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Limited and Only Edition, 1000 copies Printed in 1937
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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING
TO THE MINISTER OF NATIVE AFFAIRS DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND (THE RIGHT HON. M. J. SAVAGE, M.P.) AND THE FUTURE OF THE MAORI RACE
I am much indebted to the officials of the Public Record Office, the
For help in regard to the illustrations my thanks are due to the New Zealand Government, for permission to use several blocks used in The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period by
The Colonial Office records in the Public Record Office are distinguished by the letters C.O. and the War Office records by W.O. It has been thought best to print the references in footnotes, as no other plan seems to be any more satisfactory.
This book was originally intended simply to fill a gap in the history of New Zealand by giving the results of the first examination of England's policy during the Maori Wars, based on the original documents. As the work went on, however, it became more and more obvious that the Maori Wars provided the opportunity for working out in practice theories of Imperial defence and colonial self-government which changed the whole character of the Empire. Was it possible to throw on the colonists the onus of self-defence without cutting them off from the Motherland? Was it possible to include in colonial self-government control of native races protected by treaty with the Motherland? Was it worth while to retain colonies at all if they were to be almost entirely independent?
These questions were by no means easy to answer without practical experience, and the manner in which successive Secretaries of State put them to the test of experience in New Zealand and elsewhere is of great interest to those who wish to understand the Empire as it is to-day. The manner of the testing may have been rough and ready, with inadequate precautions against failure, but the test had to come sooner or later. If Gladstone and Granville seem to us unconscious of the risks they ran with the tender plant of Imperial unity, there is nevertheless something well worthy of attention in the political philosophy of the late 60's. To the policy of retrenchment in colonial expenditure more lasting merit may be ascribed than a mere lowering of taxation, while even the opposition to the Liberal Government's policy towards New Zealand produced important Imperial results. The great influence exerted by the Royal Colonial Institute, now the Royal Empire Society, can scarcely be questioned, and it was the policy of withdrawing Imperial troops from New Zealand and “leaving the colonists to their fate” which led to the meetings from which the Institute emerged.
From whatever standpoint we look at the Maori Wars, they have interesting aspects. As this introduction is written the question of the transfer of native territories in South Africa from the administration of the British Government to that of the Union Government is prominently before the public. The Secretary of State for the Dominions has repeated in the House of Commons the assurance that before such transfer takes place the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories will be consulted. No such consideration was given to the Maoris when the British Government, in order to secure the withdrawal of the Imperial troops, decided to transfer control of native affairs to the New Zealand Government. In handing over the task of interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi to a Government engaged in a bitter struggle with the other party to the treaty, the British Government took, no doubt, considerable risks with its own honour. The alternative policy of creating a Maori protectorate with Imperial officers to assist the Maoris in ruling themselves might conceivably have averted the long and costly warfare which we have to describe. From motives which are discussed in the narrative the British Government chose to trust the colonists of New Zealand to find out from bitter experience that a benevolent native policy paid best in the long run. For many years after the wars the Maori problem was left to solve itself through the extinction of the race, believed to be inevitable. It was a Maori movement which arrested the fatal process and put new life into the people. To-day the Maoris are increasing in numbers more rapidly than their white neighbours, and the Maori King moves in 1938 to Turongo, his new home in the old capital, Ngaruawahia. The reed house of the first Maori Kings is gone. The idea of Maori kingship persists.
In this book we are dealing with the darkest period in the chequered story of New Zealand and one which still influences the relations of Maori and white man. The causes and results of the Maori Wars are imperfectly understood to-day, and only great episodes of the struggle, such as the Maori defence of Orakau, the British disaster at the
The Maori Wars raised problems of colonial policy which demanded the close attention of successive British Governments, and which attracted the equally close attention of newspapers in many lands, missionary bodies, and societies interested in the welfare of native races. In Australia there was naturally keen interest in these wars, as Imperial troops were sent from there on the outbreak of hostilities and large forces of military settlers were raised later. In Canada, at the same time, the question of Imperial responsibility for local defence was being settled and the events leading to the “withdrawal of the legions” from both Canada and New Zealand were very closely related. There was also a very close connection, as will be shown in the volume, between
As the story of the wars unfolds, we realize why this decade is so important in the history of the British Empire. “The broad road leading to Imperial disarmament lay plainly ahead,” writes Dr. A. Folsom in her account of the formative years of the Royal Empire Society, while books like Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, by the Danish historian, C. A. Bodelsen, strengthen the conviction that in the struggle of the Maoris against Imperial troops and the colonists more than local issues were decided. “It was the belief,” writes Bodelsen, “that the Gladstone Government was about to cut the colonies adrift and that their treatment of New Zealand was part and parcel of a deliberate scheme for bringing about such an event, which started the new Imperialist movement.”
One of Lord Granville's despatches to New Zealand, dated March 21, 1869, divided the Press of London into two camps. The Times, Daily News, and Morning Post supported Lord Granville, but the Spectator wrote on July 24: “It is clear that Mr. Standard (Conservative) wrote on October 13: “By a minute of Lord Granville it has been decreed that there shall be no colonies.” Bodelsen says that the tone of this particular despatch “would hardly have been admissible in a note to a foreign Power under strained relations.” It was, as we shall see, but one of a series of communications which had the effect of causing New Zealand to consider seriously annexation to the United States. This effect, almost unimaginable to-day, is the more significant in view of the hostile relations between England and the United States arising out of incidents during the American Civil War.
“The decade 1861–70 may fairly be called a critical period in British Imperial history, for it was during those years that tendencies in England towards the disruption of the Empire reached their climax, …” wrote Political Science Quarterly (December, 1921). “This subject, however, received little or no notice in the standard histories of England or in the biographies of the leading statesmen of the day. Perhaps this is not to be wondered at, since the insularism of English historians, against which Seeley lodged a memorable protest a generation ago, has been only slightly modified since his day, and the revival of Imperialism in England during the last fifty years has no doubt predisposed Englishmen, as historians, against dwelling upon what, as citizens, they would prefer to forget.”
We are certainly inclined to forget many aspects of Imperial history in the nineteenth century which contain lessons for us to-day, and to take for granted many conceptions which were very far from being generally accepted during the period with which we are dealing in this volume. The American War of Independence had effectually quenched enthusiasm for colonies, and even the burning faith of Wakefield, Buller, Durham, and the rest of the Colonial Reformers scarcely sufficed to revive it. Missionary enterprises prompted by the evangelical revival of the 20's were of great importance in promoting interest in far-off lands. The humanitarian motives of the missions and the disinterested enthusiasm of most of the missionaries did not always result in complete sympathy with the local authorities, and both in New Zealand and South Africa there were differences of opinion which produced misgivings in England and consequently affected colonial policy very considerably. Kaffir wars in South Africa followed by Maori wars in New Zealand had the not unnatural effect of producing a reaction against heavy colonial expenditure. Where withdrawal of the British flag was impossible this reaction itself produced another important effect. It smoothed the way for colonial self-government, since colonies that governed themselves were less expensive than those governed from
British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics.
The Kaffir War of 1851 may be taken as the beginning of a new and eventful era in British colonial policy. It prompted Cobden to write: “The proper cure for these recurring wars is to let the colonists bear the brunt of it. This must be done by first giving them the powers of self-government, and then throwing on them the responsibility of their own policy. They would then be very careful to treat the neighbouring savages with justice.” Cobden to H. Richard, March 13, 1851. J. A. Hobson, Cobden, the International Man, p. 75.
In England and New Zealand (1926) the present writer traced from original documents the relations of the two countries down to the eve of the Taranaki War of 1860. In this volume the story is continued. The writer has relied mainly on original documents and contemporary newspapers to reveal the true motives of British policy during a period which was characterized by an almost complete lack of understanding between the mother-country and the colony. He has attempted to examine as much as possible of the information that was actually before the Colonial Office, in order to show how far its policy towards the colonists was just and reasonable. All the material sent home by the Governors—despatches, ministerial memoranda, reports of
The Times for more than twenty years has been consulted and that journal becomes one of the chief characters in our story. For local impressions of the warfare and Colonial Office policy, the file of the Taranaki Herald in the library at New Plymouth was examined. Great attention has been paid to the evolution of the Colonial Office despatches, for the successive minutes of the different officials are, of course, not available in New Zealand, and without them it is not possible to decide whether despatches were framed by the permanent officials and merely signed by the Secretary of State, as Sir
Accounts of the major battles of the different campaigns, founded on the official War Office reports, have been included in the narrative, but no attempt is made at a detailed military history. A careful examination of the local sources for such a history has been made by Mr. The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period, published by authority of the Minister of Internal Affairs, absolve the present writer from the necessity of adding still further to what is of necessity a long work. As the issue of further volumes of New Zealand Historical Records to cover the period after 1840 is not likely to be undertaken in the near future, the writer has felt that it would be of real value to give in full some of the historic despatches and minutes of the period. A certain amount of duplication is caused by the method employed, but, as the aim is to give a detailed study of policy during a period which must necessarily be treated in summary fashion in books dealing with the whole history of New Zealand, it is hoped that the advantages of the method outweigh the disadvantages.
Material for this volume had been collected over a period
The Letters of Lord Blachford (edited by G. E. Marindin, 1896). Blachford, then Sir
“The Duke of Newcastle was an honest and honourable man, a thorough gentleman in all his feelings and ways, and considerate of all about him. To me he was always kind…. It was said of him that he did not remember his rank unless you forgot it, and the expression well hit off his relations to his subordinates. In political administration he was painstaking, clear-headed, and just. But his abilities were moderate; and he did not see how far they were away from being sufficient for the management of great affairs—which, however, he was always ambitious of handling….
“Cardwell was just and kind, clear-headed and hard-headed, industrious, very accurate and enormously safe, especially in regard to matters of which the House of Commons might have cognizance. In fact, he seemed always to feel on his trial before the House of Commons; and I have occasionally felt that his dread of a Parliamentary scrape sometimes supplied the place of thorough force of character…. And it is to be remarked that in nine cases out of ten his guide would be a true guide—the House of Commons seeing in ordinary cases what is not honest or not for the public interest…. He took pains not to make enemies, and bore no ill-will to his opponents.
“Lord Carnarvon became at once a friend more intimate than Cardwell, both because there was more warmth in him, and because there was the bond of a common feeling in Church matters. The Tractarian movement had “the sympathy and counsels” of Rogers (Dict. Nat. Biography). He was one of the founders of the Guardian newspaper.
The Duke of Buckingham was “a thoroughly honest and kind-hearted man, with a rough but friendly manner, not without shrewdness, and clear-headed, but with a natural turn for detail, which he had indulged as Chairman of a great railway, The London and North-Western, from 1853 to 1861.
Of Rogers himself his writings, letters, and minutes give a clear picture. A contemporary at Eton of “Have you any views as to the use of a peer?” he wrote to Sir
The right to the battle honour “New Zealand” was won by British regiments in a series of arduous campaigns. Below are set out the names of regiments which served in New Zealand between 1854 and 1870, with some of the battle honours they had won before the Maori Wars, and the names of the regiments to-day. The Royal Regiment of Artillery and the Corps of Royal Engineers were represented throughout the wars, each justifying the regimental motto “Ubique.” Detachments of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines also played a prominent part in the operations.
[The 96th (2nd Battalion, The Manchester Regiment) and 99th (2nd Battalion, The Wiltshire Regiment) won “New Zealand” honours in earlier campaigns.]
The Secretaries of State for the Colonies and the Ministries in England and New Zealand during the period with which we deal were:
ENGLAND
Secretary of StateMinistryThe Permanent Under-Secretaries of State were: Herman Merivale (1847–60); Sir
NEW ZEALAND
The New Zealand Ministries were:The Governors were:
The New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852 gave the colonists self-government but reserved to the Governor the direction of native affairs. The reservation was prompted by the best possible motive—the welfare of the Maoris—but unfortunately the Governor was not provided with adequate funds to administer the Native Department. Consequently there was a damaging division of authority which led to confusion and uncertainty. The Treaty of Waitangi had guaranteed to the Maoris the possession of their lands, but they viewed with apprehension the rapid influx of a white population naturally anxious to acquire land in the most fertile districts. A section of the colonists did its best to increase the apprehension of the Maoris—from motives good in some cases but dubious in others.
In 1854 Colonel Wynyard, the Acting Governor, reported that a pamphlet which had been circulated by a member of the Church Missionary Society was calculated to incite the natives against the Government system of land purchase. Here is a passage from the pamphlet:
What is the root of the wealth of the world? It is the land.—Deuteronomy, 3, 7, 8, 9.
For what reason did the foreigner desire to purchase the Maori land?
What are the things upon the land? Timber, grass, water, and numerous other things.
What are the things inside? Coal, iron, gold, copper, gum, and endless wealth.
When all these pieces of land are gone to the foreigner, where will you find a place as a town for you hereafter?
In 1855 the situation was so threatening in Taranaki owing to an inter-tribal feud concerning the sale of land in the Puketapu district that the settlers sent a memorial asking for more troops. H. Merivale's minute to Sir
Sir local questions with which the Imperial Government has no concern, and to settle which disputes the Imperial Government cannot be expected to maintain a body of troops in the colony. If we send 2,000 or 3,000 soldiers whenever any one of these petty communities apprehends a Maori row, there will be plenty of such rows. For such a body of troops creates a public expenditure of great importance in such a place as New Plymouth. I think these views should be expressed to the memorialists in clear and distinct though conciliatory terms. In existing circumstances, and having the troops to spare, the Governor has probably done right in concentrating 300 men at New Plymouth.”
Governor Gore Browne, who arrived in New Zealand on September 6, made a summary of the Taranaki question in a despatch of November 19, 1855. The agent of the New Zea-
C.O. 209, 131.
In a despatch of February 14, 1856, Gore Browne reviewed the state of the colony, nothing the growing pretensions of the provincial councils and the evils arising from the election of superintendents. He suggested a Lieutenant-Governor for Auckland and nominated superintendents for the other provinces. He emphasized the importance of better communication
C.O. 209, 135.
Merivale, in a long minute on this despatch to John Ball (Under-Secretary for the Colonies), said that none of those responsible for the framing of the Constitution meant to make the superintendent anything more than president of a Legislative Assembly. “It was left to the general and local legislatures to give him executive power, if they thought proper. The provincial ordinances herewith sent disclose at last (what was never revealed to us before) how this has been done. I see nothing illegal in the general purview of these ordinances, though there may be here and there a mistaken assumption of power. But it is a great misfortune that this step has been taken by the Provincial Governments—not by the Central, as it ought to have been. There were several reasons for this. In the first place Governor Grey committed what I must now think a serious error, though I am bound to say that none of us anticipated the consequences, when he convened the provincial legislatures before the general, thereby giving them the start in action, and time to acquire an independent hold on popular opinion. The Act seems to have limited the same time for both (six months after its proclamation). In the next place the government fell on Governor Grey's leaving, into the hands of a temporary administrator quite unfit to deal with such a contingency as the establishment of a new Constitution. Thirdly, the House of Representatives discredited itself at the outset by an unseemly squabble for place and power, and the General Legislature has ever since been almost in abeyance.
“Government therefore has practically fallen into the hands
may be also that they are really expensive, as they certainly must be annoying to industrious people who dislike constant local squabbles. But I cannot think these reasons for undoing by extraneous force what has been done, without any expression of popular wish to justify us. These observations, however, only apply to the Southern settlements. With regard to Auckland and New Plymouth the case is different. Without insisting on the Governor's grievance of his own want of executive power, and being obliged to ask the Superintendent of Auckland for a policeman, I cannot think it is safe or judicious to maintain a considerable Military Force for the protection of these settlements against the natives, in places where the Crown has literally no civil power at all. But I can suggest no mode of rectifying this state of things, unless Mr. Labouchere is prepared to refuse all additional military assistance except on terms of the concession to the Crown of the required civil power.
“As to the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, there are no funds wherewith to pay such an officer.” C.O. 209, 135, June 2, 1856. Henry Labouchere was Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1855 to 1858, succeeding Sir
John Ball, Under-Secretary of State, in a minute to Labouchere, wrote: “In the passage which I have underlined, Mr. Merivale has indicated the only means that I can perceive for
escaping from the very difficult position in which we are placed by the present constitution and especially by the practical results of the way in which it has been brought into operation. The existence of elective superintendents, if these are to continue to be political officers exercising considerable power and patronage and dealing (together with their councils) with all the concerns of government, is a most serious evil and will tend, I fear, to infuse into the entire New Zealand society a spirit of faction and adherence to local cliques rather than principles …. The only real … remedy is, in my opinion, to be sought in the increased power and consideration of the Central Legislature.”
With reference to Auckland and New Plymouth, the writer concurred with Merivale “in thinking that if the amount of protection which is demanded is to be continued, the Crown should obtain in return a restoration of that executive power which never should have passed into the hands of the local elective functionaries.” “I may observe that on this point it is essential that the instructions to the Governor should be of the most precise and definite character. With the present feeling of insecurity, the Governor will be very reluctant under any circumstances to let the 58th Regiment go, but it seems necessary to give him formal instructions not to retain troops in either Auckland or New Plymouth unless the necessary conditions are complied with. But the precise question now to be settled is what conditions should be required. In one of his minutes on this subject I understood Mr. Merivale to suggest that a temporary suspension of the present constitution is what he thinks most advisable. My own opinion (is) that it would be far better to take the opportunity for practically reducing the provincial bodies to little more than ordinary municipal functions without suspending, transferring not to the Governor but to the Governor in Council all the powers and authority usually vested in the Executive. The measure as to New Plymouth would require some modification in this respect. From both provinces some moderate contributions to the cost of military defence may be fairly demanded, but it should, I think, be very moderate, limited to the cost of barracks for additional men now maintained in these provinces. If political concessions
Labouchere's instruction was: “Write to the War Department that under present circumstances I am of opinion that it would be better not to withdraw the Regiment. Inform them of the Governor's request that the troops be armed with Enfield rifles. State that we intend to instruct the Governor to ask the local authorities to bear a certain proportion of the expense of barrack accommodation, etc.” Labouchere also directed that a letter should be sent to the Admiralty expressing the opinion that it was of great importance that a ship of war should at once be sent to New Zealand. C.O. 209, 135.
A despatch of the Governor from Auckland, dated February 14, 1856, in connection with the murder of a Maori woman by an American at Auckland, drew from Merivale the following minute: “This despatch is very serious—not only New Plymouth but Auckland itself, if not in danger, is evidently in alarm. I do not think sufficient attention has ever been paid to the enormous difficulty of managing natives with ‘responsible’ government, or with the expectation of it, where those natives are numerous and quarrelsome. Personal influence alone can control them, or else a superior military force. The first is incompatible with a popular system of government in these small communities. Even the second, a disagreeable alternative at best, is difficult to reconcile with civil independence. I believe far the best thing for New Zealand would be to withdraw Auckland and New Plymouth back again under Crown Government; to increase the military force there, and to leave the other settlements, which are under no apprehension from the natives, to govern themselves. And I daresay the European settlers would be content enough to submit to a ‘Suspending Act’ for a limited time, such as that which passed in 1847, in exchange for greater security and greater military expenditure. But if it is too late for all this, as may probably be the case, then I doubt whether any good will really be done by increasing the force. Self-governing communities must aid at least in protecting themselves from such dangers.” C.O. 209, 135.
In a despatch of March 12 Governor Gore Browne expressed the view that all dealings with the native tribes should be reserved to him alone. Merivale's minute was: “I do not think it possible, with advantage, to withhold native affairs from the cognizance of responsible advisers, the matter being so closely connected with other points of domestic administration.” C.O. 209, 135.
A Colonial Office memorandum, prepared for Labouchere on August 8, set out: “By your despatch of 28 November last the Governor was told in the usual terms that New Zealand would henceforth be expected to contribute to its own military defence. This has been entirely disregarded, and it may be taken as generally true, that no expenditure whatever will be devoted to such a purpose, so long as troops are maintained by this country. Even contribution towards barrack accommodation at New Plymouth has been resolutely declined, both by the general and provincial governments. The only governments concerned are those of Auckland and New Plymouth, where the Governor says (by a very incredible piece of political arithmetic, however) there are 49,000 natives capable of bearing arms, against 4,000 British. Gore Browne later altered his figure from 49,000 to 30,000 (C.O. 209, 141).
“These are the points for your decision and there are several courses open: (1) To leave matters as they are and pay for the soldiers and barracks; in which case Lord Panmure will require to be answered. (2) To make payment for the barracks the only condition, but to insist on it that the 58th shall be withdrawn, unless this is satisfactorily done. (3) To insist in
C.O. 209, 135.
Labouchere's minute in reply was dated August 26: “I believe that the best course will be to retain the troops in New Zealand for the present as they are now, but insist on the colonists paying the barrack accommodation which may be required for any number exceeding one thousand, directing the surplus number to be sent away after a certain date if the accommodation is not provided. Write to Lord Panmure accordingly.” On October 21, 1856, Governor Browne was informed of the decision arrived at and told that unless he should be soon able to report that barrack accommodation had been provided, the Government would feel it necessary to issue peremptory orders for the withdrawal of the troops from the districts concerned. C.O. 209, 135.
C.O. 209, 135.
In a private letter to Merivale dated April 29, 1856, Gore Browne referred to a minute he had drawn up on the view he took of his relation to his responsible advisers. Section 2 of the minute was:
On matters affecting the Queen's prerogative and Imperial interests generally, the Governor will be happy to receive their advice, but when he differs from them in opinion, he will (if they desire it) submit their views to the consideration of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, adhering to his own until an answer is received. Among Imperial subjects the Governor includes all dealings with the native tribes, more especially in the negotiation of purchases of land.
“Judging by what I now see,” Gore Browne wrote, “the difficulty will be not to turn men out of office, but to keep them in it. My advisers will be subject to pressure from an opposition agitated by violent party feelings and restrained by no fear of consequences. If my view of the case is correct, they will not find it easy to control those who cast longing eyes on native land, nor will the fear of war have that effect, for many would profit by it largely in the way of trade and to the unscrupulous it holds out hope of acquiring the lands they covet. If, therefore, the Governor is obliged to consult with his Executive Council in questions affecting the natives, he will be liable to their throwing up office and being supported in so doing by the Assembly whenever they take or are C.O. 209, 135.forced to take a one-sided view of
In the House of Representatives on April 25, 1856, C.O. 209, 135.
Baron de Thierry, in a confidential letter to the Governor from “Ivy Cottage” on May 17, reported that his son George had just returned from Coromandel with an account of the activities of one Tekin, from Mechanics' Bay, “who leaves his cutter at Paparoa each trip and is the principal furnisher of grog, powder, caps, etc., to the hostile natives, and this man is now at Coromandel with his traitor's cargo, and brought upwards of 200 boxes of caps. The fighting dress is to be white shirts and shawls about the waist and Tekin has brought about £200 worth of them for the warriors.” The name of a member of the Provincial Council was also mentioned in connection with the trade. Ibid., 136. The Baron's earlier activities in New Zealand are described in See below, p. 148.England and New Zealand, chapter 2. A biography of the Baron, Check to Your King, by
C.O. 209, 137.On July 31, 1856, the Governor circulated a letter to a number of prominent people asking whether the management of native affairs might be safely conceded to the Governor's responsible advisers, reserving to the Governor a veto in all cases, and a recommendation in relation to expenditure or whether the whole management of native affairs should be reserved to the Governor.
Those who favoured keeping control entirely in the Governor's hands included Colonel
Archdeacon legislation is somewhat democratic they prefer a monarchical executive, and above all things they value permanence, stability and fixedness—words and ideas unknown in an English colony and a Colonial Assembly during
Archdeacon William Williams and Archdeacon
Archdeacon Hadfield's plan, though rejected at the time, was very similar to that adopted a few years later by the British Government. Whether it would not have been wise to adopt, as a temporary measure in 1856,
The Rev. G. Smales, Wesleyan missionary, supporting reservation of full powers in native affairs to the Governor, said in his memorandum of August 11: “A considerable number of natives in the interior and in the Waikato district have recently been canvassing the propriety of electing one of their chiefs as i Kingi mo te Maori (a King for the Maoris).” This passage was heavily marked in the Colonial Office.
Bishop Pompallier advocated the responsibility of the Governor assisted by a Council of Advice consisting of representatives of the House of Representatives and the chief religious denominations.
The report of a Board of Inquiry on Native matters, transmitted to the House of Representatives on July 6, 1856, referred to the “League not to sell land formed among the native population”: “This League, commencing south of Auckland, at about fifty miles from the town, at a branch of the Waikato River called Maramarua, embraces nearly the whole of the interior of the island, and extends to the East Coast, and the West Coast, south of Kawhia.” The Board considered the existing method of purchasing land from the natives the best adapted to the difficult circumstances. C.O. 209, 138.
Governor Gore Browne wrote to the Colonial Office on September 25, 1856: “I do not hesitate to say that Auckland exists on the forbearance of a race of savages, and I consider this a perilous state. The natives are all, or nearly all, armed. I doubt if one European in twenty has a gun or knows the use of it.” Ibid., 139.
In his work, The Maori King Movement in New Zealand, published at Auckland in 1860, the Rev
John Ball, in a minute of February 23, 1857, expressed the opinion that it was desirable that the transfer of responsibility for native affairs to the Governor's executive council should not be very long retarded. “But as it will be an experiment not free from risk,” he added, “I am strongly of opinion that it should not be tried mainly at the cost of this country. I shall have far more hope that the Assembly will deal justly and prudently by the natives when they know that they will be in their own persons and purses responsible for their proceedings. Even then there remains the risk that so many of the members are really without a stake in the game, being removed from the native districts…. I would then say that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to retain permanently for the Governor acting on behalf of the Crown the exclusive control of these matters, but that until the representative institutions
C.O. 209, 139.
Governor Gore Browne, in a despatch of January 6, 1857, wrote: “If… the qualification (for voting) is strictly confined to persons possessing individual titles, the natives must be for many years to come excluded from any share in the representative institutions of the colony. Of this they are aware, and great pains are taken to remind them that the revenue,
C.O. 209, 141.
On May 9 Gore Browne reported that he had had an interview with the chief Te Heu Heu, who stated that the English were by degrees obtaining the best of the Maoris' lands, and that they would soon “be eaten up and cease to be.” That for these reasons they were determined to have a King of their own, that they would not interfere with the English in the settlements, but that the laws they intended to make should be binding on all who chose to reside among the natives. Gore Browne said: “I was not elected by the English but appointed by Her Majesty, and though I should always be glad to consult with
Colonial Office comment on the Governor's actions was favourable. “The conduct of the Governor seems to have been very judicious,” wrote Gairdner, one of the permanent officials. Merivale and Labouchere concurred. In a minute on the Governor's report on his journey, his advisers noted: “The peculiar feature of the time is the tendency to self-organisation now being exhibited by a large section of the Maori people.” Ibid. Cf. The Changing Maori, p. 47: “One common basis of unity fired them, … namely, to seek to restore the declining mana of their people.”
On May 11 Gore Browne forwarded two minutes by his responsible advisers on the question of the colony paying the cost of barrack accommodation for troops. Merivale's comment was: “They will never pay a farthing unless they are made. Whether it is worth while quarrelling with them about the £6,000 or £10,000 is another matter…. To try the provincial
C.O. 209, 141.
March 10, 1858 (C.O. 209, 141).
The result of the meeting of the Waikato tribes for the purpose of instituting C.O. 209, 141.Southern Cross on June 5, 1857: “The King's flag, for the present, has been struck to that of the Queen. But the idea is far from being abandoned. The movement still goes on; while the propriety, the thoughtfulness, and the caution with which it is conducted render it all the more serious by nature…. It is becoming more and more evident even to the most incredulous, that a crisis in native affairs is coming on. We do not believe, indeed, that a King will be actually made; but it is clear that a great change is approaching, either for good or for evil, in the relations between the races. The natives thoroughly understand what they want, and it is not a play-thing that they seek. They are resolved on making an effort to preserve their existence, not only as a race, but, as they understand it, a nation, before they shall be over numbered, and therefore out-mastered by the whites.”
The Governor replied: “Are there two suns in the heavens? Can there be two Sovereigns in New Zealand?… This thought about setting up a Maori King is not wise…. What could a Maori King do for you, which the Queen, the Governor, and
C.O. 209, 142.
On August 7, the Governor reported that he had with-drawn the detachment of troops stationed at the Bay of Islands as his advisers had refused to provide proper accommodation for them. His action was warmly approved by the Colonial Office. “The Governor has acted with courage and wisdom,” was Labouchere's minute. C.O. 209, 142. C.O. 209, 142.
On September 23 Gore Browne reported that he had received a letter from Ibid. In spite of his acceptance of the kingship the pension of
On October 17 Gore Browne reported that an old feud between two tribes under Te Hapuku and Te Moananui in
C.O. 209, 142. C.O. 209, 142.
The Governor, in a despatch of January 23, 1858, reported that See above, p. 30. Cf. Saunders, I, 342. Though the chief Ihaia admitted that the murder was contrived and directed by him, no attempt was made to bring him to trial. C.O. 209, 145.
Lord Stanley, in a Colonial Office minute on this despatch, wrote: “The state of the Empire and especially that of India renders it impossible to send more troops, or to alter our de-
C.O. 209, 145. C.O. 209, 145.
On February 15 Governor Gore Browne reported that he had issued a proclamation declaring “that all persons whosoever who shall unlawfully assemble with arms within the boundaries of the district described in the schedule to this proclamation, will without further notice be treated as persons in arms against the Queen's authority and active measures will be forth-with taken against them by Her Majesty's civil authorities and military forces.” He added that the officer commanding the troops in New Plymouth had been directed, if satisfied that his interference was necessary, to call in all the inhabitants and inform them that it was not in his power to protect them unless they did as he directed: “He is also furnished with an authority to draw out the Militia for active service, and to call for military assistance from Wellington; but he is enjoined not to commence hostilities unless they are forced on by the natives…. Should war be forced upon us, of which however I have no sort of expectation at present, Her Majesty's Government and the people of the mother-country will know that they are assisting men who are willing to do all that is possible for themselves, and that war has not been brought on for the sake of commissariat expenditure by those who are willing to lay the burden on others, but shrink from bearing it themselves.” C.O. 209, 145.
In a confidential despatch of February 18, 1858, Gore Browne said: “This [King] movement, if not originated, is fostered by a man named Davis, C.O. 209, 145.Te Karere Maori, very mischievous in intention.
In a despatch of February 25 Gore Browne wrote of the Maoris: “I need say no more than that in a military point of view they have every advantage, as they possess and are capable of threading fastnesses we cannot enter, and that they occupy the interior, while we are scattered along the coasts of the island. It may be asked—is a colony which possesses self-government in the most complete form to depend always on the mother-country for military support, and yet contribute nothing towards its expense? In answer I would submit that when the revenue arrives at a certain sum—say two hundred thousand pounds per annum, Her Majesty's Government may fairly require that the colony should contribute towards the cost of its protection, such contribution to increase with the increasing wealth of the colony.”
Here there is a Colonial Office note in the margin: “Yes, but the provincial revenues?”
“In a few years also,” the Governor's despatch went on, “it is to be hoped the natives will be so far advanced as no longer to require special exemption from the control of the Assembly and may in some way or other be represented in it. Till that time arrives I venture, at the risk of appearing im-
C.O. 209, 145.
Merivale wrote the following minute for Lord Carnarvon: “Governor Browne deserves credit for the frank and clear statement of his views. For my own part, I am very much inclined to believe that the maintenance of 2,000 men in New Zealand, disposed as he suggests, would be an excellent ‘investment’ for this country—that the stimulus which the sense of security would give to occupation and protection would soon amply repay it in a pecuniary point of view. But this is not the policy in vogue with Parliament or the country, and the next best thing is to adhere definitively to the scheme of reduction and force the colonists to defend themselves?” “Probably,” Lord Carnarvon replied, “but the aspect of affairs at New Plymouth is threatening and affords reasonable grounds for anxiety.” The despatch was referred to the War Office. Ibid. It may be noted that during the financial year 1857–8 there were in the colonies 47,000 troops. The British Exchequer disbursed for Colonial military defence £3,590,000, while the colonies' own total expenditure for the purpose was £378,000. Cf. Cambridge History of the British Empire—South Africa, p. 391: “The heavy expense of the Kaffir War of 1850–3, the menace of the native war in the Sovereignty, and the collapse of British administration there, caused a violent reaction in England in favour of that section of public opinion led by Cobden and Molesworth which demanded that the colonists should undertake and pay for the conduct of their own internal affairs.”
Merivale, in a minute of August 24, 1858, on a speech by C.O. 209, 145. C.O. 209, 145.Southern Cross had written of Grey: “No one ever understood the art of displaying his plumes, borrowed or proper, to greater advantage, than did the ‘model governor.’ But day by day the fact is becoming more apparent that he bequeathed his difficulties to his successor.”
On November 1 T. F. Elliot, Assistant Under-Secretary, wrote on a despatch from Gore Browne enclosing a memorial from New Plymouth concerning power to deal directly with the natives for land: “The New Zealand settlers have from the first origin of the colony been as willing to rush into rash disputes with the natives as unwilling afterwards to fight them out manfully. Insolent and aggressive in spirit, they have failed in the hour of action, and they are the last members of the Empire who can with any fair countenance seek to involve the national forces in difficult native wars in which their own part has so little redounded to their honour.” C.O. 209, 145.
In the House of Representatives on June 25, 1858, C.O. 209, 146.
After reading all the papers, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, in a minute of October 23, expressed himself as certain that a force of at least 2,000 men was not one too many in New Zealand if great disasters were to be averted. Ibid., 145. Cf. Life of Lord Norton, by W. S. Childe-Pemberton, p. 172. go in twelve hours.” Lytton tendered his resignation in December 1858, for health reasons. He was estranged from his wife and “the brightest moment of his public career coincided with the darkest hour of his private affliction.” (See Life of Edward Bulwer, by the Earl of Lytton, 1913, chapters 4 and 6.) On remonstrance from Lord Derby and Disraeli, Lytton withdrew his resignation, but secured release with the defeat of the Government in the general election and a vote of no-confidence at the end of May 1859. The new Secretary of State was the Duke of Newcastle.
On August 19 Gore Browne forwarded “far from satisfactory” accounts of the progress of the King movement. He trusted that “time and absolute indifference and neglect on the part of the Government will teach the natives the folly of proceedings undertaken only at the promptings of vanity and instigated by disaffected advisers.” “In the entire absence of naval protection and the expected reduction of the military force,” he added, “no other course is open to me, even should my anticipations prove incorrect.” C.O. 209, 146. Ibid., 147.
The Governor, in a despatch of October 14, on native
C.O. 209, 147.
The “Native Territorial Rights Bill,” proposed by ministers, was opposed by the Governor and the Native Department. The Governor declined to recommend it for the Queen's assent. It contained a provision asserting a right to levy a tax of ten shillings an acre on land alienated by natives to Europeans. Gairdner, in a Colonial Office minute on the subject, took the view that “there is a marked exhibition of ability and subtlety on the one side, and of clear manly common sense on the other,” in the controversy between ministers and the Governor, traversed in voluminous minutes, letters, reports, and despatches. The Bill was disallowed. C.O. 209, 147.
Gairdner wrote on an Admiralty letter of December 7, 1858: “We have at last wrung from the Admiralty a promise that a war steamer shall be sent to New Zealand, though it will probably not be long detained on that unpleasant station.” Lord Carnarvon: “This is certainly a point gained—thanks
C.O. 209, 150.
In a despatch of January 25, 1859, Gore Browne reported that attempts had been made by Maoris at Kawhia “to levy contributions from Europeans in the name of the Maori King” and that serious disturbances had broken out among the Maoris at Wanganui. “I regret also to state,” he added, “that I am about to withdraw the European magistrate from the Bay of Islands on the East Coast owing to the disaffection evinced by the natives in that district.” The Governor trusted that time and “the supreme indifference manifested towards the restless agitators who foment the troubles, will produce the desired effect.” The Colonial Office minute, written by Gairdner, read: “This is not a satisfactory report, but the firm and temperate policy of Governor Browne will probably serve to check any serious difficulties. In the meantime the military force has been increased and the Admiralty have reported the assignment of an armed steam vessel for that station.” C.O. 209, 150. C.O. 209, 150.
In a despatch of February 12 the Governor stated that the Government was willing to support an entire company of the Royal Engineers in New Zealand at its own expense. C.O. 209, 150.
Merivale was sympathetic towards the colony: “Surveying operations are all in all for a young colony,” he said. “The need
C.O. 209, 152.nothing, it would be of the greatest possible advantage to both parties.” Chichester Fortescue and the Duke of Newcastle agreed with Merivale, but the Duke decided that in view of the condition of Europe at the time, he could not press the matter on the War Office.
In a despatch of March 29, 1859, the Governor stated that he had visited Taranaki, where he found “the settlers dissatisfied with the Government and ill pleased with the Maoris, who, though they possess large tracts of land which they cannot occupy, refuse to sell any portion of it.” The Governor said he had had an interview with the Chief
During the meeting Te Ibid., 150.
On June 13 Gore Browne described his visit to Wellington
“From Wellington,” the Governor continued, “I proceeded to the New Province of Hawke's Bay, where also I had interviews with some important chiefs. Here too I found the emissaries of the party professing allegiance to the Maori King had preceded me, but I have reason to think that their influence was in a great degree neutralized by my visit.” Referring to the King movement, the Governor stated that in 1857 Potatau had given him an assurance that he would control the then probable movement, that he had no desire to be King, and that he would always be a faithful subject to Her Majesty. The Governor said he had every reason to believe that the old chief had adhered to his promise.
“At the time alluded to,” he said, “I appointed Mr. Fenton to be magistrate of that district, this officer being enthusiastic in his desire to introduce law amongst the natives. It soon, however, appeared that the tribes of the Waikato were divided into two parties: one chose Potatau as their head and was composed of all the old and important chiefs: the other consisted of young men who called themselves the Queen's party and desired to be assimilated with the English.
The Governor reported that Fenton had been appointed assistant law officer in 1858 and removed from the Waikato. Cf. The Maori King (1864): “To extinguish Mr. Fenton was no doubt a great triumph for the Native Department but has since turned out rather a costly one for the British Empire.” The report of a select committee of the House of Representatives, dated October 31, 1860, noted “the entire want of harmonious action between the Ministry and the Department of the Native Secretary.” Fenton's report is in C.O. 209, 156. For an impression of Fenton and of the general state of the Waikato before the wars, see More Maoriland Adventures of J.W. Stack, edited by
C.O. 209, 150.
In a despatch of June 15, 1859, the Governor noted that land in Wanganui was selling at £2,000 per acre. C.O. 209, 150. He became Baron Carlingford in 1874. C.O. 209, 150.elected superintendent is incompatible with the system he is supposed to work.”
To fears of Maori aggression was now added dread of foreign attack. France and England were on the verge of war. In a letter to the officer commanding the troops, Colonel Gold, dated August 2, 1859, the Governor wrote: “As the erection of batteries and the supply of arms, etc., from England are matters requiring considerable time, while the colony would in all probability be in greater danger from the French squadron at New Caledonia immediately after a declaration of war than at a later date, I beg to suggest for your consideration such preparations as could be made at a moment's notice.… I have already ascertained that at least one hundred volunteers trained to artillery can be obtained at a moment's notice, and arrangements are being made for enrolling them and establishing a fixed rate of pay.” Ibid., 151.
In a despatch of August 14, the Governor referred to the Admiralty's statement that the The Cf. Buddle, C.O. 209, 151.Niger, steam frigate, would be sent to Sydney for service in New Zealand. “I have, however,” he said, “heard nothing of the Niger, and am reminded that similar assurances of naval protection have been repeated
Niger arrived at Auckland in October 1859 (C.O. 209, 151).The Maori King Movement: “If,” said an intelligent Waikato chief, “some means had been initiated at an earlier period to give the Chiefs a status in connection with the Government and some part in the administration of our affairs, we should not have had a Maori King.” See also Keesing, op. cit., p. 48.
Fortescue, who, in a minute to the Duke of Newcastle,
The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “I should be glad to see the regiment in New Zealand raised to 1,200 men, and this ought to be done, but I cannot recommend another battalion…. If a native insurrection were to take place, two things should be borne in mind: (1) that no military force which could be sent there could undertake to protect scattered settlers, and (2) that the soldiers should act in force against the enemy in the field and the small posts must be withdrawn and their places occupied by volunteers. This is the best way to prevent the sanguinary excesses which will occur when civilians only half trained to arms and smarting under the loss of property, and perhaps of relatives, are called upon to take the field unchecked by the presence of regular soldiers.” C.O. 209, 151.
In a despatch of August 22, 1859, the Governor said that he had received a letter from the Superintendent of Wellington (Dr. Featherston) “in which he states that Sir C.O. 209, 151.
Fortescue wrote on this: “I think the answer should contain an approval of the course taken by the Governor. The tone of the correspondence between Mr. Featherston and the General Government is very characteristic of a New Zealand superintendent and very different from what it would be were he the deputy of the Governor. The latter seems to have no power to enforce police regulations, even on these critical native subjects.” The Duke of Newcastle's instruction was: “Approve the Governor's proceedings.” C.O. 209, 151. C.O. 209, 151.
In a despatch on the administration of native affairs, Gore Browne wrote: “The natives have seen the land they alienated for farthings resold for pounds; they feel that dominion and power, or as they term it ‘Substance,’ went from them with the territories they alienated, and they look with apprehension to the annihilation of their nationality. The consequence of this feeling has been the formation of a league to prevent the alienation of land, commenced by the tribes in the Waikato before my arrival in the colony and which has since been combined with the so-called King movement.”
“The Europeans,” the Governor went on, “covet these (Maori) lands and are determined to enter in and possess them, recte si possunt, si non quocunque modo. This determination becomes daily more apparent. A member of the Auckland Provincial Council stated in the Council that ‘the fault lay in the system of acquiring land from the natives. We were called upon to leave them the best land and sacrifice ourselves to sympathy for the natives—and all that kind of humbug. The settlers had no room for their stock and would be obliged to set Government at defiance…. People would soon begin to act on the old principle of letting land belong to those who can keep it.’”
The Governor saw clearly the dangers of such a policy: “The immediate consequence of any attempt to acquire Maori lands without previously extinguishing the native title to the satisfaction of all having interest in them would be a universal outbreak in which many innocent Europeans would perish, and colonization would be definitely retarded, but the native race would be eventually extirpated.” He recommended that the Governor should be assisted by a permanent council for
C.O. 209, 151.
In a Colonial Office memorandum on this despatch it was stated: “Much discussion from time to time occurred in consequence of the steadfast desire by the responsible ministers to press their interference in native questions, a claim which Colonel Browne has hitherto succeeded in resisting with great firmness and temper on essential points…. All the evidence goes to show the strong and striking difference which is attached by the natives to the influence of the Queen and her representative, and to that of the Ministers, whom they at once recognize as a body having no permanent existence in themselves and dependent on the will of the Legislature, a body which they regard as their natural adversaries.” C.O. 209, 151. Ibid., 153.
In New Plymouth the dissatisfaction of the settlers with the lack of land for occupation was growing acute. In a leading article of January 7, 1860, the Taranaki Herald said: “At the close of another year we are again discouraged to find that next to nothing has been effected by the Land Purchase Department for the Province. Our transactions during that period after so much promise and expectation, show a purchase of fourteen thousand acres of back forest land! A small payment, it is true, has been made for some land at the Waitara, but the opposition affect to treat this as a mere present, and the view—and we
The Governor, in a despatch of February 27, 1860, wrote: “Contrary to expectations … the chief Niger to proceed to Taranaki and would accompany a detachment of troops there himself. Volunteers would be called to protect Auckland in the absence of troops.
Gairdner, in the Colonial Office, wrote: “The issue of this case will depend on the spirit with which the other native chiefs act. If they are disaffected to any extent there will probably be a prolonged and tedious bush warfare.” The Duke of Newcastle's minute was: “Nothing more can be done at present than to express approval of the steps which the Governor has taken and hope that they may be successful. The affair is, I should fear, critical, but much will depend upon the settlers exercising as much discretion and forbearance as the Governor. C.O. 209, 153.
It may be noted here that on June 17, 1860, Sir G. E. Marindin, op. cit., p. 227.
Sir Frederic went on to give an account of his relations with his chief: “I see very little of the Duke [of Newcastle]. The Duke works at home, comes down about three, is off to the House of Lords about four, and probably has two or three appointments in the meantime, so that it is very difficult to catch him at all, and you must dispose of what you have to say shortly and clearly when you see him; so far perhaps no bad thing. But then, when a thing has to be passed in a hurry, amended in progress, and so on, the absence of your chief, or his inaccessibility, is worrying. However, he is very ready to accept your conclusions, very clear in his own directions, and extremely careful (which I respect highly) never to turn back on a subordinate any shadow of responsibility for advice that he has once accepted.”
The Secretary of State's New Zealand policy was opposed by the Aborigines Protection Society, founded in 1838 by Sir T. F. Buxton and Dr. T. Hodgkin and supported by many members of Parliament. Here is one passage from its journal in 1860: “Even the Bishop of New Zealand says—‘My advice to the natives in all parts of New Zealand has always been to sell all the land which they are not able to occupy or cultivate. I had two reasons for this: first to avoid continual jealousies between the races; and secondly to bring the native population within narrower limits in order that religion, law, education, and civilization might be brought to bear more effectually upon them.’ We cannot doubt the sincerity and purity of in-
Here is the Society's view of the Duke's attempt to solve the New Zealand problem by legislation: “The difficulties of the native land question … inevitably claimed the attention of the British Government, and a Bill was brought before Parliament from the Colonial Office with the express object of removing them. The Bill was evidently drawn with the intention to do good. Its failure to give satisfaction to the colonists' party sufficiently indicated that it afforded the natives some shelter from the colonists, but, when carefully examined, it no less clearly manifested that the rights of the natives were not placed on any solid foundation. The committee of the Aborigines Protection Society therefore regarded it as a duty incumbent upon it to explain to the Colonial Office the grounds on which it deprecated the passing of the Bill.
“What can be said in defence of a system by which, under pretence of protecting the natives, the Government practically levy a duty upon the sale of their lands amounting to thirty-nine-fortieths of their value? This is no exaggeration of the case, and the interdiction of the natives to sell, except to the Government, has become in practice—whatever it may have been in theory—a plan to keep down the prices at which the natives might sell to the Government.
“The constitution of the proposed Native Council is objectionable, because its members are to be exclusively the nominees of the Crown and removable at will…. Our most serious objection to the Bill is that, while it gives to the Council an almost unlimited power of interference with the natives, and especially with their lands, the natives themselves are entirely unrepresented in it.”
The Society suggested that one or more commissioners should be despatched from England, “armed, not only with the power necessary to institute an inquiry which will lay bare all the facts of the case, but also with the authority to adopt such remedial measures as circumstances may render desirable.” Commenting on the withdrawal of the Bill, the Society said this was probably due to the “more public opposition” to it.
Of the attitude of the missionaries in New Zealand the
Archdeacon Hadfield's “Letter to the Duke of Newcastle” was then reviewed. In it Hadfield wrote: “The question at issue is simply this—Is a native chief to be forcibly ejected from his land, because an individual member of his tribe tells a subordinate land-agent that it is his, and not the chief's, and that agent believes him? The Governor says ‘Yes’; the chiefs say ‘No.’” Also reviewed in the journal was Sir The Taranaki Question. “We rejoice,” the reviewer stated, “to find that our opposition to the iniquitous Taranaki War is sustained by so unquestionable an authority.” The investigation of the Waitara purchase was “in every respect insufficient and irregular.” Sir William showed, it was contended, that “the whole weight of the evidence goes conclusively to prove that dénouement of the Taranaki tragedy.
On February 22, 1860, Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. Murray, having received a letter from
The Superintendent of Taranaki wrote to Colonel Gore Browne on February 24: “Your despatch intimating active hostilities against C.O. 209, 153.
On March 2 the Governor reported that he had arrived at
Parris “had been a small trader among the natives before he became Land Commissioner” (Airedale steamer on March I, and that H.M.S. Niger had arrived in the evening of the same day. The strength of the troops assembled in New Plymouth was: Officers 25, sergeants 34, drummers 9, and rank and file 380. Total 448. He had sent ParrisThe War in New Zealand, by pa alone and succeeded in bringing the chief back.) “After a long desultory talk in which he asserted no proprietary claim to the land, he said he would either come or send his final decision to us to-day. The place to which he has retreated is far back in the woods, and exceedingly difficult of access, but enables him to command many straggling settlements recently occupied by Europeans, most of whom have taken refuge in the town. I have now the honour to forward a translation of his letter in reply, which is nothing but a mockery and a subterfuge to obtain time until he can get assistance. It is now my intention to request Colonel Gold to occupy the land at the mouth of the Waitara with Her Majesty's troops, taking every possible care to prevent a collision unless it is forced upon him. I shall there erect at the expense of the local Government a blockhouse large enough to hold a company of troops, and strong enough to be left in charge of twenty men. My future movements will depend on the conduct of
Kingi wrote in his letter: “I am afraid of your force, because you have brought soldiers with you into the town, and therefore I think you are angry with me.… The reason we have come to the Bush is because the settlers have gone to the Town.” C.O. 209, 153.Niger about four hours earlier. Some boats from the ship landed at once, and my private secretary, Captain Steward, Lieutenant Blake, R.N., and Mr. Rogan, native agent, seeing no one, advanced to meet the troops. They soon, however discovered a number of natives lying in ambush well concealed. After some talk with the native agent who told them they were between the troops and the sailors, they retired saying they would return. During the night pa commanding the road and the following morning stopped an escort coming into camp. On hearing of this I sent a message … saying that if they did not evacuate it in twenty minutes I should instruct the troops to fire on them. This had the desired effect and the pa which was found to have traverses and to be extraordinarily well designed, was burnt by the troops.” The Governor then returned to New Plymouth in the Niger, as he had been informed that Maoris from the south would attack the town at once. The force in the town at this time consisted of 300 militia and 26 regular troops. The Governor sent for the 65th Regiment, stationed at Wellington, directing the O.C. there to entrust the care of the town to the militia.
Fifty men, a six-pounder gun, and a twelve-pounder rocket-tube were also landed from the C.O. 209, 153.Niger. Europeans on the Tataraimaika block were recommended to go into the town and two blockhouses were erected to command the main roads and afford protection to stragglers. The native pa in the town was closed, and Maoris admitted by passes given only to those signing a declaration of allegiance to the Queen. “The
On June 27, 1860, the Duke of Newcastle, in a despatch in reply, stated that “if the next reports should show that this insurrection is spreading, a regiment will be ordered to New Zealand without delay for the relief of the 65th, and you will be authorized to retain the latter regiment until the insurrection is put down. I have great confidence in the spirit of self-reliance shewn by the colonists on the late occasion as marked by the zeal and alacrity both of the militia and volunteers on this the first occasion after their enrolment on which they have been called out for duty.” C.O. 209, 153.
On March 13 the Governor described the scene of operations and said: “It is difficult to imagine a country better adapted for the operations of savages whose strength lies in their power of penetrating fastnesses and taking advantage of every inequality to conceal themselves.” We may perhaps wonder why the Governor did not think of this before committing himself to a policy that made war inevitable. Cf. Swainson, New Zealand and the War (1862).
The difficulties of the country did not intimidate Colonel Gold. On March 19 he reported that pa on the Government block of land for hostile purposes and had refused to abandon it on March 17: “The guns and rockets now opened upon the pa at about 750 yards; in half an hour I moved to the right to batter another face at shorter range, when the natives opened fire upon us. I again took the same direction and fired at about 300 yards. Having made considerable havoc on this side, and a swamp deterring our further progress, I took ground to the left, when a rash but daring movement of the volunteer horsemen occurred towards the pa. A heavy and well-sustained fire was then opened on us from two faces, on which occasion Mr. Sarlen of the mounted volunteers and two privates, 65th Regiment, were dangerously wounded. One of the latter, P. W. Corbett, I regret to say, is since dead. The enemy's musketry
“The troops were now halted and formed in close column covered by the guns. A line of entrenchment was then drawn out by Lieut. Mould, R.E., which the soldiers speedily converted into a suitable cover guided by the intelligent non-commissioned officers of the Royal Engineers. During this opportunity we were within good range of a rapid and continuous fire from rifles and musketry, and but for a kind Providence, might have sustained considerable loss. The guns were put in rear of the trenches, and it being nearly dark we laid down on our arms, the fire from the pa continuing nearly all night. On the morning of the 18th, as soon as there was sufficient light, the guns were advanced towards the stock-ades, covered by skirmishers of the 65th Regiment, who, with the Royal Engineers, soon threw up a trench in their front. Fire was then opened, after which another approach to about 50 yards, protected as before, was made, and a breach in the pa soon made, into which the troops entered at 40 minutes after 11 a.m., finding it, to their great disappointment, evacuated.” The Maoris had left their flag and several tons of potatoes.
On March 22 the Governor reported with much regret that a collision had taken place between the troops and the Maoris at Waitara. “It is now clear to me,” he wrote, “that mana (viz. a feudal superiority without proprietary interest in the land) exists at all,
The Governor gave this as the real problem at issue: “The
C.O. 209, 153. The Secretary of State's reply to this urgent despatch of March 22 was not written till July 26, more than four months later (see below, p. 79). The long delays in communication between the two countries greatly hampered administration. They also increase the difficulties of writing a connected narrative of events.
The Sydney correspondent of The Times, in a report of April 16, published on June 13, 1860, wrote: “The native discontent in New Zealand has burst out into open insurrection. Notwithstanding that the Governor collected all the available naval and military resources at his command, and fully paraded them before any conflict began, pa, the correspondent added: ‘The news that the natives had all escaped capture was heard with dismay by the colonists, who loudly condemned the commanding officer for not bringing his artillery into closer quarters at first, and ‘rushing’ the pa overnight, or, at least, surrounding it so as to prevent escape. … The natives, after recovering from their fright, began to construe the engagement as a victory and the effect of this indecisive action on the native mind was soon seen. Manahi, a Taranaki chief, who had quite recently taken the oath of allegiance, began with his men to plunder the neigh-
On March 30 the Governor reported that hostile Maori tribes had approached New Plymouth from the south. On March 27 three settlers and two boys who had gone into the country to look after cattle were savagely murdered, and on the following morning the hostile tribes came close to the stockade at Omata, “danced the war dance and fired some shots at it.” A force of volunteers sent to relieve a blockhouse had been attacked by the Maoris. They were reinforced by sailors from the C.O. 209, 153. For gallantry in the engagement at Waireka, Niger and after a long fight captured the Maori pa at Waireka. Four sailors were wounded and sixteen Maoris killed. “It is evident that other combinations may be made against us and that a trial of strength between the two races will take place unless I am able to prevent the junction of the powerful tribes living on the Waikato and their allies with those now in arms against us. The provincial authorities are making arrangements to send away as many women and children as possible to Nelson, as they look forward to protracted troubles.” The Governor added that he had obtained a small steamer to enable him to keep up communication with the detachment at Waitara—no longer possible by land.
The resentment of the settlers at the tactics employed by the Maoris is reflected by the Taranaki Herald, which wrote on April 7: “These tribes have chosen to make war upon us, race against race, to murder, plunder, and destroy, and we owe it to the righteous cause which united us, and our own
On April 6 Major-General Pratt, Officer Commanding at Headquarters, Melbourne, informed Governor Gore Browne that he had sent 3 officers and 125 rank and file of the 12th Regiment, and 1 officer and 40 rank and file of the Royal Artillery as a reinforcement to Taranaki.
On April 24, Gore Browne reported that he had sent agents to the Waikato to correct false reports. He had also consulted with Colonel Mould, the commanding Royal Engineer, concerning the defences of Auckland. “Reports of an intended attack upon Auckland by the powerful tribes on the Waikato had caused a panic as general and extreme as it was groundless,” he remarked. “These fears were scarcely dissipated when it was reported to me that friendly natives were insulted in the town, that a canoe with a large number of natives, passing one of the Pensioner villages, narrowly escaped being fired into, and that the natives friendly and unfriendly were viewed with a feeling so bitter that unless something was done to prevent it, collision would be inevitable and the whole native population would be in arms against us.” The Governor stated that he had published a notification on the subject. C.O. 209, 153. C.O. 209, 153. Cf. Auckland Examiner: “How dare he publish a request to the inhabitants of Auckland, even a request, that they should endeavour to conciliate brown-skinned ruffians whose recent conduct is a standing
For defence Auckland was divided into five districts, each of which was to furnish a company of militia. In addition, a volunteer force of nearly 400 men, a mounted volunteer troop of about 43 men, 160 men of the 65th Regiment, and 40 marines formed the garrison of the town.
In a despatch of July 26, 1860, the Secretary of State in reply to the Governor's request for 3,000 additional troops, wrote: “England cannot undertake the defence against a nation of war-like savages of a number of scattered farms and villages selected not with any view to such defence but to the profitable pursuit of peaceful industry…. A policy which requires the continual presence of a large force carries, in most cases, its condemnation on its face. I cannot refrain from observing,” the Secretary of State continued, “that neither your despatches nor Mr. Richmond's memorandum On native affairs. In C.O. 209, 153. C.O. 209, 153. The despatch was written by Sir. G. C. Lewis in the absence of the Duke of Newcastle in America with the Prince of Wales. The principle that England could not undertake the defence of scattered farms was approved by The Times on January 23, 1861.
Reviewing the progress of the King movement in a despatch of April 27, Gore Browne stated that two tribes unconnected with the Waikatos had tendered their allegiance and presented their lands to the league of which the King is the nominal head. Great exertions had been made to obtain similar adhesions from other tribes. “The King's Council,” he wrote, “openly assume the right to decide on the justice of my proceedings, and consider whether or not they will aid a chief in rebellion against Her Majesty's Government. A large sum has been subscribed and given to a disaffected European for a printing press to be conducted by him. A flag has been designed and hoisted and an abortive attempt made at Kawhia to levy customs in the King's name…. I cannot but think the occurrences at Taranaki fortunate because, to use the expression adopted at the King meeting, ‘it has led to the discovery of the C.O. 209, 153.Pa before the builders have had time to complete it.’ It is well known that Potatau, who is blind with age and very infirm, represents only the most moderate of the King's party, and that his power to control those who advocate war and a return to indiscriminate slaughter in prosecuting it, is very uncertain.” The Governor said he had asked all the chiefs to meet him at Auckland on July 2.
T. H. Smith, the native agent who visited the Waikato tribes for the Governor, reported that he had met Potatau at Ngaruawahia. The Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribes had sent representatives to tender allegiance to the Maori King. In their speeches in reply the Waikato chiefs “broadly hinted that by the proceedings at Taranaki the Governer had committed an aggression on the Maori people and violated the principles which Potatau and the Ngaruawahia party had adopted, and by which universal peace and good will was to prevail.” “I am impressed,” the Governor said, “with the conviction that the Maori King movement, so far from dying out, is assuming
C.O. 209. 153.
Sir William Denison, the Governor of New South Wales, took a somewhat different view of the situation: “You have now as a fact,” he wrote to Gore Browne on May 16, “something analogous to a General Government among the Maoris, a recognition on their part of the necessity of some permanent authority. This is a step in the right direction; do not ignore it; do not, on the ground that some evil may possibly arise out of it, make the natives suspicious of your motives by opposing it, but avail yourself of the opportunity to introduce some more of the elements of good government among them.” A copy of this letter was sent by Denison to the Duke of Newcastle. Sir W. Denison, Varieties of Vice-Regal Life (1870).
On March 20 the Provincial Council of Hawke's Bay had passed a resolution recording its full and entire sympathy with the province of Taranaki “at present under martial law owing to the meddling of disaffected aborigines,” and thanking the Governor for his able and efficient aid. This resolution brought a strong protest from the Bishop of New Zealand, C.O. 209, 154.
In a memorandum on his protest, the Governor's responsible ministers wrote: “It should be remembered that the Philanthropist, notwithstanding the high ground he takes, which given him perhaps an undue advantage in public opinion over those who are discharging the ordinary duties of life, is often found to be liable, even beyond other men, to the disturbing influences of prejudice and passion.” “Looking to the whole
Ministers asserted that pa and cultivation at Waikanae and was moving northward to Taranaki Sir pa on the south bank, disregarded the Governor's prohibition and now pretends to claim Waitara in virtue of a species of conquest achieved by his defiant return.” Ministers added that the Bishop's anxiety for an effective land tribunal could not exceed their own or that of the Governor. The difficulty of establishing such a tribunallay, they contended, with the natives themselves.
Addresses of congratulation on his policy were tendered to the Governor by the Provincial Councils of Canterbury, Wellington, and Taranaki and by the residents of Wanganui, Nelson, and Auckland. In the Journal of
The Times, in a leading article on June 18, said: “Nobody can be surprised at the sensation created by the report of the insurrection in New Zealand. It is not merely that a success-
“Twice during the brief campaign did differences of opinion arise between the commanders of the regulars and the colonial volunteers, and twice was it proved by the event that the volunteers were in the right…. Without any intention, therefore, of impugning the strategy of our regular officers, which was probably in strict accordance with military rules, we think it impossible to deny that the tactics of the colonial volunteers were better adapted to the actual exigencies of the war in hand. We observe also that the alacrity of the colonists in the duty of self-defence was most remarkable, and it had received, indeed, a well-merited tribute at the hands of the Colonial Secretary…. Seeing that the colonists are in point of numbers so fairly matched with the natives, in point of zeal so unexceptionally animated, and in point of military ability so manifestly excellent, we may certainly ask why forces less fitted for the work should be despatched from a distance of 15,000 miles to supersede the settlers in the business of self-defence? We are not arguing absolutely against the maintenance of a military establishment in those parts. The single regiment which is stationed in New Zealand will doubtless do good service, notwithstanding the unlucky beginning just announced, but it does seem to us that, if the war should continue, we might do far better by improving such material as the colony undoubtedly contains than by sending fresh battalions across the globe to take the place of volunteers on the spot. A cargo of Enfield rifles, a battery of Armstrong guns, a few light ships of war off the coast, and some hearty words of encouragement and sympathy from home, would, we think, put the colonists
Cf. The Times, February 27, 1849, quoted in Canada and the British Army (C.P. Stacey), p. 47: “It had often been calculated,” it remarked in a leading article on the Kaffir War then in progress, “that Canada was enriched by her outbreak, and that the blood our soldiers shed was amply compensated for by the money they circulated.” Stacey traces the hand of Robert Lowe, “that arch-Little-Englander,” in The Times leading articles of this and subsequent years on colonial affairs.
On June 27, 1860, the Governor forwarded a report by C.O. 209, 154.
Maclean's report stated that the main object of the meeting was “to confirm C.O. 209, 154.
In his report Maclean went on: “A New Zealand chief like Potatau, who could always lead several thousand warriors into the field, and who is, moreover, proud and sensitive, must often have felt the restraints imposed by intercourse with Europeans, and the little attention paid to him in an English
Here the following Colonial Office minute appears on the margin: “This is the natural course, and is that suggested by Sir W. Denison.”
Maclean's report continued: “Indeed it may be safely assumed that the King movement is not supported so much with a view to the regaining of national independence, but as a means of exacting such a recognition of their rights as may ensure the preservation of the declining influence and power of their chieftainship. The King movement is more remote in its origin than is generally supposed. The earliest attempt to establish a King was suggested by Buddle gives 1852 as the date of Te Whiwhi's movement. C.O. 209, 154. Cf. Saunders, History of New Zealand, I, pp. 396–7.
“You will find Mr. Maclean's report very interesting,” wrote Gairdner in a minute to Elliot. “It contains no very new feature, but brings out the present state of the New Zealand natives very clearly. The present King movement, if skilfully managed, might most probably be turned to good account, but it is very doubtful if there is any one in New Zealand at present capable of successfully working out such a policy. Mr. Maclean understands them well, but he is only a subordinate officer.” C.O. 209, 154.
On July 6, 1860, Gore Browne reported that pa within a mile of the English camp at the Waitara and on June 23 his men fired on a reconnoitring party sent out by Major Nelson. “When Colonel Gold received information of this,” the Governor wrote, “he reinforced the troops at the Waitara and instructed Major Nelson ‘to teach the troublesome natives a lesson they will not easily forget.’ Accordingly, on June 27, Major Nelson, with a force consisting of 348 men of all ranks, made an attack upon the new pa. After a severe and gallant conflict he was obliged to retire with a loss of 30 killed and 34 wounded. Considering the difficulty which Colonel Gold himself experienced (on March 17) in the capture of a pa built in a very inferior manner in a single night, the prudence of an attack upon this pa with so small a force, without support or co-operation from New Plymouth, seems doubtful…. This reverse is likely to have a prejudicial effect upon our relations with the Maori races generally and it is not easy to foretell the
pa, but had left the matter to the discretion of Major Nelson.
The Times of September 13, 1860, printed news from the Sydney Morning Herald of the further outbreak of war and the Herald's comment: “The die is cast. It is plain that we have a foe to deal with who is not to be despised; it is equally so that he must be put down at all cost.” The Taranaki Herald, quoted in the same issue, said: “There were men present cool enough to see that the British honour was not only sustained but exalted by this fierce struggle. The great numerical superiority of the natives only made it necessary for our troops to retire. Officers and men fought with steadiness and energy under a fire which an Indian officer compares to that at Feroze-shah and Sobraon, and which a soldier of the Crimea states to have been hotter than that in the Redan…. The enemy, too, showed unexpected resolution, and have proved the first body of men able to meet the British bayonet…. The large army assembled about Kingi is a fine comment upon the policy of our Government, which stands trifling with mild addresses and Maori Parliaments, while the men whom it seeks to conciliate gather by the thousand, with arms in hand, to give that dignity to the deliberations of their senators which belongs to a sense of their power…. India might have taught what New Zealand is repeating that the most tremulous hand makes the bloodiest work.”
On September 14 The Times published an account of the engagement from a Melbourne correspondent: “The conduct of Colonel Gold is severely censured in the accounts which have reached us…. It is said that he was hissed by his own men of the 65th when ordering a retreat. It is impossible to believe that an old officer of his standing wants mere animal courage, but I fear it will be found that he is deficient both in judgment and energy, and on this as well as on a former occasion, he got bewildered by his difficult position…. The sentiment of the Australian colonies is now almost universally enlisted in the cause of the New Zealand settlers, and there is hardly any
The Times, in a despatch printed on the same day, said that all but about 120 soldiers had been sent to NewZealand and that no volunteer force had been raised to act in place of the regulars. Two French regiments were due shortly en route to New Caledonia, and speculations were being made on the result of a sudden breach with France.The Times of November 11, 1860, recorded that the French transport Sibylla arrived at New Caledonia with 600 soldiers on August 20, without calling at Sydney. The war steamer Coetlagon, which called on September 13, had only 24 soldiers on board.
The Times, in a leading article on September 14, said: “The news from New Zealand which we published yesterday is only too fully confirmed, and will create a very painful impression in this country. We had a right to expect that the reputation of the British arms would not be again risked at so critical a time without ample provision against the possibility of failure.” The Times ascribed the failure of the attack to “the old Anglo-Saxon tendency to undervalue our enemies,” and the tardiness of Colonel Gold, who did not bring up his force of three hundred men.
Discussing the New Zealand question on September 17, The Times said: “Had things been allowed to take their own course, New Zealand might still have been in the possession of the aborigines, or we might have seen the Emperor of the French engaged on a still larger scale in the work he has undertaken in New Caledonia, to which we observe he has just despatched two fresh regiments. The people, however, who wished to colonize New Zealand were not so easily put off. As the Home Government did not choose to colonize the island, they colonized it themselves, and by this means and by the exertion of a considerable amount of Parliamentary interest they succeeded in forcing the recognition of the Colony on the Home Government. Thus it was that we have become involved in the barbarous politics of New Zealand, and are compelled to support by military force an occupation which we so long opposed…. Their contests with our troops of the line, and perhaps the observations they have made on the peculiar abilities of the colonels who command them, have given the
In a letter to The Times, dated December 4, and published on February 19, 1861, Gold, now Major-General, wrote: “For a considerable time I have passed over unnoticed the unfounded abuse of a portion of the colonial press, smarting under the mildest possible administration of martial law, being quite satisfied that my friends in this country would know the truth in all its bearings; but when I find The Times adopting their expressions I think it is high time to request you will do me the justice to state that, with reference to your article on Major Nelson's attack on the Waikato Pa at the Waitara, I had neither the knowledge that such would take place, nor had I arranged any combined movement whatever with him. I had the day before sent him all the reinforcements I could spare from New Plymouth. It is true that I made a reconnaissance as far as Mahoitai, where I was anxious to form an outpost, but (independent of the river being impassable) I could not have advanced further without endangering the town and its 2,000 women and children. As to your remark that this was not the first instance of tardiness on my part, I am quite unconsciouss of ever having merited such a severe accusation at your hands.”
Major A. A. Nelson, brother of the Major Nelson in New Zealand, replied to this letter in the issue of February 20: “Documents in my possession enable me to assert that the attack was not made without the Major-General's knowledge.” On May 11, 1861, The The verdict of J. W. Fortescue on the engagement is: “The whole proceeding was one of almost criminal folly” (Taranaki Herald discussed the affair and strongly supported Major Nelson's version.History of the British Army, XIII, p. 478). Major-General Gold, on promotion, retired from active service in New Zealand on October 1, 1860. He had served with the 65th for 32 years—in British Guiana, Barbados, Canada (during the rebellion), Ireland, England, and Australia.A Sketch of the New Zealand War (1899), p. 37. Grace was a staff assistant surgeon.
On July 1, 1860, Colonel Gold wrote from New Plymouth to the Deputy-Adjutant General, Melbourne, emphasizing “the urgent and absolute necessity” for reinforcements: “I am now in a position involving great risk to this town if I leave it without a strong garrison of regulars, as the militia troops armed are not drilled, and the rebels are cunning in tactics, quick in their movements, and armed with double-barrelled guns or rifles. I regret to say that the artillery at my disposal are comparatively useless for attacking W.O. 33/16.pas.”
“The arrangements thus made,” Sir Henry continued, “have
C.O. 309, 52.
General Pratt arrived at New Plymouth on August 3. On September 8 he wrote to the Military Secretary, New Zealand: “The state of the Taranaki province…is most deplorable; the settlers are driven in from their farms, their property destroyed, and in many instances their homes burnt. They bear their losses with great fortitude, and are most uncomplaining, and I do trust they will be compensated for their losses at some future time. The natives in arms against British authority have adopted a system of warfare which they have never before resorted to since this country has been occupied by us, viz. to move about in small parties, with the avowed intention of murdering every European they can meet, and thus driving them out of the country; and the nature of the country, affording concealment in every bush, enables them to carry this out without loss to themselves. The Maori King movement is agitating the native mind to an extent unknown before, and though the powerful Waikato tribes are wavering, any untoward event may make
In a despatch of July 6, 1860, Gore Browne reported that he had received news of the death of Potatau, the Maori “King.” On July 31 he reported that Potatau's son would probably be appointed his successor. New Zealand and the War (1862), records that Potatau received a Government pension up to March 31, 1860, and that on November 11 of that year £1 17s. was paid on account of coffin furniture for him. The continuance of the pension is a little difficult to reconcile with the Governor's policy, but it may have been prompted by a desire to keep the King as inactive as possible.
In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on July 30 the Governor said: “My thanks are due to the Governments of the neighbouring colonies for the efficient aid which they have rendered on this occasion and particularly to the Government of Victoria, which promptly despatched to my assistance its fine armed steamer.” On July 31 the Governor, in reporting to the Colonial Office Major-General Pratt's intention to proceed with reinforcements direct to Taranaki, enclosed a copy of his letter to the General in which he had stated that the Maoris, “aided by the strength of their country and fighting in their own fashion,” were “brave and formidabel enemies.” “They boast with some truth,” he said, “that since our first arrival in the colony the British troops have gained no decided advantage over them, though our arms have always been immeasurably superior and our numbers often in excess of theirs.”
The Times of November 14, 1860, contained more than three columns of New Zealand war news from correspondents in Melbourne and Sydney. The Melbourne despatch was dated September 25: “General Pratt, on his arrival, did not im-
carte blanche as to the conduct of the war, he would decline the responsibility of the command and return to Melbourne, and that the Governor had yielded to this condition. The General was quite right in having his position clearly defined…. The General Assembly has been called together at Auckland, and we are indebted to that circumstance for some very important disclosures, and for a general expression of opinion which we should otherwise have remained without. These disclosures impart to the war a character different from that which I communicated in former letters. A belief is gaining ground among a large number of the settlers that the war is unjust; that Governor Browne has committed a great error; that he has wantonly departed from principles which he himself had laid down for conducting the purchase of land; that
The literal translation of the Governor's proclamation was given by the correspondent as follows: “Because soon will be commenced the work of the soldiers of the Queen against the natives of Taranaki, who are haughty (rebellious), fighting against the authority of the Queen. Now I, the Governor, do openly proclaim and publish this word, that the fighting law will extend at this time to Taranaki as a fixed law, until the time when it shall be revoked by proclamation.” For an exposition of the difficulty of translating English ideas into Maori terminology, see The Changing Maori, PP. 61-2.
“Now this proclamation,” the correspondent wrote, “is not directed solely against Kingi's party in arms at Waitara, but is extended to all the parties at Taranaki who are alleged to be fighting against the Queen, although at that time (January 27, 1860) not only had no fighting taken place, but no open act of rebellion had been committed…. It cannot be wondered at that the tribes who were denounced as rebels fighting against the Queen (an undoubted falsehood) should at once make common cause with
The Sydney correspondent, in his despatch dated September 21, took a different view of the rights of pa on
On November 15 The Times commented on the discrepancy between the different accounts of the case: “As for the original dispute, its merits are as inscrutable as the sources of the Nile or the causes of the Trojan War, so hopelessly is it overlaid by the subtleties of Maori jurisprudence and the operation of subsequent aggressions on both sides…. The Home Government may have had good reasons for declining to send extraordinary succours, but we cannot acquit of the gravest indiscretion those in New Zealand whose inopportune scruples weaken the hands of the Government. It is a first rule in dealing with all lawless outbreaks, from a school rebellion to a political émeute, to restore order first and to redress grievances afterwards. No irregularity in the transfer of land can justify the natives in renouncing a sovereignty which they have formally accepted and which has raised them from savages to Christians and civilized beings…. Meanwhile, it would surely be possible, either by proclamation or through the agency of friendly chiefs, to separate the question of the Te Porepore block of land from that of sovereignty, reserving the former, if necessary, for further investigations, while insisting upon absolute submission to the Queen's authority. If this can be enforced we trust that no false notions of honour will interfere with the peaceable termination of a dispute which, trifling as it seemed, has gone far to mar one of the fairest pages of our history.”
The Melbourne correspondent's attack on Gore Browne was answered by Professor E. Afterwards Bishop of Winchester. Cf. More Maoriland Adventures of J. W. Stack, edited by
Commenting on this and the situation generally on November 21, The Times said: “We intended to make an honest bargain, and the worst that can be said is that we bought the land from the wrong man. We were ready to pay somebody or other a fair price for it, and it is to be presumed that we should look out, with the natural instinct of purchasers, for the best title procurable. Although, therefore, it is impossible, as we do not deny, that not for the advantage or benefit of Englishmen, but, in its primary object, for the protection of the natives against the encroachments of the settlers on their territory…. We say distinctly that the native-ascendancy theory cannot stand. It may have been designed but cannot be upheld. If the interests of the rival populations cannot be reconciled, those of the natives must give way. The result, whether consistent with justice or not, is simply inevitable.”
Professor Browne, in his book, The Case of the War in New Zealand (1860), wrote: “It is a matter of deep concern to me that I am forced to express a strong difference from one, whom of all men living I have honoured most for his unparalleled missionary labours, I mean Archdeacon Hadfield. There are passages in his conduct as regards the present disturbances which I cannot construe, and which I long to see cleared up. I can but strive to be satisfied with the knowledge that burning zeal in imperfect beings will at times degenerate into intemperance, and that then it will blind its owner to principles and even to facts, which under other circumstances could not be overlooked.” Browne recorded that letters of
The effect of the war news on Childe-Pemberton, Life of Lord Norton, p. 176. Cf. on p. 178, Robert Lowe to Adderley, December 31, 1861: “It seems to me that from a muddling tyrant the Colonial Office has sunk into a parasite of the colonies, and that there is more danger of dismembering the Empire by over-indulgence than by over-interference.” Sidney Herbert was Secretary for War, 1859–61. He became Lord Herbert of Lea before his death in 1861. The Cabinet formed after the general election of 1859 was one of “Whig-Liberal reunion,” its members including Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone.
Describing a “Native Conference” he had convened at Kohimarama, near Auckland, from July 10 to August 10, in a despatch of August 28, 1860, the Governor stated that its results had far surpassed his expectations: “The language, conduct and general courtesy of the chiefs towards each other,” he stated, “might be imitated with advantage at many European meetings, and in no assembly could greater decorum be maintained. The result may be summed up in a few words: The great chiefs
“Confidence having been secured, various subjects were submitted for their consideration.” The Government's policy in connection with the Waitara purchase was explained, and approved by all except a few who (the Governor stated) were connected in some way with
A Colonial Office memorandum proposed that a certain number of chiefs selected by the Conference or nominated by the Governor should be made capable by law of being placed on Committees of the House of Assembly or the Legislative Council upon questions respecting native affairs. “And I would give,” the writer added, “to all these representatives of the Conference the right of being present at the debates of the Assembly and Legislative Council in a place which marked their rank. Perhaps before long the Conference would be allowed as they desire actually to send members to the Assembly or rather perhaps the Legislative Council.” C.O. 209, 155.
On September 7 the Governor wrote concerning certain actions of the Rev.
In a Colonial Office minute Chichester Fortescue wrote: “These gentlemen do not appear to recognize the fact that we are at war with a portion of the natives and that the Petition of Right, etc., does not apply either in the case of Englishmen or Maoris.” C.O. 209, 155.
The Duke of Newcastle, back in England after that visit
Cf. Sir E. W. Watkin, Canada and the States(1887): “The real, practical measures which led to the creation of one country extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific were due to the far-sighted policy and persuasive influence of the Duke. The Duke was a statesman singularly averse to claiming credit for his own special public services, while ever ready to attribute credit and bestow praise on those around him.”
Fortescue, in a minute, added that among the changes he thought it desirable to obtain, if possible, was the abolition of the elective character of the superintendents of provinces and their subordination to the Governor and the Crown, “Their present position,” he wrote, “seems to me intolerable, weakening an already weak executive, even when they are friendly (if they ever are), and often creating opponents to the Governor when he ought to find instruments and supporters.” C.O. 209, 155.
In a debate in the General Assembly on August 3, 1860, on the Native Offenders Bill, the policy of the Governor and
Dr. Featherston said: “I am glad of the opportunity of declaring that whatever doubts previously existed in my mind as to the gross injustice of the war—as to the fact that a flagrant error had been committed, have been entirely removed by the inquiry that has taken place; however one-sided and partial the inquiry has been I am also glad to express my conviction that His Excellency has been more sinned against than sinning in this matter, for he has evidently been most grossly deceived by those upon whose information and trustworthiness he had a perfect right to rely. It appears to me as clear as noon-day that the war is to be attributed to an undue pressure having been brought to bear upon His Excellency in order to force him to acquire possession of Waitara, no matter by what means, or at what sacrifices—to the incompetency of the District Com-
The view taken by Featherston, in this celebrated speech,
Vol. i, chapters 37 and 38. N.Z.P.P. 1928, G—7.History of New Zealand.
C.O. 209, 155. C.O. 209, 155.
In a despatch of October 2 he stated that he had urged
C.O. 209, 155.
In his letter of September 29 General Pratt recalled the state of the province when he arrived on August 3: “I found the settlers,” he said, “driven in from their farms, their cattle seized and other property destroyed, many of their homes burnt, the enemy in the immediate vicinity around the town, an attack on it avowedly threatened, the place crowded with women and children, whose only safety was the presence of the troops, and the defence in a very imperfect state.” Cf. Taranaki Herald, January 16, 1864, referring to conditions of 1860: “Our degradation will best be made apparent by the fact that at one time firewood was actually imported from Auckland.”pa Puketakauere, little more than a mile from the camp on the Waitara. This pa was connected with the Bush by a chain of
pas, some of them of considerable strength, by which the enemy were enabled to bring reinforcements to the front with great ease and rapidity. The other body comprised the Southern natives, Taranakis and Ngatiruanis, who were busily engaged in the construction of considerable works within a few hundred yards of the Waireka camp.”
The General stated that in removing the women and children to safety he “did not meet with that cordial co-operation on the part of the civil authorities of the Province, which, in the delicate position I was placed in, I had a right to expect, and the people showed so much unwillingness to leave the place that after only about 112 women and 282 children had been shifted I found that without resorting to actual force, no more could be induced to go.” On his return from Auckland, where he had gone to confer with the Governor, the General said he had found that the enemy had abandoned their strong positions at Puketakauere and Waireka, which were immediately destroyed, and that a large number of them had left the neighbourhood. The movement convinced him, he said, “of the utter hopelessness of all endeavours to prevent their escape from any place which they did not intend to defend.” “During the whole of the period,” he continued, “the enemy have been suffering very severely from sickness caused by privation and exposure, and I have certain information that they have lost a good many men, including several of their most influential chiefs who have been killed in action or have died of their wounds. The whole of our casualties throughout all these operations amount to only one killed and four wounded…. I am satisfied that any increase in their numbers which might give them sufficient confidence either to defend a C.O. 209, 155.pa in an accessible position or to accept battle in the open country would lead to a much more satisfactory result than a lengthened continuance of the present state of affairs.”
On November 1 Gore Browne, in reviewing the history of New Zealand, wrote: “A large annual grant from the Imperial Treasury, full power and great tact, enabled Sir C.O. 209, 156.
On October 14, 1860, the Governor learned that a Maori had been found dead at Patumahoe, thirty miles from Auckland, and that the natives believed he had been shot by a European. Maoris collected from all over the district and it was discovered that on a given signal they had determined to murder all the Europeans present. “Mr. Maclean,” the Governor wrote in a despatch of November 3, “was informed of this privately and advised to escape, but with his usual nerve and judgement, he took no notice of it, and, after Archdeacon Maunsell had concluded his arguments, succeeded in allaying the excitement.” On a report of the supposed murder reaching the Waikato the tribes there were greatly excited and moved towards Auckland. The Governor ordered that the militia should be called out. C.O. 209, 156.
In a despatch of October 16, General Pratt made the first mention of the use of friendly natives in an operation against Maori W.O. 33/16.pas. They were 150 in number and were under the command of Parris, the assistant native secretary.pas Ngatipaririu, Kairau, and Huirangi. In an engagement at the latter place four casualties were sustained. On October 9 Pratt marched from New Plymouth to attack “three strong pas named Pukekakiriki, Orongamaihangi, and Mataiaio, held by the rebel Maoris of the Taranaki tribe, and situated, two on the right and one on the left bank of the Kaihihi River, about eighteen miles distant from this place.” These were captured with five casualties, the natives abandoning them.
On November 6 the troops under Pratt engaged the Waikatos, who were coming to join William Kingi, at Mahoetahi. In a fierce fight five Maori cheifs were killed and the total Maori casualties were estimated at from 80 to 100. The British losses were 4 killed and 15 wounded. “I never saw,” wrote Pratt, “a more gigantic or powerful set of men than these tribes; and being armed with well-finished English rifles and double-barrelled fowling pieces, they were able to keep up a most continuous fire, while their power of concealment was most marvellous; indeed, when closing upon them, we only knew of their whereabouts by the smoke from their guns.” W.O. 33/16.
On January 14, 1861, The Times published an account from its Melbourne correspondent of the engagement at Mahoetahi in which the native loss was estimated at 70 killed: “The correspondent of a local paper, who was an eye-witness, speaks highly of General Pratt's coolness and insensibility to danger.
pa, and in the thickest of the mêlée, and yet came off unhurt.” The Times devoted its first leading article to this victory: “Those who take an interest in the colony of New Zealand will rejoice to hear that, in the opinion of the settlers, the late battle of Mahoctahi has probably not only ended the war, but given the natives a lesson which will prevent them from lightly entering on another…. The safety of this promising colony depends on the strictness with which the lawless habits of these people, the elder of whom remember, and perhaps regret, the days of cannibal feasts, are repressed.” On the next day The Times discussed the motives of the Waikatos in assisting Kingi: “If the warriors defeated at Mahoetahi were in reality adherents of the Maori King movement, and not partisans of
An Auckland correspondent, in a message printed in C.O. 209, 159.The Times on December 20, 1860, wrote: “It seems that the Imperial Government do not yet realize what will one day be clear enough to them, that the surest economy is in sending a force sufficient to put an end once for all to these Maori Wars. I say no more because I am persuaded you all believe us in England to wish for troops merely for the sake of the Commissariat expenditure. What is the good of protesting against this belief? It is in the nature of things, perhaps, and we must bear the consequences as we may…. Whatever you do, pray make up your minds to one of two things—either keep the control and fulfil the obligations, or leave one and the other to us; you need not fear that we shall disgrace the English name, or justify, by any legislation, or by the expression of a single sentiment in the assembly, the supposition of Lord Granville (founded on an atrocious article in a low newspaper which has ceased to exist) that we desire ‘blood for blood’ and the annihilation of the native race.” The New Plymouth correspondent wrote on October 12: “Hitherto we have never once remained masters of the field, and since the affair of Waireka have not had a single success—not one gleam of sunshine to cheer us in this miserably conducted war. Six months, I believe,
In a long despatch of December 4, Gore Browne reviewed the question of “seignorial right” in Maori chiefs with special reference to the case of C.O. 209, 159. J. Martineau, all parties if they did not shew their almost bitter partisanship for the natives against the Governors and the settlers—the Governor having always hitherto been considered to go as far as possible in justice and common sense in the same direction.”Life of Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle, p. 319.
This letter was written after the publication on January 4 by the Church Missionary Society of a “Memorial to His Grace the Secretary of State for the Colonies” requesting “some authoritative declaration to the effect that the tribal rights and the rights of the chiefs in respect of land titles, will be recognized as heretofore; so as to allay the apprehension of all parties in New Zealand of any deviation from the policy which has been for twenty years regarded as established by the Treaty of Waitangi.” The memorialists expressed deep regret that martial law should have been precipitately proclaimed against all the tribes of Taranaki and urged that some method should be devised of explaining to the Maoris that such proclamation
In a despatch of January 26, 1861, the Duke of Newcastle reproved the Governor for assenting to a grant from the Imperial Commissariat chest for the pay, allowances, and rations of the Taranaki militia and volunteers, without a definite guarantee that the money so disbursed would be refunded by the Colonial Government. C.O. 209, 155.
Fortescue expressed the view “that the settlement in the end will be one under which the expense of the Queen's troops will be borne by this country and that of the local forces by the colony.” The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “I fear the Governor has thrown away our best chance of getting the colony to bear any portion of the military expenses hitherto incurred.” C.O. 209, 155.
On December 22, 1860, Gore Browne reported that his ministers had accepted the proposal made by the Duke of Newcastle in his despatch of September 12 that the colony
C.O. 209, 157.
On December 4 the Governor, referring to a Colonial Office despatch on naval protection for the colonies, had stated that a colonial force, whether naval or military, would cost at least three times as much as one of equal strength employed by the Imperial Government. “The colonies,” he said, “might be called upon to pay a certain percentage of the cost of the vessels in the manner now agreed on for the Royal troops employed in New Zealand.” He pointed out, however, the difficulty arising from the fact that the Governor could only ask the naval commander to perform a service, and that if the latter took a different view of its advisability nothing could be done until it was almost inevitably too late. “Being fully aware of this,” the Governor went on, “it is not improbable that Colonial legislatures would be unwilling to contribute towards the maintenance of a fleet, the usefulness of which must depend so much on the temperament of individual commanders responsible to no authority nearer than England.” C.O. 209, 157.
A memorandum by Stafford, the Prime Minister, on the subject set out: “The system of separate Colonial fleets appears open to grave objections, amongst which the mode in which they are to be officered and the position they are to occupy relatively to Her Majesty's Navy, are among the least. This question does not affect New Zealand directly at present—nor is it likely to do so for some time to come, as it is not probable that for some years at least this colony will seek to establish vessels of its own for its defence by sea, unless the neglect of the Imperial Government to protect its shores should reluctantly compel it to do so.”
On December 31 Major-General Pratt reported that on December 28 he moved out from New Plymouth “in order to attack a large body of the Waikatos, who had occupied a very strong position at Matarikoriko on the left bank of the Waitara and not far from Huirangi. “The result of the three days' campaign,” he said, “was that the proud Waikatos who
In his report of operations in January 1861 General Pratt said that his 5½-inch mortars were “totally useless in consequence of the fuses in store in this colony being some of them as old as 1805 and all rendering the shells more dangerous to ourselves than to the enemy.” C.O. 209, 160.
In a leading article on the engagement of January 23 the Taranaki Herald wrote: “The moral effect of this affair will be extremely valuable. The extreme caution of the responsible commanders has led to the mistaken impression among the natives that our race, and especially our soldiers, are physically timid. Now they have felt the pluck and vigour of the hearts and arms of our soldiers; and those who have not hitherto entangled themselves in this miserable struggle will not, with a few exceptions, be likely to drop in now. The gallant 40th have abundantly retrieved Puketakauere, and recovered in the eyes of the Maori any prestige they may then have lost. Colonels Wyatt and Leslie, the officers and men of the 12th, 40th, and 65th, by their wise, prompt, and bold conduct on Wednesday last, have laid a lasting debt on New Zealand—they have changed the face of the war. The timely arrival of the first instalment of the 57th Regiment and the intelligence brought by the November mail of the departure of a battery of Armstrong guns and 250 men, with rumours of further aid, are further grounds for thankfulness. The human race are readier at demanding what they think their rights than at paying the debts of gratitude; but it is to be hoped that the colonists of New Zealand will not fail in the fullest acknowledgment of the liberal support we have received from the mother-country. It
Before the news of the January fighting arrived, The Times, in a leading article of February 14, said: “No news from New Zealand may be considered good news. So little can be gained, and so much may be and has been lost, in this inglorious contest; the initiative has so invariably been taken by the natives, and the selection of the theatre of war seems to rest so entirely with them, that we may well augur favourably from their inaction up to the early part of December…. If it were justifiable or possible to deal with every rebel Maori as a traitor or criminal, we might by degrees intimidate them into submission. As it is, we are compelled both in justice and policy to adopt the principles of regular warfare, while our antagonists are a fluctuating body of marauders, occupying all the strong places of the island, combining or separating and professing friendship or enmity as it may suit them best, and waging war on the whole European population, while we confine our reprisals to that part of the natives which is actually in arms…. For the present the Governor retains a paramount control
casus belli indefinite, and the limits of supreme authority indefinite, we cannot expect much vigour or unity of action…. A doubtful cause may be a good reason for not going to war at all, but it can be no reason for prosecuting a war languidly, and sacrificing in loss of capital and unproductive expenditure as much as would suffice to buy up all the rights of all the tribes in New Zealand.” But we must remember that the Maori King's followers would not sell their land at any price. Mana not money was at stake.
On February 9, 1861, Major-General Pratt wrote: “The information forwarded to me in this colony is in many instances so exaggerated and so contradictory that it is most difficult to act upon it, or to form an opinion as to the future. At this moment I have reason to believe that the continuous losses the Waikatos have of late received have subdued them very much, and that they now, for the first time, freely admit the skill and bravery of the troops, and begin to feel that a contest with them is a forlorn hope. I believe they would readily come to terms, if offered to them, provided (they being a proud and haughty race) these were of such a character as would show the clemency of the victors, without inflicting degradation on the vanquished; at the same time I equally believe that there are in the colony mischievous characters (few, I trust, in numbers) who would not desire the war to cease, but would look rather to its continuation, for the extermination of the natives and confiscation of the land, and are persuading them that the frequent arrival of troops is for the purpose of seizing their lands.” W.O. 33/16.
The Times wrote on April 15: “The New Zealand question drags on, like a Chancery suit in the good old days of Lord Eldon.” It went on to say that the battle of Huirangi on January 23 read like the story of a miniature Inkerman. “The Maoris,” wrote the Melbourne correspondent of The Times, whose despatch appeared on April 13, “showed great courage, frequently
In a despatch of January 24, 1861, the Governor referred to a mischievous pamphlet “printed at a press worked by a person named Davis who was for many years in the Native Department of the Government and left it to avoid inquiry into alleged misconduct.” pas in the forest country inland of Drury. They are using every effort to collect supplies of ammunition, and they are at present busily engaged in securing their crops, and placing them in those fortresses. In one pa recently finished they have several tons of flour, and it appears they have a large supply of powder, obtained by the aid of foreigners, in a place which is not easily accessible, and to which they themselves only resort at night.”
On February 2 the Governor reported a conversation between T. H. Smith, the Assistant Native Secretary, and the Waikato chiefs,
Sir C.O. 209, 160.
On January 1, 1861, the number of effective troops in New Zealand was 3,306. In February the Governor had interviews with certain native chiefs on the subject of the restoration of peace. The Maoris suggested that the Waitara question should be remitted to a Court and all crimes relating to the war forgiven. The Governor stated that the chiefs had said not a word about the future recognition of British sovereignty in cases where individuals of the two races were concerned. “Were they to expect,” he asked, “after joining in an insurrection, spilling so much blood and utterly desolating an English settlement, to have an unconditional peace which would leave them at liberty to renew hostilities when they pleased?” C.O. 209, 160.
In a report of February 5 C.O. 209, 161.
The following Colonial Office minute appears on Gore Browne's despatch of March 4, 1861, forwarding correspondence with Commodore Seymour: “It is to be regretted that there appears to be the same want of cordiality between the Governor and the Senior Naval Officer that there is between the Governor and the General in Command of the military forces.…. We have heard of General Cameron's arrival at Sydney.” C.O. 209, 161.
On April 2, 1861, Major-General Pratt reported that on March 19 a white flag was hoisted and operations suspended. The Governor had arrived on March 27 and negotiations were proceeding which, he trusted, would terminate in an honourable and lasting peace. “On the 30th, when I was being sworn in as a member of the Executive Council of the Colony, the English mail arrived, and Lieutenant-General Cameron, C.B., reached my camp with orders to assume command of the forces in New Zealand, which was to be separated from the Australian colonies, while I am directed to return to my command in Melbourne. It is not for me to express any feeling in this matter, or as to the moment chosen for the change: my duty was simple obedience, and I the same day handed over the command to Lieutenant-General Cameron. I trust, however, that I may be permitted to assure His Royal Highness that during the seven months in which I have conducted this war, neither mental exertion nor bodily labour has been wanting on my part in endeavouring to carry it out to a successful termination, and that success has been continuous, whilst I felt, and well knew, that any serious loss or reverse on our part would have led to a general rising all over the Northern Island, and to the wholesale destruction of the property, and possibly of the lives, of the great mass of the settlers in New Zealand, for no amount of force which England could supply would be sufficient to protect the lives or save the property of the detached and widely separated out-settlers.”
In transmitting this letter to the War Office, “announcing the successful termination of the operations in New Zealand,” the Duke of Cambridge recommended on June 17 that Major-
The temporary peace had been arranged by Maclean, who was sent by Gore Browne to Taranaki with certain terms:
(1) Investigation of title of the Waitara land to be completed;
(2) Disposal of land in possession of Her Majesty's forces to be made in any manner he thought fit;
(3) All arms belonging to the Government to be returned;
(4) All plunder to be restored;
(5) The Ngatiawas must submit to the Queen. C.O. 209, 161. See Saunders, I, 430–1. Saunders regarded Cameron's arrival at this juncture as most unfortunate. “The terms of peace were altogether altered and put into much harsher language, without a word about investigating the title to the Waitara block.”
Gore Browne, in a memorandum of May 25, 1861, the day on which the Colonial Office was informing him of his recall, wrote: “When the supremacy of the Queen is fully established, the first step to be taken is the initiation of a system by which the natives may be governed through themselves.” He expressed the view that the Native Department should be entirely remodelled, that a native Service should be established, and that increase of pay and advancement should be offered as a reward for fidelity and efficiency. He advocated the establishment of a central school for the training of native assessors in the rudiments of British law. He stated that there was no school at all north of Auckland. Roads through native districts were absolutely necessary for the progress of civilization and the maintenance of peace, and a tribunal to deal with land claims should be set up. The memorandum was warmly approved by the Colonial Office and Fortescue expressed the hope that Sir C.O. 209, 162.
In his journal on June 15, 1861,
On August 16 The Times reported that the 70th Regiment from Calcutta landed at Auckland in May and detachments of the 57th Regiment in the same month. The Governor's proclamation to the Waikatos concerning the King movement was published on the same day. In a leading article on August 17 The Times asked: “It is possible that we can be involved in a fresh war in New Zealand? It is but a month or two since we were invited to rejoice over the timely submission of the Maoris, to retract, mentally at least, any suspicions we might have entertained as to Colonel Gore Browne's policy, and to condole with Sir ultimatum of demanding the abdication of the Maori King, which the natives will not fail to construe into weakness…. Always sensitive, and self-conscious far beyond the ordinary level of savages, the New Zealanders, like the Israelites, whose example they somewhat ignorantly invoke, are moved by an instinct, shortsighted perhaps, but not wholly blind or rebellious, in clamouring for a king. This need not have been conceded in words,
“The truth is, that the New Zealand colonists, for whose exclusive benefit, if not at whose instigation, this war is to be undertaken, are literally the only parties who will not be out of pocket by it. The late report on Colonial Military Expenditure records, indeed, the enrolment of 1,500 New Zealand volunteers, but on referring to the list of those colonies which contribute more or less to their own military defence the name of those favoured islands is wanting, and Sir G. C. Lewis Secretary for War, August 1861, until his death on April 13, 1863. He was succeeded by Earl de Grey and Ripon.
The report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Colonial Military Expenditure, to which The Times referred, was dated July 11, 1861. The fifteen members included General Peel, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Stanley, Chichester Fortescue, Sir James Fergusson, J. A. Roebuck, and C. B. Adderley, with
Earl Grey expressed the view that the presence of Imperial troops had tended to check rather than to encourage wars in the colonies. He attributed the New Zealand war to the change in the form of government. It was difficult to say on which side right lay. “I think it is on the side of the settlers, but that is perfectly immaterial.” He thought that the Imperial Government should, in default of a considerable contribution by New Zealand to its defences, secure a greater control not only over native policy but over “the general policy of the Government of the island.” Lord Grey's contention was that no motives of expediency could justify the abandonment of colonists and subject races.
The report of the committee's discussions shows that it was the views of C. B. Adderley which prevailed. He maintained that when colonies were made responsible for their own internal defence, full and unqualified self-government could not be withheld, and it is with the efforts of the Imperial Government to stimulate the colonists' activity in self-defence that the history of Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand is for the next ten years to be largely concerned.
One of the recommendations of the committee was: “That with respect to New Zealand, while it may not be right, under all circumstances, to withhold from the settlers in that colony assistance in protecting themselves against the attacks of native tribes, so long as the Imperial Government retains a control over native policy, their principal reliance ought to be on their own resources.” In Australia, South Africa, Ceylon, and the West Indies it was recommended that the number of Imperial troops should be reduced or their cost provided in great degree locally. In conclusion, the committee submitted “that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile Power; and that it is, therefore, desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire.”
The report, which has been justly described as “the most important single document in the long series of events which was to lead at last to the evacuation of the self-governing colonies by the Imperial Army,” C. P. Stacey, op. cit. Cf. pp. 123-128. The Report reference is P.P. 1861, No. 423, vol. xiii.Historical Geography of the British Dominions, vol. v, Canada, p. 232. See also R. G. Trotter, Canadian Federation, p. 204, etc.The Times was very
Even in South Africa, where the great numerical superiority of the native races created special difficulties, the Imperial Government was to foster a policy of federation similar to that devised earlier by Sir
On November 26, 1860, Governor Gore Browne had forwarded to the Colonial Office an act to establish a council to assist in the administration of native affairs, entitled the New Zealand Native Council Act. “When the Constitution Act was framed,” the Governor wrote, “sufficient provision for the performance of its engagements by the Crown (namely that it should act independently as guardian of the Maori race) was not made.” (The Colonial Office comment in the margin consisted of one word: “True.”)
“It has for some time been evident,” the Governor continued, “that the existing relations between the Governor and his responsible advisers on the subject of native affairs are not satisfactory. I believe that there has been little or no difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Richmond, the Minister for Native Affairs, for whose ability and integrity I entertain the highest respect, but the responsibility for native affairs has rested entirely upon me, while, with the exception of £7,000 a year (the appropriation of which I cannot alter without the consent of my advisers), the power of the purse, which is all but absolute, has been altogether in the hands of ministers. This has been an unequal and unsatisfactory division.”
Though the Act was recommended by the Governor, Chichester Fortescue, the Under-Secretary of State, said he could not bring himself to think that it should receive the Royal Assent. “It looks and sounds as if it were a concession to the Imperial Government, while in reality I believe it would be a concession by the Imperial Government in the matter of native administration. It creates indeed a ‘Native Council’ to be appointed by the Crown, and provides £2,350 a year for its support. But it carefully avoids associating the Council with the Governor. It gives the Council no initiative. It subordinates it to the ‘Government’—that is, the Ministers
“Now, if the effect of the Act be to make a further transfer of power in native affairs to the Colonial ministry, it seems to me that the present is the worst possible moment for such a concession. First, because it will appear to the natives that the Queen is delivering them over to the rule of the ‘Pakeha’—at the moment when the latter are flushed with victory, and confident in their strength, under the protection of the large force which will then be present in New Zealand. Secondly, because our only chance of bringing the Colonial Government and Parliament to any terms upon the native question lies in making the amount of the Imperial payment for the expenses of the war and the amount of force to be retained in the colony dependent upon the arrangements for the administration of native affairs, to which they may consent, and above all upon their liberality in providing founds for that purpose.”
The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “I find it quite impossible after a very careful consideration of the Ordinance and the accompanying documents to advise the Queen to assent to it…. It may be that when responsible government was given to the colony it was impolitic to attempt to exempt from its operation the management of native affairs. It may be that the natives would be more liberally treated under the operation of this Ordinance…. Such are not the immediate questions…. In the face of the Treaty of Waitangi this Ordinance cannot be sanctioned without injustice and bad faith to the natives.
Sir C.O. 209, 156.handling. If the Native Minister has the power of appointing, removing, advancing, instructing, praising, censuring, and paying the Native Department subject only to the Governor's power of saying no to anything that is very bad, that Native Minister will have the power of causing peace or war—of affronting or conciliating chiefs—of preventing or arresting the progress of a particular tribe or of the whole native race, and the Governor and Council will only be able to prevent definite strong acts in a mischievous direction and to make general laws which they have no powers to enforce—against the possible opposition of the European commonwealth and Native Department which will soon be made to take their cue from their new masters. The circumstances of the colony render it natural that New Zealand should be a kind of military
In his outline of the proposed despatch, Rogers wrote: “I would shew at some length that the defence of New Zealand from internal wars was plainly a New Zealand affair.” Fortescue made the following comment in the margin: “It would be dangerous to carry this doctrine too far, remembering Caffre wars.”
A long despatch—82 pages of manuscript—was prepared and printed privately at the Foreign Office on May 10, 1861. It contained the reasons of the Secretary of State for declining to recommend Her Majesty's assent to the Bill for the establishment of a Native Council in the form submitted to him by the Governor, and outlining other proposals for the establishment of a Council. The despatch was later marked “Cancelled. See to Sir
In this despatch to Sir C.O. 209, 156.
The Duke of Newcastle wrote to Gore Browne officially on May 25: “The present conjecture renders it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to leave no expedient untried which is calculated to arrest the course of events, now unhappily so unpromising, and at the same time to provide for the future difficulties which there is only too much reason to anticipate even if the war should happily be soon brought to a conclusion. Having regard therefore to the peculiar qualifications of Sir C.O. 209, 163.
In a despatch to Sir
On the draft of the despatch appears the following important Colonial Office memorandum, with the Duke of Newcastle's decision:
“
Should Sir G. Grey's offer be noticed? I have avoided noticing it in the despatch to Col. G. B. because it would seem as if Sir G. Grey had been suggesting his (Col. G. B.'s) displacement.”
“Better not notice it in a public despatch.”—N.Ibid. Cf.
The Case of New Zealand,1865, reprinted from theNelson Examiner,in which it is asserted that Grey offered “to come and restore peace at Taranaki, with the title, we believe, of Commissioner.”
It is clear from this hitherto unpublished memorandum that Sir
Gore Browne's reply to the despatch notifying him of Sir C.O. 209, 163. Cf. Newcastle to Gore Browne, May 27, 1861: “I cannot but feel that in some respects you will be glad to quit New Zealand. Circumstances have occurred, more especially the unfair conduct of some of the Clergy and the desertion of your old friend, Sir op. cit., p. 320).
In Gore Browne's final months of office efforts were made to supply one want long felt by the Maoris—a reasonably comprehensive system of courts. On March 1, 1861, the Governor forwarded a report from H. B. White, the resident magistrate, on the working of the Native Circuit Act, 1858, in the district of Mongonui. Courts, he stated, were held at intervals of about six weeks at Whangaroa, Wai Kainga, and at Ahipara. The natives attended regularly on the day appointed. White stated that he had not encouraged the formation of an Assessors' Court. “I find the feeling of the people opposed to it,” he said. “They have more confidence in the impartiality of the European magistrates. Moreover, I found that for many years the chiefs in settling disputes always inflicted a penalty, which was appropriated to their own uses, often both parties being fined. This I found a great difficulty. On the one hand the people complained bitterly of the exactions of the chiefs, on the other the payment in the way of annual presents to the assessors did not cover their expenses…. It will be very necessary to pay these men some regular salary…. I cannot fairly state that I have met with any great success. Indeed I never expected it. But I am fully justified in reporting that some advance has been made.”
Chichester Fortescue made this comment: “It will be a question which will have to be decided not here but in New Zealand whether to adopt the system of European magistrates with paid native assessors, or that of paid chiefs with European magistrates attached to them (like Indian Residents), which is Sir C.O. 209, 161.Chieftainship, however, is stronger among the Kaffres than among the Maoris. At
The Governor forwarded on March 1 a letter from C.O. 209, 161.
On March 2 the Governor reported that he had received several contradictory reports of the movements and intentions of C.O. 209, 161.
War of a much wider scope than the Taranaki campaign now began to appear inevitable. The first impressions of Lieutenant-General C.O. 33/10.
Cameron enclosed a letter, dated April 14, in which the Governor said that, according to W.O. 33/10. (Strictly confidential despatch and enclosures printed at the War Office, September 16, 1861.)sic], etc.; that they have appealed to the
sic] coast, because I could see no better way in which Her Majesty's troops could be employed, and not with any idea that such an operation, however successful, could be productive of any decisive results.” Cameron inquired whether it was intended to maintain martial law in Taranaki “now that hostilities have for some time ceased, and, so far as I can judge, are not likely to be renewed soon.”
On May 6 there were 2,172 troops at Auckland, 910 at Taranaki, 191 at Napier, 178 at Wanganui, and 279 at Wellington, in addition to 16 field officers, 31 captains, 73 subalterns, 48 staff, 253 sergeants, and 83 drummers. Discussing the extraordinary success of the Maoris in resisting the troops, The Times said on May 23, 1861: “Their strength has been found to consist in an instinctive knowledge of fortification—a knowledge at once so perfect and so true that all the skill of scientific engineering has been taxed to match it…. There is no place so strong but it must fall in time, and we can only capture a ‘pa’ by such proceedings as would bring a modern citadel to terms.”
Commenting on a speech by Earl Grey in the House of Lords on May 28, The Times said that, in Grey's view, “coup d'état, supported by an adequate military force, and followed by certain appropriations of revenue in favour of the Maoris, he flatters himself that the knot of the difficulty would be cut, and that in a short period representative institutions (considerably modified) might be once more established in New Zealand.
“We are not much surprised that the Duke of Newcastle did not close at once with this bold and slashing proposal. At the same time, we hear with satisfaction that the Government had already anticipated that part of it which consists in the reappointment of Sir
One of the most discussed writings of those who sided with the Maoris was Sir C.O. 209, 162.Examiner newspaper) of an intended change of the policy of Government towards
In a despatch of May 16 on Sir William's “Memorandum,” the Governor wrote: “I cannot believe, as Sir
The Colonial Office minute, by Sir must settle the question now once for all.’ This must mean one of two things. Either ‘we must avail ourselves of the presence of superior force to extort a verbal admission of the Queen's rights and an abandonment of obnoxious phrases.’ Or—‘We must avail ourselves of the presence of superior force so to break the power of the Maoris as they shall never dare to be able again to set up the claim of independence of Colonial authority.’ The first would be merely nugatory; a form of phrase imposed by superior force will never prevent the Maoris from reclaiming (if they are inclined to do so) substantial independence, the moment that force is removed. The second means a desperate and tedious and expensive war of extermination—I do not see that anybody really doubts this.
“I should say (with Sir W. Martin) that nothing could be more impolitic or clumsy than to allow a quarrel of this kind to spring up on a matter of language, with savages who do not half understand the significance of the term which they use (or which we use). Whatever terms they use or are allowed to use, I should hope (with Sir W. Martin) that skilful and just government would, by giving the Maoris what they want, throw the King movement into the shade. (Remember the success of Mr. Fenton's movement.) And I think that the great object to be gained by the presence of a large force is not to
C.O. 209, 162.
The Duke of Newcastle made the following minute: “As there is not a word in Sir F. Roger's excellent minute to which I do not entirely accede I will ask him to draft a despatch in accordance with it. None of the Governor's despatches renders very clear the exact present state of this question of the ‘Maori King,’ but so far as we know no act of violence or insurrection is threatened by the natives in support of this ‘idea.’ On the other hand it would appear that we are proposing to attack them in vengeance for a C.O. 209, 162.name. I say this appears, for I cannot believe that such is really Governor Browne's intention, and must suppose that he expects an appeal to arms by the natives under cover of this name. If they merely honour their King whether his name be Potato or Brian Boru and commit no breach of the Queen's peace, I agree with Sir W. Martin that such folly should be left to the influence of time, but if ever it be commenced, even though in a ‘cabbage-garden,’ then there
On June 3, 1861, Archdeacon Hadfield wrote to F. W. Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society: “The attempts made to represent the condemnation of the war by all the ablest men in the Colony—Featherston, Fox, Fitzherbert, etc., as the result of party warfare, are quite false; the truth being that the ablest men of all parties, who had never before acted together, united to oppose what was so grossly tyrannical. …It is quite impossible that the Aborigines Protection Society could ever have a case which more imperatively calls for their decided action…. I regret to say that since the arrival of a large number of troops, the war feeling has increased, or rather, the desire for commissariat expenditure; for I believe few or none of the settlers (except perhaps, a few new-comers) have any hostile feeling towards the natives. Bear in mind (what Mr. Fox brings out) that this war is the act of the Governor, and is supported by the Colonial Office.” The Society had already, on April 24, petitioned the House of Commons for a special commission of inquiry into the Taranaki War, and it continued an active campaign in the interests of the Maoris.
On August 28 The events leading to the colonization of New Zealand by the New Zealand Company, under the inspiration of The Times wrote of the struggle in New Zealand: “There is so much inequality in the conflict as to rob it of all glory. There is so much difficulty and danger as to make it by no means an easy achievement, and we have, above all, the uneasy reflection that we have not the poor privilege of deciding upon and declaring the war which we are about to wage. To posterity, possibly to ourselves a few years hence, it will seem incredible that we should have been engaged in such a struggle, so useless, so impolitic, so discreditable—and that by a series of blunders and follies which would render the present war a just punishment, did its miseries really fall on the heads of those who have occasioned it.” On August 30 The Times pursued the same theme, and asserted that New Zealand was not colonized for Imperial purposes but settled by a private company.England and New Zealand.
On September 12, 1861, The Times published a letter from a Canterbury colonist (probably
On September 19 The Times published a two-column article on “The Times
When opening the first session of the third Parliament of New Zealand on June 4, 1861, Gore Browne said: “The terms offered to the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribes will be laid before you. Their aggravated offences can only be pardoned on their giving such tangible proofs of submission as will at once afford a means of reparation for their unprovoked aggressions, and be a memorial to themselves of the punishment due to lawless violence. The Declaration which I have made to the Waikato tribes will also be laid before you. It requires submission without reserve to the Queen's Sovereignty and to the authority of the Law, whilst from those who have arms I have insisted upon restitution of plunder, and upon compensation for losses sustained at their hands by Her Majesty's subjects, Native or European.” C.O. 209, 162. Ibid., 163.
The following resolution of a secret committee of both Houses in conference was adopted on July 5, 1861: “That no doubt exists that a large majority of the natives of the Northern Island, residing south of Auckland, are firm adherents of the Maori King, and that the allegiance of others of them to Her Majesty is not to be relied upon…. That the employment of a force adequate to put down speedily and effectually all resistance to Her Majesty's authority would be the most humane, the most beneficial to both races, and by far the least costly to the Imperial Government. That at all events the Commanding Officers in the several districts should be sufficiently reinforced to enable them to avoid being compelled to abandon everything to the insurgents except the garrison towns.”
The Duke of Newcastle's comment was: “I fear two things, equally to be deprecated, are developing themselves. 1st, The Governor seems to be gradually departing from his former policy and yielding to the anti-native feeling of a large number of the settlers. 2nd, There are amongst the Maoris evil spirits who mean to have a King in substance as well as in name and to resist the law…. I have already intimated that I will not advise further reinforcements and there is nothing in these papers to shake my opinion that we have done enough by sending 6,000 men, and the colony can, and ought to, do the rest.”
A memorandum prepared for the Governor and forwarded to the Colonial Office, set out: “The King movement originated with the chiefs. The C.O. 209, 163.people would have been content with law and order, with English magistrates and English guidance. The chiefs wanted Maori rule and a separate nationality. The work attempted in the Waikato by Mr. Fenton brought out more clearly the difference between the parties. The endeavour to establish civil institutions was frustrated by the King chiefs. They saw the danger to their agitation of allowing English institutions to be founded in their midst.”
On August 2, 1861, Gore Browne reported that See his account, op. cit., I, 438-48.
On August 9, Gore Browne forwarded a memorandum by
On August 24 Gore Browne forwarded a copy of a confidential memorandum he had written for Sir prima facie claim to the land that it would have been a gross injustice to them not to have called on
Gore Browne noted that General Cameron, “who,” he said, “had not then gained the experience which he now has,” had strongly recommended that the Waikato tribes should be called to account without loss of time. “He considered,” the Governor added, “that we had received abundant provocation, and that the Waikato should be required to submit after three days' notice. He did not then realize the difficulties attending such an undertaking and wrote officially that ‘much valuable time had already been lost in dilatory negotiations.’ I am led to believe that ere long the Middle Island will desire separation from the North, and although the demand may be put off for a time, it will be necessarily acceded to sooner or later. Advantage should be taken of any such change to replace the Provinces by counties, hundreds and muncipalities, taking care to localize the expenditure of funds derived from the sale of land.” C.O. 209, 163.
Gore Browne's term of office had not been a very successful one, but by studying his acts and despatches in detail, we have at least seen that he tried to do his best in very difficult circumstances. He had many sound ideas, but he lacked appreciation of the Maori character and proved too amenable to the conventional versions of what British sovereignty entailed, which were pressed upon him by interested parties. J. Martineau, The War in New Zealand (1860).New Zealand Rulers and Statesmen (1897), p. 84.op. cit., p. 320.
Before we describe Sir
In South Australia and New Zealand “he had learnt to regard the Colonial Office as a pliant set of men, who were not disposed seriously to question his acts and decisions.” He decided to follow the plan which had succeeded in New Zealand—to gain an influence over the tribes by employing them upon roads and public works and by establishing schools, hospitals, and “institutions of a civil character.” He planned military settlements among the Kaffirs of British Kaffraria. In default of English army pensioners, he secured 2,000 German mercenaries who had been recruited for the Crimean campaign.
“In South Africa,” writes de Kiewiet,British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, p. 95.land battle, otherwise it is lost for ever,” wrote
Grey quickly became imbued with the idea that federation alone could solve South Africa's problems, but circumstances could scarcely have been more unfavourable than they were in 1858 for the adoption of any scheme which involved colonial expansion. The year, as de Kiewiet points out, “opened gloomily with an increased national debt, distress following upon a recent financial crisis, rebellion in India and a war in the Far East.” Reduction of expenditure was the chief aim of the Government, and its refusal to accept the cession of the Fiji Islands showed that an increase of Imperial responsibilities was far from welcome. Bitter experience had taught the lesson that the infancy of colonies is an expensive period for the mother-country, and there was little but the faith of a few enthusiasts to combat the belief that after infancy they would set up independent houses for themselves.
Grey's grant of £40,000 a year for native purposes was reduced by half in the budget of 1858, the year which may perhaps be taken as a crucial one in his relations with the Colonial Office. It is much easier to understand later events in New Zealand when we know something of the details of South African events at this time. “Grey's outspoken denunciation of the Home Government's policy, his pertinacity in desiring to extend the sphere of British influence into the interior, his wilful independence of action, and his neglect of instructions were rapidly undermining the confidence which the Colonial Office had in him. Between the Colonial Office and its once favourite Governor there was a growing estrangement. The minutes written by the Colonial Office officials upon the Governor's despatches became angry and sarcastic,
de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 128.
By the time he arrived in England the Derby ministry had fallen and Lytton had been succeeded as Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Duke of Newcastle. The Duke was much more sympathetic to Grey's plans and he took the remarkable step of reinstating the Governor. Though the Duke was as emphatic as any of his predecessors that “expansion and extension of influence must not take place at British expense,” we are conscious during his term of office of a more liberal attitude to colonial aspirations. Sir
This recall to New Zealand, though welcomed generally, was not regarded by the Duke of Newcastle as a certain solution of the problems confronting the country, and there is an underlying note of anxiety in a very long private letter which he addressed to Sir George on June 5, 1861. In this he wrote: “One of your private letters to me some five or six months ago showed that, with such information as you had, your impressions were strongly adverse to Colonel Gore Browne's proceedings in the case of Taranaki. I trust you will endeavour to forget past impressions, and reform an opinion from this complete series of documents I send you, for I cannot help thinking they will much modify your views….Let me earnestly press upon you the importance of winning over to your support and confidence the New Zealand politicians. I do not expect you to be pleased to find the system of responsible government
J. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 322–3.
Sir C.O. 209, 164.Cossack, arriving on September 26, 1861. From the ship he wrote on August 15: “The intelligence received of the terms of peace offered to the natives at the Waitara renders it probable that war must break out in some other part of the Islands.” Against this passage is the following Colonial Office marginal note: “Surely this censure would have been better delayed or suppressed.”
In a despatch of October 9, Grey wrote: “Two of the three parties of natives we were treating with have arrogantly and contemptuously refused the terms proposed by my predecessor, and the third party have already broken the terms they seemed to have accepted.” Grey enclosed a memorandum by Fox on the Government's policy. Fox stated that in the three years following the relaxation of the ban on the sale of arms and ammunition the natives had spent a sum approaching £50,000 on them. “This may seem almost incredible,” he said. “It is a fact, however, that small parties of natives have purchased at one time whole tons of gunpowder.”
A Colonial Office memorandum summarized Fox's policy thus: “To conciliate the Waikatos, but to assume a stern and decisive attitude towards the Ngatiruanuis and Taranakis,” “But,” the writer added, “if that attitude leads to hostilities, will the Waikatos remain quiet? The second paper urges that the control over native matters now possessed by the Governor solely should be made over to the Responsible Ministers, a position which it may be said the Responsible Ministers had in fact usurped previous to Governor Browne's removal from the Government.”
In this second paper Fox wrote: “Ministers are bound to
On December 16, 1861, The Times, in columns black lined in mourning for the Prince Consort, published a despatch from its Melbourne correspondent recording the arrival of Sir
Grey, in a despatch of October 10, 1861, stated that he had not complied with instructions regarding a reply to a petition of the natives of Otaki in the terms set out by the Secretary of State. Sir C.O. 209, 164. Cf. Life of Lord Norton (Sir Charles Adderley), p. 173. Lytton, writing on October 21, 1859, to Adderley about Grey after the Duke of Newcastle had succeeded Lytton at the Colonial Office, said: “I saw much in Grey that I admired … though I felt that he was a most troublesome public servant … and his haughty self-opinion and his way of dealing with public money were like those of a Roman Proconsul.”
On November 2 Grey forwarded reports by C.O. 209, 164.
On November I Lieutenant-General Cameron wrote that
W.O. 33/16.
In a despatch of November 2, Grey said that his policy was—not to be hurried into a renewal of military operations if these could be avoided, to introduce into all possible parts of the island institutions suited to the present growth of the country, and to secure all the friends he could among the natives, “so as to reduce the number of our enemies.” Grey estimated at about £43,000 the annual cost of administering the native institutions he proposed. C.O. 209, 164. For comment on the introduction of Grey's scheme for the self-government of the Maoris on the East Coast, see East Coast Historical Records, by
A Colonial Office note read: “The N.Z. Ministry do not
C.O. 209, 164.
On November 28 Grey sent a sketch by a young lady who had just visited the Waikato. It showed the dwelling of the Maori King—the large ordinary reed house of a chief, with one small door and one window. Grey explained that there was not one fortified place for the troops to attack. “The contest,” he said, “if it unhappily takes place, will simply be one in which every swamp, stream, wood, and naturally strong position will be defended by men completely concealed in artfully constructed rifle-pits and breastworks.” This drew the following Colonial Office minute by Sir Ibid., 165.
In a despatch of November 3, Grey wrote: “I do not for the present deem it for the good of Her Majesty's service to carry out the publicly expressed determination of my predecessor to compel the Waikato tribes to submit to the terms, a compliance with which was specifically demanded from them on the 21st of May last.” Here followed a passage omitted from the despatch printed for Parliament: “Careful inquiries, and repeated conversations with those natives most attached to us have convinced me that the Waikato natives will not submit to these terms at present, and that any attempt at this time to enforce them by troops will instantly lead to that general war which my predecessor anticipated. For such a war no adequate preparation has yet been made, and it must under the most favourable circumstances be attended with results most disastrous to us.” Grey also said he did not propose to repeat the native conference but hoped to induce the native tribes in detail to accept the institutions he proposed.
The Duke of Newcastle's minute was as follows: “There is much of calm good sense and self-reliance without over-confidence in this despatch…. As regards the ‘Conference’
C.O. 209, 165.‘Divide et Impera’ may be (humanely and) more safely applied to the Maoris than our own more civilized and constitutional notions of combination of wisdom and power.”
On November 30 Grey intimated that he had arranged to consult his responsible ministers in relation to native affairs “in the same manner as upon all other subjects, and in like manner to act through them in all native matters.” Fortescue's minute was: “I think that the transfer of the Native Department to the Responsible Ministry cannot usefully be opposed. I believe the amount of Imperial control retained by the former arrangement was more nominal than real, and while it did not prevent the Governor from really acting under the influence of Ministers, it gave them and the colonists good (apparent) grounds for calling the native policy Imperial, and war growing out of it an Imperial war. A strong Governor will probably have as much power under one system as the other and will be more likely to obtain funds. I must say that the Colonial Government and Sir
The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “Nothing could be so bad as a nominal independence of his Advisers in matters of Native Government and a real subjection to their general views…. The financial part of Sir
The Treasury made this memorandum: “My Lords fear that the readiness with which Sir C.O. 209, 165.
On December 6, 1861, Grey reported that he had visited the Bay of Islands, Waimate, and Hokianga, to introduce native institutions among the tribes, and that the visit had been in all respects a successful one. On January 7, 1862, he forwarded reports of a visit he had paid to the Lower Waikato district. “Your Grace will find that on the whole there is great reason to be satisfied with the state of the feelings of tribes who inhabit those districts which I have visited.” Some of the chiefs, however, “shewed a quiet determination to adhere to the position they had taken and to strive to live in their own territory under officers of their own.” They said that we should find it as difficult to draw them back under our rule as the fowler did to catch the bird which had escaped from a snare. “They shewed,” Grey added, “an entire distrust and want of confidence in the Government.” He stated that he had requested General Cameron to remove the troops from Otahuhu to the line of the Waikato and employ them in completing the road from Auckland to that river, and in putting it in such a state that troops could move rapidly along it at all seasons of the
Grey also added that care would be taken to select a good site for a military post on the banks of the Waikato in such a position as to command the river. “The post,” he said, “will be only about forty miles from the residence of their so-called King, and the Waikato River will be quite open to our attacks.” Fortescue's comment was: “I would decidedly approve of the formation of the road.” The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “Certainly! The more roads made the more probable is future peace.” C.O. 209, 167. Cf. The Provincial System of Government in New Zealand, by
Grey, in a despatch of January 8, reported that several Maoris who had been promised Crown grants of land on selling tracts to the Crown had never received them. “It is certainly anomalous and wrong,” wrote Fortescue in a Colonial Office minute, “that the Governor should be charged as he is by the Constitution Act (that most imperfect piece of legislation) with the sole right and responsibility of acquiring land from the natives for the use of the colonists and yet should not possess the power of giving the seller a Crown grant for a portion of the land sold, as a condition of the sale.”
The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “Two years ago I attempted Imperial legislation on native affairs in New Zealand. The House of Lords gave an unwilling assent. The New Zealand colonists in this country got up an adverse agitation. The House of Commons threatened refusal and the Bill was withdrawn. And the measure was no less condemned in the Colony, not because its purport was bad but because it was Imperial. There is no use in raising these storms again.” C.O. 209, 167.
Grey, in a despatch of February 8, objected to the sudden withdrawal of all naval force from New Zealand by Commodore Seymour, who wished to concentrate his forces at Sydney as war with the Northern States of America seemed probable.
Sir grumble is very unreasonable.”
Affairs at New Plymouth were by now in a parlous state, judging from an article in the Taranaki Herald of January 25, 1862: “This unfortunate little province is doomed to bear the chief burden, not of the war only, but also of the present truce or peace. The war dragged its weary length along until we had little left to lose, until almost the last of our cheerful homesteads had been reduced to a heap of ashes, rusty nails, and melted glass; and now it is our fate to live on through tedious months, perhaps years, in utter uncertainty as to when the time will arrive when we may safely begin rebuilding them, and how we are to find the means to do so…. We have not even the poor satisfaction of being able to blame any one in particular for our misfortunes. We know who to blame, indeed, for the conduct of the war, but for its origin the blame must be shared amongst almost all, both here and at home, who have been concerned in the government of the colony since its foundation. All failed to comprehend the nature and difficulties of the problem which lay before them, and whilst aiming like the sons of
In a despatch of March 7, 1862, Grey wrote: “In the attacks made in some newspapers upon the natives, and upon all acts of fairness performed towards them, consists at present the greatest difficulty in this country.” Writing to Cameron on April 8, he said: “The native King's party is constantly declining in numbers and influence; but on the other hand, they being irritated at perceiving this, are making strenuous exertions to maintain their ground. I believe that they will altogether fail in their efforts to do this; but the state of the island is still such as to require the most constant vigilance and care on all our parts. I am sure that any reduction of the force serving here, or the slightest false step on the part of the Government, would bring on an immediate war, which, however, prudence and a show of sufficient force, will, I believe, avert.” W.O. 33/16.
In June 1862 C.O. 209, 168.Taranaki Herald wrote of this on August 2: “The conclusions which Mr. Gorst draws from the present aspect of the King movement our late Governor and his advisers arrived at some years since, from a general view of the condition of the native race. A singular combination of real, but blind, philo-brown-anthropy, on the part of the Bishop of New Zealand and Sir W. Martin; a mixture of this, with much bile, self-righteousness, and deliberate unfairness, in Mr. Swainson (see his little book passim) and others of his stamp; unscrupulous thirst for political power in Mr. Fox and his associates, the extreme tenderness of our respected parent, John Bull, in the region of the purse; and last, but not least, the wonderful and incredible incapacity of some of the military officers to whom that worthy individual entrusts the carrying out of his decrees—these influences combined have succeeded in bringing into temporary disrepute the doctrine first enunciated by Governor Browne and his Ministers, namely
governed.”
Grey acknowledged on July 24 a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle of April 28, 1862, expressing “surprise at the want of energy displayed by my Government in not using any effort to maintain the usefulness of the militia force,” and adding that His Grace accordingly felt he had a right to assume that there were more soldiers in the colony than were required. Grey said that to enforce militia service would create a war of races. His Ministers in a memorandum stated that it would lead to a general exodus from the colony. The Governor said he proposed to create a permanent armed police force, composed of both Europeans and natives.
Fortescue, in a minute, said that it was all the same to the Imperial Government whether British settlers prospered and consumed British manufactures at Auckland or at Canterbury or at Melbourne. The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “The reason assigned by Sir C.O. 209, 169.
On August 9 Grey reported that Fox had resigned on July 27 after failing to carry a resolution affirming that the interests of the colony required, while reserving to the Governor both the initiation and the decision of questions where Imperial interests were concerned, that the ordinary conduct of native affairs should be placed under the administration of responsible ministers. A ministry had been formed by Domett on August 5, and on the evening of the same day Grey had received the Duke's despatch of May 26 sanctioning the placing of the management of the natives under the control of the Assembly. C.O. 209, 169.
The correspondent of the Nelson Examiner wrote from Wellington: “Nobody showered wreaths on Mr. Fox, so he threw some on himself; nobody spoke an oration on his virtue, so Mr. Fox spoke one himself. ‘His mission was accomplished; he had intended to retire in 1860, but came back to rescue the country from an evil Governor and evil counsellors. He had upset the war party, dismissed Governor Browne, brought out
Examiner, August 23, quoted in Taranaki Herald, September 20.
A very different view was taken by the New Zealand Spectator in an article quoted with approval by the Aborigines Protection Society in its journal:The Aborigines' Friend, January—December 1862, p. 306.
On August 26 Grey forwarded a resolution of the House of Representatives of August 19 affirming that “Ministers should in conformity with the Royal Instructions advise the Governor in native affairs (as well as in Colonial affairs) whenever His Excellency desires to obtain such advice, and should also tender advice upon all occasions of importance when they deem it their duty in the interests of the colony to do so; that
C.O. 209, 169.pay is mean and contemptible and cannot be allowed…. To shew them that power and responsibility means payment is the simple answer to these evasive resolutions, and that on the part of England any such refined system of dividing the oyster and the shell will be repudiated as inconsistent alike with equity and the principles of constitutional government.”
In a long despatch of February 26, 1863, the Duke gave the views of the British Government on the question of the payment for administering native affairs. In preparing it, Fortescue said: “The despatch should be laid before Parliament and (I think) should be damaging to the colonists in public opinion—so damaging as to make the New Zealanders feel that they cannot be guilty of this gross disingenuity and paltering without suffering from it, and (if possible) to make them understand that candour will be the best policy.”
“The despatch should set out: (1) that it is not the duty of Great Britain to educate, govern, civilize any savages among whom British subjects choose to plant themselves; (2) that the government of the natives by the British Government (even with the limited help it has received from the settlers) has been an unparalleled success. Never, I believe, in the history of the world, except perhaps in Paraguay, have savages and whites in contact with each other made such progress in 30 years. The Home Government has discharged its trust honestly and wisely and is therefore not unhandsome in now handing on that trust to the colonists; (3) that the present war was not chargeable on the Imperial Government—but was brought on by the anxiety of the Imperial officer to act in accordance with
C.O. 209, 169.
In the Daily News of September 13, 1862,
On September 20 The Times wrote: “Recent correspondence respecting the affairs of New Zealand gives Mr.
In a memorandum sent with the Government's request for a further guaranteed loan of £500,000, Reader Wood wrote on October 20, 1862: “In applying for this loan Ministers desire to to be distinctly understood that they do not regard the payment of the militia expenses, the reinstatement of the Province of Taranaki, or roads constructed for strategical purposes, as fair charges against the Colony.” A Colonial Office marginal note read: “Monstrous. This ought to be specially noted in the despatch.” C.O. 209, 169. For a similar controversy between the Colonial Office and Canada upon the question of payment for barrack accommodation, transport of troops, etc., see Stacey, op. cit., pp. 198–9.
In a memorandum of October 31 ministers thus set out the objects of a mission abroad undertaken by
The Native Lands Bill, 1862, was considered in the House of Representatives on August 25. The general effect of the Bill, according to the Colonial Office minute, was “to enable natives, under certain circumstances, to alienate their lands directly to the European settlers without the necessity of a precedent sale to the Government.” C.O. 209, 170.
On January 19, 1863, The Times published the petition of the New Zealand House of Representatives praying for a reconsideration of the decisions announced in the Duke of Newcastle's despatch of May 26, 1862, concerning the granting to the colonists of the administration of native affairs. Commenting on the petition on the same day, The Times stated: “Instead of accepting with gratitude the right conceded to them by the Colonial Minister, the New Zealand Assembly respectfully decline to undertake the task imposed upon them. They recognize the difficulty of governing the two races by two agencies responsible to different authorities, but they cannot accept the power offered them if it is to be attended with any greater liability than at present for their own defence. They ignore the fact that the proposition came originally from their own responsible ministers, and they quote the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in New Zealand at the present moment as a reason why the system under which that unsatisfactory state of affairs has arisen ought to be indefinitely continued. We have never seen a public document less convincing in its statement, or more entirely divested of the graces of modesty and self-respect. The simple meaning is that the colonists have got a good thing, and intend to keep it. They alone of all the people of the earth have the privilege of making war at other people's expense…. We have a right to demand on behalf of the heavily-taxed people of this country that this burden shall be removed from their shoulders, and we therefore rejoice to find that Sir
C.O. 209, 172.The Maoris could see as clearly as The Times that time was against them and they were determined to put their fortunes to the test of war. On February 6, 1863, Sir
On March 25 a significant indication of the intention of the followers of the King to destroy all trace of British influence was seen in the raid on See Cowan, I, 229, 232. Weld, in Notes on New Zealand Affairs (1869), referred to “well-meant but indiscreet efforts of a stipendiary magistrate, Mr. Gorst, which added to the irritation of the King party.”
On April 6 Grey reported that he had visited Taranaki and that the troops had occupied the Omata block “not only without any opposition from the natives, but with signs of good
There had been some question of sending him to Canada to take charge of the British forces in view of the probability of war with the Northern States of America. C.O. 209, 172.
Grey, in a despatch of April 24, said that he had altogether failed to shake the “dogged determination” of the natives on the Waitara question. “A great part of the native race,” he wrote, “may be stated to be at the present moment in arms, in a state of chronic discontent, watching our proceedings in reference to this Waitara question. Large numbers of them have renounced the Queen's authority, and many of them declare openly that they have been so wronged that they will never return under it. Other most influential men state that they will not aid the Government in any war that may arise out of this Waitara question; the great majority of them declare that if war arises from this cause, they will rise and make a simultaneous attack upon the several European settlements in the Northern Island. The reasons they urge for such proceedings are, that they did not take up arms to prohibit the alienation of territory to the Crown, or to maintain any seignorial rights, but that the people of the Waitara, without having been guilty of any crime, were driven at the point of the sword from villages, houses, and homes which they had occupied for years. That a great crime had been committed against them. That through all future generations it will be told that their lands have been forcibly and unlawfully taken from them by officers appointed by the Queen of England…. They argue that they have no hope of obtaining justice, that their eventual extermination is determined
“Your Grace must be well aware that this Waitara question was from the first made a party question, regarding which the most violent controversy raged, and men's passions were most excited. Like all other questions between races in a state of hostility, it was by many taken up as a question of race, and it will I fear even now be difficult for any European to allege that the natives are in the main right in their answers to the allegations made against them regarding the Waitara purchase, without raising a feeling of violent hostility in the minds of many people. Leaving apart, however, those far higher considerations which influence Your Grace, I know that we are both to stand at the bar of History when our conduct to the native race of this country will be judged by impartial historians, and that it is our duty to set a good example for all time in such a most important affair. I ought therefore to advise Your Grace, without thinking of the personal consequences which may result to myself, that my settled conviction is that the natives are in the main right in their allegations regarding the Waitara purchase and that it ought not to be gone on with…. I must add that although I have been eighteen months in the colony, the most important facts connected with this Waitara purchase were unknown to me until a few days since, and must still have remained so had it not been for personal inquiries made by myself and the Native Minister on the spot, that from accident, oversight, or some other cause these facts have not been made public, or reported to Your Grace, and that I have seen nothing to make me think that my predecessor knew them.”
Fortescue agreed with Sir C.O. 209, 172.now will look like an act of fear and will lead to fresh encroachments on the part of the natives. Be this however as it may, there is nothing for it but to support the Governor. Even to hesitate as to the wisdom of his course would seriously embarrass him at a most critical moment.”
On May 5 Grey reported that “a terrible and shocking murder” committed by the natives on the land between Omata and the Tataraimaka block, Taranaki, had much complicated affairs. “A small party of men were coming along the beach bringing into New Plymouth a military prisoner for trial; they were accompanied, for the sake of the protection numbers gave, by two young officers, Lieut. Tragett and Assistant Surgeon Hope of the 57th Regiment, coming to town on private business. The party was fired on by a body of natives lying in ambush, and at a single volley all of them but one or two were killed or mortally wounded; the wounded were brutally cut about the head with tomahawks. Two officers, two sergeants and four men were thus murdered on the very day month we took possession of the Tataraimaka block. I fear that I cannot now prevent war by acting in the manner I believed justice required in regard to the land at the Waitara. I take great blame to myself for having spent so long in trying to get my responsible advisers to agree to some general plan of proceeding.” Gorton, in Some Home Truths re the Maori War 1863 to 1869, states that he forwarded to Grey on April 27, 1863, a warning from a native chief about an ambuscade between the redoubts at Tataraimaka and Poutoko. No notice was taken of the warning, and a week later, on May 4, Tragett and Hope were ambushed.
On May 7 Cameron reported the murder of Lieutenant Tragett and his party: “I have sent to Auckland for a rein-
W.O. 33/16.
Two days later Grey reported that there was great reason to apprehend a general rising of the native population “with a view to the total expulsion of the white race from this Island.” He asked for an additional force of 3,000 men. He requested that one European regiment and two regiments of Sikhs should be sent, as the latter would be better qualified than any other troops to perform the military duties required in New Zealand. Ministers had undertaken to propose to the House of Assembly that the colony should defray the whole of the pay of the Sikhs. Sir
The Duke of Newcastle's minute was: “I am not insensible to the objections to Sikh troops raised by Mr. Fortescue, but
shoes and this will make them more than a match for the Maoris. They fight well for ‘loot,’ but they fight hardly less well when they know there is no loot—it is when they are restrained from loot that they sometimes fail. In order to save time, which is all-important, I have requested Sir Charles Wood to send out by to-night's mail instructions to Lord Elgin to send without delay one European regiment and two Sikh regiments—made up to the number of 3,000 unless he has heard in the meantime from New Zealand that all is quiet. He will be informed of the terms offered as respects the Sikhs. Write at once to the War Office, sending a copy of this despatch, and with a general reference to the contents of the others, and request Lord de Grey to move H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief to send out orders to India in conformity with the instructions sent this evening privately to Lord Elgin as mentioned above. Write to Sir
In the Duke's letter to the India Office a passage was added to the effect that Her Majesty's Government considered itself responsible to the Government of India for all reasonable expenses incurred in preparing and sending the force to New Zealand if it should be necessary to do so, as no charge ought to be imposed on the revenues of India for such purpose. This passage was marked: “Shown to Mr. Gladstone and approved by him.” C.O. 209, 173.
A despatch informing Grey of the decision was sent on July 25, 1863, but two days later the Duke of Newcastle informed Grey that the Government had not considered it desirable to send from India the two Sikh regiments for which he had applied. The Governor-General had instead been asked to send to the colony two of the regiments which would other-
C.O. 209, 173. J. Martineau, op. cit., pp. 324–6.British History in the Nineteenth Century.
On May 13 Grey reported that General Cameron had that morning proceeded to the Waitara to withdraw the detachments quartered there, “the local government having determined that it ought not any longer to hold the land it claimed there.” On May 27 Grey forwarded a copy of a proclamation dated May 11 declaring that the Government would not proceed further with the negotiation for the block of land at the Waitara. The proclamation set out that “circumstances connected with the said purchase unknown to the Government at the time of the sale of the said land have lately transpired which make it advisable that the said purchase should not be proceeded with.” The Duke of Newcastle concurred in the decision, but expressed the view that
The Taranaki Herald, discussing on May 16 Grey's proclamation abandoning claim to the land at the Waitara, wrote: “We confess that we cannot imagine the object of this monstrous act. If it had been done eighteen months ago it would have been the honest avowal of an unwise and mischievous policy. If it had been done a month ago it might have been looked upon merely as the crowning act of a policy that was (at some distant time) to triumph by conceding everything that was demanded, but coming as it does close after the brutal massacr
The Press, Christchurch, wrote of the proclamation on June 9: “All we can say, now we have seen that document, is that Louis Napoleon himself could have penned nothing more entirely unintelligible. On every patent and obvious ground the act is one worthy of the utmost condemnation.” On December 19 the Taranaki Herald wrote concerning the statement that Letters on New Zealand Subjects (1865), said that the Taranaki colonists held that Grey's abandonment of the Waitara was “a mere bit of his old ‘Tract and Treacle’ policy.”
On June 8, 1863, Grey reported a sharp encounter at Katikara near New Plymouth on June 4: “The natives occupied a very strong position from which they were driven with heavy loss. I never saw such a rout before—they ran for miles. Our losses were one private killed, two mortally wounded, and three severely wounded.” C.O. 209, 173. W.O. 33/16.Eclipse, with Sir
Discussing General Cameron's success of June 4, the Taranaki Herald asked on June 6: “On what principle are the wounded men and others of the hostile natives who fall into our hands to be treated? It is certain that some at least of those returned as dead in the fight on Thursday would have been among the wounded if the battle had been between two civilized nations; that is to say that some wounded Maoris were killed by our men. Is this the principle which is to be adopted hereafter throughout the war? We will not say absolutely that it is wrong, morally and politically, though we firmly believe it to be so—to be neither right nor expedient.”
On July 17 the Dunedin correspondent of The Times described the situation in Taranaki resulting from the reoccupation of the Tataraimaka block and the murder of Lieut. Tragett and his party. Commenting on the account, The Times said on the same day: “It is more than probable that at this very moment the Government of New Zealand is engaged in another war. After all that has passed, the thing may appear incredible, but it is almost certain, and, what is more, our present information does not enable us to point out how it could have been avoided. We sent out to Auckland the ablest and most conciliatory Governor that we could find, who succeeded by good management in patching up the last quarrel with the natives and has since established friendly relations with the most powerful tribes. He had every motive for maintaining a pacific policy, having been warned by the Colonial Secretary in the plainest terms that this country would not guarantee the disputed titles of settlers in outlying districts. To recognize conquest as a valid title to lands which had been deserted by their owners, and ravaged by the Maoris while in a state of insurrection against the Queen, would have been inexcusable on the part of Sir
The Times, on August 17, printed an account of the war in New Zealand from a correspondent: “It is a peculiar feature of the present struggle that the natives have taken up arms in the face of conciliatory conduct carried almost to excess. Sir impedimenta of scientific warfare, to positions of the enemy which are found deserted on arrival…. All that skilful disposition of force and rapid action can accomplish is being done. The soldiers are divided into small parties, and scattered about the country with orders to pick off any stragglers they may come across; the militia and volunteers are doing patrol duty, day and night, in the town of New Plymouth and the outskirts, and the sentries have orders not to challenge any natives but to fire on them at once. The most perfect entente cordiale exists between the military and the civilian forces, and all are actuated by a common enthusiasm. General Cameron is immensely popular and the success which has hitherto attended his operations has enlisted for him the confidence of the whole colony.”
The correspondent described the engagement of June 4, and commenting on this on August 18, The Times said: “Moderate as the achievement may appear to us, it was substantial, timely, and full of promise…. A force of 200 is rather a large force for a rebel army in New Zealand. The natives understand their work better than to fight in great numbers …. General
The Taranaki Herald wrote on June 20: “When we speak of what Sir
In his report of July 1863, the Deputy Quartermaster-General, Lt.-Col. W.O. 33/16.
After a visit by Cameron to the Governor at Auckland, 300 troops were withdrawn from New Plymouth to Auckland “in consequence of reported intentions of aggressive movements on the part of the Waikato tribes.” New Plymouth was left on the defensive with a garrison of 1,500. W.O. 33/16.
In a despatch of July 30, 1863, Cameron stated that so many reports of impending insurrection had reached the Governor that he (Grey) considered it necessary to remove all disaffected natives from the vicinity of the European territory in the Waikato. “With this view, on the 9th instant, I assembled a considerable force at Drury, while magistrates were sent round to the native villages, with instructions to call upon the inhabitants either to take the oath of allegiance or to remove into the interior of the country. All refused to take the oath of allegiance (as I thought was to have been expected), some deserted their villages, others had to be expelled by the troops, and the greater part, instead of removing into the interior, retreated into the bush lying between Drury and the Waikato, from which, on account of its great extent and density, it will be a very difficult task to expel them. Gorst, in W.O. 33/12.The Maori King, says that the goods of the fugitive Maoris were looked by the colonial forces and the neighbouring settlers. He criticizes Grey's policy in the whole matter, and his account of it led the Royal Commission of 1928 to decide that “a grave injustice was done to the natives in question by forcing them into the position of rebels and afterwards confiscating their lands” (N.Z.P.P., 1928, G—7).
The battle of Koheroa was fought on July 17. In a despatch of July 20, Cameron stated that he had caught up with the troops during their advance. The enemy slowly retreated to well-selected points where he had constructed rifle-pits: “These he defended with great obstinacy; and, as we had no artillery in the field, we could only dislodge him from them with the bayonet, which was done with great gallantry by the young soldiers of the 14th led by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Col. Austen, who, I regret to say, received a wound in the arm during the action. After we had driven them from the second line of rifle-pits, where they made their most determined stand, a large number of them left the ridge, and turning to the right retreated down a narrow and deep gulley, where they were exposed for a long time to a close and destructive fire from our men on the heights above, by which many of them were killed. The rest were driven before us until they reached the Maramarua, a small tributary of the Waikato, which they crossed precipitately, some in canoes and others swimming. Having no means of effecting the passage of the river, we were obliged to discontinue the pursuit, and I accordingly ordered the troops back to camp.” The British lost 2 killed and 9 wounded in the action. The Maoris lost more than 30 killed, including one of the uncles of the Maori King. W.O. 33/12. W.O. 33/16. The battle of Rangiriri is described later, pp. 183–8. W.O. 33/16. The battle of Rangiriri is described later, pp. 183–8.
On July 17, 1863, a convoy under the charge of Captain Ring, 2nd Battalion, 18th Regiment, was attacked on the road between the Queen's Redoubt and Drury by an ambuscade of not less than 140 natives. The British loss was four killed and ten wounded.
On July 4 Grey wrote: “It has now been clearly proved that some of the chiefs of Waikato ordered the recent murders at Taranaki, and that being thus responsible for them, they have determined to support the people who carried out the orders which they issued.” On July 28 he stated that he entertained a hope that the existing insurrection would be only a partial one, but added that “no permanent peace can now be hoped for until the Waikato and Taranaki tribes are completely subdued.” C.O. 209, 174. C.O. 209, 174.
On July 22 another skirmish with the natives took place at Kiri-Kiri near Drury. The enemy were repulsed with loss. The militia's services were commended by the General. The colonial steamer C.O. 209, 174.Avon had entered the Waikato and was co-operating with General Cameron. On August 8 Grey reported that
On July 24 two settlers, Sylvester Calvert and Cooper, were shot by natives near Papakura. On August 15 Colonel Warre, writing to Grey from Taranaki, suggested that a useful corps of friendly natives might be formed. The Duke of Newcastle wrote on this: “Colonel Warre's proposal to arm certain ‘friendly’ natives seems questionable. Thompson was a friendly native.”
On October 16 The Times published a letter from its Melbourne correspondent, dated August 25: “I grieve to say that at Auckland our fellow-countrymen seem to be fighting almost pro aris et focis. The Waikatos, and allied tribes of congenial cannibals, are in arms to the number of some 7,500 in the neigh-bourhood of that town, and a general rising of tribes is apprehended…. The Maoris now plainly see that this is their last chance. They are accordingly using every effort…. The utmost enthusiasm prevails among civilians as among soldiers, and unbounded confidence is felt in General Cameron.” On the same day The Times said in its first leading article, after referring to the “very disagreeable news from New Zealand”: “We are happy to find there is no doubt of the spirit of the colonists. They have sprung to arms with an alacrity equal to that which the mother-country would exhibit if threatened with foreign invasion. The volunteers and militia of the province of Auckland amounted already to 4,000 men, fully armed. There is a permanent colonial corps of cavalry which will be actively employed. Drill was going on everywhere; the first class militiamen and volunteers had been sent to the front,
In his report of October 3, 1863, Gamble stated: “Some tons of supplies brought inside the Waikato heads by the barque W.O. 33/16.City of Melbourne, had reached Cameron (village), en route to the Mangatawhiri for the Queen's Redoubt. This day (September 7) the hostile natives attacked Cameron with a force of 200, took the place from Kukutai's people, destroyed the commissariat supplies, consisting principally of bran, oats and maize, and set fire to the pa.” qui vive and awaiting them. As our men, led by their officers, came to the clearing, they received a close volley in front and on the left flank. Here Captain Swift fell mortally wounded, but directed Lieutenant Butler, the only other officer, to charge the enemy. As this officer was leading the men on, he received a severe wound across the abdomen, after which he is reported to have shot two men with his revolver. Sergeant McKenna then assumed command of the party, which he handled, as Lieut. Butler states, with admirable coolness and skill. The natives were driven back, and our men, having first covered with fern the body of one of their fallen comrades who was killed, retired under fire, bringing with them Captain Swift, Lieutenant Butler and two wounded men who were removed to a place of safety in rear.”
A proclamation of the Maori King dated October 3, 1863, laid down, C.O. 209, 175.inter alia, rules under which all plunder was to be
The Melbourne correspondent of The Times, in a letter of October 24, published on December 15, 1863, described the new flying column system inaugurated by General Cameron: “The natives…must be kept by these flying columns in a continued state of unrest. Moreover, although they have a good supply of powder, they are short of bullets, and especially of percussion-caps. They have been known to buy marbles off little boys in the street to use in lieu of leaden balls. They purchase eyelet holes and wax vestas, and out of the two they ingeniously construct percussion-caps. They also pick up our spent balls with great diligence. All this is very illustrative of Maori ingenuity and would excite our admiration if we were spared from reading an adjoining paragraph headed ‘Another little boy shot by the Maoris,’ but the result of this ingenuity is certainly not lasting. So precarious a supply cannot compete with ours, which is practically inexhaustible. Their commissariat is also a great difficulty, and more so under this system of bush warfare than when defending a pa. A few carts for transport they certainly have, they have also learnt from us the value of pack-horses and pack-bullocks, they have also food stored in many places; but when a Taua, or war party, is compelled to shift from place to place by our ‘flying columns’ and ‘forest rangers,’ their food has to be transported on the backs of women.”
Troops of Forest Rangers were formed from New Zealand volunteers in 1863. The first was commanded by Lieut. Cown, C.O. 209, 174.The New Zealand Wars, 1, 258.
On October 28 Grey reported that Domett's ministry had resigned and he had sent for Fox. A ministry was formed with Whitaker as Premier and Fox Colonial Secretary. II, p. 411.
On October 2 a severe engagement with the Maoris took place at Poutoko, Taranaki. Further murders reported included those of Job Hantin at Henderson's farm near Wairoa on October 13, 1863; William John Jackson at Papakura on October 14, and two boys, Richard and Nicholas Trust, one only eight, at Kennedy's Farm, Turanga Creek, on October 24. C.O. 209, 175.
A reconnaissance of the Waikato River was conducted by Cameron and Commodore Sir Meremere. Lighters with one mast and lug sail.Pioneer, draught three feet, on October 30, 1863. “Rangiriri (anglice, ‘Angry Heavens’),” wrote Gamble, “is situated very low, and the entrenchment from the position from which we saw it, about half a mile below, appeared to be open to enfilade from the river, beside seeming to be otherwise not formidable. It is just a common embankment thrown
Pioneer and four gunboats. The decks of the Pioneer above and below were crammed with men; tents, etc., were piled up round the bulwark to give cover to the men on the upper deck as we ran the gauntlet under the enemy's fire. A week's provisions, entrenching tools, etc., were shipped and some time was necessary for the embarkation as the boats had to convey their loads two miles down the Mangatawhiri to the Pioneer, which lay in the Waikato and had (most of them) to make a double trip.”
When the Maoris found they were to be attacked in their rear they evacuated their position: “The enemy was completely taken aback by the movement to his rear; he saw that his almost total destruction must have resulted from his maintaining his position, and therefore he abandoned the ground on which he had spent so much labour…. Although, had we caught the whole of the enemy at Meri-Meri, an overwhelming blow might have had the effect of putting a speedy end to the war, yet, as we have gained the place without the loss of a life, and gained it with a solid advantage, the result is on the whole one for congratulation. Differing from the ordinarily unimportant results of the loss of a Maori position, which is usually followed by taking up another without any felt damage in the way of prestige, the fall of Meri-Meri carries with it a most significant meaning. Here the greatest efforts were expended in fortifying a commanding position of considerable natural strength. The Maori saw that here was a happy point at which to dispute our passage into his country, which he succeeded in doing for two whole months; here, at the very gateway, he appeared bent on a fight; but when he found that his retreat for which
On November 20 the troops advanced. “At 3 p.m.,” wrote Gamble, “we sighted the enemy's entrenchment from a ridge at about 600 yards from the works. These consisted of a line of entrenchment with double ditch, drawn across the narrow isthmus dividing Lake Waikare on the east from the Waikato River on the west. The extent of this front line was 500 yards, and at the highest point, the centre, it was strengthened by a very formidable redoubt, having a ditch 12 feet wide and parapet 18 feet to the top from the bottom of the ditch. Behind the enemy's left centre of the front line, and perpendicular to it, ran a rifle-pitted entrenchment facing the river, the approach from which (along the rear of the main entrenchment) it commanded. The right and rear of this position was defended by high ground, also honeycombed with pits. 500 yards to the rear another ridge was occupied and similarly fortified. It was to gain possession of this ridge that the 40th were to land in the rear. As we came near the position the steamers arrived in good time, and everything promised fair for the combined attack. While, however, the troops were taking up their formation, it became evident that the Pioneer had become unmanageable, just at the most critical juncture. She was unable, against wind and current, to gain the point indicated for the landing of the 40th, and not only so but got in the way of the gunboats, the fire of all of which but one, and occasionally a second, was thus completely masked…. At 3.30 p.m., just before the signal was made to the steamers to attack, the enemy opened along his whole line, but without damage to our men, who were covered by the crest of the ridge. Mercer's Armstrongs and the naval six-pounder made beautiful practice, the enemy meanwhile keeping up a desultory musket fire. Perplexing and trying as was the unfortunate position of the steamer with the 40th and of the gunboats, it was hoped every moment that it would be right. The preconcerted signal,
“At about fifty yards the skirmishers were instructed to halt, to cover the ladder party in planting. While the 65th were scaling on the left, the 12th and 14th were to keep down the fire in the centre. Eager as the men were to pass over the long interval from the point of formation to the enemy's position, they had considerable difficulty, from the broken nature of the ground and the heavy fire poured on them during the advance. Lieutenant-Colonel Austen, 14th, Captain Phelps, 12th, and many others were wounded directly on becoming exposed. The enemy's fire was sharp, quick and heavy, but nothing could check the impetuosity of the assault. The ladders were planted, the 65th were immediately seen forcing their way into the enemy's works. As the troops passed the front line they wheeled up to the left, from which direction the enemy's fire was now brought to bear upon them from the entrenched line of rifle-pits facing the Waikato. It was only the work of a few minutes to storm and carry this, when the enemy fell back on the centre redoubt and adjacent works. Happily, when our men were passing the first line, the 40th began to disembark not very far from the place selected for their landing. As fast as they got ashore they were sent at the ridge in rear already described, and carried it, driving before them the defenders who fled for the swamp of Waikare, in attempting to cross which several perished under the fire of our rifles. A part of the 40th now held the hill, and the remainder joined the main body of the attacking force under the Lieutenant-General.
“The main line and some of the inner works having been taken as described, the troops closed on the enemy towards the centre redoubt, where he now fought with desperation and held his ground against every attempt to dislodge him. Two distinct assaults were made on this work, the first by the Royal Artillery, who, being armed with revolvers, were selected for the work. They were led by Captain Mercer, commanding.
Cf. Cowan: “The General was compelled by the darkness to cease the waste of brave men's lives.” Cf. Cowan, I, 326. A veteran of the engagement is quoted as saying that want of ammunition was the reason for surrender.Eclipse. They went against the front of the work and were received with a deadly volley, and were also unable to effect an entrance. It was now dark. The Lieutenant-General, therefore, determined on suspending further operations until daylight, the troops to remain meanwhile in their respective positions, in which they almost surrounded the enemy.
“Their immediate leader was Te Priori, Tioriori. W.O. 33/16. Cowan gives slightly different figures. J. W. Fortescue states that more of the British casualties might have been avoided “by abstaining from the unnecessary assault of the central redoubt.”Curacoa…. The natives of this country have never received such a blow as at Rangiriri. The capture of prisoners and arms they have been not only unaccustomed to but must regard as a heavy misfortune. It is hoped that it may have the effect of re-estab-
After the battle Grey received a letter from a secondary chief suggesting peace. He refused to treat while the Maoris remained in arms. The disposal of the prisoners captured in this engagement was to bring about a very complicated situation. They were confined on the hulk C.O. 209, 175.Marion and a long controversy ensued between the Governor and his ministers as to whether they were being properly treated.
Discussing the result of the engagement at Rangiriri in its first leading article on February 12, 1864, The Times said: “The firm, decisive and successful measures which General Cameron appears to be successfully carrying out will be the best security for the subsequent negotiation by Sir
On November 7, 1863, Grey reported that the new ministry on that day had accepted responsibility for native affairs, at the same time recognizing, “with the deepest gratitude, the great interest which Her Most Gracious Majesty has always taken in the welfare of all races of her colonial subjects, and the thoroughly efficient aid which Her Majesty's Imperial Government is affording the colony.” C.O. 209, 175.
On December 8 Cameron's forces moved forward to Ngaruawahia, the Maori King's residence, 12 miles from Rangiriri. They found that it had been evacuated. The British flag was hoisted on the King's flagstaff and an encampment formed. “The moral, political and strategical importance of the occu-
W.O. 33/16.
On January 16, 1864, “in consequence of reports received of the east coast natives joining the enemy, the Lieutenant-General decided on sending an expedition to Tauranga, under Colonel Carey, to create a diversion.” The expedition consisted of 26 officers and 669 men, who landed at Tauranga on January 22 and occupied the mission station.
The combined main body troops consisting of 122 officers and 2,393 men set out from Tuhikaramea and Whata-Whata on January 27. On February 1 a reconnaissance was made of the enemy's position at Pa-te-rangi. On February 13 General Cameron described an encounter with the natives on February 11 at Warari on the Mangapiko River. The officers engaged were Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry Havelock, Bart., Captain C.O. 209, 179. For his bravery Heaphy received the Victoria Cross.
On February 20 a flank night march to Te Awamutu, “with a view to turning all the enemy's See Cowan, I, 344–7.pas at once,” was begun by 63 officers and 1,163 men. The advance guard consisted of von Tempsky's Forest Rangers (4 officers and 99 men).
On March 4 Cameron wrote of these engagements at and near Rangiaowhia: “The immediate result of our late movements has been the abandonment by the enemy of a series of fortified positions which could not have been taken without a heavy loss; the possession by us of a large tract of fertile country between the Waipa and Upper Waikato Rivers, and the retreat of the enemy into the interior with the loss of the cultivations on which he chiefly depended for his supply.” W.O. 33/16.
On March 31 an attack was begun on the native position at Orakau, on the Upper Waipa, fortified against the judgment of Cf. Cowan, I, 355–97.
“Hear the word of the General. You have done enough to show you are brave men. Your case is hopeless. Surrender and your lives will be spared.”
“To which answer was given: ‘And the word of the Maori is, we'll fight for ever, for ever and ever.’
“They were then told—‘Send away the women.’
“To which they answered—‘The women will fight too.’
“By mid-day an entrance was effected into the ditch of the outwork … and in the afternoon, by 3.30, the approach was pushed up close to the main entrenchment, to which the Maoris
pas) were skilfully thrown by Sergeant McKay, R.A. At 3.30 the enemy suddenly came out of their entrenchment in the open, and in a silent and compact body moved without precipitation. There was something mysterious in their appearance as they advanced towards the cordon of troops, without fear, without firing a shot, or a single cry being heard, even from the women, of whom there were several among them. They had been already more than two days without water; they had no food but some raw potatoes; an overwhelming force surrounded them, and all hope of relief failed; but still with an extraordinary devotion to their cause, calmly in the face of death, abandoned their position without yielding.
“The troops now converged to the direction in which the Maoris retired, and after they had passed the cordon, through which they succeeded in breaking, poured a murderous fire on them as they went through and beyond the thick ti-tree in rear of the position.” The Maoris lost 101 killed and the British 16 killed. About 250 colonial and 750 regular troops were engaged. The total number of Maoris “did not probably exceed 300,” according to Gamble. W.O. 33/16. Cowan states that at least 160 Maoris were killed. Cf. Sir James Alexander, Bush Fighting (1873): “Some may remark it ‘would have been generous to have held one's hand, and not pursue and fire at the retiring column of Maoris.’ Certainly it would, but it is to be considered that the soldiers had suffered, too, from the determined resistance of the enemy, and their blood was up.”
On April 6, 1864, Grey reported the engagement at Orakau and forwarded an account by R. C. Mainwaring. His version of the answer to the surrender offer was: “We will fight C.O. 209, 179. For Rewi's description of his escape unwounded, see Cowan, I, 387–8. In a newspaper article in 1934 Mr. Cowan stated that W.O. 33/16.ake ake ake (for ever).” Later he said: “The Maoris behaved most splendidly, calling for admiration on every side. They were without water from Thursday till this (Saturday) afternoon…. Rewi was in the pa, but I cannot say whether he escaped untouched.”
The admiration of the Imperial troops for the valour of the Maoris is shown by the inscription on a tablet in St. John's Church, Te Awamutu: “This tablet was erected by the soldiers of H.M. 65th Regiment as a memorial of the New Zealanders who fell in the actions at Rangiaohia on the 21st and 22nd February, 1864, and at Orakau on the 31st March, 1st and 2nd April, 1864. I say unto you, love your enemies.” It is pleasant to note that before the 65th left the North Island after its long service there, it was presented by the colonists with the regimental plate known as the “New Zealand Plate.”
The British campaign in the Waikato had been hampered by commissariat difficulties of an exceptional nature which deserve some description. In a despatch of October 29, 1864, to the War Office, Commissary-General H. Stanley Jones detailed some of the difficulties which had been experienced:
“I would like to condense into a glance the means adopted to convey supplies into the wilderness and the causes which led to losses in transit:
Lady Barkly.
Avon and Pioneer. Subsequently worked by the men of the Commissariat Transport Corps, or by sails, when practicable.Pioneer and Avon, the river here being deep enough to admit of the use of steamers.
“The losses of supplies on this long line of journey were necessarily heavy; but, considering the peculiar circumstances, they are certainly not more than might have been anticipated.
“The following circumstances should be considered:
“Many other causes might be enumerated, but I think that there can be no occasion to go further into details.” W.O. 33/16. For a tribute to the work of the Commissariat, see Fortesce, History of the British Army, XIII, pp. 517–18.
In an enclosed report on the Commissariat Department,
In a report on the Commissariat Department in the Waikato 1863–4, dated August 23, 1864, Robertson had stated that the department was first called upon to ration 1,200, but the number increased rapidly to 3,000, 5,000, and finally 7,000 men “without timely notification.” “A very large number of civilians,” he stated, “was constantly employed in Auckland, directly or indirectly, in carrying out commissariat contracts. Hitherto any man who could produce a certificate from the Deputy Commissary-General to the effect that his services were actually and necessarily required in connection with contracts obtained exemption from militia duty. As soon as
Fish-fed pork, Robertson wrote, caused some trouble with the troops. It looked excellent in the cask, but when cooked, “it was quite nauseous, emitting a powerful fish-like smell.” A vegetable ration issued to the troops, for which 1½d. a day was stopped from pay, was “very unpopular with the men. The small pickle ration was a source of constant grumbling, and it was not unusual for a soldier to be seen going about with half a diminutive onion on the point of a fork saying ‘look at the ration I'm charged 1½d. for,’ quite forgetting that he had had, in addition, a pound of potatoes for his money.” Rum and tobacco thefts caused the commissariat great trouble. “The divided responsibility in the inland transport service still continued. It is true that early in 1864 the boat companies of the Commissariat Transport Corps relieved the Navy from the boat transport, but the Navy still continued to work the steamers, and it also cannot be denied that the Commissariat
W.O. 33/16.
Deputy Commissary-General Bailey, Director of the Commissary Transport Corps, in a memorandum of July 26, 1865, wrote: “I have accompanied (from England) nearly every force that has been engaged in active operations since 1851, and I have never seen the troops land with the necessary transport, or with arrangements for a proper transport, to enable them to undertake a campaign.” W.O. 33/16.Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. viii, p. 337.
The total force in New Zealand on January 1, 1864, was: Imperial 8,630, Colonial 3,209. On May 1, 1864, the totals were 11,335 and 3,682; on September 30, Imperial 9,927, militia and volunteers 12,073. Total 22,000. Colonial Office comment:!! C.O. 209, 182.
After the Battle of Orakau, Cameron's next operations were directed against Mangatautari, where the Waikato Maoris, under Ibid., 179. One sequel to the affray is thus recorded in the Taranaki Herald of April 16: “Provincial Council, Monday, April 11. The Council met at 6.30 p.m., but owing to the absence of our reporter on military duty, this portion of the history of the Province has, we regret to say, been lost.”
On April 16 Cameron went with the Governor to Auck-
en route to Taranaki where the 70th Regiment was to proceed on account of the disaster to Captain Lloyd's party. A flying column of more than 500 troops, including 300 of the Taranaki Militia, then devastated the country south of New Plymouth. Such methods, which might have intimidated a less warlike race, only confirmed the Maori in his resolution to fight to the end.
T. C. Williams, The determined nature of the Maoris' hostility caused widespread discussion of the possibility of confiscating their lands as a deterrent. The colonists incurred considerable criticism in later years for adopting this policy, and it is therefore of importance to note that, writing to the Duke of Newcastle on December 17, 1863, Sir A Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, being an Appeal on Behalf of the Ngatiraukawa Tribe, p. 39.
That Sir
Ministers expressed the view that one of the results of the policy would be that the colonists, with a satisfactory and permanent peace established, would cheerfully fulfil the promise made by the General Assembly to undertake the responsibility for native affairs.… “There will be amply sufficient land left them (the Waikato tribes),” ministers added, “for all useful purposes.… The present will be the first occasion on which an aboriginal native of New Zealand will be deprived of a foot of land against his will, and we feel assured that it will be the last.” To counteract the preponderance of male settlers, ministers stated that they had arranged with the Superintendent of Auckland to expend money on the introduction of women imigrants as soon as they could be safely introduced. C.O. 209, 174. The German mercenaries who were introduced by Grey to South Africa had complained bitterly of the shortage of women.
On August 29, 1863, Grey transmitted a memorandum of his advisers containing the details of a plan for the introduction of 5,000 men, who were to hold 50-acre farms of land on military tenure, having first performed military duties in
Colonial Office comment (by W. Dealtry) was: “The memorandum of ministers…appears to me to establish conclusively the expediency of the plan which they recommend, the cost of which, I apprehend, will be borne entirely by the local Government.” The Duke of Newcastle wrote: “Upon the whole I believe the policy of confiscating the lands of the Waikatos who appear in arms against us is right, provided that it is exercised with justice and scrupulous desire not to involve the innocent with the guilty. It is not, however, free from danger. If the other tribes are persuaded that it is a new and flagrant proof of the greediness of the settlers for land and not adopted as a just punishment for murder and rebellion, it may make them desperate and aid the efforts of the King Party to effect a general rising. In conjunction with the confiscation of the rebel lands the proposed military settlement seems right. It is not likely to retain its character long, as, unlike the Cape and other countries where it has been tried, the necessity for it must soon cease. In a very few years the natives must become an insignificant minority. Sanction should be given to this measure in accordance with this minute. Its responsibility must rest with the Colonial Government for all depends on the spirit in which it is carried out.” C.O. 209, 174.
The minute is a good example of the reasonable way in which the Duke carried out his duties. So keen and well-informed a critic as George Higinbotham spoke of him in his celebrated speech in the Legislative Assembly of Victoria on November 2, 1869: “The distinguishing characteristic of the despatches of that nobleman is their perfect straight-forwardness, simplicity and sincerity. He was always able to speak his mind without reserve, and at the same time, so far as I know, without giving offence on a single occasion.”Memoir of George Higinbotham, by
When Domett's ministry was replaced by the Whitaker—Fox combination in October 1863, the confiscation policy was continued. W. F. Monk says In an unpublished thesis on Sewell's Journal.
A Colonial Office minute on this measure said that it provided “that the Governor in Council (i.e. the Executive Council) may order all persons whom they may think fit to take the most vigorous and effectual measures for the suppression of the rebellion which shall appear to be necessary, and to punish and arrest for trial all persons assisting in such rebellion according to martial law by death, penal servitude or otherwise, and to execute the sentences of all such courts martial. It is based on the model of the Irish Acts of 1798, which I apprehend are hardly to be taken as desirable precedents at the present time.”
The New Zealand Settlements Act—known as the “Confiscation Act”—was severely criticized in the Legislative Council debate of November 16, 1863. Dr. Pollen characterized wholesale confiscation as politically immoral and as a financial project utterly delusive and unsound. Mr. Stokes feared that the results of the measure would be to render the natives reckless and desperate.Aborigines' Friend, January 1863—December 1864, p. 360.
The Act was characterized by Sir C.O. 209, 178.
On October 23, 1863, C.O. 209, 174.The Times supported the contention of the Sydney Morning Herald that part of the lands of the Maoris must be confiscated to indemnify “the men on whom they have enforced the cost and labour of self-preservation by conquest.” A report from a Dunedin correspondent, dated September 18, published in The Times on November 17, 1863, stated that “the voice of the colony has been so unanimous regarding the confiscation of the land of the rebels that it is accepted as a measure fully decided on.” “The question is, however, one of great difficulty,” the correspondent added, “for it is almost impossible to carry out the confiscation of the lands of rebellious tribes without engendering an idea among the natives generally that we are fighting for land, and that land is the cause of all the troubles. It is well known how jealous the Maoris are on the subject of land, and if once the opinion gains ground
The struggle was now assuming a more general character and the Maoris were waging indiscriminate warfare against the white population. Incidents of the time included the following murders of settlers:
W.
Robert Watson, aged 15, at Burtt's farm, September 14;
Hugh McLean, at Hamilton's Farm, September 14;
Margaret Fahey, barbarously murdered near Drury on October 16.
On August 25 a sudden attack was made by a large body of natives on a party of 25 men of the 40th Regiment engaged in road making on the Great South Road. In nine skirmishes about this time ten soldiers were killed and fifteen wounded.
C.O. 209, 174.
Discussing the new methods of bush warfare forced on the British by the atrocity of the conduct of the Maoris, The Times in a leading article on December 24, 1863, said: “There may be something revolting to European notions in the ambuscades which are a feature in this kind of warfare, but the ferocity of the natives, and the danger which arises from allowing bodies of them to lurk in the neighbourhood of settlers, must be the excuse for any departure from the usual practices of arms. As to the conduct of the settlers themselves, it is worthy of all commendation, and the same may be said of the people of New South Wales and Victoria, who have given all the help in their power to their threatened brethren…. A correspondent…points out the faults of our administration, and it certainly seems that there has been a strange mixture of weakness and false security.” In another leading article on January 19, 1864, The Times said: “Nobody at home turns with any satisfaction to the progress of the New Zealand war. Laurels are won from equals, and this is a conflict with savages; laurels are supposed to be entwined with the myrtle, and this is a war of extermination…. There is no vision more delightful than that of an indigeneous race finding themselves the wiser and happier and better for the arrival of the civilized stranger, bearing grateful testimony to his virtues, and yielding a mutually beneficial homage. This is what we all want, and what till lately we had thought we had seen glimpses of in New Zealand. … The justification of the colonists must rest with themselves; and it is enough for us if they appear to be doing, on the whole, the best they can under the circumstances. But, if we choose to censure them, we ought at least to remember their difficulties. What is to be done with aborigines who neither make use of the soil nor sell it; who lay immense tracts under imaginary claims; who are so disunited that it is impossible
The New Zealand Ministers' plan of 1863 for disposing of native lands may be set out as follows:
Sir C.O. 209, 175.
A memorandum by Sir W. Martin on the Confiscation Policy and Fox's minute thereon was submitted to the Colonial Office, and Sir
Chichester Fortescue wrote: “Sir In a letter to the writer Professor A. Berriedale Keith thus replied to a query on this point: “There is no doubt that in law every Maori who took up arms after the proclamations of Hobson, confirmed by the new Commission or Charter of November 16, 1840, was guilty of rebellion, even though his tribe had never accepted any treaty. Of course the Crown might waive its right or might recognize the Maoris as belligerents. … The moral claim to consideration of the non-treaty tribes was obviously very strong” (May 13, 1936). C.O. 209, 178.
In a letter published in The Times on December 24, 1863, Maori Messenger, “composed of such contemptible trash as alone to explain and justify the conduct of the Maoris in thinking themselves politically wiser than their rulers.” The Europeans of the lower order settled in remote districts “were as lawless as the natives themselves.” The Maoris were made to feel grievously “their social inferiority to the Europeans.” The colonial newspapers were full of affronts to the natives. “It is easier for a savage to forgive a wrong than an insult,” Gorst continued. “The Maoris have a firm persuasion, derived, I believe, from the lessons of mischievous and treacherous Europeans, that as soon as ever the white race is sufficiently powerful their lands will be seized and they will be reduced to a condition of servitude as other aboriginal races have been before. … The above are some of the grievances under which the Maoris suffer, or at least imagine they suffer. No permanent peace can ever be secured in New Zealand until one of two things is done—either the natives must be exterminated, or those of their grievances which are real must be redressed and those which are imaginary must be proved to be so to the satisfaction of the natives themselves.”
The Times, in a leading article of April 27, 1864, on the debate in the House of Commons on the previous evening, said
The Times said that it had failed to bring out clearly one all-important thing—“that for some time past, at the present time, and for we know not how long a time to come, the lives of 10,000 English soldiers and more than £1,000,000 of money raised by taxes in the United Kingdom annually have been and will be under the control of the Legislature of New Zealand, which contributes not one penny to our taxes, which gives not one soldier to our army, which makes and unmakes its own Ministers, passes and repeals its own laws, and pursues its own policy, without the least reference to our wishes, our convenience, or our interests. We doubt if the whole history of the world can afford a parallel to this portentous phenomenon. … What possible benefit do the people of England derive from the most successful campaign against the Waikatos, from the most signal victory over the Ngatiruanui tribe? What does the poor man, whose sugar, tea and beer are taxed for such a purpose, receive as an equivalent for what he expends? What justification can be urged for the conduct of the House of Commons in thus delegating its own duties to a remote assembly, the names of whose members it does not know, with whose constitution it is not acquainted, and over whom it can exercise no manner of influence…. We have lost all Imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel, in occupying lands from which we derive no profit, and in attracting to their shores a vast Commissariat expenditure which we have the honour to supply out of the taxes of the United Kingdom, and from which they derive enormous profits…. The next Maori war must not be fought with British troops nor paid out of British taxes.”
In a leading article on Sir The Times said on June 1, 1864: “If we
A memorial signed by a large number of influential people connected with the Aborigines Protection Society in England urged the Government not to pursue a policy of confiscation. The New Zealand ministers in reply said that the custom of confiscation had always been recognized by the Maoris themselves, and they did not consider themselves conquered unless their land was taken. C.O. 209, 180.The New Zealand Government and the War of 1863–4 (London, November 1864).
On February 29, 1864, Grey reported that the colonial forces of New Zealand amounted to 4,028 officers and men, all enlisted for three years. The Colonial Office “noted with pleasure” the efforts made by the Government to provide for the security of the colony. C.O. 209, 179.
In a leading article of February 6, 1864, the Taranaki Herald
Curacoa, Eclipse, Esk and Miranda, the crews of which, and in some cases the ships themselves, in one capacity or another, have been actively and most usefully engaged ever since they have been here; and in addition to all these it is reported by this mail that there are three more regiments under orders to come here, if not already started. Happily, too, this army (for it is now nothing less) is not wanting in the most essential particular—an able leader. General Cameron is possessed of the two opposite qualities not often found together—boldness and caution, and the rarer one in military men of his standing, of being able to adapt himself to altogether new conditions of warfare.
“The General Assembly in its last session passed an address of thanks to the Queen; but its gratitude took also a practical form. The £3,000,000 Loan, the calling out of the Militia in all the Provinces of this island, the raising of the Defence Force, the introduction of military settlers from Otago and Australia, and the building and equipping of the steamers for the Waikato—these are the colony's contributions to its own defence, and they show that in asking for help it was not unwilling to help itself.” The Herald asked that if Grey, whose “wait” policy had failed egregiously, were transferred elsewhere, Colonel Gore Browne should be allowed to return to New Zealand. “But whatever may be done in this respect the debt we owe to England is a great one; not only for the help itself, but for the ungrudging spirit in which it has been given.”
The New Zealand ministers, in 1864, proposed confiscation of the following areas:
C.O. 209, 181.
Ministers thus set out their four objects in confiscating lands: (1) Permanently to impress the natives with the folly and wickedness of rebellion; (2) to establish a defensive frontier; (3) to find a location for a European population which may balance the preponderance of the natives who occupy the rebel districts; (4) in part to pay the cost of the war forced by the natives upon the colony. “While achieving these ends they would reserve for the future use of the natives so large a portion of the confiscated land as would enable them to live in independence and comfort, and they would secure it to them by such individual titles under the Crown as might tend to elevate them above that communal system (orno system) of life which likes at the root of their present uncivilized state.” Ibid., 182. In Taranaki the total area originally confiscated was 1,275,000 acres, while the final areas confiscated was 462,000 acres. As compensation for this the Royal Commission in 1928 recommended a yearly payment of £5,000. In the Waikato the area originally confiscated was 1,202,172 acres and the final confiscation 887,808 acres. The Commission regarded this also as excessive and recommended as compensation a yearly payment of £3,000.
A ministerial memorandum on this despatch and one of May 26 took exception to the following passage in the latter despatch: “It is my duty to say to you plainly that if unfortu-
C.O. 209, 182.negative power which is not disputed, but His Excellency's advisers do insist that the Governor has not the right to carry out a policy of his own irrespective of his responsible advisers…. His Excellency's advisers deem it to be an imperative duty to place on record without delay their protest against the introduction of a new form of government, under which the native affairs would be administered, partly by His Excellency and partly by his advisers … a system far worse than that which the Duke of Newcastle pronounced to be a failure, and which could not but operate mischievously alike to both Imperial and Colonial interests.”
When forwarding the memorandum on August 26, Grey wrote: “My Responsible Advisers think that practically no difference of opinion as yet exists between the Governor and themselves. What constitutes a difference of opinion admits of question. I think that several discussions which have taken place between my Responsible Advisers and myself, regarding the confiscation of native property, the entering upon military operations and other cognate subjects, constitute differences of opinion upon important points connected with Imperial interests…. Since the direction of native affairs was originally assumed by the Colonial Ministers, a great change has taken place in this country. Then a war had recently been in appearance concluded, and there seemed ground to hope that peace between the two races might be permanently preserved. Now a very different state of things prevails. What may with justice be regarded as a civil war is raging in New Zealand. The parties engaged in this conflict are the whole of the European population and a part of the natives on one side, the remaining portion of natives on the other…. The Colonial Ministers are responsible to the General Assembly for colonial matters, but, as I will presently show, the General Assembly does not even in such matters exercise such an active supervision of control
Replying on November 26, Cardwell said: “It never was intended by H.M. Government to place the direction of native affairs in the hands of the colonial administration in any such sense as to give them the control of H.M. Forces, either directly or indirectly.” He reiterated, in respect to confiscation, that no land should be taken unless Grey was personally satisfied as to the justice of such procedure in each particular case. C.O. 209, 182. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 169.
On June 8, 1864, Grey informed the Colonial Office that ministers had published a notice to the Maoris setting forth terms of peace and stating: “This power is to be remembered—the disposal of their lands is with the Governor.” “I understand,” Grey wrote, “that in the opinion (of Ministers) they had, under the system of responsible government, a right to make use of the Governor's name personally—and then to require him to take and act on their advice, on the very point which they seemed by a public proclamation to have left to his discretion.” The marginal minute of the Colonial Office was “This appears to be a preposterous assumption on the part of the Ministers.”
The Wellington correspondent of The Times, in a letter dated December 14, 1864, and published on February 17, 1865, wrote: “Why should not the Maori pay for his war? The Colonists say he ought for the following reasons:
There is something perhaps to be said for the logic of these contentions. The difficulty was that the Maoris saw the fears of many years being realized before their eyes. The lands handed down by their ancestors were in danger and they were ready to adopt any means to save them.
His parents brought him up in evil and his relations were evil towards him.
But his bow will still be strong, and the sinews of his arms are made powerful by the hands of Rura, whose sceptre is the stone of Canaan.
This fateful year, 1864, saw two notable events of ill-omen from the British point of view. The rise of the “Pai Marire” religion was linked closely with political happenings and its spread was encouraged by the leaders of the King movement. The British disaster at the Gate Pa, though soon avenged, could scarcely fail to encourage Maori resistance.
On May 26, 1864, Grey forwarded a letter from Wanganui containing a report of a body of fanatics which had recently arisen among the Maoris in that district. ? Retemanu.
“A few days after the death of Captain Lloyd, See above, p. 196.
The followers shall be called Pai Marire. The Angel Gabriel with his legions will protect them from their enemies. The Virgin Mary will certainly be present with them. The religion of England as taught by the Scriptures is false. The Scriptures must all be burned.
All days are alike sacred, and no notice must be taken of the Christian Sabbath. Men and women must live together promiscuously, so that their children may be as the sand of the sea for multitude.
The priests have superhuman power and can obtain for their followers complete victories by uttering vigorously the word ‘hau.’
The people who adopt this religion will shortly drive the whole European population out of New Zealand. This is only prevented now by the head not having completed its circuit of the whole island.
Legions of angels await the bidding of the priests to aid the Maoris in exterminating the Europeans. Immediately the Europeans are destroyed and driven away, men will be sent from heaven to teach the Maoris all the arts and sciences now known by Europeans.
The priests have the power to teach the Maoris the English language in one lesson, provided certain stipulations are carefully observed—the people to assemble at a certain time, in a certain position near a flagstaff of a certain height, bearing a flag of certain colours.
“However absurdly such ideas present themselves to the European mind, they nevertheless prevail and obtain among the Kingites of the Patea portion of this district, and as Rimitirui has given his assent to such, I recommend his dismissal. I would instance some of the cruelties and absurdities practised by the followers of this religion. While Rangitauira was at Waiota C.O. 209, 180.Pa, a native attempted to steal Lloyd's head, for which he was so furiously beaten that his life was despaired of. Another native for the same offence was taken to a creek and drawn to and for under a canoe and left to all appearances lifeless.”
The origin of the Hauhau fanaticism was described by R. Parris, Assistant Native Secretary, in a letter to the Colonial Secretary of December 8, 1864. The originator was said to be Horopapara W.O. 33/16. See Lord Worsley. After Te Hekenga, p. 117, for a description of one of niu, or tall pole, around which the disciples of Lord Worsley (S. B. Babbage). See frontispiece.
On May 30, 1864, Grey reported that a body of Hauhau fanatics (“Gabrielites”) had attempted to descend the Wanganui River with a view to attacking the town. On May 14 they were opposed at the island of Moutoa by a party of friendly natives and nearly wiped out, their high priest being among the killed. The Colonial Office gratefully acknowledged the help of the friendly natives and expressed the hope “that the action may have effectually suppressed the detestable fanaticism described in these despatches.” C.O. 209, 180.
“While all this was going on,” wrote Deputy Quartermaster-General Gamble, “matters began to assume gradually a more serious aspect on the East Coast…. It must be here stated that down this East Coast there are two tribes, the Ngatiporou and the Arawa, who regard each other with deadly hatred. The Government sympathized with the Arawa, and promised them assistance and arms, and Captain Drummond Hay of the Auckland Militia, attached for general purposes of interpreting, etc., to this department, and Lieutenant McDonald of the Colonial Defence Force (both of whom are excellent Maori linguists), were sent with some of the Forest Rangers to aid and try to discipline the Arawas.”
On March 28, 1864, Henare Wirimu Taratoa sent a letter “from all the tribes” challenging Colonel Greer to fight on
In view of these developments troops were sent to Tauranga Cf. The War in New Zealand (1866:) “Tauranga was in fact the harbour of Waikato, and the only harbour it had. It was through it that the rebels in the latter district received supplies, and it was the easiest route by which east coast contingents could reach Upper Waikato. Thompson was well aware of this, and used every exertion to keep this important port open for himself.” See also Gorton, Some Home Truths re the Maori War. General Cameron ascribed to orders of Grey the freedom allowed to the Maoris to construct the Gate Pa.
Pa, on April 28 was 79 officers and 1,616 men.
“On the following morning, soon after daybreak, fire was opened from the batteries on the enemy's position and was kept up for eight hours…. At 3.30 the Lieutenant-General resolved on storming the position…. On the appointed signal the assault was commenced in gallant style, and the men, splendidly led by the officers, dashed into the work, where they were quickly and desperately resisted by the Maoris, and hard fighting with personal encounters ensued. Colonel Booth and Commander Hay, who led, were both mortally wounded. Captain Hamilton, R.N., jumped on the parapet, and as he called on his men to follow him, was shot through the head. Lieutenant Hill, R.N. (one of the survivors from the wreck of the Orpheus), was killed and four captains of the 43rd, viz. Glover, Mure, Hamilton, and Utterton (than whom there were probably no finer officers in the service), also fell, and several others were wounded. When the position seemed to be on the very point of being carried, our men, from some inexplicable cause, fell back before the Maoris, who fought to the death, and they re-
“The work, it must be observed, was, in the interior, honey-combed with rifle-pits and underground passages, and the enemy, lying concealed, had no doubt considerable advantage in shooting our men from concealed positions, while the assailants no doubt got into confusion, which must have been increased by their suddenly being deprived of so many of their leaders. The Lieutenant-General, hastening to the front on seeing the repulse, ordered the immediate commencement of a line of entrenchment at about 100 yards from the left angle of the pa, and where many of the men sought the cover of a fall in the ground. Evening now closed in, the formation of the entrenchments continued, and the Lieutenant-General intended to resume operations next morning. About two hours after nightfall (as we have since ascertained) the enemy abandoned the work under cover of darkness, leaving behind some of his dead and wounded. The manner in which the natives defended the position proved them to be an enemy anything but despicable, either in intelligence or courage…. The readiness with which they stood to their posts and met the assault, as well as their endurance during the bombardment, would reflect credit on disciplined troops.
“When the guns opened on them a voice in the pa (probably Rawiri's) was heard from the 68th side saying: ‘Tena, tena, e mahi i to mahi.’ ‘Go on, go ahead, carry out your work.’
“And again: ‘Ko te manawa-rere, ko te manawa-rere, kia u, kia u.’ ‘Trembling hearts, trembling hearts, be firm, be unshaken.’
“When our men had retired from the work, a man stood on the parapet and said: ‘Pakeha e, ka kapi ahu parepare i o hipapaku.’ ‘Oh! Pakeha, my trenches are blocked with your dead.’ It is doubtful on account of the distance from which it was heard, whether this was said in triumph, or whether it was not said to intimate that the bodies might be removed.” For Maori accounts of the assault and a description of the chivalrous conduct of the defenders to the fallen, see Cowan, I, 415–23.
On June 21 a force under Colonel Greer engaged a force of some 500 Maoris at Te Ranga, Tauranga. He reported that the
Pa, within so short a time and distance of their present success.” The Maoris lost 108 killed and 43 wounded, 15 of whom died later. The 43rd Regiment lost 5 men killed and the 68th 4.
Colonel Greer's report ended thus: “I must not conclude without remarking on the gallant stand made by the Maoris at their rifle-pits; they stood the charge without flinching, and did not retire until forced out at the point of the bayonet.” W.O. 33/16. C.O. 209, 181.
In his despatch of May 3, 1864, Cameron dealt with the operations at the Gate Fortescue, Pa. The despatch was illustrated by a sketch by History of the British Army, XIII, p. 502, writes: “The sight of some scores of heads, taking the assailants by surprise, over-whelmed them with the imagination of a countless host, and so caused them to turn.” In a note he says: “The best opinion (of those consulted in New Zealand) favoured the explanation in the text; though who can account for a panic?” As the Maoris had no water, “there was no occasion to assault it at all. Indeed, friendly Maoris with Cameron pressed him not to do so.”Moko, a monograph on tattooing, and Pounamu, Notes on New Zealand Greenstone.
Brief news of the reverse sent by electric telegraph, now available on part of the route via Australia, was published in The Times on July 7. In a leading article the following comment
The Times of August 15 reported from the Melbourne Argus of June 25 an affair at Auckland when sailors of the Esk had attacked the New Zealander office, owing to a statement that they had deserted Captain Hamilton at the Gate Pa. They were only restrained by the publication of an extraordinary edition “with a ridiculous denial of the charge against the Naval Brigade,
The Times of September 3, 1864, said: “When we had been in the place a quarter of an hour, the sailors called out, ‘The Maoris are coming down on us in thousands,’ and immediately turned tail and ran, and then there was a regular panic, and our men followed their example.”
The Melbourne correspondent of The Times, in a despatch written on May 26 and published on July 14, 1864, gave the “main facts” of the Gate Pa disaster as follows: “Our troops having entered the pa found it, to their surprise, almost deserted. Only two or three wounded natives were seen inside. Thrown off their guard the men dispersed, and it is said fell to plundering. In an instant there opened from beneath and from every side a tremendous fire of musketry, pointed by unseen hands. The whole ground was alive with Maoris, and the air was rent with savage yells. A panic seized the 43rd, and the whole party, in spite of the heroic efforts of their officers, fled in terror from the deadly place. The second force despatched to their support, under Captain Hamilton of the Esk, arrived just in time to share their fate. Their gallant leader himself, while standing on the parapet and waving his sword to the bluejackets, was shot through the head, almost all the other officers being either wounded or killed. The men poured headlong out of the breach like a flock of sheep. To complete the story of the disaster, the 68th who had gone round…by the rear of the enemy's position, were also repulsed in an attack on another face of the pa. Thrice they were led to the assault, and thrice driven back by the deadly cross-fire. The night of the 29th closed on a scene perhaps unparalleled in British military annals. A regular force of infantry, supported by the crews of three or four men-of-war and by 13 large guns, had been beaten in a hand-to-hand conflict with a horde of savages. A British regiment had fled in terror from perhaps an equal number of Maoris.… The 43rd Regiment lost in officers alone as many as, perhaps, any single regiment at the battle of Alma.”
On December 14, 1864, a letter from Colonel H. H. Greer, commanding the 68th Light Infantry, dated October 1, was
The Times. He referred to the Melbourne correspondent's despatch on May 26. Of the paragraph about the repulse of the 68th he wrote: “In that statement there is not a particle of truth; nothing of the sort occurred. The 68th did not attack any face of the pa. It was not repulsed, it was not led to the assault, and it was not once driven back; nor was the 68th ordered to attack, nor was it any part of its duty to do so; in fact to have attacked such a position as the Gate Pa in front and rear simultaneously could only have resulted in the mutual destruction of the assaulting parties. The 68th were sent to the rear of the Gate Pa by a difficult march the night before the attack (not, as your correspondent states, by a road during the attack) for the purpose of cutting off, or preventing, the escape of the Maoris. The Lieut.-General had stated in his despatch how the 68th did its duty.… It is evident that your correspondent when he wrote had not seen the position, had no personal knowledge of his subject, and was unfortunate in the selection of his intelligence.”
Gamble concluded his report of July 7, 1864, on the military situation, by observing: “There does not seem just at present any immediate prospect of the Maoris, as a people, coming forward to make peace, although it is more than probable they do not contemplate any aggression if let alone. The effect so far of the operations has been that the enemy, who were at one time infesting the bush in the vicinity of Auckland, have been driven back beyond a line 120 miles distant from it; that military settlements are being at the present moment established on the frontier, and that nowhere now do hostile natives venture to show themselves near our ports, while simultaneously with all this, the safety of the other settlements in the Northern Island had been effectually provided for. If the enemy has not yet formally yielded, he appears at least to have resigned himself to our armed occupation.
“The measures at present contemplated by the Colonial Ministry, in whose hands, as the responsible advisers of the Governor, the administration of native affairs was lately placed by the Imperial Government, amount, I believe, to the following:
(1) Establishing a southern frontier across the island, by producing the present line within the delta of the Waipa and Horatiu Rivers to Kawhia, on the west, and to Tauranga on the east coasts, and the confiscation of all hostile native lands within that line; (2) the occupation of part of the country of the Ngatimaniapoto tribe, beyond the above line; (3) the confiscation of land north and south of the town of New Plymouth, in the Province of Taranaki, to an extent to be determined on, and of the country from Wanganui to a point northwards on the coast, about fifty or sixty miles from the settlement of Wanganui.
“Without entering on the special difficulties of carrying out quickly the first and second of these plans, and the impossibility of executing all together, it will be enough to say that the third project appears to be the most likely to be undertaken, if the policy of confiscation be not meanwhile arrested by the arrival of prohibitive instructions from England. Though as yet the Maoris have made no offer to yield, it still remains to be seen whether the sufferings of the present winter and the indications of easier terms in Mr. Cardwell's first despatch (published since the transmission of last month's journal) will not have the happy effect of bringing about the termination of a war which is accompanied by more than ordinary difficulties for us, and which, though it has assumed large dimensions, is not, in its result, really identified with Imperial, so much as with Colonial, interests.”
The Duke of Newcastle died on October 18, 1864, aged 53. He had been Secretary of State for War during the Crimean War, and The Times, in an obituary notice on October 19, said: “The Duke had so generously borne himself when he was expected to endure all the brunt of our Crimean disasters that when in 1859 Lord Palmerston offered him the Secretary-ship of the Colonies, every one was glad to hear again of his accession to office…. The war in New Zealand was almost the only serious colonial difficulty with which we have had to contend. The dispute was a complicated one, but perhaps most persons in this country would be inclined to regard it as curious and vexatious rather than important. Whatever be its real character, the Duke left office without the satisfaction of seeing his policy rewarded in an end to the dispute, and the Maoris have submitted under Mr. Cardwell's rule.”
This impression that the Maoris had submitted was founded on a telegraphic summary of the surrender of the Tauranga Maoris to Colonel Greer, and on October 25, 1864, The Times, after enlarging on the wonders of the electric telegraph, said that one of its drawbacks appeared to be due to the impossibility of correctly summarizing long reports: “Thus we have recently laboured under the agreeable mistake that the war in New Zealand is at an end, and now awake to the chilling conviction that out of the many tribes which have taken up arms against us it is only one section that has laid down its arms…. Still there can be no doubt that the merciful treatment extended to the first tribes which have made their submission will have the very best effect upon native opinion throughout New Zealand. There is no excuse now for the argument of desperation—for the feeling that all is lost by surrender and therefore nothing is endangered by continuing the war. The best argument is thus taken out of the mouths of the native agitators…. The announcement that after the close of the present year the burden of the war expenditure will fall in a great measure on the Colony has, we have reason to believe, operated a most beneficial change, if not in the opinions, at any rate in the projects of the Colonial Government. They are disposed to be moderate because it has been made quite clear to them that the cost of a violent and aggressive policy will have to be borne by themselves. No amount of confiscated land, the only property of which it is possible to deprive the natives, would compensate the colonists for a few months of that expenditure which has hitherto been borne by the Home Government. It is their interest to conclude the war just as they conceived it to be their interest to continue it, and we doubt not that they will govern themselves accordingly.”
But cf. The Wellington correspondent of The Times, in a letter of September 14 published on November 17, 1864, said that the motive of the Tauranga natives in agreeing to sell much of the land left to them arose “from the wish to abandon New Zealand and settle at one of the South Sea Islands.” “The terms accorded to the Tauranga natives,” the correspondent added, “have been everywhere regarded as lenient, and this leniency has been attributed by some to the influence of recent despatches from the Home Government and to the debates in Parliament, on the strength of which Sir Provincial Government in New Zealand, p. 133: “Sir The Times, commenting on a brief telegraphic message that the escaped prisoners were fomenting rebellion, expressed the view that the escape would not be “altogether displeasing to the war party at Auckland.”
The Wellington correspondent, in a letter of October 14 published in The Times on December 15, said: “The question as to who is guilty of the neglect that led to this escape has been fiercely debated in the Auckland press. Ministers declare that Sir
“The debates in Parliament on the guarantee proposed by Mr. Cardwell last July, and the instructions to Governor Grey contained in the papers laid before the House of Commons, have filled the colonists with dismay. The manner in which Mr. Cardwell and the other members of the Government spoke out for the colonists is gratefully acknowledged, but the condemnatory tone of independent members and of the greater portion of the London press has excited considerable indignation. The British public can have no conception of the drawback which war is to our progress. The land we are accused of coveting would be dear at an immeasurably less cost than the mere money which the war has already absorbed…. When everyman in Middlesex from 16 to 40 is marched about its streets and encamped upon its commons, or on those of an adjoining county for weeks together, and every man from 40 to 55 is employed keeping guard or doing some kind of military service, leaving the ordinary daily duties of life to be discharged by Government employees, old men and incapables, then will the Home
Commenting on the correspondent's defence of the colonists, The Times, in a leading article on the same day, said: “Our grievance is expressed in the simple fact that an army of 10,000 British soldiers is maintained at the Antipodes for the support of a policy over which we have no control. We do not deny that the colonists suffer also. We dare say the picture drawn by our correspondent of the drain upon the settlement is by no means exaggerated. But these wars are not of our making, and it is hard to convince people here that they are entirely the making of the Maoris, however injudiciously those savages may have been treated.”
On November 7 Gamble referred to the escape of the prisoners from Kawau: “The escape of these men at the particular time it took place was very unfortunate; for there was no knowing to what extent it might encourage the Waikato and other tribes to which they belonged to continue in arms, in addition to the still greater danger of the whole of the Northern natives, hitherto loyal, being drawn into the strife.” Gamble discussed the refusal of the Colonial Government, “which was essentially a war ministry,” to assent to the Governor's offer of terms to the Maoris and their resignation. They were holding office until the meeting of the Assembly on November 21. “The Governor has meanwhile himself published a proclamation which allows the natives, except those implicated in certain murders, until the 10th of December next to come in and submit, ceding such territory as may be determined on by His Excellency and the Lieutenant-General Commanding. Concerning the success of this proclamation in inducing the natives to submit, there is much contrariety of opinion, but it is to be regretted that it could not be published earlier, when its success would have been more general and immediate. Now, though the favourable time for active operations has arrived, none can be undertaken for a month, but
From the escaped prisoners.
On October 7, 1864, Sir
Fortescue wrote to Cardwell: “The first thing which strikes me in these papers is the unsound and mischievous form which Responsible Government has assumed in New Zealand—the next thing Sir C.O. 209, 183.decided some of the questions which have produced all the special pleading, the clever fencing, and the pro-
A ministerial memorandum of October 21, 1864, stated: “Ministers are placed in this unfortunate position: The Governor neglects their advice when he thinks fit and makes it appear at other times that he is suffering a species of martyrdom from the way in which he would have it supposed that he was bound by the smallest expression of their opinion.” (“True enough, I think,” was Fortescue's comment.) C.O. 209, 183. Ibid., 184.
On October 27 Grey forwarded a copy of his proclamation (dated October 26) notifying terms to persons involved in the rebellion. On October 31 he forwarded a report of operations in Taranaki on October 8 and 10. The Maoris had been expelled from positions at Mataitawa and
In a memorandum of November 2, signed by Ibid., 185.
In a despatch of February 27, 1865, Cardwell observed “with great satisfaction that the meeting of the Assembly had brought to a close those differences between yourself and your former advisers which have occupied so large a portion of your late correspondence, and have been attended with such unfortunate consequences to the colony.” “I learn with pleasure,” he went on, “that Mr. Weld had formed [on November 24] a new Colonial Ministry, on principles which you regarded as being in conformity with the instructions you had received…. I am gratified to see that the Assembly recognize the assistance rendered to them by the mother-country and cordially appreciate the gallant services performed by H.M. Land and Naval Forces. I have great pleasure in acknowledging on the part of H.M. Government the gallant and effective services of the Forces raised in New Zealand and the spirited exertions which the colony has made to meet the very heavy expenditure which has been thrown upon it…. You rightly attach great importance to these resolutions of the Assembly. In admitting the claim of the Imperial Government to exercise a reasonable control over policy upon which the restoration of peace must necessarily depend, whilst the colony is receiving the aid of British troops for the suppression of internal disturbances, they have, I trust, re-established harmony between the authorities whose divided counsels were a cause of so much regret…. I trust that now, in conformity with Mr. Weld's proposal, plans of the land, part of the territory belonging to the insurgents and now in military occupation, which you propose to obtain either by cession or by confiscation, will be made public without delay.” Cardwell concluded by saying that instructions had been sent to General Cameron “which contemplate that he will make arrangements for sending home five regiments.” C.O. 209, 185.
In a letter to C. B. Adderley, written on November 14, 1864, from Christchurch, and published in The Times on January 25, 1865, The Times, and from the speeches in Par-
“On the contrary, as one of those who have ever advocated a peaceful administration of the Government of the natives, and who hailed the arrival of Sir
FitzGerald proceeded to traverse Sir FitzGerald scarcely does justice to the strenuous efforts made by the Colonial Office to induce the New Zealand settlers to finance the war for themselves.
The Times, referring on January 26 to the charges made against Grey, described them as “highly coloured statements,” but accepted as valid the alternatives set out by FitzGerald: “We do not think the nation would long hesitate between the profitless offer of a mountainous land, with a war settled upon it by way of mortgage, and leaving to the Colonial authorities the management of a war, certainly the most important of their own affairs. We are well content that Imperial control should cease with Imperial interference and only wish that the person who makes the suggestion could be supposed to speak the feelings and wishes of the united colonists of New Zealand, instead of a particular party, and, at the most, a particular island.” Several correspondents disputed FitzGerald's charges against Grey, notably “An Old New Zealand Settler,” on February 6, 1865.
In a review of Grey's policy and the war to 1864 the C.O. 209, 188.Nelson Examiner said: “Mr. Chichester Fortescue, especially, has from the first to last refuted any attacks on the colonists and displayed
In a leading article on December 1, 1864, The Times said: “Sir
The colony's “love and respect” for Grey were not obvious in several of the newspapers. Under the heading “Character of Sir Taranaki Herald of September 24 a quotation from The Press, Christchurch, of September 3. The Press referred to Grey as “that wily and treacherous Pro-Consul.” “His great and mysterious reputation as a Governor lives, not on the labours
Taranaki Herald quoted the following newspapers concerning the resignation of the Fox ministry:
Hawke's Bay Times: “There would seem to be but one opinion on the subject, and that opinion is that Sir Lyttelton Times: “Surely the Imperial Government will not bear long with so imbecile a representative.”Christchurch Press: “Sir peace but of war. Let there be no mistake about that. From the day on which he rode back from the Waikato and pondered over the fatal truth that his influence with the Natives was gone, that man had war in his heart; and the Natives, with all the keen perception of instincts sharpened by fear—the Natives knew it…. Sir
Chichester Fortescue, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, speaking at a Liberal demonstration at Maldon, Essex, on December 15, 1864 (reported in The Times on December 17), devoted much of a long speech to the state of New Zealand. He confessed, he said, that he did not believe in its being the
“Could we be blamed for having assumed the government of New Zealand? Any one acquainted with the history of that colony would know that we were open to no blame on that point. Our people had already gone there in considerable numbers before we assumed the government. It was perfectly certain that these magnificent and beautiful islands, almost equal in extent to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, could not be left in the possession of a small, sparse and diminishing native people, but must have been inevitably seized and occupied by some European power. In fact, it was well known that it was a race between Great Britain and France which of these powers should obtain possession of New Zealand. The French plan is fully described in England and New Zealand, pp. 94-138.
The Times, on January 25, 1865, devoted a leading article to “The Case of New Zealand,” which it described as “a circumstantial statement of facts put forward on behalf of the colonists by some of themselves.” “The colonists proclaim
On the next day The Times said of the war in New Zealand: “It is astonishing, considering how long these operations have continued, and how voluminous are the accounts we possess concerning them, that we should know so little of the causes that originated them or of the motives with which they are carried on. We are bewildered with the intricate geography of an unsettled and little explored country, and with the combinations and divergences, the clashing and the coincidence of a number of interests, the power of which we have no means of estimating, and the validity of whose charges and counter charges we are quite unable to measure. We have the same transactions described to us by persons equally worthy of credit and equally above the suspicion of wilful misrepresentation in colours and lights so different from each other that we can scarcely recognize them as attempts to describe or to account for the same event. Who caused the war? Who has prevented the conclusion of peace? Who has an interest in the continuance of hostilities? Who was responsible for the escape of the 200 native prisoners? These are questions which we ought by this time to be able to answer, but on which we can as yet give no opinion by which we should be willing to be bound.”
The colonists' case was strongly argued by Charles
London, 1865.Letters on New Zealand Subjects:
The New Zealand ministers, in a memorandum of December 30, 1864, described by Chichester Fortescue as “an excellent state paper, which does great credit to the Weld Ministry,” contemplated the removal of the Imperial troops:
“There may be partial disturbances, there will be imaginary alarms, the timid and those who have largely benefited by the presence of the troops will raise the usual outcry. But it is hoped that the war in the Waikato has practically come to an end. His Excellency the Governor has, by the advice of Ministers, and, as they understand, fully concurring, issued a proclamation which is virtually a declaration of the cessation of active operations at least in the Waikato, a district [which] is now occupied by no less than 2,500 military settlers, armed, organized and capable of self-defence. The operations at Taranaki … may be carried on with a local force, which, when the troops are withdrawn, the colony must supply. Ministers are of opinion that that spirit of self-reliance which constitutes real strength, and the surest guarantee for the future of a country, would be fostered by the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces and by the substitution of a small colonial force, partaking of the nature of an armed constabulary, officered, equipped and disciplined with especial reference to the services it would have to perform, and to the country in which it might be called upon to act.… It is confidently hoped that when the troops are withdrawn, the entire control of all its internal affairs, native as well as others, will be left to the Colonial Government. The system of double government, has, in the opinion of ministers, been fraught with the most disastrous consequences to both races of Her Majesty's subjects in this colony.”
Reference was made to the proposal for the separation of Auckland from the rest of the colony and other alternatives—
C.O. 209, 188. For a description of the separation movement, see Provincial System of Government in New Zealand, pp. 139–44. A petition from the Provincial Council for the separation of Auckland from the rest of the colony was forwarded on January 5, 1865. It was supported by Sir
Discussing Weld's programme on February 17, 1865, The Times expressed the view that it would be received with “little dissatisfaction by the great majority of Englishmen.” “Mr. Weld,” it said, “appears to think that a moderate standing force would suffice to control the Maori tribes.… For the rest he relies upon strong and well selected military posts, and, above all, on military roads. He would drive these roads straight through the districts in which the Maoris entrench themselves, not fighting except upon compulsion, but completing the road at all hazards, and paying the natives themselves for working at them, if they could be induced to do so. Then he would establish military settlements on lands to be taken from the tribes actually in rebellion, and thus by one and the same act remunerate the auxiliaries now in the field, and raise a barrier against invasion in future.”
The New Zealand ministers in a memorandum of January 3, 1865, stated that they had under consideration “the expressed intention of the Imperial Government to insist on immediate repayment of all advances to the Colony on account of the war, to withhold from it all future pecuniary aid, and to require for the future a rate of payment per man upon a greatly increased scale for all Her Majesty's Lands Forces employed in the Colony.” “If from any cause the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Land Forces should be delayed for any lengthened period, and the terms now composed by the Imperial Government insisted on,” they wrote, “ministers are of opinion that the
On January 7 Grey reported that “almost the entire native population at Tauranga, who recently submitted to the Queen's authority, have become infatuated under the influence of the fanatical faith which has been propagated by the false prophet who has appeared in this country, and that, abandoning all their property, they have betaken themselves to the mountains where the rebel natives are.”
In his Journal dated January 7, 1865, Deputy Quartermaster-General Gamble noted the spread of the “new Maori superstition called Pai Marire.” See above, pp. 216–18. W.O. 33/16.Pa, on January 25, 1865, when the Maoris made a spirited attack on the British camp, apparently believing themselves invulnerable. Gamble wrote: “Although the commencement of operations in this district (on the political wisdom of which it is beyond my province to speculate) has led to another collision with the native race, and the early termination of this protracted war may have thus become more unlikely, yet, as the great native meeting held at Rangitoto appeared to lean generally on the side of peace, and all is quiet elsewhere, it may be hoped that the hostilities unfortunately occurring here may continue to wear a purely local aspect, that they will ere long be brought to a close, and that the story of the last field of contest in New Zealand will then have been told.”
Deputy Commissary-General Strickland's report of March 1, 1865, stated: “On the 24th and 25th January the fight at Nukumaru took place. Nothing like it has ever occurred before in New Zealand. There for the first time an army of New Zealanders, numbering not less than 600, appeared in the field, and in broad daylight measured their strength against the Pake-has. Their plan of attack is admitted by all military men here to have been very good. The work was commenced with great vigour and spirit, but resistance soon became feeble; the army of savages lost its cohesion; it was beaten by the steady discipline of the British troops, and the excellence of their arms
A translation of a “Pai Marire” prayer, found in the village of Manutahi on March 15, was sent to the War Office:
W.O. 33/16.By belief in the Ruler, all men shall be saved in the day of the passing over and the pouring out of blood, lest they should be touched by the destroyer, the enemy, the Governor, and his soldiers. The many thousands of the skies shall close up the mouth of the enemy, the Governor. To you, O Ruler, belongs the power to destroy his thoughts, and the sources from whence they spring, and all his works. You alone, O Ruler, are the strong stone slung at the Governor, his works, and the thoughts of his heart. To you only belongs the power to darken his eyes lest he should see the brightness, so that his thoughts may be troubled. By your power alone shall the Governor be completely overcome, because his works are evil. Be you strong, O Ruler, because your people, like men of Canaan, are naked people, possessed of nothing. You know it. With you alone, O Ruler, is the correctness (of this). This is my earnest striving to you, O Ruler, that the heart of the Governor should be drawn forth by you that it may be withered up in the sun, not to see any brightness because he is the bad Devil of the world, the destroyer of the men.
On February 6, 1865, Sir D. Cameron, in a despatch to the War Office from Waitotara, stated that if the Home Government approved of the objects aimed at by the Colonial Government, he recommended that a reinforcement of 2,000 men should be sent from England. On February 27, however, the War Office instructed Cameron to send home at once 5 battalions of infantry. W.O. 33/16.
On the same day Grey forwarded instructions concerning the payment to the Imperial Treasury of £500,000 Government debentures with a view to the adjustment of the debt due by
A memorandum of ministers rebutting the impression that the war in New Zealand was continued for the profit of the colonists was signed by C.O. 209, 189.
The Times referred on March 13 to the debate in Parliament of March 10, 1865: “The debate on New Zealand is an epoch in the history of British colonization; itself a movement which ranks in importance with the first dispersion of the human race, the invasion of the Northern races, and the discovery and settlement of the New World. New Zealand has had the full benefit of our liberal politics, our philanthropy, our poetry, and our religion. It was colonized at that fortunate juncture when everything that existed was found to be wrong, and we could not be too thankful that we knew how to mend it. The first
In his journal of March 7, 1865, Gamble described the truce negotiations at Weraroa W.O. 33/16.Pa and the exchange of communications. One sent out from the pa was a manifesto from the high priest of the “Pai Marire” (“goodness and quietness”) religion.
“The friendly natives of Wanganui, flushed with their recent success, have asked permission to attack the Weraroa Pa, which has been granted. It is possible they may succeed. There is always a mystery about these native battles, which it is hard to understand. Relatives and friends are divided, and thus the friendly natives, in fighting their own countrymen, are not only on equal terms with them in knowledge of ground and other matters, but may probably bring them to reason through the influences of kindred and race. It is to be hoped that it may prove to be so in the case of Weraroa, which is a formidable work, and formidably situated. If it be defended, as it no doubt would be against ‘Pakehas,’ then the friendly natives have a hazardous task before them. The pa is on a commanding ground within the bush. It is protected on either side by a deep wooded ravine, and in its rear by a steep precipice, which at
Gamble described the advance of the troops along the West Coast from Wanganui to the Waingongoro River, from the camp at which place he wrote on April 6: “In these Wanganui districts alone is war carried on, and, though it may not be immediately within my province, I cannot help placing on record that it had been better for the peace and prosperity of the country and the mutual welfare of both races, as it certainly would have been more to the interest of the Imperial Government, if the further acquisition of territory, and the other ends which the Colonial Government appear to have in view had been left to time and gradual development, instead of being prematurely forced at the point of the sword.” W.O. 33/16.
On July 7, 1865, a leading article on the murder of the Rev. Carl Volkner at Opotiki on March 2, appeared in Levy's diary of the Volkner murder is in The Times. Volkner was crucified according to the laws of the “New Canaan” by followers of the “Pai Marire” faith, and Kereopa, the ringleader (afterwards hanged) swallowed the missionary's eyes as a symbol of the treatment he would mete out to Queen and Parliament. “Intelligence more horrible than that which has reached us has never been received, even from New Zealand,” stated The Times. “A most atrocious murder has been deliberately committed upon one of the missionaries, and this, moreover, in cold blood, with every sign of deliberation, and with all the most revolting circumstances of cannibalism. It has been committed, moreover, not by a rebellious tribe of savage natives, who had never been brought under civilizing influences, but by the very flock of the minister himself, among whom he had resided for years, and within the sight of his own house…. The source of this horrible reaction is the new superstition which we have lately had occasion to mention,
The Times of July 19, 1865. The Wellington correspondent's account appeared on July 6. The Illustrated London News of July 29 contained an account of the affray, with sketches. A good bibliography is included in Haubauism, a thesis by S. B. Babbage.
Sir In a letter to In Personal Recollections of Bishop G. A. Selwyn, privately printed, 1894.
With the bitterness of the struggle greatly accentuated by the rise of the Hauhau fanaticism, the sharp difference of opinion between Grey and Cameron, which developed into open controversy, was disastrous.
The Aborigines Protection Society published in its journal a letter dated February 4, 1865, written by an officer from Headquarters, New Zealand: “Here we are in the field again! Everyone is heartily sick of it, from the General downwards. How long are the people at home going to allow this to go on? If they depend on the Governor they are placing confidence in a broken reed, for it is apparent to every one here that he is seeking popularity among the colonists by retaining the troops, and will not allow a single man to go out of this island unless he is ordered unconditionally and unreservedly to do so. So long as he has ten regiments at his entire disposal he is a great man; but directly he allows them to go, he is shorn of all his splendour and greatness, and sinks down to the comparatively insignificant level of a constitutional Governor, with all power lodged in the hands of his responsible ministers.” The officer strongly criticized the attempt made to purchase the Waitotara block.
On February 7 General Cameron wrote to the War Office: “I find my health so much impaired by the arduous and harassing duties which have devolved upon me since the commencement of the war and particularly by the great heat of the last two summers, which I have passed under canvas in the field, that I consider myself no longer justified in retaining so important a command.” W.O. 33/16.
This led Grey to write the following memorandum to his ministers on March 4: “The Governor, hearing that an impression prevails in some quarters that the present war is carried on for the profit and gratification of the colonists, trusts that his responsible advisers will in all instances, whether in recommending measures for the Governor's adoption or acquiescing in those he may recommend, make such a full and explicit statement of the objects they have in view and of the reasons on which the proceedings they advocate are based, that no misunderstanding can take place in the minds of just and unprejudiced persons regarding the propriety and necessity of the course which may be adopted.” W.O. 33/16. W.O. 33/16.
Cameron wrote to Grey on May 3: “Sir, I was much surprised at seeing in one of the local newspapers a memorandum by Your Excellency to Ministers, dated 4th March, in which you thought proper to quote certain expressions contained in a private letter from me to Your Excellency of the 28th of January last. The memorandum of Ministers in reply, which is a personal attack upon myself, shows that they were fully aware of the person to whom your memorandum was intended to refer and that they fully understood the object you had in view in sending them that memorandum. I intend to forward copies of these memoranda for the information of Her Majesty's Government that they may know what Your Excellency, in concert with the Colonial Ministers, was doing behind my back, whilst I was engaged in operations in the field.”
In forwarding the memoranda to the War Office on May 7, Cameron wrote: “I am aware that, as Sir W.O. 33/16.
In his reply to Sir W.O. 33/16.
Cameron had written in a letter to Grey of March 30 (to “My dear Sir George”): “What is it to Mr. Mantell W.O. 33/16. The whole of the correspondence between Grey and Cameron is in C.O. 209, 189.History of New Zealand, II, 293: “The General was unhappy in singling out Mr. Mantell for reporbation. His voice and pen were often used more eloquently than the General's in demanding justice for the Maoris.”pa at Paparata, and I have reason to believe that you were of opinion that I ought to have attacked the pa at Mere Mere and Paterangi, and that you and the Colonial Government were as much disappointed on those occasions as you appear to be in respect of the Weraroa Pa. For my own part, I have a great responsibility in this matter; and, having already lost a great many valuable officers and men in attacking pas, I think I may be excused if I am somewhat cautious in undertaking operations of that description without the most absolute necessity. At all events I consider it my duty whenever you propose to me an operation which I think likely to be attended with serious loss, to let you know my opinion, and leave it to you to decide whether the political object to be gained is worth the cost.” This letter brought a rejoinder of Sir
The Wellington correspondent of The Times in a despatch dated March 14, published on May 16, 1865, referred to the Wanganui-Taranaki campaign: “General Cameron has a European reputation, but, however fitted for the style of warfare to which his long lifetime has been devoted, the stern logic of experience proves that he is not the man for such warfare
The Times wrote on June 23: “For the first time for a long period we have offical information from that disturbed settlement of our cause being actively espoused by friendly natives, of debt adjusted, and troops recalled…. A more decisive success appears to have been achieved by a skilful employment of the friendly natives than by all our dearly-bought military achievements.”
In a letter from the camp at Te Awamutu on May 28, 1865, Brigadier-General G. J. Carey described the submission to him, on the previous day, of pas. That it occurred at this early date confirms the belief that the great Maori leader's heart was never really in the war and that it was only tactless treatment which forced him to take up arms.
On June 7, 1865, Gamble wrote in his regular report to the War Office: “It will, of course, have been expected that the five regiments (65th, 70th, 68th, 43rd and 40th) ordered to return to England (in compliance with the expressed wishes of the Colonial Government), or some of them, are in course of embarkation by this time. The present Colonial Ministry, when initiating their policy, of which one of the leading features was to rely for the defence of the country on their own resources, spoke very confidently of their desire and ability to dispense with Her Majesty's troops, and they seemed to be so much in earnest that the delay necessary for communicating with England appeared to be the only obstacle to the immediate gratification of their wishes. It is now, however, a month since the Lieutenant-General received the instructions of Her Majesty's Government for the withdrawal of five regiments at his discretion, but a strong protest received from His Excellency the Governor against any immediate reduction of the force, has placed it out of the Lieutenant-General's power to
W.O. 33/16.
On May 26 Cameron wrote to Grey: “I can see no reason to expect that the natives will ever make a formal submission; and I think that all we can hope for is that the punishment we have inflicted on some of the rebel natives will induce the others to remain quiet for the future.” On June 10 Cameron declined to supply Grey with copies of certain despatches he had sent to the Secretary of State for War. In reply to Grey's protest he wrote on June 12: “Looking at the spirit which has actuated your Excellency's proceedings towards me during the last three months, it is a matter of no surprise or concern to me what construction your Excellency is pleased to place on my actions.” Ibid., p. 418.
Military expenditure in New Zealand for the month of June 1865, was estimated roughly by Commissary-General Jones at £80,539, regimental pay accounted for £22,298, general staff pay £639, commissariat staff pay £1,701, provisions £23,226, forage £12,663, and transport £4,989.
Major von Tempsky, leader of the Forest Rangers, writing from “opposite Weraroa” on June 24, protested against the interference of Imperial officers with the plan to attack Weraroa with colonial troops and friendly natives, and tendered his resignation of his command. C.O. 209, 191.
Cameron, in a report to the Secretary of State for War, dated July 5, wrote: “The unpleasant relations existing between the Governor and myself rendered it advisable that all occasion of unnecessary correspondence between us should be avoided.” Ibid., 194.Pa. “The plea,” he wrote, “of not attacking an entrenchment occupied by only about 250 natives, without artillery and badly armed, within a few miles of a British settlement, upon account of the winter season, is in a climate such as this difficult to understand.… The natives themselves do not ever think of going into winter quarters. As you will find from other letters, the fanatics are using this interval of absolute inactivity on our part to attack our allies on the East Coast, and will, I have reason to fear, involve us in another war.”
On July 13 Grey reported that his advisers had decided to resign as soon as the Assembly met owing to “the line of proceeding followed by the General in Command of the Forces.” The resignation was later withdrawn. Ministers in a memorandum stated that “it is clear that so long as the Im-
C.O. 209, 191.Pa, the centre and focus of disaffection (as admitted by high military authority), have been frustrated by military interference.”
On July 26 Lord de Grey and Ripon wrote to Sir D. Cameron from the War Office expressing regret at the differences which had arisen between the General and Sir W.O. 33/16.
In this despatch, also dated July 26, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote: “It is impossible to read without profound regret that which has passed between yourself and General Cameron and to see that in the midst of difficulties and dangers like those by which you have been surrounded, it has not been possible for two very able and distinguished men filling positions of great responsibility and importance to maintain unbroken those friendly and confidential relations with each other which, in such circumstances, are so essential for the public good. It now appears that the real origin of that difference has been an opinion on the part of yourself and your ministers that after the Waikato Tribes had been reduced the safety of the Southern Settlements required that the tribes between Taranaki and Whanganui, who were amongst the most guilty of all the tribes and that in a great measure without cause, should also be reduced to submission, while, on the contrary, General Cameron has considered it undesirable to recommence hostilities, has thought it inexpedient to enter upon any further aggressive operations—has regarded it as necessary to consolidate what we had got, and especially has objected to your employing the troops in aggressive operations in the manner you have desired in the neighbourhood of Taranaki. It is painfully evident that two campaigns have been more than enough of a contest in which ten thousand of the Queen's troops, aided by a Colonial force sometimes nearly equal in number, have been engaged in war against a body of natives, never exceeding, as you have led me to understand, more than 2,000 in number at one time.”
On July 21 The Times wrote: “Our own correspondent tells us much of discord believed to exist between the Governor and Commander of the Forces, of a precipitate retreat of Sir The Times refused to credit Grey's desire to avoid an interview and Cameron's belief that inaction was justified because he considered the war unrighteous.
Referring to the dispute between the two on August 17, The Times said: “It is sufficiently provoking that this quarrel should be added to all our other difficulties.” In the same article the surrender of
The Times published on August 16 Weld's memorandum of April 8, which, according to its Wellington correspondent, was “nothing more or less than a dismissal of the General so far as the Ministry is concerned.”
In his journal of July 7, 1865, Gamble expressed the view that the natives would quietly give up Weraroa Pa, “for the surrender of which they have negotiated more than once.” On August 2 he wrote: “The pa is now in our possession; but the circumstances attending its fall are unique in the annals even of New Zealand warfare, with all its peculiar characteristics, military and political.… The natives in the pa were informed by a native messenger of the submission of pa must be given up. Soon after the letter was received, a white flag was hoisted on the pa, and they were talking over the matter when the native contingent and
pa at the time. On the 24th the rebels and friendlies had a long talk, which, however, resulted in nothing. When Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, 57th Regiment, who was then acting as Government Agent at Wanganui, heard that the surrender of the pa was un fait accompli (as reported by Major Rooke of the Militia), he sent out, but only to find that it was still in the enemy's hands.”
Logan had thereupon ordered the native contingent and Forest Rangers to retire, as they had gone there without the sanction or knowledge of the Brigadier-General Commanding. On June 20 the principal chief, Pehimana, had come to see General Waddy and declared that he desired peace. Waddy said he must prove his sincerity by giving up the pa. A meeting of the chiefs and Waddy was held at Nukumaru on July 3 but was without result. On July 16 the Governor arrived at Wanganui from Wellington and went to the camp of the Colonial forces with General Waddy. They approached the pa and Grey rode up to within some thirty yards of the palisades. He was urged not to enter, as the people inside were under the fanatical influence of the new faith and there might be treachery. He therefore returned to Nukumaru.
“There were said to be some 200 men in the pa, but some of these were expected to come out to join Pehimana and the other chiefs who had now surrendered. Mr. Parris, who is most experienced in the feelings and habits of the natives, as well as Captain McDonnell, who also knows them well, firmly believed the pa would be given up to the Governor. At all events the submission of the leading chiefs and the divided counsels of the defenders, showed a wavering and undecided state of mind utterly different from the spirit which animated them at the time of the action of the 25th January last at Nukumaru. His Excellency the Governor now, however, addressed to General Waddy, commanding the Wanganui district, the letter of the 19th July, marked ‘Enclosure No. 1’ in the attached printed paper, in which is published in detail His Excellency's despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
pa. His Excellency the Governor was aware that the Lieutenant-General was not in favour of commencing siege operations at the most inclement season of the year. Although the Lieutenant-General had communicated the opinion to His Excellency, he had also stated his readiness to undertake any operation the political necessity of which the Governor might consider paramount to such objections. The instructions of May 19 to Brigadier-General Waddy were never intended to interfere with any operations which the Governor might order. They cannot be construed as precluding even siege operations, much less as interdicting the active employment of Her Majesty's troops in operations of any other kind which might have appeared to His Excellency necessary for ‘the suppression of rebellion, and the preservation of peace in Her Majesty's Possessions.’
“It will be seen by the correspondence between the Governor and General Waddy, which followed His Excellency's letter of July 19 (Enclosure No. 1), that General Waddy stated his inability to undertake the particular service of the immediate reduction of the pa by regular operations without the orders of the Lieutenant-General, to whom he would refer. This reply expresses an unwillingness to undertake such a responsibility. It does not appear that General Waddy was called on for the active employment of Her Majesty's troops in any other way, or that he was requested to conduct the operations which ensued. The partial aid in the way of ‘moral support’ would, however, render the services of the colonial troops, if successful, the more conspicuous. It may be inferred from the correspondence between the Governor and General Waddy, and from the Governor's own despatch, that, in default of the regular troops to carry on siege operations, the small colonial force available was to undertake them, though with what means and appliances is not explained, for none had been yet collected at Nukumaru for the regular troops.… The story of the capture of the pa is fully told in the Governor's despatch. It is no detraction from the merits of the plan or from the services of the colonial troops to express a deep regret that the operations should afford ground for the further and more notable
“It happened as an unfortunate coincidence that at the time when this lamentable spirit was most strongly betraying itself—when, moreover, the leading Weraroa chiefs had surrendered—when the union of the others seemed to be breaking, and when the most experienced in the traits of native character believed that the pa would be surrendered, or at least evacuated—that at that particular time His Excellency should have felt constrained to undertake operations against the pa, and that Her Majesty's troops, and their immediate commander, should have been allotted the part of ‘moral support’ on the presumption of a forced inactivity. The instructions to General Waddy which do not appear to have been called for, are on record, and give no ground whatever for the presumption, but the idea of ‘forced inaction’ suited the circumstances of the time and the occasion. Howbeit it is a matter of great satisfaction that the pa has fallen, and of congratulation that it fell in the happy way it did, without a man being wounded on either side—a result very different from what might have been expected had Her Majesty's troops attacked it immediately after the action of Nukumaru, when the enemy were in full force, thoroughly united, and animated by the highest spirit. The manner in which the pa fell (however objectionable may have been some of the preceding and attendant circumstances) proves the wisdom of not attacking it immediately after the action of Nukumaru, under circumstances which might have entailed a heavy loss without compensating advantages. The result also illustrated the benefits arising from the establishment of the post at Nukumaru, which evidently unsettled the natives, and made many of them anxious for peace.”
On July 31 Cameron addressed a letter to Grey with reference to his address at the opening of the General Assembly on July 26. He denied having given any orders to any officers
Pa.
“Lieutenant-General Sir W.O. 33/16.
On Sir C.O. 209, 191.Pa without the help of the Imperial forces, except two detachments furnished by Brigadier-General Waddy after he had first declined to assist, Sir
When opening the fifth session of the General Assembly on July 26 Grey stated that he would at once issue orders for the return to England of five regiments. The recent discoveries of gold on the West Coast of the Middle Island had offered new fields for colonization and given a fresh impetus to the development of the natural resources of the colony.
A further stage of the Grey-Cameron controversy was reached when Cameron handed to the C.O. 209, 192.Australasian (Melbourne) correspondence in which he stated that Grey's allegation that Waddy had been ordered not to attack Weraroa had no foundation in truth. The Colonial Office concluded that Waddy had been at liberty to attack Weraroa in his own way (by breaching and surprise) but not in Sir
In a letter written on the P. and O. steamer W.O. 33/16. For a strong criticism of Grey for interference with Cameron, see Jeddo on September 4, 1865, with reference to the capture of Weraroa Pa, Cameron said that the chief delay in attacking the pa had been the postponement of hostilities until January—“for which Sir pa was not attacked at an earlier period. Had I done so I have no doubt that I should have lost many officers and men without gaining any greater advantage than has been obtained by its evacuation. Nothing had occurred when I left the colony to warrant the Governor's statement that the delay had involved consequences fraught with disaster, and led to fresh outbreaks in other parts of the colony. The fact is that on the East Coast the natives had for many months remained on the defensive, and all the hostilities that had taken place in or near any of our settlements had been provoked by our invasion or occupation of their territory.”Some Home Truths re the Maori War, 1863 to 1869, by Lieut.-Col. Edward Gorton (New Zealand Militia, late Captain 29th and 57th Regiments), London, 1901. He gives correspondence with Cameron in 1886 in which Cameron wrote: “I was very unfortunate in serving under a Governor who was constantly interfering with my plans.”
In a despatch of August 14, published on October 17, 1865, The Times correspondent described the capture of the Weraroa Pa in detail and added: “The colonies are not insensible to what they owe to England for the generous manner in which troops were poured into the colony in time of need. Nor are they ungrateful for what those troops have done, and while they consider that more ought to have been done, they know that what has been left undone is mainly the fault of the system.”
The correspondent reported that he understood that The Times (to Adderley) would have rendered it incompatible for him to work with Governor Grey. It is, however, more than whispered that Governor Grey will not remain long in New Zealand, having applied by last mail, in a very earnest manner, that he might be relieved from the governorship.” On October 31 the Otago Daily Times
The War Office in a letter to the Colonial Office of September 20, 1865, referred to Grey's despatch of May 23 (No. 73): “In that despatch Sir W.O. 33/16, p. 483.
On October 25 H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief (the Duke of Cambridge) wrote from the Horse Guards to the War Office: “I think that the time has now arrived when it becomes my duty to bring to Your Lordship's very serious notice the utter confusion into which military proceedings in New Zealand have been thrown by the lamentable differences which for a considerable time have been going on between the Governor of that Colony, Sir Pa, when they had to look on and give their so-called ‘moral support,’ whilst the colonial forces were detailed for active operation of assaulting the pa in question, under the immediate direction of the Governor, as represented in the New Zealand Herald of July 31, 1865 (herewith transmitted), containing extracts from Sir
“The views I have always understood as guiding the conduct of the civil and military authorities under such circumstances are these: that whereas the Governor is supreme in all matters affecting the government of Her Majesty's colonial possessions, and as such is in a position to indicate the line of conduct to be adopted by the military, the commander of the forces is bound to carry out, to the best of his ability, the instructions he may receive from the Governor; and that though no doubt perfect concert ought to exist between these two high functionaries, still the Commander of the forces is in duty bound, without reference to his personal views or feelings, to obey such instructions as may be conveyed to him in the proper channels. Had this line of conduct been adopted, we should not now have to deplore a state of things which I believe to have no parallel in our colonial or general history. Without in the slightest degree entering into the question as to who has been in the wrong in producing this lamentable want of accord between such high functionaries, I deem it to be essential to the public service, and to be only just to the officers and troops employed in New Zealand, that a very clear and defined line of conduct should be laid down by the Government as to the mode in which it is thought right that the service of the Crown should be conducted; and I therefore trust that such instructions may be sent out, as well to the Governor as to the officer commanding the troops in New Zealand, by the next mail, as may restore harmony, when the confusion and discord at the present moment are so great, and may prevent a recurrence of complications which are alike detrimental to Imperial and Colonial interests as also to the discipline, I might also say the honour of Her Majesty's forces.
“The early return of Lietuenant-General Sir C.O. 209, 196.
Lord de Grey replied on November 22 that he had given the subject his careful consideration and was in communication with the Secretary of State for the Colonies with regard to it. In a letter to the Colonial Office of November 20 Lord de Grey expressed the view that “as the supreme authority in each colony is entrusted to the Governor, it is for him to determine the general nature of the operations to be undertaken by Her Majesty's troops for the suppression of the rebellion. … But it does not appear to Lord de Grey to form any part of the functions of a civil Governor of a colony to take the personal direction of military operations in the field, or to issue any orders to Her Majesty's troops engaged in such operations other than those conveyed in the instructions given by him to the officer in chief command.” C.O. 209, 196.
In a leading article of February 23, 1866, The Times discussed the papers on New Zealand affairs presented to Parliament. After referring to the provision in the instructions for the withdrawal of the troops which gave Cameron discretionary power to retain them, The Times said: “Sir The Times concluded by saying that the military and political deadlock had at least the happy effect of inducing the colony to organize its volunteers, who were taking pa after pa and “making short work of the war.”
A Colonial Office memorandum of April 26, 1870, thus summarized the quarrels between Sir (The War in New Zealand), ‘seems to have been by far the most “vigorously prosecuted” of any which was ever carried on in New Zealand. If these “two very able and distinguished persons” had exhibited as much energy and determination in fighting the rebels, as they did in fighting each other, the war might perhaps have been brought to a much earlier termination.’
“During the campaign of 1863 and 1864 the relations between General Cameron and Sir contrived to do so little. And slow as his progress was, he was leaving on his flank unattacked, a strong place the enemy called the Weraroa Pa, which, as long as they held it, placed the whole of that country, not actually held by troops, at their mercy. Sir
Reference was made to allegations by Colonel Weare. See Chapter 13.the new's current in the camp.”
“It was a quarrel, not only between Sir C.O. 209, 212.
A letter from FitzGerald to Adderley, written on October 13, 1865, and published in The Times on December 20, paid tribute to the fairness with which Grey had treated him when he was in charge of native affairs before the resignation of Weld. He held that Grey was right in his disputes with the Whitaker Cabinet and with Cameron, and maintained that it was monstrous to accuse the Governor of violating the confidence of a private correspondence, when that correspondence included all the public business of his station.” This is true, but for some of his other complaints Cameron had more substantial grounds. In the great Governor v. General controversy neither party emerges with complete credit. The situation in which they found themselves was in some respect unprecedented and it cannot be said that either showed great tact in meeting it. The General, by asking for recall on the grounds of ill health, perhaps did all in his power to end an intolerable position, damaging to the British cause in more ways than one. “If we have to send out another General,” wrote the Army and Navy Gazette, “we can only assure Mr. Weld and our New Zealand friends that we can find no man with a higher reputation than General Cameron when he was selected to do battle for them.” The General might have spread fire and destruction throughout the land of the hostile Maoris. That his conscience made his sword less keen should not diminish his reputation to-day.
“A New Zealander must certainly be the most remarkable creature in existence,” wrote The Times in a leading article on September 19, 1865. “He combines every characteristic of the wild beast with the faculties of civilized man. We call him a savage, and, as far as nudity, fierceness, and scarcely abandoned cannibalism can make him so, he is one; but no being of human race is so intelligent. He can live in the mountains or in the bush like a wolf; but he meets his pursuers with all the resources of military art. He manufactures excellent rifles out of old ships' muskets, and makes percussion-caps out of soldiers' buttons. He has never studied at a military academy; but he is a greater master of the science of fortification than the average British Engineer. If there was one thing that might have been expected of modern artillery, it was that it would render a Maori pa untenable; but the Maori sappers and miners counterplotted us in a moment, and added a work or two to their redoubts which completely defeated our Armstrong guns. Our soldiers actually respect them for their extraordinary talents and eminent valour. With all this, too, they are singularly given to rhetoric and debate. They would as soon talk as fight—sometimes even rather, and they display incredible proficiency in negotiations and conferences. We must add to this sketch of the New Zealander that though his real conceptions of religion would probably be satisfied by the African Fetish, he has contrived to make a conquest of Christian Bishops and missionaries; insomuch that these good people support him with a devout fidelity, even against their own fellow-country-men and friends. That we should find some difficulty in dealing with this creature is natural, but the trouble is even greater than it ought to be.”
The article proceeded to describe the incident at Weraroa when Colonel Logan refused to allow the friendly natives to
pa: “We cannot pretend to fathom the motive of this policy, but if events ever carry a lesson, this story of the Weraroa Pa ought surely to teach us that the colonists can do more for themselves than we can do for them.”
On September 26 The Times quoted a “curious story of smuggling war materials to the Maoris” from the Hawkes Bay Times: “The writer of this was in the employ of a noted trading firm engaged in the native trade, owning a small schooner running from Auckland to the Bay of Plenty, trading with the natives with gunpowder, lead and rum, arms of all sorts, from a George II musket to a minie rifle, tomahawks and cartouch boxes; in fact, all the implements of war coveted by our dusky customers. One of their common tricks to cheat the customs was to enter the vessel with pork in casks, and to clear out with empty casks and salt, the said casks containing six or ten kegs of sporting powder and bags of salt, containing each about 100 lbs. of old lead, boxes of caps, etc, all these shifted in the open day, rolled through Auckland streets, left standing on the wharf, and sold in the Bay of Plenty. The old files of Auckland papers need only to be consulted to tell tales of cargoes of empty casks and tons of sash weights (lead, of course) for building purposes, in places where the only buildings going up were raupo whares. The writer of this knew of one whare containing at one time 72 kegs of powder headed up in the way mentioned, and close alongside an old potato hole with about a ton of leaden sash weights in it. And all this carried on by a firm whose principal held office next to the Superintendent, and he went Home and with other Auckland merchants who had made their pile by Tower muskets and other honest merchandise, went in deputation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and hoped that the war would be carried on with vigour, and cruisers stationed to prevent the extensive smuggling by the Yankees.” The failure of the Government to suppress trading in war materials was probably due more to inefficiency and inadequacy of staff than to corrupt motives, but it was in any event inexcusable.
On September 23 the text of an address of the Aborigines Protection Society to the Maori people, dated November 1864, was published in The Times in reply to a letter from
The Times on September 27: “The leading ideas of a practical tendency which are embodied in the address are that a very small number of the colonists are friendly to the Maoris; that the great mass stand ready to destroy and by any means to rob them of their lands; that the natives must on no account sell their lands to them, and, even if they let some portions, they must exercise the greatest caution in the selection of their tenants, remembering that the men they have to deal with are rogues, and that other rogues elsewhere have robbed other people.… It is not, in my opinion, too much to say that the prolongation of the war for the last year and a quarter has been due to the encouragement given to the rebels by the interference of the Society on a previous occasion.”
Replying in a letter published on September 30, F. W. Chesson, Secretary of the Society, characterized this statement as “monstrous.” The former occasion was that on which the Society had protested to the Governor against the wholesale confiscation of native lands which was threatened. In a leading article on September 20 The Times said that the people of England would not accept the Society's view of the rights of the Maoris—acquitting them as savages of rebellion, yet promoting them to the rank of civilized men when it came to a question of their title in land.
The strictures of The Times led the Society to make the following statement of its policy: “We urged the breaking up of the tribal system as regarded the tenure of land, and then the allotment to individual families of certain pieces, which, for their own protection, should be subjected to a species of entail. That was the limit of our proposition; and every one conversant with the history of native tribes must know that unless they are protected during the transitional stages of their existence, their land will go for a mere song, and they and their children must starve, or like many of the Indians of America, become wretched outcasts.”Aborigines' Friend, January—December 1865, p. 457.
On September 2 Sir W.O. 33/16. See pp. 247–8 C.O. 209, 192.
On October 13, Gamble thus referred to the Governor's proclamation: “There were critical moments in the war when a proclamation of this type would, by a timely publication, have been gladly received, and been regarded as the announcement of a determined and lenient policy, such as the strong and victorious can well afford to exhibit. There were occasions when it was both their interest and duty to decide, with determination and generosity. We let these opportunities slip, and now when the hostile natives, as a rule, stand sullenly aloof—when in some places they are not even so harmless, but kill and shoot whenever and wherever they can (and this it must be remembered is their way of waging war, and we cannot call it murder)—at this particular moment we announce that war is at an end. All these proclamations suit some, though they may be few, and certainly there appears to have been nothing
A native bearer of the peace proclamation, Kereti, was killed soon after leaving the Weraroa Redoubt. Another who went out returned to report that the rebels near Patea would not receive peace at any price. “They said they would not cease fighting, and would not give up their king; that they would have nothing to do with the Governor's peace; he wanted too much land. One native remarked: ‘The sea is the Queen's highway, and the land is ours, and we intend to keep it.’” W.O. 33/16.
The correspondent of The Times, in a letter of September 14, published on November 14, said that the proclamation of peace signed by Grey and Weld “narrows down to eight the numerous murders that have been committed during the past five years. Ministers consider that some twenty of them should be removed from that category into that of the chances of war, and in some cases they are undoubtedly right. But as two former proclamations (so late as October and December last) have declared that the whole of them, each distinctly specified, should be punished whenever they should be captured, the question naturally forces itself as to how much a Governor's proclamation can be worth in native eyes. Was the chief far
On November 27 Cardwell notified Grey that he had received a copy of the W.O. 33/16.New Zealand Gazette with the intimation that the “war which commenced at Oakura is at an end,” and also the financial statement of the Treasurer, which left it “no longer open to doubt that your Ministers decline to propose to the Assembly the capitation charge” for the maintenance of Imperial troops. Her Majesty's Government had accordingly decided that the number of troops must be immediately reduced to a strength not exceeding three battalions of infantry and one battalion of artillery. Even this force would not remain unless ministers undertook the required capitation charge. “It is the fixed purpose of Her Majesty's Government that no Imperial troops shall remain in New Zealand for whom this appropriation shall not have been made.”
The Imperial Government, influenced no doubt by the Grey-Cameron controversy as well as the general principle of reducing commitments overseas, was by now determined to withdraw its forces as rapidly as possible from New Zealand, leaving the vexed question of the rights of the Maoris to be settled by the local Government as best it could. In South Africa, also, a determined effort was made to reduce the number of troops, but Wodehouse, the Governor, in a private letter to Cardwell of December 11, 1865, emphasized the dangers of withdrawal and secured a postponement.
On October 14 Sir C.O. 209, 192.
The Wellington correspondent of The Times in a letter of November 15, 1865, published on January 13, 1866, wrote: “The Ministerial crisis which existed when the last mail left speedily terminated in the assumption of office by Mr. Stafford, a hurried wind-up of business and a prorogation. I have before explained fully the causes that led to Mr. Weld's resignation. His Ministry carried their oft-repeated threat of resignation into execution in the confident belief that, as no one was likely to be found willing to take their places, the éclat of returning to office would furnish them with sufficient political capital to carry all their measures without further trouble. It was a bold stroke and it would have proved a successful one if they had not had to deal with a Governor who can exhibit supreme contempt for constitutional courses whenever it pleases him. When Mr. Weld advised His Excellency to send for Mr. Stafford, he seems to have forgotten how much Sir
The correspondent described the exploits of Lieutenant Biggs and his 30 volunteers and 100 natives in capturing the Cf. Cowan, II, 116–18. He states that “about five hundred of the rebellious Ngati-Porou were taken here with three hundred stand of arms. The prisoners were all fighting men; none of the women or children had been taken to this mountain retreat…. Many of the Ngati-Porou so summarily weaned from the Hauhau craze became in after years loyal supporters and soldiers of the Government in the campaign against pa at Pukemaire on the East Coast and pursuing the rebel natives until 200 men and 300 women and children surrendered. In a leading article on January 15, 1866, The Times described this as “a capture almost without precedent, we fancy, in a New Zealand war.”
Cardwell's increased “head money” for the Imperial troops was the subject of a memorandum in which the New Zealand ministers wrote on January 8, 1866: “Should the Home Government arbitrarily insist upon it, it will undoubtedly hereafter be a matter for regret that a great country should have so treated a helpless dependency, already weakened by the efforts it has made and is making for its military defence.” C.O. 209, 196.
In a paper on the situation in New Zealand, Sir
“In the beginning of the war, the Kingites had prayed for their King after the form in our prayer book, and that sometimes with great feeling and earnestness. Now a new form of prayer was put together, and the new worship was accepted as the bond of union amongst all who still adhered to the cause of the Maori King. No spot in the island was better prepared to receive this fanaticism than Opotiki in the Bay of Plenty. The people of that place had sympathized with Waikato, and some of them had taken part in the war. Various circumstances had caused their Minister, Mr. Volkner, to be suspected of being in secret correspondence with the Government on the subject of their disaffection. The feeling of the people became more bitter when their leading chief Aperotanga, who had been wounded and taken prisoner by our allies, the Arawa, was murdered by a woman of that tribe (the widow of Pehama Tohi) in revenge for the death of her husband, who had fallen in the war.
“The Hau Hau fanatics who visited the West Coast harangued the Maoris there on the subject of the missionaries. ‘These men were always telling us: “Lay up for yourselves treasure in heaven,” and so, while we were looking up to heaven, our land was snatched away from beneath our feet.’”
After a description of the murder of Volkner, Sir William went on: “The state of the case is this. We have put too great a pressure upon these people, more than they can bear. More than we can continue to exert. We have driven many natives into a state of determined resistance bordering on desperation. We have brought upon ourselves the necessity of bearing burthens beyond our strength.” Sir William made an appeal for moderation and generosity and proposed:
In a despatch of February 2, 1866, Grey referred to the disagreement between Sir
Sir C.O. 209, 196. C.O. 209, 196.
It may be noted here that formal notification of disallowance of Act No. II of 1866, entitled “An Act for indemnifying persons acting in the suppression of the native insurrection” was sent on June 1, 1867. The notification was in the name of Richard Plantagenet Campbell Temple Nugent Brydges Chandos Grenville, Duke of Buckingham and Chandos. The Law Officers had reported that they thought the Act “too wide in its terms in indemnifying persons who may
C.O. 209, 204.
On February 13, 1866, Grey reported that General Chute had completely subdued the natives of the West Coast. On the same day the Wellington correspondent of About five miles from the present town of Hawera. Cowan gives the Hauhau losses as 30 killed and many wounded. The British had 11 killed and 20 wounded in the assault on the The Times, in a letter published on April 12, wrote: “General Chute's continued vigorous procedure has alike surprised and charmed us. Within the short period of five or six weeks he has completely redeemed the character of the service and wiped out the stigma to which it has so long been subject.” The operations against Otapawa Pa
pa (II, 62). For a full description of the march, see A Campaign on the West Coast of New Zealand under … Major-General Chute, Wanganui, 1866. Chute's force of 618 officers and men was drawn from the Royal Artillery, 2nd Battalion, 14th Regiment, Forest Rangers, and Native Contingent. (Sketch, opp. p. 320.)pa that lay in General Cameron's route, and (to native eyes) by the mere force of Hauhau incantations drove him and his large force to the sea coast and ever after kept them there. Now this once powerful priest submits to General Chute and supplicates the Governor's clemency for his misguided people.”
A Melbourne telegram of March 24, published in The Times of May 11, 1866, said: “The advices received here from New Zealand state that the success of General Chute's expedition was much questioned.” The Wellington correspondent, however, in a letter of April 14 published on June 14, said: “Week by week the good effect of General Chute's campaign becomes
On March 23 Grey reported that the Hauhau fanatics at Napier had submitted, taken the oath of allegiance and given up their flags. On March 29 he reported that Te Hauhau and Herekiekie had made complete submission on his arrival at Ohinemutu. On May 3 he reported an interview he had had with C.O. 209, 196.
At the opening of the first session of the fourth parliament at Wellington on July 3, 1866, Grey said: “By the expedition of General Chute on the West Coast important results have been obtained. Our prestige has been restored, and the Maoris have been convinced that the British soldier, when properly led, can follow them to their fastnesses, and is nowhere to be successfully resisted. Recent occurrences have, however, proved that this campaign—so ably conceived, and so gallantly and vigorously conducted—has not sufficed, owing to its abrupt termination, to secure the tranquillity of that district; nevertheless a valuable service has been rendered by the Major-General to the colony and to the Empire. The unbroken success which has attended the operations on the East Coast, of Her Majesty's Colonial Forces, largely aided by loyal natives, has resulted in the surrender or capture of most of the hostile natives. My Government has eagerly watched for, and gladly accepted every indication on the part of any of these natives, of a desire to live peaceably with their fellow-subjects, and with the view
C.O. 209, 196. This “temporary” removal to the Chatham Islands was to have disastrous consequences.
On August 17 Grey reported the resignation of Stafford's ministry, following a vote of no-confidence. Stafford formed another Government. On October 15, 1866, reporting the murder of a trooper by natives, Grey ascribed the growing boldness of the Maoris “to the attitude of inaction observed by the Imperial Forces.” “Any power of taking any effective measures is completely paralysed by the recent orders from the Secretary of State for War directing the Major-General to reside at Auckland, fifteen days distant in point of time from myself Wellington had replaced Auckland as the capital in 1865. C.O. 209, 196.
In a letter of September 8, 1866, published on October 30, The Times correspondent recorded that
On January 8, 1867, The Times correspondent at Wellington, in a letter published on March 2, reported the untimely death of Thompson: “Thompson was in every sense a great man. He was the prime moulder of the King movement, not intending that it should be inimical to the whites, but hoping to make it the means of preserving the nationality of the Maoris. The movement grew too large for his control and as he was always leaning to the side of peace, and active in preventing a resort to the barbarities of native warfare, he gradually lost his influence, and latterly possessed comparatively little. By those who can see no good under a dark skin he was regarded as double-tongued, and questionable acts have often been ascribed to his authority of which he was entirely ignorant. He was the most distinguished Maori throughout the island, one of the greatest friends of the northern colonists they have ever had, and not a few persist in declaring that he manifested in the whole tone of his morals and behaviour that he was every inch a gentleman.” Grey did not report Thompson's death until April 2, 1867. He gave the date as December 27 and the cause consumption. “My own belief,” wrote Sir Nation Making (1890): “As he has often expressed to me, he desired to make his people into a nation, capable of existence among the increasing numbers of the whole colonists, without being either demoralized by their vices or crushed by their power!” Firth describes the death of Thompson, “the greatest and best of his race.”
In a letter of November 8, published on January 1, 1867, The Times correspondent said that the regular troops were
In a despatch of November 3, 1866, Grey complained about military officers writing to the Home Government when opposed to his views, without letting him know what they had written, although editors and newspapers received the information. The Colonial Office comment was: “Sir C.O. 209, 205.
On November 17, in a letter printed on January 12, 1867, The Times correspondent wrote: “The Governor and General (Chute) have not been hand in glove for the past month or two and since they met at the front last week they have been at daggers drawn.” In a letter of March 8, published on May 16, the correspondent wrote: “The Governor's peculiar idiosyncrasy seems to put him in perpetual antagonism to some one or other. In the very difficult position in which the Governor has been placed—responsible to the Imperial Government for prolongation of hostilities, yet dependent, it may be, on the caprice both of the General Commanding and the Colonial Government for the means wherewith to bring about peace—in this very difficult position the strong will which it has often been necessary to exercise has naturally raised up an opposition to him for which he would have been to blame had he not resisted to the utmost. This was especially the case in the quarrel with General Cameron. There can be no doubt that the Governor did his duty on that occasion, and the sympathy of the colony supported him; but in the misunderstanding which has arisen with General Chute the sympathies of the colony are enlisted against His Excellency, and universal regret is manifested.”
Grey, in a letter to General Chute of May 10, 1866, requesting the General's presence in Wellington, had said: “The additional charges on account of military expenditure entailed on Great Britain and the colony by your non-compliance with my request on this subject, must in my belief have already been considerable.” On February 17, 1867, Grey wrote to the Secretary of State: “I have the honour to report that the Officer Commanding the Forces still resides at such a distance from the Seat of Government that the greatest inconvenience results to the public service. No common effort can be made for the general good. The local government has lost all control over Her Majesty's Colonial Forces.… I hear indirectly of movements of troops going on, of the most important kind, for which I should have made due provision, and except for newspaper reports or rumours, I have no more knowledge of these movements than if they were being made in some distant colony which was in a state of profound peace.” A further despatch on the same subject, dated from Dunedin, February 19, 1867, was characterized by Sir
The controversy between Grey and Chute was but one more in the long series of disagreements and misunderstandings which makes the story of the Maori Wars so difficult to summarize fairly.
It had been for some time obvious that relations between Sir
On June 30, 1866, Grey acknowledged the receipt of a confidential despatch from Cardwell (dated April 26) enclosing copies of a letter from the Rev. T. W. Weare and extracts of a letter written to him by his brother, Colonel H. E. Weare, C.B.
“These letters,” he wrote, “contain the gravest allegation against myself, the Government of the country, and against the General Commanding the Queen's Forces, and the officers and men composing those forces. Generally I would remark that they are, in so far as Her Majesty's Forces are concerned, charges of enormous and atrocious cruelties, practised either by the troops or with their knowledge, such as partially disembowelling prisoners and then roasting them whilst still alive, etc. Now what is done by Colonel Weare, C.B., under such circumstances? Does he, justly filled with righteous indignation, instantly report these acts to the Governor or the Government of the country that an immediate stop may be put to them and their perpetrators punished? No, he does not do this. Does he instantly write to the Government at Home, forwarding his letter through the Governor and pray that instant orders may be sent out to put a stop to such atrocities? No, he does not do this. Or does he, as a just man and officer should have done, openly, boldly and instantly make an official report of these alleged atrocious acts to his General, and at once stop them in this way?
“No, he does none of these things, but in private letters addressed to a person in England, he details horrid atrocities which he states have been committed, and alleges that since
[sic] selfishness. That is, according to the system pursued when Sir
“I could have wished that Her Majesty's Government had, in this case of Colonel Weare's letters, so manifestly a shameful one, at last peremptorily put a stop to a system at once so unjust and pernicious, by refusing in accordance with the rules laid down for the guidance of Her Majesty's service, and hitherto for so long a series of years carefully and beneficially observed, to receive reports made in this manner, and by directing and requiring Colonel Weare to make them through the proper channel, and at the same time at least subjecting him to the reproof which he so justly deserved, for having made statements privately against his superior officers, which he should have made instantly and openly or not at all.… On
“Though I have thought it due to myself and my position so decidedly to refuse to notice the imputations to which I have been directed to furnish a complete reply, I beg to state that if any cases of cruelty are brought to my notice, I will see that the fullest inquiry is made into them, and that ample justice is, in as far as possible, done. I will also throw no obstacle in the way of the fullest publicity being given to your despatches, and to Colonel Weare's allegations against myself, the Government and the troops. Everyone shall have full freedom to make complaint of cruel acts, or of pressure put upon them directly or indirectly by myself or my Ministers, to force or induce them to commit acts of cruelty, and a patient hearing of his or their complaint shall be secured to them, and
“I mentioned the subject of the atrocities of which they were accused to some Whanganui natives, stating how distressed I was at the allegations made. They replied: ‘Why should you distress yourself? It arises from jealousy. These are just such stories as we should tell amongst ourselves if we were jealous of each other's actions. We thought the Europeans were superior to us. We now see that they are as jealous a people as we are.’
“I beg that you will set your mind at rest that no open or good land is being kept for the natives between Whanganui and Mount Egmont. The Government assure me that their wants will be amply cared for. At present little or none of that country is occupied by Europeans. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant, C.O. 209, 196.
Grey's refusal to treat Cardwell's communication on the subject of Colonel Weare's allegations as confidential drew a rebuke from Sir
The despatch was dated November 1, 1866. It recapitulated the circumstances of Colonel Weare's charges and their retraction and quoted extensively from Cardwell's and Grey's despatches. It referred to the Governor's “repeated and studiously direct refusal to comply with what you represent as being the Secretary of State's instructions to you—a refusal which becomes even more pointed, because what on the 30th June you thus peremptorily refused to do in compliance with instructions, you seem in fact to have done independently of such instructions on the 29th. I wish it were open to me to misunderstand the character of that refusal or to put a more favourable construction upon it. My strong sense of the public services which you have at various times rendered and of your high character, my recollection even of the circumstances attending your temporary recall from the Governorship of the Cape during my former connection with this department, Carnarvon was Under-Secretary to Bulwer Lytton in 1858.
“I endeavour to make every allowance for the feelings of an officer who is conscious that he has rendered important services to H.M. and who conceives himself to have been left without due protection from cruel and unfounded imputations. But it is wholly impossible that the Government of the colonies can be carried on, if such language as you have addressed to my predecessor is to be applied on such grounds as you have alleged by an officer representing Her Majesty (I repeat my words) to the Minister whose function it is to communicate to him Her Majesty's commands. I will add no more now. I hope that a cooler consideration of this painful question will have convinced you of the impropriety of the language that you have used and will lead you to take what appears to me the course which is due not less to yourself than to others, viz. that of recalling both your minutes of June 13 and your despatch of the 30th. In this hope I now refrain from considering
On July 3 Grey wrote that he had received from Major-General Chute the copy of a letter from Colonel Weare stating that his letters were private, “written to a near relative in the freedom of family correspondence” and “that these letters merely mentioned certain camp rumours that were in circulation at the time.” “He now believed that there were no grounds for the rumours that certain prisoners were disembowelled and then thrown on the fire alive, or that a Maori was shot by soldiers of the 14th Regiment after an officer had tried to save his life.” Grey said that the letter confirmed the view which he from the first took of the case and shewed that the course he pursued in relation to it was the proper one.
Colonel Weare's letter was dated June 6, 1866. In it he said: “I certainly myself understood that the Major-General did not wish prisoners.” C.O. 209, 196. For Rusden's view of Weare's allegations, see his History of New Zealand, II, 354–61.
In a long despatch of January 12, 1867, Grey wrote: “I think that Colonel Weare, in attributing to me such wicked motives, and a connivance in shocking crimes, brought about at my instigation, and in then passing me by without calling attention to them, and in allowing such crimes to continue unchecked, until people in England could be appealed to, when it would be too late to stop that which should have been instantly repressed, virtually reaffirmed the wickedness of my motives, and made it apparent that it would, in his belief, have been useless to appeal to me. I also think that Her Majesty's Government, in leaving this point unnoticed and taking his charges up, did not do me justice. The imputations made against me were—that, entertaining the most wicked hatred of the native race, I had concealed my real feelings whilst there was any one in the colony to keep me in check, but that after General Cameron had left the colony, my own true sentiments and those of my Government towards the Maoris had come out in our urging General Chute on to atrocities—that most shocking atrocities were being committed under pressure from the Colonial authorities, and that Her Majesty's troops were
“Then specific acts of the most revolting cruelty were stated to have been committed and in the plainest terms it was alleged that an attempt was made to force officers to murder prisoners who had surrendered and given up their arms, Colonel Weare himself having been made to feel that he was under the General's displeasure for not having committed a crime of this nature.… I was an officer on distant service, acting as Mr. Cardwell's representative, and I think the imputations I have quoted were of such a character that I was entitled to his instant protection from them.”
[C.O. marginal note: “What protection so effectual as informing him of them?”]
“… I think he might instantly and indignantly have stated that he did not credit and could not entertain such suggestions of evil motives. Had our places been reversed, I would to the last have supported him against accusations of the kind, and in stern but becoming language have expressed my opinion of the officer who made them.… I do not think if such accusations and imputations had been entertained at all, that they should have been confidentially entertained, and have been made the subject of a confidential despatch. This fact was more painful to myself and my responsible advisers than any other. I feel sure Your Lordship will, on full consideration, admit that knowing that such accusations against myself and my Government are on record in the Colonial Office, where here-after they will be certain to be found by some historian, who must naturally conclude [C.O. marginal comment: “Qu?”] that there must have been some ground for believing them to be true…that I only shewed a just jealousy of the good name of my Government and that of the people of this country in putting them on record here as a public document. This proceeding could have injured no one, if the accusations were in good faith and (in)the manner in which they ought to have been, and I believe that I did my duty to the Queen, and to the race to which I belong, in this publicly and indignantly dealing with the question.
“I beg now to remark upon my minute to the Executive
“In reference to the opinion Your Lordship has expressed that I have made use of improper language in the despatch and minute to which you refer me, I conceive that I should submit at once to your decision on this point, as you are the Head of the Department under which I serve. I cannot myself detect this improper language, but I may be a very wrong judge in my own case. Wherever, therefore, Your Lordship may decide that any improper language may occur, I beg it may be withdrawn, and I offer the fullest and most unreserved apology for any such language of which I may have made use.… On a point on which my whole future reputation rests, I ought to and must decide for myself, and I believe that hereafter it will be admitted if not now, that the course I have taken was becoming to my office, to the great powers with which the Queen and nation had entrusted me, and to my own long service, and I still trust that Your Lordship will concur in this view of the subject.” C.O. 209, 200.
A Colonial Office minute by C. Cox on this despatch set out: “The tone of Sir
Sir
Sir C.O. 209, 200.
Lord Carnarvon, in a letter to the Secretary of State, dated November 28, 1868, dealt with Sir Ibid., 209.in extenso: “I cannot admit that the non-communication of this letter of 19 March affords to Sir
A Colonial Office despatch of December 1, 1866, had vested the control of the troops exclusively in the hands of General Chute “in consequence of a want of hearty co-operation between the civil and military authorities in giving effect to the instructions of the Home Government.” On February 4, 1867, Grey wrote: “I have received your despatch of the 1st of December last deposing me from a large portion of my powers, placing them in the hands of General Chute and requiring me to assist him in carrying them out. I feel keenly this disgrace, but I shall do my duty under it to the best of my ability.” Sir C.O. 209, 200.
On February 4, 1867, Grey reported a native outbreak at Tauranga. “The confiscation policy is bearing its natural fruit,” remarked Sir C.O. 209, 200.
On a further despatch from Grey of February 12, 1867, Rogers wrote: “The object of the Home Government must be steadily borne in mind. That object is to get the Imperial Troops (or all but one regiment) out of the colony—first, in order to put an end to the intolerable expense to which this country has been subjected and secondly to force the colony to make provision, at their expense, to meet any disturbance which may arise out of their confiscation or other native policy. The Derby Government had taken an equally strong attitude in South Africa. “Really peremptory instructions were sent to Wodehouse. Of the five regiments stationed at the Cape, one was to be withdrawn immediately; another was to be allotted to Natal and St. Helena. In 1868 the Cape Colony was to assume responsibility for one regiment at the rate of £40 per man; in the next year two regiments had to be paid for; for the three following years the whole remaining force had to be paid for at the rate of £70 for artillerymen and £40 for infantrymen.” In default troops would be withdrawn as the Home Government thought fit. These demands caused consternation both to Wodehouse and the Cape Parliament. Wodehouse thought a Governor with dictatorial powers was necessary. He “felt that self-government and entire independence were ultimately synonymous terms.” In his eyes Canada and New Zealand were visibly alienating themselves from the Mother Country. (C. W. de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 218.)appear at least to proceed from him. It is plain, therefore, as a matter of prudence and safe policy that the Government cannot depend upon the Governor and General in their present relations for executing what in fact they have not executed—and they cannot depend upon the Governor alone with any certainty, while they can depend on the General. The only real way of securing that the thing will be promptly done before it is too late is to enable and require the General to do it.…
“Even if it is granted that Sir C.O. 209, 200.allegations made by Gen. Chute to the Home Government, which may have been correct or incorrect—but on copies of correspondence forwarded by General Chute, of which it is impossible to deny the authenticity and which the Governor might, if he had chosen, have sent home with an explanation. As he did not send home any explanation of his apparent disobedience of orders—and as the matter would not brook delay, it was for him to take the consequences of the omission.… A more substantial answer to the charge of delay is contained in paragraphs from 26 to 31, viz. that the safety and well-being of the colony required him to do what he did do. But what do these paragraphs really amount to? They menace us, in a manner familiar to readers of Sir G. G.'s very able despatches, with various disasters—but with disasters arising (as we hold) out of colonial policy, and which ought to be provided for out of colonial resources, but which he, notwithstanding the most peremptory instructions from home,
A long memorandum by the New Zealand ministers on a despatch of December 1, 1866, in which Lord Carnarvon referred to two alleged attacks on unarmed natives, was issued on April 17, 1867: “The Imperial Government has ignored the constitutional position of the Governor and has in successive despatches displayed a sense of irritation, and a proneness to take and give offence which is much to be deplored. Ministers are unable to perceive either equity or good policy in such a course of action. It is unworthy of the great Empire to which New Zealand colonists are proud to belong; it is unjust to the colony and it is dangerous to the welfare of the aboriginal race to which the faith of the Crown has been solemnly pledged. …Grave charges against the Colonial Government and the colony, and an objectionable system of secret calumny have not, Ministers feel bound to say, met at the hands of Secretaries of State for the Colonies that indignant rejection which the Governor and Her Majesty's Colonial subjects had equally a right to expect when their reputation and conduct were attacked.” Ibid., 201.
The two engagements referred to by Lord Carnarvon were described in the New Zealand Gazettes of October 11 and October 26, 1866. The first dealt with the affair at Te Whenuku, near Patea, and the second with the engagement between the militia and volunteers and the Hauhaus at Omarunui and Petane, From Cowan's accounts (II, 136–7) it would appear that the Hauhaus were armed.
In a despatch of April 28, 1867, Sir
“It is true that differences have arisen between myself and two officers commanding the forces in New Zealand since 1863. But it should be remembered that although there have been two Generals here in that time, there has only been the. same military staff in this country. That is an important point. My differences with these Generals arose, in part, from powers which belonged to me having been assumed by the military authorities, under the sanction of the War Department, and from my efforts to get an end put to a system which led to an expenditure of life, money and resources, which, when measured by the insignificance of the enemy and the results obtained, is, I believe, unparalleled in our history; which led to disastrous repulses, to a wavering of confidence in our men, to the spread of rebellion, the ruin of parts of the country, the contraction of an enormous public debt upon military objects, which will cripple the resources of New Zealand for many years—and to other evils not less serious than those I have named. At last, amidst all difficulties, and notwithstanding the frequent attacks made upon me by the military authorities and the support which has invariably been given to them from home—I have had the happiness of seeing a sounder system
On April 4, 1867, Grey reported that the New Zealand Government had declined to acquiesce in the conditions under which the Home Government was prepared to allow one regiment to be retained in the colony. Ministers in their memorandum of rejection, dated March 15, 1867, stated that they did not believe “that it is either consistent with constitutional practice, or for the interests of either race of Her Majesty's subjects in these islands, that the determination of questions of peace and war, and the power of fulfilling engagements with the native race, should thus virtually be withdrawn from the control of the Queen's representative, and given to an irresponsible officer having no constitutional authority with respect to such questions, and necessarily unacquainted with the ever-varying disposition of that portion of the native race so lately in arms against Her Majesty's authority.” C.O. 209, 201.
The Duke of Buckingham directed that the implied offer to carry on without troops should be closed with at once. “The only doubt is how the Governor can be continued for the short remainder of his time.” The despatch sent on June 1, however, stated that a reply would be delayed until further expressions of view promised by the Governor and his advisers arrived.
The Duke, in a memorandum of June 4, on Grey's despatches respecting the removal of the Queen's troops, wrote: “In these despatches Governor Grey has made certain statements
“Simply acknowledge the whole of the despatches containing certain statements and explanations upon matters alluded to in Lord Carnarvon's despatch No. 49 of the 1st December last. (State that the removal of the troops in question and the consequent departure of General Chute which probably has taken place, viewed in connection with the approaching termination of Sir The passage in brackets was crossed out in the draft. The elimination of the reference to “the approaching termination of Sir
“Add that General Chute and Her Majesty's Forces in New Zealand with the exception of one regiment will in pursuance of their instructions have left the colony before Sir
The despatch as finally drafted was as follows:
Downing Street, June 18, 1867Governor Sir George Grey, K.C.B. Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the Nos. and dates noted in the margin containing certain statements and explanations upon matters alluded to in my predecessor's despatch, No. 49, of the 1st of December last. As all Her Majesty's regular forces in New Zealand, with the exception of one Regiment, will, in pursuance of instructions from the Secretary of State for War, probably have left the colony before your receive this despatch and as it is very possible that General SirT. Chute may also have left, I deem it unnecessary to review the correspondence with regard to the control of the troops in question. The Regiment which will be left in the colony will, as you were informed by my predecessor, remain while in the colony under the control and direction of the Queen's representative.
With regard to the ultimate disposal of this Regiment I await the arrival of the next mail in the expectation of receiving by that opportunity the further expression of your views on the subject of my predecessor's despatches referring to military operations in New Zealand which your despatch of 4 April promises. I shall then also be able to inform you of the appointment of your successor in the Government of New Zealand and of the time at which he may be expected to arrive in New Zealand.
I have, etc.(Signed)Buckingham and Chandos.C.O. 209, 201.
Discussing Lord Carnarvon's questioning of the Duke of Buckingham in Parliament concerning the withdrawal of the troops, The Times, on July 17, 1867, expressed the view that Carnarvon should have recalled the Governor when he failed to send the troops home as ordered.
Commenting on the debate in a letter published in The Times of July 25,
In a despatch of August 22, 1867, the Duke of Buckingham informed Grey that Sir C.O. 209, 200.
Grey, in a despatch of September 7, 1867, wrote: “In one short paragraph of your Grace's despatch No. 37 of the 18th of June I am informed in one sentence that I had said that which I never said, and in the next short sentence I am told that my successor in this Government is to be appointed. After so many
Stafford, the Prime Minister, in a memorandum of September 16, 1867, wrote: “Ministers … recognize the absolute right of Her Most Gracious Majesty to appoint and recall at pleasure Her Governors; but they regret that Sir
The Legislative Council, in an address expressing regret at Grey's recall, said: “We consider that the Imperial authorities have listened too creduously to accusations of the gravest kind, communicated by non-official informants, against your Excellency, your Government, and the Colonists generally.” C.O. 209, 202.
In a minute upon Sir George's reply to this address, Sir C.O. 209, 202.
In his reply the Duke of Buckingham wrote: “I may observe that the intimation given for your convenience at the end of your term of office that your successor would very shortly be appointed seems to have been mistaken for a premature recall.” In reply to another ministerial memorandum dated October 3, 1867, pressing for a determination of the constitutional question involved in the independence of the military authorities of the Governor's actions, the Duke wrote this minute: “It seems to me an unconstitutional course for the Home Government to enter into controversy with the colonial
C.O. 209, 202.
The Wellington correspondent of The Times, in a letter of November 8, published on December 31, referring to the Governor's recall, said he had not received one word of explanation: “He has not been told whether he is simply relieved through effluxion of time, or whether he is to return in disgrace. A very largely increased sympathy for his Excellency has, in consequence, been evoked. It is not the change, but the manner of the change, that we find fault. The colony is fully prepared to meet the rising sun. Much that we hear of the newly-appointed Governor is in his favour. We hear with especial pleasure that he is frank and open-hearted, which will not only be a pleasant contrast to the wiliness with which his predecessor has always been credited, but will, under the circumstances, be considered a virtue covering a multitude of sins. Our only fear is, judging from what has happened in Queensland, that Sir
On October 30, 1867, Sir
C. B. Adderley wrote this minute: “I think the reply must not imply too complete approval: otherwise the brevity of the despatch announcing his relief and the previous supercession of the Governor in direct orders to the troops would be indefensible.” The Duke of Buckingham wrote: “Although I have had no reason to differ from Sir C.O. 209, 203.
In a despatch from Kawau, dated January 14, 1868, Sir C.O. 209, 206.
On September 8, 1868, Bowen reported that Sir Ibid., 207.
The Imperial claim against New Zealand for war expenditure was summarized by Sir
“The whole claim is £1,304, 963.
“The items positively objected to by Major R. roughly speaking are:
“But Major R. admits provisionally only and under protest:
which, if allowed, would reduce the debt to £660,814.
“Per contra he states the debts of the Imperial Government to the colony at £906,856:
“The arrangement by which certain military allowances, etc., were commuted for £5 per head was allowed to drop in 1864 without coming to any other arrangement. It would therefore be difficult to charge it after December 1864, and still more difficult after the withdrawal of the troops had been consented to by the colony and ordered from Home. (This affects £237,000).…
and that the Imperial Government will further guarantee a loan of £3,000,000. The English of this, I suppose, is simply that they do not intend to pay us a farthing—and I am not aware that we have any means of making them do so.”
C.B. Adderley wrote: “I have all along thought we should have to make it quits for the past and start on a new system for the future, with the new Governor. If so, better not haggle.” C.O. 209, 202.
In a despatch of April 1, 1868, the Duke of Buckingham, fortified by a Treasury minute of March 28, said: “The colony is oppressed by a heavy debt, to a great extent caused by the same circumstances which had led to the Imperial expenditure in the colony. The magnitude of that debt has raised the taxation of the colony to more than £6 5s. per head of the entire popu-
In nine years ending 1867 permanent charges rose from £20,265 to £305,365. A Treasury estimate of the cost of the Maori War was £2,750,000. Cf. C.O. 209, 202.The Poverty Bay Massacre, thesis by Marjorie E. S. Black, Victoria University College.
The terms arranged were not regarded as just by the New Zealand ministers and Adderley, in a minute to the Duke of Buckingham, regretted that they did not take the settlement “as handsomely as it was meant.” Ibid., 207.
The objects of Fitzherbert's mission to England had been set out in a ministerial memorandum of November 7, 1867:
Ibid., 203.
In dealing with a request for the gift of old pattern guns not required by the War Office, Sir C.O. 209, 209. Cf. the elaborate programme of annexation in the Pacific put forward in 1875 by the New South Wales Government, which, however, declined to take any financial responsibility in what was “wholly an Imperial question” (Hall, Australia and England, p. 227).
In a letter of November 27, 1868, Fitzherbert suggested the creation of a system of naval defence for Australia and New Zealand. He proposed the constitution of a fleet under Imperial command, capable of guarding not merely the safety of the colonial coast but the free passage round Cape Horn. “What is wanted is a special Naval Station in the South Pacific under an Imperial officer with an independent command.” Fitzherbert stated that the cost, estimated at £500,000 a year, might be borne in equal proportions between the mother-country and the colonies concerned under a federal arrangement, the mother-country providing ships and munitions of war.
Sir
C. B. Adderley commented: “This is a most important suggestion and should be favourably received, offering to send it to all the Australian Government for general discussion. … It will lead to federation, and ultimately to the Australians having a squadron of their own, as Canada ought to have now.” The Duke of Buckingham concurred. The Earl of Granville, on coming into office, stated that it appeared that the cost of the existing squadron was only £70,000 a year and he did not think it probable that the very great increase in the naval force contemplated by Fitzherbert would be sanctioned by Parliament in time of peace, even if a contribution of £250,000 a year were made by the colonies. He would, however, send copies of the correspondence to the Governors of the Australian colonies for their information. C.O. 209, 209.
In a memorandum on a letter from Fitzherbert to Lord Granville written in London on February 5, 1869, concerning the guarantee of a loan of £1,500,000, Sir Ibid., 215.
We have seen that the first impression of Sir Frederic was
See above, pp. 67–8. In his book The Colonial Office: A History, published shortly before this volume went to press, H.L. Hall illustrates the views of Sir
Sir George Bowen's first despatch was written on February 6, 1868, the day after his arrival at Wellington. In his second despatch of March 3, he wrote: “It would, of course, be as yet presumptuous in me to pronounce any judgment on Native questions. It is obvious, however, that the old institutions and rules of the Maoris have crumbled away; and so, it is to be feared, has, to a deplorable extent, their recently adopted Christianity. When I visited
For a discussion of this topic, see History of the Church Missionary Society (1899), II, chapter 67.
C.O. 209, 206.
A meeting of natives at Tokangamutu, the Maori King's headquarters, on January 20, 1868, had confirmed many of them in disaffection.
On March 7 Bowen reported that writs had been issued for the election of four Maori members of the House of Representatives. This had been provided for by the Maori Representation Act, which Sir Ibid., 203.
On April 3, 1868, Bowen wrote: “The intelligence of the murderous attempt made at Sydney on the life of the Duke of Edinburgh has excited throughout New Zealand general horror and indignation, and has called forth enthusiastic expressions of the devoted loyalty to the Throne of the over-whelming majority of the people of the colony. I regret, however, to state that, previous to the arrival of the sad news from Sydney, a Fenian demonstration had been made recently by a section of the Irish miners on the gold-fields at Hokitika, a town on the Western coast of the Middle Island, distant above 800 miles from Auckland and above 300 from Wellington. There, on the 15th ult., a mock funeral procession was held as mark of sympathy with the Fenians executed at Manchester in last November, and was attended by about 900 persons
Larkin and Manning the editor, were tried on May 18–20 and convicted.New Zealand Celt, is also published at Hokitika; and its articles seem to be as violent as those of the Fenian organs in Ireland and America. The local authorities have arrested Mr. Larkin and the Editor of the New Zealand Celt, on a charge of sedition, and also two other persons accused of rioting.New Zealand Celt, and to protect the cross erected in the public cemetery at Hokitika in honour of the Manchester Fenians. On the other hand, the local militia and volunteers have been called out, and above one thousand special constables had already been sworn in when the mail left the Middle Island. The cross had also been removed and destroyed and the Government has forbidden its re-erection.
“Under these circumstances, and after consultation with the Colonial Ministers and with the Senior Military and Naval officers, I have arranged to despatch H.M.S. Falcon this day to Hokitika, with a detachment of the 18th Regiment on board to support the civil power, in case of necessity. It is hoped that the presence of this additional force will reassure the well-disposed majority, overawe the disaffected, and maintain the authority of the law.”
Against the last paragraph C. B. Adderley wrote: “The old story repeated.” W. Dealtry's memorandum was: “The Government has taken the necessary measures to support the civil power, but this does not look well for the removal of the Regiment stationed in New Zealand which has been decided on.” Adderley made the following minute to the Duke of Buckingham: “I confess I do not think Sir C.O. 209, 206.Falcon and detachment of the 18th Regiment ought to be approved. It is the old story decies repetita—as soon as removal of troops is threatened some necessity for retaining them (arises).” The Duke of Buckingham wrote: “The orders for
Bowen, in a despatch of April 14, 1868, described his visit to Shortland in the Thames goldfield, where the Chief Taipari was drawing, he said, about £4,000 a year as landlord. His example was already exercising an influence upon many of his countrymen “who have hitherto lived in sullen and hostile isolation.”
On May 4 Bowen reported that he had returned from a very interesting visit to the Bay of Islands. He went, on the urgent advice of C.O. 209, 206.Brisk corvette instead of a small unarmed steamer. Busby thought that his prestige as Governor would otherwise be affected. Bowen saw, with deep interest,
In a despatch of June 30 Bowen described a visit to the Waikato area, compared the Maoris to the Highlanders of the eighteenth century, and discussed the possibility of a recurrence of war: “Friendly natives have sent several warnings to the Government to the effect that the ‘King tribes’ are inclined to begin afresh a desultory warfare, and are waiting only for a favourable opportunity, such as would be afforded by any relaxation of vigilance on the part of the detachments of armed constabulary which now protect the settlements of the interior, or by the immediate withdrawal of the single regiment of regular troops which now garrisons the principal towns. I am further informed that the Arawas and other tribes that have fought gallantly and suffered much for the Crown are disposed to regard the entire removal of the Queen's Troops
riri (i.e. angry) with the Pakehas—in other words that the Imperial authorities are displeased with the Colonists. It has been represented, in short, that the loyal clans in New Zealand at the present day would view the entire withdrawal of Imperial troops with feelings similar to those with which the Hanoverian clans in Scotland, 150 years ago, while exposed to the vengeance of their Jacobite neighbours would have regarded the removal to the English garrisons from Inverness, Fort William, and Stirling.
“The latest reliable intelligence tends to show that there exists among the disaffected tribes two parties; one, headed by Tawhiao and his family and kinsmen, disposed to moderate counsels; the other, headed by the Hau Hau prophet Hakaria, of a more uncompromising spirit. If Tawhiao is the Maori Saul, Hakaria is the Maori Samuel.… A distinguished colonist, who is generally believed to be more intimately acquainted with the natives of New Zealand than any other European, lately remarked to me that one of their seers may one morning allege that he beheld in a dream the Maoris hewing the Pakehas to pieces, and that the next day a war-party of Hau Haus may rush on the nearest British settlement to prove the truth of the vision. Much loss of life and property may be inflicted by such outbreaks among the scattered homesteads, in the districts bordering on the territory of the hostile tribes; but the settlers in those parts will always, as on several previous occasions, assemble speedily for their own protection, and they will be supported with all the strength of the Government. On the whole it appears to be very generally agreed that, since the authority of the Crown and of the law was not established throughout the interior of this country while there was an army of above ten thousand men in New Zealand, the attitude of the Colonial authorities towards Tawhiao and his adherents must and ought to be, in the main, defensive; that it is at once more politic and more human to outlive the ‘King movement,’ than to endeavour to suppress it by the strong hand; that the turbulent natives should receive every encouragement to live peaceably
On June 9 a settler named Cahill and two others were murdered. Another man was killed within sight of the camp of the constabulary.
Adderley's minute to the Duke of Buckingham was: “N.Z. will give even more material to Bowen's pen and imagination than Queensland…. The ‘outliving’ rebellion in N.Z. is the point of true and vital interest in this despatch and the proofs given that the English regulars are unsuited to the task of reducing it, and that the colonists left to themselves will take to defensive attitude and caution, and if force is required, to most effective action. Those who thought a Maori ‘Province,’ left to its own laws, would have led sooner to settled relations (as the Indian territory in U. States), must see that, soon after ill-conducted warfare, they are more likely to C.O. 209, 207.amalgamate than to live by the side of us. Whether they must not ultimately die out seems a less hopeful question. I would not give in to leaving the single Regiment. The reasons adduced are convincing the other way. It is said its removal would be taken by friendly tribes and colonists as a sign that they can expect no longer support from England—the very thing most desirable, and the state our early American colonists throve best in. ‘The Queen will be thought riri,’ which means that they are still babies. It is a sentiment only and a wretched one. Even if the colonists were made to pay the whole cost, transport and all, and learn that dipping their fingers in the Mother Country's pocket means taxing English labourers for what they should pay for themselves, still it would be undesirable—witness the feeling produced by the past services of English troops partly paid by them and wholly abused.”
On September 19, 1868, the Duke of Buckingham, after thanking Bowen for the full and valuable information he had sent, wrote: “As regards the withdrawal of the Regiment of H.M.'s Troops … my despatch of May 30 will have informed you that the 18th Regiment was required in the ordinary course of relief to proceed to Australia
On July 23 Bowen transmitted reports on the state of the Maoris which he had called for on his arrival. C.O. 209, 207. Cf. Old New Zealand. He described the last few years as “years of war, followed by a doubtful armed truce, the result of physical exhaustion on the part of the natives, and of a great pecuniary expenditure impossible to be longer maintained, on ours.… I think the Maoris do not believe we would be left alone to deal with them in a second struggle. Should they eventually become of a different opinion, it would seriously diminish the chances of peace being established securely for several years, and it is certain that by a change in their tactics, which the natives are quite capable of adopting, they might, with half their former numbers, inflict as much or more loss upon the colony than they have already done.… In only one direction do I see a hopeful influence at work, powerful, if human calculation can be trusted, to produce in the future the permanent pacification of the country, and the dominion of law. I mean the action of the Native Land Court, which, by giving natives individual and exclusive property in the soil, stimulates industry, detaches them from tribal or national interests, disposes them to support and strengthen the law from which they have derived their rights.…”New Zealand in the Making, on the Native Land Court: “For more than sixty years this Court has functioned steadily and, within its limits, successfully.… Throughout its history, however, it has been a means of facilitating the separation of the Maori from his land as equitably and painlessly as possible.” See also Omapere Lake judgment of Judge Land Problems of the' Forties (1936), pp. 229–30.)
On July 31 Bowen transmitted a memorandum from ministers praying that Her Majesty the Queen would be pleased to make New Zealand “the Sanatorium of the invalided troops of the British Army.” Adderley objected: “They would still hold the red cloth up to the Fenian bulls and keep up the appetite of the colonists.” C.O. 209, 207. Ibid. Cowan, II, 190–1, discusses the tardiness of the relief force.
Bowen, in another despatch of August 8, reported that on July 15 news reached Wellington from Napier by electric telegraph that about 150 Hauhau prisoners sent to the Chatham Islands two years before had made their escape and landed at Whareongaonga, Poverty Bay. “On the 23rd the C.O. 209, 207.Rifleman, a schooner belonging to a New Zealand mercantile firm, arrived at Wellington, under the command of the chief officer, Mr. Payne, who made a statement (the accuracy of which there seems no reason to doubt) respecting the manner in which the Hauhau prisoners had seized that vessel at the Chatham Islands, and forced the crew, on peril of their lives, to convey them to Poverty Bay.… It will be seen that, a storm having
Atua, or ‘God of the Winds.’” Bowen reported that Colonel Whitmore now had under orders about 150 Europeans and the same number of Maoris. “Great importance is attached to his soon striking (if possible) a decisive blow; as otherwise it is feared that the escaped prisoners (among whom are many most dangerous fanatics) will be joined by the Ureweras and the other hostile and disaffected tribes of the East Coast. At the same time it is felt that it would be worse than useless to pursue the Hauhaus, if they should retire into the wild mountainous country of the interior.”
H.M.S. Whitmore discusses his failure to rouse these men to join his force in his book, Rosario arrived at Napier from Wellington on July 19. Colonel Whitmore and two officers embarked there for Poverty Bay with 31 men. In a report of July 21 Captain Westrupp described a reverse suffered by his men in a fight with the Hauhaus. Two were killed and seven wounded. Westrupp wrote: “I trust the Government will make due allowance for the privations and fatigue undergone by the men, who throughout the whole of this trying day were engaged with a very superior force almost all armed with Enfield rifles, and kept up so hot a fire that it was impossible to make head against it. It must also be considered how depressing on the minds of the men unused to war was the effect of the apathy (call it by no worse name), of the bulk of our native allies. For ten days the Force has kept the field without an opportunity of changing or drying their clothes, and with very scanty and irregular supplies of provisions.”The Last Maori War in New Zealand. He concedes that his language was impolitic and ill-chosen.
The return of the escaped prisoners from the Chatham Islands was recorded in Cf. Stacey, The Times on October 1, 1868, on the same day that the surprise of the constabulary under Captain Ross was reported. “To watch a population like this,” commented The Times in a leading article on October 2, “the only force the Government appears to have kept regularly trained, besides the single English regiment left in the island, has lately been a body of five hundred armed police, and they were on the point of letting the regiment quit them because they would not pay for its support. They have now to begin drilling recruits for a campaign which has already opened.”op. cit., p. 222: “The Imperial determination to throw the cost of the naval defence of the border upon Canada had merely resulted in the border being left undefended.”
On August 8 Bowen forwarded a resolution of the Legislative Council requesting that the removal of the last regiment might be delayed “until His Excellency shall have placed the present state of the colony before the Imperial Government and have received instruction thereon.” “I am aware,” the Governor said, “of some of the reasons which have led to the decision that the Queen's Troops shall be altogether removed from this colony notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary which His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief (the Duke of Cambridge) is reported to have expressed in the House of Lords in the debate on this question which took place on July 15, 1867, and which appears to have been relied on here to a considerable extent. In a letter from the Horse Guards on December 28, 1867, the Duke also expressed the hope that “the important colony of New Zealand would not be left wholly without regular troops.”
W. Dealtry's Colonial Office minute, addressed on this occasion to T. F. Elliot, was: “His Grace will I presume adhere to the decision with regard to the removal of the Regiment, to retain which Mr. Stafford, the present Premier, is still unwilling to accede to any formal conditions.” Elliot wrote to Adderley: “On general grounds I think it quite the right course (to withdraw the troops); and the New Zealand ministers who are letting them go rather than pay for them, ought to be the best judges whether there exists any crisis to render their presence indispensable. This seems a strong ground for letting things take their course.” Adderley's minute to the Duke of Buckingham was: “I have not the smallest hesitation in saying that the embarkation should take its course. Not a shadow of a reason has been assigned against it, nor any offer of terms—but the reverse.” The Duke's decision was: “Embarkation to proceed.” C.O. 209, 207.
In the despatch of October 24 conveying his decision, he said: “Her Majesty's Government do not consider themselves at liberty to depart from the terms of the agreement under which the colonists of New Zealand were to take charge of native affairs and to undertake the duty of defending the colony against internal disturbance. And they are supported in this decision by observing that Mr. Stafford does not make any proposal whatever as to the terms on which this regiment is to remain in the colony. I have therefore no alternative but to inform you that its departure must not be delayed.” C.O. 209, 207.
Stafford's memorandum on the subject, dated August 8, set out that since October 1865 he had declined to advise that Imperial troops should be employed in the field or to accede on behalf of the colony to any formal conditions on which the single regiment now in New Zealand should be retained. “Mr. Stafford does not now propose to depart from the course which has been consistently pursued for the last three years.” The Colonial Office decision was therefore not surprising.
On September 5, 1868, Bowen transmitted a despatch by Colonel McDonnell describing the capture on August 21 by the colonial forces under his command of the fortified C.O. 209, 207.pa of Te-Ngutu-o-te-manu (or The Hawk's Beak), the principal stronghold of the cannibal chief, pa was partially destroyed before the troops departed. In his despatch Bowen wrote: “It will be seen (from a memorandum of Colonel Haultain) that Rewi, the chief of the hitherto hostile Ngatimaniapoto tribe, and one of the most resolute and formidable of the rebel leaders, has applied for and obtained a safe conduct to enable him to attend the Native Land Court and to plead therein his claim to a disputed portion of the Waikato territory.
In the pursuit of the East Coast Hauhaus by Colonel Whitmore an engagement was fought when the pursuers came up with the enemy, who were driven from an island on which they had taken up their position. Five of the attackers were killed and five wounded.
On October 7 Bowen reported a serious reverse sustained by a party of colonial troops on September 7 in endeavouring to penetrate the forests towards the rebel village, Te Ruaruru, behind Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu. Major von Tempsky and Captain Buck were killed: “A party of 360 men composed of 250 Europeans and 110 natives, under Lt.-Colonel McDonnell, set out at daylight from the headquarters at Waihi, marching a distance of ten miles, more than half through a rough and
pa, which is built on a small clearing surrounded by dense forest.… The enemy had been reinforced and had knowledge of the approach of our men, who, advancing hastily, fell into an ambuscade of Maoris placed in the branches and loophooled trunks of trees. Lt.-Colonel McDonnell ordered a retreat. Some of his officers thought that the enemy might yet be beaten out of his ambush and the pa successfully attacked. Meantime the men got into confusion; the officers began to fall under the fire from sharp-shooters in the trees; and a panic ensued. The result was a disastrous defeat. The men struggling through an almost impenetrable forest were followed up by a victorious enemy, and obliged to leave all the dead and many of the wounded on the field. After the loss of several of the officers there appears to have been an utter absence of order in the rearguard; many of the men threw away their arms and accoutrements, and had it not been for the help of the friendly native contingent, our loss must have been even more severe than it was. There is too much reason to fear that some barbarous cruelties were afterwards perpetrated by the Maoris upon the wounded, including one officer who fell alive into their hands. The loss in killed and wounded fell entirely upon the European force; none of the Maori contingent have been hit, as Maoris know how to keep under cover in bush fighting. Our loss was: Killed, Officers 5, men 12; Wounded, Officer 1, men 24; Missing, Men 2. Total 44.”
For an account of the battle by one of the officers engaged, Captain O'Halloran, see an article in The Times correspondent in a letter of October 8 (published on November 27) said that after the disaster “a thorough disorganization of the colonial forces in that district ensued…. McDonnell, from being the pet of everyone, was declared unfit for his position; numbers of the men swore they would never go out again. von Tempsky's company mutinied, and within the past month the force of about 77 has been reduced by desertions, mutiny, disbanding and expiration of service nearly one-half…. While I have not hesitated to speak of the colonial forces in very disparaging terms, I would have it understood that there are portions of them who are as true as steel. There is something in encountering a naked, yelling savage foe for the first time which has made even disciplined Imperial troops
The New Zealand Herald, September 9, 1933. by
The Times, in a leading article on November 28, said: “Englishmen, wherever they are, are never exempt from responsibility to the public opinion of England, and the letter which we published yesterday from our Wellington correspondent shows that it is full time the force of public opinion was brought to bear on the colonial policy.… These men appear, at a single check, and without seemingly having been pursued beyond the gully where the surprise befell them, to have thrown away their arms, abandoned their outposts, and, as soon as they found themselves in a place of safety, dissolved into a rabble of drunken mutineers. We know, in fact, that they were not troops from which the Colonial Administration had a right to anticipate very military conduct. A considerable part of them was composed of hasty levies made two months previously in the towns, and partaking therefore, probably, the character of an Australasian town population.… The Colonial Ministry and the Assembly, which is to the full as chargeable with the catastrophe, excuse themselves on the pretext of the improbability of the circumstances, which led to the outbreak. But with the elements of rebellion ever ready in the Maori race, an outbreak ought never to have seemed improbable.” A vigorous policy was advocated. Bowen, in his despatch, stated that he had instructed the two companies of the 18th Regiment stationed at Wellington to proceed to Wanganui to protect the town.
Sir The census of 1867 showed a rise in European population from 59,413 in 1858 to 218,637 in 1867.
“Notwithstanding all this, they have been pushing forward settlement into the confiscated lands as if they had an indefinite force at their command for the reduction of malcontents and the protection of the settlers. They have reduced their military force. They have refused to keep a military regiment on the terms on which (unfortunately as I think) it was offered them, and, though this is of less importance, they have so contested our pecuniary claims on them as to force us to abandon much of these claims for peace's sake.
“Now what we have warned them of happens. And they propose not to change their policy and draw in their settlements—not to give the Home Government the old control (imperfect and delusive enough) over the causes of war (which indeed would be impracticable if they did offer it)—not to pay toward the expenses of any troops left in New Zealand—but only that the regiment should be left because the Colonial Government has in fact for the last few years performed what Lord Carnarvon required and they (most fortunately, I think) rejected as a condition of keeping that regiment. I think that they ought not to receive that encouragement to carry out their past and present policy, which the retention of this regiment will give them—and I think that if it is retained the Home Government will find it extremely difficult not to employ it in active service, and will then find itself involved in all the old difficulties and responsibilities and disputes and expenses which have been found intolerable with regard to this colony. Of course if this revolt spreads and a massacre of Europeans is
C.O. 209, 208.Himalaya arrives it would be impossible to withdraw the troops and leave the settlers to their fate. But nothing short of such a pressing and most improbable necessity ought I think to be allowed to prevent the departure of the troops. I should write … that the abandonment by the Home Government of all control over native policy, and their consequent acquiescence in a line of policy in respect of confiscation and occupation of native lands which they considered highly dangerous to the future peace of the colony, was conditional on being totally relieved from any responsibility in respect to the protection of the settlers and control of the natives … that His Grace is convinced that in thus calling on the colonists to perform a task to which they are perfectly competent, if only their affairs are conducted with prudence, courage, and justice, he is, in the long run, consulting the truest interest both of New Zealand and of Great Britain.”
The Duke of Buckingham wrote: “I agree generally with Sir C.O. 209, 208.
Lord Granville succeeded the Duke of Buckingham as Secretary of State in December, 1868, and, in a memorandum from 16 Bruton Street, he wrote: “Would it not be well as there has been a change of Government here to write by the next mail to say that I entirely concur with my predecessor in desiring the remaining Regiment to be sent back.” C.O. 209, 208.
As a sequel to the defeat of September 7, Colonel See Cowan, II, 236–54. He states that many of the missing were killed. The battle was “Whitmore's one great blunder.” Whitmore has a chapter on “The Reverse at Moturoa” in his book, The Last Maori War in New Zealand. In it he says that throughout his West Coast campaign, “I was opposed pertinaciously, insubordination preached to my men, and my smallest action criticized with relentless spite, if not contorted and misrepresented.” See also With the Lost Legion in New Zealand, by Col. The Press, Christchurch, on January 12, 1869. Reference was made to “the perpetual abuse of the public press.” Whitmore was “not a popular man,” but “we don't want a popular man, we want a good soldier.”
“A few hours after this untoward intelligence from the West Coast the news reached Wellington from the East Coast of the massacre by the Hauhaus under C.O. 209, 208.
Lord Granville made the following minute: “The impression on my mind is that Col. Whitmore is a very fine fellow but destitute as he himself almost admits of the qualities which fit a man to obtain influence over the Maoris…. Cf. Gorton, C.O. 209, 208.Some Home Truths re the Maori War: “Colonel Whitmore as a commander was in many respects a success … it was very unfortunate that his manner was at times so offensive to his officers and his men, and also that he did not look better after the interests of the wounded.”
The Times, in a leading article of January 1, 1869, said: “The telegram of yesterday from Sydney will have made the last day of 1868 a time of gloom and apprehension in many English homes. The statement, made in a single line, that in New Zealand, ‘fifty Europeans, with their families, have been massacred,’ is at once so clear and so vague as to spread terror throughout the numerous households which have relatives in the North Island. Information from Wellington had shown that up to the beginning of November the new Maori War had been a continuous series of disasters on the side of the colonists, till, at its date they had actually been compelled to exchange an offensive for what was mainly a defensive attitude. Yesterday's intelligence would imply that the rebellion has reached a new and yet more alarming stage. But even such a tragedy is still only a consequence which was to have been anticipated from the conduct pursued by the colony itself. A cry may very likely, we fear, be raised on behalf of making
The Times printed an extract from the Wellington Evening Post giving details of the distribution by
Correspondence on the subject of New Zealand ensued in The Times. One correspondent signing himself “G. G.” combated the suggestion that Sikhs should be sent and asserted that the Imperial troops had accomplished not too little but too much in New Zealand. Sir
In a letter to The Times, published on May 26,
Richmond described the difficulties of administration in New Zealand arising from the great dispersion of population and the ease with which men could move off to safe districts and other colonies to avoid militia service. He suggested that the New Zealand Government might be allowed to raise a volunteer corps, both officers and men, from the British arm, for service for a definite number of years, at no cost to the Imperial Treasury. Another mode of assistance would be “the endorsement of the Colonial Bills.” A commission of inquiry might be set up to ascertain the financial and commercial prospects of the colonies with a view to some comprehensive action in this direction. “Perhaps,” he concluded, “I am altogether visionary in these suggestions, and Great Britain's eyes are turned inwards too much to allow her leaders to ex-
The Times described this letter as an able reply to its question “What can the colony of New Zealand want or expect from this country?” “Nevertheless, though we neither contradict nor disparage the pleas of our correspondent, we must avow our own persistence in the convictions we have expressed. It is not our duty nor is it in the interests of the colony, that we should take upon ourselves the protection of the colonial population.”
On January 21, 1869, a telegraphic message described the Poverty Bay massacre. “Men were burnt alive, children mutilated, and the dead bodies of women thrown to the pigs.” On January 22 The Times, in its first leading article, advocated the raising and officering of a well-trained native force, as the best method of bringing to an end “these otherwise interminable New Zealand wars.”
The Wellington correspondent of The Times, in a letter of December 8, printed on January 30, described the Poverty Bay massacre and the disastrous campaign on the West Coast, where the attack by Colonel Whitmore on the Okutuku pa had failed, every port north of Patea had been abandoned, and the Weraroa Redoubt, after being held against a Maori attack, also deserted. The correspondent referred to the successful campaign of General Chute who had handed the West Coast to the Government “with the natives thoroughly broken and admitting their defeat.” Then from one end of the colony to the other rose the cry for economy. “The self-reliant policy cost money.” The result was the inadequacy of the force maintained after the regular troops left. “The East Coast troubles arise in some measure out of the same economical policy—the miserable guard at the Chathams being perfectly useless.… It is not pleasant, after the almost defiant tone adopted towards
Commenting on this letter in a leading article of February 2, 1869, The Times said: “As long as British troops were sent out to fight the natives, all went on comfortably, the Colonial Legislature had nothing to do but to vote thanks to the distinguished General, the gallant officers and men, and to extend to them and their naval brethren an agreeable hospitality. But no sooner is the system changed than the New Zealand public becomes singularly parsimonious in the matter of the Maoris.”
In a despatch of December 7, 1868, Bowen referred to the difficulty of securing a definite policy towards the Maoris “when almost every leading member of both Houses has a native policy of his own, and is swayed by various kinds of personal and local feelings and interests. A portion of the population of the Northern Island of New Zealand, under the pressure of the long-continued Maori War, and of the recent disasters, would regard with complacency the suspension of the existing constitution in this island, or, at least, a return to the system in force up to the year 1862, under which the Governor, directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, possessed the control of native affairs….”
The main causes of the long continuance of the Maori War, he said, were generally believed to be:
Bowen, who stated that “at the Gate Fortescue states that this assertion, often made, is incorrect.Pa, near Tauranga in 1864, the 43rd Regiment appears to have lost more officers
Lord Granville's comment was as follows: “Sir C.O. 209, 208.
In a despatch to Bowen, dated February 26, 1869, Lord Granville complained of insufficient information on the origin of the disturbances: “In the first place I find it said that the escape of the prisoners from the Chatham Islands is to be ascribed to the fact that they had been taken there with the expectation if not the promise that they should be brought back to New Zealand after a given time; that it was only after this expectation or promise was left unfulfilled that they made their escape, and that on their return to their country they did not offer any violence to the settlers till attempts were made to hunt them down. I find it also said that the disturbances on the West Coast arose from an arbitrary seizure of two natives as pledges or hostages for the return of two horses which were retaken by the natives after having been captured by General Chute.… I see it stated in the newspapers that you have offered a reward of £1,000 for the person of the Maori chief Tito
C.O. 209, 208. Captain The Poverty Bay Massacre, thesis by Marjorie E. S. Black.) See also East Coast Historical Records (
In replying to this despatch, Bowen enclosed a memorandum by Stafford, dated May 21, 1869, in which he quoted the following from a speech of
Cf. Sir Edward Stafford: A Memoir, by Edward Wakefield, who ascribes the failure to answer
C.O. 209, 211.
But Rolleston's own report of his visit to the Chatham Islands, dated February 3, 1868, shows that he did release eight men—a fact which naturally tended to increase the impatience of those left behind. Moreover, Rolleston commented on the “unsatisfactory character of the military guard,” members of which had figured “rather as a public nuisance than as a protection or example of discipline and order to the community.” The sick natives unanimously maintained that they were neglected, and altogether there was abundant reason to expect trouble.
When the storm of Ibid., 208.
Bowen, in a despatch of December 18, forwarded a letter
C.O. 209, 208.
On January 10, 1869, Bowen reported the fall of The Maori death-roll is estimated by Cown at 136, “of whom 120 were summarily executed after capture” by order of Ropata, leader of the Ngati-Porou native contingent—“the most vigorous and successful of all the Maori officers who served the Government” (Cowan, II, pp. 268–74). See also Whitmore, op. cit., pp. 83–4, and C.O. 209, 210.With the Lost Legion in New Zealand, pp. 286–315. Of Ropata's execution of the prisoners Browne writes: “You must remember… we were fighting without gloves, and that it was war to the knife.” New of Whitmore's victory, telegraphed from Colombo, was announced in Parliament on February 26.
In a letter of January 18, 1869, published on March 22, The Times Wellington correspondent wrote that in the capture of Ngatapa Colonel Whitmore was assisted by a fine body of 60 Arawas, under a European officer. “The Ngatiporous, comprising the remainder of the natives, were under their own chiefs, and, with no present idea of the value of ‘push,’ were coming up leisurely.”
“Oh! the delays and vexations” (writes one of the officers) “attendant on employing native allies. East Coast or West Coast, they are all alike, and many a commanding officer has seen his best plans thwarted by the non-fulfilment of their engagements. By themselves, or detribalized—i.e. enlisted, and serving under European officers, like Gundry's Arawas—they can be relied on; but under their chiefs the relative position of the moon and a star, the shape of the clouds, the direction of the wind, a dream, may upset all the arrangements. It is too bad to watch
Commenting on the victory on March 23, The Times said that if the outcry raised in the first moment of panic had been listened to, half a dozen regiments would have been sent to New Zealand only to find the whole work done by a single battalion of natives enlisted on the spot.
Cf. J. H. Kerry Nicholls, The Times correspondent in a letter of February 16, published on April 18, 1870, described an interview between The King Country, 1884, pp. 334-5. By this time
Folsom, The New Zealand crisis of 1868 and 1869 has been described as “the most critical of all in the years when the permanence of Empire seemed to be seriously at stake,”The Royal Empire Society, p. 29.
Sir Parts of these communications are given after Bowen's summary.
“Both the professed friends and the professed opponents of the so-called ‘self-reliant policy’ equally cry aloud for help from the Mother Country,” wrote Bowen. “Mr. FitzGerald and the former party ask for ‘money,’ while Sir C.O. 209, 210.
In his letter, dated November 21, 1868, and published in the Nelson Examiner, Sir
“I said last year that I could understand one Government for the colony, or I could understand nine Governments for the colony, but that I could not understand how the two things could co-exist. The experience of the last session in our Parliament has been a pretty commentary upon this view of the case. What has it really been but a chapter of bloodless civil war, in which the weapons were resolutions instead of swords and muskets? And what was the spectacle which the action of the House of Representatives offered to the country? Two parties almost equally balanced, each claiming under the Constitution Act a certain position and grumbling like a couple of cull-dogs on the floor of the House, the unhappy country in the meantime going to the wall.… I will go further than merely asking the Home Government to resume to itself the control of native affairs. The country is, in my opinion, in most imminent danger, and likely to be so for a considerable time. I would ask Her Majesty to send out a Commission to inquire into the state of the colony, and to report to her upon it; and I would ask her to clothe that Commission with the most ample powers. I should like to see it suspend the Constitution Act in the North Island and to assume the position and vigour of a dictator. It is no time when armed bands of murderers are marching through a country and the flames of blazing homesteads are reddening the skies, for a discordant Parliament to be wrangling and coming to no results.” C.O. 209, 210.
In his letter published in C.O. 209, 210.The Independent, Wellington, money and arms….”
On January 28, 1869, The Times contained an account of a complimentary dinner to
Major Atkinson, responding to the toast of the Army, Navy, and Volunteers, said that the volunteers would value the compliment paid to them that evening, “because much had been said and written in England which might lead people to think that the colonists were fighting an unjust cause.” Not-withstanding the late disasters, he was firmly convinced that the colonists were capable of taking care of themselves.
Fitzherbert in his speech said: “Remembering what sacrifice England had recently made to liberate some 20 Europeans from captivity in Abyssinia, he would never believe that she would remain indifferent to the agony of a young colony where not only men but women and children were exposed to the brutal tortures of the cruel Maoris.”
Lord Granville read a telegram received that afternoon to the effect that the rebels responsible for the Poverty Bay massacre had been defeated in two engagements with severe loss. He said he felt sure that the people of England would all feel the greatest sympathy with the colonists, not only on the
The Times, in its first leading article on January 29, said: “However abundant may be the news, and however urgent the political questions at home, we never need offer an apology for calling attention to the colony of New Zealand. That young settlement, the little Benjamin of the Anglo-Saxon family, has always been a favourite with the English public.” After referring to the history of the colony and the generosity of the mother-country to it, the article proceeded: “We cannot therefore encourage the hopes which animated Mr.Fitzherbert's speech at the New Zealand dinner on Wednesday.… We have paid far more than enough for New Zealand, and our people will rather be disposed to approve the sentiments of Major Atkinson who is ‘firmly convinced that the colonists are capable of taking care of themselves.’ … This is the manly tone in which we desire to hear men of our race speak; and it is satisfactory to find that Lord Granville did not commit the Home Government to any other policy than that which has recently received the approval of the country.… The greater the efforts of the colonists to merit Lord Granville's eulogies, the stronger will be that sympathy which is asked of the English public.” The Times went on to notice once more the disparity of numbers between the colonists and the disaffected Maoris.
Lord Granville's after-dinner speech and eulogy of the colonists did not alter the tone of his correspondence with the New Zealand Government, for it was on March 21, 1869, that he wrote the despatch which was to cause controversy by its curt rejection of the proposal for a fresh loan to the colony of £1,500,000. Granville asserted that the Home Government, after a number of Englishmen, “without any invitation or encouragement” from that Government, had taken on themselves to form settlements in New Zealand, “never at any time attempted to make New Zealand tributary to Great Britain or to direct local affairs in such a way as to produce any political or pecuniary advantage to this country.” Granville further asserted that a great part of the Imperial expenditure in the colony “might be regarded as the price paid by this country
“So far therefore as there is any equitable claim remaining unsettled, it is not a claim on the part of New Zealand against Great Britain but the reverse—a claim, and, if it were thought proper to urge it, a very heavy claim on the part of the Mother Country against the colony.” Granville concluded by expressing the view that “the present dangers of New Zealand are not due to the punctual performance of their obligations to the Maori race, but rather to their adoption of a policy which, if not inconsistent with those obligations, was certain to appear so to the natives affected by it.” C.O. 406, 25.
Granville's plain words caused a storm among the New Zealand colonists in London, but as we shall see later, P. 370.The Press, Christchurch, on January 13, 1869: “Ten thousand of the best troops in the world … could not maintain peace against a policy of occupying confiscated lands by outlying settlers against the will of the natives. If every owner of twenty acres on the frontier of a hostile territory is to be maintained in his possession by force of arms, New Zealand must become a second Algeria.”
On February 12 Bowen reported the evacuation by The plan of the C.O. 209, 210.pa at Taurangaika near Nukumaru,pa is shown in the illustration facing p. 352.pas of
On February 22, 1869, Bowen reported the murder on February 13 of the Rev.
The Wellington correspondent of Rev. The Times in a letter of March 12, published on May 17, wrote: “Matters are daily getting worse and worse, and the good hope with which the colony was inspired when Ngatapa was captured is again in danger of becoming despondent, the rebellion having spread in such a way as to indicate the necessity of coping with it, no longer at one point at a time, but on all sides at once. The Times yet again recited the story of the disparity in numbers between Maoris and settlers, and added: “Our New Zealand colonists do not pretend for a moment they are too weak or too few to compete with the savages around them. They are only too rich and too busy.”
On March 11, 1869, Bowen forwarded a ministerial memorandum inquiring on what conditions a portion of Her Majesty's
(1) Will one regiment be allowed to remain if the Legislature bind itself to accept the conditions specified in Lord Carnarvon's despatch No. 49 of December 1, 1866, namely, that the grant of £50,000 per annum for native purposes be continued? (2) If not, then what payment per head for each officer and man would be required; and could more than one regiment be left if paid for by the colony? (3) If troops are retained, could they, when directed by the Governor, be employed in active service in the field to suppress insurrections? (4) If not allowed to be employed in the field, would they be allowed to occupy in sufficient numbers positions to act as supports to colonial outposts though not required to take part in active operations, and would the Governor be empowered to determine at what posts they should be stationed? (5) If full discretion is not allowed to the Governor, might troops be stationed at such of the following posts as he might indicate—namely, Auckland, New Plymouth, Wanganui, Wellington, Napier, Tauranga, Ngaruawahia, Taupo, Patea; and what would be the minimum strength of a detachment stationed at any of the four places?
Sir “(1) That the settlers are encouraged in the extravagant notion of
subduing the natives—holding confiscated lands—exercising authority over the Maori King, and so on; (2) that the Home Government is entangled as principal in a fresh Maori War if it takes the conduct of affairs; (3) that the troops are sacrificed, the officers involved in barbarous modes of warfare, and the commanding officer engaged in continual quarrels with the Governor and Government of the colony if the Imperial Government is only auxiliary and subordinate.”
The alternatives, he stated, were:
(1) To withdraw the troops relentlessly, though it may be with a little delay.… (2) To take the war on our backs and send out troops in plenty and a military officer to replace Sir
“I should be disposed to number (3). If a harsher tone were taken it would perhaps require to be supported by saying that it was not a mere matter of money—but a difference of policy which led to this course;—that to enforce the submission of the Maori nation involved evidently a protracted war pregnant with calamity to both races, that so long as the colonists entertained the notion of enforcing that submission no real progress could be made towards a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, and that the offer of assistance from the Mother Country only encouraged them in holding an untenable position and delaying those overtures for compromise in which, if made seriously in good faith, and with the admission that large concessions had become necessary, the best hope of avoiding great disasters was to be found.”
Lord Granville's minute was: “I see nothing in these papers to induce me to change the policy which has already been decided upon.… In mere guerilla warfare the regulars are not much superior to the local forces. Such a war would be conducted at a great disadvantage either by a joint command or by an Imperial officer, who might not have the confidence of the local Government. Please send the papers by messenger to Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden, who will have time to inform you by telegraph if he thinks my despatch should be sent.”
Gladstone's verdict was: “I agree with the draft despatch. Mr. Stafford's memorandum is like that of one who either seeks to gain time by communications during which he reckons on the retention of the troops, or who has no strong sense of the necessity of troops, at all. Did he think it a question of the safety of the Colony, he would not bargain about terms for the moment but leave them to be settled. The confused state of the executive instructions seems to require notice and rec-
Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War, agreed with the course proposed. He wrote from Plymouth on May 20: “Ever since I have known N.Z. affairs I have been convinced that the policy of the colonists would result in making the ejected Maoris ‘a desperate banditti,’ and would leave the new settlers exposed to their vengeance as soon as the troops should be withdrawn. Especially was this evident when the Waikato campaign and the Taranaki campaign were resolved upon for the purpose of seizing fertile districts far in advance of our occupation. The Taranaki campaign was undertaken after the colony, at Mr. Weld's instance, had adopted the policy of self-reliance, and had demanded the withdrawal of the troops. It led to the quarrel between Grey and Cameron. I refer to this because I have no doubt we shall have to justify ourselves in Parliament—and I am confident that my first despatch (April 1864) and each subsequent one, when occasion required, contain a full expression of these views and threw the whole responsibility of extension, and the liability to afford protection entirely upon the colonists.… A series of massacres in New Zealand now would be seized upon by our opponents in Parliament, some discredit would be thrown upon the general policy of self-reliance, and our withdrawal of the troops from Canada retarded.… I have written to Lugard to make our instructions follow your lead.” C.O. 209, 210.
The despatch to Bowen in reply to Stafford's memorandum was dated May 21, 1869: “I have failed to find in it any basis upon which to change the policy which after the rejection by the Government of New Zealand of Lord Carnarvon's proposal had been adopted by my predecessors and myself.”
On March 11 Bowen forwarded a ministerial minute on the Confiscation policy: “The present Government is of opinion that it would be impolitic to attempt to extend settlements in distant or isolated parts of the confiscated lands, and further that it has had for some time under consideration the policy of extending the liberality which has already been shown to the natives who have been dispossessed of portions of their lands
C.O. 209, 210.
pa called Rauporoa on the Whakatane River. The pa was held by friendly natives, most of whom managed to escape.
In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on March 15 Ibid., 211.
Dr.
On March 26, 1869, the New Zealand Advertiser, Wellington, wrote: “The Queen's speech in opening the reformed Parliament, reiterates with the courtesy to be expected in a manifesto of the Government of Mr. Gladstone, the cardinal idea which was conveyed with the perfection of official rudeness in the first despatch bearing Lord Granville's signature as Secretary of State for the Colonies. The despatch, a production doubtless of some sour doctrinaire of the Colonial Office, ruling from behind his official screen, must be read as conveying in ungracious terms the resolve of the new Ministry that among its economies one of the first and least debateable is the repudiation of all liability for the defence of the colonies. Language could not be plainer or more ungracious. … We are prepared to justify the British Government in the line of policy they are adopting towards us, if only their decisions are conveyed in terms not studied to offend—if, in short, the Minister for the Colonies will take the trouble to read the documents laid before him by his subordinates before signing them.”
There should not be wanting evidence in this volume to prove that successive Secretaries of State not only read the despatches they signed about New Zealand but had a considerable share in framing them. Lord Granville, as we have seen, went out of his way, on assuming office, to declare his approval of his predecessor's policy. The Colonial Office despatches were for the most part politely expressed and they can stand comparison with the memoranda of the New Zealand ministers.
In a confidential despatch of July 15, 1869 (printed for Parliament on April 8, 1870), Granville informed Bowen that he had requested the Admiralty to instruct commanding officers of H.M. ships cruising near New Zealand to shew themselves for the present as much as possible on the coasts of the North Island. “Although no force is to be landed from H.M.'s ships for any ordinary operations of war, the officers in command will be instructed that in the case—I hope very improbable—of any great disaster, they are to take such steps as may be necessary to save the lives and properties of Europeans in the maritime settlements. I wish you to consider this despatch as very confidential and not to be communicated to your advisers at present.”
In his letter to the Admiralty, dated July 6, Sir
In a despatch of May 2, 1869, Bowen reported that though
In his speech, delivered by commissioners at the opening of the session of the New Zealand Parliament for 1869, the Governor said: “The conquest of a permanent peace will require an exceptional expenditure beyond what is advisable to levy in the shape of annual revenue, and a portion of it should be provided for by loan. An application for a guarantee to such loan has been made to the British Government. You will probably believe that the condition of the country requires a renewal of the application, and justifies the hope that the last prayer of the colony to the Mother Country will not be rejected.” Some exception was taken to the tone of portions of the speech by Colonial Office officials, but Lord Granville decided that it would be better to take no notice.
The Times correspondent in a letter of May 15, published on July 12, 1869, said: “The whole island is more or less in a state bordering on bankruptcy, population leaving, property reduced immensely, capital and enterprise scared. No wonder we are looking eagerly to the home country for help, and that the Press, with few exceptions, comment bitterly on England's barren sympathy. I am aware that such comments are wholly unjustifiable all the while our own Ministry steadily refuses to ask for Imperial troops, and professes to treat Imperial help in that direction as interference. But, as we are so much worse off now than we were a year ago, as there seems so little prospect of making permanent headway, and as the cost is so immeasurably greater than we can bear, it will not be the fault of the Northern Island members if the self-reliant policy is not reversed at the approaching session of Assembly.”
The Times correspondent, in a letter published on August 9, criticized experimentum crucis, had he thrown himself into the breach and re-
Notes on New Zealand Affairs (1869.)
On July 1, 1869, Bowen reported that the Stafford ministry had been defeated on a vote of no-confidence by 40 votes to 29. Cf. Edward Wakefield in Sir Edward Stafford: A Memoir: “The Poverty Bay massacre was a grievous blow to Mr. Stafford, and though he was in no way to blame for it, he suffered heavily in popularity and prestige.”
The Times on July 22, 1869, in a review of a Blue book issued by the Colonial Office on New Zealand affairs, referring to Grey's recall, said: “The circumstances…lifted him into the position of a martyr whose martyrdom was incurred in the service of the colony, and the colonial press, during his last few months of office, were more unanimous in his praise than they had been at any time during the many years of his terms of office.” The review described the “general retrogression in
Lyttelton Times summary received by the latest mail: “Property steadily declines in value, old-established businesses are verging on ruin, and men are leaving our shores in utter despair.” The reviewer, however, saw “no reason to doubt the future of New Zealand.”
In a leading article on the debate in the House of Commons of July 22, The Times on July 23 said: “It is an unpleasant task to take the rigid and relentless side in such a question as this: so true indeed is this that we shall not be surprised if the later and sterner dogmas of the Colonial Office be abandoned and the settlers gratified with a modicum of Imperial assistance on their own terms. But, in justice to the English taxpayer, we must ask the legislature to be cautious in its liberality. Let it be remembered that the so-called ‘self-reliant policy’ came as much from the colonists as from the English public.” The Times recommended the colonists and their friends to study the speeches which Mr. Monsell and Sir C. Adderley, representing the two great parties in the country, made on this occasion. “Mr. Monsell dissipated the arguments used by the colonists to the effect that England had by past errors incurred an indefinite and insoluble debt to the settlers, and both gentlemen agreed in upholding the principle that the colony, in return for independence in its internal affairs, should defend itself from internal enemies.”
On July 28 The Times devoted its first leading article to the debate in the House of Lords on the previous day. The Bishop of Lichfield (Selwyn) spoke “manfully and feelingly” for the natives. “It is generally agreed, and the Bishop assents to the opinion that our practice of managing the Maoris from this side of the world, has been one of the greatest mistakes of our policy. Their destiny now is, for good or evil, in the hands of the European settlers.… It is to them, and not to us, that the pleadings of the Bishop should be addressed.”
Fox, in a memorandum of July 22, wrote: “The alarming news contained in the enclosed communications just received from Waikato and elsewhere of the arrival of C.O. 209, 212.
On August 14 General Chute wrote from Melbourne to the Under-Secretary of State for War that he had consented to retain the regiment, pending further instructions. He stated that Dr. Featherston, the Superintendent of Wellington, had arrived, “having been deputed by the New Zealand Government, at the desire of His Excellency the Governor, to urge upon me the imminent danger of a rising in the Waikato, and the necessity of retaining the 18th Regiment, and to furnish me with any information I might require.”
In his despatch of October 7 in reply, Lord Granville said that the Act and resolutions transmitted by Sir On receipt of the telegram Granville had written to Sir British Colonial Policy, pp. 367, 393–6, for a description of Granville's attitude towards New Zealand affairs. He was “by birth and manner an aristocratic Whig, and by conviction a Manchester Radical.”
On September 2, 1869, Bowen reported that a number of copies of the “protest” against the recent policy of the Colonial Office, published in England by Sir By the C.O. 209, 213.Saturday Review, see next page.
The signatories of the Protest published in London were Sir C.O. 209, 213.
W. Dealtry, in a Colonial Office minute on the reference to the Secretary of State being “led by wrong information to attach his name to some despatch,” wrote: “I am rather surprised at an old public servant like Sir Hutt, in C.O. 209, 214.The Times, June 3, 1869, contested Granville's statement that “a number of Englishmen” without invitation or encouragement from the British Government, “took on themselves to form a colony in New Zealand.” He asserted that the enterprise had received encouragement from Lord Normanby. Colonial Office action, however, was with-held, and “Mr. Somes, Mr. Gibbon Wakefield, another gentleman and myself determined to fit out an English expedition of our own. We subscribed £5,000 and chartered a ship which—oddly enough for a swift-going vessel—was called the Tory.” Hutt described the French plan and the project of convict colonization, revealed by the Journal du Havre. See England and New Zealand, chapter 5.
Bowen forwarded as a specimen of Press comments the following from the Ibid., 213.Otago Witness: “The necessity for some sort of representation of colonial interests at home is specially noticeable in the case of New Zealand.… With the public opinion of the Mother Country deliberately set against us, it is not likely that we can shake the resolution of the Imperial Government to disregard our claims. One good result, however, may flow from the unpleasant conflict of opinion which is now at its height, between the Colony and the Imperial Government. The Colony may become convinced that its relations with the Mother Country must be placed on a very different footing or else abandoned. The absurdity as well as the iniquity of the present system is too great to last much longer.… Possibly it may be the policy of that (the Imperial) Government to reduce the dimensions of the British Empire, with a view to the concentration of its military force and the reduction of its expenditure. In that view of the case the concoction of such despatches as Earl Granville's is intelligible enough. No one can fail to notice that the tone of these documents is even more offensive than the subject-matter. They show no desire to conciliate the colonists; on the contrary, they suggest the idea that the writer is not unwilling to irritate them when an opportunity offers. ‘It would be a grave misfortune,’ says the Saturday Review, in an article on this despatch, ‘if American rancour against England were to extend to Canada, to Australia and to New Zealand.’ Should such a revolution take place, the historian will have no difficulty so far as New Zealand is concerned, in tracing its rise and progress.”
In a letter of November 22, 1869, to Sir
Grey returned to the attack on December 20. He contended that “one General Officer and some few persons following his example had led a policy of violence in the country, committing acts of great violence against prisoners and secretly throwing the blame on other persons.” He asserted “that the Colonial Office concealed some of these acts, and facts connected with them, even from H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, and from the Governor and Civil Government of the country whose authority had been set at nought, and generally by such proceedings stamped them with its approval.” “The power,” Grey added, “has all been on your side, and I cannot but feel that it has enabled you for the moment to triumph over me. Nevertheless, I know that this triumph ought to be and will be but short-lived, and I indulge the hope that even your Lordship will before long admit that neither the Empire, New Zealand, the inhabitants of New Zealand, nor myself have in this case received just treatment from the Colonial Department, or at your hands.” C.O. 209, 215.
The letter was written after an interview with Lord Granville and W. Monsell, by Sir C.O. 209, 215. Quoted in H. L. Hall, Australiasian, Melbourne, which, on October 9, expressed the view that when a colony really wanted help in time of danger, the Colonial Office became indifferent whether it remained in the Empire.Australia and England, p. 105.
On September 3 Bowen reported by telegram that Dr. Featherston and C.O. 209, 213.inter alia, whether Ghoorka Regiments or other bodies of disciplined men might be secured for duty under the Colonial Government. In a despatch of September 19 Bowen forwarded a memorandum by Fox on the visit of the Commissioners to England: “One great object … is the establishment of cordial relations between the Imperial and the Colonial Government, which appear to have been more or less disturbed by the manner in which the question of the maintenance of Imperial troops in the colony, and some other matters, have lately been discussed.” The Colonial Office instruction for the despatch in reply was: “Earnestly concur in the hope, etc.”
Discussing the lack of success of the campaign against the Maoris carried out “at the instigation of Mr. Richmond, the Native Minister, and against the better judgment of Colonel
The Times on September 9 welcomed Fox's advent to office and the announcement of “a temperate and restrained native policy”: “Instead of fitting out expeditions to the heart of the island, composed of raw levies, liable to grow mutinous under mismanagement, Mr. Fox proposes to withdraw the constabulary from the interior, to weed them, and convert them, as far as possible, into a purely defensive force. He proposes the abandonment of advanced and isolated posts and of much of the confiscated land, and by these measures he hopes to reduce the native expenditure to a sum within the means of the colony, and far below a thousand pounds a day at which rate it is now running on. We believe this policy to be in every way the wisest and most attainable. It is, of course, still far from satisfactory that a great part of the North Island of New Zealand should be tacitly abandoned to natives among whom the Queen's writ does not run; but the surrender is only for the present.… New Zealand, now in its extremity compelled to a safe and humble policy, can hardly adopt its extremity compelled to a safe and humble policy, can hardly adopt it without some regret and self-accusation. She certainly has not the consolation of having spilt her blood and spent her money to much advantage since she first undertook the entire conduct of her own affairs, and can only feel mortified that both have been squandered with a blundering profusion.… We have no wish to be hard on the colony; we must remember that it was the theatre not so very long ago of some very bungling Imperial campaigns, and the Mother Country has little cause to underrate the difficulties of a native war; but we did think, when the departure of the troops was speeded with such indignant invectives on their cost and incapacity, that the experience of the colonists was worth more than it has proved to be, and that they would be wise enough to enter on the practice of a judicious economy, not of the penny-wisdom and pound-foolishness into which they soon deviated.”
The despatch of Bowen of August 5, 1869, concerning the removal of the last of the troops in the midst of the crisis due to the actions of Cf. J. W. Fortescue, in The Times on October 12. It was the subject of the first leading article on October 14, and Lord Granville's refusal to grant Imperial troops was approved. “We think New Zealand will in no very long time
History of the British Army, XIII, p. 513: “The Governor, a pusillanimous old pedant, shrieked to England for help, and the whole colony cried out against the removal of the Eighteenth.… This Governor was more frightened than anyone. He actually descended to write foreboding of horrors that would compare with those at Delhi and Cawnpore, and to forward extracts from colonial newspapers which advocated annexation of New Zealand to the United States. But no pathetic periods of his quaking Excellency could move the hard heart of the Imperial Government.” The reflection on the Governor's courage seems scarcely justified, and he would have been failing in his duty if he had not kept the Home Government informed of public opinion on annexation to the United States. In a private letter to W. Dealtry, on April 13, 1869, Bowen wrote: “I am considered by all competent judges on the spot to have greatly under-rated the dangers which threatened this colony” (C.O. 209, 210).
The Times correspondent, in a letter from Wellington on September 4, 1869 (published on November 2), said: “We were surprised to learn by the last mail what a hubbub the publication of Lord Granville's despatch of the 21st of March had occasioned among the friends of the colony in London. No one took any particular notice of it when published here. We have got so accustomed to this kind of despatch that we regard them as a matter of course; thanks to our London friends notwithstanding. We are truly grateful for the good offices of the London committee, and the Press throughout the colony has not been slow in saying so; but I think we take a juster view of these despatches than our friends do. They lay the blame on the Home Government for not helping us, while we wonder that the Home Government has, under the circumstances, helped us so long. For the last three years England has been told by the late Colonial Ministry that we did not want her troops, or that, if we did, we did not want them sufficiently to pay for them. If under the reversal of that policy by the Fox Ministry our earnest appeal for aid should now be made to a deaf Throne, then such despatches might well create surprise and consternation.”
In a letter to The Times of November 3, 1869, Lord Carnarvon dealt with the relations of New Zealand and the mother-country. After conceding that “it has not been difficult to make out a strong case as against the colony,” he went on: “In the gov-
The Times, in a leading article on the same day, described the letter as “eminently temperate” but took exception to the epithets applied to Lord Granville's correspondence. It dismissed as “wild and vague” the reference to possible appeal to a foreign power, and stated that the grounds of the Government's refusal to help the colony were simple and conclusive: They disapproved the Maori policy which the colonists had long pursued, more especially as it was not backed by any resolute attitude of self-reliance or self-defence. The colonists would neither conciliate the Maoris nor boldly encounter them.
Nevertheless, conditions in the colony were improving. In a despatch of October 14, 1869, describing a journey through the North Island, Bowen mentioned that C.O. 209, 213.Pa the defenders sent him a message that if he liked to employ them they would themselves contract to do all his sapping for him on reasonable terms.”
In a despatch of October 22, Bowen protested against certain errors in newspaper reports of the speech delivered by the Hon. William Monsell, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons on July 22, 1869. Monsell was reported to have said that the Chatham Islands prisoners had been sent there for two years only, and did not cause any trouble till that time had expired. He had also stated that “the C.O. 209, 213.Governor, though he made no military preparations, insisted on endeavouring to recapture the prisoners.”Himalaya transport. He received a severe rebuke for the tone of the despatch in a Colonial Office despatch of January 28, 1870.
Bowen reported on October 28, 1869, that
A memorandum by ministers on Lord Granville's despatch of October 7, 1869, was dated January 7, 1870; “Ministers feel assured that throughout the colony there will arise a universal feeling of regret that the tone of Earl Granville's despatch (written at a time when he must have known the colony to be in the greatest distress), is scarcely susceptible of any other explanation than a desire to abandon this country and to sever its connection with the Empire. Confiscation of part of the land belonging to rebel natives in arms against the Crown is the principal feature to which His Lordship takes objection. Whatever may be its defects, a reference to official documents will show that the Imperial Government is equally with the Colonial Government responsible for it.”
[C.O. marginal note: “Both are equally responsible for the opinion that the policy is just—at least, if applied to those who deserved the punishment. But the Imperial Government never committed itself to the opinion that it was wise. It warned the colony that if the policy should bring trouble—on which point it could form no independent opinion—the question depending purely on local considerations—they were not to look to England for help.”]
Replying to the memorandum on March 25, Lord Granville wrote: “Her Majesty's Government absolutely disavow any wish on their part to abandon New Zealand, or to bring about the separation between this country and the colony. The refusal to retain the troops in New Zealand did not proceed from any indifference to the true welfare of the colony, but from a conviction that on the one hand the employment of British troops in a colony possessed of responsible government was objectionable in principle except in the case of foreign war, and under conditions arising out of such a war; and on the other hand it is not for the true interest of the colony itself that New Zealand should be made an exception from that rule, which, with due consideration from circumstances, is in course of application to other colonies.” C.O. 209, 216. The “course of its application” to Canada is described by Stacey, op. cit.; cf. Granville to Lord Russell, August 28, 1869: “Our relations with North America are of a very delicate character. The best solution of them would probably be that in the course of time and in the most friendly spirit the Dominion should find itself strong enough to proclaim her independence” (Fitzmaurice, Life of Earl Granville, III, 22).
Bowen, in a despatch of February 13, asked that the confidential despatch informing him of the naval measures taken to protect the settlements should be made known, in view of the imminent departure of the troops. Such knowledge, he said, “would contribute powerfully to remove the irritation now fostered by a portion of the local Press against the Imperial Government and to put an end to the ventilation of projects for separation from Great Britain and for seeking protection from the United States of America, or other foreign powers.” He added that there was a suggestion that the colony should decline to pay the Governor's salary. The Colonial Office at first decided to print the despatch, but the order was countermanded by Monsell and Lord Kimberley. In a despatch of February 19 Bowen reported the march of Kemp (Te Kepa) and Topia in pursuit of
On February 25, 1870, Bowen reported that the last detachment of the 2/18th Regiment had left New Zealand on the previous day. The long discussed exodus of the Imperial troops was at last complete.
A memorandum by Fox, the Prime Minister, dated March 28, deprecated the “unpatriotic harshness” of the Imperial Government's attitude to New Zealand: “To satisfy the theories of Lord Granville as to responsibility New Zealand must cease to be a part of the Empire.” In reply Granville referred to the agreement to guarantee a loan of £1,000,000 to the colony for roads and immigration and the instruction with regard to naval protection, and added that he hoped that these evidences of the continued interest of the Home Government in the colony relieved him from the necessity of reopening matters of controversy. In reply to Granville's disavowal of desire to abandon New Zealand, Ministers in a memorandum of June 11, wrote: “They cannot suppose that it in the least effects the
C.O. 209, 216. The theme is discussed in Stacey, op. cit., 215–18. Granville wrote to Sir
George Higinbotham, in his speech of November 2, 1869, introducing resolutions on the rights of the colonists of Victoria to complete local self-government, had characterized the refusal of the Home Government to allow the Imperial troops to be retained in New Zealand as “ungracious.” He believed that a similar application from a weak independent Government to a “neighbouring powerful country” would not have been refused. The attitude of the Government in England raises the question whether the Australian colonies should continue their connection with the mother-country, and if so, on what conditions.Memoir of George Higinbotham, p. 164. Higinbotham was formerly Attorney-General of Victoria and later became Chief Justice.
In a leading article of March 8, 1870, The Times referred to the House of Lords debate on the previous day: “We have taken so large a part in this controversy that we need hardly declare our general agreement with the policy which the present Government, and indeed the late Government also, has followed. It was, we believe, our own policy before it was that of the Government, and we can feel only satisfaction that it has prevailed not only in New Zealand, but throughout the whole colonial system.”
The Times correspondent at Wellington, in a letter of January 21, published on March 23, thus referred to Lord Granville's despatch refusing Imperial assistance: “The despatch is stigmatized freely as harsh in the extreme, ungenerous, and filled with assertions and implications showing misrepresentation or great ignorance of the antecedent history of the colony. It would, however, be impossible to recapitulate the objections to this celebrated despatch, which appears to have been commented on as severely in England as here. As the immediate
J. G. Gray, Intense irritation with the Imperial Government was the primary cause of the desire of New Zealand ministers to secure a commercial agreement with the United States. The significance of this movement is more readily appreciated if we remember that the relations between England and the United States are throughout our period unfriendly, and that on more than one occasion the two countries had been on the verge of war. Moreover, all British negotiations with foreign countries had hitherto been conducted exclusively through the Foreign Office, and independent action by colonies was a new and, to many people, a disturbing departure. When the Canadian Government had negotiated directly with France through Baron Boilleau, French Consul at Quebec, for a reciprocal trade arrangement in 1862, the British Government had remonstrated with France and the Baron was removed from Canada.Confederation of Canada, p. 352.
On May 9, 1870, Sir Relations between Britain and the United States continued to be very strained for several years. The Alabama question was not settled until 1872.
On April 30, in a letter published on July 4, The Times Wellington correspondent wrote: “In the following letter an application has been made by the Premier to the United States Government for the free admission of New Zealand wool into American markets. This letters, taken in conjunction with a remarkable expression at the Dunedin public meeting, ‘doubting if New Zealand were still a colony,’ is sufficiently indicative that the head of the Government is not unprepared to accept the position of alienation from the Empire which, according to Mr. Fox's views, expressed in his memorandum on Lord Granville's despatch, is a necessary corollary to Lord Granville's theories as to Imperial responsibility.”
Fox, in his letter to Henry Driver, U.S. Consular agent at Dunedin, dated March 19, 1870, said: “As the first steamer which is to place in regular monthly communication New Zealand with the United States is to start on its voyage a few days hence, perhaps you will be good enough to communicate to your Government the high appreciation by the Government of New Zealand of this close intercourse with the great and powerful country of which you are the representative, and of their earnest desire for its continuance. The Government believe that the colonists of New Zealand welcome in this line not only a means of mail communication with Great Britain, but the commencement of what they hope will prove friendly relations, and, to both sides, profitable commercial connection with the people of the United States. The Government will be glad to learn that, under the circumstances, your Government will in future be willing to allow the Government of this country to communicate with them direct in matters affecting the relations between the two countries.
“It has for some time been the intention of this Government, in concert with the Governments of some of the neighbouring colonies, to represent to your Government their earnest desire that a market should be opened in the United States to the wool which is one of the largest articles of production of the Australasian colonies. There are circumstances which, it is felt, should render the subject one which our Government may entertain irrespectively of the question whether or not it is deemed that immediate pecuniary profit will arise from it. The colonies are peopled by a race speaking the same language and acknowledging many of the same traditions and associations which belong to the people of the United States. For a long time to come the colonies will manufacture to a very limited extent even for home use. They will use a great many of the manufactures and products of the United States, but it is not probable they will be able to supply manufactures in exchange. They cannot therefore prejudice, but must benefit, the manufacturers of the United States. The wool the colonists are able to send will assist those manufacturers, and the wool ships will return laden with the wares and products of your country.… It may be argued that the wool might even now be sent direct, but a moment's consideration will show that, while there is a heavy duty on it, wool sent to America has not the opportunity of finding a world-wide market, which otherwise it would find if not burdened with charges of that kind, and if it were as available for sale for the use of other countries as it is in the market of Great Britain.”
The Foreign Office, since July under the control of Lord Granville, who was succeeded at the Colonial Office by Lord Kimberley, referred, in a letter to the Colonial Office of August 3, to the correspondence between the New Zealand Premier and the United States Consul-General at Dunedin. The Foreign Office pointed out “the inconvenience of departing from the rule that Colonial matters should be negotiated with foreign powers by the Home Government, except when the latter consent that the Colony should undertake negotiations on subjects of purely local interest.” “If, however, Lord Kimberley is of opinion that the present is an exceptional case arising out of the feeling of discontent in New Zealand, which, it is hoped,
In a leading article on April 19, 1870, The Times referred to the Wellington correspondent's statement that H.M.S. Virago had sailed from Wellington Harbour with the last detachment of the 18th regiment. This news, “which would have fallen like a thunderbolt six months ago,” was, said The Times, “the actual consummation of that terrible policy which was to be the destruction of the colony and the ruin of the British Empire.”
A debate took place in the House of Commons on April 26, 1870, on a motion by Robert Torrens that a Select Committee should be set up “to inquire into the political relations and modes of official intercommunication between the self-governing colonies and this country and to report whether any or what modifications are desirable, with a view to the maintenance for common nationality, amended by cordial good understanding.” See After a meeting of New Zealand colonists in London at the Palace Hotel, Westminster, had decided to call a conference of representatives of the self-governing colonies.Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. vi, part II, pp. 216–17,The Times on April 27 said of the debate: “Men spoke as if it were incumbent on them to occupy a certain number of minutes in the utterance of articulate words, without any obligation to connect sound with meaning. The existence of discontent is not unimportant, even when those who are discontented do not quite know what they desire, and we should be heartily glad if the self-constituted mouth-pieces of Colonial feeling would endeavour to know their own minds. Ever since the publication of the circular,
Referring again to the debate, The Times on April 28 said: “Lord Granville is not the author of any new-fangled revolutionary conception of the relations that subsist at present, or ought by degrees to be established, between the Mother Country and the Colonies; he has done no more than to follow up the principles that have been laid down and practically affirmed by his predecessors. Sir Charles Adderley bore emphatic testimony to this fact in the acute argument with which he opposed Mr. Torrens' vague and illusory proposition, and he did an eminent service by so clearly divesting the question of all party colour and by showing that the experience of all responsible advisers of the Crown in matters of Colonial
Adderley, in a letter published in The Times, wrote: “I see that men are still harping on the old argument that we are
R. Torrens, in a reply to this letter, stated that the colonists did not ask the mother-country to bear the expenses of their defence, but only that the single regiment should be left in the colony at the expense of the colonists. “Can Sir C.Adderley assist Her Majesty's present advisers by producing any reasonable plea upon which to justify the present policy in affording to Canada, while not under any serious pressure or difficulty, that military aid and financial guarantee which they deny to New Zealand under the pressure of a life or death necessity?”
The Melbourne correspondent of The Times in a letter of March 28 written after a visit to Auckland and published on May 17, 1870, found a “strange indifference” where he had been led to expect to see all the symptoms of a dangerous crisis. He expressed the view that the withdrawal of the troops would expedite the return of peace. On the same day The Times said: “The proposal that Parliament shall guarantee a New Zealand loan of a million sterling is not one that can be received with unmixed satisfaction.… The Government has undertaken to recommend a guarantee of a required amount not… for purposes of war, but, on the contrary, for the construction of roads and other public works by friendly natives, as well as for the promotion of immigration. It is not to be disguised that, even thus limited, the sacrifice of principle is considerable.… Whatever irritation may have been felt in
On May 20 Lord Granville informed Sir
Acknowledging Lord Granville's notification in a letter dated May 19, the Commissioners wrote from their head-quarters, the Charing Cross Hotel: “A long series of discussions arising out of a war in which the Imperial and Colonial Governments had been jointly concerned for ten years had unhappily caused misunderstanding between them, and much bitterness of feeling among the settlers. The General Assembly believed this would be set right by personal communication in a kindly and conciliatory spirit; and they desired nothing so much as that all grounds of complaint on both sides should be forgotten, and the relations between the two Governments secured on the footing of the most hearty friendship and co-operation. If we have not been able to induce your lordship to regard in the same light as the Assembly did the question of military assistance, still the chief object of our mission has been gained. It is not a mere matter of money that has been arranged. A lasting tie has been made between the two Governments, by
W. Dealtry wrote: “This letter should be inserted in the Parliamentary papers in New Zealand now in Mr. Joseph's hands. It will make a very good finish.”
Bowen, in a despatch of August 1, 1870, reported that the news of the concession respecting the Imperial guarantee of a loan had had a conciliatory effect and that the House of Representatives had refused even to receive a petition praying that steps might be taken to withhold payment of the Governor's salary. “This looks like the end of the misunderstandings,” was Dealtry's comment. In his despatch in reply, dated October 24, Lord Kimberley wrote: “I have much pleasure in anticipating from these communications that nothing will occur to disturb the good understanding between the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and that the connection between New Zealand and the United Kingdom will be maintained and strengthened to the mutual advantage of both countries.”
A ministerial memorandum of August 1, forwarded by Bowen, set out: “So much has been said lately about New Zealand separating from the Empire that Ministers deem it to be their duty to ask His Excellency to convey to the Secretary for the Colonies their views on the subject. In their instructions to the Commissioners and the various memoranda which have been published Ministers have not disguised their impression that the Imperial Government adopted a line of action which was tantamount to inviting the Colony to withdraw from the Empire. It matters not what reasons may have dictated a change,
C.O. 209, 217.
In his financial statement of June 28, 1870,
“Although objecting to a Customs Union we highly value reciprocal arrangements between the colonies. The Colonies should have the power to make such reciprocal arrangements for the interchange of Colonial produce and manufactures as is desirable. So strongly are we impressed with this conviction, and so much do we feel the injustice of the Australian colonies being placed at a disadvantage as compared with the British-American colonies that we intend to submit to you a proposal which will, to all intents and purposes, give us the power, without waiting for the tardy assistance of the Imperial Government. Although we cannot legally impose differential duties, there is nothing to prevent our voting money, by way of bonus, to importers of particular produce or manufactures; and the bonus may amount to a part or the whole of the duty. We propose to take power to enter into agreements with the neighbouring colonies to pay sums, in the shape of bonus, on the importation of certain goods. We mean still to urge the
Vogel stated that the Government had entered into direct correspondence with the United States Government on the question of relaxing the restrictions upon the admission of colonial wools. “We want to raise,” he went on, “a certain amount of revenue, and it is highly expedient that the revenue should be derived in the manner best calculated to stimulate local production. If imports must be taxed, let those escape lightly which cannot be produced here, and let those which need not be imported but which wealthy persons choose to consume, be made to yield a revenue…. We shall be told that these proposals will entail a tremendous burden. Granted—but they will give to posterity enormous means out of which to meet it. Every member has constituents whom he represents; and he will be justified in assuring them that the measures we propose will benefit every person in the community, from the highest to the lowest, from the richest to the poorest. They will lead the colony to prosperity, and enable it to do justice to its splendid resources.”
Colonial Office minute: “The evasion of the rule against differential duties … is one which I suppose the Imperial Government cannot contend against.” Sir
Sir C.O. 209, 217. For discussion of the demand of the Australian Colonies and New Zealand for power to impose differential duties—ultimately granted in 1873—see Knaplund, Gladstone and Imperial Policy, pp. 103–21. For a contemporary discussion, see J. G. Gray, Confederation of Canada (1872), pp. 331–60.
Vogel withdrew his Bill to provide for differential duties, but he was not convinced by the arguments against them and returned later to the charge.
In a letter of August 4, published on September 29, the Wellington correspondent of The Times wrote: “I am at a loss to convey any adequate idea of the marvellous change which has come over the spirit of the deliberations in the Assembly during the present session of the Colonial Parliament. It is, moreover, a change which is the clear reflex of public feeling throughout the colony, and which I can only compare to the sudden waking from a hideous nightmare to full consciousness of power, security, companionship and light. For the last ten years the colony has been spell-bound by the too-substantial phantom of Maori war, with its attendant horrors. Now the spell is broken, and, reassured by the bright dawn of peace, it rises to the hopeful anticipations of a day of earnest endeavour and great accomplishment. The appeal made by the present ministry to renew the great work of colonization has been everywhere responded to. The scheme proposed by the Colonial Treasurer has been made the subject of the fullest possible discussion in every corner of both islands during the past month. Hardly a hamlet but has held its public meeting to consider the subject, and the verdict has been almost universal in its favour.… The general tone of the debate on the financial proposals was marked rather by an excess of caution than that recklessness which too often prevails in dealing with large sums of borrowed money.
“Next to the budget the conduct of the Imperial Government towards the colony has occupied the time of the Assembly.
- 1. In the opinion of this Council, the best interests of New Zealand will be consulted by remaining an integral part of the British Empire.
- 2. That there are not sufficient grounds for believing that the people of England desire the disintegration of the empire.
- 3. That this Council regrets the course adopted by the Home Government towards the colony; but, as the causes of the dispute have been satisfactorily discussed by the Colonial Government, and as an indication of a desire to preserve a friendly feeling towards the colony has been made by the Home Government, it is undesirable to make any further reference to past misunderstandings.
“The Parliament and the country both feel the difficulty of their position. They do not wish to re-open a useless and acrimonious discussion; they are quite satisfied that the sympathies of the people of England are with New Zealand; they are not sorry, as events have turned out, that the Imperial regiment has been removed, in spite of their earnest entreaties that it should be allowed to remain; they have no wish to assert their right to protection, except in cases of extreme danger; and they have no desire to sever their connection with the Empire; and, last, but certainly not least, they are much too busily engaged in the work of reconstruction to devote much time to raking up the ashes of the past. But though the debates have been practically without result, it cannot be said that the colony at all acquiesces in the action of the Imperial Government.”
Commenting on October 4, 1870, on the resolutions passed in the Upper House, The Timessaid: “So entirely do we approve the last Resolution that we shall adopt it ourselves, and say nothing of ‘past misunderstandings’ except this—that the expression conveys the exact truth of the whole case. It was in a misunderstanding that the whole unpleasantness arose,
The peaceful atmosphere attained at long last was disturbed by the Franco-Prussian War, which caused considerable alarm in New Zealand. A ministerial memorandum of September 19, 1870, set out: “Ministers would be glad if Her Majesty's Government would send out 10,000 stand of medium and short Snider rifles with a corresponding supply of ammunition. The Colonial Government would be prepared to abide by the decision of the Home Government in respect of the cost, if payment should be required.… Ministers would also respectfully beg your Excellency to obtain from Her Majesty's Government explicit information as to what protection will be afforded to the Colony in case of Great Britain becoming involved in war with any power capable of attacking the colony; and also to what extent the colony would be expected to co-operate.”
Sir C.O. 209, 217.
On a despatch of Bowen, dated September 25, enclosing a memorandum of ministers requesting that at least two vessels of war might be stationed in New Zealand waters, Sir C.O. 209, 217.
On December 2, 1870, The Times said: “It is really quite refreshing in these times of alarm and trouble to turn to a subject of unqualified and even marvellous pleasantness. The New Zealand question, but a few months ago so full of embarrassments, is no longer any ‘question’ at all.… We need only say this, that affairs are looking well enough now, and that the Imperial policy, though it might have been open to misinterpretation, could not have been ill-conceived. Our proceedings have left the New Zealanders perfectly satisfied with themselves, and we trust that a brief interval of experience and reflection will make them equally satisfied with us. The best garrison we can send them is a garrison of permanent settlers; the best aid we can give them against the natives is assistance in the work which will turn prowling savages into industrious subjects. These will be engagements of mutual advantage and will serve effectually to link the Old Country and its Colony together.”
The New Zealand ministers, in a memorandum of December 30, discussed the colony's position in the event of Great Britain being involved in war: “The Imperial Government have adopted and acted on the policy of repudiating all concern in civil war in the colony, and have removed from it the military force which not only served as a moral support to Her Majesty's loyal subjects of both races, but which also constituted a material protection in the case of foreign war. Meanwhile the action of the Imperial Government—action in which the Colony has no share, and over which it can exercise no control—may suddenly plunge the Colony into foreign hostility, expose to serious damage its ports and its trade, and stimulate internal native rebellion into renewed activity. Under these circumstances, the Colony has irresistible right to claim that the Imperial Government should take such steps as will secure it against
“There appear to be two courses open—either that the Imperial Government should supply adequate defence, which does not now exist, or sanction an arrangement with foreign powers that in the event of war the colony would be treated as neutral. In making this representation, Ministers desire to reiterate the expression of the loyalty of the Colony to the Crown and of their anxiety that it should always be preserved as an integral portion of the Empire.”
Lord Kimberley wrote in reply: “If a British colony is to remain neutral when England is belligerent, the following among other questions would require to be considered: Could the other belligerent be expected to recognize that neutrality? Could the people of England be content to remain under the obligation of resenting injuries offered to that colony in time of peace? In what manner and in what terms is it proposed upon this hypothesis to define the connection between the home country and the colony, to which I am glad to notice that your Ministers reiterate their attachment?” C.O. 209, 221. See Cambridge History of the Empire, vol. vii, part II, chapter x (by the present writer).
This and other related topics were to be discussed over a long period, but the main question whether New Zealand should remain a part of the Empire had been settled.
On March 18, 1872, Bowen reported that
W. Dealtry made this comment: “This is the most important news we have received from the colony for some time, and may be said to put at rest any further question of a serious outbreak in New Zealand…. If I recollect right, the War of 1860 began by C.O. 209, 226.
On April 9 Bowen wrote from the “Lake of Taupo, the centre of the North Island and the heart of the native districts.” “Until the last few months,” he said, “the chiefs and clans of these central districts (with the single exception of the loyal chief, Poihipi Tukairangi and his followers) were devoted to the so-called Maori King, and were bitterly hostile to the sovereignty of the Queen and to the Colonial Government.
R. G. W. Herbert's minute was: “This is certainly a most satisfactory account of the Maori chiefs. Sir
In a further despatch of May 15, 1872, Bowen announced that the expedition through the centre of the island had been entirely successful and that he had reached Auckland on April 24 after what had been called “an important and memorable journey.” Dealtry's comment was: “Sir
On May 16 Bowen reported the completion of telegraphic
On June 8 C.O. 209, 226.
On September 7, 1872, Bowen stated that at a large meeting at Mataahu, near East Cape, a flagstaff had been erected and the Queen's Flag (the Union Jack) hoisted “in token of the permanent establishment of peace, and of the return of the entire population of the East Coast from rebellion to their allegiance to the Crown, and from the Hauhau fanaticism to Christianity.” On September 9 Bowen reported the carrying-out of the intention of the Maoris to remove into the consecrated burial ground of a new church they had built at the See pa of Ohaewai the bodies of British soldiers who fell in the unsuccessful attack on the pa in Heke's War of 1845England and New Zealand, pp. 182–91.
Minutes on the despatch were:
Mr. Herbert: “This is one of the most remarkable instances which have yet been mentioned of the good feeling of the natives.”
Mr. Holland: “Would it not be desirable to send the Queen a copy of the despatch and enclosure?”
Mr. Hugesson: “I think so. Very interesting and touching.”
Lord Kimberley: “Yes.”
On this note we may perhaps leave the tangled story of the Maori Wars, in the hope that what has been selected from the vast mass of documentary material will help towards a better understanding of the most critical decade in the colony's history—a decade which must also rank as of vital importance in the history of the Empire.
The New Zealand colonists, dispersed over a large territory and menaced by a brave and warlike race, complained of lack of sympathy and blamed the permanent officials of the Colonial Office for the treatment meted out to them. But we have seen that the successive Secretaries of State were at considerable pains to master all the details of the correspondence and outline the nature of the replies to be sent. Though Sir Memoir of George Higinbotham, p. 183.
The successive Secretaries of State who played their parts in the drama of the relations of England with the Maori race and the colonists of New Zealand were Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, the Duke of Newcastle, Edward (later Viscount) Cardwell, Lord Carnarvon, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord Granville, and Lord Kimberley. Lytton and Carnarvon displayed considerable sympathy with the views of the colonists. Newcastle showed political wisdom in deprecating confiscation in 1860, and he was, if anything, too much inclined to trust the man on
Bowen, Thirty Years of Colonial Government.
Of the Governors in this period of frequent crises, Gore Browne was handicapped by “insufficient funds, circumscribed powers, inadequate assistance.” He made errors of judgment, notably in removing restrictions on the sale of ammunition and in not keeping a closer control over the actions of the military authorities during the Waitara negotiations, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that more than human genius would have been required to avert an attempt by part at least of the Maori race to set limits to the rising tide of colonization. On Sir mana had been great when he was Governor with absolute power, but it was sadly dimmed when Parliament began to encroach more and more upon that power. Bowen, who succeeded him, had his own minor brushes with the Colonial Office, but his term as Governor saw the policy of the British Government vindicated in its own eyes by the withdrawal of the last regiment and the virtual end of the wars.
Of the relative merits of the troops engaged in the Maori Wars it is possible to speak with some confidence after reading the various accounts—official and unofficial—of the different engagements. When the wars began, the Maoris, as Captain Pasley, R.E., records in his Sketch of the War in New Zealand (1862), “made no secret of their own conviction that one Maori was equal to three soldiers in the fern and nine in the bush.” Though this flattering notion had been “rudely dispelled,” Pasley makes it clear that in their struggle with the settlers the Maoris had some distinct advantages. They had never lost the knowledge of the art of war which had been engrained in their race for centuries. The settlers, however, had never learned it. “They were very like people of their class in England, excellent material for soldiers, fine ‘food for powder,’ but altogether destitute, generally speaking, of the special qualifications for guerilla warfare which they were commonly supposed to possess.”
John Featon, in The Waikato War, gives a vivid picture of the first days on active service of the Auckland militia in 1863: “Not accustomed to anything approaching strict discipline, and used to the great freedom and independence of colonial life, it was some time before the militia and volunteers could be made to understand their true position, which event only took place when many of them got into serious trouble for disobedience of orders, and found themselves in the military cells
We have seen that there were some failures on the part of the colonial troops, but as the campaigns developed and attractive offers of land grants were made to those who served, the standard of the local forces improved greatly. It was from the militia that the Forest Rangers who served with great distinction under Jackson and von Tempsky were recruited, and they proved equal to the task of meeting the Maori at his own game of swift and silent approach through the bush.
The Imperial troops were superior to the local forces in discipline and equal to them in valour, but it was only when formal methods of warfare were forsaken and a plan suitable to the country adopted that their superiority in equipment and numbers began to tell. At first General Pratt found himself “fighting a will o' the wisp” with munitions dating back to 1805 and with information both “exaggerated and contradictory.” When General Cameron came on the scene, full of plans for a quick conquest of an ill-equipped foe, he received some unpleasant surprises. The Maoris proved themselves in some ways the equal of the invading troops and their skill in engineering was a constant subject of comment by the British officers. For a description of Maori fortification by a Royal Engineer, see Pasley, op. cit., pp. 28–30.
The support of the Maoris who remained friendly to the British during the struggle was of considerable material value. The motives of the support varied considerably and its extent fluctuated greatly. Although the friendly Maoris sometimes disappointed expectations, they played, under leaders like Te Kepa and Ropata, a notable part in the concluding stages of the wars. They had obvious advantages in knowledge of the country and the tactics likely to be adopted by their opponents. Almost as important as the active support of friendly tribes in the war areas was the abstention from the struggle of the tribes inhabiting the country north of Auckland. Had they joined the hostile Maoris the position of the town would have been precarious indeed. Age-old hatreds existing among the Maoris precluded unity of action, and even the fiery cross of Hauhauism failed to destroy the barriers between tribes taught for generations to regard fighting each other as a sacred duty. Another factor in keeping some tribes friendly was the policy of providing pensions and perquisites for chiefs with considerable influence. Sir
With Imperial troops, colonial militia, and friendly Maoris arrayed against them, the hostile Maoris maintained their struggle longer than could reasonably have been expected. Much has been made of their inferior equipment, but New Zealand and the War (1863), recorded that pa by artillery fire, even at short range; and any attempt to climb over or cut them down must be made at a distance of only a few feet from the muzzles of the guns of the defenders, who, being themselves well under cover, are able to overwhelm the storming party by a close and destructive fire.” We have seen in the narrative how lead was smuggled to the hostile Maoris from Auckland, and there is no doubt that trading with the enemy helped to prolong the contest.
How far did the profits from this illicit trade and from the more legal channels of army contracting influence the colonial attitude towards the war? Critics of the colonists attached great importance to these profits as a motive for an aggressive policy, but it is difficult to imagine that the settlers as a whole could reap, or even think they could reap, a balance of profit from the presence of troops, when that presence implied a state of war throughout the North Island. The Waikato War, shows how the calling out of the militia dislocated trade in Auckland and caused great losses. Individuals benefited from army contracts, but the community suffered severely from the cessation of immigration and from the rigours of military service undertaken without sufficient training or proper commissariat arrangements.
A more difficult charge to answer is the allegation that the colonists fostered war as a means of getting possession of Maori lands. Governor Gore Browne himself preferred this charge against a section of the colonists in words which lost little of their sting from being in Latin, See p. 64.
There can be little doubt that land was the root cause of the New Zealand wars.
If their ancestral lands were dearer to the Maoris than their life blood, possession of large areas of fertile land was necessary for the colonists. They were willing to pay a reasonable price, but, as the Land League increased in influence, it became almost impossible to acquire land by peaceful means. Though the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed to the Maoris the undisturbed possession of their lands “so long as it is their wish and desire to retain” them, their unwillingness to alienate the land which remained to them was regarded by a section of the colonists as an offence. Pressure of the Taranaki settlers on the Government, exercised through the Native Minister,
In the later wars of the decade European sympathy had considerable influence, notably in converting General Cameron from aggressive to Fabian tactics. The rise of fanaticism, the cannibalism of
The principal New Zealand ministers of the period were Stafford, Fox, Whitaker, and Weld. Stafford was in power from 1856 to 1861 and again from 1865 to 1869, so that he must be held responsible for much of the policy of the local Government. The wars began in his first period of office and the
Division of authority and false economy were perhaps the most prominent aspects of New Zealand history during our period. When the Imperial Government finally insisted on the transfer of native affairs to local control, so that the policy of withdrawal of troops could be enforced, there was no longer division of authority in native affairs. The Native Department was under normal ministerial control, and public opinion in Britain and New Zealand was the only check on native policy—apart from that more directly exercised by the hostile Maori tribes. Confiscation of land on a wholesale scale was the chief method adopted to discourage Maori aggression, and it cannot be said that it proved strikingly successful. As time went on more moderate counsels prevailed. Limits were set to confiscation and conciliatory measures, such as the provision for Maori Members of Parliament, were adopted. When the colony had to face the consequence of its own blunders, more care was naturally taken than when Imperial troops were available. Blunders still occurred, but they were due to unpreparedness and reluctance to incur expenditure rather than to undue pressure on the Maori race. The Maori Wars are sometimes quoted as examples of British “Imperial-
Dr. de Kiewiet, in his latest book, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, states that Britain neither wished nor intended to spend vast sums in South Africa: “The British Government made it almost a rule of conduct to pay only for disasters.”
Of the Maori leaders Pakeha outnumbers us in men. But we are not conquered or rubbed out, and not one of these Pakeha can name the day we … sued for peace. The most that can be said is that on such and such a date we left off fighting.’”The Changing Maori, p. 49.
A period of depression and despair about the future has been succeeded in the Maori mind by one of greater hopefulness of outlook. The events with which we have been dealing shaped and are still shaping the destiny of a whole race. “The King movement persisted and still persists,” writes Dr. The Maori Situation (published in 1935). He emphasizes the effect on the life and mind of the Maori people of their ten years' struggle with the white man. Though we have been primarily concerned about the policy of the British authorities in New Zealand affairs, we have seen enough of local events to realize that the Maoris had much justification for those fears which led to the Land League and the King movement. The Treaty of Waitangi did not settle the relations of white man and Maori. The shadow which the Maoris then thought they were conceding proved all too substantial. But there is very little in the policy pursued by the Colonial Office which can be construed as anti-Maori. On the Governors and local Government must rest the main responsibility for default in the first duty of a government—to provide appropriate administrative machinery. “The only wrongs you redressed were those against yourselves,” said
New Zealand had been, during this eventful decade, a testing ground for British policy. As wars and rumours of wars succeeded each other on the Continent and relations with the
Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. viii, p. 421.
Dr. de Kiewiet has attributed to the experience of Sir British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, p. 266.Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. viii, p. 441. The quoted references are to a minute by Kimberley on a despatch of Barkly to Kimberley, May 31, 1871.
In these pages we have seen the struggle of a race for survival. The bravery and resourcefulness of the Maoris in battle command admiration. Even the excesses and atrocities of the small minority of fanatics who led the Hauhau movement had some excuse in the belief that a desperate situation could be relieved only by desperate measures. The cruelty of
The main purpose of this volume being to examine British policy towards New Zealand in the light of the original documents, the chief source to be mentioned is naturally the Original Correspondence of the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, 1854–72, in the Public Record Office, London. This has the series number C.O. 209, and reference to the different volumes is given in the text. The Journals of the Deputy Quartermaster-General, Lt.-Col.
The next most important source, for information about public opinion in England and (through correspondents) New Zealand, is The Times newspaper for the period, 1854–72. The files and index in the British Museum Newspaper Repository at Colindale London, N.W., are very conveniently arranged. The dates of all quotations made are included in the text to avoid adding to the number of footnotes.
For direct evidence of local feeling the writer inspected the file of the Taranaki Herald in the Public Library, New Plymouth, during a visit to New Zealand in 1934. Another source used on the same occasion, thanks to the courtesy of Dr. Hight, was the manuscript journal of The Life and Times of Wiremu Kingi, and by Marion Graham on
The Report of the Royal Commission on “Confiscated Native Lands and Other Grievances” is printed in New Zealand Parliamentary Papers, 1928, G—7.
Hocken's Bibliography of New Zealand Literature (1909), with the supplement by
The bibliography of the New Zealand volume of the Cambridge History of the British Empire (1933), largely prepared by Dr. F. G. Spurdle, is the best recent bibliography of historical works, and it has been used by the writer of this volume for guidance both in reading the printed works on the subject and in the preparation of this list of works relevant to the study of the Maori Wars.
New Zealand: A Short History. 1936.
Benians, E. A., and
New Zealand in the Making. 1930.
Condliffe, J. B., and
British Colonial Policy. 1920.
Hight, J., and
The Long White Cloud. 1924.
History of New Zealand. 1883.
Saunders, A.History of New Zealand. 1896–9.
New Zealand in Evolution. 1909.
Shrimption, A. W., and
British History in the Nineteenth Century. 1922.
Blachford, Lord, Letters of. Edited by G. E. Marindin. 1896.
The Life of Henry Williams. 1874–7.
Childe-Pemberton, W. S.Life of Lord Norton (C. B. Adderley). 1909.
Collier, J.Sir George Grey. 1909.
Maori Biographies. 1901.
Creighton, L. G. A. Selwyn. 1922.
Curteis, G. H. Bishop Selwyn. 1889.
The Life and Times of Patuone. 1876.
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond.Life of Earl Granville. 1905.
New Zealand Rulers and Statesmen, 1897.
Grace, Rev. T. S.A Pioneer Missionary among the Maoris, 1850–79. Ed. S. J. Brittain. (n.d.)
Gudgeon, T. W.The Defenders of New Zealand. 1887.
Harding, A. W.Life of H. H. M. Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon. 1925.
Henderson, G. C.Sir George Grey. 1907.
Lovat, Alice, Lady.The Life of Sir Frederick Weld. 1914.
Martineau, John.Life of Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle. 1908.
Mennell, P.Dictionary of Australasian Biography, 1855–92. 1892.
Porter, Lieut.-Col.Major Ropata Waha Waha. 1897.
Purchas, H. T.The Great Bishop of New Zealand (Selwyn). 1907.
The Life and Times of Sir George Grey. 1892.
Personal Recollections of Bishop G. A. Selwyn. 1894.
Tucker, H. W.Memoir of the Life and Episcopate of George Augustus Selwyn. 1879.
Alexander, Sir J. E.Incidents of the Maori War. 1863.
Thirty Years of Colonial Government. 1888–9.
Broome, F.N. “The Crisis in New Zealand,” Macmillan's Magazine, September 1869.
Browne, E. H.The Case of the War in New Zealand. 1860.
Browne, Col. G. Hamilton.
The Maori King Movement. 1860.
Buller, J.The Maori War. 1869.
Cairnes, J. E.Colonization and Colonial Government. 1865.
Carey, G. J.Narrative of the Late War in New Zealand. 1863.
The Land Question in Taranaki. 1860.
Churchill, Lord A. S.The New Zealand Difficulty, Its Cause and Remedy. 1865.
Church Missionary Society, History of. (Eugene Stock, editor.) 1899.
Church Missionary Society.Memorial … on New Zealand Affairs. 1861. Further Remarks on New Zealand Affairs. 1861.
Chute, Major-General T.A Campaign on the West Coast of New Zealand. 1866.
Fiat Justitia. 1871.
Denison, Sir W.Varieties of Vice-regal Life. 1870.
Dilke, Sir Charles.Greater Britain. 1868.
Featon, J. (“Comus”).The Last of the Waikatos. 1873. The Waikato War, 1863–4. 1866. Revised by Gilbert Mair. 1923.
Conference with Tamati Ngapora and the King Natives. 1869.
Fitzgerald, J. E.Letters on the Present State of New Zealand Affairs. 1865. The Self-Reliant Policy in New Zealand. 1870.
Foljambe, C. G. S.Three Years on the Australian Station. 1868.
The War in New Zealand. 1860. The War in New Zealand. 1866. Revolt in New Zealand. A series of letters to his brother, the Rev. G. T. Fox. February to August 1864 (McNab Library).
Gilbert, T.New Zealand Settlers and Soldiers. 1861.
The Colony of New Zealand. 1888 and 1891.
The Maori King. 1864.
Gorton, E.Some Home Truths re the Maori War, 1863 to 1869. 1901.
A Sketch of the New Zealand War. 1899.
Grayling, W. I.The War in Taranaki during the Years 1860–1. 1862.
Gudgeon, T. W.Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand. 1879. The Defenders of New Zealand. 1887.
Hadfield, Archdeacon O.Recent Outbreak at Taranaki. 1860. One of England's Little Wars. 1860. The New Zealand War. 1861.
Hawthorne, J.A Dark Chapter from New Zealand History. 1869. (By a survivor of the Poverty Bay massacre.)
Description of the Battle of Orakau. 1888. (Interpreted by Captain Gilbert Mair.)
Hursthouse, C.F.Letters on New Zealand Subjects. 1865.
Johnstone, J. C.The Maoris and the Causes of the Present Anarchy in New Zealand. 1861.
Kerry-Nicholls, J. H.The King Country. 1884.
Martin, Sir W.The Taranaki Question. 1860. J. Busby published
Martin, Lady. Our Maoris. 1884.
McDonnell, Col. T.An Explanation of the Principal Causes which led to the Present War on the West Coast of New Zealand. 1869.
Meade, Lieut. H.A Ride through the Disturbed Districts of New Zealand. 1870.
Partridge, C.Calumny Refuted, the Colonists Vindicated. 1864.
Pasley, Captain C., R.E.Sketch of the War in New Zealand, 1860–1. 1862. Very interesting account of Maori methods of warfare.
Pratt, W. T. Colonial Experiences. By an old Colonist. 1877.
Yesterdays in Maoriland. 1930.
Richmond, Hon. J. C.Reminiscences of a Minister of Native Affairs in New Zealand. 1888.
Chronicles of the Garden of New Zealand. 1896. A history of the Taranaki War based largely on diaries.
The New Zealand Native Rebellion. 1864. The Case of New Zealand and our Colonial Policy. 1869.
The Empire. 1863.
New Zealand and its Colonization. 1859.
Wanganui, its Past, Present, and Future. 1867. The Past and Present of New Zealand. 1868.
The Story of New Zealand. 1859.
Torlesse, C.O. (“Suaviter-Fortiter”). The New Zealand War. Articles in the Lyttelton Times, 1860, by a nephew of E. G. Wakefield.
Speech on Mr. Weld's Resolutions. 1864.
What Will They Do in the General Assembly? 1863.
Ward, C.Letter to Lord Lyttelton. 1863.
Ward, R.Lectures from New Zealand. 1862. Life among the Maoris of New Zealand. 1872.
Historical Records of the Fifty-seventh or West Middlesex Regiment of Foot. 1878.
Warren, Rev. John.The Christian Mission to the Aborigines of New Zealand. 1863.
Watkin, E. W.Canada and the States. 1887.
Notes on New Zealand Affairs. 1869.
Wells, B.History of Taranki. 1878.
Whitmore, Sir G. S.The Last Maori War in New Zealand under the Self-Reliant Policy. 1902.
Williams, Right Rev. W. Christianity among the New Zealanders. 1867.
East Coast Historical Records. (n.d.)
The Maori. 1924. The Maori as He Was. 1925.
Bodelsen, C. A.Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism. 1924.
The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period. 1922–3.
De Kiewiet, C. W.British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics. 1929. The Imperial Factor in South Africa. 1937.
Egerton, H. G.Historical Geography of the British Dominions: Canada. 1908. British Colonial Policy. 1920.
Firth, R.Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori. 1929.
Folsom, A.The Royal Empire Society: Formative Years. 1933.
Fortescue, J. W.History of the British Army. Vol. XIII. 1930.
Gorst, Sir J. E.New Zealand Revisited. 1908.
Hall, H. L.Australia and England. 1934.
Hall, H. L.The Colonial Office: A History. 1937. This book covers the period 1830–1885, and is of great value for students of Imperial history.
England and New Zealand (From Tasman to the Taranaki War). 1926.
The Changing Maori. 1928.
Keith, A. B.Imperial Unity and the Dominions. 1916. Responsible Government in the Dominions. 1912.
Knaplund, Paul.Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy. 1927.
Mcdonald, R. A.Te Hekenga. 1931.
The Provincial System in New Zealand. 1932. British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell. 1930. New Zealand. 1935.
More Maoriland Adventures of J. W. Stack. 1936.
Stacey, C. P.Canada and the British Army, 1846–71. 1936.
The Maori Situation. 1935.
Wilson, J. G.Early Rangitikei. 1914.
Woon, J. G.Wanganui Old Settlers. 1902.
The Story of Gate Pa, contemporary accounts edited by W. H, Gifford, was reviewed in The New Zealand Herald, August 21 1937. A biography of