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The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the
By Authority:
R. E. Owen, Government Printer,
THIS volume was intended to be an account of the part played by the New Zealand Division in the two battles from which the title is drawn. Work on it was commenced by Battle for Egypt, published in
I found, on beginning my task, that a picture of the New Zealand share in the battles could only be drawn in its true perspective against a clear background of the events occurring to all the forces concerned, both Allied and Axis. This I have attempted to do, so that, although the Division remains in the foreground, I have mentioned the names of only those New Zealanders whose actions affected operations or illustrate the conditions under which the battle was fought. For a detailed record of the gallant actions of officers and men, I would refer the reader to the numerous unit histories published by the
My acknowledgments are due to
I would take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the first Editor-in-Chief of the New Zealand War Histories, the late
The maps were drawn by the Cartographic Branch of the Lands and Survey Department and the index was prepared by Mrs M. Fogarty of the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.
Finally, though the story told is as close to the facts as detailed research can shape it, the views and opinions expressed are my own.
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.
THE heat of the summer sun beating down on the Egyptian desert, the fine dust that rose with any wind or movement, and the legions of flies made August in the Panzer Army of Africa, facing one another across an ill-defined no-man's land, were settling in to a period of static warfare as the several inconclusive actions of July petered out.
On
Tour FDLs and examine minefields. Troops a bit lethargic but cheerful enough. Slit trenches shallow but men show no concern. Say that rock is hard and compressors few…. Dearth of information criticised…. Weather very hot. Visibility bad. Little activity….
2000 hrs mild shelling of Bde HQ area, followed by quiet night.Diary, 6 NZ Inf Bde.
The men of 6 Brigade were fortunate in that they faced the enemy across a no-man's land measured in miles. In 5 Brigade's sector and further north, where the fronts converged until they were in easy range of mortars and small arms, lethargy was less evident. Here, movement in daylight was hazardous but, with the fall of darkness, the desert became alive as men rose from cramped slit trenches to arm themselves with picks and shovels. Some worked on their own ‘slitties’, deepening them to the four to five feet laid down in orders; others worked with the sappers who brought up their compressors and truckloads of barbed wire, pickets and mines; while, behind the front, still others worked on gun positions, headquarters, supply dumps, medical aid posts—all the various tasks of digging that occupied the soldiers' time more than the actual fighting.
On the low ridges,
All through the night, in the no-man's land between the two lines of toiling men, patrols crept quietly about their missions of observing and interrupting the other side's work. At intervals a sudden staccato outburst of rifle and automatic fire and the crump of mortar bombs would break the silence as real or imagined foes were seen by the men protecting the working parties. Possibly another corpse would be added to those already lying unburied and untended between the lines.
From the dark sky overhead came the rhythmic pulse of bombers searching for gunflash or other telltale sign on which to drop their bombs. Then the gunners, unhurriedly loading and firing the field or medium guns to harass an unseen enemy, would pause in their task, as the aircraft passed close overhead, to listen for the first faint whisper of a bomb.
It was during the hours of darkness that reinforcements and reliefs moved into the front line, passing the lightly wounded and the sick, sufferers from the prevalent desert sores, ‘Gyppo tummy’, jaundice, or malaria, who were making their way back to the medical aid posts. Trucks criss-crossed the desert, each with its plume of dust to thicken the gloom into which the drivers peered for signs of minefield or slit trench, as the army services went about their business of replenishing rations, water and ammunition.
Before the first hint of dawn appeared, all this nocturnal activity slackened off. Patrols, working parties, and their guards moved quietly back to their own lines, the infantrymen slipping into their narrow slit trenches, often to wake their more fortunate comrades who, not detailed for nightly tasks, had managed to get a few hours' sleep in the cool of darkness.
As the sun rose behind the Eighth Army, the men of both sides ‘stood to’, ready for a dawn assault. One observant diarist noted that the flies stayed abed for twenty minutes after the official ‘first light’; after this short respite, they appeared in their myriads to add their unpleasant attentions to the heat and the dust and the discomforts of the day until the sun set behind the Panzer Army.
Throughout the day the British artillery fired on known, observed, or suspected targets such as gun and infantry positions, groups of
Except for the unequal artillery duel, and the occasional local vendetta with mortars and machine guns between opposing frontline posts, the hot days dragged on uneventfully for most of the men in the Luftwaffe to come and do battle, but many a day passed when only the occasional Axis fighter or reconnaissance plane was seen. The British fighters usually gathered in strength as the summer sun sank over the western horizon, the time when Stuka and Messerschmitt preferred to come roaring out of the sun for a hit-and-run raid.
Water was one of the biggest problems for both sides. Eighth Army had the pipeline from Panzer Army. The Germans also complained that the distribution at the water points
German water supplies were officially divided into three categories, each carried in marked containers to prevent contamination:
Medically tested fresh water for drinking. Untested fresh water for washing and cooking. Salty or brackish water for washing (with an issue of salt-water soap).
The medical authorities suspected a connection between sea bathing and dysentery and forbad bathing other than a short immersion every second day.—German Military Documents Section,
The Panzer Army also suffered from a steadily deteriorating transport system as the captured British trucks which had made up for its own losses became unusable from lack of spare parts. Replacements from
The Italians were nominally in charge of the supply system and there is a suspicion that they overestimated their own needs at the expense of the Germans; one German left a record of his humiliation at having to beg food and water from his Italian companions-in-arms. In the Italian army, the requirements of other ranks took a very second place to those of the officers, while their standards of hygiene made their defence positions much more unpleasant than they need have been, besides providing breeding grounds for the flies that the men of the Eighth Army, a few hundred yards away, were trying with considerable trouble and ingenuity to eliminate.
In one particular respect the troops of Eighth Army were more fortunate than their opponents. Both sides were too thin on the ground, with too few reserves, to be able to release their front-line troops for more than short spells of leave. The Germans and Italians set up rest camps on the coast within a day's journey of the front where their men could enjoy swimming in the Panzer Army rest camp.
Even had the men of Eighth Army been generally aware of their advantages over the Axis troops, this would not have been enough to lift the weight of frustration and uncertainty that had increased since the July fighting died down. When Rommel had moved forward to the attack at
Though co-ordination between his two corps and between the formations within those corps was far from complete, General Auchinleck had managed during July to regain a measure of control over his command. This he did more by his determination to hit the enemy ‘whenever and wherever possible’ Report to CIGS, 24 July.
In the space of seventeen days up to 27 July, when Operation MANHOOD Battle for Egypt, p. 375.
If, as Auchinleck implied in his despatch, the July operations were designed to withhold the initiative from the enemy, they were successful. But, with this simple aim, they could have been just as great a success with much less loss. Designed as they were with a much wider aim, they demanded a degree of co-ordination which the formations within the Eighth Army were unable to offer. Though minor criticisms of the handling of brigades and divisions at this period might be made, they would have little value, as the conduct of the operations was strictly conditioned by the plans issued by Army Headquarters and accepted by the two corps.
Several commentators on this period B. H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, p. 209, inter alia.
The July battles roused considerable criticism within the army, criticism not confined to the three Dominion divisions involved. For the New Zealanders' part this culminated in the statement by Major-General Report by Inglis to Battle for Egypt, p. 376.
On the enemy side, Rommel was more than once doubtful if his line would hold. In most cases his Italian infantry absorbed the brunt of the attack, allowing time for detachments of the German Africa Corps, trained in the co-operation of all arms, to be thrown in at the danger points. From the information available it seems clear that Eighth Army was unaware of the extent of the strain put upon the
Once the troops on both sides learnt of their commanders' decisions to remain on the defensive for a period, they settled down to making the best use of the ground they were occupying until the two front lines began to take on a definite design, each with its epidermis of wire and mines covering the forward section and platoon weapon pits, and each company sector with an inner skin mined and wired for all-round defence. From the section posts a maze of tracks like fine veins ran through the defences back to
On the British side of the defences, the white sand dunes along the coast to the west of the
Life on this rocky ridge was uncomfortable, wearing and dangerous. Being overlooked by the Germans and Italians, the troops lived an underground existence. No one in the forward positions could move with safety during daylight, and the men sat cramped in their trenches. Dusk and nightfall afforded a relief, and the men took exercise and stretched their limbs. By night, reconnaissance and fighting patrols had to be found to report on the enemy dispositions and activities and to deter enemy mine-laying parties.
Maj M. I. Qureshi ,The First Punjabis, p. 288.
The Australian, South African and Indian divisions made up 30 Corps under the command of Lieutenant-General W. H. Ramsden.
On the south of the ridge in the stretch of desert over which it had advanced and retreated in July, the New Zealand Division, under the command of Major-General Inglis, had already begun to construct what became known as the
All the infantry divisions were to some extent under strength through losses by sickness and battle during July, though none was quite so low in numbers as the New Zealand Division. With all three battalions of 4 Brigade 4 Brigade in
The British armour was reorganising along lines proposed by Auchinleck, with 22 Armoured Brigade in process of becoming the heavy armoured formation manning all the available Grant tanks and completing its strength with Crusaders. The Valentines were concentrated in 23 Armoured Brigade, and 4 Light Armoured Brigade was being equipped with Stuarts and the remaining Crusaders. The exact total of ‘runners’ available at the end of July is not known but, excluding the light Stuarts or ‘Honeys’, the Eighth Army could have mustered and manned considerably more than the Panzer Army, which had about 150 German and 50 Italian tanks in running order at this time. During the reorganisation, the bulk of the British armour was held close behind the centre of the line, handily placed to move to the assistance of either corps. General Auchinleck, since taking over direct command of Eighth Army from General Ritchie on 25 June, still combined the duties of Army Commander and Commander-in-Chief,
In view of our present strength in relation to the enemy's, I have reluctantly decided that Eighth Army must adopt a defensive attitude until we have so built up our strength as to enable us to resume the offensive.
The date by which we will be able to resume large-scale offensive operations will depend on such factors as the speed of our own and the enemy's reinforcement. We must, however, meanwhile, be prepared to take advantage of any mistake made by the enemy and to inflict on him the maximum inconvenience and loss, by local offensive operations, active patrolling, and ‘deception’ schemes. It is of supreme importance that the enemy shall NOT be allowed to develop his plans for offensive or defensive action unhindered.
In the same document, Auchinleck estimated that Rommel might before long regain air superiority and, reinforced by an airborne regiment, might then take the offensive by a sweep round the south end of the line. He warned that the Eighth Army's southern flank should not be mined so indiscriminately as to hinder a counter-attack in strength against the enemy's flank by the British armour, ‘to be husbanded until the opportunity for a major offensive arises’. Following this instruction, the Army Commander issued an amended version of the previous plans for defence in forward and main zones.
Though the Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 386
The Eighth Army therefore had to rely to a great extent on information to be gained in the front line. Visual observation and wireless interception, though valuable, were far from capable of drawing a clear picture of the complicated interlacing of German and Italian units. It was necessary for this picture to be drawn in detail before any significant alterations, possibly presaging an offensive, could be understood. To this end the Army Commander ordered a policy of vigorous and constant patrolling by all front-line troops, both to reconnoitre the extent of the new defences being laid out and to learn the identity of the Axis troops holding each sector.
The Germans and Italians then had to cope with a constant stream of British patrols who watched, listened to, and often attacked, their working parties. Every night more details of the Axis defences, newly dug trenches, stretches of wire and minefields were collected and plotted on Eighth Army's maps. But prisoners for identification of the Axis units in the line were rarely secured as the policy of day and night harassing kept the enemy constantly alert.
Facing Eighth Army across a no-man's land which became daily more clearly defined as the fixed defences grew, the Panzer Army of Africa under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had a nominal strength of four corps, one German and three Italian. As the Italians' martial ardour and reliability in defence varied unpredictably, Rommel allocated sectors of the front to the three Italian corps with responsibility for administration, but by
The dispositions of the German and Italian infantry were being altered daily at the beginning of August as Rommel fitted the available infantry into the front in order to release the three Africa Corps formations,
The next sector, from 10 Italian Corps, bolstered by infantry detachments from all three Africa Corps divisions. South of the
Reinforcements received during August included the rest of This division was intended to be re-formed as a 164 Division,Light Africa Division, but owing to the piecemeal arrival, especially of its equipment, this procedure was delayed.Ramcke Parachute Brigade and the Italian Folgore Parachute Division, the German parachutists being placed in the central sector and the Italian in the southern.
The Panzer Army had been so close to the limit of its endurance after the Eighth Army's MANHOOD operation of 27 July that it was unable even to think in terms of ‘offensive defence’. To allow its reserves of men and material to be built up, it was forced to take as passive a role as its opponents would permit. A steady trickle, though still only a trickle, of German infantry reinforcements was coming over by air, but the Allies' sea and air offensive against the supply routes was preventing vehicles, heavy weapons, ammunition, petrol, and food being shipped over in large quantities. On 2 August the quartermaster of the
Rommel, however, was only a field commander. For all his requirements he had to travel the ill-defined and complicated path of German-Italian relations, in which politics and personalities loomed larger than strategy.
The Italian supply organisation, on which Rommel had therefore to rely for almost all his needs except for the few German troops brought in by air, was corrupt at its source and inefficient throughout. Unable to provide their own fighter cover and, in the clash of interests, unable to persuade the Germans to do the job for them, the Italians had tried to avoid the ports of
Perhaps not all the fault can be laid on the Italians for, from the German records, it is hard to avoid the impression that the two men who might have helped Rommel, Kesselring and the liaison officer in Luftwaffe in the
The stalemate on the 164 Division and the promise of a brigade of paratroops, but the airlift, by a fleet of some 500 planes, was leaving much essential equipment still on the north shores of the
No charge of ignorance or disregard of logistics can be sustained against Rommel in this period. As he faced the decline in importance of his own command, he was fully aware that the African front was the only theatre of operations in the west in which the British were actively engaged. He had had word through German intelligence sources that the See also Chapter 4.
With characteristic energy, Rommel set to work to build up a striking force from the means to hand. He knew that Allied convoys were expected to reach Panzer Army was soon able to draw a reasonably correct picture of the Eighth Army front.
So the Axis infantry, under orders to maintain a passive defence and keep the expenditure of warlike stores down, endured the British harassing, only retaliating when directly attacked. The
The point where the pipeline, built by the British to serve the
From the ridge the pipeline, or what was left of it, ran southwest out of the British positions to enter the
South of 23 Battalion, 6 New Zealand Infantry Brigade under Brigadier
This expanse of open ground, while it made conditions in 6 Brigade's sector less uncomfortable than in the northern sector, also brought the need for constant reconnaissance in case the Axis troops should try to edge their line forward. Brigadier Clifton, assisted by the relative security of his sector, took Auckinleck's policy of ‘offensive defence’ to heart and quickly arranged a full programme of nightly patrolling and daylight harassing. With the incentive of a direction from Inglis that identifications of the enemy on his front were urgently needed, he instructed his three battalion commanders to step up their patrol activities on the last night of July.
An unrecorded number of patrols, but no less than three or four from each battalion, set out this night. Most of them failed to encounter the enemy but brought back useful scraps of information on areas of mines, wire and unoccupied trenches. A few got close to enemy working parties but, coming under fire from covering troops, had to withdraw. Only one was successful in bringing back an identification.
Working north-west across 5 Brigade's front, a 26 Battalion patrol of about a dozen men from 14 Platoon, C Company, led by Lieutenant 115 Infantry Regiment of 15 Panzer Division. According to the German records, a New Zealand raiding party of over fifty men was driven off this night with difficulty.
Encouraged by 26 Battalion's success, a strong patrol from 25 Battalion was sent out the following night to attack a post near the
This immediate and co-ordinated reaction to the British patrolling was the result of instructions given by the Panzer Army to tighten up its defensive measures by the use of stronger covering patrols, together with armoured cars and light tanks, for the working parties. By 2 August New Zealand patrols were reporting that they were unable to get within striking distance of the enemy working parties because of the heavy machine-gun and mortar fire let loose at any suspicious sound or movement.
The Axis troops had also begun to thicken up their minefields with anti-personnel ‘S’ mines, a device about the size of a Mills grenade set to spring out of a container buried in the ground and then explode in shrapnel at chest height. These ‘S’ mines were activated by three thin wire prongs which rose a few inches above ground and were extremely difficult to distinguish even in daylight from short vegetation or battlefield litter. They could also be worked by trip-wires attached to ‘push-pull’ igniters so that the slightest movement of the wires set off the ejecting mechanism. Some hundreds of these mines were laid in the Ruweisat and El Mreir sector at this time. The Axis troops also tried the use of searchlights mounted on trucks, the beams being swung across the front at ground level at irregular intervals, and the trucks constantly changing position to avoid being fired on.
The continuous pressure of Eighth Army's patrolling, added to the constant day and night harassing fire, thus had the result within a few days of causing the Axis troops to improve their defences and maintain such a state of alertness that small hit-and-run patrols were more likely to suffer casualties than gather prisoners. When this became clear, Eighth Army's thoughts turned towards planned raids in place of opportunist patrols. With the greater freedom from enemy interference enjoyed in his sector, Clifton was one of the first to turn this planning into action by sending out raiding parties whose routes were covered by standing patrols equipped with wireless linked to the artillery. The idea was that the raiders
A new gadget was received at this time which, it was thought, would provide a means of dealing with the armoured vehicles used by the Axis to cover the working parties in the front line. This was a parachute flare to be fired from the standard infantry 2-inch mortar. Experiments by armoured car crews of the Divisional Cavalry using derelict vehicles in no-man's land showed that the flare could illuminate a tank at night at a distance of 400 yards for sufficient time for several shots to be fired from an anti-tank gun. Danger lay in the wind drifting the flare back over the gun. After watching these experiments, Clifton fostered a plan for adding an anti-tank gun and a 2-inch mortar to a raiding party. However, the large element of luck necessary for the success of this scheme remained elusively absent and never, as far as is known, did any men of the brigade manage to site a gun, unobserved, within 400 yards of an enemy tank—with the wind in the right quarter.
Daylight activity in the first week of August was confined mainly to exchanges by the artillery, the weight of fire coming from Eighth Army. In the New Zealand sector, 5 Brigade's area was too exposed to allow much activity beyond standard firing by the 25-pounders, but 6 Brigade's distance from the enemy permitted Clifton considerable scope for experiment in ‘offensive defence’. Observers in the brigade area reported that, with the lightening dawn sky behind them, they were able to see numbers of Axis troops appearing above ground to shake out blankets and perform
This plan was given its first major trial on the morning of 2 August. Two six-pounders of 31 Anti-Tank Battery and Vickers guns from the machine-gun companies were driven out overnight and carefully sited behind a screen of infantry and Bren-gun carriers. As soon as the dawn light gave sufficient visibility, the Vickers gunners opened up on Axis troops they could observe in the
Though this experiment was repeated later with variations, the anti-tank gunners never managed to get their sights on a tank within range. Clifton maintained his routine of visiting the artillery and machine-gunners' observation posts at first light to spur them to action, and the Axis troops must have found the regular dawn harassing very unpleasant, but from the complete lack of reference in the German unit records, it seems unlikely that the shooting caused much damage. It was probably accepted in the same way as the British troops accepted the occasional Axis strafing, as one more unpleasant desert condition to be endured.
As the New Zealand troops went about the job of ‘rotating’ the enemy, in the current slang, the Australians, South Africans and Indians were also experimenting with similar methods of offensive defence. No sector of the Axis front was secure from probing patrols at night, while during the day observers in Eighth Army watched continuously for targets on which the artillery, mortars, or machine guns could be laid. With no real shortage of ammunition, the British guns used ten or more shells to reply to each one fired by the Axis. Only in small-arms ammunition and Very lights did the enemy practise no economy for, all along the front, the hours of darkness were punctuated with soaring flares and the sudden chattering of machine guns.
ALAM EL HALFA ridge lay some 12 miles behind the New Zealand Division's line and ran generally west-south-west about ten miles from, and roughly parallel to, the coast. The terrain was common to that of most of the
The highest point, Alam el Halfa itself, was some 132 metres (433 feet) above sea level. For some miles each side of this point the ridge maintained a height of over 100 metres. Immediately south of the ridge lay a wide shallow depression, the
Halfway between the Alam el Halfa ridge and the coast another parallel ridge, the
The New Zealand Division's interest in Alam el Halfa began as early as the first week in July when
An operation instruction
To complement this Eighth Army instruction,
The last complete instruction signed by General Auchinleck for the Eighth Army, issued on 31 July, Despatch in London Gazette,
No large bodies of reinforcements were expected in the Operation Victory,
De Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 123.
Whether the implications in the plan were clearly seen or not is uncertain, but Gott of 13 Corps took the liberty, when passing on the army instruction, of altering the terms ‘forward’ and ‘main’ to ‘main’ and ‘rear’ respectively for the two zones, and of otherwise changing the emphasis to a strong defence on the present front, with armoured counter-attack to drive back any enemy penetration of the New Zealand area, and a withdrawal to Alam el Halfa as merely a possible later contingency.
On 27 July Inglis was being asked by his two brigadiers if they could increase their local mining to cover all-round defence, but had to withhold permission until he could get 13 Corps to tell him the general policy. Two days later he drew from Gott the information that the policy was ‘defensive’ and that he could mine
Confirmed in his belief that, under the state of training then existing in Eighth Army, an infantry division had to remain intact as a division and rely on its own strength in men and guns rather than on promised support by other formations, he was averse to breaking up the New Zealand Division into the small battle groups that the Alam el Halfa plan required. He therefore proposed to Gott that the position, which would have to withstand the initial impact of an enemy drive round the south, should be designed as a divisional defence area with the artillery under central control. For this he would need another brigade.
Gott agreed in principle and asked for a plan. Intensive reconnaissance of the ridge was begun by infantry, gunner and engineer parties. Meanwhile 21 Indian Infantry Brigade was called from reserve to work on Alam el Halfa and put under the New Zealand Division's command on 2 August. By 7 August the Division was able to issue a plan acceptable to 13 Corps with some minor amendments. This divided the ten-mile stretch of the ridge, from
The discussions and arguments that culminated in the acceptance of Inglis' plans for Alam el Halfa also brought to an end his command of the Division. He had been far from well for some time, and now the combined effects of jaundice, dysentery and an
On 4 August he was called to the tactical headquarters of the Army, where the staff and senior officers were holding discussions on organisation and planning. Among those present was General Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant-General of the British Army, lately arrived from the
A test of the combined plans for the armour and infantry of 13 Corps was held at Corps Headquarters on 7 August, attended by Inglis and senior officers of the Division. The principal item in this staff exercise dealt with the withdrawal of the infantry, after an enemy penetration of the forward positions, to the main zone defences of Alam el Halfa under cover of a limited counter-attack by 22 Armoured Brigade. Details of this exercise show that the implication in 13 Corps' plans, of a main zone to be strongly defended and a rear zone for a withdrawal in an emergency, had been subordinated to the original army plan of a forward zone likely to be overrun and a main zone into which the infantry would retreat and reorganise for the principal action of the defence. Inglis was not too happy with the result of the exercise as it showed weaknesses both in the time taken for the armoured counter-attack and in the difficulties of reorganisation in the main zone.
Having received news that
IF any point in time could justifiably be taken as the turning point of the war in the west, the phrase should be applied to the first half of the month of
By the end of July the joint Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 408.gymnast, then torch, for a landing in French North Africa had been given priority over all proposed landings on the mainland of
Auchinleck's replacement was apparently accepted as a foregone conclusion, for there is no record of a single voice being raised on his behalf. Churchill, however, appeared unwilling to promulgate a flat dismissal of a commander who, whatever limitations he might have shown, had at least the right to claim that he had stopped the enemy at the gates of Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 414.
Gott's appointment was confirmed and left to Auchinleck to announce at the end of the staff exercise at 13 Corps Headquarters on 7 August. With the promise of a few days' leave before assuming his new role, the general left the exercise to board a plane on the nearby airstrip. As the aircraft, a Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III, Appx 6.
Although Churchill commented that, by the death of Gott, ‘All my plans were dislocated’, Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 418. ‘He was the youngest major-general in the Army when he was promoted on Alexander of Tunis, p. 66.
Churchill's visit also brought about the return of Naval Headquarters from
General Alexander reached Montgomery, Memoirs.
With a clear and incisive mind of his own, and no
It is clear that the present, static, phase of hostilities will last only until one side or the other feels itself strong enough to launch a decisive attack. The problem is thus largely one of reinforcements. For a number of reasons, of which the chief is probably the heavy German commitments in
Russia , the Germans inAfrica do not seem to be receiving men and materials on the scale which the magnitude of the stakes might have led one to expect. On the other hand, they will probably resume the offensive at the first opportunity. They may very well apply again the tactic employed atGazala , trying to contain thegreater part of our line with their less mobile elements while the armour and the more mobile infantry formations seek to break through and swing around to attack our main positions from the rear. The execution of such a manoeuvre would require less preliminary regrouping than was the case on the Gazala line, where the distances involved were much greater than they are here. In fact, the preliminary moves could be carried out overnight, and we cannot count on receiving from aerial reconnaissance much warning of an impending enemy attack.
As all these far-reaching decisions took shape, the mass of the Eighth Army went about its daily and nightly duties of digging, wiring, mining and patrolling, only vaguely aware that changes were in the offing. Churchill's visits to the forward areas were naturally kept as quiet as possible and, though a few New Zealanders saw him in person, most of the men were unaware of his presence in the area until days later. The changes were in fact heralded for the Division by the arrival on 10 August of Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Bronze Star (US); Panzer Army, which included a division ‘from
With Inglis' forceful reports on the July fighting fresh in his mind,
From these talks the GOC went to visit his two brigade commanders,
The following day In his book El Alamein to the River Sangro (p. 3) General Montgomery stated that he found Alam el Halfa ‘virtually undefended’.
On 13 August the new army commander paid a visit to the headquarters of 13 Corps and then, with Letter to
On 14 August
The new policy considerably simplified the New Zealand Division's tasks. Responsibility for the Alam el Halfa positions was to be handed over to 44 (Home Counties) Division, ordered forward urgently at Montgomery's request from its task of preparing defences in the
Montgomery gave a rousing talk the following day to a gathering of officers at Eighth Army Headquarters, which at his instigation had been removed from its uncomfortable situation in the bare desert Placed there in reaction to criticism similar to General Gordon's remark, ‘If you wanted to find Her Majesty's forces you would have to go to Shepheard's Hotel at General Gordon's Khartoum Journal.
On 16 August General Horrocks arrived to take over 13 Corps, ‘full of optimism and ready to consider changes in the plans’. Diary of GOC Horrocks, article in Picture Post,
In the week after General Gott's death, before the changes in command had become fully effective, daily life in the New Zealanders' forward positions varied only in detail. On several mornings a heavy mist covered the desert, limiting visibility to a few hundred yards and lifting only when the sun was well above the horizon. As the mist dispersed, the sun beat down from a brassy, cloudless sky. Then, around midday, the wind often arose to bring a dust-storm that might last for some hours, the fine sand penetrating into every crevice of weapons, trucks and tanks and caking the sweat-stained faces of the troops. One of the worst of these storms occurred on the day
The nights were spent on defence works and patrols. Movement noticed in and to the rear of the enemy's front line brought an exhortation from Eighth Army to all formations that prisoners were needed for identification as it was suspected that considerable changes were taking place among the Axis front-line troops. Though the New Zealand battalions responded with numerous patrols every night in the week of 7–14 August, they failed to bring back a single prisoner, though their efforts cost several men wounded, two officers and one man killed and two men lost as prisoners to the enemy. Patrols from 7 Armoured Division operating further south suffered even greater casualties for the same lack of success.
On the night of 12–13 August there occurred what was probably the last illustration of the old methods of the army before the new influences began to be felt. In an operation hastily and locally arranged, with a lack of effective liaison between neighbouring troops and even between the two corps,
The raid commenced just before midnight but the assaulting troops found the enemy posts on their objective had been vacated. While waiting for reconnaissance to decide if they had in fact reached the correct objective, the troops came under heavy fire from front and flanks. It took the raiders two hours to extricate themselves and they returned with five men wounded and thirteen missing. Of those missing, the Italians manning this sector of the front claimed five as prisoners.
While the Indians' raid was on, at least six New Zealand patrols were out on the front to the south of the ridge but, though they blew up a derelict tank used by the enemy as an observation post
At first light on the 13th, enemy troops seen in the area of the Indians' raid were subjected to heavy concentrations by the Indian and New Zealand 25-pounders. Enemy gunners then retaliated by shelling both 21 Battalion's lines and the headquarters of 6 Brigade. In the afternoon they fired one of the heaviest concentrations seen for some time into the unoccupied hollow of
With Horrocks' arrival,
The coincidence of
Once back in the saddle, and accoutred with the spur of Montgomery's directives,
If, therefore, Rommel should attack within the next week or so, the situation would be difficult and much would depend on the outcome of the armoured battle. Until the mining of the
For every week the enemy's attack was delayed, the Division's defences and the army's reserves would be so much the stronger, to the point when the British armour, free of any commitments to the infantry, could block a thrust round the flank and rear. As both the Australians and South Africans were holding strong defences, little danger was expected on their fronts, but the rocky
The General ended his talk by repeating the new terminology laid down by the Army Commander to replace certain expressions which had acquired undertones of meaning antagonistic to good morale. ‘Consolidating’, for example, had come to mean ‘sitting down and doing very little’, so was to be replaced by ‘reorganising’, with the meaning of gathering strength for further action. A ‘box’, in the Army Commander's opinion, was something with a lid on it to hold the occupants down; in future it would be known as a ‘defended area’, a secure base from which to operate. The term ‘battle group’ was to be entirely forgotten now that divisions were to fight as divisions, and any force approximating the old battle group was now to be called a ‘mobile reserve’ intended for offensive purposes. ‘Notes’ on GOC
Habit dies hard and, though ‘box’ and ‘battle group’ were banned from official use, the terms remained in common usage for some time to come.
The impact of the new Army Commander was quickly felt throughout all ranks of the Eighth Army. His clear orders and simple definitions were such as could be passed down the chain of command to reach the men in the ranks without the usual mutilation in the process. The simply stated policy of a determined defence to cover the period needed to prepare the offensive brought morale up at once, for it permitted numerous minor decisions, previously withheld in case of a change of plan, to be made on the small matters which affected the ordinary soldier. Each man's slit trench, for example, ceased to be a temporary expedient, to be filled in and abandoned for another every few hours or days; it became a permanent fortification to be designed and improved with care, at least until Rommel's attack had been beaten off. To the New Zealanders particularly, who had been so constantly on the move since they left
The June and July operations and the hard desert conditions had since brought severe losses in both battle casualties and sickness and, though only two brigades were left in the field, it had been necessary to comb the base camp in
Faced with the situation that the Division would either have to be withdrawn from active operations or be reinforced, the
But between March and August much had happened in the GOC
Army Headquarters in
Yet, against the logical arguments submitted from esprit de corps that there might have arisen strong resentment within the Division if one veteran formation—6 Brigade was tentatively chosen for the block—should be eliminated in favour of a formed body of newcomers with fixed ranks and appointments. Furthermore,
While these proposals and counter-proposals were being cabled back and forth, Montgomery had taken over the Eighth Army and announced his scheme of establishing a mobile armoured reserve similar to the German panzer formations. His first choice for the infantry component of this reserve had fallen on the British 44 Division but, on learning that the New Zealand Division might soon acquire its own armour, he changed his plans, indicating to
With such a measure of agreement following the protracted negotiations, Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); CGS file, ‘Recommendations to Minister of Defence and Canberra, had been lost, while there were signs that the Japanese efforts to retake
CGS file, ‘Recommendations to Minister of Defence and
Although this decision cut across their previous plans, both Puttick and
The cable giving the For further details of the reinforcement and manpower problem see Documents, Vols II and III; Gillespie, The Pacific; Wood,
AS the British leaders were diagnosing the ailments of the Panzer Army might soon be forced to dance to the Allied tune.
In the top levels of command in the Panzer Army there was no need for any sweeping changes. Rommel had the confidence of
Even before the fresh wind of change had begun to blow in the Eighth Army, Rommel was completing the plans for his next offensive. Churchill's visits seem to have passed unknown at the
Panzer Army but on 7 August, the very day that success and tragedy came to General Gott, Rommel called his senior commanders together to be briefed on his intentions. By setting the full-moon period at the end of the month as his deadline, he gave a sense of urgency to the Axis preparations.
Rommel chose to continue the land offensive into
But Rommel's reasoning was sound. He was an army commander only and, though debates on strategy might be swayed by his forceful arguing, the final decisions were not his. Admittedly he had earlier in the campaign forced a decision against the seaborne operation, in which he was likely to play a subordinate part, by continuing the land offensive in which he was the de facto commander, but this had only been possible because of indecision in the command structure above him. Now, in August, to add to the forcefulness of his character, he had logic on his side. The sum of his information was that the British were preparing to pour men and materials into the Panzer Army taking a share or at least forgoing reinforcements and supplies it might otherwise receive for the land advance.
The situation in ‘This was the high water mark of the German advance in the East’.—The Fatal Decisions, p. 78.
The further Rommel progressed round the shores of the
In short, any operations against
Through Axis intelligence and other sources Rommel must have had more than an inkling of
So, while Rommel left the problem of Luftwaffe and the Italians and turned his mind to his land offensive, the promised convoy, code-named
Although four warships of pedestal were sunk and several damaged, and only five of the original fourteen merchant ships reached Furious. This reinforcement of the air defences, together with the stores landed by the five surviving ships, revived Panzer Army at Alam el Halfa and
Apart from the courage and determination of the men of the Royal and Merchant Navies, the failure of the Axis to destroy or repulse the whole convoy was due in great measure to
Rommel soon felt the effects of See Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 454; Roskill, The War at Sea, Chs II, XIII; Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers; Thompson,
Troops of the Ramcke Parachute Brigade, being flown to 15 Panzer Division who were still holding front-line positions in the El Mreir sector. To get them there was only possible by calling
Since the beginning of July, when the Panzer Army had reached its lowest ebb, its strength had grown, reinforcements offsetting losses, by some 10,000 Germans and a like number of Italians by the middle of August. Each new arrival was adding to the burden of a supply organisation that, in its whole length from
Axis shipping losses of merchantmen of over 500 tons sunk in the
Over the same period 17 vessels of less than 500 tons were sunk. In October, Italian losses alone were 29 ships of 56,169 tons. Considerably more than half of the sunken tonnage was Italian.—Playfair, Vol. III, and Roskill, Vol. II.
One unfortunate result of the increased Allied action against Axis shipping was the torpedoing, on 17 August, of the transport Nino Bixio which was carrying British prisoners of war from North Africa to
The relief of the assault formations from the front line was complete about 16 August when most of Ramcke Brigade and units of the Italian Bologna Division took over from the remaining infantry of 15 Panzer Division. The assault formations,
Once General Montgomery had simplified Eighth Army's battle policy, reserves and reinforcements previously allocated to rear lines of defence became available for the main battle and planning could proceed to greater purpose. The two corps of the army faced differing tasks. In the north, 30 Corps was not expected to have to fight a battle of manoeuvre and, apart from the placing of reserves to deal with a penetration of the front, its main task was to make its defences as impregnable as possible.
The southern part of the line under 13 Corps had, however, to anticipate an assault of greater variety. The New Zealanders' defended area—which in spite of repeated admonitions from above continued to be known as ‘The Box’—had to be prepared to withstand attacks from west, south, and east, and possibly from the north as well. The two brigades of 44 Division on Alam el Halfa had a similar task, while the rest of the corps dealt with the enemy's manoeuvring. The essence of the new corps plan was for the
On the open ground to the south of the box, the light tanks and mobile columns of 7 Armoured Division were to harass and delay the enemy's advance across a series of minefields that were already being laid with all speed on a design intended to block the easy routes and increase the natural hazards of this part of the desert.
Extensions were planned to take this field as far as the edge of the
By the third week in August the three main fields from the box to the depressions had been finished for all practical purposes, each some 200 to 1000 yards wide according to the terrain and of a varying pattern of a core of ten or so rows of closely spaced mines inside two belts more widely spaced. From the depressions to
A week after sic] of 7 Armoured Division’ as the route of the Panzer Army's advance. It summarised intelligence reports to offer the opinion that Rommel was not as confident of the outcome as he had been in the past but was prepared to ‘take a very hazardous chance’ before the mounting British reserves swung the odds too heavily against him. Further influence of the new leadership showed in a paragraph: ‘The importance of this battle and the way we propose to fight it should be explained to all ranks …. This is vital. We have a good plan with every chance of success and provided the men realise this they will fight with confidence and intelligence ….’ The pernicious practice of internal criticism, such as the infantry had become accustomed to expend on the armour, was to cease, while staff officers were forbidden ‘to bellyache’, an expression used by Montgomery to describe a habit developed in Eighth Army whereby, for example, a divisional staff
When
From 16 August, when 44 Division relieved the New Zealand Division of the responsibility of the Alam el Halfa positions, the defences of 13 Corps improved daily. The Alam el Halfa feature itself was occupied by 133 Brigade and
The three battalions of 132 Brigade were in their positions within the
Following Montgomery's order for the removal of inessential vehicles from the front, all the trucks not needed for the daily servicing of the box were sent away, eventually to settle in an area
The headquarters of 132 Brigade took over the dug-in position which had been occupied by
The sense of purpose that now had permeated through Eighth Army was heightened at this time by the reappearance of Mr Churchill who, on his way back from
I am very glad to have this opportunity of visiting the Desert Army and I certainly would not dream of going away without seeing the New Zealanders commanded by my old friend of many years' standing,
General Freyberg .In England not long before I left I heard someone say the New Zealanders were ‘a ball of fire’. It was said by someone quite impartial who had a great opportunity of assessing your worth. You have played a magnificent part, a notable and even decisive part, in stemming a great retreat which might have been most detrimental to the whole cause of the British Empire and the
United Nations .I know that on the other side of the world in your homes in New Zealand all eyes are fixed on you. But even more eyes in England watch you fighting here with equal solicitude. I wish you good luck in the great days that lie ahead—perhaps not so far ahead—of you.
We share the pride that your Dominion feels in the great services you are rendering and in the contributions you have made in this war as in the last, to the pages of British Imperial history. You will be cherished by future generations who, through your exertions and sacrifices, will go forward to a better and a fairer and a brighter world.
GOC
2 NZEF /25, p. 80. This speech was published as a ‘Special Order of the Day’ and circulated within the Division.Churchill's heavy lunch of oysters and Montgomery's spartan sandwiches, as recorded in Churchill,
, Vol. IV, pp. 464–5, were eaten at HQ 13 Corps, not asThe Second World War Freyberg 's guests.
At the time Churchill was speaking to his desert audience, Rommel and his officers were gathering not many miles away to the west to hold a staff exercise on their proposed offensive. No date was yet settled for the attack, though it was known that it would have to start before the end of August or wait for the September full moon. Plans, however, were made to concentrate the mobile formations over a series of nights in such a way that movement would be as inconspicuous as possible.
THROUGH the time of 39 Regiment of Bologna Division.
At daybreak next morning observers in 28 Battalion's front-line posts saw an estimated 200 men moving in the area of the position attacked and, thinking a reprisal was being prepared, called on 6 Field Regiment for defensive fire. The field guns opened up within a few minutes of the call being sent, demonstrating how quickly and effectively defensive fire could now be provided. After the dust had subsided, there was no sign of the enemy troops who, it was later thought, were merely a reinforcement or relief party that had been caught by daylight before they had settled in to their allotted trenches.
The wide expanse of unoccupied desert facing 6 Brigade's sector, besides allowing patrols from both sides to wander almost at will, also offered considerable scope for experiment by enterprising members of the brigade. Patrolling was one way, and almost the
The width between the opposing lines in this sector is illustrated by the fact that 25 Battalion was able to maintain, day and night, a standing patrol at
After dark it was customary for a relief section of carriers to drive out escorting a truckload or more of infantry, who used partly prepared defences around the point as a listening post or as a base for further patrolling. Three-inch mortars on carriers, Vickers guns in trucks or carriers, and anti-tank guns towed by jeeps were also driven out at night to lay harassing fire on the enemy working parties which were pushing their defence works closer to the point on the north and west. Although similar listening posts were set out elsewhere on the brigade front, none was manned so strongly or consistently as
The success of 5 Brigade's first attempt to bring back a prisoner by garnering one relatively unimportant Italian did not satisfy the demands of the army's intelligence staff, who were keen to confirm the persistent rumours and scraps of information that German paratroops had been brought into the front line. It was left to 6 Brigade to confirm the rumours, for on the night of 16–17 August a small patrol from C Company, 26 Battalion, returned triumphantly with a man from the Ramcke Parachute Brigade. The patrol, under Lieutenant
The artillery fire which brought this paratroop prisoner by accident rather than design was being laid down for a raid by a 23 Battalion patrol on a troop of enemy guns believed to be situated on the south side of El Mreir. With extra support from 3-inch mortars in 28 Battalion's lines, a platoon had set out, its advance carefully timed to reach the objective as the supporting fire ceased. All went according to plan except that no guns were found, only empty pits with ammunition boxes scattered around.
The success of Galloway's patrol encouraged Brigadier Clifton to try out a method which, it was hoped, might recapitulate the same conditions by design. This involved the firing of a ‘backwards barrage’ whereby the 25–pounders commenced by laying a barrage on the rear of an enemy position and then gradually reduced the range, thus encouraging any of the enemy who did not appreciate the shelling to walk forward from their trenches into the arms of a patrol waiting hidden close to the finishing line of the barrage. In the first, and it is believed only, trial of this scheme, the patrol, comprising two platoons of A Company, 26 Battalion, was able to get within sight of the objective where a number of troops were busily digging defences, but, when the ‘backwards barrage’ had only just commenced, the enemy hastily downed tools and ran back through the shelling. Through lack of communications the patrol was unable to tell the artillery to lift its range or cease fire.
While 6 Brigade was experimenting, 5 Brigade continued with more orthodox methods. With artillery fire on previously selected targets, two strong fighting patrols were sent out with instructions to make for the area where the shells were bursting and attack as the fire ceased. Both patrols, however, encountered heavy defensive fire from positions outside the target area and were repulsed with the loss of two men killed, and an officer and another two men wounded.
With a certain ennui from the lack of activity during the long hot days, men of the
The Maoris' enterprise might have been allowed to continue had not the same day been chosen for a counter-attack exercise for dealing with an enemy penetration along
The failure of the ‘backwards barrage’ did not exhaust Clifton's ingenuity and he now proposed to 18 Battalion that it experiment with a patrol equipped with its own support in the shape of 3-inch mortars mounted on carriers. A fighting patrol from the battalion was followed by two carrier-borne mortars, moving in bounds, until the leading men reported enemy ahead. The patrol then closed up quietly on the enemy, the mortars were brought within range and, at a given signal, opened fire. Owing to an overestimation of the range, the mortar bombs, about sixty fired at a rapid rate, all fell behind the target. The enemy quickly manned his defences and swept his front with machine-gun fire, so the patrol leader discreetly withdrew his men before their presence was discovered.
Greater success was anticipated by 18 Battalion on the night of 20–21 August for a raid which had been planned with a great amount of care. Previous reconnaissance had discovered that an enemy post in course of preparation was relatively isolated and could be outflanked. The post was pinpointed with some accuracy and ranged by the artillery in daylight. At dusk a patrol from B Company set out and, unobserved in the bright moonlight, reached the chosen outflanking position. Here the men waited for the artillery concentration, which was timed for moonset to give them the cover of darkness during their assault and withdrawal. From
A similar plan was tried the same night by 25 Battalion further to the south. This time the patrol successfully infiltrated round the flank of its objective, only to find itself sandwiched between the working party it intended to attack and a covering patrol. In a brisk engagement, the officer leading the patrol, Second-Lieutenant Budd, 2 Lt B. H. Budd; born NZ
While these raids by 18 and 25 Battalions were taking place, 26 Battalion was busy with a scheme for daylight harassing. During the night signallers extended the telephone cable for a mile or so ahead of the lines to a point overlooking the Khawabir Depression and established an exchange in touch with battalion headquarters, 5 Field Regiment, and the Vickers guns of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion. At the same time a six-pounder anti-tank gun was towed out by a jeep and two 3-inch mortars taken up in carriers. With an artillery observation officer at the telephone and a covering force of a platoon of infantry, the harassing party waited for dawn. As soon as it was light enough for movement in the enemy's lines to be seen, fire was commenced but, by some misunderstanding of the plan or of the observation officer's instructions, the field artillery opened its shooting with the smoke shells intended to cover the withdrawal. The enemy's line was quickly shrouded in smoke so that no results of the fire could be observed and, under heavy but fortunately ill-directed enemy retaliation, the force had to retire in some haste. No casualties were sustained, but on the way back the jeep towing the anti-tank gun ran over a mine in a newly laid but as yet unmarked extension of the perimeter minefield, one man being killed and another wounded.
A curious incident occurred on the following night, 21–22 August, when a patrol from 18 Battalion, reconnoitring from north to south across the front, returned with the uncommon news that it had seen a large enemy patrol moving in the opposite direction. The light from parachute flares being dropped by
The extensive use of parachute flares, whose light discommoded the men on patrol and added another hazard to their activities, inaugurated an offensive by the
On 22 August a practice was held of a plan in which A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, carrying Vickers guns on its Valentines and accompanied by six-pounder guns and two troops of the Divisional Cavalry, made a mock counter-attack against an assumed enemy breakthrough in 6 Brigade's sector. This exercise was watched by
It was on 23 August that General Montgomery made his first detailed inspection of the
We had the new Army Commander around my area yesterday and he was most impressive—looked as if he knew his own mind and meant to see things were carried out on the dot. Small, quiet-spoken and tightlipped with an eye that saw more than the obvious so I shall be surprised if he does not produce the bacon. This W.D. has certainly produced a number of bowler hats for British Generals and by the process of elimination we must get the goods soon ….
As well as visiting all the brigade areas, Montgomery toured the front lines of both 25 and 18 Battalions, but an extension of the tour further north along the front, into the area under close enemy observation, was discouraged by
The New Zealand troops, however, had begun to find their night patrolling for prisoners a frustrating experience in which luck played a large and elusive part. Enemy working parties could be located with comparative ease by the noise of picks and shovels ringing on the rocky ground in the still night air. In fact, the Axis troops seemed to dislike working in silence and were inclined to talk loudly, shout and sing, especially the Italians who obviously found company in noise. But the patrols could seldom get within assaulting distance without alerting a sentry and running the gauntlet of a deluge of machine-gun fire from covering troops who were often supported by tanks or armoured cars. Even an idea that had seemed so promising, a raid with wireless-controlled artillery support, had by now been shown to make too many difficult demands, its principal requirements being a more reliable wireless set and better navigation, neither of which could be obtained at short notice. However, one last effort was tried on these lines on the night of 24–25 August. Having found by earlier reconnaissance an unprotected route round to the rear of a position on which the enemy was working, Lieutenant
Montgomery's visit to the New Zealand Division and his discussions with
The Indians on the ridge itself were badly placed to conduct such a raid, for their sector was confined and difficult to operate in and might at any moment have to bear the brunt of the Axis attack. The 5th New Zealand Brigade sector immediately to the south offered fewer difficulties and
The sum of information brought back by the brigade's nightly patrols indicated that the enemy's defences projected in a small salient around the eastern lip of El Mreir, with a line of wire, in some stretches as thick as three coils of dannert, covering groups of weapon pits on the top of the escarpment. Down in the depression there were other groups of pits not so strongly wired.
It was almost inevitable that he should choose 28 Battalion to carry out the raid. Having sat in their defences overlooking the area for so many days and patrolled over it at night, the men of the battalion knew the ground well. Moreover, they did not take happily to their forced inaction and were only too ready to let off steam.
On the previous night, 23–24 August, a mixed patrol from 23 and 28 Battalions had reconnoitred a site for an advanced observation post to the south of El Mreir and had helped signallers lay a telephone line to the post. On the evening of 24 August a platoon from A Company, 23 Battalion, manned this post in telephone communication with the brigade network while the commander of the
In general terms, the plan was for two companies of 28 Battalion to march out along the south of the enemy salient, form up facing north and follow the artillery fire through the tip of the projection before turning east back home. A patrol from 23 Battalion was to occupy the observation post and thus provide a screen on the west of the start line. The final artillery arrangements provided for 104 guns to fire 6000 shells on the path and flanks of the line of assault, while other guns laid harassing fire elsewhere on the divisional front as diversions.
At 9 p.m. on 25 August, 23 Battalion's covering party, consisting of 7 and 12 Platoons under the command of Lieutenant I. M.
Meanwhile A and B Companies of 28 Battalion began to assemble in C Company's area. Here they were joined by Lieutenant Hamilton Col P. H. G. Hamilton, OBE, m.i.d.; Waiouru Military Camp; born
The quiet of the night was broken sharp on 4 a.m. as the supporting guns opened fire. The men walked steadily forward until halted by their officers as they reached the edge of the shellfire, where one or two shells, falling wide of the target, caused the first casualties. Soon the burst of smoke shells indicated that the guns were lifting to their second target area further north and the troops prepared to advance. As the smoke, added to the dust raised by the shelling, had by now completely obscured the coils of dannert wire marking the enemy's defences, the Maori officers called on their men to make for the flash of the exploding Bangalores. The sappers went steadily ahead into the murk, to lay their torpedoes so well that gaps up to twenty feet wide were blown in the wire. As each explosion lit up the night, the nearest of the assaulting troops charged through the resulting gap with yells and
The men of A Company, working their way along the lip of the escarpment, found a thin line of sangars just inside the dannert wire manned by Italians with rifles and light automatics. Resistance practically collapsed at the sight of the Maori bayonets, so that the company caught up with the supporting artillery fire and had to wait until the guns lifted to their next task. Within half an hour of leaving the start line, Captain Porter found himself on the company's objective and set to work to gather up his men and their prisoners. A distinctive flare he had arranged for his own defence headquarters in the box to fire at intervals gave him a guide for direction and, crossing the dannert wire at a place where it was only one coil thick, he led the men to the east. The supporting artillery fire had now ceased and enemy mortars from further west came to life, laying defensive fire on no-man's land and causing some casualties among the men of A Company and their prisoners.
On the left flank, B Company advanced down to the floor of the depression where the artillery fire had raised a pall of dust. Fire from a strongpoint on the left, quickly overcome, drew the company off its true northerly course, and it was not until Captain Pene noticed that he was on the left of a small knoll on which artillery fire was falling, when he should have been on its right, that he realised how far his company had been drawn off course. Unwilling to slow the impetus of the advance, especially as there were machine-gun posts ahead, he continued to lead his men forward until they met the pipeline, overcoming several groups of sangars on the way. By following the pipeline to the north-east, he regained his correct objective, where he was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Baker. The two officers then decided to return down the correct line of advance to pick up any wounded and stragglers. Back on the start line, B Company withdrew through the enemy's defensive mortar fire, followed by 23 Battalion's covering party. By 5 a.m., an hour after the opening of the artillery support, all the troops taking part in the raid were back in the box.
Casualties in 28 Battalion, caused as much by the men overrunning the supporting fire or by shells falling short, were reported as two killed, fourteen wounded and six, including an officer, missing; of these six it was later ascertained that the officer and four men had died and one wounded man was taken prisoner. The
In return for their losses the Maoris estimated that they had left behind them about sixty enemy dead and they brought back forty-one prisoners, of whom about half a dozen were wounded.
The fit prisoners were hurried back to ‘Many officers, again, considered it unnecessary to put in an appearance during battle and thus set the men an example.’—Liddell Hart, ed., 10 and 12 Companies of 39 Infantry Regiment of the Italian Bologna Division. Most of them were described as ‘poor physical types’ and, shaken by the heavy shellfire and the Maori bayonets, were willing to tell all they knew rather than stand on their rights under the Geneva Convention. But the information they offered of surrounding dispositions or Rommel's plans was disappointingly scant. The absence of any officers among such a large batch of prisoners was surprising and none of the men who took part in the raid could clearly recollect seeing any Italian officers during the action, though some thought they had seen officers running to the rear. The prisoners took the absence of officers as a matter of course. The Rommel Papers, p. 262. The story mentioned by Rommel (Ibid., p. 282) that a senior Italian officer captured about this time gave away the plans cannot be confirmed in any New Zealand records.
In spite of its seemingly meagre intelligence results, the raid had at least proved that an important sector of the Axis front was held wholly by Italian troops who, moreover, had not yet made any preparations for a share in an offensive. One certain result, judged by the number of prisoners and the estimated total of killed and wounded, was the elimination of two full companies of Italian infantry.
The raid, one of the first major engagements undertaken under the new army command, was considered a model on which future operations of this sort should be based. Messages of congratulation to all concerned in the planning and execution of the operation were received the following morning. Captain Porter was awarded a bar to his Military Cross for his leadership and Sergeant
The raid had in fact been more successful than anticipated. The following morning observers in the box reported that ambulances were moving in the depression, but no attempt appeared to have been made to bring up reserves to man the overrun defences.
Infantry Brigadier, pp. 203–4.
The opportunity for the operation was decreasing with every hour of daylight so it was decided to send one platoon only, to be reinforced if it succeeded. No. 12 Platoon of B Company was chosen, led by Lieutenant
Burdened with weapons, picks, shovels, and the other impedimenta necessary to enable them to consolidate defences, the men of 12 Platoon passed through gaps in the Maori wire and, well dispersed, set off for the depression. Their way lay over a flat expanse of desert, overlooked by enemy positions on the higher ground to the north-west. As soon as they started, enemy machine guns came to life, to be joined later by mortars which laid a belt of defensive fire behind them. By the time the leaders had reached the enemy's wire, most of the platoon had been forced to ground in the scanty cover available. The three officers agreed that it would be impossible to dig defences in daylight under the enemy fire and that little purpose would be served by keeping the platoon in the open. Major Lambourn accordingly called by wireless for artillery fire on the enemy mortars and machine guns. As the 25-pounders opened up, assisted by fire from the Vickers guns in 28 Battalion's lines, the enemy fire slackened sufficiently to allow 12 Platoon to filter back without serious casualties.
All this activity on 5 Brigade's front brought very little retaliation from the enemy. His artillery, seldom in evidence lately, shelled 28 Battalion's area in the morning with some heavy concentrations which fell mainly on A Company without causing any casualties, but by midday the whole front had settled down to its normal torpor which lasted throughout the heat of the afternoon. Nor was the enemy apparently in a hurry to reoccupy his forward posts, for a patrol from 21 Battalion out after dark found the gaps blown in the wire by the Bangalores unrepaired and the sangars on the lip of the depression unoccupied.
On the morning of 27 August, without warning, extremely heavy shellfire commenced to fall on the Maori positions, so heavy that the whole Division and most of Eighth Army were called to the alert in case the shelling was a prelude to the expected offensive. After an estimated
Whatever the reason behind this shelling, patrols on the following night found the gaps in the enemy's wire still open and no troops in the forward posts. Accordingly, for the night of the 28th–29th, it was arranged that 21 Battalion should send out three fighting patrols in the hope that they might catch the enemy off guard and bring back some prisoners to identify any new units in the line. A powerful artillery support programme was arranged, with the four field regiments in the box and one from
The night of the Maoris' raid saw unusual activity in the rear part of the box when, after unidentified aircraft had been heard overhead, several reports came in, principally from men in the headquarters area of 25 Battalion, that suspicious objects had been seen silhouetted against the moon. As this was before the era of flying saucers, and as the presence of German paratroops had lately been confirmed, a parachute alert was ordered in 13 Corps' sector. Headquarters staffs and the NZASC troops manning the replenishment points east of the box stood to and both 22 Battalion and 132 Brigade sent out search parties. The floating objects were quickly found to be nothing more than small pamphlets carrying a message unintelligible to the New Zealanders; written in Urdu, it was an Axis exhortation to Indian troops to change sides. At this period, in spite of the New Zealand Division's activities, which included the loss of several prisoners from patrols, the Africa Corps intelligence staff believed that the Division was further to the rear and that the box was occupied by Indian troops.
Although on this same night, 25–26 August, most of the artillery had tasks in support of 5 Brigade's action, 6 Brigade sent out several reconnaissance patrols while 25 Battalion's standing patrol at
The next night the standing patrol was reinforced and an ambush was laid west of the point in the hope of catching the enemy if he repeated his tactics. A clear sky with a bright moon and flares dropped by the
The following morning, the 28th, Brigadier Clifton's harassing of the enemy continued as all three battalions sent out Vickers guns, mortars and anti-tank guns into no-man's land before dawn to catch the enemy at his early morning chores. This morning, however, enemy retaliation was quicker and stronger than previously and a considerable number of smoke shells had to be fired by 5 Field Regiment before all the weapons were brought back into the lines. As on most mornings, armoured cars of 7 Armoured Division were operating across the southern part of the front, coming as far north as the line of Ramcke Brigade to fear an attack. The brigade reported to Africa Corps that up to thirty armoured cars were advancing from
With 5 Brigade's raiding parties occupying so much of the supporting artillery on the night of 28–29 August, 6 Brigade confined itself to reconnaissance patrols, who noted that the enemy troops were keeping close in their defences, with very few of the customary chattering working parties above ground. They also observed an unusual number of enemy patrols on the front. The next night, while patrols from 26 and 18 Battalions reconnoitred the ground for future operations, 25 Battalion's standing patrol on
The standard of patrolling in the New Zealand Division during the August lull was not of a very high quality if it is judged by the results in terms of the efforts involved. The main reason for the nightly patrolling was the gathering of information; minefields, wire, and enemy trenches were plotted by rough and ready surveying by means of compass and pacing; the identity of the enemy troops in each small sector was sought through the capture of prisoners, the discovery of discarded equipment, uniforms, or
There was, however, a secondary purpose, fulfilled to some extent by the very number of patrols sent out each night. It was essential to dominate no-man's land and to deter the enemy if possible from extending his defences towards the east by constant interference with his working parties. This was all part of Eighth Army's harassing policy, a policy which, as far as the New Zealand Division was concerned, had its value in maintaining morale among the infantry, for whom it was the only aggressive activity offering.
This was the first time in the war that the New Zealand Division had experienced anything approaching static trench warfare and, although the men had developed an aptitude above the average for activity at night, they had not been given the training that could have put a sharp edge on their patrolling. The customary procedure was for a patrol to be taken by truck to some known point in the desert where a landmark such as a burnt-out tank, or even a less conspicuous object, had been surveyed in with reasonable accuracy. Then, on a compass bearing and counting paces, the patrol would set off for an objective which had been observed by day or reported by a previous patrol, in either case probably with a considerable degree of inaccuracy. If the patrol was for reconnaissance only, the results of its night's wanderings depended mainly on the leader's ability to march on an exact bearing and record the pacing, and especially to bring back a connected record of the route followed, without gaps caused by alarms and excursions when bearings and counted paces were likely to be forgotten. Early patrol reports at this period were so bad that special forms were devised to get patrol leaders to remember and record the essential points of time and distance. Surviving reports, even on these forms, seldom allow the course of a patrol to be traced with any certainty. Similar reports during the Italian campaign are models of accuracy in comparison and show how much had to be learnt.
For fighting patrols, sent out to make contact with the enemy and gather identifications from the dead or from equipment, or by capturing a prisoner, the need for such accurate recording was not so great, but good navigation, to bring a patrol to the point previously observed where a weakness in the enemy's defences could be exploited, was often the main factor in success or failure.
One drawback, and one over which the men themselves had little control, was inherent in all patrolling. The desert here was relatively flat, surfaced with patches of hard stones alternating with
It was partly because of the noise, unavoidable when a patrol was wearing standard army equipment, that the system of covering fire from artillery, mortars or machine guns was first tried out; though such fire often kept the enemy alert, it drove his pickets to ground and lessened the chance of their attention being drawn to suspicious sounds.
Covering fire, however, had to be closely co-ordinated with a patrol's movements and for this purpose much experimentation was carried out with the two standard types of radio transmitter-receivers used by the Division. The No. 18 set, compactly designed to be carried by one man and issued to infantry battalions for internal communications, proved to have too many inherent weaknesses to overcome the climatic and atmospheric conditions peculiar to the desert, especially over the distances involved on 6 Brigade's front. Even the vehicle-borne, and more powerful, No. 11 set could not be relied on. To overcome the problem of distance, trials were made of relay sets between patrols and their bases, but even this method failed to provide certain communication. Moreover, at the rare times when communication was clearly established, the accuracy of the supporting fire depended wholly on the accuracy of the patrol's navigation and, with all the chances involved in night navigation over the almost featureless desert, it is not surprising that the supporting fire seldom fell exactly where the patrol wanted it—and Clifton could write in his diary, ‘Our patrolling did damn-all as usual’.
The fundamental faults of training and equipment could not be remedied on the spot so that it was only natural that commanders, continually pressed to produce prisoners, should consider ways of eliminating the hazards of poor navigation and uncertain communications. The only means at hand lay in organisation and planning and it was thus that the small fighting
For a comparison of patrolling techniques, see Aitken, Gallipoli to the Somme.
At a conference held at Headquarters 6 Brigade on the 27th and attended by Maj-Gen Sir Stephen Weir, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d.;
The operation began early on the evening of 30 August when 25 Battalion sent out two platoons of infantry, two anti-tank guns, six carriers, three 3-inch mortars in carriers, and a platoon of Vickers guns, all under the command of Captain Weston Capt C Weston, m.i.d.;
Similarly, 26 Battalion sent out a patrol to cover two 3-inch mortars and two platoons of Vickers guns to a selected point about 1000 yards west of the FDLs. These weapons were laid on the rising ground along the northern edge of the
Meanwhile, A Company of 18 Battalion, under the command of Captain
The movement of all three battalion parties was timed so that they would be ready for action by 9.30 p.m. At this moment one battery of 5 Field Regiment started firing on the Brescia and
While the main raid was in progress, two batteries of 5 Field Regiment switched their fire to 26 Battalion's objective and at 10.20 p.m., when all supporting fire ceased, Second-Lieutenant Hansen led his patrol through the enemy wire, only to encounter an enemy tank under whose fire he wisely withdrew.
The expenditure of ammunition for this one operation amounted to a total of 400 rounds from the medium guns, 4000 25-pounder shells, 410 3-inch mortar bombs, and 36,000 rounds from the Vickers guns.
THE troops taking part in 6 Brigade's raid and the two diversions were back in their lines before midnight, leaving various small listening posts and the standing patrol on
As early as 29 August General Montgomery had decided that the Army's front was sufficiently manned and secure to deal with the type of attack he expected Rommel to attempt. The Alam el Halfa position was mined and dug and the mobile reserve had been built up to three brigades of tanks. Already he had begun the collection of reinforcements, supplies, and equipment in the rear areas in preparation for his own offensive, and now, concurring in the general opinion that the time for action by Rommel had passed, he directed that the formation of the special reserve he needed should commence. For this the New Zealand Division had to be withdrawn from its front-line position. Plans had already been prepared for a cautious exchange, spread over several nights, of the two New Zealand brigades by the two brigades of 44 Division on Alam el Halfa. When this relief was complete, 44 Division would resume command of its third brigade, 132 Brigade, already in the box. Although this division was less experienced and possessed fewer guns than the New Zealand Division, it was expected to hold without trouble the extensive and well designed ground defences that the New Zealanders had prepared. The two New Zealand brigades were to remain on Alam el Halfa, handily placed for any emergency, until the moon had waned and major action by the enemy was unlikely. After that reserve troops were to be brought up from the Delta to free the Division for its special training.
Just before he received Montgomery's decision for the exchange to commence,
The relief by 22 Battalion was therefore cancelled and Brigadier C. B. Robertson of 132 Brigade was instructed to start thinning out his positions immediately so that his three battalions would be ready to move into 5 Brigade's sector as soon as dusk fell. The method of relief meant that the southern front would be left unoccupied for some hours, but this was felt to be less important than the need to keep the El Mreir defences continually manned. The headquarters of the two brigades changed places in the afternoon, the system of communications built and manned by the New Zealand Divisional Signals enabling them to keep in touch with their battalions throughout. Before evening many of the English troops were on the march and, as soon as dusk gave cover from enemy observation, all available trucks of the few still kept in the box were pressed into service to shuttle back and forth between the two sectors.
As this exchange was in progress, 18 Battalion's raid took place and the staff at
But even before the prisoners had all been questioned,
The enemy shellfire also caught the artillery reliefs. Careful liaison had been made on the CRA's direction to ensure that the exchange of gun positions between 58 Field Regiment, RA, and 6 New Zealand Field Regiment should take place in such a way that the maximum possible number of guns would be able to fire in support of the front at any moment. One of the New Zealand batteries, the 29th, had been set a task in 6 Brigade's raid and its relief was to wait until this task had been completed. With the other two batteries, the 30th and the 48th, the exchange of guns with 58 Field Regiment had begun on time and was proceeding smoothly when shells began to drop around 30 Battery's gun pits. Some of the relieving guns had just been wheeled into the pits, others were still on tow, while several New Zealand guns and quads were being lined up in convoy ready for the journey out. The first shells caught many of the gunners above ground, causing several casualties, principally among the drivers standing by their vehicles. New Zealand casualties were two killed and four seriously wounded, but this total might have been higher had not two of the gunners, C. P.
Having got away before the enemy fire started, both 21 and 23 Battalions had reached their new positions on the southern front by midnight, 21 Battalion taking over the sector due east of 25 Battalion and 23 Battalion manning the south-eastern corner of the box. On the eastern side, 22 Battalion, having unpacked its gear and reoccupied its trenches after the cancellation of the relief order of the morning, now came under 5 Brigade's command. As this southern front had been left unguarded for some time, listening posts were immediately established outside the perimeter wire while the troops ‘shook down’ and settled in their new trenches. A strong force of carriers was sent out by 21 Battalion to cover the front, particularly of the central sector left unoccupied by the delay to 28 Battalion's relief. It was not until shortly before dawn that the Maoris eventually arrived in this sector.
About the same time as the fire began on
Half an hour after midnight
All other signals traffic throughout the Division was suspended to allow the alarm code, TWELVEBORE, to be sent to all units in the box. On this signal, trenches, weapons, and command posts were fully manned, while the engineers supervised the closing of the patrol gaps in the outer defences with mines and wire.
As the troops took station within the box, the men on
About the same time a small patrol was sitting in
The Division, however, had already heard from 7 Armoured Division's patrols that the enemy was lifting the mines in
After about an hour had passed quietly, the patrol on
On receipt of twelvebore, 21 Battalion tried to call up its carrier patrol on the wireless but could not establish contact. As the minefield gaps were being closed everywhere and the defences were alert and ready to fire on any unheralded arrivals, the officer in command of the carrier platoon set out to find the patrol. His carrier, however, ran over a mine, he was mortally wounded, and his crew had difficulty in returning. The patrol in fact stayed out until nearly daylight, observing from the eastern end of
The opening of Rommel's bid to regain the initiative from the British on the evening of Sunday, 30 August, thus coincided with a night of more than usual activity for the New Zealand Division. While the Panzer Army was crossing its start line, one New Zealand brigade was embarking on a major raid involving all three of its battalions, with up to 200 of their fighting men out in no-man's land engaged on the main operation and its diversions. The other two brigades, of about
GOC
The Sunday, a very hot and windless day, was occupied with detailed discussion with his own staff on the relief plans, rearrangements necessary if reinforcements were not quickly forthcoming from New Zealand, and such points as seaside camps for bathing and canteens in the training area. In expectation of leaving 13 Corps' command,
A certain amount of apprehension was naturally felt when the first news of the heavy shellfire on, and south of, Ruweisat reached twelvebore had been signalled and the general pattern of Rommel's plan began to emerge that the activity on Ruweisat could be seen in perspective. Gentry's comments to Panzer Army into the middle of Eighth Army's static defences.
Rommel, unaware of the strict doctrine of caution and immobility imposed by Montgomery, had felt it necessary for the initial movement of his right hook to be covered by a series of diversions on the main front, designed to pin down troops who might otherwise be transferred to help block his striking force. He had therefore ordered all sectors of his front to prepare hit-and-run diversionary raids, the first waves to go forward just before midnight, and the second and third at approximately two-hourly intervals. In the event only one raid, that against the Indians on Ruweisat, was repeated according to the information available.
In the northern part of the front, German troops of 164 Division set off on their first raid before midnight but, on reaching the Australian defences, were met by such devastating fire that they were driven back in disorder with numerous casualties and the loss of several prisoners to the Australians.
Similar raids planned against the front further south were upset by aggressive action by the South Africans, who themselves had chosen this night for a raid to gather prisoners on the same pattern as 18 Battalion's operation. This overran a sector held by Italians of Trento Division and brought in some fifty-six prisoners at a cost of nineteen casualties. Diversionary patrols to the north and south of the main raid encountered enemy patrols which withdrew when attacked.
In the central sector, Germans of the Ramcke Parachute Brigade and Italians of Bologna Division set out about 11 p.m. to create a diversion across Panzer Army had relaxed its restrictions on the expenditure of ammunition and
The German parachutists, on their first aggressive action in
The guns were stopped as soon as it was seen that no enemy had penetrated the shellfire, and when the dust had settled, the desert appeared empty. After a period of relative quiet, a platoon from Ramcke Brigade parachutists without Italian assistance.
That diversions were planned against the New Zealand front is certain, but what happened to them does not emerge from either British or enemy records. It was fortunate for the Division that the parachutists concentrated on their raid along Ruweisat and did not attack further to the south, where they might have caught 5 and 132 Brigades in the middle of the relief. It is more than probable that 18 Battalion's raid and the diversionary fire supporting it upset any plans made by the Italians on this part of the front, while the movement seen and fired on by the standing patrol on
In spite of private opinion that the Axis operations had been postponed until the next full moon, vigilance in Eighth Army had not been relaxed to any extent. The warning that brought all formations to the alert was in fact received with some relief, for the tension of anticipation felt before the defences had been completed had given way to a mild state of anti-climax as the troops saw another month of the heat and discomfort of the static war stretching ahead of them. Action was now welcome, especially as there had been time for Montgomery's energy and crisp decision to permeate his army thoroughly. Morale was high, though not at that imprudent level of self-confidence prevailing before the Libyan and
The last intelligence summary issued by GHQ Middle East before the battle opened, and based on information received up to the evening of 27 August, listed the signs of the imminence of an
Panzer Army's known fuel shortage had been eased if not overcome.
The summary drew the obvious parallel between the Africa Corps would lead the mobile force, leaving
The estimate of enemy strength in this summary gave the Germans a striking force of 25,000 men with 230 tanks and a holding force of 18,000 men. The Italian striking force, ‘if that title can be granted to those who follow after’, was thought to be about 17,000 with 200 tanks, most of them mechanically unsound, and a holding force of 22,000 men. The total strength of the Panzer Army was thus thought to be 82,000 men and 430 tanks.
This summary is evidence that British intelligence had managed to draw a remarkably close picture of Axis intentions and strengths. The enemy records show a front-line strength at this time of approximately 41,000 Germans and 33,000 Italians, of whom about half the Germans and less than half the Italians belonged to the formations of the mobile force. Of the Axis total of 514 tanks, 233 were German under Africa Corps' direct command, and 281 Italian. A number of the Italian tanks were retained to support the infantry defences and did not take part in the advance.
Against these enemy totals, the Eighth Army could now muster in the front areas about 693 tanks, of which 517 were in the armoured and motorised brigades and the remainder with the
Comparisons of the qualities of British and Axis tanks are extremely difficult to make as there are so many factors involved. In most points of armour and armament, the Grant was a reasonable match for the German Mark III Special, Mark IV and IV Special, and the Crusader and Valentine for the lower Marks, while the Stuart could stand comparison with the Italian tanks. On this basis, a table of comparison of numbers and quality on v 109 Mk III Sp, IV and IV Spv 124 Mk II, IIIv 281 Italian
The exact numbers of ‘runners’ recorded in both Eighth Army and the Panzer Army vary, but the variations are too small to have had any effect on operations. It will be noted that both sides more than doubled their tank strengths during August.
In men, including those manning the front and easily available in reserve, the Eighth Army had a two-to-one superiority, together with a handy base from which, in an emergency, further reserves of men and over 200 tanks could be mustered and equipped. In comparison, Rommel had few reserves on African soil, either of men, tanks, ammunition, transport, or petrol; even his food and water supplies were not over plentiful. For the rather complicated pattern of comparitave air strengths, see Playfair, Vol. III. See also pp. 176–80.
THE Panzer Army of Africa was not accustomed to attacking in darkness and Rommel did not in fact plan the
As each night passed after the moon reached the full, the period of darkness between sunset and moonrise was increasing while the hours of moonlight and the brightness of the moon both decreased. By 30 August the moon was appearing about three hours after sunset, so that the Panzer Army, setting off after daylight had completely faded, had to start its trek in darkness in which both contact and control were difficult. There was then a limited period of moonlight in which any confusion could be sorted out and the columns could reach their destinations before daylight revealed their positions and intentions. The planners on Rommel's staff held that the night of 30–31 August was the last on which the operation stood a chance of success.
To postpone the operation until the September full moon was, in Rommel's opinion, to give the battle away to the Eighth Army, for by this time he knew he could not rely on any large addition of German troops to offset the arrival of men and equipment known to be flowing in to the British base in
At a meeting on 27 August, Rommel discussed his Panzer Army's needs and chances with Kesselring and Cavallero. The Italian marshal was obviously infected with Rommel's enthusiasm, if Ciano's diary can be accepted as evidence, but Kesselring's opinion is difficult to unravel from comments after the event. Both of them, however, gave sufficiently earnest promises that the one real shortage, of petrol, would be overcome within forty-eight hours. On the basis of these promises, Rommel set the date of the offensive tentatively for the 29th.
It seems strange that Rommel had not grasped that the Italian commander, in spite of his lip service, was incapable of galvanising the Italian supply organisation into action, and that Kesselring could not or would not use his influence with the
Kesselring's attitude to Rommel and his plans is enigmatic. Through his position and rank he should have been able to exert considerable influence on the planning and supply for the African campaign. Yet in the records and reminiscences of this period, he emerges in a negative light. He does not appear to have encouraged Rommel, at least very positively, or to have acted as a restraining influence of any strength. Though his role of Commander-in-Chief South placed him theoretically above Rommel, the latter's personal repute and favour with Luftwaffe, though his control over the Italian air force was limited by the Italians' intransigence.
The explanation of Kesselring's equivocal attitude may be that, while Rommel was
Much of the story of the two men is told in the letters Rommel wrote home to his wife. When he was able to take his mind off the battle at the end of July to consider why his German requirements were not being met, Rommel initially chose to put the blame on Italian self-interest rather than inefficiency and thought the solution lay with the liaison official in Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers, p. 263.
Ibid., p. 263.
Arising from this same meeting, Rommel sent a proposal to the
Kesselring had a personal interest in helping us at
Alamein ; he had considerable strength of will, a first-class talent for diplomacy and organisation, and a considerable knowledge of technical matters.Kesselring had the
Luftwaffe and Goering behind him and could thus command sufficient support at the highest level to enable him to tackle questions of high policy in relation toItaly .Ibid., pp. 268–9.
Although, according to Rommel, his suggestion was not acted on early enough or in the form he wanted, Kesselring did in fact make a show of exerting his influence, but only to the effect that, just before the meeting on 27 August, Rommel wrote home:
Kesselring is coming today for a long talk over the most acute of our problems. He, too, often has a tough job in
Rome . He gets plenty of promises, but few are kept. His over-optimism concerning these blighters has brought him bitter disappointments.Ibid., p. 272.
From his diplomatic connections, Kesselring must have been aware that the African campaign stood on a low priority and that it would never be treated with the importance Rommel demanded, unless Rommel Papers, p. 283. Luftwaffe lifted some 400 cubic metres of fuel but delivered less than 100 at the front, the balance being consumed on the journey.
Nehring, Der Feldzug in Afrika, Union of South Africa War Histories translation, p. 65.
Young, Rommel, p. 168.
Rommel had the impatience of the enthusiast so that, in the realms of supply over which he had no direct control, he was willing to accept promises at their face value. His own army, by restricting its activities and hoarding supplies, was rested, reorganised, and sufficiently equipped with almost everything except petrol for a short, but possibly decisive, action. Much was made for British propaganda purposes of Rommel's stated intention to reach the
Many of my worries have been by no means satisfactorily settled and we have some very grave shortages. But I've taken the risk, for it will be a long time before we get such favourable conditions of moonlight, relative strengths, etc., again…. If our blow succeeds, it might go some way towards deciding the whole course of the war. If it fails, at least I hope to give the enemy a pretty thorough beating….
Rommel Papers, p. 275.
The original plans made out by the Panzer Army staff provided for the concentration of the various formations of the striking force in their assembly areas behind the start line over a period of five nights. With the petrol situation uncertain, the initial movement was postponed day by day until Rommel gave his decision after the meeting on 27 August. The bulk of the armour set off for the assembly areas that evening but the journey was delayed by the
The following night, 28th-29th, the assembly was continued, but it soon became obvious that the original five-night plan could not successfully be condensed into two nights. It was with considerable relief, therefore, that the army learnt from Rommel on the morning of 29 August that the offensive would not start until the evening of the 30th.
Rommel's decision, though possibly influenced by the delays encountered, was primarily based on news he received shortly after the meeting, that three ships carrying petrol had been sunk or damaged. The vehicles of his mobile formations had been ‘topped up’ by the expedient of draining the forward dumps of practically every gallon, and it was only after he had been assured again by Kesselring and Cavallero that more tankers were on the way and that the Luftwaffe would assist in the transport from the rear to the forward dumps, that Rommel gave his final decision. Even then, the offensive might have been postponed again had not news reached the
Throughout the 30th, the Luftwaffe flew constant patrols over the southern part of the front to drive off British reconnaissance planes while the German and Italian formations sorted themselves out after their hurried assembly. With a last-minute distribution of petrol which had just been brought up, the two German panzer divisions recorded that they had enough fuel to take their tanks about 100 miles and their other vehicles about 150.
The start line from which the German-Italian offensive was to drive to the east ran practically due south from the Reconnaissance Group formed up. This force comprised 3, 33, and 580 Reconnaissance Units of Africa Corps and a composite reconnaissance group from the Italian
Along with the Reconnaissance Group there was a battalion of Italian parachutists from Folgore Division which had the limited task of occupying
In the area around Africa Corps lined up with
Still further north, slightly to the left rear of Africa Corps, the Italian
The 90th Light Division, with a strength of just under 4000, formed up immediately south of the Ramcke Brigade, two Italian battalions from both Folgore and Brescia divisions and a group of the artillery and men from the infantry battalions of
The design of the advance was simple. Moving out of their assembly areas at dusk, the armoured and motorised formations were to form up and cross their start lines at ten o'clock of the evening on a course slightly south of east. After passing the Reconnaissance Group was allowed five and a half hours by the plan to complete a journey of about 40 miles to reach its dawn objective. At the hub, the Italian Ariete Division, with only 20 miles to go, was allowed five hours. By 5 a.m. the whole striking force was expected to be lined up facing north along a front of some 15 miles, with the left flank resting on the depression known as
Had the initial plan succeeded and brought the British forces to a sufficient state of confusion as at 90 Light and 15 Panzer divisions were to drive south-east direct for 20 Corps was to cut the 21 Panzer Division was to encircle
It was an ambitious plan but Rommel was probably justified in attempting it. The disparity in strength was not so widely dissimilar from that prevailing at
Much has been made of the fact that, in comparison with the situation at
The general dispositions of Eighth Army had not been changed when the Panzer Army advance commenced. The fixed defences from the coast to
On paper 7 Armoured Division appeared much stronger than it was. With a front of over 15 miles, it had insufficient infantry and guns to man a continuous line, so that its various groups occupied temporary bases inside the minefields through which patrols were sent out into no-man's land to watch and harass the enemy. The division's orders were to impose the maximum possible delay on any enemy advance without getting so involved that any of its columns should become surrounded or overwhelmed. In short, its role was to harass and run. In the rear of its sector there were two dummy tank brigades and a partly completed dummy infantry position, manned by a few troops whose task was to demonstrate against any light columns in the hope of turning them to the north against the forces disposed on and around Alam el Halfa.
The true rearward defences of Eighth Army consisted of the two brigade boxes of 44 Division on Alam ei Halfa ridge, 133 Brigade on the west and 131 Brigade on the east.
The open desert south of 131 Brigade was guarded by
There was still another tank formation in the army, the Valentine-equipped 23 Armoured Brigade, which had been rebuilt
For reserves, there were in the
The reaction to the start of the Axis offensive by Eighth Army on the ground has already been described. In the air, the Allied Air Force had been prepared for some time to lay on heavy assaults, with plans closely co-ordinated with those of the ground troops through Montgomery's insistence on close liaison between the army and air headquarters.
Small signs during the preceding days, such as reports from all reconnaissance aircraft that enemy vehicles tended to move from north to south, the enemy's own air patrols against reconnaissance and general lack of aggressive air activity over the front, all went towards convincing the
In the early part of the night of 30 August, 20 Corps was assembling. By the time these particular bombers had returned to their bases and reported their activities, Air Headquarters had heard from the army that the Axis attack was on its way and all available night bombers were got ready to take to the air. By 3 a.m. searching aircraft had picked up three main enemy columns and kept them under observation by successions of flares to guide the bomber squadrons. From then until dawn, according to observers in the
The German records make it plain that much of the delay in the planned night march was caused by air action for, although material damage was probably not great for the weight of bombs dropped, the morale effect on men trying to break a way in unknown desert through minefields on a hostile front was considerable. Many vehicles and even tanks received minor damage, while one bomb landed close to the headquarters group of Africa Corps, wounding the corps commander, General Nehring, and causing several casualties among the staff.
Ground action on the southern front commenced as early as 10 p.m., when heavy shelling began to fall on various points along the outer or ‘first’ minefield. This shelling itself was unusual, and, when the small patrols which normally stayed overnight on the west of the minefields began to fall back to the main laagers of the various 7 Armoured Division columns with reports of large and aggressive enemy patrols, it was obvious that something was afoot. A good half hour before 13 Corps called its troops to the alert, 7 Armoured Division ordered its columns to instant readiness. Following their orders not to get too closely involved and cut off, the columns opened fire on any of the enemy who approached the minefield, until retaliation became too heavy, when they disengaged and withdrew. The Germans found this fire particularly accurate and were considerably delayed by it in their attempts to lift the mines. No sooner had the ground forces disengaged than the Air Force appeared in strength overhead. The German method of dealing with minefields was simple but effective. Each advance guard, led by engineers with infantry and tanks in close support, drove forward until a minefield was either recognised or suspected, or until one of the vehicles was blown up. The engineers then debussed and, providing their own immediate protection, started to search the ground and clear a lane through the field. The rest of the advance guard deployed and increased the covering fire until
The widest part of the British minefields, between the 90 Light Division and the left flank of the Italian armour. The two panzer divisions broke through at points between Munassib and 15 Panzer Division led it through two more isolated minefields, but
The Panzer Army's advance fell behind schedule right from the start. Difficult going in the early part of the journey in the moonless period split Africa Corps, 15 Panzer Division diverging to the
On Africa Corps' left,
The Italian armour, trailing Africa Corps' left flank, also travelled too far north and, halted by the minefields and British fire, found itself being crowded from the rear by
So great was the confusion, aggravated by the ground and air attack, that even Rommel himself was unaware of how his striking force was faring until dawn began to break and his liaison officers could bring him reports based on visual observation. He only knew that, at 5 a.m., when his troops should have been lined up south of Alam el Halfa ready to start the main assault on Eighth Army's rear, the formations were spread out over some miles of desert and well short of the first objective. The vanguards of the two German divisions were in fact by this time clear of the main minefields, but each gap was creating a bottleneck behind which columns were bunching, with supply vehicles strung out all the way back to the start line. A great deal of petrol had been used, many vehicles had either broken down or become bogged in soft sand, and others had been damaged by shellfire or bombing. The 21st Panzer Division alone had received the attentions of eighteen flights of bombers during the night. The only part of the mobile striking force to reach its dawn objective was the group from Folgore Division, which followed the wake of the Reconnaissance Group to occupy
On the British side, 7 Armoured Division's columns maintained field, anti-tank, and small-arms fire for as long as they thought wise, claiming—over-enthusiastically—as many as twenty-four
Panzer Army was uncertain at dawn, with conflicting messages coming from the various columns, but the
By nine o'clock on the 31st, after regaining communication with most of the elements of his army, Rommel found that the Reconnaissance Group and 15 Panzer Division were some way to the west of
The strength of the German enthusiasm for this offensive may be gauged from entries in the diaries of both the Panzer Army and
German reconnaissance aircraft had already reported this morning that an extensive infantry position existed on the Alam el Halfa ridge, but they appear to have failed to notice the hull-down tanks of 22 Armoured Brigade. No mass movement of tanks or transport vehicles had been observed in the British lines and this tied in with information Rommel had received from agents in
The extent of the disorganisation caused by the night march became apparent as soon as Rommel gave his orders. All units had taken the opportunity of the morning halt to refuel and start running repairs to their vehicles, and this delayed the assembly for the correct order of march. Then, about 11.30 a.m. the dust-storm thickened so that visibility at times was only a few hundred yards. Rommel's orders, given at 9 a.m., had allowed four hours for the panzer divisions to get ready, an exceptional length of time for German troops, but by 2 p.m. only 15 Division was on its way. On the left flank, Littorio Division, trying to make up for its previous tardiness, had pushed up into the area chosen by 21 Panzer Division for its assembly, thus bringing another hour of confusion as in the murk of the dust-storm Germans and Italians were sorted out, a task made no easier by the constant bombing and machine-gunning from the air. The management of the assembly was also delayed by the need for several changes in command caused by the wounding of Nehring and the death of von
As the Panzer Army was reorganising in the morning of the 31st, two of the light squadrons of 22 Armoured Brigade were sent out some three to four miles south of the brigade's position to observe and to act as a decoy to draw the enemy towards the prepared defences along Alam el Halfa. From ground and air observation and from wireless intercept, the Eighth Army had already begun to draw a fairly exact picture of the dispositions and composition of Rommel's forces, though for a time
Though some of 7 Armoured Division's columns were in contact with the Reconnaissance Group and appeared to have directed some harassing fire on the panzer formations, there was little action during the day until the dust-storm began to subside in the late afternoon. By this time 15 Panzer Division had progressed some miles along the eastern side of the telephone line and, as visibility increased, the light squadrons of 22 Armoured Brigade found themselves within range of the leading German armour and boldly took it on. The two-pounders of their Stuarts and Crusaders were no match for the enemy tanks and, after losing four tanks and a number of men, the light squadrons disengaged to drive rapidly back to the armoured brigade's protection.
Their role as a decoy was however not fulfilled, for 15 Panzer Division did not follow but swung out to the east. About the same time
As this engagement was in progress, 15 Panzer Division had turned to a northerly course and its leading tanks were probing at the infantry defences on Alam el Halfa. The headquarters of
While the opposing armoured forces were joining battle well to their rear, the New Zealanders in their box remained relatively undisturbed except for the medium, field and anti-aircraft gunners. Save for a short period in the worst of the dust-storm, the noise of aircraft was almost continuous throughout the day as the Air Force attacked the enemy on the south and the Luftwaffe passed directly overhead on call from the panzer divisions to the east. The Bofors gunners of 14 New Zealand Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, spread among the gun lines and headquarters areas, had one of their busiest and most successful days on record, with a final bag of three Stukas, and three Me109s shot down for certain and one ‘probable’. Two of the German pilots, parachuting in or close to the lines, were taken prisoner.
The field and medium guns were also kept busy firing on targets passed to them by patrols and OPs in the south, who watched the enemy columns moving through the line of the three depressions, the deirs twelvebore was signalled and the fall of darkness on 31 August.
To the infantrymen in the box the day was comparatively restful. After their busy night, either in exchanging positions or taking part in the raids and patrols, followed by a long stand-to from the receipt of the alarm until well after dawn, the men were glad to snatch what rest they could in the heat, the dust, and the continual noise of gunfire and bombs.
Towards evening the Divisional Cavalry patrols and OPs, watching from the northern rim of 21 Panzer Division, and the infantry were part of
This movement gave Africa Corps. Their absence left the eastern front, occupied by 22 Battalion, and the south-eastern corner, where 23 Battalion had just settled in, uncovered except by the Cavalry patrols. This was the weakest part of the box, with no minefields extending beyond the perimeter belt.
On
With this arrangement
August passed into September with a night of little incident. On the coast the Australians were busy with preparations for a daylight raid and neither invited nor received much attention from their opponents. The South Africans scored an unexpected success when a patrol of the
The New Zealand Division's southern front was more lively. A request had been made by the Corps Commander for ‘substantial raids’ to the south-west and south to harass the enemy's line of communication and to deter him from pressing overnight closer to the defences. This demand, however, reached the two New Zealand brigadiers rather late for the detailed planning they had come to see was the best insurance for success in such raiding, but on
Shortly after dusk a strong infantry patrol set off from 18 Battalion's sector with three tanks of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, to raid Folgore Parachute Division.
Similar raiding parties with Valentine tanks were sent out to the south by 21 and 23 Battalions but both failed to find the enemy. The 23 Battalion patrol incurred casualties to men and vehicles in a minefield which had either been laid by the enemy or, more probably, by one of 7 Armoured Division's columns and not recorded. Although the ‘third’ minefield leading south from the
Not very long after these patrols had returned to the box, a column of some fourteen vehicles, moving up between the routes taken by the 21 and 23 Battalion patrols, stopped within a few hundred yards of the defences held by D Company of 28 Battalion. The Maoris watched while the occupants, estimated at about 100 men, debussed to search for and lift mines. Once the troops were identified as hostile, the Maoris opened up with rifles and Bren guns, and sent up the light signal for the Vickers and 25-pounders to lay defensive fire on their sector. The enemy troops replied with automatics and anti-tank gun fire until the field guns got the range, when they withdrew, leaving behind the bodies of two men, three burnt-out trucks, and a light anti-tank gun. A patrol from D Company identified the dead as men from 90 Light Division and brought in the gun to add it to the battalion's arsenal of assorted weapons. The fact that the enemy could approach so close to the Division's defences before being observed caused considerable concern and brought orders from
Throughout this night single enemy bombers droned overhead, occasionally letting loose a stick of bombs without causing much damage, while away to the south-east of the box Air Force flares lit the sky for long periods at a time and the rumble of heavy bombing could be heard distinctly by the New Zealanders.
SEPTEMBER opened with the Panzer Army lined up across the south of Alam el Halfa in a good position to commence the assault on Eighth Army's rear, as envisaged in Rommel's plan, but exactly twenty-four hours behind schedule. The element of surprise had thus been lost but no major regrouping had been made by the British, so that an opinion was growing among the
Rommel Papers, p. 275.
In detail, the two panzer divisions were well poised to give 22 Armoured Brigade some fairly rough handling, even to the extent of eliminating it as a fighting force, for 23 Armoured Brigade's Valentines could have offered only limited assistance, while 15 Panzer Division and were so far away that they could have been dealt with separately later. The line of communication from the spearhead to the
But Rommel had already begun to lose his customary confidence. Petrol was not reaching the front in anywhere near the promised quantity, the constant air bombing was having a noticeable effect on morale, and this, coupled with the delay in reaching the first objective, had brought him to issue on the evening of the 31st an order for his army to go over temporarily to the defensive. This order was obeyed by 21 Panzer Division after it had disengaged from 22 Armoured Brigade, and by the Italians, but it was not
Dawn on 1 September brought news which added to Rommel's misgivings. First, the Reconnaissance Group sent in a report that it was scarcely battle-worthy. In the approach march its vehicles had suffered severely from ground and air action, mines, and mechanical trouble. In its laager overnight near
After this Rommel learnt that a strong force of tanks with infantry in support was attacking 164 Division in the coastal sector, while 15 Division reported a force of British tanks approaching from the east.
Meanwhile, 15 Division, renewing its attempt to take 21 Panzer Division, whose commander countered by questioning the accuracy of
Diary of 21 Pz Div,
By mid-morning 15 Panzer Division was claiming, with the Corps Commander present to corroborate the claim, that it had beaten off a tank counter-attack and had occupied
While the tanks were skirmishing on the south of Alam el Halfa, there occurred ‘one of those little actions customarily described … as a “bad show”’,History of 2/7 Australian Field Regiment, p. 192.bulimba. This operation had originally been planned over a week earlier as one in the sequence of major raids for harassing and information ordered by Montgomery. The Australian contribution, however, had somehow developed on a greater scale and with a somewhat different conception from the raids already laid on by the South Africans and New Zealanders. According to its operation order, bulimba was intended as an ‘immediate counter-stroke to enemy attack or as a diversion prior to enemy attack’. Set in motion some thirty-six hours after the enemy had attacked, its immediacy as a counter-stroke could be questioned. That it was intended as ‘a diversion prior to enemy attack’, that is to harass and deter a possible enemy assault in this sector to link up with the spearhead, seems unlikely. It appears to have been allowed to proceed purely in the hope of either diverting forces from the enemy's main advance or preventing the Panzer Army troops in defence from being used to reinforce the striking force. However, reports and despatches remain vague as to the operation's exact purpose.
It was on the afternoon of the 31st that 9 Australian Division received orders from 30 Corps to start the raid at 5.35 a.m. the following day. Extremely detailed plans had been in existence for some time—so detailed and widely distributed as to offend all the theories of security—and many of the necessary preparations had already been made. The method proposed for the raid was of a
In short, an infantry force was to push forward a salient into the enemy's lines, clear it, and hold it as a firm base from which tanks would advance to ‘exploit’—a military term which meant many things to many men. The exploitation was to cease about 3 p.m., when the tanks would retire through the firm base, to be followed after dark by the infantry. No material gain of ground was intended.
The infantry, four companies of Queenslanders of 2/15 Infantry Battalion, crossed the start line on time. As they approached the area chosen to be occupied as the firm base, heavy artillery concentrations kept the enemy in cover, but as soon as the shelling lifted to its next targets, the enemy came vigorously to life with automatics and mortars. Most of the Australians reached their objectives but they had struck an area held by German troops, who resisted tenaciously and mounted immediate local counter-attacks whenever they were driven from their positions. For some time communications broke down, battalion headquarters losing touch both with its companies and with the squadron of Valentines of 40 Royal Tank Regiment which was to come up in support and start the exploiting.
The tanks themselves experienced difficulty in negotiating the narrow gaps cut in haste by the engineers through the British and enemy minefields. Before they got through the enemy mines, the Valentines came under fire and, with several of their number ablaze and others immobilised by mines or gunfire, halted well short of the infantry.
The second-in-command of the Queensland battalion, Major Grace, taking charge when his commanding officer was wounded, decided that the uncertain communications and lack of close co-ordination between tanks and infantry made the task of securing a firm base practically impossible and the likelihood of the tanks going on to exploit remote. Using the one reliable means of communication, the wireless link between the artillery's forward observation officer and the guns, he called for covering fire from all available weapons and sent word by runners to the infantry for them to retire as soon as the fire commenced. Four hours after the operation started, the companies were on their way out.
It is difficult to assess whether this raid had any value or not. Rommel may have been influenced, if only to the extent of calling back some of his Africa Corps tanks to form a mobile counter-attack force in case a similar attack was repeated. It may, on the
A tally of casualties showed that the Australians lost 15 men killed and 120 wounded, and nine tanks were knocked out. Against these losses, the enemy lost probably 150 killed, while the Australian infantry maintained their reputation by bringing out of the disorder and confusion nearly 140 prisoners, most of whom were Germans of 382 Infantry Regiment.
While this early morning local battle was being fought far away near the coast, another isolated and inconclusive skirmish by British forces had begun off the south of Alam el Halfa. On orders to make contact with 22 Armoured Brigade, the regiments of 15 Panzer Division, whose eastern flank was covered with a gun line in which were several 7·62-millimetre self-propelled guns of Russian origin. Under fire from these guns, which the brigade thought were the dreaded 88s, the tanks halted while the brigadier made arrangements with 44 Division for covering fire under which he intended to lead his brigade northwards and thence, in the shelter of the infantry minefields, on to the west. No sooner had this movement started than a heavy Stuka raid came in on the area between the two el Halfa boxes, where the headquarters of 13 Corps,
For the New Zealanders in their box, this second day of the battle was hardly more eventful than the first. Artillery observers who had gone out before dawn to the high ground overlooking
The enemy's movement was in fact not a concerted operation but a number of only loosely related activities. The tanks were mainly those of Littorio Division, with no immediate aggressive task other than to protect 21 Panzer Division's left flank and link the spearhead with the infantry covering the line of communication rearward. To
Two prisoners of 90 Light Division who were gathered in by a 23 Battalion patrol just after dark told a story of a hard day. Two parties, of about thirty-six men altogether, had set off that morning from the vicinity of
The second day of the battle, which saw the Australian raid and some minor skirmishes on the Alam el Halfa front, ended with the bulk of the two armies in much the same positions as they had occupied at dawn. The three British armoured brigades had already lost some fifty tanks, more than half of them Grants, in the inconclusive skirmishing, apart from losses sustained by the columns of 7 Armoured Division. The Panzer Army's tank strength was down by about ninety German tanks and an unknown number of Italian, but many of these had suffered mechanical breakdown or minor damage from shelling and bombing and were repairable. The total German and Italian losses by actual encounter appear to have been no greater, and may have been less, than the British losses by the same cause, while the loss of so many of the Grants made it plain that the British armour was still no match for the German panzer divisions.
By the morning of 1 September the Eighth Army had garnered sufficient information to account for all the major formations of the Panzer Army. Patrols, air reconnaissance and other sources confirmed that there was no ominous gathering of forces along the static front, so that General Montgomery could confidently assume that the drive on Alam el Halfa was the only threat to be dealt with, at least in the immediate future.
During the day he was joined at the Panzer Army from Alam el Halfa to defending its own lines of communication, the northern attack to catch the defences without an adequate armoured reserve and make Rommel withdraw some of the armour from the spearhead. It is worth considering that the
Unaware that the stringency of supplies had already brought Rommel's offensive to a stop, Montgomery was concerned about the defences between Alam el Halfa and the sea. He therefore arranged to combine the strengthening of these defences with the gathering of his reserves. One brigade of the newly arrived 51 (Highland) Division was brought from its training and acclimatisation in the Delta defences to take the place of 151 Brigade in the
Towards the evening of 1 September
But while Montgomery was planning slowly and cautiously, the opportunity to strike really hard at the Panzer Army was passing. About the time that the corps' order reached
At this point, when the Panzer Army has been taken to the limit of its advance, it is worth considering the much publicised story of the ‘going map’ which was supposed to have deceived Rommel into choosing the worst possible route that led him into a trap of soft sand. A New Zealand officer who was concerned in the actual preparation and printing of the map has given his story, and various other versions have appeared in print telling how the idea was conceived, and how the fake map was printed in great secrecy, marked and stained to give the appearance of use, and finally left in an abandoned vehicle for the enemy to find. Evidence that the map was found and used by Rommel's staff in their planning was given by General von Thoma on direct questioning after his capture later in the year, but this officer did not arrive in
On the night of 1–2 September, with the enemy's situation well reconnoitred during daylight, the Air Force stepped up its bombing programme. For the first time in the desert war, a 4000 lb bomb Bombs of this weight had been used earlier on enemy harbours in
New Zealand patrols brought back news of considerable activity in the two depressions, Angar and Munassib, where the Axis troops were obviously digging positions of some strength. Between the depressions and the box there were numerous groups of trenches, fully or partially dug but unoccupied. Several of the slit trenches were found to contain booby traps, which were disarmed by engineers with the patrols. No one knew whether the Axis troops intended to occupy these positions when they were completed, or whether they had abandoned them as too close to New Zealand observation.
With Africa Corps patrol reports offering no hint of British night activity between Alam el Halfa and the
Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, p. 274.
Rommel prefaced his withdrawal orders with the explanation that British air supremacy and the sinking of several tankers made a continuation of the offensive impossible. Accordingly the Panzer Army was to retire in bounds to positions behind the British minefields that ran north from
For the first stage of the withdrawal proper, the troops covering the line of communication on the north were to stand firm, 21 Panzer Division was to move to the south of
Observers in Eighth Army, though unaware that a major withdrawal was commencing, were quick to note that outlying columns and patrols were being pulled in on the morning of 2 September. On renewing its advance at dawn 15 Panzer Division's troops had laagered overnight had been vacated but, when they tried to follow up, were met by the gun line of the rearguard. Well to the south a column of Reconnaissance Group, shooting up several trucks and taking some prisoners.
By the middle of the morning the field guns of 10 Armoured and 44 Divisions were falling silent as few targets remained within range. The armoured division then took some of its batteries from their dug-in positions and set them up further to the south. By midday a thick dust-storm was raging, hindering observation both from the ground and the air. Several New Zealand artillery observation officers took advantage of the dust to settle themselves in better vantage points overlooking the line of the depressions on the south of the box and, when the dust began to settle about two o'clock, reported a wealth of targets as numerous enemy columns, also taking advantage of the low visibility, were moving to their positions for the withdrawal. On orders from Eighth Army for maximum harassing fire, all British guns within range maintained constant fire until dusk, several batteries expending over 1000 rounds each during the afternoon and evening.
A curious incident occurred this day in the sector north of the Ramcke Brigade, demanded immediate surrender on the grounds that Rommel had surrounded the Eighth Army. The two optimists were escorted back to parlementaires without official approval.
Early on 2 September
One patrol, under Second-Lieutenant
While these patrols were out, the British guns, on Montgomery's instructions, harassed the enemy constantly throughout the hours of darkness, while seventy-two sorties were flown by the Air Force between dusk and dawn. Two 4000 lb bombs were dropped this night, both causing large fires to show that they had found targets of some kind. According to the German records, 300 aircraft dropped 2400 bombs and caused such damage to transport that some units were nearly immobilised.
THE third day of September ushered in the third year of the war in the west. In the rear areas and in some of the Eighth Army headquarters the day was observed by prayer services. For the troops in the front line there was little opportunity to join in the observances for, though there was relatively little ground activity, no one was yet sure of the Panzer Army's intentions and all positions were fully manned. In the air 200 bombers and 574 fighter sorties were flown by the Panzer Army.
Patrols from all three of the brigades of
There was to be no forward movement from the main battle positions except by patrols.
The armoured car ring was to close round the enemy and picquet him.
Strong patrols were to operate against any enemy MT.
13 Corps was to proceed vigorously, methodically and carefully, with the plan for closing the gap from the N.Z. Box to
Under these orders, the British heavy armour was content to keep the enemy under observation and fire. The light armour and armoured car columns were more vigorous but, with no plan or direction to follow up success, they did not seek for weak spots in the anti-tank gun screen but merely probed forward until they drew
Panzer Army stood firm until the British columns retired.
Later in the day 7 Armoured Division was offered the opportunity of more aggressive action as its share in the closing of the gap between Panzer Army's southern flank. Air reconnaissance was already indicating that the enemy might be withdrawing, though General Horrocks himself felt that it was yet too early to assume that such a withdrawal was a ‘definitely established fact’.
When Horrocks passed the orders on to 7 Armoured Division with the detail that both 7 Motor Brigade and 4 Light Armoured Brigade were to take part, the value of the scheme for a two-pronged attack meeting at
Such a light force, operating in difficult country and with no infantry or gun support, was not likely to make much impression on the Panzer Army's flank. In fact, in one of the first engagements, a column of Stuart tanks was attacked and driven off by tanks of Ariete Division which had been directed to help cover this southern front.
During Eighth Army's methodical and careful, but not very vigorous, preparations for closing the gap, the Panzer Army took full advantage of its opponents' caution to stage a leisurely and ordered withdrawal. In the early dawn of the 3rd,
As had happened before, the Italians failed to act with German efficiency. In spite of attempts by 21 Panzer Division to co-ordinate the Italians' withdrawal with its own,
By the evening of the 3rd, when Eighth Army was getting ready for its counter-attack, the Panzer Army's retirement had progressed even further than its plans demanded. The Reconnaissance Group was falling back on Folgore Division's positions around 21 and 15 Panzer Divisions' rearguards were on a north-south line running from the south-east corner of 21 Division's reconnaissance and anti-tank companies, who were out of touch with any troops on their west. In the western end of the depression there were some guns of the army artillery, including some 88-millimetre, and scattered troops of 90 Light Division, all awaiting relief by Trieste Division. In the neck of desert between Trieste had surprised
Between the north-west of Munassib and Ramcke Brigade and Folgore Division. Two battalions of Brescia Division held Angar, with other units of this division linking the defences with the
Two armoured regiments of 21 Panzer Division, with up to sixty tanks in going order, were laagering immediately to the south of
The main route used followed the track through Trieste, the transport of
Opinion in the Eighth Army on the evening of 3 September, according to the records of the time, ranged from the hypercautious, in which the enemy's withdrawing was seen as a gathering of his forces prior to a further advance, to the extremely sanguine view that Rommel had had enough and was getting out while the going was good. Either to hinder the preparations for a renewal of his offensive or to hasten his going, a hearty blow struck at this time seemed indicated. Although the commander of 7 Armoured Division had made clear his inability to take effective action from the south, Montgomery decided to proceed with the attack from the north, through the
The development of the plans for this northern prong of the pincers is of interest. As soon as the probability of an enemy advance round the south of the box had been accepted, planning included numerous suggestions for cutting off the Axis spearhead or disorganising the lines of communication. For any such operation the Panzer Army's advance was less than twenty-four hours old before Horrocks had warned
With no specific task or objective given him,
Montgomery, however, saw the proposed operation as something more than limited action by a mobile column and had already developed his scheme for a pincers movement from north and south.
This matter was discussed on 1 September, when the Panzer Army was so placed that it could have turned all its strength against the
Horrocks replied to the objections with a vague offer of armoured assistance to protect the eastern flank and a concrete offer of another infantry brigade placed under
Agreement set going the ‘general post’ of brigades between the Delta and the front as already recorded.
As the planning proceeded on its various levels, enemy tanks and infantry had been closing in on the south-eastern corner of the New Zealand position, thus cutting off access to the first objective except through the already crowded and congested box. This brought to light the misunderstanding mentioned earlier, for
Panzer Army's armour could easily be loosed at the narrow salient that one
With these points in mind, the morning's conference evolved a plan which, with some minor modifications, was eventually approved by Corps and Army. It started with the relief by 5 Indian Infantry Brigade not only of 132 Brigade but of 6 Brigade's northern sector held by 26 Battalion. This battalion was then to extend 6 Brigade's front to the south of
Horrocks, on receiving details of this plan, telephoned
This conversation took place in the late afternoon of 2 September and before nightfall Horrocks had learnt from Eighth Army that the headquarters of 50 Division would not be available, and that
All the discussions and arrangements leading up to what was first called Operation wellington and later beresford indicate that it was intended as a probe to test the enemy's reactions. No plans were prepared in advance for the powerful force of the British armour to assist, either before or during the action, by containing the German panzer divisions or by warding off counterattacks. Nor were the armoured formations briefed to action should the infantry advance open the way to greater success. The New Zealand infantry, thrusting forward into the lifeline of an as yet undefeated enemy, was given two squadrons of Valentine tanks.
On the morning of the 3rd, the Corps Commander held a conference at the New Zealand headquarters attended by the commander of
A divisional conference was held immediately afterwards when the plans emerged in their final form. On the right, 26 Battalion was to extend 6 Brigade's western front for about two miles south from
Fifth Brigade was to send one battalion down the line of the third, or so-called ‘dummy’, minefield to occupy the neck of desert between Munassib and
To avoid letting the enemy be forewarned of the advance, no artillery barrage or concentration was to precede the infantry though the guns prepared tasks to cover the newly gained front.
The English brigade's guns were still sited in the north of the box with tasks mainly to cover the western front, so 4 New Zealand Field Regiment was placed in support of 132 Brigade while 6 Field Regiment continued to support 5 Brigade.
As the Air Force had been bombing the depressions regularly since the beginning of the offensive, it was not expected that air activity would give the enemy any warning of the infantry operation but would rather draw attention away from it, so the Corps Commander arranged for air action in the early part of the night to be concentrated on the objective and the ground further south.
All this, however, did not complete the plans. It was known from observation and patrols that the main part of the advance would cover ground that had not yet been occupied in any strength by the enemy, but 26 Battalion's new front would lie close to the east of
To most of the New Zealand troops, seeing things in simple patterns and buoyed by the new spirit of decision in the army, Operation beresford was the opening move of the awaited and logical counter-attack that had to be made against the Panzer Army. To Montgomery at the head of affairs the operation was a minor or limited manoeuvre to test Rommel's reactions. Between these two extremes there was an area of confusion of thought which led to some extent to a confusion of aim.
While the Africa Corps tanks remained in force to the east of the southern minefields, any major advance to the south of the
Fifth Brigade's plans were drawn with care by
At dusk on the 3rd, sappers of 6 Field Company, assisted by men of B Company, 22 Battalion, were to start cutting the 12-foot lane in the wire and minefield on 28 Battalion's front. Then A Company of 23 Battalion was to move through and cover the start line on the south of the gap against surprise by enemy patrols. Next, 21 Battalion was to pass through and line the eastern side of the objective, where little or no opposition was expected, and the Maoris were to follow and proceed due south to the edge of the two depressions. Meanwhile 22 Battalion was to leave its defences and bivouac close to the new tactical headquarters as immediate reserve, and all the various vehicles—the tanks of B Squadron, 50 Royal Tank Regiment, anti-tank guns, mortar and Bren carriers, engineers' trucks with mines, and similar transport needed for the operation—were to form up in groups ready to be despatched through the gap like trains in a marshalling yard. In fact, most eventualities that could be foreseen from past experience were covered by 5 Brigade's plans.
Brigadier Robertson of 132 Brigade had been visited by
The final plan was for the brigade to travel in all available transport through 25 Battalion to a start line parallel to and about half a mile outside the defensive minefield on the south of
The share that 6 Brigade took in the operation was larger than would appear in the orders. It had the task of preparing sufficient routes through its sector for the passage of 132 Brigade and 26 Battalion. This included clearing and taping gaps in the inner minefields surrounding 25 Battalion's area, marking the routes with coloured lamps, clearing three gaps in the perimeter minefield, two between the first and second minefields and one east of the second, and surveying and marking the start lines. There were also the two diversions to be provided by 18 and 25 Battalions, as well as the major task entrusted to 26 Battalion of following the English brigade to form a front facing west along the inner side of the first minefield.
Many of the preparations had to be started in daylight in areas over which the enemy held observation of some degree. The start lines were laid out during the day and work started on the gaps in the inner minefields. The sappers in charge of the clearance had earlier stated that they would find it difficult to open the gaps in the outer minefields between the fall of darkness and 132 Brigade's scheduled time of arrival, so some preparatory work was started on these gaps before the sun had set.
Operation beresford, on the extreme south-western corner of Eighth Army's front, took place on an arc over ten miles in length along the northern edges of the four depressions, Angar,
The night was probably the noisiest experienced by the New Zealanders in the box. Dusk had hardly fallen before the glowing orange flares of the Air Force's Albacores commenced to blossom over the depressions, followed by the thump of bombs. As if in retaliation, but in fact under arrangement between Rommel and Kesselring to help cover the night's bound of the Panzer Army's withdrawal, Axis aircraft flew over the Eighth Army in greater strength than previously. Although this effort spread past Luftwaffe was sending over a succession of lone bombers, each of which circled until its stock of bombs, mostly dropped singly rather than in sticks, was exhausted, when it would give way to its successor. Some of the bombers were equipped with ‘Banshee wailers’ which screamed as they dived, and most of them interspersed their bombing with haphazard bursts of tracer.
Damage sustained in the box was negligible. Though some of the newcomers among the Division were affected by the Banshee screams, the haphazard bombing and the tracer fire, seasoned troops were hardly disturbed. The greatest nuisance value came from the canisters of butterfly bombs dropped in some profusion, those that fell on tracks or defence positions presenting a hazard until found and exploded. Fortunately many of these were duds and others exploded prematurely on impact. Of the Banshee bombers the
Of the Luftwaffe's effort the
The
Luftwaffe attacked the enemy concentrations at and east ofAlam Nayil with good effect. It also made a night attack on10 Indian Division which seemed to have considerable effect. It was believed to have smashed a large troop concentration intended for an attack southwards against Brescia Division….
But Africa Corps was less enthusiastic about Kesselring's assistance with an entry, ‘From observation, the attacks did not seem comparable with the enemy's night bomber raids’.
Possibly because of observation of unusual activity in the
At 8.30 p.m. the
The infinite variations that the human element can play on the most carefully laid plans appeared early.
However, by the appointed time, 10.30 p.m., 21 Battalion had set off, leaving guides to wait for B Company, while 28 Battalion had shaken itself out and was on its way to the south. As the final details of 132 Brigade's plans had not been received, no method of contact had been arranged between the Maoris' right flank and the Buffs on 132 Brigade's left.
Similar troubles beset 132 Brigade but did not straighten themselves out so simply. As the troops reached 25 Battalion's sector, each group was supposed to select its respective lighted route to one of the three main gaps. Inexperience in night travel under such conditions, the customary congestion at the gaps through the inner fields, as well as the sporadic fire and bombing brought considerable delay and confusion. The Buffs' column was least affected and reached the gap east of the second minefield on time, to pass through and wait for word that the rest of the brigade was ready. The two West Kent battalions became considerably disorganised, with trucks on the wrong routes and often, in losing the way, becoming stuck in the soft sand or in the minefields. Several casualties to men and vehicles from the enemy fire or mines stretched the delays so that, at 10.30 p.m., when the battalion columns should have been lined up on the start line, there was a confused mass of men and trucks on both sides of the gaps, with officers and NCOs, both English and New Zealand, working hard to get order out of the chaos. The leading troops of 26 Battalion, coming up behind, found the centre gap, through which their vehicles were supposed to pass, completely blocked, and the commander then gave orders for the transport to try to follow the infantry through the right-hand gap.
Some order was being gained and the assaulting battalions of 132 Brigade were beginning to form up on the start line when the field and Vickers guns opened up in support of 18 and 25 Battalions' diversionary raids, causing the enemy to retaliate with increased fire on the perimeter minefield. Fortunately the start line was out of the main area of fire. The brigade hastily completed its deployment and, almost an hour behind the scheduled time, set off away from the enemy fire into the open desert to the south. The Valentine tanks, with which all contact had been lost for some time, eventually found their way through the centre gap and followed on behind the brigade. Two squadrons of the Divisional Cavalry, whose task was to follow the brigade with a possible exploitation role into
The increase in enemy fire caught many men and vehicles of the rear elements of 132 Brigade still on both sides of the minefield. The confusion was not helped by several drivers who left their vehicles or tried to drive back into the box. The infantry of 26 Battalion, marching in file close to the tape on one side of the western gap so as not to interfere with the passage of vehicles, got through with only minor casualties until a salvo of mortar bombs landed among the battalion headquarters group bringing up the rear. The commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Peart, Lt-Col J. N. Peart, DSO, m.i.d.; born
Meanwhile the companies had reached the start line to find the area still occupied by confused groups of the tail of 132 Brigade. As these groups moved on, the battalion followed, keeping to the right of 132 Brigade's route, and only a half hour behind its planned starting time. The transport column, led by the adjutant, brought up the rear, to halt about a mile south of the gap where a temporary headquarters was established.
The two diversionary raids had been timed to meet the enemy at 11.30 p.m., that is, one hour after 132 Brigade should have passed over its start line and half an hour after 26 Battalion's start. Any postponement, with all its alterations in timing for the supporting fire, would have been difficult and, in the event, with the uncertainty over the possible length of the delay of the main advance, virtually impossible. The raids, therefore, were set going on the original plan, and though the enemy's retaliation did not help the confusion in which 132 Brigade had already fallen, the intention behind the diversionary action was probably achieved. The defences prepared in the Panzer
Army since the commencement of the offensive had been gradually extended to a point within a mile of the south-west corner of the
The 18 Battalion force started on time but B Company, 25 Battalion, was held up at the patrol gap for some minutes to allow the enemy's searching fire along the perimeter to move on. Owing to this delay, this company, under the command of Captain Weston, was still some 300 yards to the north of the depression when the supporting fire lifted. Further advance was met by such a volume of fire from all types of weapons that Captain Weston, deeming the necessary element of surprise lost, ordered an immediate withdrawal. Through a curtain of mortar bombs falling across their line of retreat, the men reached the box with four wounded and twenty-eight missing. Several of the missing turned up later but about twelve, including several wounded, were taken prisoner.
The 18 Battalion force reached the edge of the depression just as the supporting fire lifted to find itself between two defensive positions. Charging the posts nearest to them, the men broke into small groups and for some time a mêlée of hand-to-hand fighting developed. When the three officers of C Company became casualties the company sergeant-major, WO II Brescia Division brought back as prisoners. From A Company's action on the opening night of Rommel's offensive and this engagement, it was plain that 18 Battalion had mastered the art of night raiding. Together the two actions, according to acceptable estimates, brought the enemy a loss of nearly 400 men, of whom over eighty were prisoners, against a loss to the battalion of fewer than fifty.
As the two diversionary raids were taking place, the initial stages of the main advance continued unchecked. Away on the left flank, C Company of 21 Battalion had already, by 11.30 p.m., reached the area of its objective without finding any enemy and the other companies of the battalion were close behind.
The Maoris, unaware that
A few minutes before midnight C Company encountered the first opposition, a group of three machine-gun posts whose fire was quickly subdued, the men of the company then passing on. It so happened that battalion headquarters followed through this area and, coming under rifle fire, made a search which brought in several of the enemy missed by the screen ahead. From this point on the speed of advance slowed as the battalion found itself crossing a stretch of desert dotted with newly constructed but unoccupied weapon pits and sangars, all of which had to be examined. This search caused C Company to lose any of the cohesion that it might still have maintained, so that it was no longer the evenly spaced advance guard of the commander's plan.
By this time C Company had ceased to exist as a formed body. Some of the men may have obeyed orders to go to ground and engage the enemy by fire, but few could have resisted joining in as the other two companies charged by. The company commander himself, Captain
About this time there occurred one of those unfortunate actions that are probably the basis for the complaints noted in German reports that the New Zealanders did not ‘fight fair’. Keiha's small group had been almost overwhelmed by enemy troops who wanted to surrender, and had had some trouble discriminating between those leaving their trenches with the intention of offering themselves as prisoners and those merely moving to better cover to continue the fight. In the heat of the battle a party of prisoners collected by one man was fired on by the others, several being killed or wounded. Eventually the surviving prisoners were sent back in charge of two of the riflemen, but the escort lost direction and ended up in the enemy lines.
In a quick search around, in which he gathered up another ten men, mostly of his own company and some wounded, Keiha discovered that he was close to the lip of the depression, on the floor of which vehicles were on the move. Thinking they might be from 21 Battalion, he led his small party down the slope towards the nearest trucks only to be met by fire from automatics.
See p. 137.
On the initial impact with the main enemy line, D Company's commander, Captain
Eventually, with several men killed and most of the survivors wounded in greater or lesser degree, the impetus of the advance slackened. The enemy then rallied and brought up mortars which, from behind a ridge, laid down a heavy barrage. Awatere, realising that his men's enthusiasm had carried the company too
With about thirty-two fit men left, Awatere followed after his runner, eventually finding Baker in process of setting up his headquarters close to the point where the track from the north entered the
This company, under Captain W (‘Ben’) Porter, had been within sound of Baker's whistle when the first opposition was met. It had immediately charged through the middle of an Italian defence position, collecting fifteen prisoners on the way, and had then been called to a halt by Porter as he estimated he was on his objective, the neck of ground between 2
Following up the retreating enemy, the men of A Company swarmed down over the floor of the depression, attacking all who tried to oppose them and destroying numerous trucks with grenades or Bren fire. During the course of its advance so far, the company had had remarkably few casualties, but numerous men had lost contact with the headquarters in the darkness. Among these was Second-Lieutenant
Porter had already sent runners to follow the escarpment back to battalion headquarters and report his position. About half an hour after the D Company platoon arrived, the runners reappeared guiding the rest of D Company, which had been sent by Baker to link up and form a defensive position ready for daylight. Both Porter and Awatere, however, agreed that the knoll was well to the west of the battalion's proper objective, so they decided to move back at once to the east so that their men could dig in before the day broke. On the way they gathered in several stragglers and added a few more wandering Italians to their bag of prisoners. After a conference with Baker, they set out their company positions across the track at the point where it ran down into the
As the Maoris were playing havoc with the enemy in Munassib, 21 Battalion had marched on to its objective along the inner side of the fourth minefield with very little incident. Defence positions had quickly been laid out, the men commenced to dig in, and
The carrier force moving up behind 28 Battalion and met by Keiha had been despatched by
A route having meanwhile been found that avoided the mines, the remaining carriers drove on until they were halted by Keiha and his men. Two of the vehicles were then left to take the wounded back while Hayward led the rest down into Munassib.
This column had been sent off about an hour behind the carriers after
The column, which kept good contact with Brigade Headquarters through the powerful wireless sets in the tanks, was led by Captain portées, trucks with the battalion's mortars, reserve ammunition and rations, as well as the mine trucks of the 6 Field Company detachment, who were to mine the new front, and the sappers' escort, B Company of 22 Battalion.
Captain Bennett at first followed the shaded lights already set out by the provosts along the brigade axis, which ran due south from the minefield gap. For a reason never explained, the lights which should have continued for about two miles were not visible much beyond half that distance, but Bennett continued to lead by compass after the last light had been passed. At one time aircraft dropped flares over the column, causing many of the soft-skinned vehicles to scatter. No bombs were dropped on the column itself but it took some time to get the vehicles reassembled in order.
Just before 4 a.m. both Bennett and Hughes became worried because they had not yet found any signs of 28 Battalion, so they halted the column and called up Brigade Headquarters on the wireless. Their call coincided with one of the rare moments when 28 Battalion's wireless worked successfully and Baker himself came on the air. In a conversation, relayed between the two wireless links and much of it in Maori, Baker offered to fire two white
A short distance had been travelled when one of the leading tanks ran over a mine. Hardly had the others halted when heavy fire from anti-tank and machine guns swept over the column. The trucks in the rear immediately dispersed into the sheltering darkness, but the carriers, and Bennett in his jeep, sheltered behind the line of tanks.
The role of the Valentines, in the brigade plan, had been to support the infantry at first light and to do any exploiting that might be feasible, but Major Hughes must have felt that his main task was to reach the infantry. Whatever his thoughts, he engaged the enemy until several of his tanks had been put out of action either by mines or by enemy fire. He then led the remainder off to the south as if to outflank the enemy position, but in doing so took them into that part of the fourth minefield that lay in and around the
Meanwhile, Hayward and Bennett, with no communication with the tanks and uncertain what action Hughes contemplated, directed the carrier force to follow the tanks and help if possible while they turned back to round up the transport convoy. With the vehicles re-formed in some sort of order, Bennett was preparing to lead them on a roundabout route to avoid the enemy position when some of the carriers returned to report that there were mines and more enemy on this route. He therefore turned the column about and dispersed it some distance to the rear.
Of the tanks' first engagement, Captain Bennett later recorded:
I cannot speak too highly of the courage of Major Hughes and the men of his tanks…. It was night time and there was very little they could see.… Yet I saw Major Hughes' tank gather up speed and charge straight into the unseen enemy positions with every tank doing likewise. The last I saw of them they were charging with all guns blazing.
This was in fact the last seen of most of the squadron. What exactly happened, as well as the location of the engagement, has been difficult to determine, but it is known from the German records that the squadron came up against 7 Troop of 25 AA Battalion, manning two 88-millimetre and several 20-millimetre anti-tank guns. This troop had somehow been missed in the advance, though the Maoris had overrun all the 88-millimetre guns of its companion troop, No. 8. The diary of 135 AA Regiment states:
7 and 8 Troops were involved in heavy fighting after enemy troops broke into our lines. During the action all the 88mm guns of 8 Troop were knocked out and their crews fell into enemy hands temporarily. 7 Troop came into action with all its guns and cleared the enemy off the battlefield before daybreak. At 0700 hours the enemy launched more infantry and tank attacks which were beaten off. Before 1000 hours eight enemy tanks were knocked out…. Casualties (nearly all in 7 and 8 Troops) 28 killed, 26 wounded, 11 missing….
GMDS 79009/79002.
Just before daybreak some of the Valentines were seen still in action down in the
While the carriers formed a screen, Bennett re-formed what he could find of the transport column and, on orders from Brigade Headquarters, withdrew the column about a mile and dispersed it. Meanwhile the sapper party and B Company of 22 Battalion had broken out of the column with the intention of moving west and
At the same time as B Company was ordered forward,
At the time the Maoris met the enemy line, the main force of 132 Brigade, having run the gauntlet of the fire round the minefield gaps, was advancing unopposed southwards over the open desert. Anticipating that the enemy would not be met in any strength, at least until they reached the northern edge of
The Maoris' battle, some two or three miles off to the south-east, was hidden by the contours of the ground and its noise was overlaid by the Air Force bombing and enemy anti-aircraft fire along
The headquarters column, brought to a sudden halt just behind the crest, found itself at first sheltered from the direct fire of machine-gun and anti-tank tracer. Possibly for the same reason, the brigade commander was not fully aware of what was happening over the crest for his first reports to
A picture of the action emerges from an account given by Major
We were under intense m.g. and s.a. fire and the tracer was coming through them and over our heads…. We stayed on the ridge all night being mortared and shelled all the time. Every time another truck went up in flames, we moved just far enough to get out of the worst of the light. This was fairly frequently and there were not many trucks left by morning. The situation in front was very obscure. Brigade had no communication with any of its three battalions, no phone, no wireless, no runners, until after dawn. The Brigade wireless trucks were not hit and they must have been in touch with N.Z. Div. all the time. I was in touch with my battery and regiment throughout.
After the brigadier was wounded, the brigade major, believed to have been Major R. J. Murphy of the Buffs, took command, and of him Bevan wrote:
It was bad luck for him that his first action should have been such a mess. He was willing to take any advice except that he would not move off that ridge. I wanted him to move back a few hundred yards on to the back slope where his vehicles—and mine—would be safer from observation and gun fire, but he would only say ‘I won't retreat’. A few infantry straggled back during the night with wild tales that the battalions were wiped out and it seemed pretty certain they were in a bad way, or at least pinned down in the open, and I suggested artillery concentrations on the enemy positions as marked on the map and actually fired at least two Div. concentrations. I hope they helped….
During the night parachute flares were dropped…. and we expected bombs but none came…. The flares showed us up to the enemy gunners however. About half an hour before first light I at last convinced the brigade major that unless he moved off the ridge he would lose all his vehicles at dawn and that he was useless without his wireless trucks. He agreed to move … and asked me to lead…. I got them lined up and led them to a position about 400 yards from the minefield gap and dispersed as it got light. I had wirelessed for ambulances and they were there to pick up our wounded…. There we were with a brigade headquarters and no brigade….
Part of the brigade major's reluctance to move his headquarters may have stemmed from a belief that some of his brigade, though out of touch, was still in action. The enemy's defensive fire abated considerably after the first outburst but never quite ceased for some hours, while at times some real or imagined alarm would set the whole Axis front to sudden outbursts of fixed-line machine-gun fire and mortaring. The enemy records do not indicate that the defences here were broken into or that casualties were suffered to any extent, but they claim 200 prisoners for this night, of whom about 150 must have been men of 132 Brigade. Such a number cannot be accounted for merely by stragglers who, inexperienced in desert movement at night, wandered into the enemy lines, and it seems probable therefore that more than one group of the brigade broke through the enemy outposts to be surrounded further back.
About 3.30 a.m. Chaplin, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.
The column of
The subsidiary operation by 26 Battalion to protect 132 Brigade's western flank went off smoothly at first. Two of the companies, A and B Companies detailed to establish the northern and central sectors of the battalion front along the first minefield, reached their positions without meeting opposition and quickly started to prepare defences. Enemy posts to the west, where 18 and 25 Battalions' raids had just finished, were jittery and sweeping the
As 26 Battalion was settling in, stragglers from 132 Brigade commenced to drift into the area in ever increasing numbers, causing considerable concern to the depleted staff at battalion headquarters, who had already spent much time earlier helping to sort out the brigade's transport confusion. Patrols scouting to the south, both to find C Company and obtain first-hand information of 132 Brigade, returned to say that no organised bodies of men could be found between the battalion and enemy defences to the south, though the commander of
News had come in that the supporting weapons, including some New Zealand anti-tank guns, which were to follow 132 Brigade's column, had run into mines or been otherwise delayed. Major Walden then decided that he would have to provide the protection for his own southern front, so called up all the anti-tank guns, 3-inch mortars and Bren carriers that could be spared, to form a screen across the south of A Company's sector as far as possible towards the second minefield. The carriers, patrolling to the east, found the headquarters of 132 Brigade, so that direct contact was at last established between the brigade and 26 Battalion. Some of the Valentines of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, were also found, as well as other parties of troops of various arms, all of whom were brought into the defensive screen.
The ground over which 132 Brigade had advanced remained under shell, mortar, and machine-gun fire of varying intensity, with aircraft circling overhead to drop flares and a few bombs, until about 4 a.m., when the enemy's activity began to die down. By dawn of 4 September the whole front was relatively quiet.
Just prior to dawn, Brigadier Clifton set off from the box to visit 26 Battalion and from there was directed on to 132 Brigade headquarters. Returning to give 26 Battalion instructions for providing extra cover for the southern front, he took Major Walden in his jeep to reconnoitre the front, and particularly to find C Company. Seeing some khaki-clad troops above ground off to the south, Clifton told his driver to make for them, only to discover the troops were Italian parachutists of See also Liddell Hart, Folgore Division. The two officers, the driver, and the wireless operator were all taken prisoner and with them the enemy collected a number of documents and marked maps. The latter's value was lessened by the action of the driver who, when he realised capture was imminent, did his best to obliterate the chinagraph markings on the talc overlay of the brigadier's situation map. The operator, attempting a last-minute call, had his set smashed by a rifle butt. The only witness to this capture on the New Zealand side was an artillery observation officer, who saw the jeep surrounded by troops but did not realise who the occupants were. Clifton was renowned for his mobility so that it was some time before the staff at 6 Brigade Headquarters became concerned over his absence. The Rommel Papers, p. 281, and Clifton,
Apart from the story of C Company, 26 Battalion, to be told later, the actions during the hours of darkness of all the main parts of Operation beresford have now been described. At dawn, most of the stragglers of the 18 and 25 Battalions' raiding parties who had not been taken prisoner were back, the wounded seen to, prisoners sent back to
Some way further south and immediately east of the second minefield, with two of their attached Valentines in running order and with few casualties to either men or vehicles,
Shortly after McPhail joined
From B Company's positions, a fairly solid and well-supported front ran through
NEARLY two miles to the south of 22 Battalion's line on the
After he had fired the flares to direct the tanks, Lieutenant-Colonel Baker sent off a patrol to meet them and then returned to the battalion defences. Soon, however, he realised that dawn was not far off and the tanks had not yet put in an appearance, so decided to search for them himself. In his jeep he set off in a northerly direction and, in the fast increasing light, caught sight of two Valentines off to his right. As he turned towards them, the jeep ran over a mine, fortunately without injuring either himself or his driver. Continuing on foot, he found that the tanks had also been immobilised by mines, in the third, or so-called ‘dummy’, field, and from the crews he learnt something of the tanks' action in the night. Baker next met Keiha, from whom he borrowed
Meawhile the two Maori companies had been far from inactive. A small patrol sent to find 132 Brigade returned to report that contact had been made with parlementaire with the white flag turned out to be a very weary private of the Buffs. He showed no inclination to return to captivity with any of the suggested answers to the demand he brought for capitulation.
After this incident, enemy fire increased and then a flight of
The battalion's casualties for this action were listed as 5 killed, 18 missing, and 54 wounded and safe. Of those missing, a few later reappeared but about half the number were made prisoner. Against this total of 77, the battalion claimed that it sent back over 100 prisoners and left 500 killed or severely wounded enemy on the field. The claim for prisoners was soundly based, for of the 108 that passed through Brigade Headquarters, all were sent in by 28 Battalion except for a few passed back by 21 Battalion, and in the capture of some of those Keiha's men had a share. The second claim was accepted at the time as a reasonable estimate. It was possibly too high, but the enemy records offer insufficient detail to dispute it. Of the German troops involved, only 25 AA Battalion's casualties have been found, a total of 70 for the two troops in action against the Maoris and the tanks. Other German prisoners were all from 90 Light Division and represented infantry, artillery, engineers and signals. Trieste Division, the biggest sufferer, reported to Africa Corps a list of 8 killed, 55 wounded and 40 missing, an absurd set of figures, for 89 prisoners from the division were checked through the headquarters of the New Zealand Division. It is certain that the Maoris overran many machine guns and other light weapons, either destroying them or bringing them back as booty, as well as capturing four 88-millimetre anti-tank/anti-aircraft dual purpose guns, of which two were recovered by the Germans. Estimates of the number of vehicles shot up ran between thirty and forty.
As the Maoris fell back, C/D Company of 22 Battalion was already digging in beside B Company, while A Company and battalion headquarters were on their way through the minefield gap to a reserve position behind the other two companies.
The day of 4 September began with a series of Stuka raids in which the engineers' and anti-tank gunners' lines in 5 Brigade's sector were the main target. One raid arrived just as the cooks were serving breakfast, delaying the meal but causing little damage. Then a strong flight of Stukas dive-bombed the trenches vacated by 28 Battalion on the northern slope of Munassib. This was taken as the prelude to ground attack, and
As the morning wore on, intercepted messages between enemy units as well as observers' reports of tanks forming up in Munassib kept the southern front alert. Another flight of Stukas screamed over 23 Battalion, scattering bombs among the men digging in. All movement in the foremost positions, especially around
Further west,
On the Defensive
The enemy facing 26 Battalion on the west remained fairly quiet, at least for the first part of the morning. Several patrols from the battalion set off to locate C Company, but all met determined fire from posts across the south of A Company's sector and were forced to return. The presence of these enemy posts, combined with the fact that no messages or runners came from C Company, made it appear probable that the company had been surrounded and captured. This assumption was strengthened when Clifton and Walden failed to return. When
About 10 a.m. enemy fire on all the fronts increased in severity. Observers reported considerable infantry movement to the west of 26 Battalion and activity by both tanks and infantry in Munassib. The front-line infantry of 26 Battalion called for a sortie by tanks to shoot up the infantry, but as the Valentines of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, provided the key defence for 132 Brigade, this request was refused and the battalion had to be content with concentrations from 5 Field Regiment. Under this artillery fire the enemy infantry dispersed and went to ground. It seems possible that no attack was intended at this time, but that the enemy was merely reorganising the positions attacked during the night by 18 and 25 Battalions.
On 5 Brigade's front, however, enemy activity continued to increase. Several tanks could be seen creeping out of Munassib from one hull-down position to another, with infantry dispersed around them. The line of advance led towards C/D Company's positions on 22 Battalion's right flank. Stukas appeared overhead but, except for some scattered bombs, left the front line unharmed when their attention was caught by the stream of vehicles using the minefield gap by Brigade Headquarters. Just before this
From a vantage point, the two officers watched the tanks advance to within 3000 yards of the defences.
As the enemy attack drew closer, 22 Battalion's 3-inch mortar detachment began to search the folds in the ground where the enemy infantry sheltered. Vickers gunners of 10 MG Platoon, which had earlier taken up a position near
When the turret of a tank appeared over a low ridge ahead, men of 22 Battalion holding a post slightly ahead of the main line began to leave their shallow trenches and run back, but prompt action by the battalion commander quickly had the men back in position.
By midday the whole of 5 Brigade's southern front was alive with bursting shells and mortar bombs. The rising dust was pierced with a pattern of tracer from anti-tank and machine guns and only a strong breeze from the north saved the defence from being completely blinded at times in the haze of smoke and dust. The fire of the defenders held the enemy infantry off, but glimpses could be had of several tanks working close enough to charge and overrun the outlying posts.
Russell then called on Brigade Headquarters for more artillery support. arthur, he let loose a five-minute concentration from the forty-eight guns of two field regiments and several medium guns.
The full effect of this fire was not felt immediately. The spearhead of the attack had already closed with 15 Platoon of C/D Company on the left flank, where there was a slight gap between the two companies' defences. The enemy troops, however, were unable to break in against the small-arms fire and, whenever they went to ground, the 3-inch mortar crews searched them out, working under the direction of Corporal
As the infantry assault faltered, a number of tanks came forward. The six-pounders manned by 32 Anti-Tank Battery opened on them at long range, forcing most of them to take cover, but four, later identified as Italian M13s, kept going until almost into the defences. Here they came into view of 28 Battalion's anti-tank platoon commanded by Captain
The summary disposal of these tanks, and a repetition of the shoot arthur to which 6 Field Regiment added its guns, appeared to break the back of the enemy's attack. Shortly after 1 p.m. both tanks and infantry could be seen in withdrawal and the volume of enemy fire died away. Fire was maintained by the defenders for some time but targets were difficult to observe as the wind had risen to drive clouds of dust across the battlefield, so that visibility distance at times was less than a hundred yards. When the wind fell temporarily about half an hour later, observers reported much activity down by Munassib, possibly as the counter-attacking troops were being reorganised and wounded evacuated. After a shoot by 6 Field Regiment, all movement in the enemy lines ceased for some time.
About the time that the attack on 22 Battalion was at its peak, shell and mortar fire on 26 Battalion's sector increased. Signal cables were continually being cut and, with wireless working only erratically, communications were badly disrupted until Corporal
Enemy infantry again appeared in numbers to the west of A and B Companies' lines, small parties of them, as if reconnoitring the way for an assault, approaching close enough to be fired on by the infantry. After some rounds had been fired on them by 5 Field Regiment and the Vickers guns, the enemy troops went to ground and, in the early afternoon heat when the rising wind began to lift clouds of dust, the western front quietened down to spasmodic exchanges of fire.
Several attempts had been made by individuals and small patrols during the morning to scout for signs of C Company and Clifton's jeep, but the enemy seemed to have complete coverage of the desert round the south-west of A Company's sector. Hope had practically been given up when, shortly after noon, Lieutenant A. J. Fraser, one of C Company's platoon commanders, arrived with one of his men to give the news that the company was surrounded but still holding out some way to the south-west. Three of the Bren carriers that could be spared from 132 Brigade's front were then sent out with Fraser as guide to bring the company in under a smoke screen to be fired by 5 Field Regiment. By this time the dust-storm was so thick that navigation was almost impossible, so the carriers waited until the dust subsided, about 2 p.m., before starting off. Twenty minutes later the field guns, as well as the mediums of 64 Medium Regiment, RA, laid smoke and HE across the west of the area in which Fraser had indicated the company lay. Well short of the smoke, however, the carriers ran into fire, one being disabled. On the return of the other two carriers to the battalion area, a patrol on foot set off to find a way round the enemy positions but met fire at every turn.
As the dust-storm died down and the carriers set off, the western front had begun to come to life again. Both A and B Companies were in action against small parties of enemy infantry which were working their way forward, while behind them a large force of men was assembling. A divisional artillery shoot had been prepared earlier, but not fired, when the enemy assembled in the same area
At the same time as the counter-attack appeared to be starting opposite 26 Battalion, the enemy in Munassib showed increasing movement. Again the 13 Corps intercept service reported having overheard several orders for an attack and, just as the big artillery concentration was being fired for 26 Battalion, observers in 5 Brigade's lines reported that up to twenty-four tanks were advancing in the strip between Munassib and arthur. At 3.25 p.m. the target was pounded by more than 100 guns for five minutes. As the smoke and dust cleared, enemy vehicles could be seen retreating into the cover of the depressions, leaving behind several vehicles blazing, on which 6 Field Regiment continued to fire to discourage salvage and rescue.
Meanwhile, well dispersed infantry, followed by some unidentified vehicles which were to the north of the target area, continued to advance until they were within range of 22 Battalion's weapons. Under fire from the infantry, the Vickers and the Valentines, these troops turned to the east but, coming under more fire from 21 Battalion's right-flank defences, retreated over the escarpment into the
A few surviving records of ammunition expenditure offer some idea of the volume of fire that the enemy had to endure this day. The two batteries of 64 Medium Regiment, RA, in the box together fired over
In the defence of 22 Battalion, the Vickers gunners of 10 MG Platoon on
There are no Axis records which give even a hint of the casualties sustained in these counter-attacks. Only the advanced troops, probing for a weak spot, reached the defences and came under the small-arms fire. The main body of the counter-attack force, preparing to follow and exploit any weakness disclosed, was caught by the shellfire as it formed up but, though it was obviously too disorganised to continue with its task, it may not have suffered a great number of casualties.
Losses in 5 Brigade, almost completely confined to the two companies of 22 Battalion and the various small groups supporting them, amounted to four men killed or died of wounds and about twenty wounded.
It may seem strange that the Axis forces attempted to attack only on the two narrow fronts and did not disturb 21 Battalion or, particularly, the long and poorly organised front held by the remnants of 132 Brigade. The reason for this, however, was that the Axis operations were nothing more than local counter-attacks to regain supposedly lost ground. Rommel had learnt from both German and Italian sources that parts of the defences had been overrun. In conformity with standard German tactical doctrine he issued orders that the defence line must be restored. But most of the defences on the northern flank had been taken up hurriedly and to some extent temporarily, so that no one except the local commander on the ground knew exactly where the line ran. In Munassib, where troops of Trieste had only just taken over from
A similar confusion seems to have existed on 26 Battalion's front. Here the Axis front had in fact been penetrated at one point and news of this, added to reports of defences overrun and prisoners lost by 18 and 25 Battalions' raids, also triggered off high-level demands for a counter-attack to restore the position. The practical Italians, having found they could regain their deserted posts in
Once the Maoris had withdrawn from Munassib, all the Axis counter-attacks to ‘restore the situation’ were in fact unnecessary, except at the one small point where C Company of 26 Battalion was sitting some way inside the line.
The enemy posts which prevented patrols from reaching the company were a continuation of the line against which 132 Brigade had broken. The men of the company, marching down behind, and to the west of, that brigade, had seen the burning trucks and the firing on their left before they themselves met the enemy. Coming under fire, the company charged, to overrun the flank of a position held by Folgore parachutists and break through into clear ground beyond. The commander, Captain
The brush with the Folgore defence upset the calculation of distance, done simply by counting paces, but Hall continued to lead his men on until he reasoned he was on his objective. The exact position taken up is difficult to determine but appears to have been further than planned, though it complied with the orders in
After the confusion and delay in reaching the start line, Hall was told not to wait for the rest of the battalion but to push ahead. In doing so his company had been caught in the confusion of 132 Brigade's tail and had somehow lost its medical orderlies and signallers. The company arrived on the objective about sixty strong but with no means of communication other than by runners. The commander laid out defences and the men dug in before dawn broke. Daylight brought scattered small-arms fire, mainly from the west, but not enough to hinder patrols being sent out to find 132 Brigade and A Company. None of the patrols got very far, however, before meeting much heavier fire. It was soon clear that the position was nearly surrounded, with Italian posts on the northeast and east, more Italians to the south, and Germans on the west. As the morning wore on and details of the enemy positions could be observed, several men tried to find routes between the posts, but only Lieutenant A. J. Fraser and one man were successful in breaking through the ring.
Captain Hall had been given to understand that he was to hold his objective for twenty-four hours, by the end of which period the second phase of the operation would have been decided on. He guessed that he had advanced slightly further than expected but, unaware of the complete failure of 132 Brigade's attack, he was confident that, at any moment, friendly troops and supporting weapons would appear over the slight crest that hid him from the north. The enemy at first showed no great interest in the company except to subject any movement above ground to bursts of small-arms fire. Small parties of infantry who approached, either to attack or merely to investigate, were seen off and in the middle of the afternoon the company opened fire on a staff car that came up the
By the late afternoon C Company had accounted for about thirty of the enemy at a cost of only six casualties. By this time Hall had decided that in the circumstances the orders for a stay of twenty-four hours could be ignored, and had warned his platoons to be ready to withdraw as soon as darkness offered some concealment.
At 6 p.m. shells commenced to fall across the position, killing three men and wounding several, including Hall himself. At the same time enemy infantry closed in from the west. Salvoes of mortar bombs and bursts of automatic fire preceded repeated
200 Infantry Regiment of 90 Light Division.
From survivors' accounts and the enemy records the story emerges that the initial, and rather half-hearted, attempts to seal off C Company's penetration were made by Italians. After the staff car was shot up, the job was given to the See p. 95.Ramcke parachutists on the company's west, a group about 100 strong. After capture the prisoners watched the occupants of the car being buried with considerable ceremony as if one of the dead was of high rank. They also saw in the vicinity the grave of Major-General Bismarck.
The return of the survivors of C Company coincided with a general withdrawal from all the ground gained by Operation BERESFORD. After touring the whole front during the morning,
General Horrocks, however, was unwilling to forgo the ground won by 5 Brigade, especially
In the middle of the afternoon he let Panzer Army had withdrawn far enough to the west to make the point valueless for observation. In fact, any keenness
So convinced was
At 7.20 p.m., after touring the front and discussing the situation with
The Corps Commander then passed on
With plenty of warning for details to be seen to, the withdrawal from the salient went smoothly. As soon as dusk fell the surviving tanks of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, and the anti-tank guns in 132 Brigade's front formed a line covering the minefield gaps on the south of
The troops in 5 Brigade's salient also started on their return journey as dusk fell, with 21 Battalion moving first to pass through the box and bivouac by the main gap in the north-east corner of the minefield. The men of 22 Battalion thinned out in the front line behind rearguards who watched for enemy patrols, the two forward companies then falling back through the reserve company. Once back in the box, the battalion settled into its old sector on the eastern face.
Care taken to ensure that nothing of value and no troops were left behind, as well as precautions against surprise raids by the enemy, delayed the planned timing of the withdrawal of the first two battalions so that 23 Battalion, arriving at the gap by tactical headquarters, had to wait until 22 Battalion could report that all its men were through. By 2 a.m. 23 Battalion was through, to bed down near Brigade Headquarters, and the sappers of 6 Field Company had started to re-lay the mines in the gap. Lieutenant
THE closing of the gaps in the perimeter minefield in the early hours of 5 September marked the ending of Operation beresford. In the reconnaissance patrols immediately preceding the action, in the diversionary raids, and in the operation itself, some 80 New Zealanders were killed or died of wounds, 300 were wounded and 60 taken prisoner. Though 28 Battalion among the infantry suffered most, with nearly 100 casualties, mostly wounded, 5 Brigade as a whole came off more lightly than 6 Brigade. The losses in 132 Brigade were more serious. The two Royal West Kent battalions lost about 250 men each, the Buffs approximately 100, and the attached troops, including the Valentine crews, lost close on another 100, to bring the total of English casualties to nearly 700, of whom over 200 were listed as missing or prisoner.
corps d'élite. Over the planning, both he and
The brigade had been shown the position, estimated from reconnaissance and observation, of the enemy's line, and in fact it met this line fairly close to the point where it should have been expected. The defences were not continuous but consisted of groups of weapon pits and sangars, well spaced out both frontally and in depth according to the evidence of 26 Battalion's C Company. There is nothing to suggest that the enemy was specially prepared for an attack on this narrow sector any more than on any other sector this night, or that the fire met by 132 Brigade was anything more than the enemy's standard defensive fire.
The defences met by 132 Brigade were manned by Folgore Division parachutists, who proved later to be some of the best of the Italian troops in the desert. They were stiffened by a sprinkling of German parachutists of Ramcke Brigade, and these two specialist groups, undisturbed in their defences since the first day of the battle, may have offered stronger resistance than that met by 28 Battalion, whose opponents were Italian infantry of Trieste Division, supported by German anti-aircraft gunners and elements of the Kost Group (mainly 155 Infantry Regiment) of 90 Light Division, including a detachment of 900 Engineer Battalion. The Trieste troops had moreover only just taken over in Munassib from
Information sent direct to Panzer Army Headquarters from the Folgore-Ramcke front on the engagement with 132 Brigade brought urgent orders for the detachment of 15 Panzer Division's tanks, then in bivouac west of Ramcke Brigade. In recording this part of the action the following day, the Panzer Army had acquired the information that the attack was made by about thirty tanks and a battalion of infantry, of whom 200 were taken prisoner, including the commander of 6 New Zealand Brigade.
GMDS 34373/1.
From 7 a.m. on the 4th to 10 a.m., Panzer Army Headquarters, obviously acting on delayed reports from the anti-tank gunners, was urging 21 Panzer Division to join in the battle in
Apart from a certain amount of flurry in Panzer Army Headquarters when piecemeal reports of the night's fighting were arriving, Operation beresford hardly affected Rommel's plans of withdrawal. On visiting 21 Panzer Division on the morning of 4 September, he stated his feeling that a threat of attack from the north still existed, directing the division to remain where it was, that is immediately to the south of
The rather meagre German reports made later on this action contain several points of interest. Rommel could not understand Eighth Army's inertia and took the lack of aggressive action to mean that the British were conforming to his criticism of slow and cumbrous reaction. By the 3rd, he felt that the British command had had time to show some reaction, and concluded from reports by air and ground observation that slightly increased activity in the Brescia Division, that is, on the Pz Army war diary on GMDS 34373/1, 14, 15.beresford was over.
From prisoners the Germans acquired the notion that two brigades of 44 Division and 6 New Zealand Brigade had attacked the Folgore – Ramcke front, and on 90 Light Division's front they had captured ‘some members of the 28 Maori Battalion. They were reinforcements just arrived up with the battalion from the Sixth Reinforcements’15 Pz Div intelligence report on GMDS 24442/7.Pz Gp Africa intelligence reports on GMDS 34373/8–9.
Of the changes in the British command, interrogation of New Zealand prisoners confirmed the news that General Gott had been killed in an aircraft shot down by a German fighter, and also elicited the strange information that Auchinleck had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, Ibid.
Later in the month the intelligence summary of 15 Panzer Division carried the appreciation that, among the newly equipped and reinforced British forces in the
15 Pz Div intelligence report on GMDS 24442/7.
90 Lt Div intelligence report on GMDS 28876/8. Troops of 900 Engineer Battalion were in the western end of
For the New Zealand troops, the few days following beresford brought a test of morale. Rumours of relief had been rife towards the end of August, for much of the story of the Division's future role had filtered down to the man in the line. Internal rearrangements, especially the exchange of sectors between 5 and 132 Brigades, seemed to show that relief was not far off when Rommel struck. When beresford was over and 151 Brigade was seen to settle down in 5 Brigade's old defences, hopes revived.
Three of 5 Brigade's battalions remained in reserve in temporary bivouac in the open desert with nothing much to do except tidy up after the battle and watch the dogfights in the air above. The fourth unit, 22 Battalion, settled back into its old area facing east, with little expectation of being called on to man the defences. While here the battalion was unfortunate in losing its popular commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, who was killed in a mine explosion as he went to help the casualties among the crew of a carrier which had been blown up in a minefield.
The battalions of 6 Brigade, however, returned to their August routine of daylight inaction and nightly patrols. With the relief of ¼
The heat remained excessive in the early days of September, while the fighting had left many corpses, dismembered and unburied, to swell the plague of flies. In spite of all efforts towards hygiene within the lines, of fly traps and veils of mosquito netting, no man in daytime could avoid his attendant swarm of flies, insistent for moisture from mouth, eyes, or sweat-damped clothes.
The enemy gunners, now relieved of the need to conserve ammunition as strictly as before the battle, followed Rommel's orders to keep the Eighth Army under constant harassment to deter any interference with the Panzer Army as it settled back into defence. They laid regular and methodical strafes on key areas, from mortar and anti-tank gun positions, platoon and company headquarters, in the forward defences back to battalion and brigade headquarters and the gun lines. The cookhouses in the company areas of both 18 and 25 Battalions were subjected with Teutonic punctuality to salvoes of shells at normal meal hours. The ration parties, coming in to collect their dixies of tea and stew, soon learnt to disperse and go to ground until the customary number of shells had fallen, so that few casualties occurred. The enemy shelling reached its peak on 6 and 7 September, on which two days it was almost continuous. From then on it gradually declined. The accuracy with which this shellfire fell on many previously undisturbed targets was attributed by many of the men to marked maps carried by prisoners taken by the enemy, but it may of course be possible that more targets were engaged merely because more shells were fired.
The Axis air forces, as if to make up for the lack of ardour complained of by the ground troops, also put out a burst of activity at this time. Several Stuka raids were directed at the
Patrolling by 6 Brigade's battalions followed the pattern learnt by experience before beresford. No major raids were made to get prisoners, but each night seven to eight patrols of varying sizes were out reconnoitring new Axis defence diggings and harassing working parties. On the evening of the 5th, men listening to radios in the Division heard
In spite of the trials of these few September days, morale in the New Zealand Division was extremely good. The lack of worth-while results from Operation beresford and the loss of comrades in the fighting were offset by the gradually emerging details of the complete failure of Rommel's offensive. Confidence in the higher command of the desert war reached a point unknown for many months. The trying conditions combined with the Axis shellfire to keep the medical staff busy. The occasional battle casualties were well outnumbered by the steady flow of men falling sick with malaria—a hangover from the stay in
Official news that the Division was to be relieved and out of the line within four days was released by
Finally
From the time the New Zealand Division vacated the ground occupied in Operation beresford on the evening of 4 September, the battle of Alam el Halfa can be said to have faded slowly to a finish. Hardly affected by any of Eighth Army's actions, Rommel's planned withdrawal and the deployment of the formations of Panzer Army continued until, by the morning of the 8th, all but a few patrols were behind the line along which Rommel had decided to set his new southern front. Italians of
As the Panzer Army fell back to these positions, the British heavy armour was kept by Montgomery's instructions close to its chosen positions west and south of Alam el Halfa. All three armoured brigades, however, made up light columns of Crusaders, Valentines or Stuarts with scout cars and field guns, which kept in contact with the enemy's rearguards by day and pulled back to laager and replenish at dusk. Several of these columns had minor engagements, particularly at dawn as they felt forward to test how far the enemy had retreated during the night. Further to the south the mobile columns of 7 Armoured Division found themselves too weak and the going too rough to ‘hustle’ the enemy as Montgomery had directed. As the
By the evening of 4 September both air and ground observation had noted a decrease in the Panzer Army's movements. This was taken, by the more sanguine of Eighth Army's commanders such as Panzer Army had begun to thin out and disperse its vehicles as the troops took up their final defensive positions, so that good bombing targets became progressively more difficult to find. And, as if ashamed of the
On 5 September the Valentines of 23 Armoured Brigade were allowed to make a cautious advance round the south-eastern corner of the
That evening the following message from Montgomery was received by the formations of Eighth Army:
The battle … has now lasted for six days, and the enemy has slowly but surely been driven from
8 Army area. Tonight, 5th September, his rearguards are being driven west, through the minefield area north ofHimeimat . All formations and units, both armoured and unarmoured, have contributed towards this striking victory, and have been magnificently supported by the R.A.F. I congratulate all ranks of8 Army on the devotion to duty and good fighting qualities which have resulted in such a heavy defeat of the enemy and which will have far-reaching results.
From this time on the Army Commander's orders were based on his assumption that Rommel would return to the defensive in the positions held before the battle. Horrocks was urged to regain the ground up to the original first minefield, using 7 Armoured Division and the light columns from
The departure of the Valentines left the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry in sole control of the
On 7 September Montgomery officially called the Alam el Halfa battle off. He decided that, in order to commence at once the major reorganisation of Eighth Army needed for his own offensive, he would be unable to spare enough troops to reinforce the columns of 7 Armoured Division so as to push Rommel back to his original line in the south. He accordingly ordered that the Panzer Army should be left in possession of the minefields from Munassib to
See p. 195.
In order to retain sufficient armour for support and counter-attack on both corps' fronts, Montgomery rostered his armoured formations so that each brigade in its turn could be relieved for training and re-equipping. Not many miles to the west, Rommel, only slowly losing his suspicions that the Eighth Army might eventually counter-attack, was planning a similar reorganisation but a step behind Montgomery. While the Eighth Army was preparing for offence, Rommel knew that, unless he could win the battle with the strategists in
The Alam el Halfa story should not be closed without some note of the air effort, as it was here that, for the first time in the course of the war, the Allied air forces gained and maintained superiority over the Axis. Until this battle the significance of the air had been
Luftwaffe to equal or surpass the Allies, the whole pattern of the desert war would have to alter. Whichever side held control of the air, even if temporarily, would force its opponents to take to fixed defences. The war of manoeuvre, of the movement of masses of tanks and vehicles, so often likened to war at sea, would cease.
During August the
On the evening of 21 August the air effort was stepped up with the intention of disrupting Rommel's expected offensive. The positions on the Panzer Army. The fighters on this day carried out some 200 patrols. From then on, targets were harder to find as the enemy dispersed his transport and commenced digging in, while heavy dust-storms became more frequent. On 5 September Montgomery and Coningham, the AOC Western Desert, agreed that the air offensive could now be called off.
The fighter cover provided during the battle was so constant that, while the Boston Tea Party flew almost unmolested over the Axis columns, few Axis bombers ventured over the Eighth Army's lines during daylight, except for occasional hit-and-run raids by heavily escorted Stuka formations. Against these dive-bombers the tactics evolved were for the USAAF Kittyhawks (the RAF P40s were fitted with bomb-racks and used as light or fighter-bombers) to engage the fast Me109s while the Spitfires and Hurricanes dealt with the Italian MC202s and the Stukas. In this way the slow and vulnerable Stukas, once so dreaded, were faced with such odds that their pilots would jettison their bombs, more than once on their own troops, and turn for home as soon as the Allied fighters were sighted. In the light of the number of aircraft employed and sorties flown, the total loss of Allied air forces was not unduly high.
The strategy of attrition employed over the previous weeks by air action against enemy ports in Panzer Army found that not only was its cutting edge blunted but that all its movement had to be constricted. Wide dispersion of trucks and tanks cost petrol that could not be spared. Supply vehicles following the advance and the whole army in retreat were forced to use the short, direct routes through the depressions rather than risk greater consumption of petrol on more widely dispersed routes further to the south. So, as the Eighth Army sat stolidly on the defensive, the Allied bombers took the offensive against targets almost made to order. With the strong fighter cover that allowed the Boston Tea Parties to fly virtually unmolested by Axis fighters, and the flares from the Albacores that turned night into day, the
Africa Corps messages on GMDS 25869/9–11.
The battle of Alam el Halfa lasted in effect less than a week. The Eighth Army's commander, his own referee, claimed a victory, but in losses inflicted and sustained the British forces could justly claim only a bare win on points. The army started the battle on 31 August with a grand total of 935 tanks, of which 693 were in the forward areas ready for action. By 8 September at least 100 tanks had become unusable, principally from enemy action, but many of these were repairable, and the final total of loss seems to have been between 40 and 50. The British official history (Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III, pp. 390–1) gives 67 tanks ‘put out of action’, including 18 Grants knocked out and 13 damaged. As this figure includes those damaged and possibly salvaged to a greater or lesser degree, it cannot fairly be compared with the Axis loss of 38 German and 11 Italian tanks, all of which were ‘total’ losses. A figure of 40 to 50 is therefore a better comparison of total losses.
Although some of the 300 Sherman tanks diverted to the
In men, the British suffered at least British estimates ‘for the week's fighting’ were 984 British, 405 New Zealand, 257 Australian, 65 South African, 39 Indian, a total of The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 492.
In the air war from 31 August to 5 September, called by the The figures for air losses are drawn from the R. A. F. Middle East Review of
The diary of 135 Anti-Aircraft Regiment, a Luftwaffe formation attached to the
…The probable reasons for this decision were:—
The enemy's air superiority,
the petrol shortage….,
the fact that the push through to the sea had not come off, the enemy had regrouped to better advantage, and our attacks were not reducing his strength at all. GMDS 79009/79002.
On 7 September, when the battle was over, the diarist saw fit to alter his opinion:
In connexion with the diary entries for 2 September it now appeared that the main reason for the withdrawal of our forces was not the enemy's air superiority or the petrol shortage. The main object of the operation had been to force the enemy to come out and come to grips in an open tank battle. The enemy had not accepted the challenge but fought a delaying action and gained enough time to regroup. If our assault divisions had pushed on farther east, their right flank would have advanced past the cover afforded by the
Qattara depression and the plateaus north of it, and would have become vulnerable. Enemy forces had concentrated south-east ofDeir el Risw , and an enemy recce force had made a raid on the supply track. This gave rise to the conclusion that the enemy would have let the assault divisions push on east almost unopposed and would then have attacked the line of communication from north and south.This supposition is supported by a remark of Field Marshal Rommel's to Field Marshal Kesselring on 1 September, ‘The swine isn't attacking’.
The operation was now broken off. It had cost us heavily in men and equipment with very little to show for it, and the formations had given evidence of some exhaustion and lack of drive. The morale and material effect of the enemy air attacks were mainly responsible for this.
Ibid.
This opinion represented in essence the story that both sides were content to have commonly accepted. On the Axis side, embellished by the addition that Rommel had originally intended the operation as merely a ‘reconnaissance in force’, it saved Rommel's face and gave his troops an excuse for their ‘Six-day Race’. So called after the Sechstagerennen, a famous cycle race. (Rommel Papers, p. 284.)
Rommel had not previously been on the receiving end of massive and continuous air attack, but he was quick to realise what the British had learnt by bitter experience, that battle tactics are limited against an opponent who has command of the air. In Normandy Rommel tried hard, but unsuccessfully, to pass this lesson on.
It was in fact lack of petrol and lack of fighter cover that blunted Rommel's last offensive in
AS members of the Division were thankfully relinquishing their tenancy of the
As the proposals involved the co-ordination of action by widely separated forces, planning took such time that decision was delayed by other events, but eventually the
The decision resulted from a meeting of Alexander, Harwood and Tedder and was arrived at on the grounds that any interruption of the Panzer Army's supply lines ‘might prove fatal to the enemy’. Harwood was willing to risk the seaborne forces, but Tedder could not offer full air support while the land battle continued.
The final scheme provided for two major and three minor attacks to take place on the same night, but widely spaced in distance, against the Panzer Army's rear installations. Most of the preparations were complete by the time the final decision was reached and the first troops set off immediately, other groups following later according to the distances involved, to reach their objectives on the evening of 13 September. By 10 September, when all danger of a sudden return to the attack by Rommel had passed, the whole series of operations could have been called off but there seemed no valid reason for so doing. The land forces were closing on their objectives, the sea and air forces ready; success would have had a psychological effect and might possibly have caused the enemy to spread his forces in defence.
The operations were designed in five parts as follows:
A combined land and sea assault on
A land raid on the port of
A land raid on the
A land raid on the landing ground and military installations at
The capture of the oasis of
Three diversions were also planned for the same night: a dawn shoot of some 6000 rounds by 9 Australian and 44 British Divisions to simulate the opening of an attack on the Young Fascist Division garrison of the oasis from interfering with other operations. These diversions were carried out as arranged and appear to have served their general purpose.
The operation against
While this battle occurred east of the harbour, another assault force comprising some 400 Royal Marines and specialist personnel carried in the destroyers Sikh and Zulu was attempting to land on a beach to the north of the harbour. About half the troops in the first flight of landing craft reached shore, but some way west of the intended landing point.
By this time the enemy defence was fully alert, with coastal guns, 88-millimetre anti-aircraft guns and automatics firing on the destroyers and landing craft. Out to sea the anti-aircraft cruiser Coventry and eight destroyers patrolled, prepared to assist in re-embarkation and against counter-attack.
The destroyer Sikh, moving inshore to give covering fire and pick up survivors, was hit and finally sunk by gunfire. The rest of the naval force, as the coming of daylight made its situation precarious,
Coventry and the destroyer
In
In this action the Sikh, were later reported to be prisoners. The Royal Marines lost 300 men and the Army 166, of whom probably more than half were prisoners. Against this total of 746, the Axis defence recorded a casualty list of 62 killed and 119 wounded. According to the German area commander, General Deindl, the raid was not anticipated nor was the approach of the assault forces observed, but the intensity and duration of the Air Force bombing caused him about 11 p.m. to issue an ‘alert’ which had the effect of delaying reliefs and the customary settling down for the night.
The raid on
Delayed by difficult country, the two patrols abandoned their task for the night and withdrew to an area in which their vehicles could be concealed against air attack in daylight, but the commando force pressed on, only to run into an Italian machine-gun post on the
The operation against
The raid against
Losses of the
The German records dismiss the actions at Panzer Army's strength, while the raids themselves proved what Rommel already knew, that the British were able to operate small raiding parties over the wide expanse of desert in the Panzer Army's rear. The Panzer Army's diary recorded that, after seven hours of air bombardment, troops landed at the port at 2.30 a.m. on the 14th. A mobile force of German troops was hurriedly called together from the units in the 3 Reconnaissance Unit and the Italian Nizza reconnaissance group to join the troops of the Young Fascist Division in
Rommel himself saw the series of raids, especially the
There was some talk in Middle Eastern circles that the raiding operations were so long in the planning, and accordingly discussed freely in
Of the series of operations, General Alexander stated in his despatches that ‘From a material point of view the raids had been a failure and our losses had been heavy but it is possible that they had had the psychological effects we had hoped for. They probably …. assisted in diverting Rommel's attention to the possibility of seaborne raids on his long open flank.’ Montgomery, with commendable restraint, left no public comment on the operations, but his Chief of Staff, de Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 158.
Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. II; Kay, Long Range Desert Group,
AS these raids were taking place, the New Zealand Division was settling in its rest area along a stretch of the coast between
At the rest area the men were housed in bivouac tents, dug in against air attack, along a stretch of sand dunes between the main road and the coast. Although the extreme heat of the summer was already showing signs of abating, the midday sun encouraged sea-bathing. On parts of this coastline there was a dangerous undertow, and in spite of surf patrols two men were drowned. Unit and
GOC
Although the troops' behaviour improved after this,
I very much regret that [this officer] has apparently been communicating with you at great length about the disturbances in
Cairo last week. I am seeing him about this as I am convinced that, regrettable though they were, they were no worse than might have been expected. In any case, every incident that happens is with him verging on a disaster and needs to be looked at from that angle.GOC
2 NZEF /26.
With the Division out of the line,
A vexatious problem with which
Another point he dealt with about this time was the matter of waste and salvage. With the vast amount of material pouring in to the
At this time GOC
On 18 September the Division's rest period ceased, the bivouac areas were cleaned up, and the troops became mobile once more. Picking up surplus transport, field guns and other impedimenta at the ‘Swordfish’ area, the units assembled next day in the open desert to the west of
In the afternoon of the 25th
After dawn the tanks and anti-tank guns had a live shoot against targets set out ahead of the objective to represent enemy tanks in a counter-attack. When it was all over,
After
But the greatest weakness demonstrated by the exercise had been in the employment of 9 Armoured Brigade. This was the first opportunity the attached brigade had had of integrating its communications and services with those of the infantry. Naturally, several differences in method and some misunderstandings appeared, but other faults lay deeper and
The exercise had been watched by a number of senior officers from Eighth Army, including Major-General Lumsden of GOC 2 Lt K. Elliott, VC; sic] and bobtail Army’.
While the New Zealand Division was on its training exercises the
Another attempt, this time in the southern sector, was far less successful. On taking over the Folgore Division backed by men of Ramcke Brigade, all paratroops and among the best infantry in the Panzer Army. Attempts by 44 Division to renew the assault and relieve the survivors were delayed by a Stuka attack and other disorganisation caused by inexperience, and on the morning of 1 October General Horrocks called a halt on the small gains made. On the enemy side, an immediate counter-attack fell into some confusion, first when Italian infantry and German tanks failed to ‘marry up’, and later when supporting Stukas were forced by British fighters to jettison their bombs on the Axis lines. Against the weight of artillery and air support the British were employing, the counter-attack was finally abandoned on the excuse that the small amount of ground lost was not worth regaining. The defence put up by the Italian parachutists brought considerable praise from the Germans, but at the same time the
Diary of the Panzer Army. GMDS 34373/1.
Since the halt on the Panzer Army of Africa to his relief, General Stumme, who continued the plans without major alteration.
The system of defence worked out by the Panzer Army's engineers under Rommel's orders was formidable. The outer edge of the defences in the north followed the wire and minefields laid down when the battle stopped at the
This outer edge of the defences was to be wired and mined throughout to a thickness of 500 to 1000 metres according to the terrain and was to be furnished with weapon pits for infantry manning light weapons. Directly to the rear of this outer belt there was to be an empty zone one to two kilometres thick, backed by another mined strip some two kilometres deep. Each infantry battalion in defence was to be allotted a sector with a front of one and a half kilometres and running the full depth from the outer belt to the rear, that is, up to five kilometres. One company only, set out in section strongpoints, was to hold the battle outposts while the rest of the battalion, with its heavy mortars, anti-tank guns and similar support weapons, occupied the second, or main, belt. At night the outposts were to be reinforced from the rear and given watchdogs to guard against surprise attack.
Plans of the defences prepared by the German engineers early in October indicate that initially lateral or flanking fields were to be laid between the outpost and main belts to cut the front into sectors three kilometres wide, each sector accommodating two battalions. The design of each lateral field was that of a narrow isosceles triangle, its apex resting on the front line. It was intended that the base and centre portion of each triangle should be left clear of obstacles to provide a route to the outposts for counter-attacking forces. Although the master plan was followed along much of the front, there were many local variations caused by the lie of the ground, shortages of engineers and equipment, and lack of enough infantry to man the whole front.
For their system of defence the Germans used the term ‘mine gardens’, likening the open areas to gardens surrounded by hedges or borders of mines. The underlying principle was that, in the event of a British breakthrough at any particular point, the attacking forces would be halted by the main defence line and, hemmed
The extent of the defences can be gauged by the number of mines laid, some 445,358 of all types according to an estimate made by the German engineers. Over half these were British mines, either lifted from existing fields and relaid or taken from dumps captured in earlier campaigns. The majority were anti-tank mines, but some thousands of German anti-personnel ‘S’ type mines were laid thickly in the forward defences. The Axis sappers also made much use of trip-wires set a few inches above ground and attached to ‘push-pull’ igniters, which would explode mines or other explosives by either increase or release of tension on the wire. Where the sappers had time to add finishing touches to their work, they placed captured British shells of large calibre and aircraft bombs in the minefields, set in such a way that they could be electrically detonated by men in the defence posts, or by trip-wires or the explosion of nearby mines.
Mainly through photographic reconnaissance from the air, Eighth Army headquarters soon recognised that the Axis engineers were working to a pattern so that, by early October, it was able to issue a description of the defence works from the coast to as far south as
Immediately south of Panzer Army's intention to man the whole front as strongly as in the north as and when troops became available, and even to continue the mine gardens south from
British reconnaissance had also quickly picked up traces of a massive minefield running west from the vicinity of Africa Corps would be closely concerned with any manoeuvring and fighting in the rear, the Qatani work was made the
The only other major defences to the rear were those along the coast, but any clear appreciation of them was difficult to obtain by aerial reconnaissance as the area along the road and railway from Rahman to
Although the Panzer Army might be strong enough to launch an offensive in November, or even to try a spoiling attack earlier, enemy records carry no definite information of proposed offensive operations. Neither war diaries nor reports by the Axis commanders mention even a vague target date for the resumption of the drive for the Canal. Rather, there is in some of the records a faint flavour of fatalism as if the turn of the tide had been perceived. Most of the senior German commanders, Rommel and Kesselring in particular, must have been aware that little was likely to be achieved in North Africa so long as the attention of the
Rommel left no clear record that he expected the Eighth Army's offensive to take any particular course. In The Rommel Papers his statements imply that he was anticipating a battle of material and attrition similar in fact to that laid on by Montgomery, and he made the comment, ‘In this form of action the full value of the excellent Australian and New Zealand infantry would be realised and the British artillery would have its effect’.
The Rommel Papers, p. 299.
It is very doubtful, however, if Rommel saw the issues and results clearly before the battle. His intelligence staff had in fact practically discounted the value of the New Zealand Division after
The true expectations of both Rommel and the Panzer Army must be sought in the records of plans and actions prior to the battle. Here the plan of defence, the positioning of front-line troops and reserves, and several minor instructions, all indicate that the British offensive was expected to take the conventional pattern of a breakthrough and outflanking movement in the southern half of the line. In an intelligence summary issued by the
GMDS 34373/7.
Following this policy, the Panzer Army concentrated its efforts from the end of the first week in October on making the northern half of the front, from the coast to El Mreir, as impregnable as
The Panzer Army's estimate of the Eighth Army's intention was at least soundly based. The previous attacks in the Panzer Army could rely on its speedy response to danger and the slow reaction of the British to exploit success. In all the comments in the Axis records known to have been made before 23 October, this theory, often seemingly with a touch of complacency, is evident.
The Panzer Army commanders and staff were anticipating an attack in the full-moon period in the second half of October, but were confident that the assembly and concentration of the British forces would be observed over a period of two to four days before the offensive opened. A senior staff officer, Colonel Liss of the
War diary of Africa Corps.
Had the Axis commanders been aware, as several later claimed, that the odds were heavily stacked against them, it is strange that they did not develop their intelligence services more fully in order to gain every item of information that might offer them some advantage in the coming battle. Yet just as before
The direct approach to information on the forces facing them, by means of fighting patrols and similar operations, was not used to any extent, and even reconnaissance patrolling was sketchy compared to the Eighth Army's efforts. Some recognition of this brought an order early in October for more vigorous patrols with both German and Italian tanks in support, but such efforts were rare. ‘The value of [armoured patrols] is very debatable, particularly in view of the high petrol consumption of about 600 litres per patrol.’ Message from Africa Corps to
Air observation, on which the Axis had earlier relied for most information of immediate value, was proving progressively more difficult and hazardous against the superiority of the Allied air forces. High-level, or stratospheric, reconnaissance was attempted by Ju86 aircraft equipped to fly above the British fighters' ceiling, but was only carried out about once a week, usually over the
Planned low-level reconnaissance, similar to that carried out by the Allied air forces, was impossible in face of superior fighter cover, so that the Axis planes could attempt no more than hasty and irregular sorties when the opposing fighter patrols were engaged elsewhere. Aerial observation under such conditions could not hope to do more than bring a general picture of shipping and major transport movement. It was quite unable to detect details, such as the difference between genuine and dummy trucks and guns, which would have been of immediate value to the ground commanders. In contrast, the
Another of the Axis sources of information, the wireless intercept services operated by both Germans and Italians, could hardly have failed to gather items which would have been of value when examined in the context of other intelligence. The enemy records mention agents' reports from civilian sources in
2See R.A.F. Middle East Review, Vol. I, pp. 85, 99.
As early as 1 October the intelligence officer of 15 Panzer Division wrote an appreciation in which the sector of attack, the British tactics, and the use of camouflage and deception were foretold with some accuracy. His choice of the sector lay solely in the fact that his division's role covered that part of the line and was therefore accidental, but otherwise he was at fault in only two points: he expected the British to spend a day in preparations which could be observed and recognised, followed by an infantry advance in the late afternoon to allow a full night for mine clearance, and the armoured advance at first light next morning. He did not attempt to foretell the date, and later divisional records, probably made by the same officer, comment on the scanty information and poor observation reports available, especially the air reconnaissance which was ‘as always of doubtful value and lacked clearness’ and ‘gave no preliminary indication when or where the offensive might come’.
15 Pz Div intelligence reports on GMDS 26421/1 and 3.
21 Pz Div appendices on GMDS 27641/8.
The only known warning the Panzer Army received of the opening date of the battle came in an Italian naval intelligence message of 22 October, which warned that major British naval operations were imminent and possibly would include an assault landing on the coast.
Panzer Army war diary, GMDS 34373/1.
On 10 October the Panzer Army issued a summary
Ibid.
133 Bde became 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade in
The failure to take steps to improve their intelligence system is perhaps understandable in the light of the internal troubles that beset the Axis commanders. In spite of Rommel's representations at the top level in Panzer Army suffered. Food in the German half of the army became progressively worse in the latter part of September and, though two ships were despatched to ease this shortage, they sat, one in
In the first days of October the Panzer Army reported that its petrol situation was precarious and ammunition stocks inadequate. Presumably under pressure from Rommel, the
The state of inadequacy of the whole North African supply organisation made any real improvement impossible without a concerted effort and a calculated risk similar to that made by the Allies in relieving Panzer Army. Yet there were available in
By 19 October a slightly improved flow from Panzer Army quartermaster could call adequate, that is, sufficient for a battle not unduly prolonged. Food at this date was sufficient for twenty-one days for the German troops, and probably more for the Italians, but water in the whole forward area was scarce and, what there was, unpalatable since several heavy rainstorms in the first weeks of October had spoilt many of the coastal wells and cisterns upon which the
Thus General Stumme on 22 October commented that his troops were living from hand to mouth, denied the ‘strategic mobility absolutely essential for the existence of the Panzer Army’. Panzer Army war diary, GMDS 34373/1.
With this continuing source of worry the new Commander-in-Chief of the Panzer Army allowed himself to be deceived by the thoroughness of Montgomery's scheme of deception. Although previous experience indicated that the full moon would bring danger, the lack of any overt signs of British preparations seems to have been taken as an indication that the Eighth Army was not yet ready and would follow the pattern set a year previously by opening its campaign in November.
At conferences on the 8th and 14th, Stumme directed the two panzer divisions to prepare plans for counter-attacks, to be submitted to him by the 25th. The records of the two divisions show that planning and some exercises were carried out with no sense of urgency, 15 Panzer Division preparing for relatively simple
21 Pz Div war diary, GMDS 27641/8.
AS in the trench warfare of the First War, there was not a great deal of variation possible in the planning of an offensive at Panzer Army would have been hard pressed to deploy its reserves to meet the threat and at the same time maintain its fixed defences against a possible frontal assault. But the strongest argument of all against outflanking movements lay in the likelihood of a planned withdrawal by the Axis army before it was encircled. Montgomery was determined to break the pattern of see-saw fights up and down the desert by forcing the
Planning was thus resolved into a choice of the sectors of the defended line against which main or secondary assaults should be made. There is evidence that Montgomery, or his staff, early considered the course suggested in some of the German appreciations, of holding attacks in the north to cover a major breakthrough in the vicinity of
But hard facts, of the number of experienced troops and the amount of equipment available, brought second thoughts about a two-pronged assault, leading Montgomery to a decision to concentrate his forces in the north, with 30 Corps to make the infantry break-in and lightfoot, a name it retained throughout later variations.
Considerable detail of this phase of the planning survived in the New Zealand records in spite of Montgomery's direction that the ‘paper battle’ was to be kept to a minimum. This came about mainly because lightfoot had been disclosed, he had driven to lightfoot plans developed at the conference he had missed. Until close on midnight, lightfoot proposals in the light of previous desert experience and of the current manoeuvres.
The New Zealand Division's manoeuvres with 9 Armoured Brigade in September were watched with interest by most of the senior commanders of the Eighth Army and the post-mortems were carefully studied, particularly of such details as the speed of communications between front and rear, the rate of advance of both infantry and tanks, the time taken by the engineers to clear the gaps in the minefields, and the timing of the operation as a whole from the moment dusk gave concealment from observation until the objective was occupied and consolidated against counter-attack. One innovation, arising from a suggestion made by Captain
The results of the manoeuvres had a great bearing on 30 Corps' plans. Although several details were varied by the three other infantry divisions to allow for differences in organisation and experience,
As for the main body of the armour in Panzer Army should
By the time the results of the New Zealand post-mortems were made known, Montgomery himself had begun to see more clearly the shape of the battle he intended to stage, influenced no doubt by comments of the ‘Commonwealth commanders’ and other old desert hands. Studying the question why, in previous battles, superiority in numbers of tanks and men had failed to ensure victory, he realised that in the conventional form of breakthrough battle he was planning, his main body of armour would pass for a time beyond his immediate and direct control. Although, shortly after his arrival in the corps d'élite’ or a ‘corps de chasse’, it was becoming obvious that weaknesses in training, and particularly the strong cavalry tradition of the British armour, could hardly be eliminated in a matter of weeks so that Africa Corps lay. The Army Commander in fact foresaw danger if his armour was permitted, in the local slang, to ‘swan around’ and fight independent battles on its own, but just such action was part of his present plan in which the armour was expected to sally forth from the infantry breach and do battle with the Axis tanks.
As already explained, after wide outflanking movements and a pincers assault by the two corps had been ruled out, the only method left was the direct, concentrated attack on a relatively narrow front, which was the method of the lightfoot plan. A seaborne landing behind the Axis lines might have been added, but it is doubtful if Montgomery ever seriously considered such an
It would seem, therefore, that little variation was possible on lightfoot. Yet, on 6 October, Montgomery made it known that he had changed the plan. Admittedly it was mainly a change in the principle under which the battle was to be fought, but it was a significant alteration and one that added much to the army's faith in his leadership, especially among the infantry. In detail, the lightfoot opening was to proceed as arranged, with a frontal assault by the four infantry divisions of 30 Corps under massive artillery support, to coincide with diversionary action along the whole of the fortified front and a feint, seaborne attack in the vicinity of Panzer Army.
It was a bold conception and it shows that Montgomery perceived something of the essential differences between German tank tactics and the British. Seldom did German tanks advance against British tanks unless they were closely supported by anti-tank guns and, if possible, other artillery. Upon engagement the leading German tanks fell back, drawing the British tanks, unencumbered by supporting arms, on to an anti-tank gun line. The actions of 23 Armoured Brigade at El Mreir and
Montgomery's plan was in effect an example of the concentrated frontal assault as employed by commanders throughout the ages in face of strong fortifications which could not easily be outflanked, and against which ruse and strategem were limited to the point and time of the attack. For the Axis, it held little element of surprise, except uncertainty of time and place. Although the desert had seen numerous versions of the outflanking manoeuvre since General O'Connor's early victories over the Italians, and was to see several more under Montgomery's leadership, the frontal assault on a narrow sector had not been completely unknown or untried. The claim that the new plan was a reversal of the accepted military thinking of the day See Memoirs, p. 119; Alamein to Sangro, p. 13.
Yet it almost came to grief over a blank spot in tactics which received far less attention in the planning than its importance warranted. This was the lack of practice in a common doctrine among the tanks, artillery and infantry for dealing with anti-tank guns, and particularly with those firing from the protection of minefields. Admittedly there was little time for such practice, even had the lack been generally recognised. Only 9 Armoured Brigade and the battalions of the Valentine-equipped 23 Armoured Brigade had the opportunity to train with the infantry divisions and other arms; the bulk of the armour in
Yet from the first day of the battle the German anti-tank guns rather than the Axis armour were clearly the main adversaries of the British tanks. Handling their guns, from the small 20-millimetre to the dreaded 88, with competence and determination and displaying an ability to disengage and re-form rapidly on a new line, the enemy anti-tank gunners in fact provided the key to the defence so long as the British armour was restricted by minefields.
Because of this and other acknowledged weaknesses in co-operation, the planners, Montgomery included as his writings indicate, were still drawn towards regarding their armour as an entity separate from the rest of the army, and ignoring the absence of such a strict separation in German tactics. The plans thus kept alive the traditional concept of the desert battle, with its distinct phases of armour versus armour followed by infantry versus infantry. The change of principle merely reversed the order, and added a finale of infantry and surviving tanks versus infantry alone. The German anti-tank gun, under whatever arm of the service it was organised, The Eighth Army's anti-tank organisation consisted in the main of six-pounders manned by anti-tank regiments of the artillery and parcelled out in detachments to brigades, battle groups and columns, and the two-pounder platoons of the infantry. The British field regiments had some training, and experience, in anti-tank work, but such a role was not expected of them save in grave emergency. The tenor of British anti-tank policy was defensive. The Panzer Army had a greater variety of weapons, the armoured divisions having their own anti-tank units trained to act closely with the tanks in both defence and attack, and the infantry formations having a similarly integrated organisation. The German field artillery was trained in anti-tank work and supplied with suitable ammunition, while the
The change in principle in lightfoot made little difference to the preparations already in hand. The sector chosen for 30 Corps' initial infantry breakthrough was not altered materially, so that the New Zealand Division's exercises, over ground and defences resembling those of the actual front, were still valid, while the deception scheme, well started before 6 October when Montgomery announced the change, was not greatly affected.
The selection of the breakthrough sector was influenced by the fact that, though the enemy defences were believed to be less developed the further south the line ran, operations based on the main line of communication along the coastal road and railway would simplify many of the problems of supply, assembly and deception. Ever since the troops and reserves promised by Churchill in early August had begun arriving in the
Aware that his offensive could only gain surprise in the exact day and point of the opening attack, Montgomery was determined from the start to use security and deception to the full. Once he had decided that 13 Corps would take only a minor role, he directed that all movement and assembly between the front and the
The first step of the deception plan was to assess the requirements of 30 Corps for the opening day of the offensive, and as quickly as possible to fill the coastal strip to the necessary density of occupation. This would then remain constant, providing aerial observation with no signs of the sudden increase in the movement and concentration of transport or the dumping of stores which would normally precede an offensive. The appearance of the required density was practically reached by the first week of October by means of the extensive use of dummies of all types—vehicles, guns, tanks and dumps. In daylight the normal transport to service the front-line troops proceeded openly, but at night the roads were given over to convoys that brought forward the genuine articles to replace the dummies. In the same way, the movement of bodies of troops was disguised; the New Zealand Division, for example, carried out its exercises inland with no attempt at concealment but, on returning to the coastal area under cover of darkness, it replaced a camp of dummy vehicles while similar vehicles were erected in the inland area it had just vacated, manned by a small detachment who, by lighting fires and driving trucks around, gave a semblance of occupation to the dummy camp. Various refinements of camouflage were developed, such as devices known by the code-name ‘sunshields’, an erection of canvas over a framework, resembling a truck but capable of housing a tank or gun. Boxes of ammunition and other stores were either hidden
Knowledge that the Axis had a technically efficient wireless intercept service was utilised in the design of a network of sets passing bogus routine messages from fixed positions, while the formations concentrating for the offensive maintained wireless silence.
With a constant stream of men moving to and from
However, in spite of the great care and detail of the deception plan and security, there were times when this work appeared in jeopardy. On the morning of 12 October, six men of a 51 (Highland) Division patrol failed to return and fears were felt that, as a group, they might give the enemy information of value. The German records, however, show that nothing more than rumours of an impending offensive were elicited from them under interrogation. Again, on the morning of 22 October, an officer and NCO of the same division went missing, but it would appear that interrogation of these two either did not take place or was delayed until after the opening of the battle. Gale force winds on 16 and 17 October, causing the disintegration of many of the timber and canvas dummy vehicles, brought fears that enemy air reconnaissance might penetrate the deception, but hard work by the camouflage units under extra fighter cover repaired the damage in short order.
The Panzer Army was aware of the existence of dummy vehicles behind the British lines but their intelligence service attributed their use purely to the misdirection of air attack; for some time both sides had been using dummy aircraft and vehicles set around little-used landing grounds to draw attention from the main airfields, and Axis deductions apparently did not go beyond this idea. Certainly the changes from dummy to real went unobserved by Axis air reconnaissance, which day after day reported no changes of importance in either the British positions or the density of occupation. Yet the actual number of dummy vehicles erected, though difficult to assess with close accuracy, must have been in the vicinity of 4000, or possibly even more.
FOR the New Zealand Division as well as for most of the troops in the Eighth Army, the first fortnight of October was set aside on the Army Commander's instructions for detailed and intensive training in the particular tasks which each unit was to undertake in the offensive. Three New Zealand units, 4 Field Regiment, 31 Anti-Tank Battery and 6 Field Company of the engineers, remained under command of 9 Armoured Brigade for exercises in co-operation with the tanks. The Divisional Cavalry, warned that its role would be reconnaissance and exploitation ahead of the armour, practised drills for getting its armoured cars and Stuarts quickly through minefields and for passing back information about enemy defences and strongpoints. Perhaps the busiest men in the Division were the engineers, who were expected to become proficient in the standard army drill for mine-clearance and then practise it on exercises with the brigades or units to which they were attached.
The infantry brigades carried out day and night exercises on the lines of the September manoeuvres, with innovations and alterations that earlier faults suggested. Each brigade in turn advanced behind an imaginary barrage in daylight so that faults of contact and cohesion, not easily observed at night, might be studied and the troops themselves could gain a better picture of what was expected of them. Two of the infantry battalions in co-operation with tanks of 9 Armoured Brigade, 28 Battalion with the
On 14 October the Division began a series of movements which eventually brought the troops to the starting line for the offensive. About the same time the two armoured divisions of
By this time the Egyptian winter had set in, for although October opened fine and warm, as early as the third day the troops in the desert were shivering under grey skies and biting winds that brought showers and hailstorms. In one burst of hail the pellets rattled down almost as large as the undersized ‘eggs-a-cook’ of the Cairene street hawkers, so unpleasant a battering that a performance of the
From the 14th to the 19th, the two infantry brigades remained on the coast by
After dusk on the following evening, the 20th, the guns moved again, this time into the prepared and camouflaged pits from which they were to fire in the battle, each pit having been carefully surveyed in, with its quota of ammunition in hidden dumps nearby. Before daylight the towers withdrew to be hidden again in the dummy area while the gunners settled down to a day of inaction, except for such minor tasks as would not draw enemy observation.
Darkness on the 21st saw the two New Zealand infantry brigades in movement, ferried by 4 and 6 Reserve Mechanical Transport Companies to an area some ten miles behind the front. Here the infantry were dispersed among ready-made slit trenches with strict instructions not to be seen above ground in daylight. Though the day was fine and mild, it seemed exceedingly long before dusk allowed the men to stretch cramped limbs above ground and join the queues at the cooks' trucks for a hot meal. Then trucks of 4 RMT Company appeared, to gather up the men of 5 Brigade and take them to a position immediately to the right rear of 23 Battalion's front-line trenches. As there was some doubt whether the second transport company could get 6 Brigade up and its trucks back along the difficult and congested tracks near the front before daylight, the three battalions of this brigade were told they had to march. Setting off ahead of the 5 Brigade units so that the latter in their trucks overtook them, the men of 6 Brigade, stoically enduring uncomplimentary remarks and clouds of choking dust as each truck passed them, trudged the ten winding miles through wire and minefields in some five hours. Shortly before dawn began to lighten the eastern sky they thankfully dropped their loads of weapons, extra ammunition, grenades, picks, shovels, and other impedimenta into ready-dug trenches on the left of 5 Brigade. The same night the brigade and
Although the New Zealand Division was the only complete infantry formation to move from the rear to the front, all the other divisions already in the line had to bring up their reserves of men and extra artillery, whose movements and arrival were camouflaged in the same manner. The complicated movements of men, vehicles and guns took place on a series of roughly parallel tracks starting some eight to ten miles behind the front line. Certain parts of these tracks had been in use for normal supply purposes for some weeks but the remainder, particularly the stretches immediately behind the front, had been camouflaged from observation by allowing wire, minefields and other defences to appear to cut across them. At night all such obstacles were removed and traffic kept flowing by control posts manned by provosts and linked by telephones, so that any accidents or breakdowns likely to disclose in daylight the use of the tracks could be quickly cleared away.
The Australians, using mainly the coastal road for normal supply, had developed a system of short tracks to the sector of their front on which the attack would start. These went under the names, from north to south, of Diamond, Boomerang, Two Bar Also known as ‘Double Bar’.
This carefully prepared traffic plan, upon which the speed and secrecy of the final assembly depended, was in general extremely successful. Although the western ends of all the tracks were well within enemy artillery range and the whole system as well as the concentration and assembly areas of the troops and transport was in easy bombing range, the enemy was unaware of the vast movements taking place in the three or four nights preceding the offensive. Lone night bombers continued to fly over, dropping random bombs but seldom causing any damage, while both by day and by night the enemy's artillery loosed occasional salvoes which only rarely found a worthwhile target. Yet several units, in accounts published later, reported difficulty in preventing unauthorised transport movement and in keeping their men from appearing above ground in areas over which the enemy should have had good ground observation.
The amount of detailed planning and execution that went into the preparations for the offensive cannot be adequately told in brief. Every branch of the services took its share, from the men in the base installations who worked long hours in assembling, repairing and testing equipment to the provosts who policed the traffic lanes from base to the front line. Signals troops laid many miles of cable, much of it underground to avoid damage from traffic, and set up exchanges, duplicating and in some cases re-duplicating their lines so that vital information and orders could be passed without delay. The men of the Army Service Corps, British and Commonwealth, worked together in a comprehensive plan of delivering and dumping the many tons of stores, from rations to ammunition, needed to carry the army through the opening phases of the battle. Behind a flapping hessian screen in the coastal sandhills a team of engineers and mechanics, South Africans predominant, worked in secret to construct a fleet of twenty-four ‘Scorpions’ or flail tanks for beating a way through minefields. Artillerymen worked on tasks varying from the digging of gunpits close behind the front line and the dumping of vast quantities of ammunition, to the intricate calculations of fire tasks for each gun.
Perhaps the most diverse jobs fell to the engineers. A special Eighth Army school of mine-clearance was set up in an empty portion of the desert, run from 18 September onwards by a New Zealander, Major
One large headache for the planning staffs lay in preventing traffic congestion on the tracks leading to the front. The Eighth Army at this time was probably the most mechanically minded army that the British had ever fielded and, with its short lines of communication, was more than adequately provided with vehicles of all types. Unlike the Panzer Army, whose trouble was in bringing its
The medical organisations of the British and Commonwealth forces, though retaining their individual entities, were also integrated in a master plan so that wounded would be evacuated and treated with a minimum of delay. For this, the lines of evacuation of each division were carefully planned from advanced dressing stations to field and base hospitals, with check posts linked by radio or telephone so that the wounded could be distributed according to the degree of injury and a heavy influx at any one point might be spread over several of the medical channels. Cab ranks of ambulance cars were set up well forward so that an empty car could be despatched at once to take the place of every loaded car coming back through the check posts. In this work the drivers of the
The divisions holding the line had their medical channels in going order for some time, though in the few days before the battle the facilities were increased and improved while the majority of patients then in hospital, both wounded and sick, were moved rapidly out of the desert to the base hospitals in
Montgomery's desert offensive commenced in the air some days before the ground battle was joined. Since the end of the Panzer Army's front. A particularly intense effort was made by day and night on 9 October when it was learnt that heavy rain had made several of the enemy's forward fighter landing grounds unserviceable. For the loss or damage of some nineteen aircraft, the Luftwaffe was never a serious threat to the Eighth Army's operations.
On the night of the 18th, the air offensive in direct support of the land operations was officially commenced with the light bombers and fighters joining in, the main weight of assault being concentrated on the area between the
Although the Axis commanders noted the increase in air activity, the suspicions of most of them were lulled as each day passed with no corresponding land action, while the Luftwaffe was so fully occupied with defence and repairing the damage to its landing grounds and aircraft that it had little time or opportunity for offensive action or even for reconnaissance. In fact, according to reports made by the front-line units, during daylight on 23 October not one enemy aircraft was seen over the Eighth Army's lines.
BY the morning of the 23rd, all the major preparations for the battle were going according to the plans. The infantry to start the advance were lying doggo in trenches near the front, the guns were in their camouflaged pits, the tanks and transport vehicles waiting in their various echelons in the assembly areas in the order in which they would be called forward. Normal and unhurried wireless messages were being passed by the few stations that the deception plan permitted to stay on the air, though telephone lines hummed with last-minute queries and instructions. Medical teams, mechanics, engineers, signalmen and drivers checked their equipment to ensure that, when dusk fell, they could start their varied tasks without hitch or failure. And in every unit cooks were making preparations to issue, in dixies of tea and stew, what was likely to be a last hot meal, at least for some time and to some men.
In spite of the care with which the deception scheme had been planned and the stringent orders given to the troops to keep in cover with no unnecessary movement, the area over which the enemy had observation must undoubtedly have offered some signs of unusual activity. Yet no hint is carried in the enemy records that any suspicious movement was noted, and this is confirmed by the enemy's inaction. The Eighth Army's gunners were under orders to restrict their fire, retaliating only if Axis shellfire was above normal and obviously directed at some observed section of the preparations, restrictions intended both to lull suspicion as well as to keep the Axis gunners from moving to alternative positions which might not be within the area of counter-battery fire planned for the night's operations. The Axis gunners appear to have taken their cue from their opponents, for by all accounts their harassing fire was even less than customary and certainly caused little damage.
Along this almost somnolent front, the troops of the Eighth Army were disposed as described below. Against the coast and
The Australian division's task was to drive due westwards from
The Australian operation was to be supported by the whole of the divisional artillery, six attached troops from
To allow the infantry to keep up with the timed concentrations, three pauses were allowed, one for ten minutes at approximately halfway to the first objective (called the Red line), another for an hour on that objective, and one for thirty-five minutes halfway between there and the final objective.
Hard on 9 Australian Division's left, 51 (Highland) Division was to advance at the same rate to a final objective that ran in a south-easterly direction for some 5000 yards from the end of the Australian objective. The Highland Division's front had been narrowed to about 3000 yards by the relief of its left-hand sector by 23 New Zealand Battalion, and the distance from this line to the objective was between 6000 and 7000 yards. The divisional commander, Major-General Wimberley, chose to follow the Australian method of timed concentrations rather than a barrage, although he possessed as many guns as the Australian artillery and had no need to disperse his gunfire to a flank. The method he proposed looked relatively simple on paper but had within it the germs of confusion. The division's sector of assault was marked off into three intermediate objectives and a final objective, called the Green, Red, Black and Blue lines respectively, roughly equidistant one from the other. All the known enemy positions were given code-names in good Scots and the intermediate objective lines were bent around these positions so that no one line was parallel to another or to the start line or final objective, a system unlikely to make for co-ordination in the advance.
On the right, 153 Brigade was given about a third of the total frontage from which it was to advance with all its three battalions. The method of advance was for 5 Battalion The Black Watch on the right, and 5/7 Battalion The In order to save constant repetition of the rather cumbersome full titles, units will customarily be referred to, after first mention in full, by the shortened forms in use by Eighth Army: e.g., 5/7 Battalion, The
The left-hand two-thirds of the Highland Division's sector was to be occupied by 154 Brigade on a plan that, even on paper, appears to be somewhat elaborate, with six groups of men operating in four lanes of varying widths. On the extreme right, 1 Black Watch was to advance to the Black line (third objective) and in the right-centre lane 7/10
The procedure for the left-hand side of the brigade sector, believed to be thinly held by the enemy as far as the Black line, involved an advance by two companies of 5 Battalion, The Cameron Highlanders (attached from 152 Brigade), to occupy the Green and Red lines. Then 7 Black Watch, moving up on the left of the sector, was to assault through the Black line to the final objective. However, the attack on a strongpoint, ‘Nairn’, just ahead of the final objective, was the special task of a composite force which was to advance on the right of 7 Black Watch. This force comprised a squadron of 51 Reconnaissance Regiment mounted in carriers and trucks, together with
Artillery support for both of the Highland brigades was to be by concentrations, of predicted fire without previous registration, on the enemy strongpoints as shown on a map prepared by 30 Corps and Eighth Army intelligence staffs, the fire on each position being timed to lift just ahead of the arrival of the assaulting infantry, who were to advance at the rate of 100 yards every three minutes after making contact with the forward defended positions. Pauses of 15, 60 and 15 minutes were to be made on the Green, Red and Black lines respectively, each pause marked (‘pricked out’ was the phrase used in orders) by a short barrage fired on the line at the calculated time of the infantry's arrival and repeated at the time of departure. Tracer shell from Bofors guns in short bursts was also to mark the estimated times of arrival, and a burst of three similar tracer shells fired every ten minutes was to mark the divisional boundaries and the inter-brigade boundary.
The Highland Division had its own three Royal Engineer companies as well as a troop of sappers of
A great deal of work and care was put into 51 Division's initial preparations. As early as the evening of the 20th, the start line was surveyed and inconspicuously marked. After dark on the 22nd, eleven gaps in the British minefields were cut and camouflaged, and on the following evening the start line, the gaps, and all the routes leading back to the lying-up positions of the assaulting troops were marked by lamps facing eastwards and by white tape, some nine miles of this tape being used altogether. This work was accomplished by engineers and infantry parties of the reserve brigade without detection by the enemy, who had good observation over most of the ground, though some alarm was felt when, on the morning of the 22nd, it was found that an officer and NCO, out on a night patrol to cover the preparatory work, had not returned. See p. 218.
Immediately to the south of the Highlanders, the New Zealand Division was given the task of assaulting and occupying a sector closely similar in shape and size. From a start line of some
Of the battle to gain the ridge, GOC
The Australian commander, Morshead, with three strong and experienced brigades, was probably wise in choosing the more modern method of support by timed concentrations, both for the reasons already given and through confidence in the co-operation between his infantry and artillery. Wimberley, commanding the Highlanders, had a difficult decision for, though his division was well up to strength, it was inexperienced and had a wider sector to cover than the Australians. Probably because his men had been
Though unable to sell his ideas to the other commanders,
The sector was divided evenly, the right-hand half allocated to 5 Brigade and the left-hand to 6 Brigade, with start lines and objectives of equal lengths. Owing to the angle at which the final objective ran in relation to the start line, 5 Brigade had a slightly longer distance to go. From the start lines, marked with white tape by the sappers just ahead of the forward posts held by 23 Battalion, one battalion of each brigade was to advance at 9.35 p.m., covering 100 yards every two minutes. With the opening line of the creeping barrage
At this point, the barrage trace supplied to the infantry held a small discrepancy which passed unnoticed at the time. The trace made it appear that fire would jump 200 yards beyond the first objective and continue there, on what was in effect the opening line of the second phase of the barrage, for an hour and 50 minutes, giving covering fire for consolidation by the men of the two leading battalions. Some of the officers in fact expected to use the line of this fire to indicate the forward edge of the objective and thus simplify the laying-out of the defences. The actual artillery programme, however, was for the barrage to cease for this period while concentrations were laid on known enemy positions between the
The four battalions following up were to deploy along a start line on the first objective ready for the barrage, which was to recommence at 12.50 a.m. with a five-minute stand on the opening line followed by lifts and concentrations similar to those before. There was to be a pause of fifteen minutes, indicated by smoke, in the progress of the barrage as the shellfire reached the final objective on the extreme left, though in this case the fire was to continue throughout the pause. At 2.22 a.m., that is 4 hours 22 minutes after the opening of the artillery programme, the barrage was to cease as the fire reached the junction of the Division's centre line and the objective, after which some heavy concentrations were to be fired on the untouched triangle of ground between the centre line and the extreme right flank. On the conclusion of the fire in support of the infantry advance, all guns were to be ready to lay down defensive fire on call to cover consolidation on the final objective.
Although the other divisions in the assault were expected to carry out the customary exploitation for a short distance beyond their objectives in order to clear the ground ahead of their new lines, both the New Zealand and South African divisions were given a larger exploitation role. According to 30 Corps' orders, the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, following the night assault, was to reconnoitre at dawn to the south-west on the north side of the Panzer Army in two. The
Careful study of the Division's campaigns has shown that GOC
The reason why the sectors to be overrun by the Highland and New Zealand divisions widened from start lines to objectives in the shape of truncated wedges becomes clear when the final sector of
Panzer Army's line. The gradual spreading of the two other sectors thus allowed the South Africans to attack the bulge from the north-east, their right flank against the New Zealand sector and their left practically along the line of the enemy's forward positions. In this way, unlike the long exposed flank of the Australians on the north, the South Africans' left flank would be covered by the existing British line and needed no more than strengthening at the junction with 4 Indian Division's sector further south. In simple terms, the South Africans' task was to iron out the point of the bulge in the enemy's line.
The South African division was an experienced and well-trained formation whose artillery held a reputation for versatility and ability to co-operate closely with the infantry. The division had been holding its sector of the front for many weeks and had the opportunity to observe and range the enemy defences facing it in some detail. All this, added to the circumstances of the advance in that the division's left flank would be moving along the line of the enemy's front rather than through it, appears to have influenced the commander, Major-General Pienaar, to choose timed concentrations for his artillery support. The South Africans had their own three regiments of field guns, plus three troops from
The position of the South African sector allowed a
A third force, called the Divisional Reserve Group and consisting principally of the fifty-one Valentines of GOC
There was one further division under the command of 30 Corps, 4 Indian Division which, since the
ALTHOUGH there is no doubt that hopes were held of a measure of success in the efforts of 13 Corps, the composition of the forces within the corps, their varying degrees of training, the terrain and the quality of the defence through which any advance would have to be made, all militated against anything more than a successful diversionary operation. The corps had three divisions under its command, 7 Armoured, 50 and 44 Infantry Divisions. The armour comprised 22 Armoured Brigade and 4 Light Armoured Brigade, together mustering 71 Grants, 57 Crusaders and 86 Stuarts, and there were 190 armoured cars in the corps' command. Though both these armoured brigades had had long desert experience, this had all been on the old independent model, with little training in co-operation with infantry. Of the two infantry formations, 50 Division had suffered so heavily in earlier fighting that it had been threatened with disbandment but had lately managed to build up two of its original brigades, 69 and 151, though not to full strength, with reinforcements. For a third brigade it had 1 Greek Independent Brigade under command, an enthusiastic but neither a well trained nor well equipped body of men. The Home Counties formation, 44 Division, had lost 133 Brigade to
Though its formations were thus not yet ready for complex or sustained operations, 13 Corps was set quite an ambitious task
21 Panzer and Ariete divisions had at least 70 heavy tanks to match the 71 Grants of 7 Armoured Division, and well over 200 lighter German and Italian tanks and captured Stuarts. Unlike 30 Corps, 13 Corps had superiority only in men and that only at the point of assault, for on the corps' front, stretching for nearly 20 miles, the Panzer Army deployed three Italian divisions and the German
The plan agreed on between Montgomery and Horrocks was for 13 Corps to advance on a line to the south of 21 Panzer Division, was in fact all that 13 Corps could expect to achieve.
The northern sector of 13 Corps' front, immediately on the left of 4 Indian Division, was held by 50 Division, with 1 Greek Independent Brigade in the south-west of the old New Zealand
The corps plan in detail was for raids or simulated attacks as diversions by all three brigades of 50 Division, while the main attempt to breach the minefields was made to the south of the
Once through the mine-belts, the armour was to form a screen, 4 Light Armoured to the north and 22 Brigade to the south, to allow the infantry to consolidate the bridgehead. Later the two
Owing to several factors, principally the broken nature of the ground and the wide dispersion of the positions on both sides, 13 Corps had not been able to secure the same detailed picture of the enemy's dispositions as was acquired in the northern area. Accordingly, as early as 17 October, a provocative shoot, by three medium batteries firing nearly 4000 rounds altogether, was commenced to encourage the enemy to disclose his gun positions by retaliation, while the field guns laid smoke and the infantry ‘demonstrated’ to suggest an assault in order to get the Axis forward posts to open fire. In spite of a chain of flash-spotting, sound-ranging, and observation posts, not a great deal was recorded for it would appear that the Axis troops, remembering Stumme's strictures on the wastage of precious ammunition, refused to be drawn. So it was that 13 Corps to some extent assaulted blind, in places against objectives not held by the enemy and at others against unexpected opposition.
FOR his armoured corps to follow the infantry break-in of 30 Corps in the north, Montgomery had hoped to have three full armoured formations, 1, 8 and 10 Armoured Divisions. But shortages of equipment and trained men could not be made up in the time available so that, just prior to the opening of the operation, 8 Armoured Division had to be ‘cannibalised’ to build up the others. Thus 1 Armoured Division was composed of 2 Armoured Brigade, 7 Motor Brigade, and a composite force, mainly artillery, from 8 Division, and
The plan of operations gave
In discussion and study of the problem of traffic movement in the area of penetration,
For the advance of 1 Armoured Division it was planned to extend Sun, Moon and Star tracks on a compass bearing slightly south of due west, the extension of Sun track running almost on the boundary between the Australian and Highland divisions' sectors. On each route the way was to be led by a reconnaissance party of the task force in touch with the infantry ahead, followed by a detachment formed into three groups, the first to deal with the first enemy minefield, the second the next and so on. Behind the gapping parties, one of the three regiments of 2 Armoured Brigade was to lead each of the three main columns, the Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) on Sun track, 9 Queen's Royal Lancers on Moon, and 10 Royal Hussars on Star, each with its supporting tail of lorried infantry, engineers, artillery, and replenishment vehicles. The commander, with his Tactical and Main Headquarters of 2 Armoured Brigade, was to travel with the Lancers on the centre track, Moon. Following the tank columns, the armoured cars of
On the tail of the armoured brigade, 7 Motor Brigade was to have a battalion on each of the outer tracks, 7 Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, on Sun, and 2 KRRC 2 Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps.
In each of the columns on the two outside tracks there were well over 200 vehicles, and on the centre route, Moon, considerably more. The armoured fighting vehicles of 1 Armoured Division consisted of 92 Sherman tanks, one Grant, and 76 Crusaders, a total of 169, with 118 armoured cars. Humbers, Daimlers and Marmon-Herringtons.
The other armoured formation of
Behind the task forces,
To avoid the slightest chance of observation by the enemy, the vast mass of tracked and wheeled vehicles of
In the orders given to the armour, it was appreciated that the infantry might not succeed in reaching its objective and that news of success or failure might be too scanty and incomplete for some hours to indicate whether the Axis defences had been sufficiently breached for the tanks to pass through and deploy. The armour was therefore warned that its columns might have to fight their own way forward at any point. To allow for any disorganisation caused by opposition or delay in getting through the minefields, the various armoured groups were instructed not to make their way direct to the final
In detail, 1 Armoured Division was to deploy 2 Armoured Brigade on the first bound to cover the western end of the Australians' area of penetration and then, as it advanced westwards to the next bound, was to bring up 7 Motor Brigade to extend the Australian northern flank to link the infantry's gains with the armour's objective. Meanwhile 15 Panzer Division which, according to Allied intelligence, was stationed to the west of 2 Armoured Brigade, a move with which both 2 and 8 Brigades could deal. Should the southern armoured reserve under
It should be noted that Montgomery retained no true armoured reserve. All the fully equipped armoured brigades, 2, 8 and 24 in
THE strength of the opposing armies on the day before the battle is difficult to compare owing to the differing methods of organisation, and thus of computing strengths, used in the available British and German records. The Allied figures are known in considerable detail, down to the number of tanks under repair in forward and rear workshops, and they cover the totals of men in all units and formations under the direct command of the Eighth Army without distinction between riflemen, gunners, cooks and clerks. The surviving German records, on the other hand, offer only the number of tanks fit for action in the panzer divisions and formation strengths in terms of men ready to take part in the battle under the Panzer Army's command as carrying or manning weapons. The Italian figures examined are incomplete, their detail difficult to reconcile with any totals given. The following comparisons are offered, however, to give some idea of the relative strengths of the two armies.
Against the Eighth Army's total on 23 October of 220,476 men under command (including 10,570 officers), the Panzer Army in the line could probably muster about 110,000, of whom slightly more than half were Italians.
The Panzer Army war diary carries entries to indicate that in the week before 23 October there were 237,000 Axis troops on the ration strength in North Africa. Of these, 91,000 were German Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, and 146,000 were Italians, divided into 84,000 in the rear and 62,000 in the forward areas. An equivalent ration state of British troops in the
For artillery the Eighth Army had approximately 900 medium and field guns, the majority 25-pounders, as well as 800 six-pounder and 550 two-pounder anti-tank guns, 48 3·7-inch and 700 Bofors anti-aircraft guns. With some 52 other weapons of assorted calibres, the British could man a grand total of 3050 guns. In the assault on the Chemin des Dames in 1918. The Last Act.
The figures for the Panzer Army fighting strength may be on the conservative side but there is no doubt that the Eighth Army had generally a two-to-one superiority. The course of military history shows that such a ratio is not sufficient on its own to ensure victory to the attackers.
The Panzer Army's dispositions were fairly well known in general to the Eighth Army through normal intelligence sources, but the Axis method of stiffening the Italians with German units made an exact delineation of divisional sectors impossible. It was known that, facing 30 Corps from the coast to the South African front, there were the infantry battalions of 382 and 433 Regiments of 164 Division in the tactically important positions in the mine gardens, with Italians of 61 and 62 Regiments of Trento Division and some Bersaglieri units sandwiched in between. Behind them there was the armoured reserve consisting of 15 Panzer Division and
THROUGH Montgomery's firm stand, backed by Alexander, against various pressures to hasten the offensive, the Eighth Army's preparations were sufficiently complete in all major points on the day of 23 October for the orders for final assembly and forward movement to be issued with confidence. Most of the requirements for the type and length of battle foreseen were in the front line or ready to be brought forward, whilst the troops, including those for special tasks, were trained as well as time and opportunity had allowed, and their commanders had been briefed more fully than ever before.
Some details in the planning admittedly still gave cause for concern, as for example the reliability of the newly invented Scorpion flail tanks and the training of their crews, but where possible such weak points had been insured against: the use of the Scorpions was made subsidiary to the normal engineer methods of clearing minefields. Communications probably presented the biggest weakness, for the wireless sets then in use were notoriously unreliable, and the plans included the laying of telephone cable by special signal detachments, the use of signal rockets, and even carrier pigeons. But there was nothing that really warranted a delay for the month that would have coincided with the next full moon. A delay in fact would surely have staled the enthusiasm that had gradually built up within the ranks of the army.
In daylight of the 23rd, the army's cover plan provided that much of the normal supply traffic should be dispensed with in place of some of the preliminary movement of the assault forces, the altered pattern screened from observation by continuous fighter patrols provided by the This estimate is based on the following details. Approximately two brigade groups out of three in each of the Australian, Highland, and South African divisions had to move up to the front, as well as the whole of the New Zealand and the two armoured divisions, together with a large body of ancillary troops. The New Zealand Division (including 9 Armoured Brigade) had some 2800 vehicles, including its tanks, and nearly 16,000 men, most of whom, including medical and other rear services, moved after dark this night. The proportion of men to vehicles in the New Zealand Division was thus nearly 6:1; the ratio throughout 30 Corps could not have been much different.
That the organisation was substantially sound was soon proved. Apart from some minor upsets when last-minute changes were imposed in the schedules of movement and routes, the various columns on each route formed up in the right order and generally kept closely to their timings in spite of the fact that the fine dust churned up by the vehicles sometimes made the darkness of the night almost impenetrable. Eventually all those units whose task was to advance without further orders crossed their start lines successfully, though other units farther to the rear, who had to wait upon reports of the degree of success gained, spent a trying night in long halts and short bursts of movement as news from the front filtered back.
Right up at the front the movement, mainly by men on foot, was brisk and up to time, first by the engineers and their covering parties who opened the prepared gaps in the last British minefield, and then by the assaulting infantry who filed through the gaps to fan out on the taped start lines. Visibility here was at first very good, with the full moon rising and few clouds in the sky, and the night was mild with a slight breeze. The silence in no-man's land was broken only by the occasional bark of one of the British batteries detailed to make a show of firing the normal night's harassing tasks and by the rarer salvo in reply from the enemy. The noise of the vast mass of Eighth Army's vehicles grinding their way along the tracks behind the front seemed to get lost in the desert's flat vastness.
Contrary to popular report, the guns at
It was not until 10 p.m., when the assaulting infantry of 30 Corps were within a few hundred yards of the foremost enemy posts and the raiding parties and the main assault groups of 13 Corps were crossing their start lines, that searchlights pointing skywards behind Eighth Army's lines swung to intersect each other and give the signal for all the 900 field and medium guns to join in concert in direct support to the advance by concentrations and barrages. At the same time the first flights by the
The initial response of the Axis was slow and weak under the sudden impact of the heavy shelling and bombing. The German records show that, though casualties were not very heavy and many weapons survived the ‘murders’, communications with the front-line positions were badly disrupted, so that for some hours the Axis command was unable to ascertain exactly where and how deeply the defences had been overrun.
‘…in face of the overwhelming evidence of history no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position.’—B. H. Liddell Hart,
The Decisive Wars of History.
THE first move in the
Land operations commenced at 9 p.m. when 125 Infantry Regiment, were so sure that they had repulsed a major assault that their morale remained high in later engagements. To add to the confusion, four Hudson aircraft dropped a number of self-destroying dummy parachutists and flares to illuminate them in the vicinity of
These diversionary actions on the coast were intended not only to confuse the enemy as to the actual point of the main assault and hinder the deployment of reserves in the northern sector, but also to cause the Axis command to turn its thoughts to the south once it realised the diversions for what they were, for one of Montgomery's aims was to keep the Africa Corps from concentrating against 30 Corps.
The main Australian operation commenced at 10 p.m., when the guns switched from counter-battery fire to the supporting concentrations for the infantry's advance. On the right of the divisional sector 2/24 Australian Infantry Battalion, charging each enemy post immediately the shellfire lifted to the next, disposed of all opposition as far as the first objective, where a new start line was quickly laid out to allow the following unit, 2/48 Battalion, to form up and set off at the appointed time, 12.55 a.m. This battalion also advanced with great dash and, though meeting some fierce and determined opposition, passed through it all to reach the final objective about 2.45 a.m. The complete success of this advance by the two battalions of 26 Brigade along the right flank of the area of penetration, besides doing much to ensure the success of the whole corps operation, allowed the division's
In its wider sector on the left, 20 Australian Infantry Brigade advanced with two battalions forward, 2/17 on the right and 2/15 on the left. Near the first objective heavy fire caught 2/17 Battalion and brought some eighty casualties, but by midnight both battalions were firm on the objective, to allow 2/13 Battalion to form up ready for the final part of the advance. This battalion was to be assisted by the forty-two Valentines of
Thus at dawn 9 Australian Division had one battalion in good strength on the objective and another weakened battalion slightly to the left rear. Three battalions were on the first objective in good order, ready to operate to north or west and, as Axis retaliation was relatively slight in the first few hours of daylight, the remaining Valentines and support weapons were able to consolidate the sector in strength. Communications were maintained throughout the action by both brigades though sometimes with difficulty. Casualties for this first night of the offensive are not known in any detail but were reported as not unduly heavy, while prisoners taken amounted to 137 Germans and 264 Italians.
Much of the story of 51 (Highland) Division, in the sector immediately to the south of the Australians, has been lost in the fog of war. The initial stages, however, in which it had been possible to prepare and train the men in their exact tasks, went almost as smoothly as a parade-ground drill. Ten gaps were opened in the outer British minefield, each 24 feet wide or more, so that each assault group of the division had a route of its own, whether it was to move in the first wave or later. The start lines were quickly and correctly laid for the troops of the first wave, who formed up in good order and, with pipers leading some of the units, set off at 9.50 p.m., some fifteen minutes later than the
In 153 Brigade's portion of the divisional sector, the northern side, 5 Black Watch on the right successfully used its A and B Companies to subdue two enemy strongpoints and then passed C and D Companies through to the Green line by midnight without much trouble. Then A Company carried the advance to the Red line to cover the forming up of 1 Gordons, detailed to take the final lines, Black and Blue. This battalion, advancing with two companies forward and two to the rear, ran into heavy fire thought to come from the enemy, though it now seems likely that some of it was from supporting artillery concentrations falling short. The battalion then fell back until the shelling eased, when the two leading companies, A and C, again set off, only to find themselves without benefit of artillery support. On coming under fire from two strongpoints, the men gallantly attacked with the bayonet but were beaten back in some confusion. Rallied by officers and NCOs to try an outflanking assault, the survivors swung wide of the nearer strongpoint and broke into the further one, close to the Black line. At dawn three junior officers and sixty men were holding on in a part of this position with the enemy still determinedly defending the remainder. Here they remained, under constant fire and completely out of communication, until well after daylight.
The rest of the battalion, B Company and a platoon of D, had remained close to the Red line to await the arrival of the fifteen Valentines of A Squadron,
On the left of 153 Brigade's sector, 5/7 Gordons successfully overcame a number of small posts to reach the Red line shortly after midnight. Here A and B Companies dug in while C and D set off for the Black line. In attempting an outflanking move against a strongpoint, D Company was caught in a thickly sown minefield under fire and disintegrated. On reporting that it was out of touch with other troops and unable to advance on its own, C Company was told by the battalion commander to dig in where it was, some way short of Black. Thus by dawn the farthest 153 Brigade had penetrated was about
In the Highland Division's left sector, 154 Brigade had a much wider front to cover, for which it had been reinforced with
In 154 Brigade's right-centre lane, 7/10
Meeting little direct opposition but suffering a steady drain of casualties from anti-personnel mines, booby traps and mortar fire, the Argyll and Sutherlanders passed Green and reached Red in good time. Here the battalion came under some heavy shellfire in which a whole platoon was wiped out by one concentration. However, when the second phase of the artillery support opened at 12.55 a.m., the battalion was sufficiently reorganised to resume the advance. A successful assault on a strongpoint brought the men to a position just short of the Black line where the survivors, about 100 men altogether, dug in to await the Valentines. As wireless contact had failed, an officer went back to give information about the strongpoint on the final objective and arrange for artillery fire in readiness for a combined assault on the arrival of the tanks. The tanks, however, had met considerable trouble with navigation and mines and did not appear until about 5 a.m., some way to the left (south) and cut off by a minefield. In the rapidly increasing light the enemy in the positions ahead were able to bring aimed fire on the sappers who tried to cut a gap to let the tanks join the infantry, and when anti-tank guns joined in, the Valentine force withdrew to cover some way to the rear.
The left-centre lane of 154 Brigade was cut for a special support force consisting of the headquarters of
The rest of the support force worked its way through several belts of mines, meeting little direct opposition but occasionally coming under fire, and by 3 a.m. the commander decided that he had reached the Black line. Here the Valentines of B Squadron, carrying assault troops of 51 Reconnaissance Regiment and with a troop of the regiment's carriers on each flank, set off to assault what was thought to be a large defensive position just ahead of the final objective. Little or no opposition came from the objective, which was either unoccupied or hastily evacuated by the enemy, but heavy fire broke out from the flanks. With three tanks and six carriers lost by fire or mines, the commanding officer ordered the Valentines to lay smoke, under which the force retired to the Black line and took up hull-down positions as day was breaking.
For the final lane on its far left, 154 Brigade had borrowed two companies of 5 Camerons (of 152 Brigade) for the task of occupying the Red line, from which its own 7 Black Watch was to carry the assault to the final objective. Setting off level and in time with the New Zealand troops on their left, 5 Camerons appear to have conformed with New Zealand timings.
In following up the Camerons closely, 7 Black Watch also came under fire from the flanks but formed up on Red in good time for the second phase of the artillery support. Beyond Red, enemy resistance increased and, with the thick minefields encountered, caused a steady loss of men, including all six officers detailed to navigate the battalion along its axis. At the pause in the vicinity of the Black line to reorganise for the final phase of the artillery fire, the toll of casualties became apparent. The battalion commander therefore hastily re-formed his men into two groups, A and C Companies to dig in and hold Black, while B and D went for the final objective. This was gained by 4 a.m. by the survivors, who by then numbered less than two platoons, led by only three officers, all of whom were wounded. Contact was made with 21 New Zealand Battalion on the left but communication immediately to the rear was cut by an unsubdued enemy post until shortly after first light, when a patrol from the group on the Black line, trying to make contact with the forward troops, rushed the post and overcame it, taking ten prisoners. Even then communications were far from easy, as the remnants of B and D Companies were on a forward slope, heavily mined and exposed to enemy fire. However, the position held by 7 Black Watch was the only portion of
Contact across the division's front and from front to rear was too patchy for a clear picture of the operation to be seen, as the infantry wireless links either worked only spasmodically or failed completely, while the Valentine tanks, though keeping radio contact, could do little more than report the situation in their own immediate areas. Few units knew their correct positions on the map so that the more sanguine reported they were further west than they had in fact progressed. Several bypassed enemy posts were still lively as the sun rose and were able to fire on movement west of the Red line, deterring the support weapons and vehicles, as well as the mine-clearing parties, from advancing beyond this line. The area to the rear thus became heavily congested, especially on the northern side of the division's sector, where the mass of vehicles of 1 Armoured Division banked up in columns and spread out in dispersal in any mine-clear patches available, adding to the Highland Division's difficulties of communication and movement and causing conflicting reports of progress to be circulated.
It later became apparent that the Highland Division was not within 1000 yards of the final objective except on the extreme left. In 153 Brigade's sector on the right, where congestion was the worst, an immediate enemy counter-attack would certainly have caused a great deal of confusion though it could have been held by the armoured division's tanks; but on the rest of the front the infantry were extremely thin on the ground, in places not well organised, and generally so out of touch with their support weapons that defence against counter-attack would have had to rely solely on the previously planned fire tasks of the field guns.
To complete the story of the right-flank operations, the events occurring to 1 Armoured Division need to be told. This formation was to cut its own three lanes, each separated from the next by about 500 yards, from the ends of Sun, Moon and Star tracks to the infantry's final objective. Then, breaking out beyond the infantry, the armour was to deploy across the front, ready to step forward in ordered bounds to its own objective some five miles further to the west. The tanks had received strict injunctions that they were to press forward relentlessly, but with full reconnaissance and on properly co-ordinated plans, against any opposition and were in no case to rush blindly against anti-tank gun screens.
Well on time the three regimental columns of 2 Armoured Brigade had formed up, fully equipped for the battle expected
On the extension of Sun track behind the Australian advance, the sappers of the minefield task force had cleared numerous scattered mines and gaps in three main belts as far as the leading infantry battalion, which however was still some way short of the final objective. The armoured column following, led by the Bays, The Queen's Bays, 2nd Dragoon Guards.
On the extension of Moon track which ran through 153 Highland Brigade's sector, the sappers had to call on their supporting troop of Crusader tanks to subdue opposition at the first enemy minefield and again at the next major mine-belt. Although a squadron of armoured cars came up to assist the task force, this second field was not gapped at daybreak. The column on this route, 9 Queen's Royal Lancers.
The last column of 1 Armoured Division, 10 Royal Hussars.
At dawn on the 24th, therefore, 1 Armoured Division's three columns had not got beyond the infantry's intermediate objective, the Red line. This failure was partly attributed to the unsubdued points of enemy resistance left in 153 Brigade's line of advance, but it was basically due to the lack of co-operation between tanks and infantry still endemic in the British Army, for the strongpoints encountered were mostly small, isolated, and vulnerable to immediate combined assaults, as was later shown. The northern column of the Bays, though handily placed to do so, does not appear to have co-operated in the resumption of the assault by 2/13 Australian Battalion and
With its three columns no further than the Red line, the rest of 1 Armoured Division had perforce to halt and disperse as best it could, all units remaining to the east of the old front line except for some of the field guns which managed to deploy further west. Casualties in the division, both in men and vehicles, were very light and, in spite of the lack of initial success, the tanks were reasonably well organised and handily placed to deal with a counter-attack on a weak part of the front and to resume the assault later on. But the surprise effect hoped for by the Army Commander had been lost and the Panzer Army was already reorganising new anti-tank defences against the massive armoured breakthrough Montgomery had anticipated.
On the southern part of 30 Corps' front,
The order of advance gave 5 NZ Brigade the right-hand or northern sector, for which 7 NZ Field Company the previous night had opened two gaps about 300 yards apart in the British wire and minefield about halfway between the ends of Star and Bottle tracks. After dusk on the 23rd these gaps were lined with tape and lights facing to the rear. Then the men of 23 Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Romans, left their front-line trenches to file through the gaps and line up on a start line which had already been taped and lit. C Company took the right of the line, B Company the centre and A Company the left, with D Company and Battalion Headquarters behind B Company. 23 Battalion's company commanders were Captain P. L. Lynch (A), Captain G. M. Robertson (B), Captain W. Hoseit (C), Major D. B. Cameron (D).
The rest of 23 Battalion meanwhile had dealt with several minor posts and arrived on or close to the objective in good order. Contact with 5 Brigade headquarters could not be established as
See p. 235.
Setting out through two gaps cut on the evening of the 21st by 7 Field Company at the end of Bottle track, 24 Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel The battalions of 6 Brigade had only three companies each. 24 Battalion's company commanders were Captain E. W. Aked (A), Captain J. Conolly (B), Captain A. C. Yeoman (C).
The two A Companies met considerable direct opposition but, guided by the Bofors tracer fired down the inter-brigade boundary, kept a true course to the first objective and then carried on to clear up a strongpoint some 200 yards beyond. B Company's right flank was involved with the same enemy defences while its left was harried by fire from the south. This caused B Company to edge over to the right, leaving C Company exposed and having to fight
The four companies of 28 Battalion, 28 (Maori) Battalion's company commanders were Captain J. C. Henare (A), Major C. M. Bennett (B), Captain W. M. Awarau (C), Captain F. R. Logan (D).
Although the first objective was gained within a few minutes of the planned time, five minutes past eleven, confirmation of their success from the battalion commanders did not reach the brigade headquarters until much later. However, a general but sometimes confusing picture of events was gained from information passed back by the various parties of engineers, signals, and support groups following up the infantry. The brigade major at 5 Brigade headquarters,
For this second phase, the artillery barrage was to resume at ten minutes to one just beyond the start lines, stand for five minutes and then move forward in 100-yard lifts every three minutes. In 5 Brigade's sector, 21 Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Harding took the right-hand side with its A, B and C Companies in line from right to left and D Company in reserve, 21 Battalion's company commanders were Captain W. C. Butland (A), Captain J. R. B. Marshall (B), Major N. B. Smith (C), and Captain B. M. Laird (D). 22 Battalion's company commanders were Captain P. R. Hockley (A), Captain J. L. MacDuff (B), Captain H. V. Donald (C), Captain D. F. Anderson (D).
Exactly at five minutes to one o'clock the first smoke shells marking the resumption of the barrage began to fall some way ahead of the taped start lines. By this time the four battalions were ready and in contact with each other and, in the five minutes during which the barrage stood on the opening line, the leading companies moved up until they reached the danger zone of the 25-pounder bursts. As the second fall of smoke shells signalled the first lift, the whole line of men rose from their lying or crouching positions on the sand and hurried forward into the haze of dust and smoke. Several enemy posts were caught with the defenders still hugging the safety of their slit trenches, and others were missed completely as the leading men bunched to attack points of resistance or to avoid booby-trapped minefields. With the fan-like spread of the sector leading the battalions on diverging bearings and with
On the extreme right 21 Battalion met opposition from ahead and the right flank. Edging over to this flank and probably encroaching on the Highland Division's sector, the battalion encountered men of 7 Black Watch, who remained in close contact as far as the objective. In the last stages of the advance over the broken ground which here constituted
On the left of 5 Brigade's sector, 22 Battalion met little opposition on the right flank, but D Company on the left was held up by a strongpoint of which returning stragglers of 23 Battalion had earlier given warning. A flank attack by C Company in the centre cleared the way but left this company with few survivors. At the pause in the barrage at 1.40 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell replaced the company by A Company from reserve, but during the final stages of the advance the battalion became so extended that all four companies were in the front line. On the ridge, here forming a small plateau, there was an extensive position which B Company, under Captain MacDuff's leadership, rushed close on the heels of the barrage, thus clearing the way for the other companies to cross the ridge and exploit well down the forward slope. By 3.15 a.m. the objective was cleared, but fire from air-bursts and mortars continued to rake the position and by dawn the battalion's casualties amounted to 110 men, or one in three of those taking part in the assault. The total strength of 22 Battalion was 35 officers and 628 men, but of these only about 310 actually followed the barrage, the remainder being headquarters, administrative and support group personnel.
On the left of the divisional sector of advance, 26 and 25 Battalions followed a similar pattern of movement through the British minefield up to their start lines. With only three companies each, both battalions placed two forward and one in reserve, the four leading companies thus being thinly spread over the front. Owing to difficulties in maintaining contact, 26 Battalion on the right reached the start line on the first objective rather later than planned and had to deploy its companies in some haste in order to be ready for the barrage opening. Consequently there was little time to search for 24 Battalion, whose survivors seem to have been in a concentrated group on the left. In the event, although contact was made with 22 Battalion on the right, 26 Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel 26 Battalion's company commanders were Lieutenant J. R. Williams (A), Captain L. G. Smith (B), Captain H. J. H. Horrell (C).
From its arrival the battalion was shelled and mortared until well into daylight, one early salvo falling on the Battalion Headquarters group and causing several casualties. This salvo also
On the left of 6 Brigade's sector, 25 Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel 25 Battalion's company commanders were Captain C. Weston (B), Captain C. S. Wroth (C), Captain G. A. W. Possin (D). In surviving notes given by C Company's commander to one of those detailed to count paces, the distance to be marched is shown as 2760 paces. This was in fact the distance, scaled on the map, from the first to the final objectives on the extreme left boundary of the brigade sector. By diverging off course and also by travelling nearer the centre of the brigade sector, 25 Battalion, in marching the required distance, halted at a point estimated to be between 500 and 800 yards short of the objective.
A summary of the records of events and times shows that the four New Zealand battalions maintained a relatively steady and level advance in spite of the tenuous contact between the leading companies, a feat due to the experience so many of the men had already had in night navigation over the desert, aided by the creeping barrage. The two Maori companies following 5 Brigade found little mopping up to do, and of those behind 6 Brigade, C Company reached the ridge with the loss of only two men. On the left flank, however, D Company missed 25 Battalion's passage over the start line and followed up later to find several unsubdued enemy posts along the left boundary. Altogether 28 Battalion's casualties for the night were 6 killed, 53 wounded and 3 missing. By the afternoon of the 24th, about 250 prisoners had reached the cage behind the start line; most of them had been taken in the night advance. They included Germans of 382 Regiment and Italians of 62 Regiment of Trento Division.
No sooner had the four battalions halted their men along the ridge than the commanders sought ways and means of communicating their success to their brigades. All had been supplied with special signal rockets, but none of those that survived the march, and were fired, were identified by watchers in the rear from the other fireworks of flares, tracer, shellbursts and explosions. Runners were also sent back and eventually wireless contact was established through various vehicles carrying sets that followed up the infantry, so that by 4 a.m. the staff at
In this period of insecure communications, the infantry was most vulnerable to counter-attack. Until the supporting arms and particularly the observation parties of the artillery could arrive, a determined enemy attack could in fact have thrown the whole front into confusion for, by the time the infantry had reached the final objective, the routes for vehicles had only just passed the first objective. Two lanes had been planned for each brigade sector, reconnaissance parties of the engineers setting off close behind the Maori mopping-up companies. In 5 Brigade's sector, both of the gapping parties worked under fire from the north flank which only ceased when the second wave of the infantry
There were numerous diamond-shaped booby-trapped areas combined with the minefields in the New Zealand sector, possibly as many as fifty originally. Some were set off by the shellfire but many were untouched, especially towards the final objective where the barrage fire was thin. A typical trap consisted of a camouflaged captured British 500lb aerial bomb connected through igniters to two anti-tank mines, and with radiating trip wires as well as a remote-control wire leading to an enemy post, the whole contraption set to explode by a change of tension on any of the wires. Two such booby traps were detonated, one causing casualties to the engineers, as recorded, and the other to 26 Battalion's support column. Several others were rendered harmless by the engineers by the hazardous process of inserting fine wire into each of the igniters.
By 2.30 a.m. all four routes to the first objective were open for vehicles, the lanes marked by signs and lights and policed by provosts. By this time the reserve engineer parties were already at the work of extending the lanes, with the infantry's support groups hard on their heels. Though Scorpions and detectors were used, both of these aids proved technically unreliable so that much of the clearing was done by the traditional method of prodding the ground with bayonets, a method which of necessity had to be slow and deliberate.
As each lane progressed, a dense column of vehicles gradually banked up on it–signal detachments laying cable, anti-tank guns on portée or towed, 3-inch mortar carriers, Bren carriers, Vickers gun sections in trucks, RAP vehicles, and numerous trucks and jeeps carrying essential equipment and stores. First came the support columns for the two battalions on the first objective and, as these dispersed off the marked route, the columns for the other four battalions passed through. With these latter were Crusader troops of 9 Armoured Brigade for the infantry's support against counterattack, and behind them again came the Stuarts and Bren carriers of the Divisional Cavalry and the heavy squadrons of 9 Armoured Brigade. Traffic discipline on the whole was good, though at points the narrow minefield gaps became jammed and vehicles were lost when attempting to take short cuts over uncleared ground, led by impatient support group commanders who knew how vulnerable their battalions might be unless their weapons arrived before dawn.
The extreme right-hand lane, behind 21 Battalion, seems to have been the first to be cleared as far as the final objective, and on receiving the engineers' report the battalion commander sent back guides to find his support column. In the half light before dawn, this was discovered among the traffic on 5 Brigade's left-hand lane, waiting while the sappers were using a Scorpion to flail a way through a wide belt of scattered mines. Led to the right behind
On the route behind 22 Battalion, the clearing of the scattered mines took so long that, of this battalion's support weapons, only two two-pounder anti-tank guns arrived in time to be dug in before daylight. However, on learning that tanks of the
In 6 Brigade's sector, an advance support column for 26 Battalion, including three Crusader tanks of the portée and carrier-borne 3-inch mortars, had set off on the right-hand Route ‘A’, led by a small detachment of engineers manning two Scorpions. Both the flail tanks broke down early in the march and later several of the vehicles were damaged on mines. Three mortars and two of the anti-tank guns eventually reached the ridge intact and, about 4.30 a.m., were dug in, but one of the guns was almost immediately put out of action by a direct shell hit. Route ‘A’ was properly cleared and marked by 8 Field Company sappers following this advance party and on it the main battalion support column travelled, arriving in the lee of the ridge an hour or so later.
The southern lane, Route ‘B’, on which 25 Battalion's support column with its troop of Crusaders followed the engineers, was cleared fairly quickly as far as the ridge but then had to be diverted to the right to join the battalion's positions, where the first vehicles arrived about 5.30 a.m. Attempts by the engineers to cut a gap in the thick minefield on the forward slope of the ridge were hindered by heavy enemy fire and eventually stopped by Brigadier Gentry's orders as too hazardous in the fast increasing light.
The heavy squadrons of the
The task of
The extensions of Boat and Hat tracks, the former commencing at the junction of the New Zealand and South African sectors and the latter within the South African area, presented greater difficulties, as the lanes here cut along rather than through the pattern of the enemy minefields, while the South Africans had trouble in subduing the defences in the area. The gapping of the first minefield on Boat track commenced under fire from a post close to the inter-divisional boundary, and it was not until one of the Maori mopping-up parties arrived to deal with the enemy that the gap could be completed. Further on the sappers were held up by heavy shelling, possibly a South African concentration, and then they encountered a very thick field sown with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. The gapping of this took until nearly dawn but a clear route then led as far as 25 Battalion's positions. Daylight prevented the sappers from clearing mines over the ridge beyond the infantry positions as the enemy covered this forward slope with fire. On Hat track the covering party met opposition only 300 yards beyond the South African start line and again about 1000 yards out. In both cases the enemy was too strong for the light covering party, so that the sappers were unable to work until the South African infantry had cleared the ground. They then found themselves in an extremely complicated part of the German mine-garden stretching for some 700 yards. With this
The task of leading From lack of exact information, it can only be assumed that Ink route was kept as a reserve and/or return route.
On Boat track, the Notts Yeomanry were probably the first on the infantry objective, arriving before first light. This allowed them time to clear mines and pass two squadrons and some field guns over the ridge. In the increasing light enemy fire forced a withdrawal after sixteen tanks and some guns had been lost either by mines or anti-tank gun fire.
Through reports of unsubdued opposition ahead, the column led by
Of the remainder of the armoured division, the three regimental columns of 24 Armoured Brigade, 41, 47 and 45 Battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment, had been held back by the slow movement ahead and were by dawn still waiting at the gaps in the
In the New Zealand sector, therefore, at dawn on the 24th the infantry was practically on its objective, with its support weapons well enough organised to deal with an immediate counter-attack. In the same sector, in various stages of organisation and grossly overcrowding it, were the best parts of three heavy armoured brigades, enough to repulse an attack by a full panzer division. Communication throughout the sector was generally good so that both infantry and armoured headquarters had a reasonably accurate picture of the disposal of the various units.
To the south of the New Zealanders, the South African Division placed its 2 Infantry Brigade in the right-hand sector, in which the
The advance of the
The opposition began to dwindle as the tanks of
The opposition offered by this German position also had considerable effect on the progress of 3 South African Brigade further south. In this brigade's sector the plan was for 1 Battalion, The Rand Light Infantry, to assault a large strongpoint which lay just ahead of the first objective and then send patrols to clear a start line for the second phase. In this, the Royal Durban Light Infantry was to advance on the right and 1 Battalion of the Imperial Light Horse on the left to the final objective. The Rand Light Infantry met the strongpoint as and where expected and, under heavy artillery concentrations and machine-gun fire, used Bangalore torpedoes to good effect to break into the defences. Against fierce resistance by troops of 433 Regiment (164 Division), elements of the Rand Light Infantry fought through the strongpoint to reach the line of the first objective. The extension of the defence area to the north into 2 Brigade's sector was still unsubdued, so that the rest of the Rand Light Infantry had to form a front facing north to cover the troops moving up for the second phase. This action allowed the Royal Durban Light Infantry to reach the start
Behind the main infantry advance the Divisional Reserve Group, of armoured cars, artillery, machine-gun and other units, moved up to provide depth to the defence against counter-attack. The fifty-one Valentines of
Owing to the configuration of the front the South African Division had to use troops of its third formation, 1 Infantry Brigade, to clear the area between 3 Brigade's advance and the old front-line positions. Besides arranging a massive medium machine-gun programme in support of the main advance (sixty-six Vickers guns fired 640,000 rounds) and putting in an anti-tank gun screen at the point where the final objective met no-man's land, this brigade also was given the task of occupying the ground, part enemy and part no-man's land, on the left of 3 Brigade's advance. The anti-tank screen, in sites secretly prepared beforehand, was set out with no enemy interference, while the
By dawn, therefore,
To the south of the South Africans, 4 Indian Division was also under command of 30 Corps with the task of holding a firm base as the southern anchor for the assault. The division's artillery was given a part in the corps' counter-battery programme and defensive fire tasks, as well as supporting three minor diversionary operations designed to hold the enemy's attention and draw his fire. The first diversion was a raid by men of
For the second diversion a trick was tried out, similar to that employed by the Australians on the coast, of placing out in no-man's land dummy figures which could be made to stand erect as required so that, illuminated by flares or even in bright moonlight, they gave the appearance of advancing infantry. The illusion was supported by vehicle noises, lights and covering fire. This deception was laid on by 7 Rajput Regiment at 1.30 a.m. opposite the eastern end of the
The last diversion was a raid by a company of 1 Punjab Regiment to harass, and gain identifications of, the enemy in the line to the south of El Mreir. Starting out half an hour after midnight, the company seems to have run into the supporting fire provided by seven field batteries and withdrew without making any contact with the enemy.
All in all, the Indians' operations, though individually not scoring any obvious success, gained their object in keeping the enemy from moving troops from this sector for some time and causing him to waste a great deal of ammunition. The division had also prepared plans for an advance, but the progress of operations elsewhere caused this to be cancelled.
N the southern sector 13 Corps did little more than carry out a fairly costly diversion. The operations of this corps have been somewhat clouded by later emphasis that it was intended to accomplish no more than was in fact accomplished, that is, to hold 21 Panzer Division away from the north. Yet the corps' task, as laid down in orders, was to ‘destroy the enemy east of his main position’. It was erroneously thought that this ‘main position’ lay along the old line held before the
It is of course possible that a certain amount of wishful thinking affected the method proposed, for Montgomery's method as used by 30 Corps, of an infantry ‘break-in’ followed by an armoured
That this was the type of engagement anticipated is made clearer by the injunction Montgomery gave to Horrocks, similar to that given to
The British estimated that the enemy facing 13 Corps consisted of three Italian infantry divisions, Brescia, Folgore and
The 13 Corps operations started in the north about 10 p.m. when 1 Greek Brigade in the vicinity of Brescia Division for a loss of four casualties. Next in order were the operations of 151 Brigade, a simulated attack on
Similarly 69 Brigade, from its positions in
The main 13 Corps operation took place to the south of the
The method of attack called for the main assault to be made by 7 Armoured Division on a due westerly course and on a front of about
The width of no-man's land and the corps' dispositions necessitated an approach march of over four miles for some of the infantry and ten for most of the armour. Some preparation and concentration was therefore done before dusk and may have been seen by the enemy, for 21 Panzer Division hinted in a report made out later that the offensive was not altogether unexpected. There is, however, no evidence that the front-line troops were ordered to be any more on the alert than on previous nights.
Movement forward of 7 Armoured Division began after dusk along routes lit by over a thousand oil or electric lamps placed to face the rear. The advance was led by 44 Reconnaissance Regiment, formed into four minefield assault groups with engineer detachments and Scorpions. Each of these was followed by a mixed column of 22 Armoured Brigade of about two hundred vehicles, comprising tanks, field artillery, anti-tank guns and lorried infantry. These in turn were followed by 4 Light Armoured Brigade in four columns, each of about a hundred vehicles. Co-ordinating their timing with the armour's advance, units of 44 Division set off to occupy the ground on the right while Fighting French forces swung south round
After a counter-battery programme fired from 9.25 to 9.50 p.m. by thirty-four troops of 25-pounders (136 guns all told) on known or suspected enemy battery positions, there was a ten-minute pause before the main weight of the corps artillery began to fire the creeping barrage behind which the 44 Reconnaissance Regiment's parties were to assault and gap the minefields. But the armoured columns had first been halted because it was thought they were travelling so fast that they would reach the start line too early and would thus be exposed to enemy defensive fire; and then, on resuming the march, they had difficulty in finding the routes (it was later claimed that some of the guiding lights had gone out). Finally, enemy fire in retaliation to the counter-battery programme fell in the area, setting some vehicles alight. All this brought delays which allowed little time for any form of reorganisation on the start line, the leading troops getting away in fact some minutes after the barrage commenced.
In the lead, the task forces put into practice the method of mine-clearance developed by 44 Reconnaissance Regiment. In each group carriers took the van until mines were encountered, when the group's Scorpion was brought up to flail its nine-foot path. A Stuart tank and two sections of carriers followed through the gap to form a bridgehead while sappers enlarged and marked the gap. In the event, the short time lag in crossing the start line was augmented by further delay caused by bad going, scattered mines, and the mechanical unreliability of the Scorpions. With the barrage well lost, the mine-gapping parties came under fire from machine guns and mortars which the tanks and carriers were unable to subdue. Units of lorried infantry were then sent up to clear and occupy the small bridgeheads so far gained beyond the first mine-belt; the barrage was stopped and a hasty reorganisation made, the survivors of the four groups of the Reconnaissance Regiment being re-formed into two parties, each with one of the two Scorpions still in going order. At 5.10 a.m. the barrage resumed but the gapping parties were again unable to keep up with it. Enemy posts, recovering after the shellfire had passed over them, were able to prevent any breaching of the second main mine-belt.
Under this defensive fire, and with the sky rapidly lightening, 22 Armoured Brigade ordered its troops to withdraw into the bridgeheads between the minefields. Here, with the coming of daylight, conditions were extremely unpleasant, for the areas were very congested with men and vehicles, under enemy observation and, because the gaps had been cut closer together than intended, exposed to a strong concentration of the enemy's fire.
The night's losses in 22 Armoured Brigade were estimated at 250 men killed, missing, or wounded, up to thirty carriers and a few tanks destroyed. One damaged Scorpion was unfortunately left within reach of enemy patrols. On the credit side, the brigade claimed 400 prisoners, all Italians and mainly from Folgore Parachute Division. In the meantime, the columns of 4 Light Armoured Brigade, due to come up behind 22 Brigade's right and draw up on the right flank, were still well short of the start line when it became obvious that the operation was not progressing according to expectations. The light brigade was therefore directed to halt and disperse in defensive formation where it stood.
The infantry operation by 44 Division to cover the armour's right flank gained even less success. Advancing under a mixture of barrage and concentrations, 1/7 Battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey) of 131 Brigade fell into some confusion under determined enemy resistance, though the Commanding Officer managed to rally and lead a small group of his men as far as the
To the south of 7 Armoured Division's operations, the Fighting French sent out four columns, two to form a base in no-man's land, and the other two to work round the south of Panzer Army's outposts as far as the armour's left flank. Initially this operation went well, the two bases being taken up and artillery disposed to cover the area, while the two mobile columns, against some resistance, reached a position to the west of
THE situation of the Eighth Army as day dawned on the 24th was that, in the main area of operations, the infantry of 30 Corps had gained most of the desired objectives, but the armour had not yet broken out as planned, while the subsidiary action by 13 Corps had done little more than keep the enemy on the southern sector engaged and apprehensive of further assaults.
The first estimates of casualties received at Army Headquarters indicated that the Australian and South African divisions had each lost about 350 men, of whom about forty were known killed, the rest wounded or missing. The New Zealand estimated total was slightly higher, 420 wounded or missing and 41 killed, while the Highland Division offered a rough total of 1000, but this probably included several of the isolated groups and stragglers out of touch with their units. The total loss in 30 Corps was therefore thought to be in the vicinity of
Casualties in 13 Corps, excluding the French, were under 400, almost equally shared by the armour and infantry, and of the total 71 were known killed and 50 reported missing. Losses by the Fighting French were believed to be relatively heavy in the two battalions of the Separation of casualties occurring on the opening night from those suffered up to midnight on the 24th has been found impossible. The totals given above provided the basis on which immediate future operations were planned.
It will be seen that the first night's achievements at This operation gave evidence that the pleas of New Zealand, and other, infantry commanders for ‘armour under command’ were not without foundation, for 9 Armoured Brigade, acting as an integral part of the infantry division, was the only formation that reached the ridge in time to take part in a mass tank advance.
The failure of the armour to break out as a body gave the Panzer Army the small amount of time it needed to recover from the initial shock of the assault. German plans of the defences indicate that 30 Corps' infantry had in most places penetrated the outer belt of the mine-garden design.
On the Panzer Army's side of the line it was some hours after the Eighth Army's artillery fire began before General Stumme could be certain that the British attack was genuine and not merely a noisy diversion such as had been laid on for the Panzer Army and some of the main German formations, were lost in the course of the fighting, while most surviving reports, prepared later when the course of events had become clearer, cannot be guaranteed to mirror knowledge and reactions at the time. However, it is clear that the British offensive did not catch the
See p. 202.
The only element of surprise lay, as Montgomery himself had expected, in the weight and direction of the assault, and it was in this that weaknesses in the command structure between Italians and Germans, acidly commented on earlier in German records, left the Panzer Army headquarters almost completely enveloped in the fog of war until well into the following day.
The last entry in the Panzer Army's daily diary noted that after dark on the 23rd a heavy barrage commenced on the whole front, later slackening off in the south but increasing in the north. Communications with the front-line positions and for some distance to the rear were badly disrupted by the shelling, and though some of the German battalions seem to have passed news back, no reliable information was received of the Italian front-line positions. Even when the duration and extent of the shelling convinced Stumme that a major offensive had commenced, he felt constrained to order that immediate counter-attacks, customarily laid on by local commanders, should be held up in place of a planned and co-ordinated operation when daylight allowed observation and some assessment of the true situation. Only sufficient information had come in during the night for Panzer Army headquarters to estimate that a broad penetration had been made in Mine-boxes J and L (which, with K to their south, covered the assault front of 30 Corps). According to the German situation sketches, it was at first believed that the major assault had been made by the New Zealand Division backed by a part of 7 Armoured Division, with the Highland Division operating between the coast and the main road. The Australian Division was placed at the rear and south of the main area of penetration. News of the fortunes of individual front-line units, pieced together as the day wore on, indicated that the whole of the Italian
Panzer Army situation sketches, 15
A comment in the German campaign narrative, compiled later from diaries and reports, that ‘After the overrunning of the Italian battalions, the interspersed German battalions stood like islands in the holocaust’ GMDS 34373/1–2.
News from the southern sector also took time to filter through to the staff at Army Headquarters, who appear to have decided at first that the British effort there was diversionary. This opinion was modified shortly after dawn when it became known that some
Folgore Division's outposts had been overwhelmed and that up to 160 tanks could be seen between the inner and outer mine-belts. Accordingly no immediate consideration was given to moving the reserve force under 21 Panzer Division to the north. In the few relevant records, there is no hint that the
The The German campaign narrative (GMDS 34373/1–2) gives the total German-Italian casualties compiled to the evening of 26 October as 3655. It is doubtful if this figure is accurate.Panzer Army's losses for this first night cannot be accurately assessed but, on a basis of five battalions overwhelmed by 30 Corps together with the casualties inflicted by 13 Corps and by the British shellfire, the total cannot be far short of that suffered by the Eighth Army. A check of prisoners, mostly captured during the night and early morning, showed 954 held by 30 Corps and about 500 by 13 Corps, a total of 1454, of whom approximately one third were Germans.
ALTHOUGH the impetus of the infantry's night advance had not been followed up by the armour of
With the coming of full daylight aircraft of the 15 Panzer Division would be concentrating for a counter-attack. On the ground the
Along the newly established front sporadic firing broke out as daylight exposed tanks, vehicles and infantry to hostile observation. In places Axis troops were still occupying defences within throwing distance of the positions taken up by the attackers, but as first the infantry and later the tanks and artillery fired on them, a no-man's land of varying width gradually became defined.
In the Australian sector heavy exchanges of fire occurred as the troops on the north, mostly Germans, turned to cover their newly exposed southern flank. The Australians on this line held firm, though menaced by several minor counter-attacks, and even managed in places to improve their positions. On the left flank of the western objective Valentines of
At 7.15 a.m., as two companies of 2/17 Australian Battalion were preparing to move into the gap between 2/48 and 2/13 Battalions, observers reported the signs of a counter-attack from the west. Under increasing enemy fire the Valentines ahead of 2/13 Battalion withdrew through the infantry, while tanks of the Bays to the left rear deployed for action and a call for defensive fire was sent to the artillery. At least five field regiments responded, causing the enemy to disperse hurriedly. As this excitement died down, part of a flight of aircraft, including a number of USAAF Mitchell bombers briefed to attack a suspected enemy headquarters
To the south of the Australian sector, the Highlanders were gradually sorting themselves out. Daylight disclosed that at least three main enemy posts still held out between the right-flank troops and the final objective. The divisional commander accordingly decided to use 2 Battalion, The Seaforth Highlanders, from reserve in a daylight attack, with artillery support and the use of any available Valentines of
The Bays, having earlier indicated their position to the enemy by long-range firing, set off due west on the right but soon were stopped by mines and anti-tank gun fire, some reputedly from 88s. With the loss of six Shermans they fell back, but then received orders from their brigade to turn south and follow the Seaforths. Meanwhile
It would seem that the tanks were neither as far north or west as they claimed, for the Australians were preparing to repeat the final tasks of the artillery programme of the previous night to allow 2/13 and 2/15 Battalions to advance after dark to the objective. Had the Bays and Lancers been where claimed, and especially if they had spread north as ordered by 1 Armoured Division, they would have been well within the area of the artillery fire. In arranging their fire programme the Australians either must have been unaware of the movements of the armour or more likely knew by observation that the tanks were clear of their sector. In the event Australian patrols at dusk found the area vacated except by a few enemy stragglers, so that artillery support was not needed and both infantry and tanks were on the final objective overnight.
The story of 2 Armoured Brigade illustrates the weaknesses from which Eighth Army still suffered, weaknesses in communications, liaison, and particularly in understanding of the role of the armour in the plans. Instead of assisting 51 Division to clear its area and organise a firm front, 2 Armoured Brigade in fact took the path of least resistance, which led it from, rather than towards, a common front with
On the rest of 51 Division's front, the confusion following the night advance was being slowly ironed out, but movement in the sector was still greatly hindered by observation and fire from the large enemy pocket remaining in the centre of 154 Brigade's objective. On the far left the two companies of 7 Black Watch well forward against the New Zealand sector found themselves caught up in the tank engagements being fought on their front.
The New Zealand front was perhaps the strongest and best ordered in 30 Corps for, although short of the objective on the left, it was manned as a continuous line by the four infantry battalions in contact with each other. Both 5 and 6 Field Regiments had observation posts set up on the ridge before dawn and in contact with the infantry. Communications to the rear were quickly established, although signal lines were constantly being cut by both shellfire and the mass of tanks milling about behind the front, while wireless was initially somewhat erratic. Through valiant efforts by the Division's signal linesmen, and by using alternative radio links, the observation officers were able to get their calls for fire answered by the guns within a few minutes. As no immediate counter-attack developed to call for defensive fire, the first calls were on targets of movement and gun positions disclosed by the fast-growing light.
Although the infantry had arrived in time to get dug in before dawn, the masses of vehicles following behind took some time to be sorted out as the various groups were led from the gapped routes to the battalion and company positions. In the unavoidable confusion, and often through impatience to carry out the tasks required, a number of the drivers ran off the cleared routes and immobilised their vehicles on minefields; others lost their way and waited for guidance. Altogether probably as many as half or more of the support weapons – anti-tank guns, mortars, machine guns – failed to arrive in time to be properly sited and dug in before daylight exposed them to enemy fire. However, the mass of tanks closely following the infantry advance more than made up for any shortage of support weapons. The
Further to the south, the Crusader squadron of the Notts Yeomanry (of
Meanwhile, as these first attempts to cross the ridge were being made, the remainder of the three brigades of armour banked up in the New Zealand sector, blocking the minefield gaps on the routes up and hindering free movement across the front. It is recorded that some of the tanks fired on the New Zealand infantry in reserve positions. Many of the men in positions behind the ridge went to the trouble of laying out old tins and lengths of barbed wire to simulate minefields in order to deter the milling tanks from overrunning their slit trenches.
Such was the press of vehicles that the Divisional Cavalry, attempting to cross from behind 6 Brigade's front to reach the gap reported in 22 Battalion's sector, could make little headway, and about 7.30 p.m., on
At 7 a.m.
Currie himself was only concerned to be given a definite objective. He signalled that there were about forty enemy tanks in view and that he was prepared to lead his brigade over the ridge straight away, but wanted to know if the other armour would assist and if his artillery liaison could be improved. This latter trouble took some time to settle, though it was later found that observers from 4 Field Regiment were well forward and in fact directing fire but not in close contact with the tank regiments. What definite objective
Queree had meanwhile managed to speak direct to his opposite number in
The time lag involved, of some three hours since
Meanwhile Queree received a long message from
The actual sequence of orders given to the armour and of the movement of the various groups of tanks during this morning is difficult to disentangle. According to the British official narrative, on an order given by Lumsden just before 7.30 a.m., 24 Armoured Brigade sent its
On returning to the New Zealand headquarters, Leese immediately called up the Army Commander, his side of the conversation being recorded as follows:
I have seen
Bernard [Freyberg] and Gatehouse and I understand Herbert [Lumsden] has talked to you in the last hour. There is one Bn of 9 Bde over the ridge. On the left inf are in touch with SAs and an attack is developing. B. is confident that he could get on. The Wilts in front appear to have run on to some mines on his right – rest of Bde is behind ridge. He thinks he could go well through provided one of Gatehouse's brigades goes with him. G. says RoyalsA/Tk weapons and anything that puts its nose over the ridge gets shot up. G's main preoccupation at moment is to get 10 Armd Div into position to receive attack from someone else … I think we damn well do. He keeps on saying he is trained for a static role. I think that is getting above him. I have told Bernard to hold a meeting with G. and Brigs. I am placing whole Corps arty at his disposal and am suggesting that under smoke they try and do something later in day. What did Herbert say, Sir? That is happening…. You want them to get into position so that they can manoeuvre on the far side of M. Ridge…. Right I shall do that. I shall find out earliest time Corps arty can be ready…. The northern one is not complete – attack goes in at 1200…. Bernard thinks he is moving off. They did a hell of a lot of shooting up this morning. He may be shooting off his ammunition. M. Ridge was full of hate but now there is hardly anything happening. The
10 Armoured Division 's armoured car regiment which had lost two cars to anti-tank guns while trying to reconnoitre to the south-west from the New Zealand front.GOC
2 NZEF /45.
As this conversation concluded, Lumsden appeared at the New Zealand headquarters. Both corps commanders then agreed that, if the Army Commander insisted on a further tank advance, the sooner it took place the better. On the arrival of a liaison officer from
Plans were then prepared for the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry and 9 Armoured Brigade to advance after dark behind a creeping barrage while 8 and 24 Armoured Brigades, supported by timed concentrations, made for their original lightfoot objectives, the whole operation to be supported by the combined artillery of the two corps of some 300 guns.
As the commanders were attempting to co-ordinate their actions, there were several alarms of impending counter-attacks on the New Zealand front. From daybreak until the middle of the morning, enemy fire built up in intensity with 88-millimetre and other guns searching along the crest of the ridge and behind it, while smaller calibre anti-tank guns from the nearer defences let fly at any tanks that showed their turrets above the crest.
The
By midday the enemy's shelling had almost died away, although any vehicle moving into view on the ridge still drew immediate fire. On the counter-attack alarms, which waxed and waned about every two hours from seven in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon, the British guns laid observed fire on any concentrations reported by their observers while preparing for the planned defensive tasks should the enemy forces approach the ridge. Every enemy movement, however, appeared to disperse under fire and none came close enough to be a real threat to the infantry. A count of prisoners taken on the New Zealand front gave a total to date of approximately 250, made up of infantrymen of 382 and 62 Regiments with a few men from artillery and other units. Nearly half of the total were Germans.
There is little doubt that troops of the Panzer Army facing the New Zealand front intended to counter-attack. Orders were given early for the positions lost overnight to be recovered and, according to the German records, advances were aimed during the day at the New Zealand right flank from two directions, one from the southwest by elements of the
The Panzer Army directed its attack to this particular point to close a gap caused by 5 Brigade's overrunning of
The lack of drive by the counter-attack force possibly showed the effects both of Rommel's absence and the defensive attitude engendered by the Panzer Army's policy of static defence in fixed positions. There is no doubt, however, that the real cause of its failure to develop into a threat lay in the fact that, for once, the British army had ensured that the objective was covered by strong artillery support and by a force of tanks well forward at first light to act as anti-tank defence. The counter-attack force was first harassed from the air as it formed up, then subjected to heavy concentrations from the field guns as it moved off and, on further advance, its vehicles came into range of the 75-millimetre guns of the Shermans and Grants. This was sufficient to break its impetus, for only a few infantry came within range of the small-arms of the men in the defences and the tanks' machine guns.
DURING the afternoon of the 24th the various commanders settled the details of the night's plan, which was in effect the armoured phase of the original but with extra support from all the available artillery of 10 and 30 Corps. Though both Lumsden and Gatehouse stressed the dangers and the possible heavy loss of tanks in an armoured advance without infantry to precede it, they appeared to agree that unless the advance was continued as soon as possible, the battle would become static and, in Lumsden's own words, would just ‘fizzle out’. GOC
There are, however, clear indications from recorded statements made at the time that none of the commanders concerned, except perhaps the as yet inexperienced Leese, was very sanguine of the result of an unaccompanied armoured sortie. The experienced infantry leaders, assessing the armour's capabilities on the opening night's performance, would have preferred a repetition of that night's plan had the reserves of infantry and the time to prepare been available. Lumsden himself counselled caution, both in speaking to the Army Commander from the New Zealand headquarters and later in conversation with
Playing with armour is like playing with fire. You have got to take your time about it. It is like a duel. If you don't take your time you will get run through the guts. It is not for tanks to take on guns.
Ibid.
The Army Commander, however, was insistent that the momentum of the advance must be maintained and there was no other way of maintaining it.
The start of the operation was timed for 10 p.m. under the support of 300 guns. The positions of the two
At the same time the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry and 9 Armoured Brigade, now reduced to two regiments as the Wiltshire Yeomanry had been withdrawn and its surviving tanks given to the other regiments, were to cross the ridge in the area held by 26 Battalion and, proceeding behind a creeping barrage fired by the New Zealand guns, were to form a front facing generally south to link the left of
It was also proposed that 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade should take over 5 Brigade's area so that it would be ready to advance and consolidate ground won by the tanks, while 5 Brigade would be free to follow 9 Armoured Brigade in the exploitation role.
At dusk the rearward side of
At the same time the Panzer Army, estimating that, as no major tank advance had been made by the Eighth Army during the day, the British would attempt a renewal of the infantry advance in the dark, started to lay artillery harassing fire on and behind the ridge, while the Axis infantry, returning to forward posts vacated in daylight, began their customary bursts of machine-gun fire on fixed lines, with salvoes of mortar fire on the gaps west of the ridge.
This enemy activity delayed the sapper party of 6 New Zealand Field Company detailed to clear the ground beyond the gap between 25 and 26 Battalions' fronts for the passage of the Divisional Cavalry and 9 Armoured Brigade. Led by their company commander, Major
The two squadrons of light tanks and Bren carriers of the Cavalry, on passing through the final gap, soon met machine-gun and anti-tank gun fire and were further delayed by scattered mines so that they lost the barrage. On losing two tanks, C Squadron halted, but B Squadron pushed on for nearly two miles, clearing a route along which the tanks of 9 Armoured Brigade followed. On being joined by the heavy tanks, the Cavalry asked permission to fall back, but
Next in time over the ridge after the Cavalry were the
The Staffs Yeomanry were followed by the Notts Yeomanry, the ‘soft-skinned’ part of whose column came up through the left of 25 Battalion's area and turned right, parallel to, and in the shelter of, the ridge, and halted while waiting for their tanks, which came up on a different route further to the right. Some time before midnight a random shell or mortar bomb hit and set alight one of the leading vehicles of this stationary and closely packed convoy which was carrying infantry, petrol, ammunition, and other stores. Lone enemy bombers which had been about since dusk then used this blaze as a target, dropping several sticks of bombs around it, while enemy gunners also laid some salvoes on the area. In spite of attempts by men of 25 Battalion to drive some of the unharmed vehicles clear, few were saved, the majority being abandoned to the flames which eventually swept through the whole column. The constant enemy attention caused by the blaze forced a number of 25 Battalion men to leave their slit trenches, some of which were within a few yards of the burning vehicles. Casualties directly attributable to this event were at least fifty and probably more, mainly in the lorried infantry of the Notts Yeomanry. The losses in men, vehicles and stores completely disorganised the advance of the Notts Yeomanry and eventually of all
Meanwhile Brigadier Currie managed to lead 9 Armoured Brigade through the congestion and confusion and, personally reconnoitring on foot the route over the ridge, sent his leading regiment,
Encouraged by the appearance of 9 Armoured Brigade on its left, the Staffs Yeomanry joined in the advance to the west, successfully using its infantry, a company of 1 Battalion, The Buffs, to overcome some anti-tank guns. The two regiments of 9 Armoured Brigade drew away to the south-west, following the trail blazed by the Cavalry. How far the Staffs Yeomanry advanced is a matter of conjecture, estimates ranging from 1000 to 3000 yards, but as day began to break, they were in a slight hollow, offering a little cover, about 1000 yards in front of 22 Battalion. The regiments of 9 Armoured Brigade went about
On the right flank
The first news of the progress of the advance, reaching
News of the activities of
But
There are several records of this ‘fateful’ conference De Guingand, op. cit., pp. 176, 199.Memoirs, p. 130.
As it was, the New Zealand reports of 9 Armoured Brigade's advance and the inaction of Ibid. Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, p. 263.
Whichever way the call was made, Montgomery used the fact that Gatehouse was some ten miles behind the front to castigate him for leading his division from the rear. The implication in this charge may not be fair as there is indirect evidence that at some time during the night Gatehouse was in the New Zealand sector, but there is no doubt he laid himself open to the charge by his rather casual method of command and communication and his failure to keep in direct and constant touch with the other commanders. That GOC
Montgomery's orders at the conference and by telephone to Gatehouse appear to have been merely that the original plan should be adhered to and are probably reflected in a written message received some three hours later at Headquarters
Gatehouse's understanding of the decision, whether gained from Montgomery or Lumsden is not clear, appeared in an order he issued to
By the time the last tanks of
Thus, at dawn on 25 October, there were seven regiments of tanks out in front of the New Zealand positions. On the right were
A thousand yards or less to the left of 24 Armoured Brigade, but without that close contact that would have allowed cooperation, the Staffs Yeomanry of
When the Staffs Yeomanry had started its advance, 9 Armoured Brigade's two regiments were spread in an arc facing south-west and south, with
Before receiving Currie's request,
Some of the difficulties
What actual orders Gatehouse issued at this time is uncertain, but it could be assumed he instructed
As Littorio Division aided by five German tanks, the Italians turning tail when their commander became a casualty. Littorio's return
After this attack had been repulsed there were several false alarms of fresh enemy assemblies and advances on various parts of this front, culminating in a report sent in about 4.30 p.m. that 24 Armoured Brigade was in danger from a force on its north-west. The commander of 2 Armoured Brigade then ordered
While the troops of 1 Armoured Division and the Australians facing to the west were engaging the enemy, the Australian Division was already preparing for the Army's new offensive and the Highland Division was planning a final effort to get its men overnight on to the original infantry objective.
Further to the south 24 Armoured Brigade remained out ahead of 5 New Zealand Brigade, surprisingly unmolested for most of the day. Some salvoes of 88-millimetre shells at midday ceased after artillery concentrations had been fired on the suspected gun positions, and another bout of shelling occurred when enemy vehicles could be seen assembling some way off to the brigade's north-west in the late afternoon. The shelling ceased when 2 Armoured Brigade took action as recorded and the enemy dispersed.
Though it was logical for this brigade to be left out beyond the ridge to form a common front with 1 Armoured Division's tanks on its north and 9 Armoured Brigade to the south, even though contact between the three groups was tenuous, the changes of plans made during the day entailed the brigade's withdrawal. It is not known, however, when the order for the withdrawal was issued but the two regiments beyond the ridge were ignorant of it until after 5.45 p.m., at which time Gatehouse personally made contact with the brigade commander. At this time the two regiments were in long-range engagement with enemy tanks so had to call for artillery fire and smoke to be laid down before they could safely disengage. It was not until dusk was falling that they eventually drove back over the ridge to rejoin the rest of the
While the two main armoured formations of Eighth Army were inconclusively skirmishing on the 25th, the New Zealand armour, on
In the late afternoon
The enemy, however, had his riposte, for as the last of the British tanks returned through 6 Brigade's positions, a solitary Grant followed up and swung in among the men of C Company of 26 Battalion, many of whom were out of their trenches enjoying the freedom of movement permitted by the dusk. Some of the company managed to avoid capture, but thirty-four were lined
On the front to the south of the New Zealand sector, the South Africans used the previous night and the day of 25 October for organising their defences and clearing mines. They also sent out numerous patrols to discover the enemy's new defence line. Overnight diversionary actions by 4 Indian Division and a programme of harassing fire by 50 Division in 13 Corps' sector were carried out to keep the enemy guessing. From enemy reaction and from observation during the day, on all three divisions' fronts, there appeared to be no sign that the enemy was thinning out his defences for reinforcement elsewhere.
The main action in the south was a resumption of 13 Corps' original plan with some modifications, starting after dark on the 24th. Two battalions of 44 Division under the command of 7 Armoured Division were to break through the second mine barrier that had defeated the first night's advance and were to form a bridgehead from which 22 Armoured, followed by 4 Light Armoured Brigade, was to sally out. As the armour swung north across 50 Division's front, this division was to be ready to step forward and clear the ground encircled by the tanks.
Disorganisation in assembly delayed the start of the operation for an hour and a half but eventually the two units, 1/5 and 1/6 Battalions of the Queen's Royal Regiment of 131 Brigade, made their way through the second minefield, only to be pinned to the ground in a very restricted bridgehead. Heavy enemy fire turned back the vehicles bringing up support weapons and, with the complete failure of wireless, the leading troops were unable to call for artillery fire to subdue the enemy guns. The engineers managed to cut two gaps, on news of which the leading armour advanced, but several tanks missed the gaps and ran on to mines while others were halted by anti-tank gun fire. About 4.15 a.m. the commander of 7 Armoured Division called off the armoured advance until observation in daylight would allow the use of artillery to subdue the enemy positions that dominated the bridgehead.
As his tanks claimed that the mine gaps were not properly cleared the armoured commander ordered the engineers out again, but poor communications delayed his order so that by the time a sapper party had been assembled, the growing light made a close examination of the ground impossible under the fire the
On the Corps Commander's advice, the armoured commander then halted the whole operation, though this meant leaving the
At this stage of the battle, when the capacity of the Panzer Army to react was as yet not fully tested, it was still necessary for General Horrocks to keep 13 Corps spread over a very wide front and to be prepared to provide reserves for the Army as a whole. Under such restrictions the use of only two battalions to open the bridgehead was perhaps unavoidable but not well-advised, for such a small force was unlikely to gain an area wide and deep enough to enable the tanks to use the mine gaps unmolested. Estimated losses for the operation up to the evening of the 25th amounted to 350 men, most of them from the two West Surrey battalions, and 26 tanks. Had the attack been intended to delay the switch of
Although stalemate seemed to have been reached on the ground, the Luftwaffe's activities and to hinder counter-attack, over 300,000 pounds of bombs were dropped on landing grounds and targets close to the front. Although the
From the start of the offensive to the evening of the 25th, some 1456 prisoners, of whom about 600 were German, had been counted into the Eighth Army's cages. Including this figure, the Panzer Army's losses were probably not much different from those of the British, which totalled slightly below 3000 killed, wounded, missing and prisoner. Though British tank losses appeared heavy, many of the tanks had suffered minor damage or breakdowns and were recoverable. The total number of runners this evening in 2 and 24 Armoured Brigades, now to work together in 1 Armoured Division, was 189;
Against this a German supply report indicates that 15 Panzer Division had only 31 runners of the 119 with which it had begun the battle
GMDS 33142/5–6.
Although the British advances on the ground seemed inconclusive from the Panzer Army's side as the main minefields had been penetrated and not fully breached, and that only on a narrow front, the events of 25 October proved that the Axis had little chance of wresting the initiative from the attackers. The messages recorded in the Africa Corps' daily diary made clear how precarious was the hold of the thin screen of infantry lining the area of penetration and also how ineffective, under the British fire and air assaults, were the counter-attacks designed to relieve the pressure on the infantry. The system of narrow but deep battalion sectors, though perhaps ideal for sandwiching the two nationalities, made it difficult for the higher headquarters to appreciate the situation in detail, a factor which led to the misdirection of counter-attacks. Many of the infantry, both German and Italian, had fallen back under the threat of the British tanks and then, in some cases, returned to reoccupy their positions, while other strongpoints thought to be holding firm were later found to have been overrun or abandoned.
The Panzer Army's worries were not lessened by the fact that for twenty-four hours it had had no commander. During the previous day General Stumme had set off on a tour of the front from which he failed to return, and it was not until midday on the 25th that his body was found. The accepted story was that he suffered a heart attack when coming under fire, probably in the vicinity of the Australian objective. On his disappearance, Rommel had been warned by the General Staff to resume his command and immediately flew over from The Rommel Papers, pp. 304–5.
The events so far described up to the evening of 25 October were all part of the dying impetus of Eighth Army's first attempt to breach the Panzer Army's line. The first orders for the day issued by Montgomery at the early morning conference were for a continuation of the operation. The detailed orders to implement this decision were, in short, for
It is difficult to say when these detailed orders reached down to the New Zealand Division, but GOC Panzer Army regain the observation of the ridge, the Eighth Army would be forced back to its original line. With such doubts in mind, he was against the idea of letting Currie's tanks and 5 Brigade off on an unsupported exploitation role, and also of letting 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade replace 5 Brigade, especially as
He also gave Leese his opinion that the delays had allowed the enemy time to recover and prepare a new line of defence so that further operations to the south or south-west would have no element of surprise. In discussion later in the morning, both
With such opinions finding their way back to his headquarters, and with more exact information of what had really happened to the armoured advance, Montgomery soon decided that a change of plan was necessary, and accordingly called his two corps commanders to a conference at the New Zealand headquarters at midday. Though Gatehouse may have been present there is no record that he attended this conference, but
The wisdom of this proposal, shown in the records to have been accepted by Lumsden and probably by Leese, is doubtful. Infantry casualties would have put the New Zealand Division, and possibly the Highland Division as well, out of effective action for some time, while, even if the armour had broken out, coordinated action between the armoured groups had already proved too uncertain to ensure that the Panzer Army would have been bottled up and defeated. It is more likely the enemy would have withdrawn in reasonably good order to fight again another day.
As it was, while prepared to change the detail of his planning, Montgomery held to his main intention – to defeat the Panzer Army where it stood by the process of holding off the armour while ‘crumbling’ the infantry. Accepting
THE change of plan entailed a northward advance by 9 Australian Division to ‘crumble’ the enemy infantry in the defences that lay between the northern flank and the sea. To cover this operation 1 Armoured Division, now comprising 2 and 24 Brigades, was to take up positions to the west of the Australian area and, if possible, bring the enemy armour to battle and threaten the main lateral supply route of the Panzer Army along the
Montgomery had decided on this new plan, at least tentatively, well before the midday conference at the New Zealand headquarters, so that what was said there merely confirmed him in his decision. The Australian commander, Morshead, had already warned his brigadiers of the change of direction and preparations were sufficiently advanced for the first phase of the operation to commence that night. Plans prepared by 1 Armoured Division to take its tanks to the original first bound beyond the Australians' western front were allowed to stand as they fitted into the change, as did a final attempt by 51 Division to occupy its original objectives and form a continuous defence line. But while the Australians went smoothly ahead with their preparations, the armour and the Highlanders found themselves still at loggerheads over their map reading.
The Australians' intention was to advance the northern front up to
Reports from patrols and observation of the movement of enemy vehicles had already indicated that there were open channels in the minefields around 125 Regiment and its II Battalion. Besides providing a number of useful documents, one of these two officers confirmed the information gained from the captured sketch.
At midnight two companies of 2/48 Battalion set off due north for about 1100 yards to overcome several enemy posts and secure the intermediate objective. From this start line, a third company in carriers navigated a mine-free route at high speed to
The next phase of the operation did not go so smoothly. At 4 a.m. on the 26th, 2/24 Battalion, having assembled on the intermediate objective, advanced in a north-easterly direction, but found the enemy in deep and well-protected defences. Though the leading companies fought their way to the planned objective, the reserve companies met fierce resistance as they tried to link the left of this objective to Panzer Army's reaction to this Australian operation was immediate and violent, showing the importance attached, as the German records prove, to the possession of
While this new phase of the British offensive was beginning, 51 Division was carrying out four minor operations intended to complete the first phase. On the right of the sector 1 Gordons tried to advance to the ‘Aberdeen’ locality, where the survivors of its D Company were thought to be still holding out. With nearchaotic congestion in the Gordons' area, where tanks, trucks, guns, and men of 1 Armoured Division were constantly on the move among the infantry positions, neither reconnaissance, observation, nor liaison with the armour was sufficient to pin-point the positions of the survivors or the enemy in ‘Aberdeen’ or of the leading elements of the armour nearby, so that artillery support could not safely be laid on. Accordingly, in a silent advance begun about an hour before the Australians' attack started, a company and a half of the Gordons set off, only to meet unexpected opposition. Somehow in the engagement, the group of survivors was discovered some way to the north of the point of attack and contact was eventually made with them. Portions of the ‘Aberdeen’ locality, however, still remained in enemy hands.
About the same time, the four companies of 5 Black Watch, with a squadron of
The ‘Nairn’ locality, to the south-west of ‘
According to the German records, the area against which most of the Highland Division's attacks this night had been directed was held by III Battalion of 382 Regiment. Threatened during the day of the 25th, and almost surrounded by the advances of 2 Armoured Brigade on its north and 24 Brigade to its south, the battalion had sent back reports on which Africa Corps had prepared an armoured counter-attack to relieve the infantry. What exactly occurred to the force detailed for counter-attack is far from clear, but it seems probable that elements of the force came through the gap between
Also on the Highlanders' front, an operation was planned for this night by 1 Armoured Division to place the reserve unit of 7 Motor Brigade, 2 Rifle Battalion, 2 Battalion, The Rifle Brigade.
A further opportunity for an advance by the armour was lost this night when 5 Black Watch, correctly gauging the state of the enemy's defences at ‘
On the rest of 30 Corps' front, that is, on the sectors held by the New Zealand, South African and Indian divisions, no major operations were undertaken this night though patrols were sent out in some strength, all of which reported that the enemy appeared to be working hard on new defences and showed no signs of withdrawal. At dusk all the units of
The confusion over positions and objectives was brought to a head this night when the Motor Brigade's operations had to be altered in consequence of the last-minute discovery that its objectives and those of the Highland Division either coincided or overlapped. The Motor Brigade was finally given a general role of sending a reconnaissance group behind the Gordons' advance to check and clear a route for tanks to the Kidney feature. The reconnaissance appears to have been started late and, after dawn, was held up by enemy fire, the brigade reporting that it had run into opposition from the ‘Nairn’ locality. As this locality was so far from the intended route, the report was questioned, and when similar dubious reports from the armour reached Eighth Army headquarters, including one that the Kidney feature was occupied by Highland troops, Army insisted that the discord over map reading, which so bedevilled co-operation between armour, infantry and artillery, be settled once and for all. During daylight on the 26th it was arranged that certain tanks should fire signal rockets on which the Army's flash-spotting posts could take bearings. This check, which showed that few if any of the tanks were as far west as they claimed, was only reluctantly accepted by the armour.
When, on the morning of the 25th, Montgomery was making his decision to change 30 Corps' direction of attack, he had also under consideration alternative plans submitted by Horrocks of 13 Corps. Though the constricted bridgehead of the two beleagured battalions of 131 Brigade west of the second enemy minefield offered a sallying point for the armour, Horrocks himself favoured a new line of attack further north, away from the dominating observation of the enemy on 21 Panzer Division in the south. In agreeing, he enjoined Horrocks to keep his armour ‘in being’ in case it was needed elsewhere.
The new plans illustrate how strong the spirit of the textbooks and tactical exercises remained in 13 Corps. Whereas the older desert formations preferred to move on compass bearings to grid references, trig. points, or features named on the map, newer arrivals peppered their orders with nostalgic code-names. So in 13 Corps the minefields were called after the months of the year, the gaps after English towns ending in gate or ford (with the odd inclusion of Henryford), areas were known as ‘The Moor’ or ‘The Puddle’ and objectives as ‘The Cape’ or ‘The Twins’.
Horrocks' plan was in effect the second phase of the original plan, in which the infantry of 50 Division were to move up when the armour had succeeded in breaking out and swinging north to its final objective. Details of such an advance had already been prepared so that its choice may have been influenced by this as much as by its tactical value. The first moves, made in full daylight on the 25th and designed to give the impression of impending armoured action, were for units of the dummy tank brigade to move openly to the rear of the area of attack and for 4 Light Armoured Brigade to reconnoitre ‘The Puddle’, the minefield loop to the south of the objective which the light brigade was to ‘dominate’ in order to prevent the enemy from outflanking the infantry on the objective. The dummy tanks were brought up without trouble and may have had an effect on the enemy, but the light tanks, sallying forth in the afternoon on their reconnaissance, became involved in a minefield and then came under fire, losing fifteen tanks all told.
After dark on the 25th, while the Greeks from north of 45 Folgore prisoners for a loss of 144 killed, wounded, or missing. On the left, 5 Battalion The East Yorkshire Regiment ran into trouble either from the supporting artillery fire or from the enemy, and with the loss of 106 men fell back before it reached its objective. This partial failure caused the next phase of the operation, an advance further north to ‘The Twins’, to be postponed.
While this action was taking place, the two battalions of 131 Brigade quietly withdrew from their bridgehead west of the outer minefield, the corps front then being established along the rear of this field.
By the morning of the 26th Eighth Army was in possession, from documents and prisoners, including the Australians' valuable bag the previous evening, of information which made it seem unlikely that the Panzer Army would start a major counter-offensive. That this deduction was correct is borne out by the German records, the defence policy followed being for local counter-attacks to close breaches in the line and for the maintenance of a stubborn opposition to wear down the assault. Apart from the limited reserves of troops in North Africa, the main reason for this immobility, in an army noted previously for its mobility, was the petrol situation. So acute was the shortage that major movements could only be made at the expense of the daily maintenance of the troops in the defences. As at
With fears removed of a counter-thrust, and also hopes disproved, by patrols and observation, that the enemy was thinning out, Montgomery devoted this morning to an appraisal of the situation. He was not yet aware of Rommel's return to the theatre the previous evening so did not anticipate any change in the Panzer Army's policy. His staff had prepared an accounting of Eighth Army's losses set against an estimate of the enemy's, the latter of such staggering proportions that, had it been correct, the Panzer Army would have had few men or weapons left to fight with.
The British official narrative records this estimate as 61,000 men, 530 tanks, 340 field guns, etc.
The British casualties since the evening of the 23rd were assessed as 4643 men in 30 Corps, 455 in
With these facts and estimates before him, Montgomery issued a general directive, the main point of which was that the infantry of 30 Corps should form a firm front facing west and prepare to withstand local counter-attacks. Freed thus from responsibility to support the infantry, the armour of
Later in the day detailed dispositions were issued by Army Headquarters. These included the relief of most of the Australians' original western front by 152 Brigade, the reserve formation of 51 Division, and the withdrawal of the New Zealand Division to reserve, the gap thus caused to be filled by a general side-step to the north, the South Africans and Indians moving up a sector and 13 Corps extending its northern boundary. The tanks of 7 Armoured Division were also to make ready to move to the northern sector as soon as word was received that 21 Panzer Division was doing likewise. All this reorganisation was to be completed by dawn of the 28th, ready for the next major assault timed for the evening of that day.
While this planning was in progress the Australians' overnight gains were being subjected to a series of counter-attacks. The value of the newly won
By two o'clock in the afternoon the observers on the point reported that there were some 200 enemy tanks within their area of observation—an estimate that must have included trucks and tracked troop-carriers—while groups of infantry could be seen collecting; at the same time the enemy fire noticeably increased. Under heavy air and artillery support called for by the Australians, however, the enemy vehicles dispersed to cover and only a few infantry came within rifle range of the Australian defenders of the point, and these men, divorced from their supporting tanks, either went into cover or withdrew. Gradually during the afternoon enemy movement and shellfire diminished until by last light the counter-attack appeared to have been abandoned, although up to one hundred vehicles could still be seen to the west of the point.
During this period, the tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade, claiming to be in the area held by 2/13 Australian Battalion and even as far forward as the Kidney feature, had received orders to fan out to the north-west and cover the western flank of the newly won
Under orders to join 2 Armoured Brigade, 24 Armoured Brigade, its tank crews suffering by now from loss of sleep, took some time to get replenished and sorted out. An advance party, navigating on the map references supplied by 1 Armoured Division, got as far as the isolated group of Highlanders in the ‘Aberdeen’ locality but was unable to find 2 Brigade. The rest of the brigade, setting off about midday, became delayed in the near-chaotic conditions prevailing along the extensions of Sun and Moon tracks, where the confined areas between the minefields were full of Highlanders, motorised infantry, artillery, and replenishment columns serving them all. As it neared the front the armoured brigade came under the shellfire that accompanied the counter-attacks, so the tanks dispersed and the guns deployed as best they could to help in the defensive fire. One squadron of
Thus, by the evening of the 26th, the Army Commander's orders for a screen of armour on the west of the Australian front had not yet been fulfilled, a screen that was vitally necessary if the Australian crumbling operations were to continue without interference from the enemy's armoured reserve. The men of the tank
The Highlanders on the northern part of their division's front came under fire throughout the 26th, but were saved from direct engagement against the counter-attacks by the tanks and motorised infantry sharing their front. The lost company of the
The men of the New Zealand Division and the tank crews of 9 Armoured Brigade, which now mustered fifty-nine tanks in two regiments, spent the day of the 26th under intermittent shell-fire. There was little enemy activity close to the ridge but observers reported considerable vehicle movement some two and a half to three miles to the west. Towards evening, after the artillery had laid some heavy concentrations on these vehicles, they appeared to withdraw. The artillery activity, however, drew the attention of enemy aircraft which bombed 6 Field Regiment's gun lines, causing casualties and damage in the regiment and also in the Divisional Cavalry and 28 Battalion.
During the day plans were prepared for reorganising and straightening the Division's front. For 5 Brigade the plans entailed the relief of 21 Battalion by 28 Battalion, and the reorganising of 22 Battalion's sector after the departure of the
On the South African front the day's activities were similar to those of the New Zealanders. Observers confirmed a trend of the movement of enemy vehicles towards the north from which it was deduced that troops were being moved from the southern sector. Initial preparations were made by the division to take over the New Zealand front and plans were made for the night advance to straighten the front. Next in line to the south, the Indians also prepared to ‘side-slip’ while continuing with their task of simulating offensive intentions. For this task, their artillery laid two bursts of high explosive and smoke on the western end of
For 13 Corps the morning of the 26th brought a period of some confusion. When daylight allowed the results of 69 Brigade's night attacks to be clearly known, Horrocks cancelled the further phases of the operation and ordered 50 Division to prepare a plan for clearing the Folgore Division, but before the men had settled in, the enemy came to life with heavy defensive fire under which the company withdrew, with sixty-six of its number casualties.
Until dusk on the 26th the enemy facing 13 Corps showed no signs of withdrawing or thinning out. Though his harassing fire was reduced, his reaction by artillery, mortars and small arms to
By dint of concentrated staff work at all levels the details and timings for the changes in dispositions were ready for a conference held at headquarters of 30 Corps on the evening of the 26th. At the same time the motorised infantry of 7 Motor Brigade were getting ready for their advance beyond the FDLs to form a base of manoeuvre for 1 Armoured Division, while the Highlanders, New Zealanders and South Africans prepared their final efforts to secure those portions of the original objective as yet unattained.
On the part of their front facing north the Australians had a busy night straightening out their line eastwards from
Matters did not go so well further south where 7 Motor Brigade planned to occupy two objectives, ‘Woodcock’ on the north and ‘Snipe’ on the south of the Kidney contour, and by pinching out the anti-tank posts in the area, allow the armour to pass through into the open. The troops of the Motor Brigade were then to follow the tanks, their places in ‘Woodcock’ and ‘Snipe’ being taken by 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade.
The commanders of the two motor brigade units concerned, 2 Battalion The King's Royal Rifle Corps for ‘Woodcock’ and 2 Rifle Battalion for ‘Snipe’, were told of the plan in time for them to reconnoitre routes forward and to observe the objectives, while an artillery programme was worked out for all available guns of 10 and 30 Corps to fire concentrations in the path of the infantry. With the confusion over map reading not yet fully settled, one battalion commander, with doubts whether the artillery fire would fall on the path he intended to follow, made a second reconnaissance but his return was too late to allow the plans to be checked and altered. In the event the advance began with some misgivings.
On the right 2 KRRC set off in Bren carriers at 9.30 p.m. with the intention of debussing 800 yards short of the map references given for ‘Woodcock’ and completing the advance on foot. With
In similar conditions of poor visibility and uncertain navigation 2 Rifle Battalion set off from a start line laid out in daylight, probably to the east of the ‘portées and some vehicles with stores joined the infantry, the guns and stores being unloaded and the vehicles retiring, but unfortunately both the medical officer and the artillery observation officer were not with the battalion. Carriers on patrol to the south an hour after midnight had a short encounter with an Italian tank laager, while in the increasing light towards dawn the men on the north of the position reported a number of German tanks not far off. By opening fire as soon as visibility permitted, the anti-tank gunners claimed fourteen tanks knocked out before the enemy retired.
The orders issued by 1 Armoured Division were that at 4.30 a.m. 2 Armoured Brigade should proceed via ‘Woodcock’ and face north while 24 Armoured Brigade made for ‘Snipe’ and faced west, but at 4 a.m. 2 Armoured Brigade was ordered to wait until dawn, when it was hoped that reliable information of the ‘Woodcock’ operation would be available. As reports indicated that ‘Snipe’ was occupied, 24 Armoured Brigade was told to advance as planned. Having set its own zero hour half an hour later, this brigade had to hasten its start but eventually managed to assemble and set off in the dust, darkness and congestion through the minefield gaps, its tank crews close to physical exhaustion.
The Highlanders took advantage of the armour's activities on the evening of the 26th to send a company to reinforce the isolated garrison holding ‘Aberdeen’, which lay almost midway between the ‘Woodcock’ and ‘Snipe’ objectives and about 1000 yards to the east. Some two hours after midnight men and vehicles of 2 KRRC passed through the locality and towards dawn marched back again, drawing a considerable amount of fire on the troops of 1
The reorganisation of the New Zealand front and the extension of the left wing to the original final objective were completed during the night of the 26–27th in spite of heavy enemy fire drawn down by 6 Brigade's attack. By 10 p.m. the men of 28 Battalion had taken over the front-line defences of 21 Battalion and the companies of 22 Battalion were being resettled after the departure of
Under artillery support, the details of which were not clearly recorded, 26 Battalion set off at 10 p.m. to advance its right flank a short way to conform with 22 Battalion's line and to swing its left about 400 yards forward in conjunction with 25 Battalion's operation. Except for a heavily booby-trapped minefield which brought several casualties, B Company on the right met little opposition but was harassed by mortar and machine-gun fire as the new positions were being sited and dug. The longer advance by A Company on the left was met by similar fire and brought to a halt, and, though C Company from reserve was sent up to assist, the objective was not reached. Anti-tank and Vickers guns were then brought up behind B Company to cover the battalion front.
At the same hour 25 Battalion advanced under a creeping barrage with its three companies in line. The start was not auspicious for the battalion strength was too low for the riflemen to spread over the whole front in contact, and accordingly the companies had to operate almost independently. On the right flank, C Company overran some Italian-held posts and, after losing several men to booby traps in the minefields and nearly as many to escort prisoners to the rear, reached the area of the objective very low in numbers. A patrol exploiting further to the west met strong opposition from German
On the southern flank, B Company advanced without proper contact with the South Africans on its left. The two leading platoons were caught in a concentration of fire, possibly from the New Zealand or South African guns, and only one platoon covered the 800 to 1000 yards which brought it on to the line of the objective.
Though 6 Brigade could claim to have gained most of its objective by midnight, the enemy continued to react strongly with mortars and machine-gun fire, hindering attempts to establish contact between the companies and with the South Africans, though the latter could be heard and seen in action well off to the south. From the start of the operation enemy machine guns swept the minefield gaps over the ridge in 25 Battalion's old front, holding up the passage of support weapons. About 3 a.m. a message from C Company reached the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Bonifant, to report the movement of enemy tanks and lorried infantry on the company's front. Calling on the artillery for the defensive fire tasks prepared for this sector, the battalion commander went forward to the ridge, where he directed fire from a tank against the enemy covering the gaps. With the help of Major
Enemy reaction to 6 Brigade's advance remained lively until well into daylight, with machine guns and mortars firing at any movement in the company areas and 88-millimetre guns laying
2 Battalion, 61 Regiment of Trento Division, the battalion's headquarters being among the positions overrun.
Immediately to the south of 6 Brigade's area of operations,
On the left sector of the South African front, 3 Brigade, already fully on the original objective, managed to improve its front by occupying several posts from which the enemy retired when attacked by patrols.
No major activity was undertaken by 4 Indian Division during this night as the division was concerned with preparations for the reliefs planned to start next day. These entailed the move on the 27th of 161 Brigade, on relief by
Apart from the showing of its dummy tanks and the employment after dark on the 26th of a ‘sonic unit’ to simulate the noises of tanks in movement, 13 Corps passed a quiet night. That hopes of further offensive action had not been entirely abandoned is shown by directions given by Horrocks for the engineers of 44 Division to continue gapping the February minefield ‘by stealth’. The corps' main concern was, however, the problem of spreading its infantry over its extended front and the release of 7 Armoured Division.
Had Horrocks been aware of the enemy's growing insecurity and fuel problems, he need not have worried about defence, for during this night the Panzer Army finally decided that it would have to
THE fourth day of the battle saw one of the most gallant actions of the desert war, an action that, though unpremeditated in its form and almost unknown at the time to the higher command, had a great effect on the enemy. It began in the half light before dawn when 2 Rifle Battalion, hastily dug in short of its ‘Snipe’ objective, opened fire on the enemy tanks and vehicles almost surrounding it. In thus disclosing its position the battalion seems to have relied on the planned arrival at dawn of 1 Armoured Division's tanks. At the headquarters of the division it was believed, from wireless messages received, that both the motor battalions were on or very close to their objectives, 2 King's Royal Rifle Corps holding ‘Woodcock’ with a company, the rest of the battalion being only a little way to the rear, and 2 Rifle Battalion in full strength on ‘Snipe’, though, owing to the prevalent vagaries in map reading and navigation, the exact positions held were uncertain. With the Rifle Corps battalion apparently somewhat scattered, the commander of 1 Armoured Division told 2 Armoured Brigade to make a daylight reconnaissance before sending its regiments to ‘Woodcock’ but directed 24 Armoured to start at 4.30 a.m., as previously planned, for ‘Snipe’. The latter brigade, after its first quiet night for some days, was unprepared for so early a start, but eventually got its leading regiments, 47 and
Collecting on its way a number of enemy stragglers, mostly German, 2 Armoured Brigade came up behind and to the south of the main body of 2 KRRC, then a little way east of the Kidney contour, where it came under anti-tank gun fire. Halting in hull-down
Further south 24 Armoured Brigade worked its way forward on a wide front, III Battalion of 382 Regiment, a unit which, though out of touch with the rear and reputedly overwhelmed earlier according to the Africa Corps' diary, had been mainly responsible for upsetting the Highlanders' efforts at clearing up their front.
As the tanks came slowly forward, the rifle battalion on ‘Snipe’ continued its lone battle, its guns firing on the enemy tanks to damage or destroy several and force the rest to move further away. Shortly after dawn broke, the whole battalion area was subjected to heavy fire to which, without an artillery observation officer, the battalion could not retaliate. Hopes of help rose about 7.30 a.m. when, through the haze raised by the shelling and the smoke of burning vehicles, tanks were seen coming up from the rear, but these at first opened fire at long range on the battalion's vehicles and the derelict tanks around. Only a brave sortie by one of the rifle battalion's officers persuaded them, then identified as a squadron of
With only eleven runners left,
During these engagements around ‘Snipe’, 2 Armoured Brigade had been trying to gain the high ground by
Thus by midday the men in ‘Snipe’, on the withdrawal of British tanks to north and south, were left completely unsupported, but fortunately the enemy also chose this time to slacken his efforts. The pause enabled 2 Rifle Battalion to check its losses, which were now serious. Casualties in men were steadily mounting and only thirteen of the original nineteen or twenty anti-tank guns remained in action. Ammunition for the guns was also running low. The respite was short, however, for about 1 p.m. the Italian tank force on the west again probed forward towards the sector which had had the heaviest losses in guns. Only one of the six-pounders could be brought to bear effectively but this one gun, courageously manned, drove the Italians off, accounting for nine of the tanks, some at a range of only 200 yards.
While this engagement was still on, the Bays of 2 Armoured Brigade had begun their second attempt to gain 21 Panzer Division (then estimated at a strength of 120 tanks) was on the point of launching an attack. The Bays accordingly fell back to form a defensive line with
The first indications of enemy movement appear to have been seen by the Australian observers on
Coinciding in time with this engagement, but proceeding much more cautiously, another enemy force advanced under a smoke screen to the south of ‘Snipe’ and commenced a long-range duel with
The enemy's final effort for the 27th was an advance from the north-west against
When darkness fell on the 27th, and the British tanks carried out their normal manoeuvre of retiring to laager, 2 Rifle Battalion was left isolated in ‘Snipe’, its wireless out of action and with no physical contact with friendly troops. The senior surviving officer decided that his task was still to hold fast until relieved by 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade, as originally planned and as promised earlier in the day by 7 Motor Brigade when the wireless was working. He had the wounded collected and sent back in some of the remaining vehicles and reorganised the surviving men, guns and ammunition as best he could. About 9 p.m. heavy fire fell on one company area, probably as a diversion for the enemy's efforts at tank recovery for no attack developed, but the company, out of ammunition, retired to battalion headquarters. Then, when 25-pounder concentrations began to fall in and around the position, the acting commander decided that the relief force was on its way and gave orders for the surviving guns to be demolished and the men to start marching back. Against a casualty list of under 100 of the 300 or so men who made up the battalion group and the loss of most of their vehicles, carriers and anti-tank guns, 2 Rifle Battalion was credited, after an official investigation, with a score
The six-pounders were manned by the Battalion's ‘S’ Company which had 11 or 12 guns in the defences, and 239 Battery of 76 Anti-Tank Regiment, inter alia, in El Alamein and
On a claim of 47 enemy tanks, 2 Armoured Brigade was allowed by the same investigation a total of 12 to 15, most of which fell victim to
The Highland Division, except for its artillery, took little active part in the actions of the 27th, though its men in the northern part of the sector spent an uncomfortable day as the British tanks passed and re-passed, drawing enemy fire. The division took the opportunity of the presence of the tanks to strengthen its line and make firm contact with the various isolated groups scattered over its front. In doing so, the Highlanders gathered in the occupants of several enemy posts who were disturbed by the comings and goings of the tanks, principally of 24 Armoured Brigade, whose tanks spread so far to the south that some were clearly visible to the men of 5 New Zealand Brigade.
On neither the New Zealand nor the South African front was there any counter-attack, though both sectors reported air attacks and heavy shellfire in the morning.
There were few hostile exchanges on 13 Corps' front during daylight on the 27th. Having sent its main armoured reserve to the northern part of the battle, the southern half of the Panzer Army had little desire to invite attack. At the same time 13 Corps was busy with regrouping to extend its front into 30 Corps' area and to fill up the gaps caused by the transfer of the main part of 7
Owing to the general confusion over positions and the lack of reliable information being sent back, the significance of the actions on the 27th was not clearly understood until much later at the headquarters of the army or the two corps. Early in the morning Army Headquarters had warned the corps that 21 Panzer Division was likely to be thrown into the battle, upon which Lumsden asked that the reserve armour,
A report on a reconnaissance of the objectives by the lorried infantry brigade illustrates how the situation appeared during the day. The report stated that the objectives were over a rise past the Highlanders' forward posts, bare of cover, swept by machine-gun fire, unmarked and impossible to recognise on the ground. There was no point of observation from which they could be seen and no reliable guides. In fact, the brigade was left to work out for itself the route and positions to be gained, and could be offered no assistance other than artillery support which might, or might not, fall to its advantage.
On the Panzer Army's side, the fighting on the 27th was called by the diarist of the Africa Corps a noteworthy defensive success against a powerful attempt to break through the line. The overnight advances of the New Zealanders and South Africans against
The progress of 7 Motor Brigade gave more concern, for both 2 King's Royal Rifle Corps and 2 Rifle Battalion had cut gaps in a part of 15 Panzer Division's front where the infantry defences were thin and to some extent badly organised. Infantry of 21 Panzer Division, arriving overnight, were sent at once to back up this
With as poor communications and as much confusion as on the British side, the attack broke up into a number of independent actions. The infantry, accepting as their task merely to regain the line held the previous evening, did not press their advance further than was necessary against the British artillery concentrations, and never, as far as is recorded, reached the British defences.
The tanks, on most of the front, were prepared to withdraw once they found that the infantry were not coming up to take over the ground gained. Only at ‘Snipe’ did the tanks reach within range of the British infantry's anti-tank guns. This pocket of resistance is not specifically mentioned in the German records, but it was clearly the appearance of the rifle battalion so far forward, together with the early morning advance of the British tanks behind it, that brought 21 Panzer and 90 Light Division into the fight. The Panzer Army's tank losses on this day cannot be clearly established, but between the 26th and 28th, 15 Division's strength went down by 18 battleworthy heavy tanks, and 21 Division's by 53, leaving the two divisions with but 67 heavy tanks between them. In the same period Littorio Division lost 27 of its 60 ‘runners’.
Towards evening, with such evidence that even with all his available armoured reserve, his Panzer Army could not even dent the Eighth Army's line, Rommel called the counter-attack off, directing that ‘present positions’ should be held.
As dusk fell on the 27th the Africa Corps considerable annoyance, slowing its communications and adding to the fog of battle. Though it probably had little effect on the outcome of operations, it at least reduced the efficiency of German communications down to the level of those prevailing in much of the Eighth Army.
On the ground, 152 Brigade of 51 Division set out from its reserve position to travel north into the Australian sector and then west to take over the western front held by 20 Brigade, whose two battalions, on relief, were to sidestep into the
The Highlanders were several hours late, holding up the movement of 20 Brigade. In the meantime 2/48 Battalion on I Battalion, 104 Regiment, the total delay held up the completion of the relief until nearly dawn. The Australian front, on the morning of the 28th, was then held by 24 Brigade on the coastal sector and by 20 Brigade, with the
As the Australian regrouping was taking place, the front to the south of
Moving forward ostensibly to 2 Rifle Battalion's relief, 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade had delayed its start, and its artillery support, for an hour owing to various confusions, chief of which was lack of information on the rifle battalion's exact location and its survival. Finally, with an hour's artillery support laid on ‘Woodcock’ but well west of ‘Snipe’ in case of the riflemen's survival, the three lorried infantry battalions set off about 10.30 p.m., 4 Royal Sussex making for ‘Woodcock’, 5 Royal Sussex for ‘Snipe’ and 2 Royal Sussex for the area in between. The leading troops of 4 Royal Sussex were soon in action but their opponents turned out to be the
The third company had earlier turned off to the south to deal with fire coming from that quarter. What happened then is uncertain, but the company seems to have been captured almost intact, for the German diaries record a large bag of prisoners taken about this time.
The left-hand battalion, 5 Royal Sussex, passed through the Black Watch troops in ‘
In the centre, 2 Royal Sussex seems to have gone slightly further west than the left-flank battalion and was possibly nearly level with that on the right. Its advance was relatively uneventful, though it became separated from its anti-tank guns and other support weapons which were not brought forward until well after daylight.
With the advance of 133 Brigade, Gatehouse of
By 3 a.m. Gatehouse claimed that all information received indicated that the three battalions' objectives had been occupied. His headquarters confirmed this in a message which reached Army Headquarters three hours later. However, the wireless link with the headquarters of 133 Brigade was working erratically and at 4 a.m. failed completely. Neither the artillery observation officer with the brigade nor the armoured division's liaison officer, both of whom could have provided alternative wireless channels, were of much help for both had lost touch with the brigade headquarters group as it moved forward behind the centre battalion.
Shortly before dawn three squadrons of the The motorised infantry of 2 Armoured Brigade, comprising one anti-tank and three motor companies or squadrons.
On the southern flank of the operation, on hearing that 5 Royal Sussex had gained ‘Snipe’, the commander of 24 Armoured Brigade ordered
On the rest of 30 Corps' front there was little hostile activity this night. Early in the evening the three New Zealand field regiments with their attached anti-aircraft batteries pulled out their guns and moved to positions in the rear of the Australian sector. Here the regiments, under the divisional artillery headquarters, were
During the night troops of 1 South African Brigade came up in transport and, in spite of a heavy bout of mortaring from the enemy, took over the front line in a smoothly organised relief. The New Zealanders and their armour then travelled back to a bivouac area a few miles to the rear.
The southern front also passed a quiet night as 13 Corps extended its front northwards into 4 Indian Division's sector and made preparations to relieve 7 Armoured Division of responsibility in defence. Patrols were unable to find any evidence of enemy withdrawal on this front.
The dawn of 28 October saw almost a repetition of the situation that had existed twenty-four hours earlier. Once again lorried infantry had advanced overnight into a salient in which the exact locations of the battalions were uncertain and communications with the tanks and artillery unreliable or non-existent. As before, the enemy came to life in the increasing light with counter-attacks before defences and communications had been established, but on this morning the doughty resistance of the Rifle Battalion was not repeated.
At first light 2 Armoured Brigade broke night laager and sent the Bays and
When lack of communication with his battalions brought the commander of 133 Brigade forward on reconnaissance, all he could find of 4 Royal Sussex, apart from some abandoned anti-tank guns, were members of the Headquarters Company who had been following up the main battalion group.
Further south, and possibly slightly to the rear of 4 Royal Sussex, the men of 2 Royal Sussex were fortunate in not being directly attacked, as they also were poorly dug in and were not joined by their anti-tank guns until well after daylight. The presence of
On the southern prong of the advance 5 Royal Sussex also suffered under enemy fire but was not directly attacked, again possibly because of the uncoordinated action of British tanks in the vicinity. The Crusader squadron leading
Action continued in the area during the morning when enemy tanks, possibly the same that had attacked 4 Royal Sussex and the Yorkshire Dragoon squadron, advanced to threaten 2 King's Royal Rifle Corps some way to the east of the ‘Woodcock’ locality. The enemy withdrew on meeting fire from the battalion's anti-tank guns and probably from the tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade, for
The extremely fluid method of command practised by the armour was in full evidence this morning for, instead of being urged to break out to the north-west as originally planned or even to press forward to the support of the Royal Sussex, 2 Armoured Brigade
Shortly before noon on the 28th the most determined counter-attack of the day began with heavy artillery fire on
Coinciding with this midday attack on
On the ‘Snipe’ front the commander of
On the withdrawal of
This was the situation when dusk fell on the 28th. The two surviving battalions of 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade, 2 and 5 Royal Sussex, were still in their isolated and exposed positions well west of the main defence line. The supporting armour, the three newly arrived regiments of
Apart from the actions on the north-west corner of Eighth Army's front, there was little activity other than the limited harassing programmes of artillery fire by 13 Corps designed to keep the enemy from regrouping. Both the South Africans and the Indians, as well as 13 Corps, were busy with organising their rearranged sectors and preparing for further troop movements to fit the Army's latest plans. In the morning of the 28th the Army Commander held a conference at which he laid down that further offensive operations through the ‘Woodcock’ and ‘Snipe’ objectives would cease until the next morning, when
Montgomery's action in permitting this switch of command while many of the troops involved were still in action offers some evidence that he was not yet fully aware of how haphazard were the methods under which the British armour still operated. The channels along which information was sent back and orders forward were normally
‘Jorrocks … said that the “G” Staff in Generals at War.
Further conferences this morning confirmed the plans for the next Australian push, to begin that night while 51 Division went completely over to the defensive on a front composed of strong-points linked by wire and mines. The commander of the Highland Division also arranged for a set of beacons to be erected in an attempt to reconcile the discrepancies in map reading which had added to the confusion whenever the armour and its artillery were involved.
After a visit to the Australian sector, This in spite of Montgomery's earlier assertions that he would fight divisions as divisions and not piecemeal. Here his action was perhaps justified for supercharge, intended to be the final blow of the battle. He had earlier made submissions to Leese that the New Zealand Division should be kept in being for its original role as part of the ‘break-out’ force and, because of its low strength and lack of immediate reinforcements, should not be used for further ‘break-in’ operations. But as there was no other commander with greater desert experience—except Morshead who was fully occupied with his own operations—the Army Commander decided that
The provisional plan at this stage was for a New Zealand brigade to take over part of the Australian sector on the night of 30–31 October as a base from which the heterogeneous collection of attached brigades would advance practically parallel with the coast, with
The rest of
At the end of this day Army Headquarters released the news that an enemy tanker had been sunk off Contrary to popular belief, Panzer Army's fuel problem, Africa Corps had enough petrol for its immediate battle needs for its Quartermaster had built up an undisclosed reserve. There was, of course, a shortage throughout the
The surviving enemy tank states indicate that from the 28th to the 31st the two German divisions found it difficult to muster 100 tanks in running order between them, while Littorio had between 30 and 40. Ariete and Trieste still had their original strengths of about 129 and 34 respectively on the 28th.
On the German side the continuing action around the ‘Woodcock-Snipe’ area led Rommel to the conclusion that this was the intended focal point of the Eighth Army's offensive, though the commander of Africa Corps, von Thoma, seems to have had his doubts. The advance of 4 Royal Sussex and the
Panzer Army campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
Panzer Army campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
Ibid. The exact number of British tanks put out of action by the Panzer Army is difficult to assess but was nowhere near this total, although the British loss of available ‘runners’ by all causes was possibly higher. The count of prisoners in Eighth Army's cages on the evening of the 28th gave a total of 1268 Germans and
Both petrol and ammunition were bringing Rommel greater worries each day. Although he had not yet seriously considered leaving the fixed defences for a war of manoeuvre, as he still had hopes of holding on until the Eighth Army wore itself to a stand-still, he knew that petrol stocks were diminishing at a rate that would limit the possibilities of withdrawal and manoeuvre.
The ammunition problem was of a different nature, for it was only in certain types of ammunition that the dumps were running short. On appeal to von Rintelen in It was in the last week of October that the assault on
However, Rommel managed to get a promise that both Italian and German transport aircraft would fly in petrol, but von Rintelen,
Panzer Army campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
The Panzer Army had acquired by capture a British operation order, presumably for
Ibid.
For its general reserve the Panzer Army had the
NIGHTFALL on 28 October heralded the start of the final phase of Montgomery's effort to overwhelm the Panzer Army. Although the battle so far had not gone exactly to the letter of the plans—for the armour's break-out had not yet occurred, while the ‘crumbling process’ had been restricted to the relatively narrow front of 30 Corps' salient—much had been achieved in inducing the enemy to lay on costly and fruitless counter-attacks. The transfer of
As part of his plan of enticing counter-attack, Montgomery had always intended to ‘crumble’ the defences between the north of the Australian penetration and the coast, an operation that would not only remove the most complicated and strongly defended sector of the Panzer Army's line but would also free the coast road and railway for a break-out and pursuit. As already recorded, the first stages of this crumbling had been attempted and a further operation was
The first phase opened at 10 p.m. with 2/13 Battalion moving north-east from its defences on the east of
As 2/15 Battalion's new position formed a narrow and vulnerable salient, strenuous efforts were made to secure it firmly, with the four companies dug in for all-round defence and a Hawkins minefield laid on north and west.
As soon as information sent back indicated that Phase I was going well, Morshead ordered that Phase II should proceed as planned. In this phase 2/23 Battalion (26 Brigade) was to marry up with
As news of this action filtered back, Morshead called off further operations, directing 2/23 Battalion to go under 20 Brigade's command and join its front with 2/13 and 2/15 Battalions. Australian casualties for this night were not excessive, while the whole operation brought in some 200 to 300 prisoners, mostly German. Fifteen Valentines were put out of action, mainly by mines, but most were later recovered.
The Panzer Army recorded that this night started with a ‘terrific’ artillery preparation that rose ‘to a violence not before experienced’. After a gallant defence lasting six hours,
Panzer Army campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
With most of their artillery firing for the Australians on this night of 28–29 October, neither 10 Armoured nor 51 Division attempted any major action. With a strength of 46 heavy and 17 Crusader tanks,
At dawn on the 29th the Australians were well settled in their new gains. Though the finger pointing north from 90 Light Division was observed in the form of groups of infantry forming up to the north-east of 2/13 Battalion. Under the defensive fire, the troops disappeared from view and no further attempts were reported during the morning, though enemy shellfire, particularly of airburst salvoes, was heavy at times over the newly-won area. About midday Stukas flew overhead, dropping their loads rather indiscriminately on their own as well as the British lines east of the point, and at the same time the enemy shelling increased. Both tanks and infantry were then seen advancing from the west against 2/15 Battalion. Artillery fire called down by the observers on
The fog of war was particularly thick this day for the enemy. Not only around 115 Regiment ( 15 Panzer Division). This caused a gap in the defence line held by
The Panzer Army was given quite a scare towards evening of this day when the Italian headquarters commanding the rear area reported that a British column of two divisions was moving deep in the desert south of
On the British side the 29th was noteworthy as the day that an innovation long proposed was finally translated into action. Many soldiers, particularly among the armour, had been asking why the 3·7-inch anti-aircraft gun, used to protect rear areas and headquarters, could not be brought into the line and used in an antitank role as the German 88-millimetre gun was used. A trial in which these guns were brought forward and laid on derelict tanks in the front line proved clearly what the artillerymen already knew, that they were not designed for rough travelling or speedy action.
As well as suffering disappointment in its hopes of retaliation against the 88s, the armour also came under a serious criticism this
The partial failure of the Australian operation during the night, together with information reaching him on the enemy's dispositions, persuaded Montgomery, early on the 29th, to change the detail of his plans. From prisoners, intercepts, and other sources, it had become evident that 90 Light Division, the last German reserve considered of consequence, had been at last committed to battle, joining the concentration of German formations in the north of the line, and from this Montgomery deduced that Rommel, of whose return he learnt this day, was apprehensive of an offensive directed along the coastal road.
The Eighth Army's analysis of the Panzer Army's dispositions was far from accurate in any detail, and understandably so in the circumstances. At the opening of the battle, 164 Division, with Italians sandwiched among its units, had held the whole front facing 30 Corps, but, under attack, it had been forced to spread its infantry into some of the Italian positions and had then been split by the penetration from 90 Light Division, leaving it in command only of the troops left in the southern part of its original front. In the central portion there was a confusion oddly similar to that on the British side. Here infantry of both 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions, sent in to plug the gaps, were mixed with survivors of 164 Division and the Italians, but unlike the British confusion in command, Headquarters of the Africa Corps retained direct control over this sector.
The Eighth Army did not as yet know how heavily 21 Panzer Division had been involved in the fighting, and though British intelligence estimated the surviving tanks in
Memoirs, p. 132.
However, on this assumption, Montgomery was open to the influence of the proponents of the old ‘Hit the Italians’ policy and accordingly changed the thrust line of supercharge from the coast to the ‘dividing line’ between the two Axis nationalities, while the Australians continued their crumbling process towards the coast to hold the German formations. Though based on error, the change of direction had several advantages, chief of which was that it would lead the armour into open desert instead of along the coast where the terrain and defences were less suitable for armoured deployment. Timings for the change were for the Australians to start their next crumbling operation on the evening of the 30th, with the New Zealand opening of supercharge taking place the next evening. Whether the infantry managed to make a breach or not,
When he learnt of the change of direction, GOC's diary, GOC
The new plan gave the New Zealand infantry attack a narrower front, of about 4000 yards with an equivalent depth of advance. This allowed a greater concentration of artillery fire from the thirteen field and three medium regiments available to cover the path of advance. The Australians and Highlanders were given subsidiary tasks designed both to deceive the enemy on the main point of assault and to assist the clearance of the flanks, while the Air Force promised to step up its operations to the maximum, especially on known positions of enemy armour at dawn on 1 November. The alteration in the plans brought in its train a mass of staff work to rearrange assembly areas and movement routes and tables, as
in situ.
To assist land operations by keeping the enemy's available reinforcements well spread out, the
For the army, the night of 29–30 October was relatively quiet on all fronts except in the Australian salient north of
While this occurred, the troops on the left, 2/15 Battalion, were laconically reporting a series of minor counter-attacks from midnight until nearly daylight. Under artillery fire these attacks were not resolutely pressed, gaining no ground and losing twenty-three prisoners, all of 90 Light Division. What was apparently happening was that this division was sending reserves up to form its new defensive line but, in the general uncertainty and the darkness, the troops ran foul of the Australian outposts. The German division complained that it was under incessant air attacks and artillery fire throughout the night.
Further south, 10 Armoured and 51 Divisions made some minor readjustments of their combined front, the two
The 30th October dawned fine and clear, the meteorologists of the Eighth Army promising several days of good weather ahead. This was officially the day when the desert summer ceased, but Montgomery decided to retain Egyptian Summer Time for his army, mainly to save any upset that might arise in the timings of the mass of movement and artillery tables already prepared for the new offensive. It was probably a wise decision but, as it was confined
The Panzer Army changed from its summer to standard time on the following night, avoiding confusion by adding ‘old time’ or ‘new time’ to any timings in its orders for the next few days.
Throughout this day conferences at all levels were held on the new offensive, and further orders issued. At the New Zealand divisional conference,
Apart from the conferences, the day passed quietly. Air reconnaissance about midday warned the Australians of a possible attack against
The concentration of the large force due to operate under the New Zealand Division into its assembly area by
As the various units sorted themselves out,
Leese agreed with his arguments which he passed on at once to the Army Commander, who some hours later issued an official notice of postponement until the night of 1–2 November. Later, Montgomery enlarged on his action, stating that although the decision was taken with reluctance, it was necessary as, once
While the complicated movements of assembly were taking place in their rear and the postponement of the offensive was under consideration, the Australians went steadily ahead with the next step in the crumbling process. This was in effect an enlargement of the previous attack, its first objectives the gaining of the railway and a swing along it to the south-east, as before, with a thrust from this base due north to the coast, the whole operation to be undertaken by 26 Brigade. For Phase I, 2/32 Battalion (from 24 Brigade in place of 2/23 Battalion, which was to remain under 20 Brigade in the defences by
Although time allowed for preparation was short, the operation was on the same lines as those attempted before, and the Australians felt they had sufficient experience to iron out many of the earlier hitches. A detailed engineer plan was made for clearing and laying mines, and particularly for blowing and bulldozing gaps in the railway embankment, known to be a difficult and hazardous obstacle for tanks and vehicles. One problem that could not be overcome was the long and involved route to the first start line, the final northerly leg of which was exposed to enemy observation from east and west, so that the approach march could not be commenced until darkness limited observation.
AT 6.45 p.m. the first units began to move up, the tail following some three hours later. In spite of delays caused by congestion along the first leg of the route and the churned-up tracks and thick dust throughout, the leading unit, 2/32 Battalion, reached its start line only a few minutes late. Hurrying forward to catch up with the supporting fire, the men overcame some light opposition to reach their intermediate objective about half an hour after midnight. Stronger resistance was met on the way to the final objective, but positions on the road and railway were soon gained and the infantry dug in while engineers of
With good news of the initial progress coming back, the second phase was allowed to continue as planned. This involved an advance, starting at 1 a.m., through 2/32 Battalion's gains, by 2/24 Battalion on the right and 2/48 Battalion on the left in a south-easterly direction between the railway and road for some 3000 to 4000 yards. Both battalions were delayed on the approach march, while 2/48 Battalion, in the lead, had to detach a company to subdue an enemy post which prevented the men from forming up on the start line. In the meantime, 2/24 Battalion, reaching its start line just after the supporting fire opened and assuming the other battalion had already started, set off at speed to catch up, but was quickly slowed down by stubborn opposition. This allowed the two battalions to regain contact, and together they fought slowly forward until losses and exhaustion brought them to a halt. One final effort was made by the commander of 2/24 Battalion who, on hearing
In the meantime 2/3 Pioneer Battalion See Mud and Sand, Part IV, the official war history of the 2/3 Pioneer Battalion, AIF, published by the 2/3 Pioneer Battalion Association,
The diversion by 24 Brigade to assist the main operation was only partly successful. In an attack from the east along the railway, one enemy position was reduced, but the main position around Thompson's Post remained extremely active so that the opening of a direct route to 26 Brigade's gains was not achieved.
From the reports sent back by the German troops defending the coastal area it is evident that, in the belief that they had repulsed major attacks in the diversion on the opening night of the offensive and in later raids by the Australians when other fronts had given way, their confidence in their ability to stand fast was high, and it was not until the extent of this night's encirclement became known that their morale began to sag.
Although this Australian operation failed to gain the encirclement desired, it kept the Panzer Army's attention to the coastal area, as well as bringing in over 500 prisoners and silencing several artillery batteries. For the Panzer Army it pointed the difficult decision whether to relieve the coastal pocket by counter-attacks across ground clearly dominated by the massed British artillery, or whether to withdraw at once to the new line being laid out by
Panzer Army campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
Though all the information available to Rommel pointed to a major offensive in the north ‘expected to begin at any time’, Ibid.
There may have been a suspicion of wishful thinking in this, for a British attack in the south would have had the result of easing the pressure in the north and allowing him to swing the line back as originally planned, thus shortening his front and concentrating his defences. Whatever his reasons, he was unwilling to draw out the small but valuable stiffening of German troops in the southern sector, a transfer made possible at this time by the easing of the petrol shortage through the use of transport aircraft. The supply of ammunition had now become the major problem.
During the night of 30–31 October, Trieste Division had begun to relieve the front-line units of 21 Panzer Division but was found on arrival to be too weak in numbers to take over all the German positions, so that one battalion of
DAK diary, GMDS 25869/1.
For the rest of Eighth Army's front the night of 30–31 October passed quietly except for some minor patrol engagements and harassing fire, which did not hinder the reorganisation plans. Dawn on the 31st saw 6 New Zealand Brigade under 51 Division's command in the positions previously held by 152 Brigade, with 26 Battalion to the south of the Australian defences around supercharge were in their assembly areas except for 151 Brigade and some of the artillery which was supporting the Australians. There was considerable relief when news of Montgomery's decision was made known for, although most of the movement and artillery plans were completed, the troops themselves were in need of time to ensure that their weapons, equipment and vehicles were in order. There was also such congestion in the assembly areas and along the routes forward that Leese finally had to send out senior officers to get order into the chaos.
The postponement also gave the Army a chance to plan a ‘general post’ of brigades to build up a reserve but, except for the release of 131 Brigade from 44 Division to form the lorried infantry of 7 Armoured Division, most of these plans came to nothing as it became evident that the Australian operations had not cut off the coastal pocket but rather were drawing the enemy into counter-attacking.
The exact situations in which the attacking Australian battalions had ended up were not all clearly known until daylight allowed observation. There were rumours that the Pioneers had reached the coast, that the Valentines of
Meanwhile the forces for the enemy's counter-attack had assembled under Rommel's direction and about midday came into view as they moved down the road and railway from
The enemy's attacks were directed mainly at the new gains so that the 20 Brigade battalions around and north of
From the enemy's point of view the operation appeared at first to be going well. The commander of the battle group of tanks, infantry and artillery reported to Rommel that his force had captured over 100 prisoners and knocked out 18 tanks, though he admitted he had not broken through the small enemy force north of the railway and made contact with 125 Regiment. In the afternoon Rommel handed over to von Thoma with orders to complete the task and contact was finally made with some of the isolated posts of 125 Regiment, though the British bridgehead over the railway still stood firm. Reporting to Rommel, von Thoma advised the
While the Australians bore the burden of attack and counter-attack, the rest of 30 Corps' front was relatively quiet on the 31st. Most of the corps' artillery within range of the Australian front was busy all day with opportunity and ‘on call’ targets as well as defensive tasks, the guns of 7 Medium Regiment laying shells into the area of resistance around Thompson's Post for a solid five hours. Enemy shelling was also heavy, not only on the salient but also on the area to the rear, one burst catching 25 Battery of 4 New Zealand Field Regiment as it was moving out to assemble for supercharge and causing several casualties. Stukas also were active, especially over the gun lines. At Eighth Army Headquarters plans were made, cancelled and reissued for
In 13 Corps, deception measures designed to precede supercharge were allowed to continue in spite of the postponement. During daylight a mass movement of vehicles was made to give the impression that the front was being reinforced, and this was followed after dark by a programme of raids, harassing fire, and simulated mine-clearing under smoke screens. Although the desired effect of keeping the enemy guessing was probably attained, the only genuine raid—by Fighting French troops against
Towards evening the Australian commander, Morshead, having personally visited the salient north of the railway, decided that the surviving troops of 26 Brigade were in no fit state to withstand further attack and ordered that they be relieved by 24 Brigade, the latter's place in the original coastal defences being taken by a screen of the Divisional Cavalry. In one of the most efficient and quickest moves of the battle, 24 Brigade handed over to the Cavalry and, travelling the circuitous and difficult route to the salient, took over the defences under enemy fire and with the threat of attack possible at any moment. The brigade took its own 2/32 Battalion and the remains of 2/3 Pioneer Battalion under command 2/24 Battalion was down to 140 men, most of whom had been in action for nine days and nights. The 2/28th arrived with the impression that a continuous defence line ran from the railway to the sea.— ‘As our weary men climbed aboard the transports to move to Tel el Eisa, they said farewell in typical Australian language with, “Start digging, you b—s, or you'll be sorry!”—in situ. The two fresh battalions, 2/28 and 2/43, were in nearly full strength, while the relieved units, 2/24 and 2/48 Battalions, had been at little more than company strength so that new positions had to be sited and trenches dug before the defences were firm.The Second 28th, p. 107.The Second Twenty-fourth, p. 222.
The planning for South African reports vary from 617 to 734, the higher figure possibly including losses from sickness.supercharge called for an accounting by Eighth Army of its losses and of the resources still available. In men, 30 Corps had lost, between 23 and 31 October inclusive, some 1157 killed, 4229 wounded and 982 missing, a total of 6368. Comparative figures in such detail for 10 and 13 Corps are lacking but were included in a round figure of 10,000 men for the whole Army. Of the infantry divisions in 30 Corps, the Australians and Highlanders had been hardest hit with more than 1000 casualties each, and the South Africans had lost under 750.
The New Zealand Division, with two under-strength infantry brigades in the field, had sustained losses of Jaundice (infective hepatitis) and malaria, developed in
Unless 4 New Zealand Brigade, training in
Comparative casualty figures for the Panzer Army cannot be readily assessed, for the few surviving returns shown in the records are clearly incomplete. British records list a total of 3921 prisoners counted into the Eighth Army cages by the evening of the 31st, and from this it could fairly be assumed that the
In armour the British were reaching a higher ratio of superiority as losses on both sides increased. On 1 November the runners available amounted to 176 Shermans, 159 Grants, 272 Crusaders, 115
Panzer Army was down to approximately 100 heavy German tanks and 189 Italian in the field, with possibly no more than 100 of all types under repair.
Eighth Army's casualties and tank totals are based on information in the British official narrative and New Zealand records; the Panzer Army's on the campaign narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2.
On the morning of 1 November it looked as if the postponement of supercharge had caused no complications. From a prisoner taken by 6 New Zealand Brigade it was learnt that Trieste battalions had taken over
There is a strong hint in the Panzer Army's records that Rommel had begun to lose faith in his ability to control the battle at this stage. He was aware that the British still had a pool of resources that would enable them to continue their attrition tactics for some time yet and, in fact, his staff had already supplied him with an appreciation in which a strong attack in the north, possibly with an outflanking move round the south, was considered certain and immediate. His own resources, particularly in men, petrol and ammunition, were being used up faster than they could possibly be replaced (two ships carrying ammunition to Panzer Army narrative referred to as ‘skilfully handled counter attacks’ to hold a front line, much of which had been hastily prepared for defence and occupied by units in uncertain contact to flanks and rear.
On this day Rommel continued to supervise von Thoma's command, arriving at 90 Light Division's battle headquarters shortly after 8 a.m. in time to watch a heavy attack by the Luftwaffe aimed at the Australian salient. This air effort was either precipitate or its results, in the form of Stukas flaming to earth, caused ground action to be deferred. Of the enemy bombers the Desert
By 9 a.m. the Panzer Army's radioed instructions, intercepted by the Eighth Army, made it appear that an attack was imminent but nothing developed immediately, thus allowing the sixteen surviving Valentines of 125 Regiment still holding out in Thompson's Post. Probing advances and heavy fire continued throughout the afternoon, to die down towards dusk, but nowhere had the counter-attack succeeded in doing more than cause some minor withdrawals of Australian outposts. Casualties in 24 Brigade, however, were heavy, equal in fact to the total number of men 26 Brigade would have had available had it not been relieved overnight.The Second 28th, p. 112.
The Australians' determined resistance and heavy artillery fire took its toll of the enemy force, particularly of the infantry of 90 Light Division, whose commander told Rommel towards evening that his troops were not strong enough to occupy a line to the surviving 125 Regiment's positions or to mount another attack.
15 and 164 Divisions' fronts, that is, on the southern flank of the area chosen by Montgomery for supercharge. Reminiscing over this period of the battle, Rommel claimed that he was fully aware that he would soon have to retreat, ‘But first we had to wait for the British to move, to ensure that they would be engaged in battle and could not suddenly throw their strength into a gap in our front and thus force a break-through’.Rommel Papers, p. 314.
The British move that Rommel anticipated was being prepared methodically throughout 1 November. At an early morning conference at the Tactical Headquarters of the Army and at a co-ordinating conference held by
To avoid previous muddles over desert navigation and map reading, Army ordered that direction beacons should be erected well forward from which bearing pickets could be surveyed in along the routes across the ground won. These beacons were poles about 20 feet high carrying the distinguishing shapes of the named routes—Diamond, Boomerang, and Square—and they quickly proved their value, After Lieutenant-Colonel Baker of 28 Battalion had attended a conference ‘… the most unsatisfactory Bde or other conference I have ever attended. There was no orderly presentation … of either information or of the job that had to be done … the orders were very indefinite….’ Cody, 28 (Maori) Battalion, p. 236.
Though little actual movement towards the start line could be made in daylight in case of enemy observation, some risks had to be taken in the rear areas over which strong fighter cover was maintained continuously. Most of the tactical headquarters for the operation were occupied during the day by advance parties, and guiding parties were sent along the various routes as far as the start lines. In the afternoon 5 New Zealand Brigade travelled from the Onsol area to the
No movement of the armour was made in daylight, the time being spent in getting the tanks into fighting trim and assembled in their various columns. No written orders were apparently issued for the armoured brigades or regiments, the final plans being passed on verbally at conferences held late in the day. The armoured plan was for a minefield task force of 2 Rifle Battalion, and three troops of Crusaders with engineers and other necessary troops, to travel in three sections, one to a track, along Diamond, Boomerang and Square tracks as far west as the success of the infantry allowed. Following the cleared routes, the three regiments of 2 Armoured Brigade, then at a total strength of 90 Shermans and 66 Crusaders, were to lead the break-out. Next was to come 7 Motor Brigade, also in three columns carried in armoured cars, carriers and trucks, and with four of the new Churchill tanks. Of these four tanks being tried out in battle conditions, one broke down on the way forward, one was knocked out later in the day, and two retired with guns out of action. The tank strength of 22 Armoured Brigade on 1 November has not been ascertained, but from later references it must have had some 50 heavy tanks, 40 Crusaders and some Stuarts.
Along most of the Eighth Army's front except for the Australian salient the day of 1 November passed with little more than customary harassing fire by both sides and occasional sharp exchanges between guns or tanks. In the southern sector 13 Corps continued its deception movements during the day and prepared for raiding and reconnaissance patrols for the coming night under orders to keep in contact with the enemy and follow up any withdrawal.
TOWARDS evening, as the setting sun blinded the defenders, enemy tanks closed in from the west against the salient held by 125 Regiment, but the proximity of the enemy round three sides of the salient brought constant sharp exchanges of fire which continued well into dark, even after the infantry advance of supercharge had begun. At one time the Australian field gunners had to switch from their tasks in support of the advance to dealing with urgent calls from 24 Brigade for defensive fire.
The supercharge operations opened at sea where, about midnight, four motor torpedo-boats off the coast to the north of Africa Corps' signal network, badly disrupted the enemy's communication system for some hours.
Ground operations did not start as auspiciously as they might for poor communications between the two attached brigades and the New Zealand headquarters brought some confusion in the
The first of the attacking formations to move was 151 Brigade, which left i.e., 6, 8 and 9 Battalions of the
The start line for Metres were used in this operation, rather than yards, to facilitate map reading; Of the three tracks on the supercharge commenced close to supercharge front, Diamond and Square were split, but not Boomerang. To prevent confusion they were named Diamond A and B, Boomerang C, Square D and E.
Half an hour before midnight the four battalions under 151 Brigade, debussing close to their start lines, were deploying ready to follow the artillery barrage due to open at five minutes past one.
In the same manner 152 Brigade assembled on its start line, unfortunately suffering some casualties when one of its columns missed the track in the dust and darkness and ran into a minefield. Engineers of 8 NZ Field Company and the thirty-eight Valentines of
Responsibility for the protection of the southern face of the area of penetration was separated from the New Zealand Division's part in supercharge and was placed on the shoulders of 51 Division, which allocated 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade (attached from
Just before the main barrage was due to open at five past one, the men of the two battalions of 6 NZ Brigade, across whose defences the start line was laid out, moved back some 400 yards as a safety precaution. Prior to this some carefully selected hostile battery positions were fired on but in such a limited and seemingly erratic manner that the enemy would not take warning. The deception schemes in supercharge were in fact generally successful for, having observed engineers working on the tracks leading north, the enemy was expecting further attacks from the Australian northern front. When a ‘deception barrage’ was fired on this front, at the same time as the main barrage, it so happened that 90 Light, Division's communications to the rear were in order while Africa Corps' signal system was in chaos through the air bombing and jamming, so that the rear headquarters received news only of the deception barrage and consequently assumed that the attack was coming in where they had expected it.
The main barrage for Apart from defensive tasks fired on call, supercharge began on time with smoke rounds to signal the opening line, the 867 easting grid, and further smoke to indicate the first lift twenty minutes later. The extreme ends and the centre of the main barrage were also marked by single smoke rounds as well as by tracer fired horizontally by Bofors guns. The artillery programme made use of 296 field guns firing nearly 50,000 rounds and 48 medium guns firing 4000 rounds in the barrage and concentrations, apart from the heavy counter-battery tasks to neutralise gun positions further to the enemy's rear.supercharge plans allowed for an expenditure of 104,576 rounds of 25-pounder and 8284 rounds of medium ammunition.
As soon as the main barrage opened, the leading troops of 151 and 152 Brigades left the start line and closed up as near as safety permitted to the line of bursting shells ahead, and when the smoke shells signalled the first lift, the whole front advanced. On the far right the leading companies of 28 Battalion, C on the right and D left, met opposition almost from the start. Overcoming determined resistance by both German and Italian positions, C Company reached its objective by 2.30 a.m., though suffering heavy casualties in the process. D Company met less opposition and reached its objective a little earlier, but could then find no sign of either C Company on its right flank or 151 Brigade on its left. The company commander therefore set out his men in positions for all-round defence and had just got them organised when he was joined by B Company which, coming up behind to mop up, had been halted by a curtain of defensive fire falling in its path. When this fire ceased the company hurried forward, only to meet a line of enemy posts. Charging with bayonets and grenades, the men broke through the enemy line, collecting numerous prisoners in the process. The two companies then formed a defensive box with D facing west and B north. Here they were joined by survivors of C Company who found themselves too few and isolated to hold their objective. The fourth company, A Company, whose task had been to follow C Company in a mopping-up role and then extend the right flank to link with the Australians, met a great deal of unsubdued opposition in its path but eventually reached the area of its objective. Enemy posts on the east prevented contact being made with the Australians while, on the west, only a few wounded men could be found where C Company was expected to be. The company then dug in, rather isolated and under fire from three sides. By dawn therefore the battalion, though on the general line of its objective, was in two groups out of contact with each other and with the Australians on the right or the Durhams on the left. The positions were under enemy observation and any movement was greeted by fire from machine guns and snipers.
The support column was delayed by scattered mines but E Troop of 34 NZ Anti-Tank Battery, 3 Platoon of 3 Machine Gun Company and some of the battalion's 3-inch mortars managed to get into positions behind the main position before daylight made
A troop of 244 Battery of 84 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA.
On 28 Battalion's left, A and B Companies of 8 Durhams led off on time, with C Company following under orders to pull up on the right of A Company as soon as the Maoris had dealt with a known strongpoint a short way west of the start line. The leading troops came under heavy fire as they engaged a line of enemy posts, but broke through to overrun a headquarters area which included a dressing station and a tank recovery park. Many of the enemy in this area were too demoralised by the barrage to offer resistance. By 2.30 a.m. the two foremost companies had reached the first objective, but in a rather disorganised state as they had lost about a hundred men and several of their officers. The battalion commander therefore ordered C Company, still fairly intact, to pass through as the barrage resumed. This company, against little direct opposition, reached the final objective about four o'clock with some fifty Italian prisoners in hand. Here, however, the company could make no contact with the troops expected to be on either flank, while its wireless link to the rear had been destroyed; but before the men had completed digging-in, battalion headquarters with the support column and some of the other two companies arrived and were followed shortly by some of the British tanks. Before dawn the defences had been reinforced with two troops of 34 NZ Anti-Tank Battery, two platoons of 4 NZ Machine Gun Company and the battalion's own 3-inch mortars and two-pounder guns. Contact was later established with the other
On the left of the brigade sector, 9 Durhams fared better up to the first objective but, on resuming their advance behind the barrage, encountered dug-in tanks and gun positions. These, however, were not defended with resolution, the enemy apparently being affected by the shellfire of the barrage, and by four o'clock 9 Durhams were up with their neighbours of 8 Durhams on the final objective. With support arms which included a troop of 34 Anti-Tank Battery and a platoon of 4 Machine Gun Company coming up before dawn, the two
The third battalion, 6 Durhams, let the others get some 500 yards ahead before it left the start line, and met only desultory shelling and mortaring but no direct opposition for the first 1000 yards. Once beyond the area cleared by the Maoris the battalion came under heavy machine-gun fire from the north. One platoon of D Company, sent to investigate the source of the fire, was pinned to the ground and eventually the whole company had to be committed. Leaving this engagement still in progress, A Company moved from reserve and, with C Company on its left, overran some scattered infantry and Italian gun crews to reach the final objective in the rear of 8 Durhams. A battalion front was then set out facing north behind a screen of carriers and backed by the support weapons, which included two platoons of 1 NZ Machine Gun Company and 244 Battery (less a troop) of 84 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA. Upon D Company's disengaging and joining the rest of the battalion, a wide gap was left unprotected between the Durhams' positions and the Maoris. However, 151 Brigade had achieved its task of occupying the north-west corner of the final objective though its infantry was very thin on the ground, the casualties amounting to 50 killed, 211 wounded and 87 missing, a brigade total of 348. Prisoners captured in 151 Brigade's sector amounted to about 350, and came mainly from 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, Littorio and Trento divisions.
From first light onwards, the three
Behind the attacking infantry of 151 Brigade sappers of 7 NZ Field Company set out with two Scorpions to extend the two branches of Diamond track. Work on Diamond A went forward steadily under considerable fire and the carriers leading the Durhams' support column were guided through before 5 a.m. On
The planned distribution was for A Squadron to join 28 Battalion and B and C Squadrons to join the Durhams.
On the left flank of the advance, 152 Brigade had on the whole an easier task. The men of 5 Seaforths on the right met very little opposition before the first objective and managed to bypass some dug-in tanks on the way forward to the final objective, which they gained shortly after 4 a.m. with extremely light casualties. The left-flank battalion, 5 Camerons, met similar tanks in greater depth, but the leading troops kept close to the barrage to reach the final objective before 4 a.m., though with company formation somewhat disorganised. Losses here were also low, one account giving the total as only twelve.
In the rear 2 Seaforths advanced with its four companies in line across the brigade sector to find that most of the enemy, even those manning the dug-in tanks, had either retreated or were demoralised by the barrage and the passage of the leading troops through their lines. The battalion collected some thirty prisoners, mainly of Ariete and Littorio divisions. On reaching the rear of 5 Camerons, the
Behind 152 Brigade, 8 NZ Field Company sappers extended Square D track close behind the infantry to let the brigade transport go forward, but had to gap a minefield to clear Square E for
The Valentines on their way up received reports of enemy tanks on the left of 5 Camerons' front. One squadron turned off to engage them but lost three tanks to anti-tank fire. After two heavy concentrations by the artillery of the prepared defensive tasks for the southern flank, the enemy tanks appeared ‘to be melting away’, in the words of a message from 152 Brigade. Two squadrons then took up supporting positions behind 5 Camerons with the third squadron and regimental headquarters a little way further to the rear. From its starting strength of 38 tanks,
The task of forming a line to cover the southern flank of the main advance was carried out successfully by 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade against little enemy opposition. The leading battalion, 2 Royal Sussex, overran some gun positions and by dawn was in contact with the left of 2 Seaforths, while 5 Royal Sussex, meeting little direct opposition, carried the line on to the south-east to join 5/7 Gordons on 51 Division's front. Casualties in the lorried infantry were very few, but over sixty prisoners were gathered in during the advance and numerous stragglers were rounded up after daylight.
Once the infantry advance had been successfully completed and the new front line formed and supported against counter-attack, the way was clear for the second phase of SUPERCHARGE, the advance of 9 Armoured Brigade. The task laid down was for the brigade to cross the infantry line on the 863 grid at 5.45 a.m. and, under a moving barrage, to occupy the rising ground on the 861 grid and there ‘prepare to resist armoured counter-attack’. In effect the brigade was to draw out the enemy's armour and take the first blows to screen the arrival of 1 Armoured Division. This was the key action of the whole operation, for it was expected to complete
Forming up near the
In the lead the portées had been damaged by shellfire or collisions. Six of the Hussars tanks were damaged, four by breakdowns and two by mines, but by 3.30 a.m. the leading tanks were passing the infantry's intermediate objective and by 5.15 a.m. had reached the defences being dug by 9 Durhams. The attached squadron of the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, following the tanks, managed to round up a number of enemy stragglers.
The regimental column of the
The third column of 9 Armoured Brigade, the
As the three columns eased their way along the tracks in the newly-won ground, Brigadier Currie was disturbed by the reports of damage and delays and just before five o'clock asked
On the right
From the beginning of dawn until well into daylight, the details of the operations of these two regiments are confused for, although individuals and units told their stories and made their official reports, few could correlate their actions with those of other troops around them. It would seem that the
The Hussars on the north do not seem to have advanced as far or as fast as the Wiltshires, possibly through encountering a greater concentration of anti-tank guns. Their leading tanks certainly passed the telegraph poles marking the
In this dawn attack by
Brigadier Currie, keeping well forward with the Hussars and Wiltshires, and acting throughout with extreme courage and resolution, did his utmost to control the battle and keep the gap open for the arrival of 1 Armoured Division. Several times, as he saw his squadrons disintegrating in front of him, he radioed
The third regiment of 9 Armoured Brigade, the
Shortly after seven o'clock Eighth Army circulated a warning, gained through an intercepted wireless message, that the Panzer Army was preparing to counter-attack from the north. Between 7.30 and 8 a.m.,
The advance of 1 Armoured Division was headed by the armoured cars of 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regiment on Diamond A track and 1 Royal Dragoons on Square E. Their cars loaded with ten days' supplies, the two regiments had orders to search for gaps in the enemy's lines, slip through before daylight, and continue well into the rear areas to harass communications and installations. On the north, the South Africans passed round the north flank of the
The Dragoons Two squadrons, mustering about 18 armoured cars. Panzer Army considerable concern and some material losses. Only three cars were lost in this advance and these were all recovered later.
Next in order of the armoured division's advance came the three groups of the
The three regimental columns of 2 Armoured Brigade, each following its group of the minefield task force, also had a slow and trying journey to the infantry start line, where they complained they were delayed by congestion on all routes. However, reports indicate that the heads of all three columns passed the 867 grid, just west of 6 Brigade's FDLs, close to 6.30 a.m. As far as can be ascertained, the Bays on the right, owing to the confusion earlier recorded on the clearance of Diamond B, swung north on to Diamond A, but
The sky was lightening and visibility improving every minute The sun rose at 7.09 a.m. according to the sun and moon tables used by 2 NZ Division.
At what time the regimental columns of 2 Armoured Brigade joined the survivors of Currie's brigade is difficult to determine. Reports were received about a quarter to seven that the
About 7 a.m., though the time is not definitely established, Brigadier Fisher, the commander of 2 Armoured Brigade, learnt that the Bays on the north and
About eight o'clock Lumsden spoke by radio from Main Headquarters 1 Armoured Division, situated just south of Alamein, p. 364.
The Bays cautiously worked their way up behind
It would appear that
About 9.30 a.m. a general warning based on intercepts was circulated by the Army of an impending attack by 21 Panzer Division from the north and
By this time columns of both 7 Motor Brigade and
By the middle of the morning the congestion in the small area of the infantry's overnight gains, an area as flat as a billiard table, was presenting a problem. Hostile fire was constant but apparently haphazardly placed, and it is possible that the dust raised by the continuous movement of vehicles, as well as the smoke from those hit and set alight, screened much of the area from enemy observation. Though numerous vehicles were damaged by the shellfire and by scattered mines, casualties among the troops were extremely light.
The Australians spent one of the quietest days for some time, although patrols to north and west from their lines could not progress very far without meeting intense machine-gun fire. Movement in the 28 NZ Battalion's defences brought immediate fire from all sides until midday, when some armoured cars rounded up a large number of Germans who had remained to the rear of the battalion. Even then A Company on the right, though in visual contact with 2/17 Australian Battalion on its east, remained out of contact with the other companies and none could establish contact with the rear by either runner or radio. To the left of the Maoris there was a wide gap, though parties of lorried infantry, tanks and armoured cars were further south.
On 151 Brigade's front, 8 Durhams in the north-west corner of the salient fell back about midday when enemy activity seemed to forecast an attack, leaving the observation party of 5 NZ Field Regiment to hold the front. Later 6 and 9 Durhams extended their
151 Brigade's casualties in supercharge were assessed at 489 all ranks, of whom a high proportion was listed as ‘Missing’. Many stragglers were being held at this time in the Australian and New Zealand lines.
Casualties in the supercharge operation so far had not been unduly heavy except in 9 Armoured Brigade. An evening check on 2 November gave the brigade about 24 ‘runners’ in sufficient order to be used immediately out of the 94 tanks which crossed the start line. Casualties in men came to 163 in the tank regiments, 66 of the motorised infantry, and 22 among the attached cavalry squadrons, anti-tank troops and engineers. The tank losses in 2 and 8 Armoured Brigades were 33 all told from enemy action, mechanical breakdown, and other causes, and casualties in men in the two brigades also totalled 33.
There is no doubt that the direction and sector chosen for supercharge had not been anticipated by the enemy, just as Montgomery had hoped. The attack, however, did not meet a purely Italian defence, for part of the front was held by infantry of 15 Panzer Division, and the grimly determined anti-tank line that broke up 9 Armoured Brigade was manned mainly by German gunners. Owing to the confusion caused by the disruption of the
Montgomery's reaction to the initial results of Supercharge is best seen in the light of the orders he then issued. Soon after dawn he joined Leese at the tactical headquarters of 30 Corps and, from the directives he sent out during the morning, he seemed to be in no doubt that the salient was secure against counter-attack. His first action was to order 7 Armoured Division to assemble as quickly as it could in the area south-west of
Montgomery appears to have accepted 1 Armoured Division's failure to follow up 9 Armoured Brigade's attack for he asked no further action during the day than an advance by 2 Armoured Brigade to the
The switch of direction from the west to the south-west of the salient was based not only on the success of the Supercharge salient along the 299 northing grid, with the New Zealand Division retaining command of the sector and the troops on the north of the line and 51 Division taking over the southern part of the salient. The day's misunderstandings did not then cease, for the orders issued by 51 Division under pressure brought signal errors and ambiguous wording that confused the roles of the various groups assigned to the operations. Apart from the necessary haste, the basis of these troubles lay in the shortage of infantry, which in turn caused divisions to be dismembered and put the Corps Commander in the position of having a direct say in the employment of brigades or even battalions.
When the majority of the misunderstandings had been settled, a plan emerged for 2 Seaforths of 152 Brigade to be relieved in the south-west corner of the salient by 5/7 Gordons (153 Brigade) and to advance on ‘Skinflint’ with the support of Trieste Division troops in the defences showed little inclination to resist, at least 100 giving themselves up, and in a short time ‘Skinflint’ was reached for the loss of two tanks by shellfire, two on mines, and no recorded casualties in the Seaforths. The tanks then withdrew, leaving the Seaforths to dig in and thus extend the western face of the salient for about a mile and a half to the south.
After settling a misunderstanding whether it would be relieved before or after its operation against ‘Snipe’, 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade made plans for an artillery supported advance by 5 Royal
On the enemy's side the initial effects of SUPERCHARGE were curious. Convinced that the next British assault would proceed from the north or north-west of the Australian sector, Rommel had planned to distract attention from this area by artillery deception programmes on 15 and 164 Divisions' fronts, that is, on the SUPERCHARGE frontage and to the south. The panzer division's gunners were probably too busy on defence but 164 Division seems to have fired its programme. The deception effect was, however, completely lost, the fire being taken by the Eighth Army as part of the enemy's retaliation to the assault barrage. When the British assault had broken into 15 Panzer Division's lines, bombing and radio jamming had so disrupted the Africa Corps communications that most of the news received at
In spite of emphatic urging by the Corps Commander, von Thoma, neither panzer division made much progress. Unable to find the infantry line they were expected to restore, and without infantry of their own to consolidate ground won, the counterattacking tanks could do little more than probe forward until the British fire became too heavy, when they went into hull-down positions. Many of the tank commanders appear to have encountered the Eighth Army's Shermans for the first time, to find themselves outgunned, and though both panzer divisions reported that they caused heavy casualties among their opponents, Africa Corps had only 35 German and about 20 Italian tanks still in battle order by the evening. Unfortunately no record exists of how these tank casualties occurred, so they must be attributed to a combination of the British bombing, tank, anti-tank and artillery fire.
As the day wore on the Panzer Army was better able to assess its situation. Its reserves were inadequate, its front was on the point of cracking and withdrawal in a short time was inevitable, while the opportunity that Rommel had been awaiting was at hand for a quick disengagement at the moment when the British appeared heavily committed and temporarily halted. Towards evening Rommel called for von Thoma and, having ascertained how desperate were the straits of the thin line around the British salient, he gave his orders for the withdrawal to be set in motion. His first move was to call for
Africa Corps diary, GMDS 25869/1.
Rommel's confidence lay not only in his belief that his Germans would maintain their superiority in mobile warfare but that the British commanders would retain their customary pattern of caution, stepping up their artillery to each line of resistance provided by his
On both northern and southern fronts the first bounds to be reached by the evening of 3 November gave most of the front-line formations less than 20 kilometres to cover in twenty-four hours, so that, had the rearguards played their part and the available transport been efficiently used, the majority of the Panzer Army might have got back to the first bound at least. Many of the Italians had already anticipated the order, on what authority it is hard to ascertain though it may have been on the ‘priority’ clause, for it was in the late afternoon, about the time that the Seaforths started for ‘Skinflint’, that the
Although the records show how Rommel saw the progress of the battle, they do not show so clearly what Montgomery was thinking at that time. His first orders after he learnt that SUPERCHARGE had bogged down were for regrouping while pressure was maintained on the enemy. The regrouping covered an extension northwards of the South Africans to narrow 51 Division's front, the reinforcement of
Montgomery also set his administration staff to implement the first steps of existing plans to extend the chain of supply dumps, the water pipeline and the tracks. From this it may be assumed that he saw the end of the ‘break-in’ phase of the battle near if not immediately to hand. His intelligence staff, however, still insisted that the Germans had up to 80 tanks and the Italians 160 in going
GOC
… I feel it is rash to make forecast regarding fighting here in
Western Desert which has been productive of so many disappointments. For information of Government perhaps it would help if I gave my opinionfor what it is worth. I feel future here is bright. I believe German resistance was finally broken by last attack and cumulative effect artillery fire during last ten days. I feel present German position is precarious, that we shall push him back in near future to frontier and later under certain conditions I am led to hope we may eventually clear Africa .GOC
2 NZEF /25A.
The various rearrangements of the front already planned were set going towards evening of 2 November. In the Highland Division's part of the salient, 5/7 Gordons moved into the position vacated by 2 Seaforths as the latter advanced on ‘Skinflint’, and after dark 1 Black Watch extended its front to include the ‘Snipe’ feature, thus releasing 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade to rejoin its armoured division. 133 Brigade's casualties from 23 October to the evening of 2 November came to 717, of whom 417 were listed as ‘Missing’.
When dusk made movement possible, 28 Battalion established contact with 6 Brigade and, on being told it was under the brigade's command and to hold its defences, rearranged its positions and brought up supporting arms while engineers laid a minefield across its front. This was accomplished with little enemy interference as activity practically ceased after dark. Total casualties in 28 Battalion in supercharge were recorded as 22 killed, 72 wounded, and 4 missing.
Also at dusk the battalions of 6 Brigade left the ‘firm base’ to take over the front from 151 Brigade, the northern part of the base then being occupied by 22 Battalion under the brigade's command. The southern half of the base passed to 51 Division's command and was occupied by a battalion of 154 Brigade. The relief of the Durhams proved a slow and difficult task for the locations of their defences were inadequately and, in some cases, inaccurately known to their headquarters while their communications were incomplete. As the men of 6 Brigade searched for the platoons and companies they were to relieve, troops and vehicles of 7 Motor Brigade were passing through the area. It was well past midnight before the relief could be called complete, but by dawn the three battalions, 24 on the north, 25 on the north-west and 26 facing west, were firmly established with supporting arms sited, backed by the survivors of 9 Armoured Brigade and the Valentines of
Having seen the state of 151 Brigade in daylight,
The attack by 7 Motor Brigade, finally settled to start at 1.15 a.m. on 3 November, was planned, as in previous operations by the motorised infantry, more as a set of battalion raids than as a brigade action. The brigade had spent the day in the congested salient awaiting decisions for its employment, and accordingly few of the troops had taken the trouble to dig themselves in or disperse their transport so that casualties and damage had been suffered under the enemy's shellfire. Patrols had been sent to the front in daylight in view of possible night operations, but little clear information had been gleaned. Artillery support could be only hastily arranged in the form of concentrations on the right-hand objectives and a sort of box barrage on the left.
In the north of the salient, behind the front where the men of 6 Brigade were sorting out the defences after sending the Durhams back, 2 Rifle Battalion formed up on the right and 7 Rifle Battalion on the left, with a number of their men and vehicles missing, and with some uncertainty over their exact objectives. Passing through the New Zealand defences, the carriers leading the advance met opposition as they neared the
Moving on a course a few hundred yards to the south, the companies of 7 Rifle Battalion had trouble finding the start line and were accordingly well behind the artillery programme. Told to expect little opposition, the companies lost touch when they met the same area of resistance as 2 Battalion encountered, and the men scattered. Although some individual efforts were made to rally
The third battalion of the motor brigade, 2 Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, had been given the task of advancing through the defences held by 5 Camerons on the south of the salient to occupy the low rise where the
The failure of 7 Motor Brigade to clear the ground brought the cancellation of further advances by the armour, which was due to start at 5.30 a.m. on the 3rd. However, in the belief that Aqqaqir was held, Lumsden told
While the various operations and reliefs were taking place this night, the British intercept service picked up a message sent by 90 Light Division to tell its 200 Regiment to send vehicles to help bring out the heavy weapons of 125 Regiment in the coastal pocket. When this information reached 9 Australian Division, some two hours after the message was intercepted, patrols were hastily sent out and harassing fire commenced on the enemy's known tracks. All patrols met strong opposition, one suffering heavy casualties, but several small posts were overrun and some prisoners taken. It was obvious, however, that the German infantry were still in position, prepared to screen the withdrawal preparations.
THE 3rd of November was a curious day in the Battle of
This news which, with the 90 Light Division intercept, seemed to indicate the beginning of a general withdrawal by the enemy, reached Montgomery as he was holding a conference with Leese and Lumsden. The Army Commander therefore urged Lumsden to maintain strong pressure with his two armoured brigades so that the enemy would not disengage and slip away before the pursuit force was ready. Lumsden had already added to his previous orders by telling 2 Armoured Brigade to advance and support 2 King's Royal Rifle Corps at Aqqaqir while
The enemy guns around
Before this information had been received and digested by the headquarters staff of
Montgomery also gave orders for preparations to be put in hand for Operation GRAPESHOT, a plan made before the battle for a drive on
By midday on the 3rd, air reconnaissance had confirmed not only the start of the enemy withdrawal in the south but also of dense convoys of vehicles on the coastal road and the tracks leading into it. The air effort, hitherto concentrated mainly on the See also Thompson, New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Vol. III, pp. 91–2.
While the Eighth Army was limbering up for its final effort to crack the enemy line, the moment was fast passing when an armoured breakthrough might have thrown the whole of the Panzer Army into confusion. Rommel's plans for the withdrawal had passed down the channels of command, and the rear services had already started to ferry stores and supplies back from the forward dumps to the second-line dumps which could service the new
The withdrawal was covered in the north by 21 Panzer Division across the coastal road and by
Expecting that the British would employ their customary tactics of halting against any opposition to deploy their artillery, Rommel was relying on his thin screen of rearguards to allow him to disengage cleanly. Whether he really expected to re-form on the
After a morning visit to the forward area, where he learnt that the British were showing no signs of immediate aggressive action, Rommel decided the moment was opportune for disengagement and gave the signal for all but certain selected rearguards to make for the
Then, running the gauntlet of the bombs of a ‘Boston Tea Party’ formation of the Panzer Army command post in the early afternoon to find awaiting him a message from
It is with trusting confidence in your leadership and the courage of the German-Italian troops under your command that the German people and I are following the heroic struggle in
Egypt . In the situation in which you find yourself there can be no other thought but to stand fast, yield not a yard of ground and throw every gun and every man into the battle. Considerable air force reinforcements are being sent to C-in-C South. The Duce and the Commando Supremo are also making the utmost efforts to send you the means to continue the fight. Your enemy, despite his superiority, must also be at the end of his strength. It would not be the first time in history that a strong will has triumphed over the bigger battalions. As to your troops, you can show them no other road than that to victory or death.Adolf Hitler .Quoted by B. H. Liddell Hart in
, p. 321n., presumably from the original message received and held in the Rommel collection.The Rommel Papers
This order could hardly have reached Rommel at a more inopportune moment. Had it arrived before he issued the final withdrawal signal or when the movement had gone too far to be halted, he could have acted with decision. As it was, he himself admitted that ‘for the first time during the African campaign I did not know what to do’.Rommel Papers, p. 321.
The German war diaries, even more clearly than his own account, underline his indecision in the next few hours. As a loyal officer he felt he had to obey his Fuehrer. As the commander of an army that relied on his leadership, he knew that such obedience would spell its doom. In discussion with von Thoma, he agreed that withdrawal might be made to the first bound, the 850 easting grid, without disobedience, but no sooner had he done this than warning of a British assault for the coming night came through intercepts, while all the time reports flowed in of the progress of the various formations in withdrawal.
The degree of compromise urged by von Thoma and his staff is well illustrated in a message issued by the Africa Corps to its subordinate formations:
The only measure left to us is to initiate a mobile defensive policy and withdraw a little to regain freedom of manoeuvre…. We can do this without abandoning our main policy of defending the
Alamein front.
DAKmessages, GMDS 25869/9–11.
However, Rommel was not as ready as his Corps Commander to deceive Africa Corps to fall back to its first bound but ‘this line is to be held to the last man’. He followed this within the hour by, ‘Stay in your defence positions. The Fuhrer's order does not allow for mobile defence’; and then, ‘I demand all possible efforts to be made to retain possession of the present battlefield, so that the operations now in progress may be brought to a victorious conclusion’.
Africa Corps messages on GMDS 25869/6. These three messages are timed
In the parlous state of the Panzer Army's communications, and particularly in the always uncertain links through the various Italian headquarters to the men in the line, the task of halting the withdrawal just as it had started was practically impossible. Unfortunately most of the low-level records were lost or deliberately destroyed in the retreat so that it is difficult to discover in what detail Rommel Papers, p. 322. Africa Corps' front, came from the pockets of German troops sandwiched among the Italians. It is known that contact could not be established immediately with large bodies of the Italians who were already on the march back, and possibly with some of the Germans, and it seems probable that such troops did not return to the front but, when finally contacted, halted where they stood and continued their withdrawal the next day. One thing certain is that
In the rear areas, the administrative and supply services had begun to load trucks and railway wagons and to prepare demolitions of any dumps that could not be carried back, and well before Rommel issued his withdrawal order, road convoys were on the move. Some hint of See inter alia the diary of the Quartermaster of the Africa Corps on GMDS 27669/1, where there are references to the order timed 0900 and 1200 hours.
So, during the afternoon and evening of the 3rd, the whole of the Panzer Army was well off balance, most of its front held by a thin line of rearguards behind whom the bulk of the troops were on the march, uncertain of their roles or destination. The
Of Littorio's tanks about 17 survived, and Ariete, when it started its move from the south, mustered about 150.
Montgomery of course knew nothing of
Several plans were considered by Horrocks for attacks to overwhelm the rearguards but he discarded them in place of a major breakthrough assault and encircling movement to take place on the 4th. However, with no armour and little more than essential transport for servicing his corps, he was forced to reconsider this plan and, in the event, no major action by his corps was found to fit in with Montgomery's plans.
Enemy fire on the SUPERCHARGE salient decreased as the day wore on, fortunately so, as the area was a hive of movement. On the northern and western faces, the tanks and observers were trying
The general orders for these infantry advances were issued in the morning of the 3rd, after which, on the assumption that the attacks would breach the enemy's gun line, the rest of the day was spent on plans and preparations for the break-out to be undertaken by 1 and 7 Armoured Divisions, and by the New Zealand Division with 4 Light Armoured Brigade under command.
At this time,
The final infantry operations at
The failure of the Gordons to reach their objective was not allowed to prevent the next phase, the advance by 5 Indian Infantry Brigade to a point on the
Although the Indian brigade was not trained to follow a barrage, the New Zealand CRA, Brigadier Weir, to whom Leese had entrusted the fire support, persuaded the brigade commander to accept the standard New Zealand method of a simple lifting barrage augmented by concentrations. In fact, Weir took the Indian brigadier and his staff forward in daylight and had his gunners demonstrate by laying a line of smoke on the start line and the lifts. This practical test also showed that the final lifts could not be reached by some of the field guns in their present positions
The Indian brigade's operation started in even more confusion than the Gordons'. Zero hour for the artillery was set at 1.30 a.m. but by midnight only one battalion, ¼ Essex, was assembled and ready to move, so the start time was postponed for one hour. Then, when it seemed that 3/10 Baluch, 3 Bn, 10 Baluch Regt.
However, at 2.30 a.m. the barrage began in earnest and the Essex battalion and two companies of the Rajputana Rifles were ready to follow as it lifted. In spite of the confusion and many loose ends still untied, the operation went with complete success. Brigadier Weir's artillery programme, though hastily concocted, proved the value of his methods of barrage fire and concentrations, for the Indian brigade met mostly demoralised or dead defenders and little direct resistance. The men of the Essex battalion on the right, after overrunning some gun positions, were on their objective by dawn with well over 100 prisoners, mostly German, while the Rajputs took some twenty prisoners at a cost of one man wounded by enemy action. The Valentines of
The final infantry operation for this night was an advance by 7/10 164 Division, where many documents, as well as much signal, medical and other equipment, were found undemolished.
These three infantry operations ended the period which Montgomery called the ‘dog-fight’, though they could hardly be said to have completed the breach in the enemy's line, for by the end of this night there was no line as such to be breached. The front from Aqqaqir southwards had been held by 164 Light Division, which had been told by Africa Corps to withdraw on the evening of the 2nd in transport provided by the
From the experience of 164 Division, and similar experiences of 90 Light Division, it is clear that Panzer Army could have been made mobile and all that
The ‘ Panzer Army were such that, once the
By the evening of 3 November, the initiative was completely in Montgomery's hands. He was aware from air reconnaissance and the reports of the Royals and Panzer Army could make a stand, so
Accordingly the night of 3–4 November was spent in probing for a gap with the infantry operations already described, and careful preparations for sending the armour through at daylight if the gap should be found. Montgomery still insisted that a continuous infantry front be maintained, though he ordered several transfers and alterations of sectors so that troops could be released to his reserves. Horrocks of 13 Corps was given clearly to understand that no part of his corps was to rush forward and ‘receive a bloody nose’.
The only experimental action he permitted was a renewal of the attempts to pass armoured cars through the enemy line. Just before dawn two squadrons of 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regiment and the rest of the Royals, that is, Headquarters and B Squadrons, slipped through the area where 5/7 Gordons had earlier been repulsed and crossed the Panzer Army. The first two squadrons through interrupted the supply routes to the southern part of the line, causing the enemy to waste valuable petrol and employ extra troops and trucks to provide convoy guards. An attempt to cooperate with the Air Force in an attack on a landing ground south of
At dawn on 4 November the
As the tanks of the three British armoured divisions reached the Ramcke parachutists were stationed caused Horrocks to ask the Army Commander's permission to lay on an attack, on the assumption that a delaying stand was being attempted, but Montgomery was unwilling to waste his forces in an unnecessary battle, for the armoured advance would soon isolate all the enemy remaining in the south. This decision was also influenced by the strain already felt by the supply services in keeping the northern battle going, and the even greater effort that would be needed to keep the advancing armour supplied. He therefore directed Horrocks merely to send out patrols all across his front to keep in touch with the enemy and, if possible, encircle any areas of resistance.
The balance sheet for the battle that raged at
The battle-worthy tanks in the Eighth Army on the evening of the 3rd included 151 Grants or Shermans and 103 Crusaders held by the three heavy armoured brigades, i.e., 2, 8 and 22 Armoured Brigades; 24 Brigade was ‘cannibilised’.
The Axis casualty figures for the whole of October and November have been assessed as 12,900 Germans and 22,800 Italians, a total of 35,700. Of the 27,900 prisoners included in this total, more than
Bayerlein, in a footnote to the Alexander in his Despatch ( While it seems certain that Alexander overestimated the Axis losses, it is equally certain that the German figures underestimated them, particularly in the Italian totals of killed and wounded. 264 ‘runners’ and 102 en route or under repair.—GMDS 25869/6.Rommel Papers (p. 358), gives the German official figures as:London Gazette, Rommel Papers, p. 336. Africa Corps retained some 50 German tanks, with a number of captured British and about 17 of
AS day dawned on 4 November, the set-piece battles of Panzer Army's fixed defences, had proved true.Memoirs, p. 126. Panzer Army fallen back earlier when it still had cohesion and control, the British advance might have been slow and laborious. Montgomery has indicated in his writings that such an advance was in his mind, an advance consisting of bringing his superior weight of tanks and artillery methodically against each bound of withdrawal taken up by Rommel and, in fact, such was his method later. But in the initial stages of the enemy withdrawal, the inherent weaknesses in the Eighth Army became obvious. The British armour, as Montgomery had feared, ‘swanned’ about the desert, out of coordinated control in several fruitless encircling movements, while powerful armoured columns were at times held up by weak German rearguards which resisted only because they had no petrol for further withdrawal.
As one army fell back in some confusion and the other followed up across a desert noteworthy for its lack of easily recognisable landmarks, it is only to be expected that records of movement and event should be hazy in details of time and place. Many of the Panzer Army's surviving records are reconstructions made after the
The day broke with a ground mist hiding much of the front. Though news of the occupation of
When the mist dispersed shortly after the sun arose, it became obvious that the enemy had gone except for some distant guns on the north-west which fired on Australian patrols and sent some random rounds towards 6 Brigade and the Maori positions. The German records disclose that on the northern flank 90 Light Division, under orders to prevent a breakthrough along the coastal road, had placed rearguards about 21 Panzer Division mustered possibly twenty tanks in battle order. Next, on an inconspicuous rise known as
All these tank strengths are estimates but are close enough to indicate the opposition facing Eighth Army.
Montgomery's provisional plan of the previous day had been for the New Zealand Division with its attached armour, under command of 30 Corps, to follow the route taken by the armoured cars of the Royals and South Africans in a wide encircling movement round the south of Aqqaqir to gain the Panzer Army had fallen. The resistance met by 9 Armoured Brigade in the SUPERCHARGE operation was still fresh in the armour's memory.
As far as can be ascertained, the orders on which the armoured divisions acted were for 1 and 10 Armoured Divisions, on right and left respectively, to probe west from the salient while 7 Armoured Division advanced to the south-west across Aqqaqir, prepared to swing north against the flank of any opposition met by the other formations.
Montgomery's desire to fight a tidy battle was this morning flouted by circumstances. By following the precept of concentrating his attack at one point, he had channelled all his mobile forces, with their massive attendant tails of support, administration and supply columns, along the tracks leading into and through the narrow salient. When word got around that the enemy had gone and the advance was starting, groups of vehicles tried to press forward to be in at the kill while others, obediently awaiting definite orders, blocked the tracks. The confusion and congestion, already bad, reached a peak this morning and it was only by the exertions of the control posts, aided by senior officers, that some sort of traffic order was gradually made out of the chaos as the day wore on.
One of the first to find his way clear of the confusion was
In the salient itself, all three armoured divisions The order of battle of the main components of 1 Armoured Division 2 Armoured Brigade The Bays 7 Motor Brigade (lorried infantry) 2 Rifle Battalion 7 Rifle Battalion 2 KRRC 12 Lancers (armoured cars) 7 Armoured Division 22 Armoured Brigade 1 Royal Tanks 5 Royal Tanks 4 CLY 1 Rifle Battalion (motorised infantry) 131 Lorried Infantry Brigade 1/5 Queens 1/6 Queens 1/7 Queens Notts Yeo Staffs Yeo 133 Lorried Infantry Brigade 2 Royal Sussex 4 Royal Sussex 5 Royal Sussex Armoured Car force 4/6 South African Armoured Car Regiment 3 South African Armoured Car Regiment
Except for a little long-range artillery fire, all this initial movement by the British armour met with no organised opposition though increasing numbers of the enemy were encountered, most of whom, both German and Italian, had obviously missed the general withdrawal and, on the appearance of armoured cars and tanks, willingly surrendered.
The first clash with the enemy's new line came in the middle of the morning when 22 Armoured Brigade, leading 7 Armoured Division, had travelled some miles down the Ariete Division with
In the meantime, 2 Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured Division had advanced slowly due west from the SUPERCHARGE salient and was heading for the rise at Africa Corps' Kampfstaffel, of a few tanks and anti-tank guns, was filling the gap between the two panzer divisions. With the Corps Commander, von Thoma, present in person, the battle group put up an exceedingly fierce resistance in which several British tanks were knocked out, including that of 1 Armoured Division's commander, Briggs,
Gatehouse's
By the end of the 4th, therefore, the three armoured divisions of Panzer Army, Lumsden was in fact following the original policy laid down by Montgomery in which the armour, after breaking out, was to position itself to invite armoured counter-attack. It was on this policy that the shallow outflanking movements of the armour were based.
Had the Africa Corps stayed to fight to the last, this method would have paid off. But what the Eighth Army could not, and did not, know was that, shortly after von Thoma's capture, Rommel's common sense finally overrode his loyalty to
However, there was one man in the Eighth Army who was impatient for bold action. Having gone forward and personally seen the quantities of guns, vehicles and equipment both destroyed and abandoned, and the groups of dispirited prisoners accumulating in ever increasing numbers, Panzer Army unaided is unlikely, but he certainly hoped to block its retreat in time to allow
In spite of his impatience,
(Note: Four platoons of 4 NZ Res MT Coy were needed to make the infantry of 5 Bde mobile, and three platoons of 6 NZ Res MT Coy had to drive through the salient to pick up 6 Bde's infantry.)
The Division's original orders were for 4 Light Armoured Brigade to deploy at 8.30 a.m. on the east of
As earlier related, some of 4 Light Armoured Brigade reached its deployment area on time, but the whole of the brigade was not assembled until after ten o'clock.
Gradually throughout the day the various groups of the New Zealand force assembled and threaded their ways through the congestion and the gaps in the minefields before opening out into widely
feet deep morasses of dust which spouted up in front of and into the vehicles. By this date thousands of vehicles and hundreds of guns and tanks had pounded the loose fine-grained surface of this part of the desert into something resembling discoloured flour. What will it be like if it rains?
9 Armd Bde and 5 Bde moved up and the congestion of vehicles in the forward area would have done credit toPiccadilly . Fortunately theRAF ruled the skies. Div [Headquarters] moved up at 1100 hours and squeezed into the crush….GOC
2 NZEF /45.
Though many of the divisional groups moved up along Boomerang and Square tracks, it is uncertain exactly where they broke out into the open, but their guiding sign was the black diamond used to mark the Diamond track which led into 6 Brigade's defences. From somewhere near the end of this track a party of New Zealand divisional provosts with engineers had set off early to find a minefree route, which led in a southerly direction round the east of Aqqaqir and then turned north-west along the path of the reconnaissance group of 4 Light Armoured Brigade. At first these ‘Diamond signs’, of black painted tin set on iron pickets, were placed at frequent intervals, but once in the open one sign sufficed for every 700 yards. Thus marked, the
Shortly after midday 4 Light Armoured Brigade reported to 20 Corps artillery sited behind the tank line. The artillery had put up a token fight, but had soon ceased fire once the Greys worked round to the rear.
At the divisional conference Gentry of 6 Brigade proposed an all-night advance to reach
Carrying eight days' water and rations, 360 rounds for each field gun, and petrol for 200 miles, the New Zealand vehicles, though heavily laden, made good progress once they drew clear of the powdered sand of the battle area and reached the hard sand along the
… we began to pass through enemy positions and tanks of the Panzer Divisions which will fight no more, burning transport, and large calibre guns. It was a change much appreciated to speed across open desert away from the dust heap of the
Alamein front. As the Div swept south-westwards the guns of the tanks and arty were in action to the north where the British armour were fighting the Panzer rearguard.4 Lt Armd Bde was ahead. Behind them marching apparently quite cheerfully were columns of PWs with a solitary armoured car or truck as an escort, carrying a few wounded and a single guard armed with a Tommy gun. We passed an infantry [? artillery] position almost intact with guns in position and ammunition boxes empty….GOC
2 NZEF /45.
During this afternoon, 22 Armoured Brigade continued its action against the Italian 20 Corps until dark but it is hard to say how this battle really went. The German records, including Rommel's own account, give the impression that Ariete Division, fighting gallantly to the last tank, was completely surrounded and annihilated. Yet 22 Armoured Brigade claimed only 29 tanks destroyed and 450 prisoners, against a loss of one tank and a few casualties, while events next day indicate that quite a large part of the Italian force managed to disengage overnight. The Italian stand at least deterred
Some ten miles past 15 Panzer Division was also making its way to
Liaison officers were sent back to find the other formations and, by the use of wirelessed directions and flares, 5 Brigade was guided
Ramcke parachutists searching for transport or petrol. The alarm brought some indiscriminate firing, even
Montgomery's intentions for the night of 4–5 November were for 1 and 7 Armoured Divisions to keep the enemy facing them in engagement while the New Zealand column continued to
As the night wore on, Lumsden issued a number of orders, presumably based on information sent back by his divisions. He told 1 Armoured Division to stay in engagement with the enemy ahead while 7 Armoured Division, having reported its victory over the Italian armour, drove for the high ground south-east of
No clear exposition of 3 South African Armoured Car Regiment had been sent out to join the Royals and 4 SAAC Regiment.
Montgomery's misgivings about what might occur if his mobile forces passed beyond centralised control now began to prove well founded. Some time during this morning he told Lumsden to take the New Zealand column under
Much had happened before this order arrived for, only an hour after setting out from the night laager, the Greys encountered an enemy force reported to include twenty German tanks. This must have been the panzer regiment of 15 Panzer Division which had been travelling only a few miles ahead on the same course as that taken by the New Zealanders. According to the
GMDS 25869/9–11.
While the Greys were in action some vehicles appeared on the south of the New Zealand column and opened fire when the commander of 4 Field Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Trento Division with most of his senior officers and staff.
By the middle of the day the New Zealand column was stretching out over several miles of the desert. After the enemy facing the Greys had broken off the engagement and retired, the armoured cars took over the lead and were close to the point where the
Just a few miles east of the pass, the leading vehicles, with which Voss Group of armoured cars, artillery and possibly a few tanks, was close to the lip of the escarpment pass, and the other, of 15 Panzer Division's rearguard, was on high ground to the west. Together the two groups dominated the approaches to the pass, while Voss Group was in a position to fire on vehicles negotiating the track down the escarpment to the coastal plain.
As the 21 Panzer Division, then beginning to suffer from an acute shortage of petrol. Both to deny the pass and observation over the coastal plain, and to extricate themselves from their precarious situation where they might be encircled and cut off from expected petrol supplies, the German forces opened heavy fire, from medium and field guns as well as 88-millimetres, on all attempts by the British tanks to pass through the minefield gap. During this period of the afternoon several parties of stragglers, including a large body of
What had actually happened further east was that 1 Armoured Division had reached 20 Corps which 7 Armoured Division had begun the previous day, but, according to the Rommel Papers, elements of this corps with ‘about ten tanks’ were in Rommel Papers, p. 343.
From Harding the New Zealand staff learnt that he intended to cut round the left of the Division and secure the landing grounds on the south of Panzer Army was slipping from his grasp. After telling
Such a manoeuvre might have had an element of success had Lumsden told Harding and
In the early afternoon the New Zealand guns fired a smoke screen to cover infantry and sappers of the light armoured brigade, who removed the wire and pickets bordering the minefield and marked a route in which apparently no mines were found. The tanks, well dispersed against the enemy's shellfire, then drove through and turned north, where they rounded up about 150 of the enemy, mostly Ramcke paratroops. The advance of the armour drew the attention of most of the enemy gunners away from the gap, so that just before dusk 5 Brigade, travelling in column at high speed, navigated the gap without casualties or damage, and halted in a hollow sheltered from enemy observation. After darkness fell, the brigade moved some way further north in order to clear the exit from the gap and to make contact with the armour. However, no other part of the New Zealand column followed for some hours. Infantry Brigadier, p. 242.
At 9 p.m. Under Brigadier G. P. B. Roberts.
How much more of
The orders for 1 Armoured Division to proceed at once to
During the morning of 5 November, Rommel seemed at first to think that his Panzer Army was in better shape than it actually was, due perhaps to early messages from
We could do nothing but shrug our shoulders, for extricating the infantry was precisely what the original order had prevented us from doing…. Now only Fate could show whether the British would permit us to stay at
Fuka long enough for the Italian and German infantry to catch up.
Rommel Papers, p. 338.
He then let his staff issue an order that the Africa Corps in engagement with a British column. Back at his headquarters, he took to a slit trench when the
By this time he must have realised, from all that he had seen and heard, that most of 10 and 21 Italian Corps could be written off. Africa Corps had already warned that it was in danger of being outflanked from the south, and then ‘several Sherman tanks came in sight and opened fire on everything they could see. We apparently no longer had any troops between us {
Ibid., p. 339
Panzer Army narrative, GMDS 34375/1–2, pp. 44–5.
As no British forces, except for armoured car patrols, were far enough west to engage Africa Corps at this time of the day, the
By the timing of messages issued by its headquarters, 15 Panzer Division began to retire almost as soon as the New Zealand column arrived to face it across the dummy minefield and, after dark, it made all speed for the
On the morning of the 6th, therefore, the New Zealand forces were preparing to advance to the north, with 22 Armoured Brigade a little way behind on the left, to meet the coast road at a point where only a few laggard Panzer Army troops might still be cut off, while 1 Armoured Division was some 25 miles or more away, deep in the desert to the south-west, but well placed to attack the still critical road junction at
At first light 90 Light Division. Among the enemy were some fifty British troops, together with some of their vehicles, who had been captured the previous evening while bringing up supplies for 7 Armoured Division.
This incident was over before the Cavalry and armour had negotiated the gap so, leaving the prisoners to the Reserve Group, 6 Brigade followed without delay, the whole force advancing steadily in a north-westerly direction throughout the morning. No opposition was met, and shortly before midday the leading Cavalry patrols reached the high ground overlooking the
Back in the desert,
Earlier in the morning, pilots of the
On the New Zealand left, 22 Armoured Brigade had set off early from its laager deeper in the desert. An enemy column, possibly the survivors of the one that 6 Brigade had engaged, passed across the line of march but drove off to the west before it could be identified; but a second group of vehicles, which seems to have been the rearguard of Voss Group, was engaged and some prisoners taken. These two incidents, allied to a shortage of petrol,
Montgomery himself had driven forward during the morning along the coast road in an attempt to ‘ginger things up’. Here he met Gatehouse of
The opportunity of encircling the fighting units of the Panzer Army at
As the New Zealand brigades drove north towards the road, first the trucks with only rear-wheel drive, then those with four-wheel drive, fell behind. As each truck sank to its axles in the wet sand, the men aboard dismounted from the shelter of cabs and canopied trays and, in the cold persistent rain, dug channels for each wheel. With camel thorn, sand trays, discarded enemy tents, or anything that would help the wheels to grip placed in the channels,
In the van, however, two squadrons of the Divisional Cavalry which had reached the rim of the escarpment worked their way with some difficulty down cuttings that led to the
As the New Zealand columns struggled forward in the afternoon, Africa Corps, which retreated rapidly to the north-west; following up, the armoured cars observed a larger group, including some tanks, stationary to the south-west. This force consisted of the remnants of
Rommel Papers, p. 343. It would appear that the panzer divisions had collected a number of tanks from the rear workshops as they withdrew.
Away at
Wireless communication on 6 November was probably the worst experienced in the campaign. Although the Eighth Army was now well equipped with transmitter/receivers of relatively good quality, so that detached units and supply columns should theoretically have been able to keep in touch with their parent formations, all wireless contacts had suffered for various reasons since the pursuit began. The great distances involved were of course partly responsible, as was interference from the enemy's radios, but the main fault lay in what might be called ‘over-indulgence’; spread out as they were and on the move, everyone in the pursuit forces with a set available—and that included practically every tank, armoured car, supply column, and all the various headquarters, high and low—was either asking for or sending instructions or information all through the day. On this particular day the weather also took a hand, with atmospheric interference which at first was intermittent, apparently preceding each rainstorm, and then in the afternoon became continuous, blotting out reception almost completely in many wireless sets.
If the Eighth Army's pursuit forces found 6 November a trying and exasperating day, for the Panzer Army it was a time of near-panic and depression. As the fighting troops moved back on
The situation met by the New Zealanders when moving against the Eighth Army's retreat some six months earlier was now to be repeated along this same stretch of the road. Rommel's own account was as follows:
Conditions on the road were indescribable. Columns in complete disorder—partly of German, partly of Italian vehicles—choked the road between the minefields. Rarely was there any movement forward and then everything soon jammed up again. Many vehicles were on tow and there was an acute shortage of petrol….
Rommel Papers, p. 340.
The diaries of the Africa Corps and lower formations offered an even worse picture, of officers in panic, drivers out of control, trucks and guns being demolished and just abandoned to block the narrow road, and of the summary execution of offenders. As the Eighth Army had been saved on this same stretch of road by the
By this day Rommel, having relinquished any hopes he may have held that some of the lost groups of his army might reappear, could now make a candid accounting of the pitiful handful of fighting men on whom he could rely. To add to his worries, after hearing that
Rommel Papers, p. 341.
The presence of British armoured car patrols to the south and south-west of 15 Panzer Division, which had just settled down with its back to the
For the majority of the men of both armies the night of 6–7 November was memorable for the discomfort it brought. Although the heavy downpours became less frequent as darkness fell, light showers and drizzle persisted throughout the night. In the New Zealand column there were few men who had not already become soaked to the skin in their efforts to push and haul their vehicles
In spite of orders for the conservation of fuel, the lights of many petrol and sand fires flickered through the rain squalls just before blackout time as billies were hastily boiled and reserve rations or hoarded tins from Patriotic Fund parcels produced and shared around. Then, grumbling impartially at the conduct of the war and the weather, the troops retired to whatever cover they had devised from the drips and runnels of rain, and even welcomed being disturbed to take a turn at sentry duty. And at 2 a.m. the Eighth Army put its clocks back an hour.
Dawn on the 7th showed clearing skies but the sand had been too well soaked to dry out quickly. Although tracked vehicles and the lighter types of wheeled vehicles such as jeeps and staff cars were able to move provided they avoided the worst of the wet areas, no formed body of the Eighth Army could move any distance without constant halts to dig and winch out the heavier trucks and guns. Moreover, having used up more than their estimated consumption in attempts to keep going the previous day, most groups were running low in petrol. Replenishment, however, proved difficult, for the New Zealand ASC columns bringing up supplies and the Division's B Echelon trucks which ferried the supplies from the replenishment points to the brigades and units were themselves hampered by the waterlogged going. The main supply column, commanded by Major
As the earlier rain showers turned to a solid downpour, Bracegirdle began to doubt whether his supply convoys could keep the new rendezvous and accordingly set off to find the Division. On the way he overtook Hillier, whose vehicle had become stuck in the wet sand. With considerable difficulty the two officers reached the Division, only to find that few of the B Echelon trucks had made the journey and that the division was practically out of petrol. Urged by the possibility that the weather might improve and the advance be resumed, Bracegirdle first collected a number of guides from the various units and showed them the position of the proposed replenishment area on the landing ground; he then made his way to the main road. Fortunately, while other vehicles of his column had gone back to the
Some time during the night of 6–7 November, and before the effects of the heavy rain had been appreciated, new orders were sent out by
As far as is known, the major part of 1 Armoured Division, bogged and short of petrol, made no major move on the 7th, but 7 Armoured Division managed to struggle to a point a few miles east of 21 Panzer Division.
In the engagement the previous evening and the follow-up this day, 7 Armoured Division claimed the capture or destruction of 15 tanks and 7 heavy guns and a bag of
The New Zealand orders based on Lumsden's plans and issued shortly after midnight gave
In the late afternoon tanks of
For the Panzer Army the rain proved a mixed blessing. It gave a short but valuable respite in which the chaos of supply and fighting troops on the road from
On 20 October, Ramcke Brigade's ‘ration strength’ in Panzer Army records as casualties by the end of November.
Although the wet weather allowed the Panzer Army's transport already on the main road to keep moving back, it also caused heavy losses of sorely needed vehicles which were travelling off the road. When such vehicles became bogged, the men aboard destroyed or just abandoned them, and often jettisoned their weapons; they then made for the main road to thumb lifts on the already overcrowded trucks passing by. In this way German rear-line troops and Italians of all units and formations became so inextricably mixed that the control points on the road found it impossible to re-form any of the Italian fighting units, and Rommel had to tell 20 and 21 Italian Corps to get their men back as quickly as they could to
The low cloud and the soggy ground hindered the Panzer Army's reconnaissance so that the presence of the British armour in the
When the meteorologists forecast that the rain was passing and the weather would clear, the ‘old desert hands’ knew from their experience that a few hours only of wind and sun would make the desert navigable again except perhaps in the sandiest hollows. With the best part of four divisions almost encircling
Accordingly, early on 8 November, Eighth Army issued a new set of orders in which 30 Corps was to move up and assume responsibility for clearing the ground up to
On receipt of these orders Lumsden told 7 Armoured Division to start as soon as it could along the railway with
Sunday the 8th of November dawned fine and clear. The morale of the pursuit forces, depressed to some extent by the rain, the hard travelling and inability to come to grips with the enemy, rose with the sun and then rose again when news began to spread of the
torch landings in North Africa. Already much of the desert had become passable and the New Zealand replenishment point, established overnight on the landing ground south of
With many trucks still bogged to the axles and having to be towed or dug out, few of the units had completed their replenishment and assembly when
The New Zealand advance was considerably slower. The reconnaissance group of 4 Light Armoured Brigade had set out early but had come up against a minefield on the flat below
The Panzer Army had only just got its tail clear of
The scale of demolitions and particularly booby traps increased steadily after 7 November, on which day Major-General Karl Buelowius became Chief Engineer to the Panzer Army. In
Because of Rommel's sudden decision to pull back from 90 Light Division set up a roadblock some 15 miles east of Voss Group watching the desert to the south.
Rommel had already learnt of the Allied armada approaching the coast of Panzer Army were now even slimmer than they had been and that Mussolini's latest order, to defend
Rommel Papers, p. 347.
Towards evening Rommel himself drove back to 90 Light Division he learnt that only armoured cars had approached the rearguard east of Africa Corps and
On the evening of the 8th,
Although in the rear of the Division's column the journey was one of stopping and starting, the head of the column advanced fairly rapidly until the afternoon when, some 15 to 20 miles short of 90 Light Division, but were then engaged by stronger positions further west. On hearing of this resistance,
As the leading brigades were threading their way past
The next day 25 Battalion, which had been held up by the mass of other traffic attempting to get on to the main road at Panzer Army's, attempts at demolition, and in its scattered buildings and dumps a surprisingly large quantity of material was recovered in usable condition, both of enemy stocks and British stores left behind in the June retreat. One partially damaged store of the Egyptian barracks was piled to the roof with Italian boots; nearby was a heap of British spigot mortars, and elsewhere were found quantities of medical equipment, machinery, and tinned food, of both British and enemy origin, as well as much Italian issue wine of the type known to the Eighth Army as ‘plonk’ or ‘purple death’. With periods allowed for swimming and sport, the men of 6 Brigade spent the waiting period in
When 4 Light Armoured Brigade halted against the opposition east of
A first-light reconnaissance on the 10th by 4 Light Armoured Brigade revealed that the opposition had melted away overnight. In fact, according to its war diary, 90 Light Division had fallen back in the middle of the previous afternoon, its rearguard of 361 Infantry Regiment being chased by an armoured force, of which four tanks and four armoured cars had been destroyed in a battle in which its own losses had been considerable. As no other battle appears to have occurred in this area, 90 Light Division's report must refer to the loss of its rearguard outpost to 4 Light Armoured Brigade, which reported one light tank as its only casualty. By the evening of the 9th, the main body of 90 Light Division was just east of Africa Corps negotiate the escarpment passes. In spite of widespread attacks by the
By this time 7 Armoured Division, following a route to the south of the railway reconnoitred the previous evening by armoured cars, was approaching the frontier with the intention of making a wide sweep to west and north to encircle
About nine o'clock the armoured cars of the
It would appear that all 90 Light Division's troops still on the coastal plain, including the rearguard, hurried back over Panzer Army artillery group which, through lack of liaison, had been left unprotected and unaware that it was the last enemy force still on the coastal plain. The tanks deployed behind the minefield and returned the fire, upon which the enemy guns were hastily withdrawn under a smoke screen. As dusk began to fall the
THE New Zealanders' approach to the Panzer Army had a sting in its tail that could maul his light armour and infantry,
GOC
In the failing light
Although the day's going had been better on the whole than that previously encountered, by evening the Division was already suffering a new crop of replenishment difficulties and it was becoming clear that the Eighth Army's estimates of petrol consumption made before the pursuit began were far from accurate, so much so that, on figures kept by the NZASC, petrol was being used at almost twice the quantity calculated. The reasons for this were attributed to various factors, including deviations from direct routes to avoid the enemy or difficult ground, the rain and the soft going, night driving in low gear and, to a lesser extent, certain faults which had developed in the system of replenishment. A great deal of petrol was, however, wasted through damage to the American-style four-gallon tins or ‘flimsies’, quite unsuitable for the heavy wear of desert travel, and a certain amount went up in flames when, several times each day, every one of the thousands of vehicles in the pursuit force had its separate petrol and sand fire to boil the billy. On this day 2 NZ Petrol Company manned a petrol point just east of
By the evening of 10 November all units of the Panzer Army had surmounted the escarpment by one or other of the passes. On
The German and Italian troops guarding the passes provided a formidable rearguard with excellent observation by day over the movement of any troops approaching over the plain below. However, Rommel had earlier refused to add the burden of Pistoia Division to his Panzer Army command, so that it was operating under what was left of the Italian fighting command and was thus without effective liaison with the German troops. In the event,
On the evening of the 10th Panzer Army Headquarters had reports of armoured cars in the desert to the south and south-west of
The task given to 4 Light Armoured Brigade, embodied in an order issued by the New Zealand Divisional Headquarters, was to seize and hold
Two patrols of four to five men each then came up, one under Lieutenant N. J. Warry and the other under Lieutenant M. Fyfe. Warry's party set off on the northern side of the road, cutting across the bends by scrambling up slopes and through wadis, and making considerable noise in the process. However, the patrol reached the top of the escarpment in about two and a half hours undetected by enemy sentries. By this time the moon was bright enough for the men to discern, only a few hundred yards away, numerous vehicles with the forms of sleeping men around them. Several sentries were on duty and, like most Italians at night, were making it known they were alert by calling out or singing. The patrol had just taken cover in some empty sangars near the escarpment lip when a motor-cyclist came in view on the road and drove past down the pass.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Fyfe's party had been climbing up the road itself, examining it for mines and demolitions, and was nearly at the top when the motor-cyclist appeared. Stopping the rider, an Italian, Fyfe sent him down the road with one man as escort carrying a report that the road was clear of mines and negotiable for transport. Fyfe's patrol joined Warry's in its sangars just before midnight, to face a curious situation. The behaviour of the enemy was hardly that of an alert rearguard preparing to defend the pass against imminent attack, but rather that of a convoy resting overnight away from immediate danger. The officers then decided to test the enemy's reaction by firing a few short bursts from their two Bren guns. This brought immediate and heavy, but indiscriminate, retaliation from several automatic weapons. With limited Bren ammunition, the Rifle Corps men held their fire and manned their sangars against attack, but the enemy made no attempt to reconnoitre or even to move his trucks out of danger. Other than Italian ineptitude, the only reason that can be offered for the defenders' behaviour is that the men of Pistoia Division had had previous clashes with Panzer Army columns withdrawing through their positions and assumed that the Rifle Corps patrol was just another trigger-happy group passing by. The patrols then stayed to watch the enemy settle down as before until, about 2 a.m., the prisoner's escort arrived with orders for Fyfe to return. Warry and his patrol continued their watch for another two hours, undisturbed by the enemy. Shortly after 4 a.m. sounds of movement up the pass were heard and, on going down to investigate, Warry met New Zealand infantry on its way up.
While Roddick's men were still investigating the pass, Luftwaffe failed to take advantage.
The sequence of events is somewhat confused, with personal and official accounts disagreeing in details, but it would seem that, on receiving the patrol report from Warry and Fyfe, brought to him by the prisoner's escort about half an hour after midnight, Roddick considered sending his tanks up the pass but decided that they would be too vulnerable to gun fire as they passed over the crest. He then further decided that his lorried infantry, of 1 King's Royal Rifle Corps, were too few to take and hold the pass firmly enough to let the armour up. These deliberations took about an hour for it was at 1.30 a.m. that he sent a signal to
Another half hour passed before the news reached Maj W. J. G. Roach, MC;
In a short discussion on the method of attack,
Guided by an officer of 1 King's Royal Rifle Corps (probably Lieutenant Fyfe), Major Smith, who had travelled over
Harding told Roach to bring his men up on C Company's right while Smith, with some of his officers and NCOs, made a reconnaissance towards a ruined stone hut close to the road, from which he observed enemy troops and vehicles in front and to the right of the battalion position. The two companies then advanced in line, and within a short distance C Company flushed some Italians from sangars on the north side of the road. However, A Company, keeping pace but meeting no enemy, found itself faced with a steepsided and rocky wadi and moved in towards the centre to avoid it. Harding then told Roach to take his men round the rear of C Company and advance on its left.
From this point, the action developed into a display of initiative by individual officers and men. On C Company's right, Lieutenant McLean's
On the left flank, Roach led two platoons of A Company along the road, with the third moving wide on their left. With sticky bombs ready for dealing with armoured vehicles, the thirty-seven men of the two platoons with Roach advanced by textbook fire and movement towards some vehicles seen in the half light ahead and, against little retaliation, quickly found themselves in possession of five trucks and forty Italians. A search of sangars and trenches nearby brought more prisoners as well as much ‘loot’ in the way of pistols, binoculars and masses of documents.
The platoon on the left, of fourteen men under Lieutenant
Further over to the north, the other two platoons of A Company were still spread out in their search for hidden stragglers and loot, and Roach was trying to assemble them when a column of eight vehicles, some with anti-tank guns on tow, appeared in the west, driving on a track that led to a gap in a minefield. Two men near the gap opened fire as the enemy column drew close and, as the trucks stopped and the men aboard went to ground, others of the two platoons joined in, advancing and firing at the same time. Under this summary attack, the enemy offered little resistance and another party of prisoners was added to A Company's total.
Away on the right of the road, McLean's platoon of C Company saw in the growing light a group of five guns which German artillerymen were hastily hitching to their tractors. While some of the platoon gave covering fire, others raced for a gap in the minefield wire where they hoped to cut off the guns, but the Germans managed to get their vehicles moving and through the gap before the attackers came within effective range.
Believing his area clear of the enemy, Major Smith was returning to Harding's headquarters to report when he came under machine-gun tracer fired from a position in the rear of A Company's line of advance. On reaching the headquarters he sent Sergeant Jennings and three of the men guarding the prisoners there to deal with this position. With his Bren-gunner firing from the hip, Jennings led his small party in a charge through a minefield to overcome the machine-gun nest and then, seeing some trucks ahead, he set off to investigate, but found his way barred by an anti-personnel minefield. As the four men sought a way clear of the mines they were seen and fired on by enemy around the trucks, but the Bren-gunner retaliated, keeping the enemy's heads down while Jennings managed to start the engine of an abandoned truck standing nearby. With the Bren-gunner and his two riflemen firing from the moving vehicle, Jennings drove straight at the enemy, who thereupon surrendered. This action brought in five trucks in good order, 10 machine guns, two anti-tank guns, and some 50 prisoners.
Just before daybreak a troop of 4 Light Armoured Brigade's anti-tank guns appeared at the head of the pass and deployed round Harding's headquarters. About the same time an officer of the brigade in a Dingo came up and drove along the road, where he met Roach who was then on his way to reconnoitre some distant vehicles which he thought might include anti-tank guns sited to fire at vehicles emerging from the pass. The officer refused Roach's request to use the Dingo for a reconnaissance, stating that he was returning at once to report the road clear for his tanks. Harding, whose wireless was proving ineffective, had already sent a runner,
The battalion had in fact secured about that number for well over 500 were counted as they were marched down the pass, while a large number of wounded and those left tending them were later collected. Some sixty of the enemy had been killed, and the booty included 30 vehicles in going order, 20 anti-tank guns, several field guns, and a large collection of machine guns and other light weapons. All this had been gained for the loss of the one man killed and one wounded. The action brought the battalion several awards, which included the DSO for Lieutenant-Colonel Harding and Military Medals for Sergeant Jennings and Corporal Ellery.
The success that fell to 21 Battalion's two slender companies cannot be attributed simply to the weakened morale of the enemy's troops. Admittedly the Italians encountered showed little desire to live up to Pistoia Division's motto of ‘Valiant unto Death’, but the collapse of their resistance was not due to any foreknowledge that they had been left on their own to face the British pursuit. Prisoners' statements and all other evidence—the reaction to the fire of the Rifle Corps patrol, the action of the despatch rider, and initial reaction to 21 Battalion's appearance—indicate they were unaware of their true situation. Although the defences were not well sited, being too far back from the lip of the escarpment, as if the Italians thought the German units would be covering them, the men of Pistoia Division were entrenched among minefields and well supplied with arms and ammunition, so that under good leadership they could have inflicted severe casualties on any troops attempting to ascend the pass.
In the event, the surprise effect of 21 Battalion's unexpected appearance was exploited to the full by both officers and men. Had there been any hesitation by the infantry, the few Germans present might have set an example to the Italians, especially those covered by the minefields, and held up the New Zealand advance for at least several hours. Instead, one of the best delaying positions on the Panzer Army's line of retreat fell in a matter of a few hours to the efforts of a handful of determined and enterprising men.
While the 90 Light Division was resting, with a feeling of security in the protection afforded by the pass garrison, in its laager only a few miles to the west and within sight of the frontier wire. This wire barrier, breached in many places in previous campaigns, offered no shelter, but to many minds in the desert it marked not only the boundary between Panzer Army records, there is a distinct impression that fortunes might change after the wire had been reached, that the British might pause and give the harried troops time to get their breath. When news got around that the British were not pausing at the wire, the order and control imposed to clear the passes was lost and panic and desperation again seized a large part of the German and Italian forces. Rommel himself was under no illusions that either the frontier wire or even the fortress of
This reply could hardly have been prepared before Rommel learnt that the Eighth Army was not stopping at the frontier. No sooner had 4 Light Armoured Brigade assembled at the top of the pass than its reconnaissance unit, shortly before 8 a.m., set off towards 90 Light Division, probably driving east to see for himself the situation at
As soon as the armoured brigade had cleared the head of
The fall of
I thought of saying to the Corps Comd that no one minds criticism which is constructive but that does not apply to the uninformed criticism of his staff.
GOC
2 NZEF /45.
There appear to have been two points at issue: one, that the Division had not been reporting its position at the exact hour laid down by Corps Headquarters; and the other, that the Division had not advanced fast enough. The New Zealand records indicate that sufficient situation reports had been sent back to allow Corps to follow progress, though possibly not at the exact hours specified, and their receipt may have been affected both by the difficulties of communication and the methods of operation of the Corps Headquarters.
The complaint that the New Zealand Division had not pressed its advance as it might have done was more serious. In his report on the pursuit operations
The policy was not to get involved, but, if possible, to position our forces to cut the enemy off. ‘Narrative & Lessons on Operations’, p. 21 (unpublished).
This of course was the policy agreed with Leese when the Division set off on the pursuit under the command of 30 Corps, and perhaps it had not been fully understood by Panzer Army still retained a force of armour that could mount a powerful counter-stroke, and the second factor was the manner in which Lumsden had employed his three armoured divisions. For a blocking role, the New Zealand Division had to be
It is clear that Lumsden and the ad hoc force of any troops available to continue the advance, all others being left behind or even sent back to the east where they would interfere less with supply of the forward area.
These arrangements were settled by the evening of 11 November and, having been given an estimate of three days before
GOC Panzer Army would probably attempt a stand at
Ibid.
Ibid.
On a promise that armour would be provided before the Division went into action,
The Cavalry set off at once, but the necessary warning messages for the early morning move had not yet reached all units, upsetting their plans for the rest period, before Lumsden's arrangements with Panzer Army seemed to be vacating
On learning merely that the movement of the Division had been cancelled,
The urgent message to the Cavalry was received by Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland on his way to For the period at Bardia to Enfidaville.
The battle of
Though there is no doubt that the characters and abilities of the commanders affected the campaigns, the importance of the personal influence has perhaps been unduly emphasised by the voluntarily accepted briefs of opposing literary lawyers, for there were many other factors besides generalship that helped to turn the tide at
The imminence of the TORCH landing was known to the higher levels of the Panzer Army, under a deputy commander, short of equipment and stores, and feeling forgotten by the Axis high command, was far from the top of its form. It is to their credit that the Axis troops resisted so stoutly and so long.
Finally, tribute for the victory should be bestowed on all those Allied troops who had a share in the fighting and behind the lines. Among them the men of the New Zealand Division rank high, for their experience and example had a great influence in the planning and operations. How much lightfoot and supercharge, for which Montgomery, never effusive in sharing the honours, wrote the following foreword:
The Battle of
Egypt was won by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire. Of all these soldiers none were finer than the fighting men from New Zealand.This pamphlet tells the story of the part played by the 2nd New Zealand Division in that historic battle. The Division was splendidly led and fought magnificently; the full story of its achievements will make men and women in the home country thrill with pride. Possibly I myself am the only one who really knows the extent to which the action of the New Zealand Division contributed towards the victory. The pamphlet contains many lessons that will influence the future training of our Army.
I am proud to have the 2nd New Zealand Division in my Army.
Commander-in-Chief,
Commander, Eighth Army: Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery
Air Commander,
Air Commander, Western Desert Air Headquarters: Air Vice-Marshal A. Coningham
Commander,
Commander, 13 Corps: Lieutenant-General B. G. Horrocks
Commander, 30 Corps: Lieutenant-General O. Leese
1 Armoured Division: Major-General R. Briggs
7 Armoured Division: Major-General A. F. Harding
8 Armoured Division: Major-General C. H. Gairdner
44 (Home Counties) Infantry Division: Major-General I. Hughes
50 (Northumberland) Infantry Division: Major-General J. S. Nichols
51 Highland Infantry Division: Major-General D. M. Wimberley
9 Australian Infantry Division: Major-General L. J. Morshead
1 South African Infantry Division: Major-General D. H. Pienaar
2 New Zealand Infantry Division: Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg
4 Indian Infantry Division: Major-General F. Tuker
Divisional Troops
2 NZ Divisional Signals
2 NZ Divisional Cavalry Regiment
Divisional Artillery
4 NZ Field Regiment
5 NZ Field Regiment
6 NZ Field Regiment
7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment
14 NZ Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
6 NZ Field Company
7 NZ Field Company
8 NZ Field Company
Machine Gun Battalion
27 NZ Battalion
Medical
21 NZ Battalion
22 NZ Battalion
23 NZ Battalion
28 NZ (Maori) Battalion
24 NZ Battalion
25 NZ Battalion
26 NZ Battalion
9 Armoured Brigade (
14 Foresters
166 Light Field Ambulance
This volume and the preceding volume, Battle for Egypt by
These narratives, covering the period January to November 1942, fill twenty volumes, eleven of which were written by
Of particular value for information outside the sphere of the New Zealand Division have been the narratives prepared by Brigadier C. J. C. Molony and Lieutenant-Colonel M. E. S. Laws for the Historical Section of the United Kingdom Cabinet Office.
9 Australian Division. Report on operations 23 October– 4 November 1942.
Eighth Army operation orders.
Falconer, Brigadier A. S. Report on operations, Abdin Palace,
General Headquarters, Middle East Forces. Lessons from operations.
General Headquarters, Middle East Forces. Weekly intelligence summaries.
Italian General Staff Historical Section. Army reports.
Kesselring, Field Marshal A. ‘The War in the
Nehring, General W. ‘Der Feldzug in Afrika’, Union of South Africa War Histories translation.
New Zealand, Chief of the General Staff. Personal files and papers.
Panzer Army of Africa, Africa Corps, 15 and
Report of Court of Inquiry on the encirclement of
Union of South Africa. ‘Precis of Evidence 1941–1942’ (Agar Hamilton, J. A. I., and Turner, L. C. F.).
United States War Department,
Weichold, Vice-Admiral E. ‘The War at Sea in the
Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division.
Crisis in the Desert.
Aitken, A. Gallipoli to the Somme. O.U.P.,
Alexander, Field Marshal Viscount. Despatch, The African Campaign from The London Gazette,
Auchinleck, General Sir Claude. Despatch, Operations in the The London Gazette,
Barclay, C. N. On Their Shoulders. Faber,
Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. Kimber,
Bryant, A. The Turn of the Tide. Collins,
Carell, P. The Foxes of the Desert. Macdonald,
Carver, M. El Alamein. Batsford,
Chaplin, H. D. The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment. The Regimental History Committee,
Churchill, W. S. The Second World War, Vol. IV. Cassell,
Ciano, Count G. Ciano's Diary, 1939–43 (ed. Malcolm Muggeridge). Heinemann,
Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (ed. Malcolm Muggeridge). Odhams,
Clay, E. W. The Path of the 50th. Gale and Polden,
Clifton, Brigadier G. H. The Happy Hunted. Cassell,
Connell, J., pseud. [John Henry Robertson]. Auchinleck. Cassell,
De Guingand, Major-General Sir F. Operation Victory. Hodder and Stoughton,
De Guingand, Major-General Sir F. Generals at War. Hodder and Stoughton,
Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War, Vols. I–III.
Fearnside, G. H. (Ed.) Bayonets Abroad. Waite and Bull,
Glenn, J. G. Tobruk to Tarakan. Rigby,
Goodhart, D. (Ed.) The History of the 2/7 Australian Field Regiment. Rigby,
Hart, Captain B. H. Liddell (Ed.) The Rommel Papers. Collins,
Hart, Captain B. H. Liddell. The Tanks. The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors, 1914–45, Vol. II. Cassell,
Hastings, R. H. W. S. The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War. Gale and Polden,
Hillson, N. Alexander of Tunis. Allen,
Horrocks, Lieutenant-General Sir B. A Full Life. Collins,
Jackett, G. (Ed.) Mud and Sand. 2/3 Pioneer Battalion Association,
Kay, R. L. Long Range Desert Group in the Mediterranean. New Zealand in the Second World War, Episodes and Studies series.
Kerr, C. Tanks in the East. O.U.P.,
Infantry Brigadier. O.U.P.,
Martin, Colonel T. A. The Essex Regiment, 1929–50. Essex Regimental Association,
Masel, P. The Second 28th.
Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles 1939–45. Cassell,
Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir B. El Alamein to the River Sangro. Hutchinson,
Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount. Memoirs. Collins,
Moorehead, A. Montgomery. Hamish Hamilton,
Peniakoff, Lieutenant-Colonel V. Private Army. Cape,
Alamein. Heinemann,
Pitt, Barrie. 1918. The Last Act. Cassell,
Playfair, Major-General I. S. O., et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vols. II and III. H.M.S.O.,
Qureshi, Major M. I. The First Punjabis. The History of the First Punjab Regiment, 1759–1956. Gale and Polden,
Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. The Turning Point. Collins,
Richardson, W., and Freidin, S. (Eds.) The Fatal Decisions. M. Joseph,
Roskill, Captain S. W. The War at Sea, 1939–1945, Vols. I and II. H.M.S.O., 1954 and 1956.
Royal Air Force Middle East Review, No. 1. Headquarters Royal Air Force,
Battle for Egypt. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War.
Serle, R. P. (Ed.) The Second Twenty-Fourth.
The Tiger Strikes. Published with the authority of the Government of
The Tiger Kills. The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaign. H.M.S.O.,
Thompson, Wing Commander H. L. New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Vol. III.
Tuker, Lieutenant-General Sir F. Approach to Battle. Cassell,
Wake, Major-General Sir H., and Deedes, Major W. F. (Eds.) Swift and Bold. The Story of the King's Royal Rifle Corps in the Second World War. Gale and Polden,
Young, D. Rommel. Collins,
Abbott, Maj R. B.,
Adam, Gen Sir R.,
Aitken, A.
Aked, Capt E. W.,
Panzer Army at,
Alam el Halfa, defences at, Panzer Army withdraws,
Alanbrooke, Fd Mshl Lord. See Brooke, Gen Sir Alan
Alexander, Fd Mshl Earl,
Anderson, Capt D. F.,
Auchinleck, Fd Mshl Sir C.,
‘August’ Column,
August, WO II J.,
Australian Forces –
2/7 Fd Regt,
Awarau, Capt W. M.,
Axis shipping losses,
Baird, Lt J. R.,
‘Ballater’ (strongpoint),
Barron, Sgt C. O.,
Bayerlein, Maj-Gen F.,
beresford, Operation,
‘Blockhouse’, The,
Boyd-Moss, Maj D.,
Bracegirdle, Lt-Col O.,
Briggs, Maj-Gen H. R.,
British Forces –
lightfoot, supercharge,
10 Corps, at lightfoot, et seq; lightfoot, supercharge,
13 Corps, commanded by Lt-Gen Gott, lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
30 Corps, Lt-Gen Ramsden commands, lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
1 Armd Div, enemy intelligence of, lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
7 Armd Div, in lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
10 Armd Div, in battle of lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
44 (Home Counties) Division, in lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
50 (British) Division, in lightfoot, supercharge,
51 (Highland) Division, arrival in M.E., lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
Queen's Bays,
Royals (The Royal Dragoons),
3 County of London Yeomanry,
4 County of London Yeomanry,
1 Royal Tanks,
5 Royal Tanks,
RAMC,
Lt Fd Amb,
RASC,
Queen's Royal Regt (West Surrey) -
Royal Sussex Regt -
The Black Watch,
King's Royal Rifle Corps -
Durham Lt Inf (6, 8 and 9 Bns),
Seaforth Highlanders -
Rifle Bde Bns -
Buchanan, Capt N.,
Budd, 2 Lt B. H.,
Buelowius, Maj-Gen K.,
bulimba, Operation, et seq
Butland, Capt W. C.,
Cairo,
Cameron, Maj D. B.,
Canberra,
‘Cape, The’,
Carew, Sgt C. P.,
Carver, M.,
Casualties -
Chalmers, Capt J. C.,
Chaplin, H. D.,
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir W., on
Ciano, Count G.,
Clifton, Brig G. H.,
Cody, J. F.,
Commonwealth commanders,
Coningham, AVM Sir A.,
Conolly, Capt J.,
Coop, Maj M. J.,
Cooper, Capt A. F.,
Cumming, Capt D. G.,
Currie, Brig J.,
Custance, Brig E. C. N.,
Daba,
Deindl, Gen,
Derrett, Sgt W. A.,
SeeBritish Forces
Donald, Capt H. V.,
Dorman Smith, Gen E. E.,
Eady, Capt A. T.,
Elliott, 2 Lt K, VC,
Fletcher, WO II A.,
lightfoot, supercharge,
Furious,
Garbett, Capt J. J.,
Gatehouse, Maj-Gen A. H.,
Gentry, Maj-Gen Sir W., GSO I lightfoot,
German Forces -
Panzer Army Headquarters,
Africa Corps,
15 Panzer Div,
21 Panzer Div,
90 Lt Div,
164 Lt Div,
15 Rifle Bde,
Ramcke Para Bde,
155 Inf Regt (90 Lt Div),
125 Inf Regt (164 Inf Div),
288 Special Force,
Army Battle Group,
Africa Corps Headquarters Battle Group (Kampfstaffel),
Battle Group South,
Luftwaffe,
Gillespie, Lt-Col O. A.,
GMDS (German Military Documents Section),
Goodhart, D.,
Goodmanson, WO I W. R.,
Gordon, General,
Gordon, Sgt N.,
Gott, Lt-Gen W. H. E.,
Grace, Maj C. H.,
grapeshot, Operation,
Greek Forces -
Guards Patrol (LRDG),
gymnast. Seetorch
‘Hammerforce’,
Hart, B. H. Liddell (Sir Basil),
Hart, Maj I. A.,
Hartnell, Lt-Col S. F.,
Henare, Capt J. C.,
Hillier, Lt-Col A. E.,
Hockley, Capt P. R.,
Holmes, Lt-Gen W. G.,
Horrell, Capt H. J. H.,
Horrocks, Lt-Gen Sir B., commands 13 Corps, lightfoot, supercharge,
Hoseit, Capt W.,
‘Hut’, The,
Indian Forces. See alsoBritish Forces
Ink Route,
Italian Forces -
20 (Armd) Corps,
Ariete (Armd) Div,
Folgore Div,
Littorio (Armd) Div,
Trieste Div,
33 Armd Regt,
65 Inf Regt,
66 Inf Regt,
Guastatori Unit,
Kalansho,
See
Kay, R.,
Kelly, Lt B. F. E.,
Kesselring, Fd Mshl A.,
Laird, Capt B. M.,
Lambourn, Lt-Col A. E.,
Lawrence, Sgt J. K.,
Leese, Lt-Gen Sir O., takes command of 30 Corps, lightfoot, supercharge,
Lumsden, Lt-Gen H., commander lightfoot, supercharge,
Lungershausen, Maj-Gen K. H.,
Lynch, Capt P. L.,
McClurg, Sgt L. T.,
Maadi,
Marsden, Maj G. T.,
Marshall, Capt J. R. B.,
See
Montgomery, Fd Mshl Viscount, appointed commander Panzer Army,
Morshead, Maj-Gen Sir L.,
Mowat, Lt R. S.,
beresford, Panzer Army in,
beresford,
New Zealand Patrol (LRDG),
New Zealand Forces -
2 NZ Div, positions at lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
4 (Armd) Bde, reorganising at
5 Bde, positions before lightfoot, lightfoot, supercharge,
6 Bde, positions before lightfoot, supercharge,
Div Cav,
18 Bn, in NZ Box,
21 Bn, in NZ Box, lightfoot,
22 Bn, reorganising at lightfoot, supercharge,
23 Bn, in NZ Box, lightfoot,
24 Bn, lightfoot, supercharge,
25 Bn, in NZ Box, lightfoot, supercharge,
26 Bn, in NZ Box, lightfoot, supercharge,
28 (Maori) Bn, defences at lightfoot, supercharge,
Medical Corps -
Nicoll, Lt-Col A. J.,
Nino Bixio,
O'Connor, Lt-Gen Sir R.,
Ormond, Maj A. R. W.,
Panzer Army, strength of,
Peart, Lt-Col J. A.,
Percy, Brig J. E. S.,
Pike, Lt-Col P. R.,
Pitt, Barrie,
Pleasants, Brig C. L.,
Possin, Capt G. A. W.,
‘Puddle, The’,
Qureshi, Maj M. I.,
Rahman. See
Ramcke, Maj-Gen B.,
Reid, Lt-Col H. M.,
Renton, Maj-Gen J. M. L.,
Richards, Lt-Col E. E.,
Roberts, Brig G. P. B.,
Robertson, Capt G. M.,
Roddick, Brig M. G.,
Rommel, Fd Mshl E.,
Roosevelt, F. D.,
Ross, Maj A.,
SeeBritish Forces
Savo Island, Battle of,
Scoullar, J. L.,
‘S’ mines,
Smith, Capt L. G.,
Smuts, Fd Mshl Rt. Hon. J. C.,
‘Snipe’ (objective),
Solomons Is.,
South African Forces -
Stalin, Mshl J.,
Stewart, Col G. J. O.,
Stumme, Gen G.,
supercharge, Operation,
Talbot, Capt J. R.,
Thompson, Wg Cdr H. L.,
Turner, Maj V. B.,
‘Twins, The’,
Waaka, Lt K.,
Weir, Maj-Gen Sir S., CRA supercharge,
wellington. Seeberesford, Operation
Westphal, Lt-Gen S.,
White, Maj J. C.,
Wilder, Lt-Col N. P.,
Williams, Lt J. R.,
Willkie, Wendell,
Wood, Prof F. L. W.,
‘Woodcock’ (objective),
Woolcott, Maj H. C. S.,
Wroth, Capt C. S.,
Yeoman, Capt A. C.,
Yeomanry Patrol (LRDG),
Young, D.,
Professor N. C. Phillips, MA, University of Canterbury
Professor F. L. W. Wood, MA (Oxon), Victoria University of Wellington
Professor F. W. Holmes, MA, Victoria University of Wellington
This volume was produced and published by the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.
The Department gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given in the production of this volume by Professor Phillips.
the author: