another for coast defence and anti-aircraft. Each had its brigade major, staff captain and liaison officers, sharing a common intelligence officer, and this system worked satisfactorily in
The lengthy and complicated task of reorganisation no doubt provoked quite understandable impatience on the part of those most intimately concerned with it. Although in June orders had been issued that all available A grade men from ballots and garrison units were to be posted to divisions in order to have sufficient ready to meet the needs for overseas service, Army Headquarters, in calling for men for
Leave in New Zealand, approved by Army Headquarters, was arranged on a basis of seven days for every two months of service, with one-way travelling time and a free rail warrant, which meant that men from the southern districts stationed in the
Concentration on defence works by all ranks in
All these were made as practical and interesting as possible and involved all branches of training so that, in the event of any sudden move, some reasonable state of preparedness would be attained. Engineers staged field days instructing the infantry in the art of bridging streams and in demolition; aircraft flew over the training areas trailing drogues as targets to accustom the men in anti-aircraft defence; lectures were given on malaria and other tropical diseases by former officials from the
In order to avoid any confusion and unnecessary duplication in training, organisation and equipment, which arose because of the idea that attention could be given to Force C after Force A had left the country, Barrowclough on 1 September asked for a definite ruling from Army Headquarters, at the same time expressing the opinion that reorganisation would be effected more smoothly if the force was considered as a division less one brigade. Some idea of the difficulties being faced at this time, when no definite answer was possible, are indicated in a paragraph from Army's reply to the commander:
‘I do not intend to bore you with the difficulties with which Army Headquarters and districts have to contend to produce personnel for your division, but I would ask you to accept them as very real…. Unfortunately a good deal of patience and restraint will require to be exercised by us all in many matters connected with this force.’
Carelessness by districts in selecting men for reinforcements for the division aggravated many of the delays in strengthening units, and a base reception depot established in
Among those marched out were the medically unfit or lower than Grade I, men with more than three dependent children, incorrigibles, men over or under age, all half-caste or full-blood Maoris, and from quarter- to half-caste Maoris if they so desired. A high percentage of those marched out as unfit were men sent forward as reinforcements.
Manpower governed to a great extent the assembly and training of all units and affected the fortunes of the division during its whole existence. By the end of No attempt has been made in this volume to give a complete and acurate record of changes of unit commanders. Because of sickness, age, and other factors there were frequent changes, particularly in the battalions. Commanders are named only at specified dates such as this, though a change of command may have followed shortly afterwards.
Many of the base units were not formed or were in process of formation and were completed only after long delay. Changes of appointment were frequent through the formative months, and many of the above appointments were altered by the end of the year.
Because of the unsuitability of some of the camps, and with a view to more comprehensive training and the use of troops for large-scale tactical exercises, a change of area was proposed, first to Warkworth, but finally to the Waikato. The division, however, seemed fated to periods of disintegration. New Zealand was
On 16 October, as the division was settling itself into the
Few men regretted leaving for the
Units marched in stages to their new areas, bivouacking by night as part of the training scheme. Morale was good, esprit de corps asserted itself, and few fell by the wayside; if they did they were soon revived by the hospitality which was showered upon them. Reconnaissance parties had previously allotted areas over a vast triangle enclosed by
The Waikato, in the full flood of spring, was lush, warm, and beautiful. In every town and village occupied by troops, residents responded so generously with entertainment, both private and public, that the period spent there remained as warmly in the memory as the thermal springs within easy reach of
In selecting this tract of wooded country Barrowclough had in mind the situation then existing in
Row's
Heavy rain fell soon after the manœuvres began and continued in torrents, adding considerably to the realism of jungle warfare but without its enervating heat. Conditions in the bush rapidly deteriorated and were such that patrols from the two forces which evaded
At the conclusion of the manoeuvre its shortcomings were ruthlessly exposed at a conference of commanders, during which Barrowclough commented that many of the troops, who were not fully aware of its purpose, seemed to think ‘they were the Tararua Tramping Club making a road and packing in supplies’. Instead of improving occupied positions troops were too concerned with settling in and building shelters to turn the rain; making tracks took precedence over lanes of fire and fire plans; localities were revealed to aircraft by smoke from fires, and little attention had been paid to camouflage. Because of the dismal conditions, commanders were to concerned with the comfort of the men instead of with the ‘enemy’. But the lessons learned were invaluable. Shortages were revealed, and the necessity shown for traffic control and anti-aircraft protection measures in rear areas, as well as an increase in unit equipment or its replacement by better quality articles. Two factors emerged triumphantly—the jeep as a means
The division's impending departure for Crescent City and reached
Through November, December, and January the division moved overseas, though not before its carefully planned departure schedules were upset by changes in shipping and escorts. The Maui, carrying Brastigi, with 917 men made up from Divisional Signals, Weltevreden, with 25, and the President Monroe, carrying West Point, taking the main body numbering 7158, reached Mormacport, with 249 members of rear parties, berthed at Nepoui on 6 January, and the Talamanca, with 226 more rear details, reached
The movement of these 13,383 soldiers, together with a vast amount of stores and equipment, was made without mishap or excitement and was a lesson in American transport methods by which every available inch of space on large transport vessels was occupied. On large ships such as the West Point only two meals a day were served, which those returning from President Coolidge had already experienced and found the intervals between meals rather tiresome. Bunks, only two feet six inches apart, were in tiers four high in holds accommodating between 600 and 700 men. Meals and recreation periods on deck were taken in rotation, but the voyage was too short to be anything other than an interlude, pleasant or unpleasant according to individual preference. The President Monroe provided an interesting comment on war for the historically minded. Named after the president whose dominant motive was the prevention of European interference in American affairs, the ship was now transporting New Zealand soldiers to a French possession to assist in a war against
Life moved indolently in picturesque
Worse congestion was evident ashore, where headquarters of the
But the men of the division saw relatively little of
Immediately on arrival the division occupied an area on the dry side of the island stretching for more than one hundred miles from Moindou, where its southern boundary joined 43 American Division's territory, to the far north and included the Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome, other airfields in the north, and the port of Nepoui. It consisted of gently undulating country covered for the most part with niaouli trees and rank grasses, rolling down to the coast from the central mountain divide and watered by numerous streams and rivers, all of which were subject to swift flooding.
Only two main roads served the whole area. One, Route Colonial No. 1, coiled its way from north to south and was the main arterial route. Despite the lethargic efforts of a few workmen using barrows and shovels to fill in the holes with soil from nearby pits, this soon broke under a constant stream of cars, trucks, and jeeps, each leading its individual cloud of dust. Narrow bridges, none too secure, crossed the larger streams; concreted fords to prevent erosion served the smaller courses, and in the far north, at Tamala, all traffic crossed the river by ferry. The other road crossed the island from
The whole of the public services and amenities of
On arrival Barrowclough's force became a component of First Island Command, under Lieutenant-General Rush B. Lincoln, and, as such, a part of Vice-Admiral Halsey's South Pacific forces. Barrowclough assumed command of the northern sector of the island on 17 December, with the tactical role of defending the aerodromes, radar stations along the coast, and the beaches, several of which were vulnerable and widely separated. From temporary headquarters established on 23 November at Nemeara, on the Houailou road, he moved to a site among the niaoulis on terraces between the Moindah River and the main road and opened permanent headquarters there on 12 December. It was 160 miles north of
Mobility was the key to the division's role in
Barrowclough decided that the most suitable plan to meet the situation was the provision of ample coastwatching detachments and the disposal of mobile formations capable of moving immediately to any threatened area, for which motor transport was now reasonably assured. The arrival of Goss with the skeleton headquarters of 15 Brigade gave the GOC three brigades of two battalions each, a most unsatisfactory organisation in the field, but the only one possible until New Zealand clarified the position regarding additional troops required to bring the division up to full strength and until his other two battalions returned from Norfolk and
The northern sector was allotted to 14 Brigade, which established its headquarters on flat, tree-clumped country beside the Taom River near Ouaco, with
Eight Brigade, with headquarters in the wooded Nepoui Valley, consisted of
Dove, who was both Base Commandant and Officer in Charge of Administration, established his headquarters and some smaller units in the town of
In the mobile defence scheme brigades were given alternative roles for the mutual support of each other in the event of attack, and although more optimistic reports from the
From the time of arrival, tented camp sites were established and made comfortable by that fantastic atitude of the average New Zealander to make himself a home, providing he has a few boxes and nails with which to construct crazy but functional articals of furniture. Men lived in six-man Indian pattern tents, scattered irregularly among the trees and raised high off the ground by additional poles of the useful niaouli and bamboo to give plenty of head-room and air. The floors were sanded or metalled. Because of its usefulness the niaouli is worthy of mention. It covers vast areas of the dry side of
Despite the eloquent minority who found nothing attractive in bures to provide additional and more comfortable accommodation. These bures, also used by the French farmers, are constructed by roofing a skeleton framework of niaouli trunks with bark and reeds, held in place with strands of fibre from the aloe, plant, and covering the walls with sections of plaited coconut fronds. Native labourers, under engineer supervision, constructed the bures, and costs were met from unit funds. In each brigade area large recreational bures were erected and became the meeting place of all troops in the vicinity. Their most appreciative patrons were the transport drivers, who left the dusty roads for a few minutes to take a cup of tea during long journeys to and from the supply depots. By the time construction was finished some of the camps resembled native villages.
The rainy season brought problems such as the flooding of access roads, when they became bogs, and added to the worries of the engineers, who were so engulfed in maintenance work that units frequently went to their aid with their own transport. Rivers rose with astonishing rapidity, forcing the removal of some camps to higher ground and disrupting traffic on the main roads, but the mud soon gave way to dust as the year ebbed into the cooler season. Relations were never anything but cordial with the American forces, whose vocabulary, both official and unofficial, was adopted with limits. The French administrative officials, farmers, and store-keepers welcomed the New Zealanders, to whom they became a race of jolies garçons, with an enthusiasm which soon overcame all language difficulties. To the Americans they were never anything but ‘Kiwis’, since that bird had become the division's distinguishing mark and every vehicle carried one.
From the time of arrival in chile con carne, and others equally spiced, though they appreciated the fruits and juices and the liberal ration of turkey for such traditional festivals as Christmas Day and Thanksgiving Day. Quantities of fresh fruit, particularly oranges, and smaller amounts of fresh vegetables were purchased from French farmers to supplement and add variety to the daily tinned ration, but fresh butter and meat in reasonable supply did not become available until refrigeration storage space was increased in
The pot-holed roads and the long distances over which supplies were hauled daily played havoc with transport, and many of the ASC trucks, which averaged
Barrowclough was continually worried by the deterioration of stores and equipment, which were inadequately housed, and by increasing problems of maintenance, which included the erection of reasonably permanent buildings and the upkeep of roads, now far beyond the limited resources and equipment of the French public works organisation. Although the division was better equipped than it had ever been in its history, shortages could not be met from American sources, which were often hard-pressed through losses at sea to meet their own requirements.
Some indication of the major difficulties was revealed in a report by Major L. C. Hardie, of Fortifications and Works Branch, Army
Some of the General's administrative problems had been revealed in his letter to Army Headquarters, written on 2 February:
‘I have to decide what should be the size of my Base installations and what degree of permanence my building construction should take. This is naturally bound up with the possibilities of our returning here and the number of reinforcements which are likely to be retained at Base. At the present time these problems are almost overwhelming. We have large stocks of rations which are deteriorating through exposure to the weather. The same applies to ammunition, and in both cases our problem is accentuated by the fact that large supplies of ammunition and rations were landed here at a time when I had few troops to handle them. Even now my numerous commitments are leaving only the barest minimum of training opportunities and I am handicapped largely by shortage of engineer equipment. Some roadmaking equipment has just arrived, including some bulldozers, only one of which is a D4 tractor equipped with earth-moving plant. Another D4 tractor is without this plant, two D7 tractors have no roadmaking fittings, and my CRE advises me that even if the materials could be sent over the workshops could not fit suitable earth-moving appliances. These tractors are practically useless, and in order to keep open access to my brigades I have to employ large numbers of men roadmaking with nothing but picks and shovels.’
The delay in sending forward equipment for the division was partly caused by shortage of shipping, but this was aggravated by the method of storage in wharf sheds in New Zealand and by a system of loading which did not ensure that cargo was shipped in
Everyone trained in
Jungle training began on a platoon and company basis, using live ammunition, mortars and machine guns, over courses designed as a preliminary to manœuvres on a larger scale employing battalions and finally brigades. Small parties made four- and six-day trips
Some of the more spectacular exploits involved operations with American forces, such as an
In the dry, open country in the north, 14 Brigade had been equally busy, practising over an assault course, testing jungle rations during a beach landing on the Gomen Peninsula in April, and in defence and attack schemes which kept the units far from their camps. As a preliminary to the most thorough exercise undertaken by the brigade and involving all arms of the service,
Fifteenth Brigade, while carrying out its various exercise, proved the value of its training during a three-day manœuvre when not a man fell out. This brigade also tested the efficiency of various rations, and came to the conclusion that some of them would do little more than sustain men in action, leaving them no reserve for fighting. One of these was the American K ration, which was neatly enclosed in a cardboard package for easy carriage and contained ¼ lb. of cheese or meat in an airtight tin, eight small biscuits wrapped in cellophane, sixteen glucose tablets, three lumps of loaf sugar, powdered fruit juice for two drinks, one stick of chewing gum, and one carton of four cigarettes. Other similar rations contained soup cubes. These were all designed for use during assault landings, each man carrying three packages made up as three separate meals, and sufficient to last him for 24 hours. All of them were disliked after the novelty wore off, but they were efficient for their purpose.
Through May and June, also, the men were toughened by arduous marches,
Although taking part in the various brigade exercises, other arms of the service continued their individual training, in spite of the distracting calls on their time for routine duty. When anti-aircraft artillery units could not obtain the assistance of aircraft for trail shoots, they improvised by using kites or balloons towed by jeeps; engineers experimented in floating jeeps across rivers, using kapok assault floats or tarpaulins, and in building bridges at night, using materials cut from the nearby bush; signals had practice enough in
Unlike other divisions in the field,
New Zealanders of
Throughout the training period specially selected officers and men were despatched far and wide to gather the latest information on jungle fighting and amphibious warfare. Some went to amphibious training courses in the
Training culminated at the end of June with amphibious exercises using an American ship, the John Penn, off the beach of Ducos Peninsula in
In a summary of the strategical situation which went to every man in the division, Barrowclough, who believed in keeping his troops ‘in the picture’, emphasised the close co-operation between the three fighting services, particularly as exemplified by the battle for
Recreation went hand in hand with training in
By the time
From
On
Although War Cabinet had approved the necessary increases for the division, Barrowclough still required a third infantry battalion
Early in February Major-General Peck, of Halsey's war plans staff, expressed concern at the strength of
On 6 March War Cabinet reluctantly agreed to the expansion of the division to 17,637 all ranks, with a first reinforcement of 1263, a docks operating unit of 90, and an engineer construction unit of 300, giving the force in
Halsey and his staff, to whom the proposal was submitted, considered the inclusion of the Maoris would be both acceptable and desirable and discounted any suggestion of discrimination, but when the subject was referred to Colonel J. H. Nankivell,
When the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Stewart, toured
A suggestion to use the Fijians to complete
When the suggestion was referred to the
Further negotiations, however, brought agreement to the employment of one battalion of Fijians with the division as scouts and raiders, and its replacement by a Grade II New Zealand battalion from
While these protracted negotiations were in progress, other factors had decided the fate of the division's strength, the most influential being the adoption of a furlough scheme for long-service men of
Apart from the vigorous requests from Churchill and Roosevelt to retain
In May, also, the political aspect of the
Through all negotiations affecting the war effort,
There was still some confusion in the
Halsey reluctantly accepted the decision to provide only a two-brigade division, and in a letter to Fraser added, ‘I do feel that these two brigades should be maintained at full strength at all times,’ and, in reference to reinforcements, ‘I am counting on you to furnish such additional reinforcements as may be necessary to maintain these two brigades at full strength.’ New Zealand's position and her policy regarding the division were made clear to Halsey in the Prime Minister's reply:
The decision to retain our battle-trained division in the
In so far as our
We have for some months been particularly concerned that there should be no collapse of our war effort in any of its several directions, and that is why I have taken steps to inform you that there must come a time when one particular activity or another must be tapered off.
It is and always has been our intention to maintain the two brigades of the 3rd Division as long as circumstances permit.
By
The distribution of New Zealand's manpower in the three services during
Denied the larger formation for which he had planned so long, Barrowclough set about the reorganisation of his force with the strength available to him and with the unhappy responsibility of disbanding several highly trained units. The 34th Battalion had returned from
Additional engineers under Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Jones, as CRE Works, consisting of a works construction company under
There was some delay in approving the extra units required, but by 17 July War Cabinet finally consented to Barrowclough's request. This gave him a two-brigade division with three engineer companies and a field park, three ASC companies, three field ambulances and additional signals, who were urgently required to maintain long lines of communication not normally associated with a division, including the maintenance of an extended base organisation to ensure direct communication with New Zealand, and a forward station planned when the division reached
On 1 July the Commander issued a special order of the day (see Appendix V) disbanding 15 Brigade, the two battalions of which were absorbed into existing units to make up deficiencies, the remainder going into a reinforcement pool at Base. A second special order disbanded 33 Heavy Coast Regiment and This action was questioned by the New Zealand Treasury. The guns were issued on loan from the British Admiralty to the New Zealand Navy who lent them to the Army. When the Americans transferred them, Treasury noted, ‘From experience it appears that the French Military authorities would be unable to pay for them in cash’. In reporting on the transaction, Dove emphasised that in any similar situation in future (when a New Zealand force was operating with other than a British formation) the creation of a special accounting unit should be carefully considered. This unit would be responsible for drawing all classes of supplies and for the complete bulk accounting of them to Army Headquarters for the purpose of accurately determining New Zealand's liability for those stores. However, in the final adjustment of the
There were many changes in staff and command during the division's sojourn in
Personal contact with New Zealand had been maintained by visits from service and political chiefs. Mr. Coates paid two visits to the area. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Jones, visited several units when he passed through
The division's base organisation and the headquarters of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the
Areas of overgrown countryside provided sites for that multiplicity of units and services which are a part of any base organisation in the field and includes engineers, signals, pay and records, ordnance, medical and dental services, canteens, welfare, postal, base training depot, base reception depot, artillery training depot, movement control, field bakery and butchery, transport and supply services. There was also sufficient space to accommodate without congestion the stores which housed military supplies and equipment, most of them erected in
Dove carried out the dual functions of Officer in Charge of Administration (OICA) and Base Commandant and, as senior New Zealand officer, also maintained liaison with South Pacific Headquarters in
Constant vigilance by the staff of the medical services was rewarded by complete freedom from any outbreak of disease which would have reduced the already limited manpower of
Despite the abundance of freshwater streams and rivers in
Because units of the division were scattered over many hundreds of miles of badly-roaded country, field ambulances established dressing stations to serve their respective areas, and the main dressing station gave the fullest possible hospital treatment. Field ambulance reception hospitals did the work of a main hospital until
The base organisation was built up over a period of months and did not achieve its full strength of 2580 all ranks until a new war establishment was issued well into
Early in the life of the organisation Barrowclough ordered the formation of a divisional welfare committee to assist with the equitable and efficient distribution of all comforts and recreational
One of the more important of the Board's achievements in bure fashion, to serve each concentration of troops, two of the largest being the Bourail Club, opened on
Amphibious training for the whole division was completed on the island of bures as memorials to occupation. Fourteenth Brigade sailed on 17 August in three ships, the President Jackson, President Hayes, and President Adams; Hunter Liggett and Fuller; and Fuller acted as guide ship for the whole convoy.
The three training groups were spaced so that one finished its exercises and departed before the next arrived. Transports were laboriously loaded from the beaches in
Vila, though intensely humid, was ideal for amphibious exercises. Outside the land-locked harbour, Mele Beach, washed by long, lazy rollers, curved in a golden arc of coral sand behind which a tangle of trees, vines, and bamboo thickets opened into coffee and cocoa plantations and the cultivated spaces which pass for farms in the tropics. There was little sign of war in the harbour, but at night the searchlights from Havannah Harbour, the immense naval base for servicing and repairing ships in the immediate forward area, spread their restless golden fingers across the indigo sky until down. As each convoy arrived, plans which were drawn up during the voyage were immediately put into operation. Every type of landing, made as realistic as possible by the use of aircraft and observers, was practised day and night, beginning with beach assaults, formation of defence permeters ashore, night landings beginning soon after midnight from blacked-out ships, as well as ship and net drill and boat discipline. Torrential rain added to the realism as troops waited for dawn under rat-infested cocoa trees, sheltered with only a mosquito net. Full equipment was carried, in addition to jungle rations for the period ashore.
Brigades exercised in combat teams, as they were to operate later in action, taking even their field and anti-aircraft guns ashore in small barges and manhandling them into position over the sand. Because they were the pattern of many similar landings, these exercises were invaluable in planning movement from the restricted space of crowded transports to allotted areas ashore and are worthy of record. First the transport's landing craft, small flat-bottomed boats with broad collapsible bows, are lowered into the water, coming under landing nets down which the men scramble in fours as they come up from their quarters, unit by unit. As each craft
Fuller by 200 yards.
The division concentrated on
By nightfall the most urgently required equipment was far from the beaches, and tents or shelters erected on the ridges to the rear where, when the sea breeze fell away with the setting sun, the stifling heat came down like an enveloping pall. Working at the rate of 119 tons an hour against a previous 104½ tons, 14 Brigade established a record in unloading a ship in the stream; not to be outdone, An artillery officer, in imitation of the travel agency brochures, produced a satirical description of the attractions of esprit de corps could survive even the sweltering heat of Fuller: ‘The ship wishes to thank all New Zealand troops for their unusual fine co-operation in keeping their parts of the ship in a constant state of cleanliness and order and for establishing a very high standard which will be hard for subsequent embarked units to maintain.’
When formations of
Below their vantage point spread the panorama of Savo and Florida Islands and the moving pageant of shipping in Sealark
There can be no connected story of
By the time the division arrived to take part with American forces in this campaign, which was designed to isolate and finally destroy
While waiting to move forward, units lost no time in becoming familiar with the jungle, in which they exercised for better efficiency when they were not engaged in moving heavy stores from the beaches, where parties from battalions laboured day and night as required. Because of stray marauding Japanese still hiding in the hinterland, beaches and ration dumps were patrolled from dusk to dawn, though indiscriminate shooting was discouraged. Guns of
Timber was more readily available from a sawmill operated by the
Some reorganisation of the division in readiness for action took place on
A Field Maintenance Centre, This was an After arriving at ad boc. organisation created specially to serve the requirements of the division while it was in the forward area. No war establishment was ever committed to paper in the accepted army sense. Barrowclough always referred to it as a ‘Forward Maintenance Centre’.James B. Francis, which brought it direct from New Zealand. This included ammunition and 15,000 each of mosquito nets and gloves; 30,000 each of drill shirts and battle-dress trousers dyed green;
Only a limited number of troops was taken forward to the island of
IMPENDING operations were discussed by Barrowclough on 10 September with Rear-Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, commander of A task force was a combat organisation of naval craft and ground and air forces created for an attack on some particular objective. When that was achieved it was disbanded, but the same elements were employed again and again in the composition of other task forces, particularly in the Before the operations began Barrett was accidentally killed and Vandegrift returned to command the Marines.en route, and Major-General Barrett,
As the division moved on to
The main Japanese force had been established in this region in defensive positions at Horoniu and Boko, but had been driven out by the Americans on 14 September. It consisted of remnants of several units, including 290 army and 100 navy personnel, who landed at Horoniu on the morning of 19 August after eluding an action in which their covering destroyers were attacked by an American naval force in Vella Gulf on the night of 17 August (two days after the American landing farther south) and approximately 190 army and 120 navy survivors from naval engagements on the night of 6–7 August, when three Japanese destroyers were sunk in almost as many minutes. These were joined by others from observation posts and staging barge bases on the island, and scattered survivors from barges sunk on 25 September, but there was no co-ordinated command as an officer detailed to take charge of the Japanese garrison never arrived. When the main position at Horoniu was overwhelmed they scattered to the north. Patrols of Fijian scouts, accompanied by 14 Brigade non-commissioned officers, had been through the northern region observing the Japanese but with orders not to attack them. Estimates of enemy strength ranged from 500 to 700, established in small groups at
Approximately 3700 troops of the division, principally 14 Brigade units and elements of headquarters, disembarked on the beaches soon after dawn on 18 September. After loading and practising disembarkation for two days at Kukum and Kokumbona beaches, they travelled north in a convoy of six APDs, six LSTs, and six LCIs, escorted by eleven destroyers. During the brief voyage troops voted in the New Zealand Parliamentary elections and watched from blacked-out ships the fiery spectacle of a Japanese air raid on
With only a limited time in which to clear the ships, disembarkation began with speed at
Except for a few coconut plantations on the more level areas,
When night falls, swiftly with the setting sun, the jungle comes to life and bedlam reigns until dawn. Millions of small frogs croak and whistle, night birds screech and chatter, and cicadas join sudden bursts of sound to this disturbing clamour. Fireflies flicker like showers of sparks in the velvet gloom, and in the phosphorescent light from the chips of one tree a newspaper may be read with ease. Among the dead and fallen leaves every creeping and crawling thing finds a home—ants by the million, millipedes, slugs, crabs and lizards, including the iguana. To this exotic land thunder-storms of great violence, coming almost daily, bring torrents of
That was the setting for 14 Brigade's first action and, with few exceptions, a background for all action in the
Barrowclough took over command of
The brigade commander planned a pincer movement employing Seaward's
35 Battalion:
C Troop,
C Troop,
Detachment of
Detachment of 16 MT Company ASC (
A Company,
2 Platoon, 14 Brigade MMG Company (
K Section Signals (
35 Battalion:
A Troop,
A Troop,
Detachment of
Detachment of 16 MT Company ASC (
Headquarters Company,
3 Platoon, 14 Brigade MMG Company (
E Section Signals (
Potter planned to complete the task in fourteen days; but it took only ten. After establishing advanced bases, battalion commanders were instructed to move from bay to bay in bounds, first clearing selected areas by overland patrols before bringing their main forces forward by small landing craft after beach-heads were secure. Eight such craft were allotted to each combat team, but breakdowns kept the 37th so short that at one stage it was reduced to two and borrowed replacements from the 35th pool. Supplies were maintained from Maravari, the main base, by a daily barge service to each team's headquarters as it moved forward. Dress for action was drill jungle suits with soft linen hats and waterproof capes or groundsheets, and individual equipment was made lighter by discarding steel helmets (except for anti-aircraft teams) and gas respirators. This was in accordance with Barrowclough's earlier instruction that assault troops were to go into action as lightly equipped as possible. The men carried their packaged jungle rations, atebrin tablets, mosquito repellent lotion, and water chlorinating tablets. In addition to full water bottles, a two-gallon tin of fresh water was carried for every five men.
Combat teams, which fought as self-contained units, began moving round the coast from Maravari Beach on 21 September and were established in forward areas four days later—
For the first few days action resolved itself into individual skirmishes, in which small resolute groups proved their ability to meet and defeat an equally resolute enemy camouflaged against a mottled wall of green and brown and occasional blobs of light. There was no definite lane of advance, as in open country. Patrols, thrown on their own initiative, fought individual actions among the enclosing growth, sometimes without seeing their adversaries. This was characteristic of the whole operation. By 27 September
On 26 September a strong patrol, consisting of 14 Platoon under Lieutenant J. S.
Meanwhile, two platoons under Major K.
By 29 September it was obvious that the battalion had come up against the main Japanese force contained in the narrow neck of land dividing
Throughout two dreary days patrols felt their way through the jungle, clearing the fully, and the two ambushed platoons rejoined the battalion. They had fought a gallant action and, as it so happened, contained a considerable enemy force deep in the jungle while the two battalions drove the Japanese in from the flanks. Not till they returned was their story known. Night fell before they reached their objective on 26 September, but they pressed on the next morning and were within reach of the main track when
Because the parties were separated, Beaumont thought it unwise to attack. Two hours later, when this enemy traffic ceased, Beaumont began to move back to the main party, but as he did so bursts of machine-gun fire shattered the silence. A few seconds later the main party under Albon, which was surprised while having a meal, rushed along the track and passed through Beaumont's men, under whose fire the Japanese melted into the jungle. Beaumont took command and formed a rough perimeter with his own platoon at one end and Albon's at the other. He instructed the men to hold fire until they saw a target. Scurrying from tree to tree the Japanese attacked, sometimes shouting in English as they hurled grenades. Again and again the New Zealanders held off the attackers until night fell, by which time three of the garrison had been killed and four wounded, including Signaller R. J.
The little force was short of food, water, and equipment, most of which had been abandoned by Albon's party when the Japanese attacked them, and completely out of touch with the main force. What little food remained was rationed among the men; rain-water was trapped in capes and groundsheets. For three more days repeated Japanese attacks were held off with determination. Although morale was high, the men were growing weak for want of food. Albon spoke to Beaumont on 29 September of attempting to reach headquarters to bring help. He slipped a way the following morning, taking two men with him, but when he reached headquarters his information was too vague to be of use. That morning Corporal R. G.
On the fifth day under that dense jungle canopy, Beaumont decided to fight his way out to the beach. The wounded were suffering acutely from exposure and lack of attention. After burying the dead, he cut poles with which to make stretchers for the wounded, lashing them with vines and branches, but they were discarded as too unweildy. Beaumont's small force then set off
Next day, 2 October, two barge parties, the first under 2 Lieutenant C. D. Griffiths, 2 Lt. C. D. Griffiths; born
On the day of the rescue Major J. A. Burden, a Japanese interpreter from the American command, came forward with a proposal to distribute leaflets among the enemy informing them that they would be honourably treated if they surrended, but nothing came of this. That day, also, 41 enemy planes attacked Matu Soroto but were driven off by Hutchison's guns, most of the bombs falling into the sea. By 3 October, after another artillery bombardment, A and B Companies finally cleared Machine-gun Gully, where most of the casualties occurred, and by nightfall were joined by C and D Companies. The battalion was then half way to Marquana Bay.
Meanwhile, away on the right flank, Confident and used it as a transport after the removal of a valuable collection of papers and equipment. Next day the battalion began its next leap some miles forward to Varuasi and then pushed on to Susu Bay, after which it was instructed to concentrate in Warambari Bay by the evening of 4 October.
With landing craft borrowed from
By nightfall on 6 October both battalions were in range of each other, with the Japanese trapped in a neck of land dividing Warambari Bay from Marquana Bay, towards which 35 Batallion had inched forward at 300 to 600 yards a day, finally losing contact with the enemy on 5 October. A prisoner taken that day stated that about 500 well organised troops were trapped. They were short of food, evidence of which were the broken coconuts found in deserted bivouacs, and wished to surrender, but were prevented from doing so by their officers. Potter, who had conducted the operation from advanced headquarters at Matu Soroto, decided to close the gap. Both the covering batteries were tied in on a common grid and came under regimental control.
By four o'clock on the after noon of 6 October,
Casualties were not heavy and, despite appalling conditions, the sickness rate was low. The brigade lost three officers and 28 other ranks killed; one officer died of wounds, and one officer and 31 other ranks were wounded. Uncertain estimates of enemy killed ranged from 200 to 300, but the Japanese always attempted to hide their losses by burying their dead and removing the wounded. Their naval records, examined in Chevalier, Selfridge, and O'Bannon— which triumphed in a sharp and bitter engagement but only after being severely mauled. Selfridge had her bow sheered off, Chevalier was torpedoed and sunk, and O'Bannon damaged herself in a collision with Selfridge. A Japanese destroyer Yugomo and several small craft were sunk, but under cover of this engagement the pick-up force moved into Maraziana Point, embarked the garrison between 11.10 p. m. and 1.5 a. m. and departed for Buin, where it arrived safely. Three other American destroyers bringing a convoy from Yugomo were rescued by naval patrols.
Units emerged from their first action with high morale but a healthy respect for a tenacious adversary. Men in action had not tasted hot food for almost a month, nor had a change of clothing been possible. Combat battalions lost one man killed for every man wounded, and all arms of the service, working as a team, overcame equipment problems, arduously tested by experience. There had been a tendency by commanders of combat teams to
Jungle conditions made immense demands on both artillery and signals. Guns were barged from bay to bay and hauled ashore by manpower over coral and tree-roots to their selected sites on beach or headland, on one occasion taking three days to do so. Working through the night, trees and undergrowth were cleared to give arcs of fire. Ammunition was manpowered from barge to gun site. Ranging on enemy targets with accuracy was impeded by the blanket of forest, and air observations was practically useless as the smoke from ranging shells never rose above the trees. Again and again the observation officers, Captain P. M.
Communication difficulties were not easily overcome. Seeping moisture, continual rain, and violent electrical storms played havoc with No. 11 and No. 12 wireless sets. Even the sets in use were not sufficiently strong to overcome the effect of the heavy mat of jungle overhead. Forward units were frequently out of touch with rear formations, particularly at night, when conditions, were at their worst. Field telephones were finally used in the forward areas and the more reliable runner when all else failed. During operations signals officers experimented with wireless aerials in trees and palms in an effort to overcome problems in such thickly wooded country. Wire-lying parties, transporting their heavy and noisy equipment through territory not cleared of Japanese, were protected by armed guards. Such was the state of country that on one occasion nine miles of wire were required between two points only three miles apart. A moisture-proof New Zealand-made wireless set, known as the ZC1, some of which came forward during operations, proved to be most suitable for jungle warfare. Finally, after most exhaustive work, a telephone circuit using seventy miles of wire was laid round most of the island, linking units, radar stations, motor torpedo boat bases, airfield and anti-aircraft defences.
Supplies during the operational period were maintained by The trials of the division's Field Bakery give a reasonable indication of what sometimes happened to small New Zealand units in the
While the combat teams cleared the jungle in the north, organisation and construction continued in the south. Barrowclough moved his headquarters to a less restricted and more congenial site among the palms of Gill's Plantation on 2 October, some of the trucks and jeeps taking six hours to bump their way over seven miles of mud and coconut logs of the only possible track. Regular flights of landing craft arrived from
Two of the flights were caught on the beach by Japanese aircraft—the first on 25 September when seventeen Americans were killed, and another on 1 October when low-flying bombers came out of the sun and caught two landing craft while they were unloading.
Once more the engineers, with increased but still limited heavy equipment, set about the primary task of transforming a rough jungle track into a two-way all-weather road from Biloa to the motor torpedo boat base at Lambu Lambu, halfway up the island, and linking all units and service installations and depots along the coast. The 26th Field Company, which became a heavy equipment company, was brought forward from
Soon after fighting ceased, reconnaissance patrols were despatched to neighbouring islands on which stray Japanese might still be in hiding. Gizo Island was searched on 10 October by two platoons from
A message from Griswold to Barrowclough at the conclusion of the
Please convey to all elements of your excellent command my thanks and heartiest congratulations for the despatch with which enemy forces were driven from
Although military operations were only of secondary importance, the conquest of
As 14 Brigade settled down to a period of routine duty after securing
A radar station was an imperative accessory to the
Tactical and supply considerations and the adequacy of air support from existing airfields dictated the landings on both the
Barrowclough was informed of this task on 20 September, when he discussed with Wilkinson various phases of the campaign, following his arrival on
There was one diversion from training which was typical of warfare in the
For the assault on the Treasury Group,
Planning this first opposed landing by New Zealand troops since
Brigade Headquarters was expanded to deal with the increased work such planning demanded, not only for the actual assault but for the loading and equipment tables of every landing craft of succeeding flights. Not a foot of space was wasted; the loading tables were meticulously detailed. Major J. G. S. Bracewell was brought up from Base in
Only one area in the Treasuries was suitable for a landing by heavy LSTs carrying earth-moving equipment, unit transport, guns and weighty stores—the sandy beaches of a small promontory at
While this main assault was in progress, a small separate force was to be landed at
Twenty miles of primitive roads and a faulty telephone system separated Row from Corps and Task Force Headquarters, and delays in obtaining information and decisions frequently hampered planning, all of which was dictated by the amount of shipping available. The arrival at the last moment of some of the more hastily assembled American units, and the lack of knowledge of their particular tasks also delayed completion of final loading tables, as they were unable to furnish such vital information as the amount of shipping space required and the number of men they were taking forward in the first flight. As the tactical loading and equipment tables were completed ten days before departure, this often led to wasteful and hasty rearrangement.
Only meagre information was available concerning the strength of the enemy and his dispositions in the Treasury Group. In order to overcome this deficiency, Sergeant W. A.
The original plan for a simultaneous assault on the
Row issued his first administration order for the Treasury operation on 11 October and his first operational order on the 21st, by which time all details were completed by the planning committee. The administration order set out minutely the beach organisation, working parties for unloading, the pooling of transport to facilitate
On 23, 24, and 25 October the slower craft were loaded and despatched from Stringham. The whole force bore a farewell message of the kind to which American commanders were addicted. It concluded: ‘Shoot calmly, shoot fast, and shoot straight’. The men each carried two days' rations, and in their equipment was half a ‘pup’ tent, to be joined with another and set up as one in the bivouac area ashore. They wore steel helmets but carried soft jungle hats in their haversacks. Gas respirators were discarded. The assault troops wore camouflaged jungle uniforms of drill to make them less distinguishable in the jungle; some daubed their hands and faces with stain. The journey to the Treasuries was uneventful. Some men slept on deck in the hot night, for there was no moon.
The following units of the brigade made the landing on Treasury:
8 Brigade MMG Company (
Malaria Control Section (2 Lt R. D. Dick)
J Section Signals (
10 Mobile Dental Section (
Brigade details.
American units included 198 Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Regiment (less one battalion) with sixteen 90-millimetre and thirty-two 37-millimetre guns and twenty searchlights; a company of 87 Naval Construction Battalion (the CBs), and technical personnel to
Zero hour for the landing was set for six minutes past six on the morning of 27 October, but because of the late arrival of the APDs it was delayed for twenty minutes and the radio silence broken by its dissemination to vessels of the convoy. In the grey light of breaking day, and wrapped in a drizzle of warm rain, the convoy lay off the western entrance to
Promptly at 5.45 a.m. the guns of two American destroyers, Pringle and Philip, cracked in the morning stillness as they bombarded
Two minutes after the naval bombardment ceased the first wave of assault troops leaped ashore at 6.26 a.m. from the landing craft, as though on a well-executed manœuvre. As these craft emptied and withdrew, succeeding waves followed at thirty-minute intervals until the last and heavier craft arrived at 9.20 a.m. B and C Companies of
There was little opposition to the immediate landing and initial casualties were light. Unexpectedly, landing craft were fired on from Cumming's point on
In the first rush from the beaches some enemy strongposts were overun and the garrisons went to earth, emerging again to take the landing troops from the rear. One of these posts was demolished
Activity on the beaches was frequently more intense than in the jungle. Sapper J. K.
By 7.35 a.m. the Japanese garrison had reorganised itself and laid down concentrated and accurate mortar and machine-gun fire on the beaches, where the LSTs were unloading heavy supplies, guns, and equipment. Direct hits set two of them on fire, but unloading parties quickly extinguished the outbreaks. Unit parties organising dumps of equipment on the beaches and sorting out gear as it came ashore were caught in the Japanese bombardment. One American 90-millimetre anti-aircraft gun and one New Zealand Bofors gun were destroyed; one 25-pounder gun of
Because of the difficult country—dense forest cut by deep water-courses—the site of the enemy guns was difficult to pinpoint. At
The Stirling landing was unopposed and accomplished with ease; as troops cleared
Activity on the beach, though hindered temporarily by exploding ammunition, proceeded with only one hitch. Typical of the speed in unloading the earlier craft was the record of LCI 330, which discharged 299 men and 15 tons of cargo in 14 minutes. Only a few tons of cargo were returned to The report of CTF 31 stated: ‘The New Zealanders were not easily convinced that unloading by hand was necessary.’
When darkness came, bringing with it more torrential rain, the two battalion perimeters were established, the men sharing without complaint their dank cruciform foxholes with centipedes and other insects repulsive to a degree. During the day a few snipers were shot out of trees inside the perimeter, and under cover of darkness the Japanese attempted to reach their ration dump, which was outside the
Row had every reason to congratulate himself on his accurate and exhaustive planning. No call was necessary on his reserve—
Although the landing was observed by the Japanese, little action was taken because of pressure by Australian and American forces in
During the day enemy aircraft were held off by No. 15 Squadron RNZAF, under Squadron Leader M. J. Cony, on which they dropped two bombs. A night raid on Mono, built round the light cruiser Nagara and ten destroyers then at
Meanwhile, as McKean, Logan disembarked his small force of 200 all ranks at dawn on 27 October without opposition and established a perimeter round the tiny 40-yards-wide beach, overhung with trees, at the mouth of the Soanotalu River, above which rose forest-clad cliffs in a verdant semi-circle. This force consisted of D Company,
Each day patrols from Graham's company worked out to a depth of 1000 yards through the jungle and along the coast, and by 29 October ran against small parties of Japanese filtering through from
By 30 October, when it was obvious that the Japanese refugees were concentrating round Barrowclough wished
Meanwhile, increasing patrol clashes indicated growing Japanese strength, though the enemy made no attempt no reach the radar and was unaware of its existence. A small patrol under Lieutenant J. A. H.
Late on the night of 1 November, between sixty and ninety Japanese attacked the west perimeter, using grenades, mortars, and machine guns in an attempt to reach the landing barge. Before midnight the field telephones joining strongpoints with the commander had been put out of action by grenades, and the groups fought independently of each other. Japanese infiltrated through the perimeter and attempted to break Kirk's small garrison, which was armed with hand grenades, one tommy gun, and two machine guns taken off the barge. The first assault came at 1.30 a. m., killing Staff-Sergeant D. O.
Platoons on the west perimeter fought off the attackers without loss. Fifty Japanese dead were counted that morning by patrols, but as on every other occasion, the wounded had been removed. Captured enemy equipment included five knee mortars, four light machine guns, several dozen rifles and one sword. During the day Logan reorganised his defences in readiness for attacks which came on the two following nights, though with decreasing violence, from desperate refugees who represented the last Japanese resistance on Mono. Patrols afterwards fanned out from the perimeter, picked up a few stragglers, and drove the remainder into hiding. D Company was relieved by A Company under Captain A. G.
Organised resistance in the Treasuries ceased on the night of 2–3 November, but groups of Japanese survivors secreted themselves in caves along the northern coast, where they built rafts in an effort to escape to the Shortlands. These survivors were eliminated only with difficulty by patrols. One such raft carrying an unknown number of Japanese was rammed and strafed by a motor torpedo boat four miles off shore. After moving elements of
Several sharp engagements resulted before groups of refugees were exterminated. On 5 November a fighting patrol of D Company Maj I. G. O'Neill;
Killed: New Zealand 40,
Wounded: New Zealand 145,
Occasional Japanese were sighted in the jungle up to the end of December, and even in January, giving rise to fantastic stories, some of them true, of their attempts to obtain food from unit cookhouses and their escapes when pursued. One such story, a true one, concerned an American cook who disturbed a Japanese in his modest kitchen and knocked out the intruder with a Coleman lamp. This Japanese had been hiding close beside
Although command of
The Treasury operation was a revealing example of that team-work, not only among services but between New Zealand and American units and formations, which brought success to this island-hopping campaign and improved the planning for subsequent landings. A detachment of the US Naval Base landed with the first wave of New Zealand troops to mark beaches for craft arriving in succeeding flights. They then organised and controlled a small
With the cessation of hostilities on both
When command of
Units remained so dispersed until the year's end, when they were withdrawn and concentrated in the brigade area along the coast between Ruravai and Juno River, with
In the Treasuries all activity centred on
This clearance of camp areas when hostilities ceased was one of the more urgent tasks as each island was secured, and also a revelation of the New Zealanders' passion for tidying up, even in the jungle. Trees and undergrowth, their overhead concealment no longer necessary, disappeared, and with them went the mud, most of the insects, and the gloom, followed by a gratifying uplift in morale. Associated with this clearance was the engineers' roading programme, always a most comprehensive one since it involved the removal of tracts of forest, the bridging of tidal streams and rivers, as well as the construction of wharves, all of which confirmed Barrowclough's wisdom in asking for three field companies for such a campaign. Such roading was also essential for the speedy distribution of supplies and the linking of defences and services.
As commanding general of the
Motor torpedo boats, powerful craft which attained a speed of 40 knots, were at this time using 250 drums of petrol each night as they hunted the enemy along his supply lanes between the islands. The record consumption of petrol (or ‘avgas’ as the Americans called it) in one day, reached during the
New Zealand soldiers in the
The division's No. 1 Malaria Control Unit, first commanded by Major N. H. North and later by Major D. McK. Jack, waged ceaseless battle against the mosquito and its breeding haunts. Round all camp sites and unit areas trained personnel carried out a strict routine programme. All damp undergrowth was removed, moist and swampy areas and other breeding places were sprayed with oil—even the ruts of wheel tracks after rain. In the Treasury islands, particularly on
A considerable amount of experimental work was accomplished by services during the waiting periods, particularly by Signals, whose maintenance and installation work was especially arduous. Electrical storms played tricks with the radio network which linked up the islands, and in the jungle itself moisture affected the efficiency of sets never designed for service in such damp, enclosed country. Many of the difficulties with field sets were overcome when Major P. Barcham, of the Signals Experimental Establishment of Army Headquarters, arrived on
The long intervals between actions, though ceaseless with administrative work for the staffs of headquarters, led to considerable
Kiwi, which was produced on a vintage plant in
The construction of motion picture theatres was simplicity itself. Areas of coconut palm and jungle were felled by the engineers and tree trunks arranged in rows as seats, with the screen suspended between two remaining upright trees. Here the audience sat under the stars or in the rain, watching films which gave them relief from a monotonous daily round. Scattered units each had their own 16-millimetre projectors and were rarely without regular film entertainment. Hobbies were encouraged and quite a business developed by enterprising craftsmen, who fashioned bracelets and necklaces and other articles of chunky jewellery from sea shells and sold them to American troops at considerable profit.
Fourteenth Brigade set a precedent by organising an exhibition of handcrafts, later sending a remarkable collection of articles to New Zealand, where it was displayed publicly. There were 294 exhibits and 505 dollars in prize money. Metal and plastic glass from wrecked aeroplanes, shells, nuts, palm and jungle woods were all used with skill and imagination. Similar crafts were encouraged by
Unit padres and Padre Falloon was awarded the Military Cross for his work in action on Thompson organised a popular recreation centre under the palms of Gill's plantation and called it ‘Te Kaianga o te Kiwi’. He and a band of volunteers cleared a site for two tents, once given by headquarters and the other obtained from a US salvage dump. Tea urns were made from shell cases and dippers from milk-powder tins. an empty petrol drum served as a furnace, with a ten-gallon dixie as a copper. Firing was collected from the jungle. Seats were made from logs and tables from packing cases. Thompson was assisted by Sergeant R. McNaught, as secretary, and a committee representing Divisional HQ, Signals, ASC, D and E Platoon, Field Security Section, Malaria Control Section, Engineers, and
There was never any shortage of visitors to headquarters, all of them travelling by air in a service which ran with a regularity disturbed only by violent electrical storms. His Excellency the Governor-General, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newall, arrived on 17 November and presented decorations won in action by members of 14 Brigade at a ceremony held in
On 21 November, on the right flank of th vast
Far-reaching changes followed Barrowclough's decision, taken on 28 November and executed in December, to retire all officers of more than 41 years of age unless their retention was justified by some special qualification. Many of the officers who returned to New Zealand had been with the force since
Changes also followed at the Field Maintenance Centre on
As in all other areas occupied by units of the division, a roading programme by the engineers vastly improved it, particularly round the Casualty Clearing Station at
Christmas came and with it a week of organised sport by all formations—swimming, wood-chopping (despite the climate), athletics, boating, mechanical horse-racing, and such other entertainment as could be improvised by ingeniously minded regimental committees. Natives on
The scene at Malsi,
On 30 December Barrowclough, on receipt of a signal from Wilkinson, left by air for
The
The Japanese command in
Although another island base was required by the
During a conference at
Barrowclough, accompanied by Brooke and Bennett, attended a conference at Wilkinson's headquarters on Squarepeg, and the date of the landing provisionally fixed for 25 January.
The task involved a difficult amphibious landing and, as soon as the group was occupied, the construction of two airfields, the establishment of a naval and motor torpedo boat base, and the installation of radar stations. Operational command was vested in Barrowclough who, after the landing was consolidated, would become island commander. He decided to employ 14 Brigade and strengthen his force by including
After issuing a warning order to Potter, Barrowclough returned to
Although the
The Green Island landing, a model of accurate and detailed planning by a divisional staff now experienced by former operations, avoided former faults and deficiencies. It was freely admitted that for once in military operations the A and Q department played a more important part than G, with whom there is inevitably a little professional rivalry. ‘From conception to completion I consider that the
Conditions were exacting and complicated the planning, since units and their equipment had to be uplifted from islands hundreds of miles apart—American units from
Navy planned the movement of groups of landing craft so that the faster APDs carrying the assault troops overtook and passed through the slower craft to arrive off the island at dawn, the second wave in the LCIs half an hour later, the third wave in LSTs an hour after the assault troops, and a fourth wave in LCTs early in the afternoon. This arrangement of echelons enabled ships to disembark their complements with the greatest speed and depart from the area without confusion. All this separate movement was co-ordinated by the responsible en route—seventeen destroyers for the landing craft and APDs, with a cruiser screen beyond, and air cover working in relays from
To cope with the increased volume of work a planning committee was established under Bennett, which consisted of his assistant, Gibbons, Williams (the DAAG), Captain H. M. Denton (staff captain, Q Branch), Silk—brought in from
Until precise information became available three plans were devised, each of them sufficiently fluid to enable any two to be discarded in favour of one selected at the last moment. Under the direction of Scaled models for impending operations were extensively used by
Nothing, however, could be finalised until the information obtained during the boldly executed raid by
The raiding force, which consisted of A, C, and D Companies, one platoon of B Company, and attached sections of signals, mortars and intelligence, embarked in the APDs Waters, Talbot, and Dickerson on 29 January and practised a landing that night on Mumia Beach, after abandoning plans to land on the narrow,
Special precautions were taken to ensure direct communication with this expedition, moving far beyond the most northerly bridgehead in the Fullham, carried the Brigadier and his liaison officer, Captain D. M. Young. Two motor torpedo boats, for the protection of the landing craft in the lagoon, joined the convoy off Fullham remained until the raid was over.
On the stroke of midnight the landing craft from the APDs passed through the entrance to the lagoon, shrouded in a night so dark it might have been prepared for such an undertaking. A rising sea had not hindered disembarkation in the open roadstead, but many of the men were sick. One of the motor torpedo boats led them in—twelve small landing craft in single file. With a sound like a deep sigh they slid up on the sandy beach of the Pokonian Plantation, a few hundred yards to the right inside the entrance to the lagoon, to await the dawn and form a defence perimeter inside which
Before seven o'clock next morning the technicians and specialists left on their missions, each group protected by its armed screen. Major A. B.
Meanwhile, Commander J. MacDonald Smith, USN, with three landing craft, sought suitable landing beaches for the LSTs and LCIs around the lagoon coast. Accompanying him were members
Lt P. O'Dowd; born NZ
Later that afternoon, when all the reconnaissance parties returned to the perimeter, the area was strafed with mortars and a counter-attack planned, using a platoon from Bullen's company on each flank with Smith leading a frontal attack from landing craft. Although the men had been landed in the flank, the attack was frustrated by six Japanese aircraft which strafed and bombed the landing craft just as Smith began to move in to land. Machine guns, one of them manned by Private W. T. A.
The raiders were not observed by the Japanese garrison until their landing craft began moving across the lagoon to Tangalan Plantation.
That evening, while
Once possessed of accurate information gathered during the reconnaissance raid, which was quickly disseminated to all commanders, the final preparations were planned with confidence during the next fortnight. Engineers made the landing plan still more precise by attaching to their model of
After his plans had been approved by Wilkinson's headquarters, Barrowclough issued his final operation order on 4 February. This was followed on 5 February by Wilkinson's operation order 2–44, an immense document defining the tasks and organisation of all navy, army and air units taking part, not only for the seizure of the group but for all subsequent echelons. In accordance with American procedure, the orders of subordinate commanders were incorporated in detail in those of the higher command, a system which hampers to some degree any last-minute changes dictated by tactical necessity. Then, on 7 February, Barrowclough flew to
Elaborate precautions were taken against counter-attack from There were good reasons for the employment of so heavy a force in both the raid and this operation. The
Halford, in which Wilkinson and his staff also travelled. They watched the rehearsal off the coast the following day before joining the last convoy. By this time, after a voyage devoid of incident, groups of slower craft had joined off the west coast of
The following units landed on
Divisional Commander (
GSO 1 (
AA & QMG (
3 Defence and Employment Platoon (
Divisional Signals (
Headquarters Company (
No. 1 Company (
No. 2 Company (
No. 3 Company (
Divisional Artillery (
Tank Squadron (
Divisional Engineers (
Detachment 37 Field Park (
Army Service Corps (
16 MT Company (
Detachment 10 MT Company (
Medical Services (
No.
Malaria Control Section (
10 Mobile Dental Section (
14 Brigade Headquarters (
Brigade Major (
Staff Captain (
Brigade Carrier Platoon (
Brigade
Under command were American services and units, the principal of which were a navy base and units commanded by Captain H. A. Rochester, USN; three naval construction battalions under Commander C. H. Whyte, USNR; an air centre and units commanded by Brigadier-General Field Harris; and 967 US Anti-Aircraft Battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Moore, afterwards made an Officer of the Order of the British Empire.
Dawn in the tropics is invariably a spectacle which fades as quickly as it flowers; 15 February was no exception. Piles of rosetinted clouds mounted in a jade sky, and along the horizon heavier cloud banks were slashed with shining gold. As the light strengthened, the ships of the force were revealed over the calm sea, spreading out for miles inside the circle of screening destroyers, with two task forces, one commanded by Rear-Admiral W. L. Ainsworth and the other by Rear-Admiral A. S. Merrill, still farther out.
Japanese headquarters in St. Louis, one of the screening cruisers, received a direct hit. These were the only two ship casualties, neither of them serious. As usual the Japanese claims were excessive—one transport sunk, two cruisers, one destroyer, and three transports damaged by near misses. The Japanese command recorded the loss of twelve
While the Japanese attempted to press their air attack on the widespread target of landing craft, the lagoon, so still that any movement shirred great stretches of rain-grey water, became the setting for activity it had never previously known. First to break the morning calm was a minesweeper at 6.10 a. m., after clearing the narrow entrance channel. At 6.41 a. m. the assault troops were down the nets of the APDs, and the first flight of thirty-two landing craft, led by a motor torpedo boat and an LCI gunboat, all in single file since they could move in no other formation, were on their way to the beaches. Circling above them was a special liaison aircraft, used for the first time that day, to acquaint the task force commander in Halford of the progress of the landing and, if necessary, direct gunfire against opposition. Not a shot was fired.
In two hours perimeters had been established with the perfection of a well-timed and executed manœuvre. Potter and his staff went ashore in the second wave of assault troops and established advanced brigade headquarters in the Tangalan Plantation. As soon as the battalion patrols established their block lines beyond the bridgeheads, the LCIs beached, then the LCTs and finally, in the afternoon, the LSTs. Men and materials poured ashore as each wave of craft was cleared and retracted from the beaches to make way for the next. Carrying parties, 100 from each battalion, removed materials as they came ashore to prevent congestion on the beaches. By half past ten that morning
On that first day the landing craft disgorged 58 jeeps, 67 trucks of various kinds, 44 guns (both field and anti-aircraft), 7 tractors, 8 bulldozers, 2 compressors, 10 radar installations of various types, 12 water-distilling plants ready for operation, 10 trailers, 2 wireless vans, 8 Valentine tanks, 426 tons of petrol in drums,
Beginning at eight o'clock that morning New Zealand aircraft, as part of the South Pacific Air Command, assisted in maintaining a continuous cover over the island. No. 14 Squadron,
The intense activity on the beaches was reflected elsewhere as patrols pushed through the jungle, and by nightfall more than the original programme had been accomplished. Artillery regiments went to their allotted sites, in many instances along swathes cut through the undergrowth by bulldozers, and guns, both field and anti-aircraft, were ready for action by eleven o'clock in the morning. The only action, however, fell to
Battalion patrols continued their advance early in the morning of 16 February, their progress in the Tangalan area made easier by the tanks, which moved with the speed of the men. Their presence
Late on the afternoon of the second day, natives reported that an unspecified number of Japanese had taken refuge on the densely wooded island of Sirot, and the task of clearing the island was assigned to B Company,
This small expedition landed on the island the following morning after a seven-minute barrage by
Later that afternoon No. 8 Platoon, under Sergeant N.
On 18 February
Although natives still reported the presence of seventy Japanese in and around the gardens of Torahatup, they eluded the patrols by hiding in cliff cave used by the natives as burial places. Working near the unit boundaries, patrols from both 30 and 35 Battalions picked them off in twos and threes but were unable to assess the numbers of those who escaped. Late on the afternoon of 19 February, a patrol from
The locality in which the remaining garrison was finally unearthed on 20 February, quite accidentally since it had been declared clear by patrols, was along the coast near a few deserted native huts passing as the village of
Action began with an unexpected rifle shot from one of these thickets. When Sergeant A. T.
Bullen and his company reached the scene of action at 3.45 p.m. and relieved Stronach's platoon, which had been holding the enemy for more than four hours but had been unable to make much progress. Although the Japanese were only fifteen to twenty yards away behind that frustrating barrier of leaves, trunks and vines, it was still impossible to estimate their strength. The men continued to fire without a target, aiming only at space and sound when the enemy returned their fire. Private P.
Fifty-one dead Japanese were counted among the trees along the edge of the cliff. Eight others were picked off by a patrol from No. 16 Platoon under Corporal L. G.
Three days later a small force from
Killed: New Zealand 10,
Wounded: New Zealand 21,
By the end of February 120 Japanes had been killed, each one checked since that was the only accepted official recording of enemy dead during the
Five days after the landing, Halsey, accompanied by Vice-Admiral A. W. Fitch and Rear-Admiral Robert Carney, his chief of staff, arrived by flying boat for a conference with Barrowclough. Their visit coincided with the action at The force was built up between 15 Feb. the day of the landing, and 17 Mar in echelons as under:
These echelons brought sufficient supplies to maintain the force over a stated period, after which they came forward as requested but not at regular intervals.
Seventh
This extract from Barrowclough's report to the New Zealand Government on the seizure of the
New Zealanders and Americans toiled through the steaming days and stifling nights unloading and transporting thousands of tons of supplies of every description. It is impossible to overestimate the magnitude of the work involved in unloading this cargo. Some of it came in LSTs which could enter the lagoon and drop their ramps on the ramps on the various beaches. No sooner had the huge bow doors opened than men swarmed into the cavernous holds and in sweating teams dragged out vehicles and loose cargo through oceans of mud to the dumps ashore. Most of the cargo, however, arrived in larger ships which could not enter the lagoon. These had to be unloaded into smaller landing craft, which pitched and tossed alongside the larger ships in the heavy ocean swell that was usually running. The agility and skill of the soldiers in performing this dangerous task would have done credit to experienced sailors. All services of both nations worked with most commendable zeal.
This subjection of natural obstacles was one of the features of the
By the time
But the health of the troops was excellent. A furry caterpillar, dropping from the trees, caused a maddening skin irritation which cleared up when the insects disappeared. An outbreak of hookworm among members of
As on every other island occupied by the division, the natives were given medical attention, which they sorely needed. When most of them were evacuated to
The construction of the airfields was the crowning achievement of the
All this had been achieved by the utmost harmony and the closest co-operation between all services of both the New Zealand and American forces. Barrowclough made available to Whyte the assistance and equipment of the New Zealand engineers to enable the project to be completed on time; he also relieved the American construction battalions of such tasks as unloading landing craft, roadmaking and maintenance, which would have hindered their concentration on the airfields programme. On the day of the landing, technicians went direct from their boats to the area selected by map and reconnaissance in the Tangalan Plantation; two days later their surveys were complete. They found a rock-like coral foundation with a reasonably level surface and no swamps. Coconut palms growing 27 feet apart, ranged in height from 15 to 60 feet over the whole area, according to the date of planting, but during the years of neglect secondary growth, vines, and young palms from the fallen nuts had filled the avenues between the trunks with a tight weave of vegetation. Nothing, however, could withstand the powerful blades of the bulldozers. On the third day they went into action, shearing off the palms and topsoil with incredible ease and revealing the gleaming cream coral. After then came the full battery of carefully organised mechanism—scoops, graders, rollers, spreaders. From pits established along the lagoon coast, where continuous blasting resembled distant thunder, came 100,000 loads of coral carried by tip-trucks, which changed drivers every eight hours. As they dumped their loads on the runway, eight-and ten-ton rollers followed them, and then the spreaders and levellers and other massive pieces of machinery which, only a few days before, had issued from the landing craft. Men worked in shifts
By 3 March a mile-long lane of coral gleamed between the remaining avenues of palms, and in areas close beside them machine and repair shops, pilot and staff quarters, control tower underground fighter-control station, and a tank farm capable of holding 350,000 gallons of petrol were in various stages of construction. Blackout restrictions were no longer necessary.
Rain, which fell almost daily at some hour and often all day, scarcely hindered the work of construction. At night in the artificial light the huge palm fronds, quivering under the deluge of water, resembled nothing so much as green ostrich plumes. There was some anxiety on the night of 5 March when a soft patch refused to firm up, but a broiling sun the following day and additional loads of coral made it sufficiently dry to take the incoming aircraft. By 7 March that strip had become the terminal for a regular air service linking every island airfield south to
The seizure of the His farewell message to all forces in the With the announcement of the virtual completion of the South Pacific campaign, except for mopping up and starving out operations, I can tell you and tell the world that no greater fighting team has ever been put together. From the desperate days of Halsey
The official dates of the division's three actions were declared to be:
Treasury Group: 25 October to 26 November 1943
SHORTAGE of manpower finally sealed the fate of The approximate strengths of the three services and the theatres in which they were serving as at Navy: 5000 New Zealand and Army: 30,500 Air: 30,000 New Zealand and
While advice was being sought from Allied leaders on which division could be withdrawn with the least disruption to the war effort, Jordan advised the Government that the food position in the
Barrowclough's first intimation that his division was being withdrawn reached him in a confidential cable message from the Prime
After discussing the relief of his division with Harmon, who visited him at his headquarters on
Although the Government resolved early in a division, to be more speedily built up later, if and when it was required. This suggestion was accepted. Barrowclough returned to his headquarters in the
On 7 April Barrowclough released the news of withdrawal and the conditions governing the return to New Zealand of men for essential industries. In this special message to the force, he indicated the reasons for the manpower demands on the division:
No modern war can be won by the fighting services alone. The production of warlike equipment and stores and primary products (including food) is as essential to the war effort as is the work of the soldier in the front line. By virtue of her geographical position on Allied lines of communication and because of her natural resources, New Zealand has been requested by the highest Allied authorities and as part of the general war strategy, to undertake a greatly increased programme for the supply of food and other primary products. This she cannot do without some reduction in the numbers of her armed forces. It has been agreed that she ought to recall from active service certain categories of men whose work in primary and essential industries at home is likely to be of greater assistance to the war effort than is their continued service with the colours.
Barrowclough had been given no policy directive regarding the future of his force, with the result that his position during succeeding months was an unhappy one, governed by almost the same degree of uncertainty which marked the building up of the force two years earlier. What was vaguely described as an interim policy provided for a skeleton force to remain in
Men for return to New Zealand were selected with commendable speed and all details of the withdrawal plan completed by the division's staff in a week. When Mr.
The slow and melancholy process of the division's disintegration began on 24 April when the first releases, numbering Wharton. On Anzac Day President Monroe. Two more ships left Tryon, and two days later command passed from Goss to 198 US Coast Artillery Group, an element of 93 US Division, then on
Barrowclough left
But no sooner was the division congregated in
‘I cannot over-emphasise the difficulties we are meeting in the absence of any fixed policy direction‘, Barrowclough wrote again before flying to New Zealand on 20 July for nine days, during which he endeavoured to obtain a Cabinet decision on the future employment of the force. Beyond deciding to withdraw it to New Zealand, as Newton wished, the New Zealand Government made no decision, as they were still waiting for some indication from the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on the future employment of
By the end of August the strength of
Finally the fate of the division was declared on 21 September when Fraser announced in Parliament that it would be disbanded. Negotiations, however, had been in progress for some time before that. Although nothing was made public, Fraser cabled confidentially to Churchill on 9 September indicating that the Government proposed to disband the division and maintain the strength of
A total of 17,134 all ranks returned from the The response by the farming community was the most disappointing. By 10 May only about 1000 men of an estimated 7000 had been asked for by the farmers, whose allotment from the labour pool was later reduced.
One of the problems arising out of the policy of sending
MOBILISATION orders to General Juichi Terauchi's South Army, elements of which ultimately reached the
The seizure of
The seizure of
Cleaning up
Two paragraphs disposed of the objective:
The objective of this operation is to destroy and seize enemy strongholds of
The sectors to be seized by the South Army are the
This operation was the fulfilment of secret plans contained in an ‘Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy’, dated
In the regions including French Indo-
French Indo- China and the Dutch East Indies: We must, in the first place, endeavour to conclude a comprehensive economic agreement (including the distribution of resources, trade adjustment in and out of the Co-prosperity Sphere, currency and exchange agreements, &c.), while planning such political coalitions as the recognition of independence, the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts, &c.
Thailand: We should strive to strengthen mutual assistance and coalition in political, economic, and military affairs.
On
In detailing this plan an independence movement, which would cause
By the first week in
This swift and unexpected success in overrunning Allied territory, which contributed to her ultimate undoing, encouraged the Japanese High Command to attack the Dutch East Indies sooner than the
The
The attacking force under Hyakutake which was designed for the conquest of the three island groups was a strong one, with overwhelming naval support from the Second Fleet under Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo, consisting of 13 heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 24 destroyers, and the First Air Fleet under Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, with seven aircraft carriers and eleven destroyers as well as auxiliary supply ships. This whole invasion force was to be protected by Vice-Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's fleet, which included the four battleships Hiyei, Kirishima, Kongo, and
Each of these three landing forces contained elements of
The first tests of American aggression, which ultimately led to these two sea battles, developed from audacious raids on Japanese targets in the Caroline and Marshall Islands on
The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway preceded the landings at Australia and
Most of the damage to Japanese surface craft was done beyond the waters of the Coral Sea. On 4 May two destroyers, three transports, four gunboats, one light cruiser, and various small craft like launches were sunk at Ryukaku and one light cruiser were sunk on 7 May. On 8 May, in the Coral Sea, the carrier Shokaku was severely damaged, the carrier Zuikaku lightly damaged, and 87 aircraft destroyed.
A lull followed the Coral Sea battle, and American carriers and supporting craft were recalled from the South Pacific in readiness for another move. Naval patrols were established to the west of Midway Island, which lies north-west of the Hawaii Group, as American intelligence, obtained from such a reliable source as decoded Japanese naval signals, estimated that an attack was imminent against that island outpost. The total Enterprise, Hornet (which was returning from a raid on Yorktown (which had been patched up after the Coral Sea battle), seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 14 destroyers and 20 submarines, divided into two task forces under Fletcher and Rear-Admiral R. A. Spruance. The Japanese Hornet, without protection, attacked the four Japanese carriers. Every aircraft was shot down and only one American pilot survived. Torpedo squadrons from the Enterprise and the Yorktown then attacked, losing heavily but registering hits on the Japanese carriers. By the end of the day two Japanese carriers were on fire and out of action, a third damaged and later sunk
Hornet sought out units of the dispersing Japanese fleet, scoring hits on cruisers and destroyers. The remainder, denuded of their air support, scattered and fled.
The Japanese had suffered their first decisive naval defeat since 1592, when a Korean admiral routed a Japanese fleet under Hideyoshi. At Midway they lost four aircraft carriers—the Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga and Soryu; the heavy cruiser Mikuma and two battleships, four cruisers, and three destroyers were damaged. The American forces also lost heavily in men and aircraft. The Yorktown was hit by two torpedoes on 5 June and sank the following day, and the destroyer Hammann, which had gone alongside to assist the aircraft carrier, was also torpedoed and sunk. Other vessels were damaged.
The Battle of Midway was one of the decisive battles in the
There is no evidence to prove that
The fighting power of our naval and air forces had been whittled away in successive operations, particularly at Midway, and recovery was painfully slow. Enemy submarines were a menace to our sea lanes; our shipping losses mounted so that new construction could not match losses. We found it increasingly difficult to provide our vast operational areas with the desired quantities of supplies. Like it or not, our forces, their initiative lost, were now forced into a defensive position. We maintained a longer fighting front than our national resources could justify.
All Japanese naval, military, and economic opinion agreed that
This is not the place for a detailed account of the land, sea, and air battles which enabled the American command to hold, overwhelm, and finally force the Japanese to give up the struggle for
On 7 August elements of 1 American Marine Division, under Major-General A. A. Vandegrift, went ashore unopposed on A report by Wasp, Saratoga and Enterprise, the American invasion force approached round the north point of the island, taking the Japanese garrison in such surprise that those on
On Tulagi and the neighbouring small islands, however, resistance was determined and the invaders lost heavily, particularly in the honey-combed hillocks of Gavutu and Tanambogo, which were not subdued for three days. Once established on The Americans admitted that the Japanese had done a remarkable piece of work in developing the airfield at Lunga Point. In five weeks they had constructed large, semi-permanent camps, wharves, bridges, machine shops, two large radio stations, ice-making plants, two large permanent electric power plants, and an almost completed aerodrome with hangars, blast pens, and a 3600-foot runway.
Because Imperial Japanese Headquarters believed that the result of the battle for the
Although ground action on Canberra, which sank the following day, and the American cruisers
Again and again, following their first attempt to land on the night of 23–24 August, the Japanese tried to reinforce and strengthen the garrison in accordance with instructions received from Imperial General Headquarters that all key positions in the
Because American naval strength had been so grievously reduced in the first clash on the night of 8–9 August, Japanese naval vessels approached Hornet, remained undamaged in the whole of the South Pacific. The other three had been put out of action in various engagements—the Saratoga, though she was able to reach Enterprise, which eventually reached Wasp, which had cost 21 million dollars, and was sunk while escorting supply ships to North Carolina was also out of action.
In the battle of the Eastern Solomons, fought out on 23–24 August to the east of Ryujo sunk and another one damaged by Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher's force, but the enemy succeeded in landing about 1500 men a few days later on the Aoba, was damaged. Two more destroyers were sunk the following day while trying to rescue men from the water. A Japanese naval report of this battle recorded that ‘the enemy used radar which enabled them to fire effectively from the first round without the use of searchlights. The future looked bleak for our surface forces, whose forte was night warfare.’
Two nights later, under cover of darkness and rain storms, the Japanese attempted to put Haruna and the Kongo, poured 918 rounds of armour-piercing and high explosive shells in and around the field while aircraft overhead dropped guiding flares. The following morning, 15 October, only one American bomber and ten fighter aircraft were fit to take the air, and then only after sufficient drums of petrol had been collected from the nearby jungle into which they had been tossed by the bombardment. Only 400 drums could be found. Meanwhile five Japanese transports, protected by eleven warships, could be
This was a critical period for the American command, both on land and sea, for their ground forces were not sufficiently strong to attack on land and naval strength was reduced to one aircraft carrier, one battleship, and a bare complement of destroyers and cruisers. Repairs to the Enterprise were rushed at
The two opposing fleets joined action on 26 October, 350 miles north-east of Enterprise, who had under command another group commanded by Rear-Admiral G. D. Murray and built round the carrier Hornet. Superior strength lay with the Japanese, whose combined forces included four aircraft carriers, three of which were seriously damaged, four heavy cruisers, four battleships, nine light cruisers and 28 destroyers, operating in three groups, and covering troop and supply transports intended for
Although the Japanese did not lose a ship, they withdrew when their carriers were put out of action with the loss of 100 aircraft. The Americans lost their carrier Hornet, sunk after great damage by enemy suicide pilots who crashed their machines into her stack, and the Enterprise was again damaged. During the progress of the battle, which lasted through to 27 October, fourteen enemy submarines patrolled the sea routes between the Santa Cruz,
Although it left the Americans with only one damaged aircraft carrier in the South Pacific, the Battle of Santa Cruz, which the Japanese always insisted in calling ‘Santa Claus’,
While daily air reconnaissance reported the concentration of Japanese naval and transport craft in
A force commanded by Rear-Admiral Turner, charged by Halsey with the dual task of getting men and supplies ashore and protecting Enterprise and two battleships, was to support Turner. Scott's group of three transports, one cruiser, and four
San Francisco was damaged seriously. These were only the preliminaries of the battle, but they enabled the Americans to get 6000 men ashore and valuable heavy supplies and munitions before the transport and cargo ships retired.
The battle increased in violence in the early hours of the morning of 13 November, when the main forces met as the Japanese battle-ships Hiyei and Kirishima moved inshore to try to bombard
Some of the more important naval units lying on the seabed of this triangle are:
Northampton, Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes.
Two anti-aircraft cruisers—Atlanta, Juneau.
Ten destroyers—Jarvis, Barton, Cushing, Laffey, Monsson, Preston, De Haven, Benham, Walke, Duncan.
Canberra.
New Zealand: One corvette—Moa.
Hiyei, Kirishima.
Two heavy cruisers—Kurutaka, Kinugasa.
Eight destroyers—Yudachi, Takanami, Natsugomo, Makigumo, Kitusuki, Ayanami, Fubaki, Akatsuki;
as well as an unspecified number of cargo and transport vessels, including four beached at Tassafaronga, and numbers of torpedo boats, landing craft, and aircraft.
The
The Japanese withdrew at three o'clock in the morning without firing on the airfield they hoped to destroy. The fact that they
Despite the fact that Enterprise, which Kinkaid had brought forward with the battleships Washington and
By nightfall the invasion fleet had been cut to pieces. Seven of the Japanese transports had been sunk, including the Canberra Maru and the Brisbane Maru. Under cover of darkness that night, however, the four remaining ships continued to the South Dakota and Washington, and four destroyers from Kinkaid's force, and sent them into the battle under Rear-Admiral Willis A. Lee. Sixteen minutes after midnight, on the morning of 15 November, they joined battle with the Japanese battleship
When morning broke clear the four remaining Japanese transports were beached near Tassafaronga Point and were destroyed by aircraft and field artillery. Japanese and American reports estimated that only about 4000 troops reached the shore; 3000 were drowned but some thousands were rescued from the water by Japanese destroyers. Only five tons of supplies reached the shore. In the four-day battle the Japanese lost two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and three destroyers sunk, as well as their eleven transports; two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and six destroyers had been damaged. American losses were serious—one light cruiser, two light anti-aircraft cruisers, and seven destroyers sunk, and one battleship, two heavy cruisers, and four
In one last major action on the night of 30 November, off Tassafaronga, when the Japanese tried to run in six transports under destroyer protection, an American force commanded by Rear-Admiral C. H. Wright suffered grievous loss. Limited visibility was made worse by a completely overcast sky, but in the first phase of the engagement, which began about an hour before midnight, Wright's force had all the advantage, sinking four of the Japanese ships and damaging others. In the second phase the remaining enemy ships launched a devastating torpedo attack before they turned and fled, and in 21 minutes sank the heavy cruiser Northampton and seriously damaged three others—the Minneapolis, Pensacola, and New Orleans—fortunately without realising the great damage they had done.
Minor clashes occurred almost daily between these major engagements, and at times the South Pacific naval forces were reduced to the narrowest margin of safety. At one time in November, Halsey had only four undamaged cargo ships at his disposal to maintain supplies to the battlefront. The situation in
Nevertheless, the forces on
While major clashes at sea held off a Japanese invasion in any strength, small numbers of men and limited quantities of supplies
In a miserably conceived plan to get supplies ashore, the Japanese cased their food, ammunition, and materials in drums, lashed them together in rafts and threw them overboard, trusting to the tides to carry them to the beaches, but most of these either stuck to rocks or reefs or were shot up by air and surface craft. By
The growing strength of American naval, ground, and air forces and the withering losses of the campaign, ultimately forced the Japanese High Command to order the evacuation of the island and establish a line which included
American intelligence failed to appreciate the Japanese evacuation which, because of the concentration of shipping in anchorages to the north, was mistaken for another attempt to land reinforcements on a large scale. A report made on
The Japanese at first did not appreciate the necessity for a series of intermediate air bases through the
Following the retreat from
In March, also, Japanese morale suffered a blow by the loss of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of their
Meanwhile American strength was increasing in readiness for an advance into the
The Japanese were never able to anticipate the next Allied thrust in the
The Japanese lost as heavily in attempting to hold and reinforce their garrisons in the
The final attempt to reinforce
That same night Admiral Sasaki, the
The loss of
The loss of
Unable to anticipate the next Allied thrust, the Japanese concentrated their main force in areas in Southern
Later, in March, when the Japanese moved a strong force through the mountains and launched a determined attack on the perimeter, they were driven off with severe loss. With the occupation of the
This translated extract from an
If supply should be stopped and there is no alternative but to starve, the troops will charge into the enemy before they are entirely exhausted and, obtaining food from the enemy sources, they will continue fighting up to the very last.
Five days after
From December 1942 to July 1944: killed in action and died of injuries, 52,684, including 12,679 drowned in sunken ships; died of sickness, 8216; seriously injured, 43,234. At the time of the surrender deaths in action were estimated at 55,379 and deaths from sickness 15,936.
From
FROM
One of the obvious dangers in the
One of the first coastwatching stations in the J. Sterling Morton, which remained off Pitcairn for ten days while materials were off-loaded into small boats and hauled up cliffs. This station was operated until
Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in The eight organisations which were concerned with coastwatching in the
Although the coastwatching service was primarily the responsibility of the Navy Department, the majority of those engaged actively in it were drawn from the Army and the Post and Telegraph Department, which supplied the necessary qualified radio operators. New Zealand maintained three small vessels of approximately 100 tons each, the Ranui, New Golden Hind, and Tagua, for the carriage of supplies and reliefs to several of the more distant stations. These craft were operated by the Public Works Department at a cost of £30,000 a year. The Viti, her only naval vessel, and a small trading schooner, the Degei, for
Coastwatching stations were established in the
Because of their proximity to the Marshall Islands, about which the British and American Chiefs of Staff vainly endeavoured to obtain information before and after the outbreak of war, the decision was made in
Cunningham received his instructions in April from Army Headquarters, and twenty-two soldiers were obtained from the Reserve Battalion (later the 34th). They were all volunteers, selected for their initiative and self-reliance and preferably from those accustomed to an outdoor life. Two of them were to accompany the radio operators on eleven of the islands, as the remaining three operators were destined for islands on which there were either missionaries or European officials, as at
Because of isolation and the possibility of losing surface contact with headquarters in
The operators and soldiers left Viti, the principal employment of which was to transport the Governor round the island territories which came under his jurisdiction as High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. The men were accompanied by Sergeant M. M. N.
These coastwatchers went unarmed to their isolated tasks, as it was assumed that such small groups would only imperil their own safety by resisting capture in the event of enemy attack. The wireless operators went as civilians, though their assignment in reporting the activities of enemy surface craft and aircraft was essentially military. When Japan entered the war the soldier coastwatchers throughout the Gilbert and Ellice Groups requested a supply of rifles and ammunition, but these were not issued until
These men, who were the eyes and ears of New Zealand's outposts in the
On 10 December, two days after war was declared, two brothers, Privates J. M. Menzies and Michael Menzies, and the operator, Corporal J. M. Jones, reported the presence of 23 Japanese naval craft of various sizes in the lagoon of Butaritari, on which they were stationed. The following day they were taken by the Japanese and, with Private Basil Were, Private L. E. H. Muller, and the operator, Corporal M. P. McQuinn, from Little Makin, and another operator, Corporal S. R. Wallace, from Abaiang, who was collected on 23 December, they were assembled at Butaritari with Mr. G. Williams, an administration official. Here the men were all closely questioned about the defences of
Although the remainder of the men on the Gilbert Island stations realised their companions had been either captured or killed, they refused to leave their posts, despite the offer of relief. In Degei which, because of enemy air activity, was permitted only as far north as Nonouti, after which supplies for the men on islands nearer the Japanese were transported by launch and canoe, moving by night and sheltering in the lagoons by day. On his return the master of the Degei reported that the morale of the men was still high.
From the time of the first Japanese reconnaissance of
When the Japanese came there was no panic among those men. Until they were apprehended they continued to send their vital messages, calmly and without haste, to the
The fate of these men was unknown until the islands were recaptured at great cost by an American landing force on
There is no explanation of the treatment of the two groups of captured coastwatchers and operators. Those taken in December were humanely treated, whereas those captured later were most cruelly used before they were killed, possibly in retaliation for bombing by American aircraft and the futile attempt at escape by a civilian member of the party when an American aeroplane flew over the island later in the day. Apparently the fact that civilians and soldiers were employed side by side was of no significance to the Japanese, nor is there any evidence that it influenced their behaviour, since the first-captured operators were
francs tireurs.
All those killed were later mentioned in despatches—Privates R. A. Ellis, R. I. Hitchon, D. H. Howe, R. Jones, C. A. Kilpin, R. M. McKenzie, J. H. Nichol, C. J. Owen, W. A. R. Parker and L. B. Speedy; and the operators, all of whom were given post-humous military rank—Lieutenant A. L. Taylor, Corporals H. R. C. Hearn, A. C. Heenan, J. J. McCarthy, A. E. McKenna, T. C. Murray and C. A. Pearsall. Sergeant Third, from Ocean Island, and Corporal P. B. Thorburn, his assistant, whose illness caused his removal from the island before the Japanese arrived, were also given military rank. A memorial erected on the island of
The treatment of prisoners of war by the Japanese varied according to the outlook of the officer commanding the particular camp in which they were held, and often also reflected the outlook of the individual. Private Were and the Menzies brothers, who spent three years and nine months as prisoners, most of the time at Indomitable and was captured in
Islands of the Gilbert Group were the extreme limit of the Japanese thrust south, though they bombed John Williams was used for their transport. For the most part the conduct of the coastwatchers was exemplary, despite their years of isolation. When a representative of the
Although the coastwatching service through the
The Rev. A. W. E. Silvester, a New Zealand missionary on the island of Helena was sunk after an engagement in the Vella Gulf, Silvester helped the coastwatchers to succour 160 survivors who reached the shore and were hidden for a week until they were taken off by a
A New Zealand naval rating,
Coastwatching stations established to the south of New Zealand in the Tagua on Ranui remained at an anchorage in Waterfall Inlet, in the Aucklands,
The first arrivals confirmed the visit of a German ship, the Erlangen, which sailed from Dunedin on
Apart from the heat in the north, the cold in the south, and the isolation of both, some of the
Throughout
IN addition to convoy duty in the
Following one of several bombardments of the Achilles, commanded by Captain C. A. L. Mansergh, DSC, RN,
Rear-Admiral C. A. L. Mansergh, CB, DSC, m.i.d., US Silver Star; born England, Achilles, 1942–43; HMNZS
Bombardments of Munda and Vila-Stanmore, combat narrative by Office of Naval Intelligence,
Captain Mansergh's report on the engagement, dated
‘The armament was manned by the AA Defence Watch, the highest degree of antiaircraft readiness short of action stations, namely, all 4-inch guns and control manned, seven Oerlikons manned, “B” and “X” turrets skeleton-manned for barrage fire and all lookouts posted.
‘At 0925 a formation of four American Grumman fighters was sighted at about 12,000 feet immediately above the ship. These aircraft were positively and correctly identified as American machines. Two minutes later a further group of four aircraft were sighted spiralling down through the clouds at an angle of sight of about 40 degrees ahead of the ship and the aircraft alarm was sounded.
‘The aircraft followed one another in quick succession, the first three attacking Honolulu without success and the fourth attacking
A few months later, during the progress of the battle for Leander was gravely damaged. She was commanded by Mansergh and for some months had been on convoy duty to Leander joined Rear-Admiral W. L. Ainsworth's task force to replace the cruiser Helena, which had been torpedoed in the Battle of Kula Gulf a week previously after surviving twelve major naval engagements in the Leander's radar was inferior to that of the American cruisers, she was placed between Ainsworth's flagship, the Honolulu, and the
The Leander came round promptly after seeing the movement of the flagship through a rent in the smoke clouds, but there was considerable bunching at the turn and drastic avoiding action had to be taken to prevent collisions as the cruisers and destroyers came into line again. The Leander was hit by a torpedo while executing this movement. The explosion tore a hole in her port side and flooded No. 1 boiler room; No. 2 boiler room had to be abandoned; the ship's electrical installations failed and five fuel tanks were wrecked. Seven men were killed. One gun crew and the upper deck fire party, numbering 21 all ranks, were swept overboard and the ship travelled some distance before this was noticed. Fifteen men were injured but the ship's crew, many of them in action for the first time, behaved like veterans throughout the engagement and afterwards. Two American destroyers, the Radford and the Jenkins, were detached by Ainsworth to escort the Leander 200 miles back to Leander was struck. Both cruisers, Honolulu and
New Zealand's little ships, the 600-ton corvettes, added a well-documented page to the country's naval tradition while they worked as part of the American naval command. Six of them spent lengthy periods in the forward zone and were actively engaged round Moa, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander P. Phipps, RNZNVR; HMNZS Kiwi, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander G. Bridson, RNZNVR; HMNZS Tui, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander J. G. Hilliard, RNZNVR; HMNZS Matai, commanded by Commander A. D. Holden, RNZNR, senior officer of the flotilla; HMNZS Gale, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander C. MacLeod, RNZNR; and HMNZS Breeze, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander A. O. Horler, RNZNR. These last two were small coastal ships taken over by the Government early in the war. Holden was
The corvettes' first ‘kill’ was one of Kiwi and Moa on the night of Kiwi's Asdic officer, Sub-Lieutenant D. H. Kiwi went into the attack, dropping six depth charges as she closed the distance between them, until the submarine could be seen outlined in the phosphorescence which is such a feature of tropical waters at night. A second release of depth charges forced the submarine to surface about Kiwi, being the nearer vessel, raced towards her with machine and 20-millimetre guns blazing and her searchlight, operated by Leading Signalman Howard Moa supported her sister ship, firing star shells to illuminate the murky tropic night. Both corvettes were outclassed by the submarine's heavier armament which by now had come into action. The Kiwi decided to ram her from about 150 yards. She struck the submarine on the port side to the rear of the conning tower, but was unable to cut through the ship's heavy plating. The Kiwi's guns put the submarine's 5.5-inch gun out of action, but her machine and six-pounder guns were still operating. Although he was mortally wounded and died later in the night, Buchanan continued to operate the Kiwi's searchlight, holding the enemy ship in its beam. Walnut (RN) and HMNZS Kiwi; Naval Officer-in-Charge, Kiwi slid up on the submarine's deck, spilling the Japanese crew into the water. As she retracted from this dangerous position, oil spouted from the submarine's tanks.
Kiwi's guns, which had been in action almost continuously for an hour, were now too hot to continue the fight. The Moa took over and scored more hits on the submarine, which struck a reef and sank before she could reach the shore. The Hon. Walter Nash later took I-1's flag back to New Zealand.
The Moa remained on patrol for the remainder of that night, and then, in company with the Tui, fought an engagement the following night off Cape Esperance, from which the Japanese had begun evacuating their troops. The two corvettes engaged four Japanese landing barges and sank two of them. Cordite on the Moa caught fire when she was struck by an enemy shell, but the flames were extinguished before any great damage was done.
As soon as the Japanese evacuation of Moa fell the task of carrying the first reconnaissance party there, and on the night of 17 February selected officers of 43 US Division and others from Navy and Marine units moved from
The Cdr P. Phipps; Moa was lost at Moa near the bridge, passed through Phipps's cabin, and exploded below. Five ratings were killed, seven seriously injured, and PhippsBay (RN) and HMNZS Scarba, Moa, Matai and Arabis; wounded,
The following August the corvette Tui was primarily responsible for the destruction of Japanese submarine I-17, a craft of 2563 tons, which had shelled the Californian coast in Tui left Tui to
Tui. I-17, which had spent from April to June in waters round
Until the Breeze on the night of 1–2 November laid mines off Cape Moltke to protect surface craft unloading in the bay off
‘The alert and courageous actions of the crews of these gallant little ships merits the highest praise’, Halsey observed in a report on their activities.
New Zealand's air strength in the
In planning air support and preliminary cover for the landing on
While the squadron maintained its routine and often monotonous flights for eight months, No. Air Mshl Sir Victor Goddard, KCB, CBE, DSM (US); born Harrow, England,
By 6 December the whole squadron, command of which passed later to Squadron Leader J. J. Achilles was put out of action. It was a pilot of No. 3 Squadron who reported the last run of the Tokyo Express to
New Zealand air strength on Oyashio and the Kagero, were strafed by the New Zealanders and sunk by the bombers; the third destroyer, Kuroshiro, was sunk by mines.
The New Zealand airmen made reconnaissance flights in all weathers, and weather in the
By the time Halsey was ready to strike for the
Throughout the months of
During the battle for
Halsey's air strength was sufficient by the middle of
Because of the prevailing conditions in the No. 14 Squadron at this time went to Santo instead of returning direct to New Zealand.
On 11 and 15 September No. 17 Squadron moved up from the
During this time important changes had been made in the organisation and administration of the Curtiss, then anchored in
Since many of the functions of a base organisation were already being undertaken by No. 1 Group Headquarters, it was decided late in
The consolidation of the
November and December were periods of intense activity for the air units of the
During a reconnaissance raid on the
During the foregoing period No.
New Zealand fighter pilots took part in all strikes on
The New Zealanders fought their last
From Wg Cdr T. J. MacLean de Lange, DFC;
New Zealand air units in the William Williams when she was attacked 120 miles south of Hearst, was sunk near Saugatuck between San Juan was torpedoed and sunk 300 miles south-east of
Catalinas of No. 6 Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander G. G. Stead, DFC,San Juan after she was torpedoed, and picked up survivors from the American ship Vanderbilt who were found floating on rafts off
At Halsey's request, New Zealand supplied several radar units for service in the
By the end of
THE history of the
Although, under the principle of unity of command, responsibility for the military security of both
Colonel J. P. Magrane, a member of the
Under the Americans
The Fijian Infantry Brigade came into being with the idea of sending a force overseas to play a more active part in the war, and this no doubt affected the commitment of units to the battle in the
In reorganising the By this time artillery units manning fixed coastal defence guns had been withdrawn from the Colony.
The first Fijian force to undertake service in the
This little action was fought out with grenades, rifles, and revolvers on sloping ground round the massive, tangled roots of a banyan tree, and was characteristic of swift individual action and thought which spelled victory in a type of warfare these men were fighting for the first time. As the remnants of the Japanese force fell back before the Americans towards Cape Esperance throughout January and February, patrols from Williams’ small but resolute force moved ahead of the advance, producing vital intelligence and creating havoc among the Japanese, whose morale was born of desperation. Their work was of such value that Major-General Alexander M. Patch, island commander of
The guerrillas wore camouflaged American jungle suits, the green and blotched material of which was difficult to detect among the tangled growth. New Zealand army boots were preferred to the soft rubber-soled jungle boot, and had a longer life. Arms were varied and consisted of Owen guns, rifles, revolvers and hand grenades, and the men all carried sufficient rations to last them for at least five days. Because mobility was of the first importance, these guerrillas carried as little personal gear as possible, consequently they suffered in some places from the unmerciful attention of mosquitoes. Patrols sometimes worked only one hundred yards apart but were unaware of the existence of each other. Malaria, control of which was not strictly administered until later, played havoc with this special party during its brief but intense period of activity, and when the
The American request for more
By the time the Fijian patrols were committed to action on
Conditions and territory, the worst encountered up to that time, hindered all action. The Tongans under Masefield gave valuable assistance to American units, who found the jungle a barrier not easily overcome, either physically or mentally, since the narrow trails were stoutly defended by Japanese strongposts. Between Zanana and stretching for miles towards
In planning his attack on
The first task allotted to Tripp's unit was the clearance of islands in the Roviana Lagoon. This was little more than an exercise. Patrols were then allotted to units of 43 US Division, one with 169 Regiment on the right flank and others with 172 Regiment, both of which worked as combat teams. Fighting was confused and uncertain in the early stages of the costly struggle for
Led by New Zealanders, the commando patrols acquitted themselves fearlessly in their first clashes with the enemy along the
Two other New Zealanders, Corporal A. M. J. Millar and Corporal W. F. Ashby,
After fourteen days of such action, which tried both nerves and stamina to the limits of human endurance, most of the commandos were withdrawn on 15 July for a rest at
Casualties, malaria, and nervous exhaustion so depleted 43 US Division that
At the end of July the third American division, the 25th, was committed in the final struggle for
During the final assault on the airfield, a period of three days marked by determined and ruthless fighting, valuable work was done by the commando patrols, but they lost heavily. Heckler's patrol reported the withdrawal of stretcher cases and supplies down the Bairoko Trail to the coast, and this information enabled the
The American divisional commanders paid generous tribute to the courage and enterprise of the Fijian guerrillas and their New Zealand leaders. Beightler, commander of 37 US Division, in a reference to the work of the non-commissioned officers of the commandos, said that their capacity for traversing the jungle both by day and by night for many miles was not equalled by any American troops. The
These tributes were both modest and just. The New Zealand officers and non-commissioned officers exercised a steadying influence on the less-experienced American troops, many of them seeing action for the first time. Others had fought through the
The commando unit returned to
These patrols were recalled to
The active service life of 2 Commando
Almost three years after its formation, President Hayes. Half the officers and many of the non-commissioned officers were New Zealanders, three of them former instructors lent to
Because of the increasing number of
On
Units of Niagara in which he was travelling was sunk by an enemy mine outside Auckland Harbour on 19 June. He was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, and commanded the battalion throughout the whole of its combat life.
The battalion now found itself a part of 14 US Corps, which had taken over the perimeter at
The conquest of the whole of the large island of
All this activity had the desired effect. The Japanese commander moved men, artillery, and heavy equipment from the mainland of Saratoga and Princeton, held off any surface interference during the actual
The original beach-heads were extended throughout November and December until, by March, the perimeter ran roughly four miles along the coast and three miles inland, but it was overlooked by a series of low foothills shelving down from high mountain ranges which form the backbone of
Inside this giant bite of country, American engineers and naval construction battalions, working with the speed and precision which made them essential to any
When the
Active patrolling by small groups from 1
The task was allotted to a reinforced company of six officers and 198 other ranks under the command of Captain R. O. Freeman, which set out on 29 December for Ibu, a native village 30 miles beyond the perimeter and
Ibu, 30 miles inside enemy territory, was immediately developed as a strongpoint. Road blocks were established along the approaches and patrols fanned out along the jungle trails, some of them reaching the north-east coast and returning with information of vital importance to the Corps commander, who was thus able to harass the enemy by directing air attacks on his concentrations and bivouac areas. The Japanese, aware of the activities of the patrols based on Ibu, frequently tried to ambush them. Lieutenant G. A. Thompson and Lieutenant Fantham, leaders of one strong patrol, fell into such a trap but fought their way out, Thompson spending the night under a fallen tree and escaping in the early morning by wriggling to a river bank, where he was helped by friendly natives.
Because of its value in supplying information, Griswold decided to retain the Ibu outpost for longer than at first anticipated, but the problem of evacuating the sick and wounded, which would have taken several precarious days over mountain trails, had first to be overcome. Upton and officers of Corps Headquarters visited the outpost early in January and decided that the problem could be overcome by carving a small airfield out of the forest. This was soon accomplished, using a few axes dropped from the air and the garrison's entrenching tools and bayonets to clear an area of ground 200 yards long by 50 yards wide. Every available man worked throughout the daylight hours, and on the third day a small reconnaissance plane landed and took off again without mishap. A regular but hazardous service began the following day from this tiny strip, so dwarfed by the forest around it that it
Fortified by this means of communication, the work of the patrols went on through January, penetrating into the heart of enemy territory. The action of one such patrol, audaciously led by
Intelligence reports at the end of January continued to indicate the massing of enemy strength in and around Ibu, despite the work of the patrols. Reinforcements under Captain J. W. Gosling were therefore despatched from the perimeter on 3 February to strengthen the garrison to ten officers and 411 other ranks. Then, on 8 February, Upton flew out to take over command, but by that time the Ibu garrison was almost surrounded by enemy moving in from both
A strong combined patrol from 129 US Infantry Regiment and 1
Meanwhile Corner found his way blocked by determined Japanese attacks on the road posts and retired along the trail he had just traversed, taking up a defensive position at a ravine which offered the only good natural barrier. He was joined there later in the afternoon with the main force under Upton, who was confronted with a disturbing situation. All escape routes were blocked by the Japanese, who greatly outnumbered him, and no help was available from American or
Gosling and his party were guided in that night by Corner, in such darkness that each man was instructed to hold the equipment of the man in front of him. A check of all ranks revealed that 25 were still missing, including a section under Sergeant B. D. Pickering which had manned a road block while the main party escaped. They rejoined Upton next day, after fighting their way through the jungle, as did all other small groups from the battalion. On 19 February the force reached the coast intact and with only one man wounded. In those four days, travelling slowly and with the utmost difficulty, the Ibu force climbed 5000 feet through dense forest drenched with rain, and carried arms and equipment, which included Vickers guns, 3-inch mortars, and food for more than 600 people—soldiers and natives. ‘The success of the
The massing of these enemy troops in the neighbourhood of Ibu was a prelude to an attempt to drive the American forces off the island in a co-ordinated attack from both land and sea. Intercepted signals gave Corps Headquarters ample warning to prepare for this attack, which began on 9 March with an assault on the perimeter in what became known as the ‘Easter action’. All possibility of air and naval support from the sea, however, had been dissipated by the capture and occupation of
On 23 March the Japanese attacked again, but with decreasing violence, and once more the American line was restored by vigorous counter-attacks. Immediately action died away,
Daily encounters developed into sullen actions, which often required the support of artillery and mortars before nests of
When the Japanese attacked the perimeter in March,
Late in March, while
When the force withdrew,
The East-West Trail, leading south from the Piva River and crossing the
At the end of a week's continuous activity, patrols reported that the enemy had moved into the valleys from the higher country, and artillery fire was directed on them, forcing them to retire still further beyond the perimeter. Road blocks established on both the East-West and Waggon Trails were taken over by
Meanwhile
Meritorious work was accomplished by Lieutenant A. P.
While
During those seven days the battalion gathered up a considerable quantity of equipment, including two 75-millimetre guns, two 47-millimetre and two 37-millimetre, and destroyed quantities of stores and equipment. As the main force of the battalion moved along the coast and inland, other patrols moved up and down the coast, increasing their mobility by using small landing craft to establish beach-heads, and investigated any signs of enemy activity in the locality. When a gunboat arrived off the coast to support the ground force Japanese gunners opened fire on it, thus revealing the site of their 6-inch gun to the spotting aircraft which was operating with
On 21 June the battalion was again despatched to the Mawaraka area, with the dual task of destroying the Japanese headquarters at Mosigetta and aiding Solomon Island natives who had obtained arms and ammunition and were engaged in a limited resistance movement in country at the headwaters of the Jaba River. As on the former occasion, Voelcker's battalion was strengthened by the addition of American artillery, engineer and chemical mortar
Maps of the region, although supplemented with air photographs, were incomplete and often led to confusion in the identification of rivers and tidal lagoons along the coast, most of which closely resembled each other. Early on the morning of 22 June three companies of the battalion moved farther south, with the intention of landing at Tavera River, three miles beyond the Jaba, leaving one company to protect the supporting artillery at the original beach-head. Once again there was confusion and the force landed instead at the Maririci, still farther to the south in enemy territory and within reach of Mawaraka. Here another perimeter was established for further operations. Behind the beach tidal lagoons and swamps of the river deltas made the country almost impassable, but a trail led along the coast, following the sandhills and a narrow belt of reasonably firm foreshore. The Japanese ranged on the beach-head, but fortunately any shells burst in the tops of the surrounding trees. At daybreak on the morning of 23 June, D Company continued to move south along the beach to Mawaraka Point, a small feature jutting out towards an off-shore reef and covering a village of that name which was occupied by Japanese. Good progress was made until the company began to cross an open stretch of country, which unhappily was covered by Japanese emplacements on the point. A supporting barrage for the advance was given by American artillery units on the coast and gunboats in the bay, and the company was able to establish another perimeter in preparation for a further advance. C Company, in continuing the advance to the point, ran into trouble where a section of beach was backed by tidal swamps and lagoons of the Hupai River delta. A Company attempted to go to its aid but was also pinned down.
Meanwhile E Company, which had moved about 300 yards inland in an attempt to join the Mawaraka Road, reached within
Late in the afternoon of 23 June, Voelcker asked for and received permission to withdraw his force and return to the perimeter. Under cover of darkness that night the companies transferred to landing craft waiting off the beaches, to which some of the units made their way after losing direction and wandering for hours in the swamp. In this, the last active operation of the Fijian forces in the
Dittmer, who retained his brigade headquarters in Altnitah, calling at
Intensive training of the Fijian brigade continued in the Colony in anticipation of another move overseas to the
NEW Zealand's participation in the 1939–45 War began and ended in the Nurnberg. These men learned of the outbreak of the European war on Leander, at that time commanded by Captain J. W. Rivett-Carnac, DSC, RN.Leander and Commodore Commanding NZ Squadron, 1937–39; Flag Officer, British Assault Area,
In
The first men for the defence of the island assembled in some secrecy at
Like all other pioneering service units in the
The first officer in charge of the detachment was not temperamentally suited to command an isolated garrison in a trying climate, and his conduct brought adverse reports from the administration because of his disturbing influence among a small community thrown on its own resources. After two months on
Lt-Col G. P. O'Leary, OBE; Aorangi was diverted to Fanning early in November to embark one officer and one sick member of the garrison. The new commander's knowledge of the native language enabled work to be speeded up on long-delayed and ill-organised camp construction, and more suitable native huts replaced the tents. By the end of the year the first medical officer, Captain A. A.
Moore continued to speed up the work in hand, extending and completing reasonable defences and constructing a road from English Harbour to the camp to avoid sea transport of supplies in lighters. The loss of the Niagara outside Auckland Harbour on
The second relief, consisting of two officers and 33 other ranks, reached Fanning on Matai, the hire of which cost the Army Department £3366 5s. In Aorangi, which was escorted to Fanning by HMS Monowai, and reached the island on 7 April. Moore, after a period in New Zealand, returned to the island with this draft, and took command of a garrison of 105 all ranks, with Houston as his second-in-command. All ranks assisted with the emplacement of the naval gun, which was completed with urgency and gave the garrison and inhabitants a reasonable sense of security.
Passing ships transported small groups to Fanning during the succeeding months. Four signallers arrived on Limerick called to embark a sick man, who was not replaced until the Waikato arrived with supplies the following November. Then, on
The Fanning garrison of 113 all ranks was relieved by 150 American troops, artillery and infantry, in Rigel on 17 May. After leave the men were drafted into units, and most of them went overseas, as the previous garrisons had done, to serve with
The defence of the Kingdom of
On Maui Pomare from New Zealand—a limited number of sets of web equipment and rifles with which to arm the recruits. Two instructors reached
When 8 Brigade Group moved into
Hostilities with
With the advent of American forces into the
Although Sumner, reached Nukualofa on
The time came, however, when New Zealand was called upon by President Jackson, after advanced parties had been recalled from the
This battalion was the first of
The satisfactory progress of the battle for
In the negotiations with South Pacific Command Headquarters, the New Zealand Government deprecated any tendency to distribute New Zealand units unnecessarily, and especially odd units in
I assure you that we are most anxious to co-operate in every possible way, and the last thing we wish is to play a passive role, especially in existing circumstances. We will make immediate inquiry as to the possibility of meeting this request, but it would be unfair to you and to us not to tell you at once our immediate reaction, which is this: This Dominion has been at war for three years during which period our resources have been seriously strained. WE are now attempting to maintain two divisions overseas in addition to substantial air force and naval units, together with the minimum forces required for the defence of this country. All told, we have withdrawn from industry for the armed services the equivalent of 11 per cent of the total population of the Dominion. We are confronted with a very serious manpower problem which it is impossible for us to solve while we are, as at present, entirely in the dark as to the situation in the zone of
That was written on
By July all Young was torpedoed 40 miles south of
Brigadier F. L. Hunt was given command of the brigade group and established his headquarters at Vaikeli, taking over the installations vacated by the Americans, with his battalions tactically disposed in the former areas. His principal staff officers and commanders, most of them from New Zealand, were:
The strength in armament contrasted impressively with the few rifles and machine guns possessed by the original hastily trained units of 1939–40. Included in the brigade group were one heavy and one light anti-aircraft battery and two field batteries of 18-pounders, officers and NCOs for which, as well as for the two Tongan battalions, were provided by New Zealand. Six 6-inch naval guns emplaced by the Americans for coastal defence were
Although the Canterbury battalion was under strength, by
Puttick's recommendation for cutting down the force to 530 New Zealanders and 1215 Tongans was accepted by Halsey, who stated in reply that he considered the only garrison necessary should be sufficient simply for the maintenance of the existing service installations and that any reduction would be in accordance with his ‘established policy of rolling up the rear areas and bringing all South Pacific resources to bear upon the enemy in the combat zone.’ Puttick, a little over-cautious in the light of events, thought the anti-submarine defence was still necessary, so that a considerable body of New Zealanders remained on the island until the end of the year. Most of them, however, departed late in December, when the strategical and tactical role of 16 Brigade Group ended its existence of less than a year, but a number stayed until the following year to assist with the demobilisation of the Tongans and the disposal of military equipment.
Major R. B.
Not the least of New Zealand's contribution to the agriculture of
It may be appropriate here to mention that defending any
Although
Soon after the outbreak of war with
An adequate garrison, however, was necessary for its defence and to deny it to possible enemy raiding parties. The South Pacific Command immediately set about its plans for the construction of an aerodrome, and early in
For defence and protection Ghormley requested from New Zealand a minimum garrison force of one infantry battalion, three batteries of anti-aircraft artillery, hospital and other services and, when the airfield was complete, one flight each of fighter and dive-bomber aircraft. The only units suitable and ready were those from
On Wahine, escorted by HMS Monowai and the Clark.
By the time N Force reached the island, work had been started on preparing the land for the aerodrome, and most of the garrison saw the mile-long avenue of 100-foot-high Norfolk pines before it was sacrificed to the remorseless dictates of war, much to the grief of the islanders, most of them descendants of the historical ship Bounty. There were about 700 of them, living an uneventful and detached life on an island where natural beauty and an equable climate combined to make it most pleasantly habitable. They found that the influx of twice their number in service personnel gave an impetus and industry to their daily round such as they had never previously known, and they were soon to be linked with the outside world, hitherto available only by infrequent visits from ships, by a regular air service.
Barry established Force Headquarters in the house and grounds of ‘Karsik, lay there for 23 days. Unfortunately rain fell soon after the arrival of the force, turning the dusty red roads into bogs and adding to the discomfort of those sleeping out of doors. Because of faulty loading, tents did not come off the supply ship Waipari for some weeks, so that many of the troops slept under improvised shelters, in deserted houses or under the pungent vaults of the pines, which they had preferred to do in the fine weather.
A natural barrier of cliffs defends most of the Norfolk coastline, so that any tactical scheme involved the defence of only certain possible landing areas. Units and guns were tactically sited to meet such eventuality, remote though it was, with mobility the underlying principle of every scheme. Coastwatchers were linked with a central operations room, but there were the usual alarms and blasphemous excursions before the arrival of any ships off the island.
As soon as defence plans had been exercised to operational efficiency, a roading and camp construction plan, invariably associated with every New Zealand project in the
In order to ensure a regular supply of fresh meat and overcome the tendency to reduce too drastically the island's limited stock of beef, a modest flock of 300 sheep reached the island on New Year's Day
N Force staff worked ceaselessly to prevent an epidemic of that peevish condition known as ‘browning off’, which became so prevalent in the Rev. K. Liggett;
At the end of
Three months after the relief moved in, however, the strength of N Force was reduced. All Grade I men, of whom there were
One of the more important aspects of the value of
* * *
Before the Achilles, commanded by Captain W. E. Parry, RN, was despatched to Papeete with Mr. C. A. Berendsen, head of the Prime Minister's Department, who held discussions with the administration authorities, after which a New Zealand representative was sent to take up temporary residence there. New Zealand was primarily concerned for the protection of the valuable phosphate works on Makatea, one of the smaller of the
New Zealand's assistance included the supply of 24 Thompson sub-machine guns, 24,000 rounds of ammunition, web equipment, and drill cloth for uniforms. Her Government also established a credit of £7000 to tide the French administration over the early war period and the collapse of Monowai and the Canadian ship Prince Rupert were sent in
IN the final thrust against Japan MacArthur, who assumed command of all Olympic, provided for a landing by 6 US Army on the southern coast of Kyushu, the southernmost island of Coronet, for which nine infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, and three Marine divisions of 8 and 10 US Armies were to be employed, with a floating reserve of eleven divisions of 1 US Army which was to follow the first two armies ashore. These two landings were to be supported by fifty air groups and the Third and Fifth Fleets of the
While these plans were being worked out in detail, the results of the experimental atom bomb, detonated in a desert area of New Mexico, were revealed to Truman, Churchill and Stalin, then meeting at AVM Sir Leonard Isitt, KBE, Legion of Merit (US); Missouri, in Tokyo Bay at 0908 hours on Gambia, New Zealand's cruiser, commanded by Captain R. A. B. Edwards, CBE, RN, then serving with the
Units of the British Commonwealth sea, land, and air forces were included in the American armies detailed for the final assault before
Discussions regarding the size and task of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force were long delayed and the subject of lengthy political exchanges beginning in the middle of
Component countries were each required to supply their quota of officers and other ranks from the three services for the headquarters of the force. It was the first experiment of its kind and a pointer to future operations requiring small units from the Commonwealth to be co-ordinated under one commander. This took time to reach a workable basis, until the difference between integration and co-operation was understood. Part of the trouble was due to individual directives from governments which were sometimes at variance with the wishes of the BCOF commander, or to the vigorous nationalism which sometimes mitigated against the success it finally achieved.
Under the original agreement only one prefecture, that of Wg Cdr D. F. St George, DFC; Glory on 23 March and flew its planes into Iwakuni, a large Japanese aerodrome on the shores of the Inland Sea, later moving to Bofu, terminal in
Because of the legal aspect of an occupation force and the powers of the commanding officer, the New Zealand component of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force was known officially as
While the units and services were assembling, Stewart flew to New Zealand for political and service consultations, leaving Sanders in command and to accompany the force to
After the surrender of
The force sailed from Strathmore on
The majority of the first New Zealand component of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force consisted of non-volunteers, who were not vastly interested in demonstrating to a conquered people the democratic way of life, another of the objectives of the occupation policy. Circumstances helped to provoke this attitude. Conditions at first were not all the men had been led to believe by some ill-advised advance publicity, and the drab and dreary barracks and camp areas, after the delights of
There were no leave centres ready, though such organisations as the Part of this directive read: ‘Every member of BCOF must bear in mind that … in dealing with the Japanese, he is dealing with a conquered enemy who, by making war against us, has caused deep suffering and loss in many thousands of homes throughout the British Empire. Your relations with this defeated enemy must be guided by your own individual good judgment and your sense of discipline. You must be formal and correct. You must not enter their homes or take part in their family life. Your unofficial dealings with the Japanese must be kept to a minimum.’
Some thousands of Japanese, both men and women, employed by the force as servants and labourers, watched closely the bearing and conduct of the men of all ranks, and it was this personal behaviour which conveyed the idea of democracy to the Japanese as nothing else did among the masses. Close contact with the Japanese people was difficult for a number of reasons and in many instances undesirable. One of the factors was the insuperable language barrier; another was the high incidence of venereal disease and tuberculosis among the poorer farming, labouring, and artisan classes which constituted the majority of the people in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force area. These were the greatest arguments against fraternisation, but healthy contacts were made with Japanese employees, shopkeepers, and
Soon after settling in, and in conformity with the other components of the force,
In an effort to provide some relief from camp life, 2 NZEF Headquarters selected a beautiful stretch of sandy beach backed by pine trees and established among them a tented rest centre, which was named Waikuku. It was only a few miles from
One of the most disturbing features of the occupation, particularly during its early period, was the operation of the black market, which was partly the fault of an unfair rate of exchange—a rate so low that servicemen were unable to purchase anything other than a few necessities at their own canteens. The Japanese, so acutely short of such essentials as clothing, sugar, tobacco, matches, soap and bread, willingly gave more than the market value for these commodities, which brought one hundred times their value when sold surreptitiously. Officers were not exempt from such transactions. Periodical increases in the rate of exchange eased black market traffic in canteen supplies, but never entirely wiped it out, even when the yen rate was raised from 60 to more than 1000 to the £ sterling.
In accordance with prior planning, the men who arrived from Empire Pride and the remainder in the Chitral in August. By 18 August, except for volunteers who remained from the original force, the change-over was complete. At the end of June Brigadier L. Potter reached
Originally
With the change-over to young and enthusiastic volunteers, a different atmosphere pervaded the force and prevailed until it was withdrawn. This was confirmed by a senior battalion commander in his evidence during a court of inquiry in
After almost two and a half years as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, the New Zealand component was withdrawn in
The Air Force representatives remained with BCOF until
In addition to
The New Zealander, with few exceptions, made a reliable soldier for occupation duty—a duty which carried with it immense privilege and power among a people to whom obedience was implicit. He rarely departed from an attitude of fairness and decency and controlled with ease a population among which, in the
THE uncertain state in which 3 New Zealand Division was maintained from its inception, and its removal from the order of battle at the height of its efficiency as an amphibious fighting force, suggest that it was beyond the manpower resources of New Zealand to maintain two divisions in the field, or that the available resources were mishandled and not employed to their greatest advantage.
At the outbreak of war, the state of the Dominion's defences and shortages of military equipment were eloquent proof of the condition into which her armed services had drifted during the years when disarmament replaced preparedness as a political ideal. In
It is readily admitted that New Zealand's commitments in the
If the Japanese were to be held as far from New Zealand's shores as possible, a policy advocated in 1942–43 by the Chiefs
There were times, too, when New Zealand's demands for men and material to defend her as yet unmolested shores seemed to ignore the more pressing needs of actual and vital battle fronts, though no doubt the lack of intelligence concerning Japanese intentions influenced all Allied planning.
It was increasingly obvious in
With only two brigades,
The existence of
Even after the Division was withdrawn from the forward zone, so that men could be diverted to industry on the home front for the production of increased food supplies for the American Pacific forces and the
During the whole of its existence
In the
Barrowclough's task, as frustrating as any New Zealand commander has been called on to undertake, was made more exacting and involved by perplexing changes and lack of resources which would have reduced to impotence a leader less resilient and resolute. Outwardly unemotional and completely free from displays of temperament or showmanship, his logical mind and inflexible character enabled him to overcome great difficulties. His brigades were often separated by leagues of ocean and his whole command dispersed over thousands of miles, a condition which contributed little to the smooth functioning of the force. His tact and discretion enabled him to adapt himself, with the least noticeable discord, to the too rigid rules of the American high command which, when issuing operation orders, leave subordinate commanders little or no freedom to meet any tactical situations as they present themselves.
Barrowclough's ‘charter’, which placed him under Army Headquarters, did not allow him the authority accorded the GOC of
One predominant aspect of the The amicable relations which existed at all times between the commander of
The division evolved a system of training, tactics, and maintenance, proved by the test of actual experience over a period of years, which should be invaluable for future guidance. Each succeeding action revealed that troops engaged in amphibious operations among groups of tropical islands require equipment undreamed of in land combat—small landing craft for the use of senior officers, specially designed wireless equipment to overcome the peculiar difficulties of communication in the jungle, a special habitable boat for the divisional commander, a revised list of transport for island warfare where landing craft are often more necessary than motor vehicles, special clothing for the jungle and the heat, and special foods to overcome the exhaustion of heat and fatigue. That Barrowclough trained his division to a high state of efficiency was proved by the despatch with which its tasks were completed, reduced casualty lists which could have been much higher with less competent troops, and the emergence of the whole force from its engagements as knowledgeable and proficient in jungle and amphibious operations, in the opinion of the American command, as any troops in the
It is impossible to write of New Zealand's commitments and action in the
All operations in the earlier stages of the South Pacific war were governed by time, space, and limited resources. There were never sufficient men or equipment to mount an overwhelming offensive; the whole campaign was conducted with an economy which made its ultimate success all the more meritorious. If landing craft were lost in an action or by storms they could not be replaced. Reserves of men and material were held on islands hundreds of miles away from the scene of action. During the greater part of
Another difficulty in the advance through the
New Zealand ground forces played no part in the battle for
One of the more unfortunate aspects of campaigning in the
As yet the importance of the
Barrowclough's special order, published on 19 October 1944 at Manurewa, disbanding 3 NZ Division:
The greater part of 2 NZEF IP has now been dispersed in one way or another and the Third New Zealand Division Headquarters will cease to function as from
I want to tell you how proud I have been of the Division and the whole of its Base organisation. It was not my privilege to command the Force from its inception nor to have any part in its initial training. It was my good fortune to command it when the supreme test of battle tried out the value of that initial training, and I am eternally indebted to Generals Cunningham and Mead and to all of you for the fine spirit and stern discipline which was so manifestly engendered in the early days of your existence. A commander owes everything to his troops. His own reputation depends so utterly and entirely on their behaviour in action. I very gratefully acknowledge your courage and devotion to duty and the uniformly high standards you established in the performance of every task it was my duty to call upon you to perform.
For most of you the war is not yet over and your services may be required in another theatre. It is a matter of regret that this further service will not be with the Division nor with the units for which we have so warm a love and regard. This is as inevitable as it is regretful. I know, however, you are qualified to take your place in any formation to which you may be posted and that you will serve therein with credit to yourselves and to your new units. My own interest in ex-members of 3 New Zealand Division and its ancillary services will never wane and I shall regard it as my pleasing duty to further your interests in any way I can. I wish you the best of good fortune—for the rest of the war and afterwards.
Appeals for Assistance
Cable message from the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser, to the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, care of the British Embassy, Washington, despatched from Wellington on :
The New Zealand Government have from time to time called attention to the strategic importance of Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, the violent and successful attacks by the Japanese upon
As you may perhaps know also, the New Zealand Government, at the suggestion and with the co-operation of the
Early offensive action by the substantial
Another telegram to Mr. Churchill, setting out the equipment required for the New Zealand Military Forces, followed the same day and asked for the following:
List of equipment required by New Zealand Military Forces:
On 25 December Fraser despatched another signal to
On 27 December a further signal was sent to Mr. Churchill containing deficiencies in Naval and Air equipment, and asking that 171 light tanks be added to the list of Army deficiencies sent on 24 December. The more important parts of this message read:
Naval requirements:
A detailed list of deficiencies in vessels (which include 13 port minesweepers, 15 port anti-submarine vessels, 12 Fairmile motor launches, and 7 ocean convoy anti-submarine vessels) and Naval equipment is being despatched to the Admiralty (repeated to New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer,
Air requirements:
A: Equipment required for
Bomber reconnaissance squadrons 2; Fighter squadron 1; Catalina squadron 1; RDF sets 4.
These squadrons to be fully equipped to the normal operational scale, plus appropriate reserves of aircraft and engines, all necessary maintenance
B: Equipment urgently required and already on order to complete original
Hudson III 34; Ansons 14; Catalinas 6; Tanker trailers, 900-gallon, 14; rifles 5000; revolvers ·38, 700; RDF sets 7.
C: Additional equipment urgently required to bring New Zealand air strength up to four GR squadrons and one flying boat squadron, plus reserves. (This strength is regarded as the minimum necessary to deal with enemy raids but not invasion.):
Hudson III 32, Catalinas 6; tanker trailers 7; and RDF sets 4.
D: Equipment required to enable pilots in future to be operationally trained in New Zealand as requested by Commander-in-Chief Far East, and also to provide: (i) emergency fighter support for land operations in New Zealand, and (ii) additional bomber effort in such operations:
Hurricane I, or similar American fighter type, 36; Hudson III, or other fairly modern medium bomber type, 24.
By February information had been received from
Directive To The Commander-In-Chief Of The
By agreement among the Governments of
The
You will appoint a commander of the
In consonance with the basic strategic policy of the governments concerned, your operations will be designed to accomplish the following:
Hold the island positions between the
Support the operations of the forces in the South West Pacific Area.
Contain Japanese forces within the Pacific Theatre.
Support the defence of the continent of
Protect the essential sea and air communications.
Prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by
You will not be responsible for the internal administration of the respective forces under your command. You are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.
You are authorised to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.
When task forces of your command operate outside the
Commanders of all armed forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.
Your Staff will include officers assigned by the governments concerned, based upon requests made directly to the national commanders of the various forces in your Area.
The governments concerned will exercise direction of operations in the
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over such related factors as are necessary for proper implementation, including the allocation of forces and war materials.
The Joint
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the land defence of New Zealand, subject to such strategic decisions affecting this responsibility as may be made by you for the conduct of naval operations in the
Change
In the exercise of command over armed forces which the New Zealand Government has assigned, or may assign, for the local defence of New Zealand, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be the Agency through which such local command is exercised.
In the exercise of command the principles of command as set forth in paragraph 14 of ABC-1 are applicable.
With regard to the possible movement of New Zealand forces out of New Zealand territory, the following by the
‘Proposals of the
Dividing Line Between Indian Theatre and Pacific Theatre
From Cape Kami in the Luichow Peninsula around the coast of the Tonkin Gulf,
Definition of South West Pacific Area
The westerly boundary of the South West Pacific Area is the westerly boundary of the Pacific Theatre, the Area including necessary naval and air operational areas off the west coast of
Definition of South East Pacific Area
From the Mexican-Guatemala western boundary south-westerly to Latitude 11 degrees North, Longitude 110 degrees West; thence south.
Definition of the
The
North Pacific Area, North of Latitude 42 degrees North;
Central Pacific Area, between the Equator and Latitude 42 degrees North;
South Pacific Area, South of the Equator.
Letter from General Barrowclough to General Puttick concerning the use of Fijian units with
Your letter of 18 May did not reach me till ten o'clock yesterday (Sunday) evening, and I am replying to it at once. Fortunately I had my two senior Brigadiers with me for a conference on other matters and I discussed the situation, in confidence, with them.
I appreciate the extraordinary difficulties which confront the War Cabinet in meeting my demand for troops, and I hope I may be permitted to say how much I appreciate the efforts that are being made by War Cabinet and you personally to implement the policy of bringing this Division up to strength. Tactically and strategically it is unquestionably right to deploy such forces as New Zealand can deploy, in the islands that constitute the outer fringe of our defence. New Zealand cannot be invaded whilst we hold the line
I ought to say at once that I should be very happy and proud to accept a Fijian Brigade.
But I feel bound to renew my request that the Fijian Brigade be accepted in addition to and not in substitution for any part of 3rd New Zealand Division. I have not overlooked the manpower difficulties that stand in the way of my proposals. On the information before me it seems practically impossible to maintain both 2nd and 3rd Divisions, especially if the older members of
What I am about to say may touch on matters of policy, the decision of which rests with War Cabinet and not with me. I disclaim any intention of attempting to usurp the functions of War Cabinet in such matters of
The resolution to bring this Division up to full strength has had a very marked effect on the morale of this Force. The belief that we shall eventually be given an active role as distinct from a purely garrison job has resulted in an unbelieveable improvement in our state of training and readiness for war. I know that, but for the fact that we are still short of some of our units, we are an infinitely better division than any American division that I have seen—Marines included. Our physical standards, our tactical knowledge, our willingness and keenness to work, our staff and administrative work, far surpasses that of the American Forces. This is no vain or idle boast. It can be demonstrated to any observer and is virtually admitted by American officers, who are astounded at the vigour of the exercises we are performing in the steep, bush-clad mountains of this Island. There is now a fine unit, brigade, and divisional spirit throughout the Force.
I am sure I am correct in saying that the men in this Force want to fight as the 3rd New Zealand Division or the KIWI Division. Whilst many of the men would like to go to the if there was no prospect of our fighting here, I am sure none of my units would wish to go if there was a prospect of our getting an active role. I am certain they would not wish to go as reinforcements whose unit organisation would be broken up on arrival in Egypt.
If any units are sent from this Division as reinforcements to the
This conflict between the manpower demands of the
I am sure none of us have anything but pride and affection for the
I do not forget that the suggestion is that by the inclusion of the
A few of us for years have regarded the bearing of arms in defence of the State as both the duty and the privilege of every citizen of the State. When the war broke out most people recognised it as a duty though they did not all see it as a privilege. Today, after long and arduous preparation, most of my troops now regard it as a privilege as well as a duty. That privilege has been extended to the
In conclusion I wish to repeat that I have no intention of attempting to formulate the policy of War Cabinet on this matter. I regard myself as merely the advocate before Parliament of the troops which Parliament has placed under my command. If the decision is against us we shall see broken and destroyed the work of many arduous months, but I know we shall all be willing to ‘stoop and build it up with worn-out tools.’ I ask that these views be placed before the Prime Minister and I enclose an extra copy of this letter for that purpose. If any question should arise which makes it desirable that I should visit
With very kind regards,
Special order of the day disbanding two battalions of the division, promulgated on
It is with very great regret that I have to announce that it has been decided that this division will be reorganised on a two-brigade basis. This will necessitate the disbandment of two of our infantry units—the First Battalion of the Ruahine Regiment and the First Battalion of the Scottish Regiment. An infantry battalion is much more than a mere tactical unit. It is a band of men associated together by a strong bond of comradeship and brotherhood in arms. It is an association that is unique in human experience, and there is nothing less than tragedy in the contemplation of the breaking up of such a special community.
I need hardly say that the decision to disband these two fine battalions was accepted only because it was inevitable. The demand for men, already very considerable in respect of New Zealand's commitments in the
A soldier suffers many vicissitudes of fortune and many disappointments. There can be no greater disappointment than that which is felt by the soldier who is compelled to sever his association with the regiment of which he is a part and of which he is so justly proud. On behalf of every member of this force I wish to tender to the commanding officers and members of the Ruahines and the Scots our sincerest sympathy with them in the disbandment of the battalions which they are compelled to leave, and a warm welcome into the ranks of any infantry battalion to which they may ultimately be posted. We shall indeed be proud to have them serving with us.
Interview with Governor Laigret, 18 December 1943
In order to avoid misunderstanding and to ensure amicable relations with the French administration in
Before coming to
For 90 years the French flag has been floating over
The population which lives here is formed of native elements entirely civilised according to French methods of colonisation; of Indo-Chinese elements, introduced to the island before the war to supplement the labour supply (the Indo-Chinese equally civilised); Javanese elements, refugees from the Netherland East Indies; and finally and above all French elements of French stock who have populated
That the inhabitants of
That, as in
That from
That when,
The Caledonians put the island in a state of defence. I had the honour recently to take the high Allied military authorities, English and American, over the points of resistance established by the French with no outside help. I can state that these high military authorities were very much impressed with what they saw.
That New Caledonia has welcomed with enthusiasm the Allied troops stationed here for the needs of war, and while the inhabitants of the country were undergoing (and are still undergoing as a duty) the great inconveniences arising from this influx of troops, a second contingent of volunteers left for
Today I know that:
Publicly Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, paid a striking homage to
That the inhabitants of
That the New Zealanders, on the other hand, appreciate this difference, and it is a pleasure for me to point this out.
That the New Caledonians are more attached to
In the near future I shall be leaving this country with this happy and comforting conviction. And since I have the opportunity of meeting journalists belonging to the great American democracy, I shall say in conclusion that I wish to Governor Tallec, who will be here soon, that he may find from the American High Command on the island more understanding in his dealing that these authorities have to have with the local Government.
I hope that the American citizens will never forget that, if their troops are in
Mr. Fraser's public statement on role of New Zealand's Armed Forces, made in September 1944:
As a result of the Quebec Conference, and of the advice just received from Mr. Churchill, it is now possible to come to decisions regarding the role of our Armed Forces in the remaining phases of the war against
Army Headquarters,
New Zealand Military Forces,
Wellington, C. 1
MEMORANDUM for:
Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister
Appreciation of the Problem of the Withdrawal of One or Other of the 2nd or 3rd New Zealand Divisions
As directed I have prepared the attached appreciation for your perusal.
I have the following comments to submit regarding it:
The appreciation deals with the problem of withdrawing one of the Divisions and does not discuss the question whether such action should or should not be taken.
You will appreciate that certain factors such as ‘Relative Strategical Importance of European and Pacific Theatres’, ‘Present and Pending Operations’, and ‘Shipping’ to some extent, require a more extensive knowledge of Allied resources, strategical plans and intentions, and of enemy resources than is available to me to discuss them exhaustively, but the arguments advanced in the appreciation in respect of these matters admit, I suggest, of little variation, being generally in the nature of principles or self-evident truths.
In arriving at a final conclusion, the chief difficulty is to give appropriate weight to each factor. In my view, practically all considerations on the military side are strongly in favour of the retention of the 2nd Division overseas, while on the political side, of which my knowledge of probable and genuine reactions is admittedly superficial and based chiefly on hearsay, the considerations, on the short view at least, favour the retention overseas of the 3rd Division. The difficulty confronting the statesman is to weigh the military considerations against his more intimate knowledge of the political considerations, while the soldier is in precisely the opposite position.
While the question of whether New Zealand's war effort should be concentrated more on production than hitherto, and if necessary at the expense of the fighting effort, is a matter for advice from the highest Allied authorities, the question of how the increased production is to be obtained, whether in fact it is necessary to reduce the fighting effort to obtain it, and if so by how much, is clearly a matter for the
It may interest you to know that after preparing the appreciation, I discussed the main factors and my conclusions with my colleagues at the conclusion of a Chiefs of Staff meeting, and the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (in the absence of the Chief of the Air Staff) have authorised me to say that they agree with my conclusions.
(Signed) E. Puttick,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of the General Staff
APPRECIATION BY THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Object
Return of 2nd or 3rd Division to New Zealand
Factors
(a) Relative strategical importance of European and Pacific theatres
She exposes the people of
British and
Every battle-experienced division in
There are signs that a really big effort may defeat
Participation in the European theatre is marked evidence of the cohesion of the British Commonwealth to our Allies and enemies, stiffens British morale which has been under strain for over four years, and follows the principle of true strategy in concentrating on the principal and most dangerous enemy.
An example of a similar attitude to that of New Zealand is
She is not affecting Allied production or morale, nor reducing shipping to any appreciable extent.
Her submarines and air strength are not favourably situated, as are
She does not affect to any degree the safety or comfort of any large Allied population other than
Proportionately, the number of battle-experienced divisions employed and likely to be employed immediately in the
Participation in the
Conclusion
The advantages resulting and the dangers avoided through the defeat of
(b) Political
Has very favourable effect in
Has unfavourable effect on
May have an unfavourable effect on that section of
As the war with
Has no effect on British war weariness which is not already obtained by the spectacle of a favourite Dominion endangered by a powerful Asiatic nation.
Has a favourable effect on
(Note:
Has a favourable effect on that section of
Conclusions
The withdrawal of 2nd Division, while it would cause acute disappointment in England and probably other parts of the Empire as well as to many in New Zealand, would be unlikely to cause any political difficulties.
The withdrawal of 3rd Division would create an unfavourable impression in the Note: Opinions in this direction are created or strengthened by the frequency of and the attendances at race meetings, reduced or absence of work on Saturdays (including the closing of many Government offices all day Saturday), apart from any actual knowledge of hours worked or of existence of non-essential activities.)
Australian opinion would be unfavourable to withdrawal of 3rd Division as a breach of what
The importance to be placed on the creation of unfavourable opinion in the
(c) Present and Pending Operations
2nd Division is engaged in full strength against the enemy in
There appears to be little if any surplus Allied strength in the Italian theatre, while the operations there are undoubtedly part of the greater invasion plan.
Consequently the replacement of 2nd Division by another division would be essential, and within the next several months appears likely to create peculiarly difficult problems of suitability of the replacement division and disorganisation of prepared plans, quite apart from administrative difficulties such as the provision of shipping. The particular value of the 2nd New Zealand Division in influencing the outcome of large-scale operations has already been emphasised on at least two occasions.
3rd Division has 2/3 rds of its strength in a very forward position on the South Pacific front, i.e.,
Both components of 3rd Division are now in a garrison role, though it is possible and perhaps probable that the force holding Treasury Island will shortly be given an offensive role, i.e., to capture islands north of
Operations of 3rd Division are undoubtedly part of a general offensive plan designed to isolate
Withdrawal of forces in
Withdrawal of forces in Treasury Island though exposed to attack is possible, while withdrawal of reinforcements &c., in
Conclusion
The withdrawal of either 2nd or 3rd Division is impracticable at the present time and its practicability in future depends upon tactical developments.
The disruptive effect of withdrawal would be most serious in either case but would have wider and more important disadvantageous effects in the case of 2nd Division though tactically less dangerous to the New Zealand troops in their present situations than in the case of 3rd Division.
(d) Shipping
2nd Division is almost double the strength of 3rd Division, the distance from New Zealand is five times greater than in the case of 3rd Division, and there is practically no shipping returning to New Zealand with spare accommodation for personnel, equipment, and stores.
The probable availability of shipping returning from the Islands to New Zealand, and the much lower strength of 3rd Division compared with 2nd Division and proximity of 3rd Division to New Zealand would make provision of shipping for 3rd Division much easier than for 2nd Division. On the other hand, loading of heavier stores and equipment in view of the primitive facilities would be much more difficult and perhaps impracticable because the time required for loading could not be spared on account of the primary tasks on which the ships are engaged.
Conclusions
The movement of 2nd Division would be very much more expensive in shipping than that of 3rd Division and in view of concentrations of shipping for the invasion of
The movement of 3rd Division utilising returning ships may be feasible and is much less expensive in shipping.
(e) Time Factor
The practicability of withdrawing either division is dependent upon developments in both theatres and cannot be judged with any accuracy. The conclusions reached under the headings of (c) Present and Pending Operations, and (d) Shipping, particularly the latter, indicate that the 3rd Division could reach New Zealand much earlier than an equal number of men from 2nd Division. Further, the tendency thus far has been to
(f) Climate, Relief, and Casualties
2nd Division has been approximately four years abroad, the first year on a garrison and training role. It has had severe fighting punctuated by periods in reserve. Casualties have been light judged by 1914–18 standards.
The number of long-service men has been considerably reduced by earlier casualties and prisoners, and by exemptions and defections from the furlough draft. Practically all men of over three years’ service have now had lengthy furlough.
2nd Division has had some three years in a semi-tropical but healthy climate with good amenities. It is now in a temperate climate.
Normal relief from the forward area into a reserve role provides the necessary relief from active service strain.
2nd Division will have fewer climatic casualties and less post-war ill-health on that account, but is likely to have higher battle casualties.
Periodic reliefs of 2nd Division from forward area raises no question of return to New Zealand and therefore no difficulties in return of the Division to the forward area.
3rd Division has been approximately two years in being, as regards 50 per cent of the force, a proportion having about three years’ service, but both above categories have had a break of several months’ Home Service. Remainder of the Division has had approximately 18 months’ service.
The Division has had little fighting and negligible casualties.
3rd Division has been in a tropical climate, which in the areas they have occupied during the last six months has been oppressive.
Amenities have been poor.
For climatic reasons, normal relief to a reserve role is not sufficient, and the Division requires relief at about six-monthly intervals in a more temperate climate.
3rd Division will have higher climatic casualties with the possibility of a more or less serious legacy of post-war ill-health. It is likely to have lower battle casualties than 2nd Division, but it cannot be assumed that this will continue, in view of the isolated nature and amphibious character of its operations.
Periodic reliefs of 3rd Division could be suitably carried out by return to
Conclusions
The factors of length of service abroad and severity of fighting favour return of 2nd Division. The strain on these accounts can be efficiently met by periods of relief in the operational area.
The 3rd Division, however, must have relief from the climate requiring retirement to rear areas, which would bring them within easy distance of New Zealand and lead to insistent demands for leave in New Zealand.
(g) Re-employment of Troops
Whichever division returns, a considerable proportion of the men will require to be sent as reinforcements to the other division over a period.
Men of the 2nd Division would almost certainly flatly refuse to proceed to the 3rd Division so long as there were fit men in New Zealand who had not been overseas.
Men of 3rd Division would in all probability readily proceed to 2nd Division, but some difficulty would probably be encountered through the contention being continued that fit men in industry should go overseas before returned troops are required to proceed twice.
Conclusion
It would be much easier to use men of 3rd Division to reinforce 2nd Division than vice versa.
(b) Temporary return of either Division
This would lead to the disappearance of the division as a fighting formation, requiring reorganisation and training over a period of not less than six months before the division was fit for active service.
General Conclusions
Of the factors considered above, the conclusions arrived at in regard to (a) Relative Strategical Importance of European and Pacific Theatres, (d) Shipping, (e) Time Factor, (g) Re-employment of Troops are decisively in favour of retaining 2nd Division in
(c) Present and Pending Operations—slightly favour retaining 2nd Division abroad, while (f) Climate, Relief and Casualties—favour retaining 3rd Division in the
(b) Political—strongly favour retaining 3rd Division in the
(b) Temporary return of either Division—applies equally to both divisions.
Course Recommended
Retain 2nd Division abroad.
Return 3rd Division to New Zealand when the operational situation permits.
Appreciation of the Situation Regarding Strength of New Zealand Army Overseas
Object
To reduce NZ Army overseas to one division plus detachments in
Courses Open
Withdraw 2 Div, or
Complete withdrawal of 3 Div, including cadres of approximately 6000 all ranks, which under existing decision is to be retained to assist in re-forming the division.
Factors
It is the policy of the Government that NZ should maintain one division in the field until the conclusion of hostilities. Therefore, if the 2nd Division is withdrawn, the 3rd Division should be re-formed; if the 3rd Division is disbanded, the 2nd Division should be retained.
The withdrawal of the 2nd Division involves its disbandment. It would not be possible to move the division to NZ and re-employ it against
The decision to withdraw the cadres (6000 all ranks) of
Constant demands for the release to civil life of considerable numbers of men from the cadres.
The retention of 6000 men for several months in NZ camps with consequent boredom and unrest.
These men can only be employed on the following tasks:
Maintaining equipment.
Training, especially officers, NCOs, and prospective NCOs.
Seasonal work as units.
If employed to any great extent on seasonal work, or if released from the Army for any lengthy periods, the value of the officers, NCOs, and men as cadres on which to reform will deteriorate considerably.
The withdrawal of the 2nd Division has the following disadvantages:
Strategical situation in Italy: Allied strength in
The reduction of Allied strength in
This disadvantage applies at any stage of the operations in Defensively, the Allied forces in
Shipping, which is still a vital factor in operations, would be withdrawn for a considerable period, to move the 35,000 men of the 2nd Division from
Manpower wastage: The disbandment of 2nd and 3rd Divisions and the raising of a fresh division would cause a heavy waste of manpower, in addition to that referred to in sub-para (b) above. From the time the decision is taken to raise a fresh division until its appearance on the battlefield, approximately 12 months would elapse. During this period, approximately 25,000 men would be neither producing nor fighting.
Assuming the strength of the new division, plus corps and base troops to be 25,000 men and that it would take six months to return the 2nd Division to NZ, the total manpower wastage would be:
Such a loss of manpower resources to either the fighting or production forces of the country at this stage in the war, and having regard to the heavy demands for production, merits the fullest consideration.
On the other hand, while a decision to retain the 2nd Division in
There are two reasons, however, why it is advisable to postpone any wastage of manpower as long as possible:
At the end of the German war there should be less need for NZ to produce munitions and war equipment, since British and US production should be sufficient
By the time
The retention of 2nd Division in
Sentiment: The withdrawal of the 2nd Division if decided upon might well be in progress just as victory in
The withdrawal of It is commonly stated that the division has been overseas for 4 ½ years. This is only partly true since through casualties and discharge in NZ the majority of the long-service men, i.e., over 3 years’ service, are no longer with the division, and the greater number of those who are still on the strength have had a recent and lengthy furlough in NZ. This feeling regarding length of service can be adequately met without withdrawing the division, by the adoption of a replacement policy, under which men who have served for a prescribed period are replaced and returned to civil life. As this policy would require an increased call-up of men who have not yet served overseas, that point also would be met to a considerable degree, but not to the same extent as if a fresh division were formed. On the other hand, a large number of men of the 2nd Division have had little service and should be required to continue service in a new division if one were formed.2nd Division has the following advantages:
Sentiment: The feeling sometimes expressed that the 2nd Division has been too long in the field and that fit men who have not yet served overseas should take their share of the fighting would be fully met.NZ Participation against Japan: Withdrawal of 2nd Division would enable a fresh division to be raised at an earlier date than would otherwise be possible, since the new division could not be formed until the 2nd Division returned.
This earlier participation in the war against
While there seems little likelihood that the presence or absence of an NZ division in the war against
Delay in return: Withdrawal of 2nd Division before the end of the war with
The advantages and disadvantages of the withdrawal of the 3rd Division need not be discussed, since in actual fact the withdrawal has already taken place.
The factors connected with the retention of the cadres for this division—6000 all ranks—have been mentioned in para 5. There is no doubt that these cadres would be of the greatest value in the reforming of the 3rd Division or of a new division, but in view of the time that is likely to elapse before the cadres could be expanded to a full division, the unrest caused by a long waiting period, and the certain attrition due to pressure for men to be released to civil life, it is at least doubtful whether much of this value will not be dissipated to such an extent as to make it inadvisable to accept the disadvantages mentioned.
If, however, the 2nd Division is to be withdrawn in the near future, the cadres of the 3rd Division should be retained and the new division built up immediately; if the 2nd Division is to remain in
Apart from the participation of one NZ division in the war, there are other directions in which the NZ Army can give a most valuable contribution to victory. These are:
Increased assistance to Fijian and Tongan forces by provision of officers, NCOs, and technical personnel, to enable an infantry brigade to proceed to an active theatre of war, plus a Fijian-Tongan infantry battalion for garrison duty in the Provision of NZ officers and NCOs as instructors for British troops in Provision of NZ officers for British forces in
Requests have already been received for assistance in these directions and if acceded to on the largest possible scale would have the highest value in the successful prosecution of the war.
Summary
Withdrawal of 2nd Division before the end of the European war would have an adverse effect on the war against a)).
It would increase shipping difficulties (para 6 (b)).
It would create an immediate manpower wastage equivalent to 8750 men for 12 months, or a total wastage of 33,750 men for 12 months if a new division were raised to keep NZ army participation at the level of one division (para 6 (c)).
It would deny the 2nd Division participating in the final victory against d)).
On the other hand, it would meet popular feeling that the division should be withdrawn and that men who have not yet fought should be sent overseas (para 7 (a)).
It would enable a new division to be raised against b)).
Whether, in the event that 2nd Division remains in c)).
While NZ participation in the final stages of the war against b)).
Apart from a division participating in the war, there are other directions in which NZ can make a notable contribution to the early and successful conclusion of the war (para 9).
Conclusions
From the above survey, I come to the conclusion that the best course for NZ to follow, in all the circumstances, known and probable, is as follows:
Retain 2nd Division in Disband the cadres of the 3rd Division, with the exception of the personnel required to guard and maintain equipment. Provide officers, NCOs, and technical personnel to the extent required by—
Fijian and Tongan forces. British forces, as instructors and/or leaders for British units in Adopt a liberal replacement policy to replace men of long service in the 2nd Division, the replacements to be provided from men in civil life who have not yet served abroad, from short-service personnel of 3rd Division, and from other officers, NCOs, and men of 3rd Division who volunteer for such service.
Mr. Fraser's telegram to Mr. Churchill, dated 9 September 1944, stating that cadres of 3 Division would be disbanded:
Thank you for making available your message to Mr. Curtin, the implications of which are of immediate concern to New Zealand.
You are well aware of the problem we face in regard to our two Divisions, and I appreciate the ready acceptance given by yourself and the Chiefs of Staff to the general understanding that our 2nd Division should return from
I should like to add that since I saw you there has been a further change in the disposition of our forces in the
We have delayed taking a final decision with regard to the disposition of our land forces overseas, firstly, because we were reluctant to take our 2nd Division out of action in the European theatre unless we had some firm indication that New Zealand troops would be required in the
From the tentative plans being discussed while I was in
This continued lack of certainty as to the probable future use of our men, and the rapidly changing circumstances in
In view of its bearing on future participation of New Zealand troops in the war I would be glad to have at the earliest possible opportunity the decision of His Majesty's Government in the
Letter from the Hon. W. Nash, New Zealand Minister in
My Dear Mr. President,
May I first thank you for your courtesy in arranging at such short notice to discuss the problem stated by me to you in connection with manpower in New Zealand.
My delay in making the case in writing has been due to my desire to obtain Mr. Fraser's latest views on the situation. He has now advised me that Mr. Churchill would be glad to see me in
The position in New Zealand requires some clarification in order to determine the most effective method by which we can use our manpower to help the war effort.
Our position at the time of the most recent full analysis was as follows:
The large proportion engaged in full-time war services is causing a reduction in our production of primary products.
When I left New Zealand, for instance, in December last it was not possible to obtain full production in our meat freezing works (corresponding to your meat packing houses) owing to shortage of manpower. Our butter, cheese, and meat production from the farms is also declining owing to shortage of manpower (and of fertiliser, which is in very short supply).
We are anxious to use our full resources to finish the war at the earliest possible date and also to meet all our commitments overseas, but we have to determine now where our manpower can best be used.
Where is the need greatest?
Is it in providing airmen for
Is it to meet naval requirements in the
Or in maintaining a division in the
Or in maintaining two brigades in the
On present evidence we have decided to endeavour to maintain our air strength, which on 31 October last totalled 40,547 men—and to provide for expansion already planned; this means that the airmen required will absorb most of the young men reaching Service age (18 years for service in New Zealand, 21 years for service overseas).
It is proposed to maintain the Navy at its present strength—8356.
The Army strength at 31 October was:
If the Air Force is to be fully provided for and the Navy strength maintained, there are no resources from which we can send reinforcements to either the European or Pacific Armies.
When the question as to the place where New Zealand's manpower could best be used was raised early last year, the advice given by yourself and Mr. Churchill was to keep the land forces in the field in both the European and Pacific Areas—even though it was not possible to send men to replace casualties, etc. It is thought that on present evidence it would be unwise to pursue this policy to its limit.
It is not possible with our existing recources of men and women to maintain the strength of our present forces.
The problem therefore resolves itself into requiring the answer to the question: How can New Zealand best serve?
By maintaining and expanding its Air Forces?
By maintaining its present naval strength?
By maintaining its Division in
By maintaining its Forces in the
By maintaining and if possible expanding its production of food supplies, particularly butter, cheese, and meat?
Presuming that it is decided that the wisest course would be to maintain a force in one zone only—European or
A further question which immediately arises is:
If any changes of the present programme are to be made when would be the best time for them to take place?
If you so desired I could set out the reasons for and against utilising our forces in the
The New Zealand Government would be helped by your advice as to what you consider is the best course to follow under present circumstances.
My present plans are being made on the assumption that (weather permitting) I will leave for
Again thanking you for your help and advice, and with every good wish.
Japanese Army daily ration
The daily staple foods rationed to each individual during the war for the Japanese Army were:
660 grammes of rice and 210 grammes One gramme equals approximately 1/16th of an ounce.
690 grammes of hard tack or compressed dried foods.
However, there were times when the ration (a) was reduced and supplemented by a portion of (b).
Subsidiary rations were as follows:
Because of the difficulty in transporting supplies during the
Information used in writing this volume was obtained principally from the following sources:
War files held in the Prime Minister's Department, Parliament Buildings,
(These contain the most valuable documents concerning all negotiations with Commonwealth countries, the progress of the war, the development and exploitation of manpower resources and supplies, and communications between Governments, Ministers, diplomatic officials and senior commanders in the field.)
G Branch secret files held by Army Headquarters,
War diaries of all New Zealand military formations serving in the
Unit histories of 3 New Zealand Division, 2 NZEF IP
The History of the Fiji Military Forces, 1939–45
Monographs held by the G2 Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in
(These monographs contained the available translated records of the Japanese Navy, Army, and Air Force which were compiled from remaining Japanese war records, and personal letters, diaries, and reminiscences of senior officers who had served in the
Documentary evidence taken during the International War Trials in
The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King.
Narratives of the United States Navy in the
Guadalcanal: the First Offensive, by John Miller, Jnr. (United States Official History)
The Second World War, by Winston S. Churchill, Volumes II and III.
Narratives compiled and held by the
Major-General H. E. Barrowclough's personal diary, letters from or lent by numerous correspondents, newspaper files and press clippings.
the author:
ABDA area, 57.
A Company. See
Adachi, Lt-Gen F., 213.
Adams, Capt P. R. W., 187.
Adams, Capt R. T. J., 136.
Aldridge, Fg Off S. P., 256.
Alford, Fg Off R. J., 256.
Allen, Lt F. R., 174.
Allingham, Lt I. D., 308.
Anderson, Fg Off D. A., 56.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1–2.
Angus, Pt Off F. J. J., 281.
Anzac Area, 57.
Appreciations—
Arabis, HMNZS, 243.
Arbutus, HMNZS, 243.
Archer, Lt-Col K. R., 311.
Armour, Maj K. I., 312.
Armstrong, Sgt F. A., 158.
18 Army Troops Company, 24.
Ashby, S-Sgt W. F., 268.
Ashwin, B. C., 74.
Ata, Premier of
1
Avery, Brig H. E., 96.
Aylward, Pte W. T. A., 176.
Ayson, Flt Lt D. F., 256.
Bain, Lt D. W., 116.
Balfour, Sqn Ldr R. H., 255.
Banks, Cpl E. C., 151.
Bannerman, Air Cdre R. B., 109.
Baragwanath, Padre O. T., 165.
Barbour, L-Sgt J. W., 137.
Barcham, Maj P., 163.
Barclay, Lt-Col P. M. B., 263.
Barnett, Maj H. W., 311.
Barns-Graham, Lt A. B., 116.
Barrowclough, Mrs. H. E., 102.
Barrowclough, Maj-Gen H. E., 59, 72, 78, 80, 84, 87, 91, 102, 115, 118, 123, 139, 158, 160, 165–6, 170, 199–200, 202–3, 321–3.
3 NZ Division—
Treasury Island landings—
Bartlett, Sgt A. T., 185.
Bartos, Lt S. J., 136.
Bassett, Col W., 113.
Beauchamp, Flt Lt D. S., 259.
Beckham, Cpl C. T. J., 135.
Beechey, Maj H. G. St. V., 81.
Beetham, Sgt R. H. H., 186.
B Force. See 8 NZ Infantry Brigade Group.
Bickley, Pte W. F. A., 133.
Bignall, Pt Off E. D. B., 281.
Biss, Capt G. H., 185.
Black, Maj R. J., 26.
Blacker, Capt E., 111.
Blair, Lt N. D., 243.
Blake, Lt-Col H. W. D., 81.
Blamey, Fd Mshl Sir T., 59.
Blewett, G., 211.
Blundell, Capt P. M., 139.
Bogle, Maj A. H., 297.
Booth, Capt L. T. G., 152.
Bouchier, AVM C. A., 309.
Bowerbank, Maj-Gen Sir F. T., 32.
Boyd, Capt W. P., 111.
Brain, Maj C. W. D., 115–16.
Braithwaite, Maj J. C., 156.
Brereton, Sgt H. B., 125.
Bridson, Cdr G., 242–3.
British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
Brooke-Popham, Air Chf Mshl Sir R., 13–14.
Brooke-White, Col J., 145.
Brooker, Maj L. F., 186.
Broomhall, Dvr C. F., 185.
Brown, Maj C. McL., 179.
Brown, Flt Lt E. H., 250.
Brown, Flt Lt J. Conyers, 260.
Buchanan, Ldg Sigmn C. H., 243.
Buchanan, Lt N. H., 164.
Buckley, Air Cdre M. W., 253.
Burden, Maj J. A., 136.
Burgess, Capt C. E., 21–2.
Burnett, Lt R. I. M., 116.
Burns, Capt B. L., 81.
Busch, Gp Capt J. J., 247.
Callaghan, Rear Admiral D. J., 217–18.
Cameron, Capt H. R., 297.
Campling, Maj C. D. B., 80.
Carney, Rear Admiral R., 188.
Caroline Islands. See
Carpenter, Telegraphist G., 238.
Casey, Rt. Hon. R. G., 60.
Cassells, C., 115.
Casualties—
Catley, Maj R., 187.
Cauty, Maj J. V. M., 52.
Central Pacific Area, 60.
Chambers, Lt D., 264.
Chandler, Lt E. C., 158.
Chappell, Maj A. B., 304.
Clark, Maj J. K. H., 179.
Clayton, LAC A. N., 56.
Clemens, Maj M., 265.
Clouston, Capt B. W., 131.
Clouston, Lt R. P., 185.
Coastwatching, 23, 33–4, 40, 43–4, 45, 49, 64, 127, 212, 215, 228–39, 249, 271, 293, 303.
Cockerell, Lt-Col A. R., 304.
Cole, Capt B. S., 81.
Collin, Lt J. T., 179.
Collins, Sgt W. A., 269.
Combat teams, 76, 93, 117, 178, 267 (see also 3 NZ Division—
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 65.
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference (
Compton, L-Bdr M. J., 151.
Congalton, Lt A. A., 164.
Conn, Sgt W. G., 268.
Cooke, Capt O. J., 80.
Coronet, Operation, 307.
Cotterell, Cpl M. H., 135.
Cowan, Sgt W. A., 146–7.
Crace, Rear Admiral J. G., 53.
Crawford, Capt J. M., 262.
Crawford, Lt W. E., 262.
Crawley, Capt J. A., 80.
Crump, Brig S. H., 315.
Dalton, Capt D., 183.
d’Arcy, Maj E. N., 48.
Davidson, Cpl P. A., 183.
Davis, Pte R., 135.
Day, Flt Lt J. R., 251.
de Lange, Wg Cdr T. J. MacL., 258.
Denton, Capt H. M., 172.
Devery, Lt-Col C. N., 83.
de Willimoff, Wg Cdr J. J., 310.
Dickson, Capt C. S., 302.
Dill, Fd Mshl Sir J. G., 195.
Dowell, Capt J. A. H., 156.
Downer, A. F., 41.
Duffield, Cpl J. H. E., 269.
Duncan, Spr J. K., 151.
Dunlea, Cpl L. N., 137.
Dyer, Flt Lt W. R., 33.
Dutch East Indies. See
Dyett, N., 228.
Eady, Capt T. C., 179.
Eden, Rt. Hon. R. A., 10.
Edwards, Capt R. A. B., 308.
Ellis, Pte R. A., 236.
Erridge, Lt N., 26.
Evans, Pte D. W. T., 133.
Evans, Lt T. K., 186.
Evers, Maj J. W., 82.
Ewen, Maj J. M., 302.
Falloon, Padre G. D., 165.
Fantham, Lt M. F., 276–7.
Farland, Sister M. S., 167.
Featherston Prisoner of War Camp, 44.
Ferguson, Maj R. G. S., 179.
Defence—
Hurricane (
Koro Island rehearsal for
New Zealand—
Royal New Zealand Air Force, 34–5, 37, 42, 44–5, 51–2, 245, 258–9.
Fiji Forces—
Infantry Brigade, formation of, 262–3.
Units—
Fisher, Wg Cdr G. H., 246.
Fisken, Fg Off G. B., 250.
Fitzgerald, Pte R. J., 135.
Flux, Maj H. G., 262.
Foote, Maj C. C., 155.
Fortune, Lt-Col W. H., 297.
Forward, Lt J. C., 187.
Foster, Sister H. B., 167.
Four Power Pact, 5.
Fraser, Admiral of the Fleet Lord, 308.
Fraser, Lt-Col R., 262.
Freeman, Capt R. O., 276–7.
Freeman, Wg Cdr T. O., 254–6.
Fulton, Lt-Col J. R. H., 297.
Furkert, Col F. W., 52.
Fussell, Lt A. T., 262.
Gallagher, Maj C. H., 293.
Galloway, Sister J. G., 167.
Galway, Rt. Hon. Viscount, 26.
Gambia, HMNZS, 308.
Ganongga Island. See
Gentry, Maj-Gen W. G., 311.
German raiders in
False alarms about, 34.
Gettins, Capt J. L. J., 55.
Ghormley, Vice Admiral R. L., 54, 60, 63–4, 66, 73–5, 300–1 (see also
Gilbert and Ellice Islands—
Gilchrist, Lt F. G. K., 272.
Gilfillan, Cpl W. M., 147.
Gillies, Maj A. G., 297.
Gizo Island. See
Gladney, Capt, 43.
Goodall, Sgt N. S., 184.
Gosling, Capt J. W., 278–9.
Goto, Rear Admiral, 215.
Graham, Lt D. H., 243.
Graham, Capt I., 154–5.
Greig, Capt H. J., 159.
Gresson, Capt J. P., 297.
Grey, Capt H. H., 151.
Grieves, Capt L. M. G., 81.
Griffen, Maj J. R., 282.
Griffiths, Flt Lt E. N., 34.
Grigg, Wg Cdr D. E., 246.
Griswold, Maj-Gen O. W., 125, 141–2, 224–5, 267, 277, 280, 283, 286.
Allied offensive planning, place in, 64.
Gudsell, Sqn Ldr G. E., 247.
Gwilliam, Sister M. G., 167.
Hall, Capt G. F. T., 81.
Hallwright, Maj W. W., 190.
Halsey, Admiral W. F., 104, 108, 166–7, 169, 171, 188, 193–4, 197, 208, 216–17, 219–20, 237, 245, 249, 259, 274, 296, 298 (see also
Hannafin, S-Sgt D. O., 156.
Hannah, W/O G. E., 257.
Hardie, Maj L. C., 96–7.
Hardy, Maj R. B., 298–9.
Harmon, Maj-Gen M. F., 100, 106, 108, 111, 119, 123, 170, 197–8, 322.
Harris, Lt E. G., 130.
Hart, Admiral T. C., 57.
Hartshorn, Sqn Ldr R. G., 258.
Harvey, Maj H. D., 297.
Haslett, Maj K., 133.
Hata, General, 9.
Hawkins, Maj N. W. M., 80.
Healy, Sgt M. J., 141.
Hearn, Cpl H. R. C., 236.
Heenan, Cpl A. C., 236.
Heffernan, A. J., 116.
Henderson, WO M. H., 172.
Hewin, Capt H. J. W., 172.
Hewland, Lt J. L. H., 164.
Highland, F., 235.
Hill, Maj J. I. L., 262.
Hilliard, Lt Cdr J. G., 242.
Hirohito, Emperor, 16.
Hislop, Pte S., 135.
Hitchcock, Capt W. P., 303.
Hitchon, Pte R. I., 236.
Hogan, Lt-Col R. A., 315.
Holden, Cdr A. D., 242.
Holmes, Lt P. E., 272.
Horan, Rear Admiral H. E., 19.
Horii, Maj-Gen T., 207.
Horler, Lt Cdr A. O., 242.
Houston, Capt B., 290–1.
Howe, Pte D. H., 236.
Hoyte, Sister D. H., 167.
Hudson, Maj D. A., 311.
Hurley, Maj-Gen P., 74.
Ibbotson, Plt Off C. G., 56.
Ilala, Sgt., 146–7.
Imamura, Lt-Gen, 213.
Inouye, Vice-Admiral, 208.
Isitt, AVM Sir L. M., 308.
1 Island Command. See
6 Island Command, 171.
1 (Islands) Group, 252–4 (see also
Jack, Maj D. McK., 162.
Jackson, Sgt L. V., 264.
Aggression and infiltration, pre-war, 1–3, 5–6, 9–13, 15–17.
Allied occupation of, 308–17.
Foreign policy, 16–17.
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 16–17.
Prisoners of war and internees in New Zealand, 44.
Rise of, 1–17.
War (1914–18), 2–3.
War (1941–45)—
Japanese forces—
1 Air Fleet, 207.
14 Army, 207.
18 Army, 213.
35 Army, 207.
2 Division, 213–14.
2 Fleet, 207.
4 Fleet, 208–9.
19 Seaplane Tender Division, 209.
South East Area Fleet, 154.
Southern advance, components for, 206–8.
Southern Army, 204–6.
Submarine operations, 49–50, 118, 154, 216, 243–5, 248, 259, 297.
J Force. See
Java Sea, Battle of, 18.
Jefferis, Pte J. H., 176.
Johnson, Lt R. W. R., 262.
Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Jolly, Maj S. N., 167.
Jones, Capt B., 293.
Jones, Lt-Col H. A., 110.
Jones, Cpl J. M., 233.
Jones, Pte R., 236.
Joyce, Lt-Col J. P., 54.
Kaimais, Battle of the, 84–7.
Kakafuji, Mr. 10.
Kawaguchi, Maj-Gen K., 207.
Keith, Maj G. F. R., 187.
Kellaway, Maj G. T., 26.
Kells, Sgt M. V., 264.
Kelly, Lt Cdr R. B., 153.
Kennedy, Maj D. G., 237–8.
Kerr, Lt C. E. G., 131.
Kete, Pte E., 281.
Kilpin, Pte C. A., 236.
Kirk, Capt L. J., 156.
Kiwi A, B, C, D. See 3 NZ Division—Reorganisation for
Kiwi, HMNZS, 242–4.
Knapp, S. R., 165.
Knipe, Spr F. L., 160.
Koga, Admiral M., 223.
See New Georgia Group.
Krueger, Lt-Gen W., 59.
Krulak, Lt-Col V. H., 147.
Laigret, Governor, 342–3.
Lamont, Capt A. M., 81.
Lawrence, Capt R. S., 145.
Lee, Rear Admiral W. A., 219.
Lees, Lt-Col C. E., 123.
Lempriere, L-Cpl J. B., 147.
Leslie, Lt J. C., 55.
Lethbridge, Maj-Gen J. S., 166.
Lewis, Maj A. W., 286.
Line Islands. See
Lloyd, Maj E. E., 262.
Lockett, Lt R. B., 130.
Lockwood, Brig-Gen B. C., 294.
Long, Pte A. T., 102.
Louden, Capt K. E., 150.
Lovell, Lt-Col A. A., 290.
Lovelock, Capt L. D., 81.
Lumsden, Flt Lt K. D., 255.
Luoni, W/O G. I., 155.
Luxford, Maj E. M., 81.
Lyons, Rt. Hon. J. A., 6.
MacArthur, Gen of the Army D., 18, 60, 62–4, 169, 274, 307, 309–10 (see also South West Pacific Command).
McCain, Rear Admiral J. S., 245.
McCarthy, Capt H. N., 124.
McCarthy, Cpl J. J., 236.
McClure, Jnr Cdr G. V. M., 116.
McCowan, Maj A. I., 82.
McCullough, Pte A., 137.
McCurdy, Capt E. E., 262.
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. J. Ramsey, 5.
MacDonald, Lt O. W., 131.
McGhie, Sgt W. Q., 135.
Macindoe, Capt H. L. G., 81.
McIntosh, Maj A., 297.
McIntosh, A. D., 74.
MacIntyre, Lt-Col D., 311.
McKay, Sgt-Maj, 140.
McKenna, Cpl A. E., 236.
MacKenzie, Sgt N. B., 268.
McKenzie, Pte R. M., 236.
Mackesy, Maj-Gen P. J., 7.
McKillop, Col A. C., 54.
Mackley, Flt Lt W. B., 259.
McLachlan, Sister A. M., 167.
MacLeod, Lt Cdr C., 242.
McLeod, Sgt G. G., 144.
McNaught, Sgt R., 165.
McNeight, Lt W. J., 133.
McQuinn, Cpl M. P., 233.
McRae, Sgt M., 125.
Malaita Island, 260.
Mansergh, Rear Admiral C. A. L., 240–1.
Marceau, Flt Lt C. S., 248.
Martin, Lt F. J., 262.
Martin, Maj R. M., 155.
Masefield, Lt B., 266–7.
Menzies, Lt-Col C. B., 297.
Merrill, Capt J., 145.
Midway, Battle of, 208–11.
Millar, Lt A. M. J., 268.
Millar, Capt D. J. S., 155.
Miller, W/O J. E., 251.
See Royal New Zealand Navy.
Missen, Maj V. P., 311.
Mitchell, Capt F. J., 159.
Mitchell, Lt-Col F. M., 297.
Moa, HMNZS, 242–4.
Molloy, Fg Off J. M., 281.
Momotake, Lt-Gen, 208.
See
Montchamp, Col H., 113.
Moon, Maj N. C., 179.
Moore, Lt-Col J. E., 180.
Moore, Capt W. A., 290–1.
Moosbrugger, Cdr F., 224.
Morgan, R. G., 234.
Morrison, Sgt R. H., 264.
Mowatt, Capt D. N., 283.
Muir, Capt A. E., 82.
Muir, Capt J. B., 179.
Muller, Pte L. H., 233.
See New Georgia Group.
Murray, Lt C. G., 81.
Murray, Rear Admiral G. D., 216.
Nairn, Flt Lt R. C., 250.
Nankivell, Col J. H., 104.
Nash, Cpl J., 146.
Neil, Maj A. J., 262.
Nevill, AVM Sir A. de T., 30.
Neville, Capt J. H., 148.
New, Capt H. B., 262.
Newall, Mshl of the RAF Lord, 165–6.
Defences (
French and native forces, 93–4.
Japanese infiltration, pre-war fear of, 1–2.
Japanese plans to attack and establish base, 206–8.
Laigret, interview with, 342–3.
Royal New Zealand Air Force, 245–6.
New Georgia Group (see also
Newlands, W/O I. D., 236.
Newman, Lt E. R., 82.
Newton, Wg Cdr P. G. H., 251.
New Zealand—
16 NZ Brigade Group. See
2 NZ Division—
3 NZ Division—
Employment of, 70–6, 78, 83, 103–8, 123, 193, 197, 201, 319–20, 337–40, 353–8.
see also 8 NZ Infantry Brigade Group).
Ganongga and Gizo Islands reconnaissance, 141.
8 NZ Infantry Brigade (see also 8 NZ Infantry Brigade Group).
14 NZ Infantry Brigade—
Reinforcements and replacements for 2 NZ Division, 106, 108–9, 200, 202–3, 344–5.
Releases for
Units—
29 Battalion 48, 71, 84–5, 93, 99, 143–4, 146, 150, 153, 158.
30 Battalion, 48, 71, 85, 88, 93, 130, 141, 153, 160, 170–1, 173–8, 181, 183–7, 190.
34 Battalion, 48, 71, 104, 110, 143, 146, 152, 155, 157–8 (see also
35 Battalion, 39, 45, 48, 71, 84–5, 93, 129–37, 178, 184, 185.
36 Battalion, 45, 48, 71, 104, 110, 143, 146, 150, 152–3, 157–8 (see also
37 Battalion, 45, 48, 71, 85, 93, 102, 110, 129–31, 133, 136–7, 165, 178, 184, 187.
Machine Gun Company, 8 Brigade, 110, 148 (see also
Machine Gun Company, 14 Brigade, 110, 130–1, 180, 183, 185–7.
see also
NZ Engineers, 78, 84, 86, 95, 100, 104, 111, 122, 161, 164, 167, 177, 182–3, 189, 191.
NZ Ordnance Corps, 200.
NZ Signals, 84, 86–7, 100–1, 111, 123, 130–1, 139, 148, 159–60, 163, 174, 179, 182, 189.
Welfare and recreation, 95–6, 102, 115–16, 162, 164–5, 167–8, 190, 200.
2 NZEF IP—
Employment of forces in
New Zealand, HMS, gift of, 1.
Requests for assistance in defence commitments, 65–9, 319, 328–33.
Support for unification of
New Zealand Post and Telegraph Department—
Operators as coastwatchers, 229–30.
New Zealand Public Works Department—
New Zealand Women's Army Auxiliary Corps,
N Force. See
Niagara, RMS, 290.
Nichol, Pte J. H., 236.
Nicholls, Lt O., 137.
See
Norris, Maj R. W., 293.
North, Maj N. H., 162.
North Pacific Area, 60.
see also
Nurse, Lt-Col F. N., 22.
O’Dowd, Lt P., 175–6.
O’Leary, Lt-Col G. P., 290.
Olympic, Operation, 307.
O'Neill, Maj I. G., 157.
Ormsby, Lt M. M., 135.
Ota, Admiral, 223.
Owen, Pte C. J., 236.
Owen, Pte E. V., 151.
Pacific—
see also
Directive to Commander-in-Chief, 334–5.
Pacific Section See 3 NZ Division.
Title, 72.
Page, Fg Off I. M., 247.
Park, Pte R. J., 134.
Park, Brig R. S., 60.
Parker, Padre J. W., 165.
Parker, Pte W. A. R., 235–6.
Patterson, R. P., 123.
Pattullo, Lt-Col H. A., 55.
Pearsall, Cpl C. A., 236.
Pearson, Sgt W. J., 159.
Peck, Maj-Gen De W., 104.
Perry, Hon. W., 109.
Peterson, Maj H. C. F., 80.
Phipps, Lt Cdr P., 242–4.
Phipps, Sgt T. J., 155.
Pickering, Sgt B. D., 279.
Pierce, Padre J. C., 165.
Pinkham, Maj W. G. F., 297.
Pirie, Fg Off N. A., 251.
Pitcairn Island, coastwatching, 228.
Potter, Brig L., 46–7, 55, 77, 82, 85, 93, 125, 130–1, 137–8, 170, 174, 178, 180, 181, 315.
Powles, Maj G. R., 179.
Pratt, Pte W. M., 135.
Priest, Pte P. M., 186.
Primrose, Lt G. H., 184.
Prince of Wales, HMS, 18.
Puttick, Lt-Gen Sir E., 37, 41, 71–2, 74, 83, 104–5, 109, 112, 201, 263, 297–8.
Pym, Maj J. A., 45.
Rabaul.
See
Ratcliffe, Cpl L. G., 187.
Rawnsley, Wg Cdr I. E., 253.
Reesby, Sgt G. H., 187.
Reid, L-Cpl C., 183.
Reid, Maj F., 297.
Rennie, Capt J. S., 292.
Repulse, HMS, 18.
Revell, Capt T. P., 130.
Reynolds, Lt-Col A. W., 297.
Rice, Capt S. R., 110.
Richard, Pte R. T., 186.
Riley, Col W. E., 169.
Rivett-Carnac, Vice-Admiral J. W., 288.
Robertson, Lt-Gen H. C. H., 309.
Rochester, Capt H. A., 180.
Rogers, Maj D., 159.
Ronaldson, Maj C. W. H., 82.
Rosenthal, Maj-Gen Sir C., 302.
Rout, Lt-Col O. E. L., 82.
Row, Brig R. A., 46, 53, 82, 85, 93, 144–8, 153, 155, 157–8, 166.
Royal New Zealand Air Force—
Assistance to shipping, 258–9.
Units—
4 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron, 258–9.
16 Fighter Squadron, 251–2.
20 (Torpedo-Bomber) Squadron, 258.
25 (Dive-Bomber) Squadron, 258.
30 (Dive-Bomber) Squadron, 258.
31 (Torpedo-Bomber) Squadron, 258.
41 Squadron, 310.
4 Repair Depot, 253.
Wellington Conference recommendations, 7.
Royal New Zealand Navy (see also under names of ships)—
Rupertus, Brig-Gen W. H., 212.
Rusden, Pte C. M., 147.
Rutherford, Capt W. G., 179.
Saito, Maj-Gen, 282.
Sanders, Lt-Col G. P., 311.
Sanderson, Capt N. R., 179.
Sandston, Capt G. C. C., 180.
Santa Cruz, Battle of, 216–17.
Sasaki, Rear Admiral N., 223–4.
Savage, Rt. Hon. M. J., 6–7.
Sayers, WO R., 164.
Scott, Wg Cdr I. A., 259.
Scott, Lt T. C., 283.
Seltzer, Col E. T., 48.
Sexton, Ch Sister J., 167.
Sheild, Padre E. O., 165.
Sherman, Rear Admiral F. C., 274.
Sherson, Pte C. H., 156.
Shewan, Matron A. G., 311.
Shirley, Lt D. M., 136.
Silvester, Rev A. W. E., 238.
Simmers, Maj J. C. M., 82.
Simmiss, Maj G. C., 82.
Simpson, Capt D. G., 130.
Sinclair, Maj R., 133.
Skilling, Sgt V. D., 269.
Smith, Pte J. E., 157.
Smith, Cdr J. MacD., 174–6.
Solomon Islands—
Campaign in, 62–4, 74, 122, 166, 210, 221, 225–7, 242–5, 247–60, 274, 323–4 (see also
Somerville, Capt G. N., 178.
Sotutu, Sgt U., 279.
South, Capt R. M., 81.
South Pacific Scouts. See Fiji Forces—Units—1 Commando, Fiji Guerrillas.
South West Pacific Command, 46, 59–60, 64, 143, 169, 274, 336.
Spaatz, Lt-Gen C., 307.
Speedy, Pte L. B., 236.
Spring, Maj J. F., 311.
Spurdle, Wg Cdr R. L., 251.
Squarepeg, Operation. See
Stannard, Pte R. C., 186.
Stead, Wg Cdr G. G., 259.
Steel, L. H., 229.
Steele, Maj A. G., 157–8.
Steele, Capt N. W., 262.
Stenhouse, Sgt L. V., 125.
Stephens, Lt L. C., 26.
Stevens, D. H., 135.
Stevens, Sgt-Maj G., 292.
Stewart, Capt D. W., 21–2.
Stewart, Maj F. H., 262.
Stewart, Lt L. C., 131.
St. George, Wg Cdr D. F., 310.
See
Stout, Rt. Hon. Sir R., 1.
Stratford, Lt O. W., 282.
Sukanaivalu, Cpl S. (VC), 286.
Sykes, Capt J., 178.
Syme, Lt R. W., 131.
Tahiti.
Tancred, Wg Cdr H. L., 253.
Task Forces. See
Tassone, Carpenter's Mate A., 151.
Taylor, Lt D., 130.
Taylor, Maj E. G., 183–4.
Taylor-Cannon, Lt L. G., 179.
Third, Sgt R., 234.
Thomas, Lt-Col W. B., 311.
Thompson, A. K., 313.
Thompson, Maj-Gen C. F., 262.
Thompson, Lt G. A., 277.
Thompson, Padre G. R., 165.
Thompson, Lt-Col H. J., 26.
Thorburn, Cpl P. B., 236.
Thornton, Brig L. W., 317.
Tisdale, Rear Admiral M. S., 240.
Tod, Cpl J. J., 160.
Tolich, Pte I. N., 183.
Tomline, Lt-Col G. H., 48.
Royal New Zealand Navy, 245.
Trench, Maj D. C. C., 158.
Trevarthen, Maj D. E., 114.
Tucker, Capt F. G., 262.
Turnbull, Lt C. E., 155.
Turner, Capt G. H., 81.
Turner, Rear Admiral R. K., 217–18.
United Kingdom—
United Kingdom Government—
Vanderpump, Sqn Ldr M. T., 251.
Vaughan, Lt D. L., 237.
Veitch, Lt H. C., 164.
Japanese forces—
Royal New Zealand Air Force operations, 252.
Voss, Lt C. A., 26.
Waddell, Maj G. W., 166.
Wainwright, Maj A., 22.
Wakefield, Capt R. F., 80.
Waldman, Cpl R. G., 134.
Walker, Wg Cdr H. C., 256.
Wallace, Cpl S. R., 233.
Wallingford, Air Cdre S., 252.
Walsh, Sgt T. J., 139.
Ward, Ch Sister R. J., 167.
Ware, Sgt-Maj, 140.
Warren, W/O R. C., 237.
Washington Conference, 4–5.
Waterworth, Maj G. E., 148.
Watson, Capt D. O., 81.
Watson, Flt Lt R. B., 281.
Wavell, Fd Mshl Earl, 57.
Webb, Hon. P. C., 41.
Wells, Lt-Col J. R., 24.
Wernham, Maj H. A., 166.
Whatman, Maj M. P., 273.
White, Wg Cdr G. R., 34.
Wickham, WO F., 146.
Wilce, Sgt S., 22.
Wilkes, Wg Cdr M., 258.
Wilkinson, Rear Admiral T. S., 108, 125, 144, 168–9, 172, 178–9, 193, 322.
Williams, Sgt F. E., 264–5.
Williams, G., 233.
Williams, Maj R. E., 139.
Williams, Fg Off W. N., 256.
Wills, Lt K. A., 131.
Wilson, Maj J. M., 311.
Wilson, Lt-Col S. L., 124.
Wimsett, Capt E. R., 297.
Withers, Telegraphist T., 238.
Wood, Lt-Col J. H. H., 111.
Wooller, Lt-Col H. G., 21.
Wright, Rear Admiral C. H., 220.
Wybourne, Sgt R. H. W., 56.
Wylde-Brown, Maj R. V. M., 81.
Yazawa, Col K., 207.
Young, Capt D. M., 174.
Young, Maj R. A., 116.
Young, Col V. A., 78.